Schlüsselwörter
(Deutsch)
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Bosnia and Herzegovina; constitutional reform; constitution; elections; context
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Schlüsselwörter
(Englisch)
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Bosnia and Herzegovina; constitutional reform; constitution; elections; context
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Schlüsselwörter
(Französisch)
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Bosnia and Herzegovina; constitutional reform; constitution; elections; context
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Schlüsselwörter
(Italienisch)
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Bosnia and Herzegovina; constitutional reform; constitution; elections; context
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Deutsch)
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The context is well analysed and described in the first chapters of the Terms of references for this external review as well as in the internal reviewer’s paper (p3-5). I do not want to repeat them here. It has to be stressed however, that as a consequence of the incapacity of the BiH-authorities to implement the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Sejdic&Finci v. BiH of 22 December 2009 in a constitutional reform, the elections of the 3 October 2010 were organised in a way that did not prevent several articles of the European Convention of Human Rights to be violated(Art.14, Art.3 of Protocol 1 and Art.1 of Protocol Nr.12). This undermines the legitimacy of the political composition of the institutions which results out of this elections what might have a negative impact for the ability of these institutions to find the constitutional compromises this country so urgently needs.
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Englisch)
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The context is well analysed and described in the first chapters of the Terms of references for this external review as well as in the internal reviewer’s paper (p3-5). I do not want to repeat them here. It has to be stressed however, that as a consequence of the incapacity of the BiH-authorities to implement the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Sejdic&Finci v. BiH of 22 December 2009 in a constitutional reform, the elections of the 3 October 2010 were organised in a way that did not prevent several articles of the European Convention of Human Rights to be violated(Art.14, Art.3 of Protocol 1 and Art.1 of Protocol Nr.12). This undermines the legitimacy of the political composition of the institutions which results out of this elections what might have a negative impact for the ability of these institutions to find the constitutional compromises this country so urgently needs.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Französisch)
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The context is well analysed and described in the first chapters of the Terms of references for this external review as well as in the internal reviewer’s paper (p3-5). I do not want to repeat them here. It has to be stressed however, that as a consequence of the incapacity of the BiH-authorities to implement the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Sejdic&Finci v. BiH of 22 December 2009 in a constitutional reform, the elections of the 3 October 2010 were organised in a way that did not prevent several articles of the European Convention of Human Rights to be violated(Art.14, Art.3 of Protocol 1 and Art.1 of Protocol Nr.12). This undermines the legitimacy of the political composition of the institutions which results out of this elections what might have a negative impact for the ability of these institutions to find the constitutional compromises this country so urgently needs.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Italienisch)
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The context is well analysed and described in the first chapters of the Terms of references for this external review as well as in the internal reviewer’s paper (p3-5). I do not want to repeat them here. It has to be stressed however, that as a consequence of the incapacity of the BiH-authorities to implement the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Sejdic&Finci v. BiH of 22 December 2009 in a constitutional reform, the elections of the 3 October 2010 were organised in a way that did not prevent several articles of the European Convention of Human Rights to be violated(Art.14, Art.3 of Protocol 1 and Art.1 of Protocol Nr.12). This undermines the legitimacy of the political composition of the institutions which results out of this elections what might have a negative impact for the ability of these institutions to find the constitutional compromises this country so urgently needs.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Auftragnehmer
(Englisch)
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Andreas Gross
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Belastetes Budget
(Englisch)
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SDC
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Gesetzliche Grundlage
(Englisch)
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Art. 57 Abs. 1 RVOG Art. 57 al. 1 LOGA Art. 57 cpv. 1 LOGA
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Impressum
(Englisch)
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Copyright, Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft | Droits d'auteur: autorités de la Confédération suisse | Diritti d'autore: autorità della Confederazione Svizzera | Dretgs d'autur: autoritads da la Confederaziun svizra | Copyright, Swiss federal authorities
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Auskunft
(Englisch)
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SDC Western Balkans Division +41 (0)58 462 12 50 azo@eda.admin.ch
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