Schlüsselwörter
(Deutsch)
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Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, de-alerting, nuclear war, missile defence, Russia, United States
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Schlüsselwörter
(Englisch)
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Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, de-alerting, nuclear war, missile defence, Russia, United States
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Schlüsselwörter
(Französisch)
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Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, de-alerting, nuclear war, missile defence, Russia, United States
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Schlüsselwörter
(Italienisch)
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Nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, de-alerting, nuclear war, missile defence, Russia, United States
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Deutsch)
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Although the Cold War ended more than two decades ago, the United States and the Russian Federation continue to maintain large numbers of nuclear forces on high levels of alert, ready to launch within minutes. France and the United Kingdom also deploy nuclear forces, which can be quickly launched, though at lower levels of readiness. Combined, these four countries deploy approximately 1,940 warheads ready for use on short notice. The international community has repeatedly and overwhelmingly called upon the nuclear-weapon states to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear forces.These current alert levels—which are deeply rooted in Cold War thinking, vastly exceed current and foreseeable security needs, and undercut efforts to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons—are sustained by a circular (though flawed) logic, whereby US nuclear forces are maintained on alert because Russian nuclear forces are on alert, and vice versa forRussian forces. Put in another way, if nuclear forces were not on alert, there would be no requirement to keep nuclear forces on alert.This study finds that the nuclear weapon states have already taken considerable unilateral steps to reduce nuclear alert levels during the past two decades. These steps include de-alerting of entire weapon systems or categories, as well as partial de-alerting by reducing warhead loading on the remaining forces. Despite warnings about re-alerting races and crisis instability at the time, none of these steps have proven de-stabilizing but have significantly increased national and international security. Indeed, in many cases, these steps have been precursors for significant reductions of nuclear arsenals. There is no reason why countries with alert nuclear forces cannot continue to take unilateral steps to gradually and responsibly reduce the alert level of the remaining forces.Overall, this study finds that alert nuclear forces contradict the efforts to reduce the role — and to some extent the numbers — of nuclear weapons by locking nuclear-weapon states in unnecessarily threatening and dangerous postures that drive high requirements for nuclear weapons capability and war-fighting preparations, motivate mistrust and worst-case planning,and contradict the hopes and aspirations of the overwhelming part of the international community to end the threat of nuclear war. The nuclear arms race may be a thing of the past, but nuclear alert plays an important role in ensuring that a dynamic of nuclear competition is not.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Englisch)
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Although the Cold War ended more than two decades ago, the United States and the Russian Federation continue to maintain large numbers of nuclear forces on high levels of alert, ready to launch within minutes. France and the United Kingdom also deploy nuclear forces, which can be quickly launched, though at lower levels of readiness. Combined, these four countries deploy approximately 1,940 warheads ready for use on short notice. The international community has repeatedly and overwhelmingly called upon the nuclear-weapon states to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear forces.These current alert levels—which are deeply rooted in Cold War thinking, vastly exceed current and foreseeable security needs, and undercut efforts to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons—are sustained by a circular (though flawed) logic, whereby US nuclear forces are maintained on alert because Russian nuclear forces are on alert, and vice versa forRussian forces. Put in another way, if nuclear forces were not on alert, there would be no requirement to keep nuclear forces on alert.This study finds that the nuclear weapon states have already taken considerable unilateral steps to reduce nuclear alert levels during the past two decades. These steps include de-alerting of entire weapon systems or categories, as well as partial de-alerting by reducing warhead loading on the remaining forces. Despite warnings about re-alerting races and crisis instability at the time, none of these steps have proven de-stabilizing but have significantly increased national and international security. Indeed, in many cases, these steps have been precursors for significant reductions of nuclear arsenals. There is no reason why countries with alert nuclear forces cannot continue to take unilateral steps to gradually and responsibly reduce the alert level of the remaining forces.Overall, this study finds that alert nuclear forces contradict the efforts to reduce the role — and to some extent the numbers — of nuclear weapons by locking nuclear-weapon states in unnecessarily threatening and dangerous postures that drive high requirements for nuclear weapons capability and war-fighting preparations, motivate mistrust and worst-case planning,and contradict the hopes and aspirations of the overwhelming part of the international community to end the threat of nuclear war. The nuclear arms race may be a thing of the past, but nuclear alert plays an important role in ensuring that a dynamic of nuclear competition is not.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Französisch)
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Although the Cold War ended more than two decades ago, the United States and the Russian Federation continue to maintain large numbers of nuclear forces on high levels of alert, ready to launch within minutes. France and the United Kingdom also deploy nuclear forces, which can be quickly launched, though at lower levels of readiness. Combined, these four countries deploy approximately 1,940 warheads ready for use on short notice. The international community has repeatedly and overwhelmingly called upon the nuclear-weapon states to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear forces.These current alert levels—which are deeply rooted in Cold War thinking, vastly exceed current and foreseeable security needs, and undercut efforts to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons—are sustained by a circular (though flawed) logic, whereby US nuclear forces are maintained on alert because Russian nuclear forces are on alert, and vice versa forRussian forces. Put in another way, if nuclear forces were not on alert, there would be no requirement to keep nuclear forces on alert.This study finds that the nuclear weapon states have already taken considerable unilateral steps to reduce nuclear alert levels during the past two decades. These steps include de-alerting of entire weapon systems or categories, as well as partial de-alerting by reducing warhead loading on the remaining forces. Despite warnings about re-alerting races and crisis instability at the time, none of these steps have proven de-stabilizing but have significantly increased national and international security. Indeed, in many cases, these steps have been precursors for significant reductions of nuclear arsenals. There is no reason why countries with alert nuclear forces cannot continue to take unilateral steps to gradually and responsibly reduce the alert level of the remaining forces.Overall, this study finds that alert nuclear forces contradict the efforts to reduce the role — and to some extent the numbers — of nuclear weapons by locking nuclear-weapon states in unnecessarily threatening and dangerous postures that drive high requirements for nuclear weapons capability and war-fighting preparations, motivate mistrust and worst-case planning,and contradict the hopes and aspirations of the overwhelming part of the international community to end the threat of nuclear war. The nuclear arms race may be a thing of the past, but nuclear alert plays an important role in ensuring that a dynamic of nuclear competition is not.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Italienisch)
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Although the Cold War ended more than two decades ago, the United States and the Russian Federation continue to maintain large numbers of nuclear forces on high levels of alert, ready to launch within minutes. France and the United Kingdom also deploy nuclear forces, which can be quickly launched, though at lower levels of readiness. Combined, these four countries deploy approximately 1,940 warheads ready for use on short notice. The international community has repeatedly and overwhelmingly called upon the nuclear-weapon states to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear forces.These current alert levels—which are deeply rooted in Cold War thinking, vastly exceed current and foreseeable security needs, and undercut efforts to reduce the salience and role of nuclear weapons—are sustained by a circular (though flawed) logic, whereby US nuclear forces are maintained on alert because Russian nuclear forces are on alert, and vice versa forRussian forces. Put in another way, if nuclear forces were not on alert, there would be no requirement to keep nuclear forces on alert.This study finds that the nuclear weapon states have already taken considerable unilateral steps to reduce nuclear alert levels during the past two decades. These steps include de-alerting of entire weapon systems or categories, as well as partial de-alerting by reducing warhead loading on the remaining forces. Despite warnings about re-alerting races and crisis instability at the time, none of these steps have proven de-stabilizing but have significantly increased national and international security. Indeed, in many cases, these steps have been precursors for significant reductions of nuclear arsenals. There is no reason why countries with alert nuclear forces cannot continue to take unilateral steps to gradually and responsibly reduce the alert level of the remaining forces.Overall, this study finds that alert nuclear forces contradict the efforts to reduce the role — and to some extent the numbers — of nuclear weapons by locking nuclear-weapon states in unnecessarily threatening and dangerous postures that drive high requirements for nuclear weapons capability and war-fighting preparations, motivate mistrust and worst-case planning,and contradict the hopes and aspirations of the overwhelming part of the international community to end the threat of nuclear war. The nuclear arms race may be a thing of the past, but nuclear alert plays an important role in ensuring that a dynamic of nuclear competition is not.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Auftragnehmer
(Englisch)
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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists and Matthew McKinzie, Natural Resources Defense Council
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Belastetes Budget
(Englisch)
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Directorate of Political Affairs
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Gesetzliche Grundlage
(Englisch)
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Artikel 170 der Bundesverfassung zur WirksamkeitsüberprüfungArticle 170 de la Constitution fédérale relatif à l’évaluation de l’efficacitéArticolo 170 della Costituzione federale sulla verifica dell‘efficaciaArticle 170 of the Swiss Federal Constitution on the evaluation of effectiveness
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Impressum
(Englisch)
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Copyright, Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft | Droits d'auteur: autorités de la Confédération suisse | Diritti d'autore: autorità della Confederazione Svizzera | Dretgs d'autur: autoritads da la Confederaziun svizra | Copyright, Swiss federal authorities
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Auskunft
(Englisch)
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Division for Security Policy
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