Mots-clé
(Allemand)
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International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, Additional Protocol, Non Proliferation Treaty, safeguards, verification
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Mots-clé
(Anglais)
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International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, Additional Protocol, Non Proliferation Treaty, safeguards, verification
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Mots-clé
(Français)
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International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, Additional Protocol, Non Proliferation Treaty, safeguards, verification
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Mots-clé
(Italien)
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International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, Additional Protocol, Non Proliferation Treaty, safeguards, verification
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Description succincte
(Allemand)
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Even though the additional protocol of the NPT is now in force in 109 NPT States parties which widely recognize its importance, persisting factors slow down its universalization and full implementation. However, the remaining obstacles can be tackled through both external and internal incentives. Amongst the latter, optimization of the IAEA safeguards system to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency can help promote universalization of the AP. The current evolution of the safeguards system tending to better allocate safeguards activities and resources, doing away with a quantitative approach and promoting qualitative, customized implementation of safeguards is reviewed in Chapter 2. The latter suggests that despite ongoing and positive efforts, remaining difficulties slow down the move to a real ‘analytical’ or ‘factors’ driven system. Chapter 3 therefore looks at ways to overcome weaknesses in safeguards approaches, institutional and collaborative practices, in order to develop safeguards resources and measures where the proliferation risk lies and not necessarily on States with large nuclear power and industries. In that sense, optimization implies targeting verification. Three main interconnected tracks are suggested: enhanced selectiveness of verification efforts could be based on a more flexible application of safeguards allowing for transparency and openness dividends; it would require improved institutional transparency; finally, it could be supported by furthering cooperation both at the regional level and with relevant international organisations.
Documents annexés
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Description succincte
(Anglais)
|
Even though the additional protocol of the NPT is now in force in 109 NPT States parties which widely recognize its importance, persisting factors slow down its universalization and full implementation. However, the remaining obstacles can be tackled through both external and internal incentives. Amongst the latter, optimization of the IAEA safeguards system to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency can help promote universalization of the AP. The current evolution of the safeguards system tending to better allocate safeguards activities and resources, doing away with a quantitative approach and promoting qualitative, customized implementation of safeguards is reviewed in Chapter 2. The latter suggests that despite ongoing and positive efforts, remaining difficulties slow down the move to a real ‘analytical’ or ‘factors’ driven system. Chapter 3 therefore looks at ways to overcome weaknesses in safeguards approaches, institutional and collaborative practices, in order to develop safeguards resources and measures where the proliferation risk lies and not necessarily on States with large nuclear power and industries. In that sense, optimization implies targeting verification. Three main interconnected tracks are suggested: enhanced selectiveness of verification efforts could be based on a more flexible application of safeguards allowing for transparency and openness dividends; it would require improved institutional transparency; finally, it could be supported by furthering cooperation both at the regional level and with relevant international organisations.
Documents annexés
|
Description succincte
(Français)
|
Even though the additional protocol of the NPT is now in force in 109 NPT States parties which widely recognize its importance, persisting factors slow down its universalization and full implementation. However, the remaining obstacles can be tackled through both external and internal incentives. Amongst the latter, optimization of the IAEA safeguards system to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency can help promote universalization of the AP. The current evolution of the safeguards system tending to better allocate safeguards activities and resources, doing away with a quantitative approach and promoting qualitative, customized implementation of safeguards is reviewed in Chapter 2. The latter suggests that despite ongoing and positive efforts, remaining difficulties slow down the move to a real ‘analytical’ or ‘factors’ driven system. Chapter 3 therefore looks at ways to overcome weaknesses in safeguards approaches, institutional and collaborative practices, in order to develop safeguards resources and measures where the proliferation risk lies and not necessarily on States with large nuclear power and industries. In that sense, optimization implies targeting verification. Three main interconnected tracks are suggested: enhanced selectiveness of verification efforts could be based on a more flexible application of safeguards allowing for transparency and openness dividends; it would require improved institutional transparency; finally, it could be supported by furthering cooperation both at the regional level and with relevant international organisations.
Documents annexés
|
Description succincte
(Italien)
|
Even though the additional protocol of the NPT is now in force in 109 NPT States parties which widely recognize its importance, persisting factors slow down its universalization and full implementation. However, the remaining obstacles can be tackled through both external and internal incentives. Amongst the latter, optimization of the IAEA safeguards system to ensure its effectiveness and efficiency can help promote universalization of the AP. The current evolution of the safeguards system tending to better allocate safeguards activities and resources, doing away with a quantitative approach and promoting qualitative, customized implementation of safeguards is reviewed in Chapter 2. The latter suggests that despite ongoing and positive efforts, remaining difficulties slow down the move to a real ‘analytical’ or ‘factors’ driven system. Chapter 3 therefore looks at ways to overcome weaknesses in safeguards approaches, institutional and collaborative practices, in order to develop safeguards resources and measures where the proliferation risk lies and not necessarily on States with large nuclear power and industries. In that sense, optimization implies targeting verification. Three main interconnected tracks are suggested: enhanced selectiveness of verification efforts could be based on a more flexible application of safeguards allowing for transparency and openness dividends; it would require improved institutional transparency; finally, it could be supported by furthering cooperation both at the regional level and with relevant international organisations.
Documents annexés
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Mandataire
(Anglais)
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Centre d'Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et de Maîtrise des armements (CESIM), Paris, France / Sonia Drobysz, Bernard Sitt
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Budget imputé
(Anglais)
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Abteilung Menschliche Sicherheit (AMS), Rahmenkredit für die zivile Friedensförderung und die Stärkung der Menschenrechte
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Bases légales
(Anglais)
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Art. 57 Abs. 1 RVOG Art. 57 al. 1 LOGA Art. 57 cpv. 1 LOGA
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Droits d'auteur
(Anglais)
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Copyright, Bundesbehörden der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft | Droits d'auteur: autorités de la Confédération suisse | Diritti d'autore: autorità della Confederazione Svizzera | Dretgs d'autur: autoritads da la Confederaziun svizra | Copyright, Swiss federal authorities
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Renseignements
(Anglais)
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Abteilung Sicherheitspolitik (ASP)
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