Schlüsselwörter
(Deutsch)
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Nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, NPT, security,
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Schlüsselwörter
(Englisch)
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Nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, NPT, security,
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Schlüsselwörter
(Französisch)
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Nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, NPT, security,
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Schlüsselwörter
(Italienisch)
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Nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, NPT, security,
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Deutsch)
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Nonproliferation is essential. If nonproliferation fails, in the long run, nuclear war is unavoidable. However, current nonproliferation measures could unintentionally promote nuclear proliferation rather than discourage it. The current consensus is that proliferation decisions are largely based on security and much of the nonproliferation regime is designed around this assumption. The United States guarantees the security of states and the Non-proliferation Treaty itself includes security assurances and so-called “negative security assurances.” The emphasis on security is unmistakable. However, thinking about nonproliferation solely in terms of security is counterproductive. Nuclear weapons are not only extraordinarily destructive military weapons. They have also come to be, over time, icons of national power. As the dangers of the Cold War recede and as the length of time since nuclear weapons were last used lengthens, it becomes increasingly plausible for leaders and citizens alike to tell themselves that nuclear weapons will never be used. They are not, it might be argued, really weapons; their only purpose is to serve as icons of power - tokens of influence, modernity, and great power status. A nonproliferation regime that only considers the problem from a military security perspective not only fails to undermine important drivers of proliferation, it inflates values that can lead to proliferation. Although the reputation of nuclear weapons as the most important military weapons in a state’s arsenal was vivid in the early years after 1945, over time that reputation has faded. Almost seventy years of nonuse by nuclear-armed states has led to growing doubts about the military value of nuclear weapons. However, their continued salience in international relations could lead some to believe that their real importance is not as actual weapons but as political symbols.Nonproliferation is difficult. The nonproliferation regime is “chronically troubled, beset by crisesand setbacks and possible defections, amidst fears for its future and doubts about its adequacy.” By conceiving of the problem as only a security one, and focusing on security assurances, the architects of the nonproliferation regime have made nonproliferationmore difficult. The world is a diverse place, and nonproliferation policies that acknowledge the multiplicity of possible motives for acquiring nuclear weapons are bound to be more effective. The measures of the current nonproliferation regime misses one of the key motivations for building nuclear weapons. As a result, restorative action must be taken to deflate the valueof nuclear weapons as icons of national power. One of the most powerful motives for nuclear weapons proliferation today goes almost entirely unaddressed. In fact, many of the security measures intended to reinforce the nonproliferation regime may actually undermine it. Urgent action is required.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Kurzbeschreibung
(Englisch)
|
Nonproliferation is essential. If nonproliferation fails, in the long run, nuclear war is unavoidable. However, current nonproliferation measures could unintentionally promote nuclear proliferation rather than discourage it. The current consensus is that proliferation decisions are largely based on security and much of the nonproliferation regime is designed around this assumption. The United States guarantees the security of states and the Non-proliferation Treaty itself includes security assurances and so-called “negative security assurances.” The emphasis on security is unmistakable. However, thinking about nonproliferation solely in terms of security is counterproductive. Nuclear weapons are not only extraordinarily destructive military weapons. They have also come to be, over time, icons of national power. As the dangers of the Cold War recede and as the length of time since nuclear weapons were last used lengthens, it becomes increasingly plausible for leaders and citizens alike to tell themselves that nuclear weapons will never be used. They are not, it might be argued, really weapons; their only purpose is to serve as icons of power - tokens of influence, modernity, and great power status. A nonproliferation regime that only considers the problem from a military security perspective not only fails to undermine important drivers of proliferation, it inflates values that can lead to proliferation. Although the reputation of nuclear weapons as the most important military weapons in a state’s arsenal was vivid in the early years after 1945, over time that reputation has faded. Almost seventy years of nonuse by nuclear-armed states has led to growing doubts about the military value of nuclear weapons. However, their continued salience in international relations could lead some to believe that their real importance is not as actual weapons but as political symbols.Nonproliferation is difficult. The nonproliferation regime is “chronically troubled, beset by crisesand setbacks and possible defections, amidst fears for its future and doubts about its adequacy.” By conceiving of the problem as only a security one, and focusing on security assurances, the architects of the nonproliferation regime have made nonproliferationmore difficult. The world is a diverse place, and nonproliferation policies that acknowledge the multiplicity of possible motives for acquiring nuclear weapons are bound to be more effective. The measures of the current nonproliferation regime misses one of the key motivations for building nuclear weapons. As a result, restorative action must be taken to deflate the valueof nuclear weapons as icons of national power. One of the most powerful motives for nuclear weapons proliferation today goes almost entirely unaddressed. In fact, many of the security measures intended to reinforce the nonproliferation regime may actually undermine it. Urgent action is required.
Zugehörige Dokumente
|
Kurzbeschreibung
(Französisch)
|
Nonproliferation is essential. If nonproliferation fails, in the long run, nuclear war is unavoidable. However, current nonproliferation measures could unintentionally promote nuclear proliferation rather than discourage it. The current consensus is that proliferation decisions are largely based on security and much of the nonproliferation regime is designed around this assumption. The United States guarantees the security of states and the Non-proliferation Treaty itself includes security assurances and so-called “negative security assurances.” The emphasis on security is unmistakable. However, thinking about nonproliferation solely in terms of security is counterproductive. Nuclear weapons are not only extraordinarily destructive military weapons. They have also come to be, over time, icons of national power. As the dangers of the Cold War recede and as the length of time since nuclear weapons were last used lengthens, it becomes increasingly plausible for leaders and citizens alike to tell themselves that nuclear weapons will never be used. They are not, it might be argued, really weapons; their only purpose is to serve as icons of power - tokens of influence, modernity, and great power status. A nonproliferation regime that only considers the problem from a military security perspective not only fails to undermine important drivers of proliferation, it inflates values that can lead to proliferation. Although the reputation of nuclear weapons as the most important military weapons in a state’s arsenal was vivid in the early years after 1945, over time that reputation has faded. Almost seventy years of nonuse by nuclear-armed states has led to growing doubts about the military value of nuclear weapons. However, their continued salience in international relations could lead some to believe that their real importance is not as actual weapons but as political symbols.Nonproliferation is difficult. The nonproliferation regime is “chronically troubled, beset by crisesand setbacks and possible defections, amidst fears for its future and doubts about its adequacy.” By conceiving of the problem as only a security one, and focusing on security assurances, the architects of the nonproliferation regime have made nonproliferationmore difficult. The world is a diverse place, and nonproliferation policies that acknowledge the multiplicity of possible motives for acquiring nuclear weapons are bound to be more effective. The measures of the current nonproliferation regime misses one of the key motivations for building nuclear weapons. As a result, restorative action must be taken to deflate the valueof nuclear weapons as icons of national power. One of the most powerful motives for nuclear weapons proliferation today goes almost entirely unaddressed. In fact, many of the security measures intended to reinforce the nonproliferation regime may actually undermine it. Urgent action is required.
Zugehörige Dokumente
|
Kurzbeschreibung
(Italienisch)
|
Nonproliferation is essential. If nonproliferation fails, in the long run, nuclear war is unavoidable. However, current nonproliferation measures could unintentionally promote nuclear proliferation rather than discourage it. The current consensus is that proliferation decisions are largely based on security and much of the nonproliferation regime is designed around this assumption. The United States guarantees the security of states and the Non-proliferation Treaty itself includes security assurances and so-called “negative security assurances.” The emphasis on security is unmistakable. However, thinking about nonproliferation solely in terms of security is counterproductive. Nuclear weapons are not only extraordinarily destructive military weapons. They have also come to be, over time, icons of national power. As the dangers of the Cold War recede and as the length of time since nuclear weapons were last used lengthens, it becomes increasingly plausible for leaders and citizens alike to tell themselves that nuclear weapons will never be used. They are not, it might be argued, really weapons; their only purpose is to serve as icons of power - tokens of influence, modernity, and great power status. A nonproliferation regime that only considers the problem from a military security perspective not only fails to undermine important drivers of proliferation, it inflates values that can lead to proliferation. Although the reputation of nuclear weapons as the most important military weapons in a state’s arsenal was vivid in the early years after 1945, over time that reputation has faded. Almost seventy years of nonuse by nuclear-armed states has led to growing doubts about the military value of nuclear weapons. However, their continued salience in international relations could lead some to believe that their real importance is not as actual weapons but as political symbols.Nonproliferation is difficult. The nonproliferation regime is “chronically troubled, beset by crisesand setbacks and possible defections, amidst fears for its future and doubts about its adequacy.” By conceiving of the problem as only a security one, and focusing on security assurances, the architects of the nonproliferation regime have made nonproliferationmore difficult. The world is a diverse place, and nonproliferation policies that acknowledge the multiplicity of possible motives for acquiring nuclear weapons are bound to be more effective. The measures of the current nonproliferation regime misses one of the key motivations for building nuclear weapons. As a result, restorative action must be taken to deflate the valueof nuclear weapons as icons of national power. One of the most powerful motives for nuclear weapons proliferation today goes almost entirely unaddressed. In fact, many of the security measures intended to reinforce the nonproliferation regime may actually undermine it. Urgent action is required.
Zugehörige Dokumente
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Auftragnehmer
(Englisch)
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British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Ward Wilson
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Belastetes Budget
(Englisch)
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Directorate of Political Affairs
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Gesetzliche Grundlage
(Englisch)
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British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Ward Wilson
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Impressum
(Englisch)
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Copyright, Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft | Droits d'auteur: autorités de la Confédération suisse | Diritti d'autore: autorità della Confederazione Svizzera | Dretgs d'autur: autoritads da la Confederaziun svizra | Copyright, Swiss federal authorities
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Auskunft
(Englisch)
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Division for Security Policy
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