Key words
(German)
|
Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, humanitarian, deterrence, delegitimizing, humanitarian
|
Key words
(English)
|
Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, humanitarian, deterrence, delegitimizing, humanitarian
|
Key words
(French)
|
Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, humanitarian, deterrence, delegitimizing, humanitarian
|
Key words
(Italian)
|
Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, humanitarian, deterrence, delegitimizing, humanitarian
|
Short description
(German)
|
In addressing nuclear disarmament, people – be they expert, practitioners or one of the interested public – find themselves in a bind. All bar a few countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, have repeatedly committed themselves in word and in law to pursuing nuclear disarmament in good faith and to the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is enormous concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and – in the longer term – to non-state armed factions. On the other hand, however, we are told that nuclear weapons are important and useful. Those that possess them or feel protected by them say that they are not deployed to be used; rather they are employed solely as a deterrent to would-be attackers and thus prevent war. We are told that they ended the Second World War in 1945, that they “kept the peace” during the Cold War, and that they provide an “umbrella” or extended deterrence to military allies of the nuclear weapons possessors. Nuclear weapons are the great protectors, the ultimate guarantee. Why then would we ever want to eliminate such weapons if they could provide so much security, and why should we not want every country to have them so as to eliminate war completely? At the heart of the double bind of nuclear weapons is the issue of deterrence. It is the belief in nuclear deterrence that enables people to accept their presence on their territories. The belief in nuclear deterrence creates an underlying fear that if we were to give up this great protection, major conflict might once again ensue. In large part, it is this fear that is causing the delay in fulfilling the longmade promises of nuclear disarmament. The hypothesis of nuclear deterrence has conferred a degree of legitimacy on the possession – by some states only – of nuclear weapons. If the global elimination of nuclear weapons is ever going to be undertaken in earnest, nuclear deterrence must be held up to scrutiny and found wanting. This paper sets out to examine deterrence as the core attribute assigned to nuclear weapons and their associated legitimacy in the international security system. We have examined the evidence for nuclear deterrence and found it to be paltry, if it exists at all. Our aim in this study is to stimulate thought, debate and action. We have written this paper with several audiences in mind: disarmament practitioners including government officials, diplomats and nuclear weapons designers; experts from policy analysts to academic dons; and the engaged, questioning public. This should not be a comfortable read; we hope to challenge the reader and to introduce new approaches and options for ways out of the nuclear conundrum.
Related documents
|
Short description
(English)
|
In addressing nuclear disarmament, people – be they expert, practitioners or one of the interested public – find themselves in a bind. All bar a few countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, have repeatedly committed themselves in word and in law to pursuing nuclear disarmament in good faith and to the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is enormous concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and – in the longer term – to non-state armed factions. On the other hand, however, we are told that nuclear weapons are important and useful. Those that possess them or feel protected by them say that they are not deployed to be used; rather they are employed solely as a deterrent to would-be attackers and thus prevent war. We are told that they ended the Second World War in 1945, that they “kept the peace” during the Cold War, and that they provide an “umbrella” or extended deterrence to military allies of the nuclear weapons possessors. Nuclear weapons are the great protectors, the ultimate guarantee. Why then would we ever want to eliminate such weapons if they could provide so much security, and why should we not want every country to have them so as to eliminate war completely? At the heart of the double bind of nuclear weapons is the issue of deterrence. It is the belief in nuclear deterrence that enables people to accept their presence on their territories. The belief in nuclear deterrence creates an underlying fear that if we were to give up this great protection, major conflict might once again ensue. In large part, it is this fear that is causing the delay in fulfilling the longmade promises of nuclear disarmament. The hypothesis of nuclear deterrence has conferred a degree of legitimacy on the possession – by some states only – of nuclear weapons. If the global elimination of nuclear weapons is ever going to be undertaken in earnest, nuclear deterrence must be held up to scrutiny and found wanting. This paper sets out to examine deterrence as the core attribute assigned to nuclear weapons and their associated legitimacy in the international security system. We have examined the evidence for nuclear deterrence and found it to be paltry, if it exists at all. Our aim in this study is to stimulate thought, debate and action. We have written this paper with several audiences in mind: disarmament practitioners including government officials, diplomats and nuclear weapons designers; experts from policy analysts to academic dons; and the engaged, questioning public. This should not be a comfortable read; we hope to challenge the reader and to introduce new approaches and options for ways out of the nuclear conundrum.
Related documents
|
Short description
(French)
|
In addressing nuclear disarmament, people – be they expert, practitioners or one of the interested public – find themselves in a bind. All bar a few countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, have repeatedly committed themselves in word and in law to pursuing nuclear disarmament in good faith and to the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is enormous concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and – in the longer term – to non-state armed factions. On the other hand, however, we are told that nuclear weapons are important and useful. Those that possess them or feel protected by them say that they are not deployed to be used; rather they are employed solely as a deterrent to would-be attackers and thus prevent war. We are told that they ended the Second World War in 1945, that they “kept the peace” during the Cold War, and that they provide an “umbrella” or extended deterrence to military allies of the nuclear weapons possessors. Nuclear weapons are the great protectors, the ultimate guarantee. Why then would we ever want to eliminate such weapons if they could provide so much security, and why should we not want every country to have them so as to eliminate war completely? At the heart of the double bind of nuclear weapons is the issue of deterrence. It is the belief in nuclear deterrence that enables people to accept their presence on their territories. The belief in nuclear deterrence creates an underlying fear that if we were to give up this great protection, major conflict might once again ensue. In large part, it is this fear that is causing the delay in fulfilling the longmade promises of nuclear disarmament. The hypothesis of nuclear deterrence has conferred a degree of legitimacy on the possession – by some states only – of nuclear weapons. If the global elimination of nuclear weapons is ever going to be undertaken in earnest, nuclear deterrence must be held up to scrutiny and found wanting. This paper sets out to examine deterrence as the core attribute assigned to nuclear weapons and their associated legitimacy in the international security system. We have examined the evidence for nuclear deterrence and found it to be paltry, if it exists at all. Our aim in this study is to stimulate thought, debate and action. We have written this paper with several audiences in mind: disarmament practitioners including government officials, diplomats and nuclear weapons designers; experts from policy analysts to academic dons; and the engaged, questioning public. This should not be a comfortable read; we hope to challenge the reader and to introduce new approaches and options for ways out of the nuclear conundrum.
Related documents
|
Short description
(Italian)
|
In addressing nuclear disarmament, people – be they expert, practitioners or one of the interested public – find themselves in a bind. All bar a few countries, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, have repeatedly committed themselves in word and in law to pursuing nuclear disarmament in good faith and to the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is enormous concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and – in the longer term – to non-state armed factions. On the other hand, however, we are told that nuclear weapons are important and useful. Those that possess them or feel protected by them say that they are not deployed to be used; rather they are employed solely as a deterrent to would-be attackers and thus prevent war. We are told that they ended the Second World War in 1945, that they “kept the peace” during the Cold War, and that they provide an “umbrella” or extended deterrence to military allies of the nuclear weapons possessors. Nuclear weapons are the great protectors, the ultimate guarantee. Why then would we ever want to eliminate such weapons if they could provide so much security, and why should we not want every country to have them so as to eliminate war completely? At the heart of the double bind of nuclear weapons is the issue of deterrence. It is the belief in nuclear deterrence that enables people to accept their presence on their territories. The belief in nuclear deterrence creates an underlying fear that if we were to give up this great protection, major conflict might once again ensue. In large part, it is this fear that is causing the delay in fulfilling the longmade promises of nuclear disarmament. The hypothesis of nuclear deterrence has conferred a degree of legitimacy on the possession – by some states only – of nuclear weapons. If the global elimination of nuclear weapons is ever going to be undertaken in earnest, nuclear deterrence must be held up to scrutiny and found wanting. This paper sets out to examine deterrence as the core attribute assigned to nuclear weapons and their associated legitimacy in the international security system. We have examined the evidence for nuclear deterrence and found it to be paltry, if it exists at all. Our aim in this study is to stimulate thought, debate and action. We have written this paper with several audiences in mind: disarmament practitioners including government officials, diplomats and nuclear weapons designers; experts from policy analysts to academic dons; and the engaged, questioning public. This should not be a comfortable read; we hope to challenge the reader and to introduce new approaches and options for ways out of the nuclear conundrum.
Related documents
|
Contractor
(English)
|
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies / Ken Berry, Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pélopidas, Nikolai Sokov, Ward
|
Charged budget
(English)
|
Politische Direktion - Abteilung Menschliche Sicherheit - Rahmenkredit für die zivile Friedensförderung und die Stärkung der Menschenrechte
|
Legal basis
(English)
|
Art. 57 Abs. 1 RVOG Art. 57 al. 1 LOGA Art. 57 cpv. 1 LOGA
|
Copyright
(English)
|
Copyright, Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft | Droits d'auteur: autorités de la Confédération suisse | Diritti d'autore: autorità della Confederazione Svizzera | Dretgs d'autur: autoritads da la Confederaziun svizra | Copyright, Swiss federal authorities
|
Information
(English)
|
Abteilung Sicherheitspolitik (ASP)
|
