Schlüsselwörter
(Deutsch)
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Nuclear disarmament, NPT, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, Verification,
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Schlüsselwörter
(Englisch)
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Nuclear disarmament, NPT, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, Verification,
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Schlüsselwörter
(Französisch)
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Nuclear disarmament, NPT, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, Verification,
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Schlüsselwörter
(Italienisch)
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Nuclear disarmament, NPT, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, Verification,
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Deutsch)
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The aim of this study is to examine and develop the concept of irreversibility as it relates to nuclear disarmament. While the word is becoming increasingly used in discussions over nuclear disarmament, its meaning in this particular context remains largely undefined and understudied. In particular, the kind of specific steps that would need to be taken to arrive at a level of disarmament irreversibility have not, to date, been given much consideration. This report argues that the dictionary definition of irreversibility is not well-suited to the context of nuclear disarmament and that, for the purposes of nuclear disarmament, an understanding of irreversibility more suited to the reality of possible nuclear reversal is needed. As a result, this report views irreversibility in terms of the costs and difficulty of reversal. Irreversibility thus becomes a scale—not the binary state implied by dictionary definitions of the term—with readily reversible actions at the low end and measures that are highly difficult and costly to reverse at the other.Nuclear disarmament itself is not a binary state. A country can be disarming while not being yet fully disarmed. The process to achieve the final abolition of an entire class of weaponry may still be called disarmament. But weapons can always be produced. Even a fully-disarmed state can rearm if there is the political will and the resources to do so. A state that controls the raw materials, the necessary industrial infrastructure, and technical and scientific knowledge will always be able to hedge against the loss of nuclear weapons capacity. All disarmament actions are, therefore, reversible. But some are more easily reversible than others. In nuclear disarmament, it may be rather more suitable to talk about unarmed states rather than disarmed states.This report follows the literal definition of disarmament as a state in which the process of disarming has been fully completed and no nuclear weapons remain. It focuses on locking-in an end-state of nuclear disarmament, and not on the process of getting to zero via nuclear arms reductions. The focus of this report is on the practical and technical aspects of securing that end-state—not on the wider societal, political and legal aspects of irreversible disarmament, which are the subject of a parallel study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Englisch)
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The aim of this study is to examine and develop the concept of irreversibility as it relates to nuclear disarmament. While the word is becoming increasingly used in discussions over nuclear disarmament, its meaning in this particular context remains largely undefined and understudied. In particular, the kind of specific steps that would need to be taken to arrive at a level of disarmament irreversibility have not, to date, been given much consideration. This report argues that the dictionary definition of irreversibility is not well-suited to the context of nuclear disarmament and that, for the purposes of nuclear disarmament, an understanding of irreversibility more suited to the reality of possible nuclear reversal is needed. As a result, this report views irreversibility in terms of the costs and difficulty of reversal. Irreversibility thus becomes a scale—not the binary state implied by dictionary definitions of the term—with readily reversible actions at the low end and measures that are highly difficult and costly to reverse at the other.Nuclear disarmament itself is not a binary state. A country can be disarming while not being yet fully disarmed. The process to achieve the final abolition of an entire class of weaponry may still be called disarmament. But weapons can always be produced. Even a fully-disarmed state can rearm if there is the political will and the resources to do so. A state that controls the raw materials, the necessary industrial infrastructure, and technical and scientific knowledge will always be able to hedge against the loss of nuclear weapons capacity. All disarmament actions are, therefore, reversible. But some are more easily reversible than others. In nuclear disarmament, it may be rather more suitable to talk about unarmed states rather than disarmed states.This report follows the literal definition of disarmament as a state in which the process of disarming has been fully completed and no nuclear weapons remain. It focuses on locking-in an end-state of nuclear disarmament, and not on the process of getting to zero via nuclear arms reductions. The focus of this report is on the practical and technical aspects of securing that end-state—not on the wider societal, political and legal aspects of irreversible disarmament, which are the subject of a parallel study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Französisch)
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The aim of this study is to examine and develop the concept of irreversibility as it relates to nuclear disarmament. While the word is becoming increasingly used in discussions over nuclear disarmament, its meaning in this particular context remains largely undefined and understudied. In particular, the kind of specific steps that would need to be taken to arrive at a level of disarmament irreversibility have not, to date, been given much consideration. This report argues that the dictionary definition of irreversibility is not well-suited to the context of nuclear disarmament and that, for the purposes of nuclear disarmament, an understanding of irreversibility more suited to the reality of possible nuclear reversal is needed. As a result, this report views irreversibility in terms of the costs and difficulty of reversal. Irreversibility thus becomes a scale—not the binary state implied by dictionary definitions of the term—with readily reversible actions at the low end and measures that are highly difficult and costly to reverse at the other.Nuclear disarmament itself is not a binary state. A country can be disarming while not being yet fully disarmed. The process to achieve the final abolition of an entire class of weaponry may still be called disarmament. But weapons can always be produced. Even a fully-disarmed state can rearm if there is the political will and the resources to do so. A state that controls the raw materials, the necessary industrial infrastructure, and technical and scientific knowledge will always be able to hedge against the loss of nuclear weapons capacity. All disarmament actions are, therefore, reversible. But some are more easily reversible than others. In nuclear disarmament, it may be rather more suitable to talk about unarmed states rather than disarmed states.This report follows the literal definition of disarmament as a state in which the process of disarming has been fully completed and no nuclear weapons remain. It focuses on locking-in an end-state of nuclear disarmament, and not on the process of getting to zero via nuclear arms reductions. The focus of this report is on the practical and technical aspects of securing that end-state—not on the wider societal, political and legal aspects of irreversible disarmament, which are the subject of a parallel study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Italienisch)
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The aim of this study is to examine and develop the concept of irreversibility as it relates to nuclear disarmament. While the word is becoming increasingly used in discussions over nuclear disarmament, its meaning in this particular context remains largely undefined and understudied. In particular, the kind of specific steps that would need to be taken to arrive at a level of disarmament irreversibility have not, to date, been given much consideration. This report argues that the dictionary definition of irreversibility is not well-suited to the context of nuclear disarmament and that, for the purposes of nuclear disarmament, an understanding of irreversibility more suited to the reality of possible nuclear reversal is needed. As a result, this report views irreversibility in terms of the costs and difficulty of reversal. Irreversibility thus becomes a scale—not the binary state implied by dictionary definitions of the term—with readily reversible actions at the low end and measures that are highly difficult and costly to reverse at the other.Nuclear disarmament itself is not a binary state. A country can be disarming while not being yet fully disarmed. The process to achieve the final abolition of an entire class of weaponry may still be called disarmament. But weapons can always be produced. Even a fully-disarmed state can rearm if there is the political will and the resources to do so. A state that controls the raw materials, the necessary industrial infrastructure, and technical and scientific knowledge will always be able to hedge against the loss of nuclear weapons capacity. All disarmament actions are, therefore, reversible. But some are more easily reversible than others. In nuclear disarmament, it may be rather more suitable to talk about unarmed states rather than disarmed states.This report follows the literal definition of disarmament as a state in which the process of disarming has been fully completed and no nuclear weapons remain. It focuses on locking-in an end-state of nuclear disarmament, and not on the process of getting to zero via nuclear arms reductions. The focus of this report is on the practical and technical aspects of securing that end-state—not on the wider societal, political and legal aspects of irreversible disarmament, which are the subject of a parallel study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Auftragnehmer
(Englisch)
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Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy and Andreas Persbo
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Belastetes Budget
(Englisch)
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Directorate of Political Affairs
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Gesetzliche Grundlage
(Englisch)
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Artikel 170 der Bundesverfassung zur WirksamkeitsüberprüfungArticle 170 de la Constitution fédérale relatif à l’évaluation de l’efficacitéArticolo 170 della Costituzione federale sulla verifica dell‘efficaciaArticle 170 of the Swiss Federal Constitution on the evaluation of effectiveness
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Impressum
(Englisch)
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Copyright, Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft | Droits d'auteur: autorités de la Confédération suisse | Diritti d'autore: autorità della Confederazione Svizzera | Dretgs d'autur: autoritads da la Confederaziun svizra | Copyright, Swiss federal authorities
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Auskunft
(Englisch)
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Division for Security Policy
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