

**Evaluation of EISA's Regional Programmes on Entrenching
the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and
Observation & Enhancing the Capacity of Election
Practitioners to support, manage and monitor elections
(PEMMO and ECEP)**

**Evaluation conducted for
Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC)**

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Annex 1: Evaluation Tool

Executive summary

- ⇒ Based on the in-country visits and interviews EISA is a NGO that is well known, credible, highly regarded and has been a seminal role player in the area of elections in southern Africa. This is a particular achievement in a region that has diverse national political and social contexts. EISA has managed to penetrate the barriers to effective citizen participation in elections and to promote and support professional and non-partisan election management and observation.
- ⇒ The PEMMO project is strongly identified with EISA's electoral work. For most partners this means election observation missions composed of civil society and EMBs (using PEMMO), training and workshops on election monitoring and observation and election management and "quality" publications on elections.
- ⇒ ECEP is less identifiable but is understood by partners as a deepening of the PEMMO work through more extensive training and "hands on" practical electoral experience. ECEP is perceived as being more technical than PEMMO and requires an in-depth, ongoing and more sustained focus on election management, participation, supervision and observation.
- ⇒ The areas of work that EISA was seen as being most competent in, and able to transfer skills to their partners, were listed by the respondents as: Research, networking (observer missions seen as essential form of networking) , training and reporting.
- ⇒ Particular challenges included the need for a stronger focus on working with political parties and building their capacity to become effective and meaningful electoral partners, in all countries in the region.
- ⇒ EISA's future electoral work should give specific attention to working with EMBs and civil society in countries that may be considered to be "closed" societies. These countries exhibit varying degrees of limited political space for effective electoral engagement and include Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Angola and Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- ⇒ EISA should be invited to submit a funding proposal for 2011-2014, which may include a baseline study. The baseline will assess what the current situation and will provide information on what needs to be done geographically and substantively in the region. It will also provide important benchmarks against which future evaluations can compare progress and achievement of indicators. The funding proposal would include a logframe with outcomes, indicators and risks and assumptions.
- ⇒ Recommendation include: establish a group of electoral experts that can be utilised to support EISA's work when EISA has capacity limitations in responding to requests for electoral training and support work in the region and the continent. Support EISA to work closely with SADC organs that will advance electoral democracy and sustainability in the region
- ⇒ Request EISA to facilitate a meeting of the other two key funders on this project, DFID and SIDA, to enable the three donors to explore the possibility of a joint project with EISA that has a common objective/s, reporting requirements and evaluation

Introduction

Structure of the evaluation

The external evaluation of EISA's Regional Programme on 'Entrenching the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation and Enhancing the Capacity of Election Practitioners to support, manage and monitor elections (hereafter referred to as the PEMMO and ECEP projects)' responds to a requirement of the contract between EISA and the principal donor, the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC). The evaluation focuses on assessing the PEMMO project and the first half of the ECEP project to determine their achievements, shortfalls or challenges and to make recommendations for future trajectory.

The evaluation is anchored in the objectives, outcomes, outputs and management of these projects. The introduction provides an overview of the requirements of the evaluation (as found in the terms of reference documents) and assesses these against the expectations of the project (found in the contracts between EISA and the SDC as well as the log frame documents). Emanating from this are some preliminary recommendations.

Section 1 provides an overall electoral context for the southern African region and positions EISA's work within to the region. Sections 2-5 are country specific sections where the evaluations occurred and are introduced by their respective context followed by a summary of the activities in that country, outcomes and findings in each country and a set of recommendations.

Section 6 compares the logframes for the PEMMO and ECEP projects with the reports from EISA, supplemented by the interviews in-country, to assess the outputs. Section 7 assesses the outcomes of the project and also looks at effectiveness and sustainability. Section 8 reviews the project management and co-ordination and focuses on EISA's knowledge management and monitoring. All these sections contain their own specific recommendations.

The concluding section summarises the recommendations into a compiled, numbered list of recommendations and provides SDC with two scenarios for consideration.

Objectives of the evaluation

The objectives of the evaluation, as contained in the terms of reference document are threefold and are:

- 1) To provide for accountability, by providing substance on what has been accomplished by the project with a reference to: (a) the original and the adjusted objectives; (b) agreed upon work-plans and budgets;
- 2) To evaluate the learning through providing insight into what has been learned during the implementation of the project or what can be learned from the experiences. The

evaluation must look both at the approach and methodology used as to the management of the project.

3) To determine the Way Forward. Both SDC and EISA will use this evaluation to chart the way forward on the basis of possible future scenarios. On the basis of the recommendations of the evaluation, it will be determined whether the programme continues in its present form, whether changes have to be effected in both its form and content or whether there is need for an exit strategy.

Underpinning each of these objectives are the lessons learnt concerning the most successful approaches and strategic choices and also a reflection on the failures of the project that will provide guidance as to future projects. The lessons learnt will provide impetus for future co-operation between EISA and SDC.

Specific issues that had to be addressed in the evaluation include:

- the relevance of the chosen project approach and methodology in achieving the intended objectives of ECEP including. This includes the selection of countries, the selection of partners (global, regional and local), the use of PEMMO, the implementation of capacity-building activities, policy dialogue forums held and election observation activities undertaken.
- the effectiveness and sustainability of the project interventions in strengthening the capacity of EMBs, CSOs and political parties;
- provide an indication regarding the efficiency of the use of its resources;
- describe the successes of the project and the challenges encountered and present these as lessons learned;
- examine EISA's institutional development: its capacity, strategic orientation, governance arrangements, stakeholder analysis, monitoring and evaluation systems, programme management and organisational setup, including the coordination between EISA headquarters and field offices, country partners and beneficiaries etc.
- Assess EISA's monitoring of the project and its capacity for effective knowledge management

The logical framework that forms part of the contract for both the PEMMO and ECEP projects specifies a series of inputs, activities, outcomes, outputs and indicators. These are all reflected in the objectives of the evaluation and provide the guiding framework for the evaluation. Each of the sections address the log frame as it relates to the evaluation.

Selected background to the evaluation

The SDC has been one of the core funders of EISA and committed financial support to the PEMMO project from July 2004 to December 2006 and to ECEP from October 2006 to September 2010. There was a slight overlap between the two projects' life spans but this did not impact the implementation of either of the two projects. PEMMO was a

natural precursor to the ECEP project¹. The SDC was the primary funder of PEMMO (along with the Embassy of Belgium) with the provision of R6. 5 million South African Rands. SDC provided 25 percent of the total budget for the ECEP project amounting to R8.5 million South African Rands. Other donors that supported ECEP include DFID, USAID and Norwegian Peoples Aid (specifically for Angola).

It was noted that the deliverables of the PEMMO project were achieved more readily and were clearer to quantify (Musanhu; Pitso). It was also clear that PEMMO attracted donor support more frequently than did ECEP (Musanhu). As ECEP was a more ambitious project and had longer term implications, as the deepening of democracy always does, EISA was unable to achieve all the objectives and conduct all the activities required in the log frame which resulted in some of the objectives being reconsidered. An example of this is revising focusing on local government elections and rather working on national elections. The log frame specified activities that would require more than 25 percent of the budget and yet, when donors did supplement the ECEP project they tended to specify particular activities or initiatives that they wished to support. Musanhu stated that there should be a clear alignment with each donors grant and the activities that can be achieved with that grant.

EISA is recognised in the southern African region as being the premier civil society organisation working in the area of elections and governance. EISA is a not for profit organisation that was established in 1996 and is based in Johannesburg (South Africa) with field offices in Kinshasa (DRC), Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), N'djamena (Chad), Khartoum (Sudan) and Maputo (Mozambique).

Soon after its establishment EISA began working regionally rather than just in South Africa. This approach was supported by EISA's core partners and donors, including SDC. Some of the key electoral and governance milestones in EISA's life include initiating, in 1998, the Electoral Commission Forum of SADC countries (ECF), a grouping of all the 15 EMBs in the SADC region, establishing the SADC Electoral Support Network (SADC ESN), a regional body consisting of national CSOs which focus on elections and democracy, developing, in 2003, with civil society and EMBs the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC region (PEMMO), deploying highly credible and non-partisan observer missions composed of civil society and EMBs to the region that used PEMMO as the standard for assessing elections and the provision of capacity building training and information sharing for EMBs, CSOs and political parties.

EISA has established itself as an organisation that has found an appropriate niche. They are recognised as providing seminal, professional, objective and required electoral and governance services to a variety of stakeholders.

Most of the milestones mentioned above were directly supported by SDC. The relationship between EISA and the SDC has been a long term one and EISA has recognised it as being "exemplary", "committed", "very good".

¹ This is explained in detail in the following section of the evaluation report.

This evaluation builds upon the ongoing relationship between EISA and SDC as it takes stock of the successes of the SDC funded projects, recognises the challenges and provides recommendations for future collaborative work.

Evaluation methodology

The methodology adopted for this evaluation combines both desktop research and in-country interviews.

The TORs for the evaluation were developed by SDC in consultation with EISA.

The desktop research consisted of a review and analysis of all documentation relevant to the project including contracts, proposals, logistical frameworks, periodic reports from EISA on progress, work plans and publications related to the project, such as observer mission report and the Journal of African Elections series.

The desktop research was supplemented by in-country visits to meet with EISA's country partners in Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. A further series of interviews were conducted with key EISA personnel who worked on the project. Denis Kadima, the Executive Director of EISA completed questions on line and provided useful background data.

Where interviews could not be conducted in-country, partners were interviewed telephonically or people responded on-line to the questionnaire. The people that were interviewed are listed in the appropriate sections of the evaluation report.

An interview tool² was designed by the evaluator, together with input from SDC and EISA that was utilised during the interviews. It was designed to address the objectives of the evaluation and contained questions relating to each component of the project.

Limitations of the methodology

In terms of the contract with SDC, EISA has conducted an array of activities to achieve various objectives. These activities have involved numerous partners in-country including EMBs, CSOs and political parties. The in-country interviews selected the most notable partners on the recommendation of EISA. These partners were not always available and a number of interviews could not be conducted. This resulted in their responses being received on line (through emailed response to the questionnaires) or telephonic interviews being conducted. This is not ideal as it does not provide sufficient space to receive inclusive answers. Also during a face to face interview, the interviewer is able to ask further questions that may not be contained in the questionnaire if she is believes they may ascertain more complete responses. This is not an option with telephonic or on-line interviews.

Political party respondents were particularly difficult to get to commit to interviews and the intended scheduled interviews with political parties in Zimbabwe did not take place.

² Annexure 1.

This may be due to a combination of factors including busy schedules and political dynamics in the country that dissuaded them from participating.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

The introductory section already raises a recommendation on the structuring of grant agreements, and coordination between donors' expectations and needs and recipients' implementation of project details and activities.

Grant agreements and the expectations of donors

When donor agreements are developed there needs to be a realistic assessment of what is achievable linked closely to the amount of funding that is being made available for the project. This is even more pertinent when the donor is only committing a percentage towards the projects and there is an expectation that the remainder will be sourced from other donors and supplemented with this funding. It is essential that the committed percentage is realistically aligned to the proposed activities, outputs and outcomes. This will prevent the recipient for having to reduce the required activities that are contained in the grant if they are unable to access supplementary funding.

Limitations on some partners when conducting the evaluation

There should be an acknowledgement that it is often extremely difficult to get a partner to commit to being interviewed or to respond to questions electronically. This is particularly so in the case of political parties where EISA was unable to get a commitment from them to be part of the evaluation. This may be due to time constraints, capacity challenges or the somewhat ineffective way political parties manage their diaries, but it should be factored into an evaluation of this type as political parties are one of the three main stakeholders of the project.

Table 1: Under-estimated and overlooked factors in the conceptualisation of the project	
Political party culture	The sheer number of parties from the region
	The bureaucracy involved in parties
	The nature of consultation within parties
	Availability of the appropriate members
	Extended party protocol
	Party priorities
	Lack of political will to cooperate with progressive civil society
State aligned EMB culture	Suspicion or cynicism towards civil society organisations
	Competitiveness that encourages closing space for progressive ideas
	Fear that a project of this nature will promote democratisation

Section 1 Southern Africa electoral context

Since July 2004, when the project commenced, each country in southern Africa has conducted elections. Angola (National Assembly in 2008) and the DRC (Presidential 2006) held historical first elections; in Angola the last election was in 1992 and in the DRC the last election was held in 1965. Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique all hold elections at five year intervals. These countries had elections in 2004 and 2009. Lesotho and Madagascar held National Assembly elections in 2007 and Lesotho held a local government election in 2005. Mauritius and Tanzania held National Assembly elections in 2005. Zambia held presidential, National Assembly and local government elections in 2006 and then held an unscheduled presidential election in 2008 due to the death of their president. Swaziland had an electoral process in 2008 for members of the House of Assembly. Zimbabwe held presidential, House of Assembly and Senate elections in 2008. This indicates that (with the exception of Angola and the DRC which have only recently held their elections) each country in southern African holds elections regularly at five year intervals as stipulated by their constitution or electoral legislation.

Whether these elections provide space for maximum citizen participation is a matter of interpretation. Electoral laws in the region are generally capacitating and, on paper at least, provide for citizen participation through the protection of the right to freedom of association and the right to vote. In practice, from country to country, the reality may be quite different with issues of freeness and fairness being disputed. Sections of the citizenry often argue that they were not given an equal opportunity to cast their ballot in an environment that is not intimidatory and in secret, as well as not being provided with sufficient information on the various parties and/or candidates contesting elections due to state domination of the media. Any allegations of closed political space may not have any correlation to whether the constitution or the electoral legislation is enabling.

On a continuum there have been elections that meet PEMMO standards (Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Lesotho to a greater or lesser extent) and those that fall far short (Zimbabwe, Swaziland). However each country is presented with specific challenges and their democratic processes are relatively fragile and unstable.

These are standard functions and responsibilities that are given to electoral management bodies (EMB) and comprehensively cover all aspects of elections management. Largely, the EMB determines the legal space that allows for citizen participation in the elections. The political space can also be determined by the EMB, if that body conducts itself in a partisan and subjective manner. Thus the composition of the EMB is of great importance. An EMB that is perceived by the public as being independent and non-aligned will be able to deliver an election that is both free and fair and provides for maximum public participation. Swaziland and Zimbabwe EMBs reflect electoral management that is both partisan and state aligned and thus these two countries are tainted with poor electoral credibility. The Angolan CNE does not enjoy the credibility an independent EMB should have and worryingly the political space in

Mozambique is more restricted for the October 2009 elections and this is often attributed to a CNE that reflects the will of the dominant political party.

Most electoral legislation provides an appeals procedure if the public wishes to challenge the decision of the EMB. Whether justice is delivered presupposes that the judiciary is independent and makes its decisions free from executive interference. This is not a given in countries in the region which are permeated with judiciaries that are, and that are perceived by the citizenry as being, an extension of the state and dependent on incumbent leadership. This is seen in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and to a lesser extent Swaziland and Mozambique.

Largely, the EMB determines the legal space that allows for citizen participation in the elections. The political space can also be determined by the EMB, if that body conducts itself in a partisan and subjective manner. Thus the composition of the EMB is of great importance. An EMB that is perceived by the public as being independent and non-aligned will be able to deliver an election that is both free and fair and provides for maximum public participation. Zimbabwe provides the region with an illustration of this practice where during the recent 2008 elections international observers had to wait for their invitation by the justice ministry to observe the elections. Needless to say any international organisations or bodies that the government determined would be critical of their deeply flawed handling of previous elections, waited in vain. Compare this to the accreditation provisions that Zambia has. There the accreditation of foreign observers is not restricted to people from friendly countries only. The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) handles the entire accreditation process and there are no charges for accrediting observers. This means that a divergent grouping of international and regional voices are heard, such as the Commonwealth, the European Union, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and EISA.

In Zambia, as well as a number other countries in the region civil society organisations do not only observe elections but monitor the process. The role of an observer is more restricted than that of a monitor. An observer does not interfere in the electoral process and can only refer irregularities to an election official. This is problematic if the allegations of irregularity are against an election official or indeed the presiding officer, who is usually the election official with the highest authority at a voting station.

The region may have competent EMBs and enabling legislation but without political will on the part of the incumbent there is little prospect for the peaceful change of government through the ballot. Currently the region has not experienced a change of majority political party despite the holding of (in most countries) elections that meet international criteria of free, fair, credible and legitimate. In Botswana, the country that arguably is seen as most democratic, the electoral system is constituency based first past the post and ensures that the ruling party continues to dominate the political landscape and rule the country. The biggest test for electoral democracy will be when historically dominant parties are challenged at elections and their continued dominance is in doubt. Zimbabwe provides us with a salient example of this with ZANU PF effectively closing political space through a combination of violence, oppressive legislation and electoral fraud when it became clear that the MDC was winning the public vote. Lack of political will to entrench ongoing good electoral process is seen as a

major challenge to the region and one that is becoming more evident in incumbent behaviour.

Civil society is not as dynamic and visible as it could (should) be and in many countries is unable to hold the state to account. As the ECEP and PEMMO projects have a strong focus on civil society it remains a challenge that in some countries in the region civil society is disorganized, fragmented and timid in its approach to holding the state and EMBs accountable and for it to take its rightful place in election monitoring and observation. A major contribution that EISA has made, through PEMMO and ECE, is ensuring that civil society is part of observer missions that are credible, professional and that are often seen as being the missions that issue the most accurate statements without fear or favour. Civil society capacity building still remains a challenge in the region.

EISA's position in the region

In addition to EISA's work with the Electoral Commission Forum of SADC countries (ECF), and the SADC Electoral Support Network (SADC ESN), they have a focus in regional work through both the AU and SADC. EISA works closely with the Pan African Parliament and has served as the secretariat for some of their observer missions. They have also conducted training of the PAP in elections and governance. The director of research, Dr Khabele Matlosa is frequently requested to assist the AU's Elections and Democracy Unit and he was largely responsible for the drafting of the AU's Charter on Democracy, Governance and Elections.

EISA is establishing a mechanism at the SADC level. SADC is establishing an Electoral Advisory Council and EISA have been requested to provide technical support to the council. At the SADC HQ an electoral support unit will be established that is similar to the one at the AU and EISA will be involved in this. The relationship with SADC has been ongoing where EISA has trained their observer missions and is recognised as the organisation in the region with electoral experience and legitimacy. EISA director Denis Kadima says that this recognised capacity that EISA has is a direct result of the projects that SDC has supported. PEMMO and ECEP have capacitated EISA to provide these essential electoral services in the region and to position themselves as the seminal election organisation in the region.

It is important to note that the SADC and AU initiatives of electoral units are challenged by an extreme shortage of funds and the AU unit (which has been functioning for over two years now) is often unable to provide a country with any electoral support and to deploy an acceptable size observer mission for an extended period. Thus the work done by EISA in deploying and supporting observer missions and training and conducting capacity building for EMBs is still relevant and needed.

Section 2

Malawi Electoral context

Malawi is a landlocked country that is one of the poorest in the world. It has a population of about 14.4 million people. It experienced one party rule for decades under Dr Banda until a referendum was held in 1993. The opposition alliance of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Aford won the referendum with a 63,5% majority vote, and immediately demanded that Dr Banda step aside for a coalition government of national unity to prepare for multiparty elections before the end of the year. The UDF won both the presidential and parliamentary elections on 17 May 1994. Since then the country has held elections every five years. But the results revealed the inherent tribal/ethnic and regional tendencies underlying Malawian politics. In nearly all constituencies the trend was that in a region where a presidential candidate had secured a majority vote that party's parliamentary candidates also won. The Commonwealth Election Monitoring Group declared the polls "free and fair", but Malawi had split along potentially dangerous regional lines. Political turbulence is an ongoing feature in the country and in 2007 a faction of the UDF headed by the president wa Mutharika split from the ruling UDF. The created a crisis in Parliament and for over a year there was no budget vote and little was achieved. In 2009 wa Mutharika won the presidential elections and his party has the majority of the seats.

Malawi's electoral system for parliamentary elections is a single member plurality (first-past-the-post) system and there are direct presidential elections. The Malawi EC has been criticized over the years for running elections that were less than satisfactory. The most recent elections in 2009 were regarded as a watershed and the MEC was commended by observer missions for its transparency and professionalism. This was largely due to a new chairperson who was willing to work with outside organisations to ensure capacity building and electoral skills training for the commission. Malawi electoral stakeholders generally enjoy all the freedoms associated with participation in elections, such as freedoms of association, movement and assembly. However there are unlevel playing field in terms of access to campaign finance and state media. The EISA observer mission noted "the Mission observed that the MEC displayed a degree of transparency in the management of the electoral process thus winning the confidence of the majority of the electoral stakeholders the Mission came into contact with."The EISA Observer Mission believed that Malawians were generally able to express their will.

Political parties in Malawi have demonstrated a lack of commitment to internal democracy within their organisations. This lack of intra party democracy has been most visible in the choice of office bearers and the selection of party candidates. This has affected the institutionalisation of parties, leading to an unstable party system characterised by frequent fragmentation. The democratisation of political parties will go a long way towards consolidating democratic development in the entire country.

Summary of activities implemented by the project

Under the PEMMO and ECEP projects the following activities have taken place in Malawi or have included Malawian participation.

- Election observer missions for 2004 and 2009 elections
- Post election workshops with the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) and Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN). After the 2004 elections EISA submitted a list of recommendations to the MEC for improvements for the 2009 elections.
- Regional election monitoring workshop held in Lilongwe 2008
- Capacity building workshop for CSOs in 2008 (attended by Malawi CSOs)
- Training of trainers workshop for MEC and MESN (BRIDGE) in 2008
- Conference on post election conflict in Dar es Salam (attended by Malawi civil society) in 2008
- Regional training workshop on voter registration and technology in 2007 (attended by MEC)
- Political party poll watching training in 2006, attended by Malawian political parties
- PEMMO training of trainers workshop for MEC and civil society in 2006
- PEMMO launch
- PEMMO distribution and information sharing
- MEC staff and CSOs taking part in regional observer missions to other countries

Outcomes

PEMMO is used in election observation in Malawi as one of the key tools in assessing elections by national and regional observers. Both the EMB and the civil society network know and use PEMMO along with other election observation guidelines and principles. There has been an improved performance of the electoral commission's ability to manage elections with 2009 elections being seen as the most independent and professional elections yet. Civil society has been strengthened and participated in the elections. However the MESN is not as strong and vibrant as it should be. The chairperson of the MEC reflected that civil society in Malawi still requires ongoing capacity building in the lead up to the next elections. Political parties also do not exhibit strong intra party democracy and remain a challenge to the outcomes of the project. Malawi is not holding local government elections due to financial constraints so there was not work on local government elections.

Findings

EISA's work in Malawi, particularly with the MEC has had a visible impact on the way that the MEC has conducted elections. It is generally accepted that the recent 2009 elections were the best managed elections that the county has experienced. Strong electoral management and supervisions has not always been present in Malawi in the

past. The chairperson of the MEC, Judge Msosa has worked closely with EISA over the years and has requested and received extensive capacity building and training through EISA's ECEP and PEMMO project. The MEC has also been involved in a number of regional training initiatives on elections as well as being part of most of the observer missions to other countries in the region. Judge Msosa stated that this networking had increased her knowledge of best practice in the region and she directly applied what she learnt in her country's context. She reflected that EISA had played a seminal role in capacitating the MEC. She said that EISA "always included them in their activities" and this meant that they turned to EISA for assistance and support.

It is evident that an EMB that is open to outside influence (in this case, EISA) are inclined to be more self-reflective and conscious of incorporating lessons learnt from their networking and training exposure. Also an ongoing partnership that is more medium or long term has additional benefits as the learning takes place over an extended period of time and is more substantive. EISA's work with the MEC has directly contribute to the quality improvement of the 2009 election.

Recommendations

Strong partnerships with national civil society and EMBs need to be established and nurtured - Long term tangible results are most evident when there is a strong partnership between EISA and the EMBs and civil society organisations that they work with. The partnership should be ongoing and sustainable by ensuring that the EMB is able to implement the skills and training that they received through ECEP and PEMMO. Once the EMB is able to effectively manage high quality elections EISA's role should be one of support and should be able to respond to requests that the EMB has for additional or "top up" training.

EISA's electoral credibility and knowledge is essential in achieving objectives - EISA's ability to forge such positive relationships with the region's EMBs is dependent upon their credibility and professional reputation, as well as being seen by EMBs as providing the best training in capacity building for election management and understanding of electoral issues. To enable EISA to continuously maintain this position and standing they require donor support for projects such as PEMMO and ECEP. It should be noted that the MEC has not turned to SADC or the AU to provide this type of support and training as they do not have a track record of this kind of electoral work.

Interviews

Justice Anastasia Msosa, Chairperson of the MEC AND Judge of the High Court of Malawi

Section 3

Lesotho Electoral context

Lesotho is a small mountainous country with a population of 2 million. It has a constitutional monarchy. Lesotho has experienced a chequered electoral history with elections in the last decade being preceded and followed by political tensions that have sometimes turned into violence. Conflict management training has been a main requirement of the Lesotho IEC.

In the late 1990s it was evident that Lesotho needed to revise its constitution and electoral legislation. The Interim Political Authority (IPA) began reviewing Lesotho's constitutional and electoral arrangements in 1999 and concluded it in February 2000, aiming to hold new elections in June 2000; the process was slow due to the conflictual relationships that had developed between the parties and the high degree of mistrust that existed between them. The final agreement required the introduction of a mixed member system by which proportional representation seats would be allocated on a compensatory basis in addition to the 80 single member constituency seats elected by plurality; this would ensure that discrepancies between the proportion of votes and the proportion of seats won were reduced and that smaller parties would also be represented in the National Assembly. The proposed electoral law was rejected by the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). This resulted in a stalemate that required ongoing negotiations between the parties. The stalemate was finally broken when the Bill was amended to provide for 40 compensatory. The elections finally took place on 25 May 2002. The run up to the elections were marked by leadership struggles and splits within the three major parties.

Though the LCD won the 2002 election and captured all but one of the constituency seats the allocation of compensatory proportional representation seats ensured that the opposition parties were not excluded from the National Assembly, all of the compensatory seats were allocated to them.

In 2006 the defection of MPs from the ruling party was sufficient to endanger the government's majority in the National Assembly, resulting in the early dissolution of Parliament and the scheduling of elections for 17 February 2007. The outcome of the election was a victory for the LCD and its ally the National Independent Party, who garnered 82 of the 120 seats.

EISA, having foreseen the high likelihood of election violence in 2007 invited Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana, to head its election observation mission to Lesotho. This was also an opportunity for the former president to subtly engage Basotho party leaders in order to help quell the tensions during the election. Subsequently Sir Ketumile Masire was appointed as the chief mediator in Lesotho by SADC. The EISA observer mission in 2007 found the election to be in line largely with PEMMO and enabled the people to express their will freely.

Summary of activities implemented by the project

Under the PEMMO and ECEP projects the following activities have taken place in Lesotho or have included Lesotho participation

- Pre-election assessment mission in 2007
- Election observer mission to the 2007 elections
- Post election review 2007
- Conflict management training for the IEC and civil society
- PEMMO launch in 2007
- Regional training of SADC ESN in parallel voter tabulation and voter registration audits
- 2008 technical assessment team to the Swaziland election included a Lesotho participant from civil society
- Regional training workshop on voter registration and technology in 2007 (attended by IEC)
- Political party poll watching training in 2006, attended by Lesotho political parties
- Lesotho participation in other observer missions in the region

Outcomes

PEMMO is one of the key tools in assessing elections in Lesotho. PEMMO has been widely distributed and is well known. The IEC has been capacitated through attending observer missions in other countries in the region. Political parties have participated in training workshops that focus on their role and peaceful participation in the electoral process. This has contributed to decreased political tensions in Lesotho. Political party agents have been well trained and this has enabled them to observe elections and play a meaningful part in elections. Civil society requires further capacity building as it is not a strong participant in electoral processes.

Findings

EISA is well known in Lesotho by both civil society and the EMB. PEMMO is closely associated with EISA and they are also seen as having spearheaded conflict management training around elections. "EISA has spearheaded PEMMO in Lesotho. We know them for that." (Thoahlane). Partners that were interviewed in Lesotho said that they had been involved since the beginning with PEMMO, through its inception to its launch and adoption and they were easily able to understand its objectives and well as the approach EISA adopted in its implementation. All of these assisted EISA's relationships in Lesotho.

As there was a specific focus on preventing and addressing conflict EISA was able to ensure that they provided the necessary training to political parties, the IEC and civil society. They responded to a direct request and proactively used an eminent elder statesman, Katumile Masire to head their mission to the Lesotho elections. This set the stage for an ongoing positive relationship between civil society that has often been fragmented, the IEC and political parties. The prime minister's office took a direct

interest in EISA's training and requested a number of his ministers to attend. They did attend.(Matlosa).

Recommendations

Ensure methodology and approach is appropriate and context relevant- A clear and precise set of objectives can only be realised if the methodology and approach is relevant to the political and social context of the country and region where the intended implementation will take place. Factors that influence this context should be considered at the inception of the project and should be discussed between both the donor and the recipient. There needs to be a clear acknowledgement that no matter how well conceptualised project methodology is it may have to be adapted and amended to reflect changing circumstances that are beyond the control of the project and its implementers. This is evident in Lesotho requiring a focus on conflict management skills as the political parties and civil society were fragmented and there was little internal democracy within political parties.

Adopt a proactive approach that reaps benefits in the long term – EISA was seen as the architect of Masire's involvement in Lesotho. It can be argued that the role he has played has substantially contributed to peace in a country that was balanced on the edge of political violence. This type of action builds and enhances EISA's profile and should be recognised as being an essential part of the way that they work.

Interviews

Mr Thoahlane, previous IEC Chairperson and Chairperson of EISA's Board
Ms Makhotu IEC Chairperson, Lesotho,

Section 4

Zambia Electoral context

Zambia has a population of about 12.3 million people. Its main political legacy was the disastrous nationalization programme undertaken by its longtime leader Kenneth Kaunda that made Zambia one of the poorest countries in the region. Its election management has been controversial with allegations of irregularities and rigging.

The December 2001 elections proved to be controversial, but the results were eventually endorsed, with a good deal of public criticism, by the Supreme Court. The voters of Zambia severely punished the ruling Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). Its presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa won the election with less than 30% of the vote, with his nearest rival Anderson Mazoka of the United Party for National Development (UPND) taking 27%. The MMD further saw its proportion of parliamentary seats decreased from 61% to 44%. By co-opting key members of the opposition into government, Mwanawasa avoided entering into a formal coalition with other parties and consolidated his position with an alliance with UNIP in May 2003.

Mwanawasa placed the fight against corruption at the centre of his presidential campaign and charges were made against the previous president Chiluba³ and other members of the previous MMD government. He also dismissed the Vice-President and Finance Minister alleging evidence of corruption against them. There was strong pressure on the government of Mwanawasa, from civil society structures, the media and the opposition, to engage in constitutional reform to reduce the powers of the presidency, to include a requirement that presidents be elected on an absolute majority rather than a plurality and to provide for greater access to government held information that could reduce corruption by subjecting the actions of state officials to public scrutiny (OECD 2005). Mwanawasa responded by appointing a Constitution Review Commission (CRC). In a June 2005 interim report the CRC recommended that a new constitution embracing these reforms be adopted by a constituent assembly. To date this has not happened and is a key concern of civil society.

In 2008 Mwanawasa died and unscheduled presidential elections were held. His successor Rupiah Banda was elected in an election. As with the 2006 election the EISA observer mission said that the election “allowed the people of Zambia to express their democratic choice”. The voter turnout in 2008 was low turnout and despite some

³ Chiluba’s trial reached its conclusion in 2009 and in a highly criticized decision he was found not guilty of corruption charges despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Current president Banda is perceived as being less than keen to address high level corruption.

allegations of biasness against the Electoral Commission of Zambia they reaffirmed their independence.

Summary of activities implemented by the project

Under the PEMMO and ECEP projects the following activities have taken place in Zambia or have included Zambian participation:

- Training of election supervisors in 2005
- Training of domestic observers in Lusaka for the 2006 elections
- PEMMO launch and extensive distribution of PEMMO to EMB, civil society and political parties
- Election observer mission for 2006 election and the unscheduled presidential election in 2008
- Regional training workshop on recruitment and training of election observers and drafting statements in Lusaka in 2007 specifically for civil society
- Regional training workshop on voter registration and technology in 2007 (attended by Electoral Commission of Zambia)
- Political party poll watching training in 2006, attended by Zambian political parties
- Zambia participation in other observer missions in the region

Outcomes

PEMMO is a key tool used by the EMB and civil society in elections in Zambia. Election management capacity has resulted in elections that are perceived as being free and fair. Citizen participation is not optimal as election turnout rate is low. However civil society has enhanced its contribution to the electoral process through increased engagement with the ECZ. This has contributed to the ECZ being more accountable to the public. Local government elections have not been a focus on EISA's work.

Political parties would benefit from a focused training programme in capacity building as intra party democracy still presents some challenges. This outcome has not been sufficiently achieved.

Zambian civil society and members of the EMB have been active participants in other observer missions in the region and this has contributed to the enhanced level of election management and accountability in the region.

Findings

EISA's relationship in Zambia is with both the ECZ and civil society, primarily FODEP and NGOs working on women's rights. Zambian civil society has not historically had a specific focus on election work and when EISA began partnering with civil society in Zambia there was a lot of training and capacity building that was needed as well as education on the role of elections and how civil society could contribute meaningfully to the electoral process. Civil society traditionally was very Christian church aligned and

had played a strong role in constitutional reform and review. This illustrates that each country is at a different stages in terms of being able to support the delivery of free and fair elections and that this needs to be recognized at the conception of the project. It also illustrates the need for a baseline study to be done before a project is conceptualised and implemented.

The ECZ provided EISA with excellent co-operation with the PEMMO launch and EISA reported that it was one of the easiest countries to get support for PEMMO and ECEP. This indicates a willingness to provide space for electoral capacity building and management learning. This approach is in sharp contrast to other EMBs such as Swaziland and Zimbabwe that are reluctant to work with EISA to outright hostile. It also indicates a need to fully understand the political context of the region and that each country presents specific challenges and may require a different approach.

Recommendations

Conduct a baseline study at the conception stage – A baseline study will provide the funder with a clear understanding of that the current situation is in the area of focus for the funding and this will also enable the project to be designed to reflect the needs that are identified in the baseline. The baseline is also able to provide the benchmarks against which progress can be assessed and the project deliverables evaluated. It is often difficult to accurately evaluate what has been achieved when the comparative benchmark are opaque. A baseline study would to a large extent address this.

Interviews

Elijah Rubvuta, ED of FODEP

MacDonald Chiponzi, Information Officer of FODEP,

Aselly Mwansa, National Women's Lobby Group,

Sharon Chilesa National Women's Lobby Group

Priscilla Isaac, Deputy Director, Electoral Commission of Zambia

Section 5

Zimbabwe Electoral context

Zimbabwe's political and electoral history has been particularly turbulent in the last ten years. The country has a population of about 12.4 million with an estimated immigrant population of about 2 million, mostly due to the dire financial crisis that the country has experienced over the recent years.

In 1989 Robert Mugabe became the president of a newly independent Zimbabwe. He was reelected for 20 years before a constitutional referendum process triggered a politically reactive process that plunged the country into crisis and resulted in a series of disputed elections. The constitutional referendum introduced a phase in Zimbabwean politics that was characterised by Mugabe's ZANU-PF using a combination of often violent elections and between-election oppressive conduct to regain its previous electoral dominance over the opposition. In the referendum campaign Mugabe and ZANU-PF advanced an endorsement of ZANU-PF's proposed constitution (a 'Yes' vote), and the MDC campaigned for the rejection of the proposed constitution (a 'No' vote). The draft constitution that ZANU-PF offered to the Zimbabwean electorate was rejected by 54.3% to 45.7% of the votes.

Political violence and farm invasions marked the run-up to the 2000 elections, the conduct and outcome of which were disputed. The power battle was conducted via electoral means, but always with state power and force deployed behind the ZANU-PF initiatives. The 2000 and 2002 elections incorporated particularly brutal elements, including the so-called war veterans and youth militia. Many were convinced that had it not been for ZANU-PF's use of force and violence in the run-up, combined with the 'restructuring' of civil society and, probably, its manipulation of vote tabulation and postal votes, it would not have recorded its 2002 electoral victory (Raftopoulos, 2002; Nhema, 2002). Electoral management was effectively in the hands of the politically appointed Registrar General and there was no attempt to ensure that the electoral commission undertook its work in a professional non-partisan manner.

The 2008 elections resulted in the majority of seats being won by the MDC and none of the presidential candidates receiving an overall majority. The elections were widely condemned (except by the SADC observer mission) with the counting and announcement of results receiving particular criticism as it took over three weeks to declare the results. In the months prior to the second round presidential votes ZANU PF unleashed their harshest violence and assault yet focusing on areas that voted MDC. The leader of the MDC Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off and Mugabe was returned as president. After months of negotiations, facilitated by SADC, a Global Political Agreement was reached and Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister. This fragile political alliance has been characterized by a recalcitrant belligerent ZANU PF

that has refused to implement political conditions contained in the agreement and finally resulted (in October 2009) with Tsvangirai and the MDC withdrawing from Cabinet. It appears that neither SADC nor the AU is able to address the situation in what has arguably become the worst the region has ever experienced.

The Zimbabwe EC is politically aligned and has not worked with EISA. EISA has not been invited to send observer missions to observe elections. This remains one of the most politically closed spaces for EISA and they have largely had to rely on working with a civil society movement Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) that is regarded as both vibrant and credible.

Summary of activities implemented by the project

Under the PEMMO and ECEP projects the following activities have taken place in Zimbabwe or have included Zimbabwean participation:

- A number of exploratory meetings took place with the ZEC to launch PEMMO and for EISA to have a working relationship with them. These overtures were rejected as ZEC made it clear they would only work with SADC and its affiliates⁴.
- Shared PEMMO at a 2005 workshop held in Bulawayo with Zimbabwean civil society
- Training of ZESN election observers in 2005
- ZESN training of trainers in 2005
- Training of party agent in 2008
- Secretariat of the PAP observer mission to the 2008 elections
- Political party poll watching training in 2006, attended by Zimbabwean political parties (not ZANU PF)
- Zimbabwean civil society participation in other observer missions in the region

Outcomes

EISA's work in Zimbabwe has been primarily with civil society. Civil society is dynamic and has been an active participant in the establishment and implementation of PEMMO. Observer missions to the 2008 elections used PEMMO as one of the tools for assessing elections and ex South African president Thabo Mbeki mentioned PEMMO as an important tool in the context of Zimbabwean elections.

The outcomes of effective election management were severely curtailed by the close political affiliation that the EMB has with the ruling party and EISA was unable to penetrate these defences in any meaningful way. Zimbabwe remains a major challenge in the region and this is most evident in its election conduct.

⁴ Even this was reneged upon when SADC Parliamentary Forum was not invited to observe elections. This was attributed to their previous observation that the elections did not meet electoral guidelines and principles.

Findings

Zimbabwe proved a key challenge to the PEMMO and ECEP project implementation. The country presents a restrictive political space and the EMB is closely aligned to the incumbent; they were not prepared to work with EISA and thus EISA's substantive contribution could be made only through the Zimbabwe Elections Support Network (ZESN), the main civil society organisation working in the area of elections. The interview with ZESN's director emphasises the need for outside organisations to work with national partners to enable them to best understand sensitive political dynamics. They commended EISA for doing this. They also welcomed the flexible approach EISA adopted that reflected the changing dynamics in the country. This is illustrated in EISA using the opportunity to launch and promote PEMMO at a civil society meeting that was held for another purpose in Bulawayo.

The EMB in Zimbabwe was closely aligned to the ruling party and any civil society organisation was seen as a threat. It was clear that the strategy adopted by the ruling party to accredit observer missions to the 2005 elections was designed to ostensibly exclude "unfriendly" missions such as EISA's and the SADC Parliamentary Forum. SDC's response to EISA's exclusion was both supportive and visionary in that training of domestic civil society on the use and understanding of PEMMO was encouraged. To a large extent this paved the way for strong civil society participation in the seminal 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections. Rindai Chipfunde – Vava, Director of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) stated that PEMMO training over the years contributed to civil society in Zimbabwe that was prepared for major election challenges. This provides us with a cogent example of how PEMMO has been able to contribute towards the deepening of democracy in the region

Recommendations

Selection of local/national partners will enable the most effective achievement of the objectives

Despite being credible and highly regarded in the region a regional organisation like EISA is best advised to protect and sustain partnerships with local organisations. These stakeholders must be relevant in the political context of the country as they will be able to anticipate and address challenges and obstacles more effectively than an organisation that is based outside the country and that works in wide range of countries, each with its own political dynamic. Local knowledge and expertise must be acknowledged and utilised. Where the local expertise is lacking skills transfer should be a priority of the regional organisation that has these skills. Networking is one of the most effective ways of ensuring cross country skills transfers and should form part of the approach to a project that aims to deepen democracy

Adopt a flexible donor approach in a region with fast changing political dynamics

A donor that understands the need for flexibility in approach and methodology is one that is more reflective of the changing dynamics of a project that is rooted in deepening

democracy. An inflexible donor would have prevented the project from achieving its objectives and would have invited frustration and disappointment.

Acknowledge that changing political dynamics can influence the project

In a region that experiences ongoing political and social fluctuations it is necessary that a project that works to deepen democracy is able to adapt to this fluid situation. Expectations at the concept stage of a project may need to be assessed and amended to ensure relevancy and appropriateness. It is important to factor in time for at least some of the unforeseen delays that are routinely experienced in the region. Flexibility needs to be built into planning. More generally, expectations have to be realistic, both by funders and recipients.

Interviews

Rindai Chipfunde – Vava, Director of ZESN, Harare

Section 6

Project Outputs

Project outputs provide indicators of the activities that have taken place during the project's lifespan. The logframe provided by SDC stipulated a number of outputs for both the PEMMO and ECEP projects (see Tables 2 and 3). This section provides an overview of what activities did take place, which didn't, as well as highlighting areas where more work is needed and where the ongoing future focus of ECEP should be, both in terms of geographics, substance and target group.

Table 2 – PEMMO activities that enabled the project deliverables.	
Year 1- 2004	
Activity 1	Deploy observer missions to South Africa , Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia
Activity 2	Train domestic observer groups to use PEMMO to conduct observer missions in these countries
Year 2- 2005	
Activity 3	Deploy observer missions to Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Tanzania
Activity 4	Train domestic observer groups to use PEMMO to conduct observer missions in these countries
Year 3- 2006	
Activity 5	Deploy observer missions to Angola and DRC
Activity 6	Train domestic observer groups to use PEMMO to conduct observer missions in these countries
Activity 7	Conduct a conference that provides regional feedback of the implementation of PEMMO

Table 3 – ECEP activities that enabled the project deliverables.	
Years 1, 2 and 3 2006 –2010	
Activity 1	Promoting PEMMO through deploying observer missions to South Africa , Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique Madagascar, Angola, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Namibia
	Conduct PEMMO launches (where not launched) and train electoral stakeholders in PEMMO
	Deploy election observer and technical assessment missions
	Review PEMMO document for relevancy

Activity 2	Enhance the technical capacity of CSOs through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - regional training workshops on pertinent electoral topics, - staff exchanges and - assistance in monitoring voter registration, auditing voter rolls and conducting parallel voter tabulations Train political parties and conduct a review of party agent training in each country
Activity 3	Local government election support to provide technical assistance to national CSOs that will observe local government elections
Activity 4	Reinforcing EISA's capacity through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - global networking (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network) - attachment of EISA staff to EMBs in the region - participation in debates and conferences - publication of the accredited Journal of African Elections

Outputs that were achieved included PEMMO launches in most of the countries, extensive distribution and promotion of PEMMO in English, Portuguese and French, observer missions composed of civil society and EMBs that use PEMMO to conduct their observation, holding regional electoral workshops attended by civil society, EMBs and political parties and EISA attending and participating in international election forae to reinforce their electoral capacity. There was also regular publication of editions of the Journal of African Elections.

Regular six monthly reports were submitted to SDC as per the requirements of the contract. These reports provide the basis for the overview of the outputs. Belinda Musanhu noted that the reporting timeframes were not always ideal and that EISA did not always get the reports to SDC timeously. She attributed this to staff capacity constraints and also said that SDC was very understanding. However she acknowledged that this needs to be an area of improvement in the project. She said that the outputs in the PEMMO project were largely achieved; "the missions took place and in most countries we could launch PEMMO. Where PEMMO was not launched, due to a variety of reasons EISA was able to hold an alternative event that recognised PEMMO." In summary she stated the following; in Zimbabwe the EMB was not co-operative and no launch took place. However the relationship with ZESN was very strong and they have used PEMMO extensively. Namibia EMB was not 'as welcoming" as Malawi and Mozambique EMBs. They were "a bit concerned about the role of CSOs in PEMMO." Mauritius, Tanzania and Zanzibar were welcoming but with Tanzania they used logistical issues as a reason not to have the PEMMO launch, but it seemed that this was an excuse as there were political reasons why they did not want to launch PEMMO. Zambia, Botswana and Lesotho all went well. There was not much of a focus on SA as they have advanced electoral management and capacity building was not a challenge.

In the PEMMO project activity 7 did not take place. It appears that funding was not specifically allocated for this activity.

Ms Musanhu highlighted the following areas that needed more attention from the ECEP project and if there is future work with SDC she suggests the focus should be in these areas:

- Political parties throughout the region
- Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola
- There may also be a need to rethink SA as there clearly is a need to do work with political parties in SA

This was reiterated by Titi Pitso who said that Mozambique and Angola civil society, EMBs and political parties specifically need attention from EISA and require capacity building. There is a “need to open up in those countries.”

A clear concern that was articulated by senior EISA project staff was their ability to achieve the required outputs with political parties. This was the one target group that was not a major beneficiary of ECEP and PEMMO.

ECEP project activities that were conducted:

- PEMMO launched in Madagascar and Lesotho
- The extensive distribution of PEMMO in three languages throughout the region
- The deployment of election observation missions to Swaziland, Malawi , South Africa, Angola, Lesotho and Madagascar
- Support provided to the Pan African Parliament observer mission to Zimbabwe⁵
- Trained observer missions, both their own and other missions that required training
- Numerous regional training workshops for SADC ESN
- Training workshops on capacity building, parallel voter tabulation, voter registration audits, communication and IT strategies for EMBs
- Training workshops for civil society on election monitoring and technical electoral issues including drafting statements
- Post election reviews in Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania and Madagascar
- Regional political party training for parties from ten southern African countries
- Political party training in Lesotho, Angola and Zimbabwe
- Ongoing networking through ACE Electoral Knowledge Network and other international and regional forums
- The regular publication of the Journal of African Elections

These represent a considerable number of outputs that are in line with the logframe. The five six monthly reports also indicate a strong degree of flexibility on behalf of SDC. In June 2009 EISA requested a reallocation in the amount of R280 250 to focus on voter registration methodology case studies in Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. SDC agreed to this request. This recognises that contemporary electoral practices are fluid and that new approaches and learning is frequently occurring and that ECEO should be sufficiently flexible to adapt. In the ECEP project activity 3 did not take place but there

⁵ EISA was not accredited to observe the Zimbabwe elections in 2008. PAP was funded by another donor.

was a request made to SDC that local government elections would not be a focus of the project and this was agreed between EISA and SDC.

The outputs contribute towards the achievement of the objectives and are delivered through the tangible visible activities for which EISA has become known in the region. Denis Kadima provides a relevant summation when he says “ECEP has positioned EISA not only in election observation but also to be a unique resource for the region in election observation and management.” Yet it must be noted that this is the area where the EISA staff member most involved with the project feels that there are a number of lessons that EISA has learned and that there is still room for substantial improvement, particularly in some countries that have been under targeted and well as in the area of political party training and capacity building.

Recommendations

Undertake a needs assessment for political parties - This needs assessment could be done at this interim stage of the ECEP project and would not require much money or time as a reference group of about ten people representing parties from the region could be convened for a day to determine what their particular needs are. The recommendations that emanate from this meeting should form the basis of the 2011 - 2014 plan of political party training and capacity building in the ECEP project. It may also be advised that workshops for political parties concentrate exclusively on their needs and CSOs are not part of these training sessions.

This does not mean that ECEP should now focus exclusively on political parties but rather that it should have specific focus on them. EMBs and CSOs are still essential stakeholders in the project and ongoing work with them should continue.

Focus on “closed” countries - It emerged that certain countries in the region, viz. Angola, Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe require more intensive nuanced work to open up the EMBs to more effective civil society participation in elections. Civil society in these countries also needs to be strengthened. EISA should assess which of the methodologies are most appropriate to this work; observer mission participation, training workshops, networking or a combination of these. 2010 project plan for ECEP should consolidate the work in these countries with the specific aim to forge stronger relationships between civil society and the EMBs as this will ensure that civil society is able to hold the EMB accountable and that the EMB is able to deliver best practice elections.

It should be noted that EISA receives a large number of requests from civil society and EMBs outside of the region which they try to accommodate but often are unable to due to constraints in terms of their capacity and resources. While they acknowledge there is a lot of work that still needs to take place in the region as the process of democratisation has a long way to go, it is unfortunate that willing, committed and enthusiastic EMBs and CSOs on the continent cannot receive optimum benefits from partnering with EISA, due to EISA's capacity constraints. The overall recommendations at the end of the report focus on this challenge.

Ensure that activities are closely aligned to the budget - EISA has undertaken a large number of activities and the budget was not always able to accommodate these requiring them to find supplementary funding from other donors. This supplementary funding was not always easy to source resulting in much time and effort being expended. As mentioned earlier in the report it was relatively easy to attract funding for observer missions but less so for capacity building for EISA staff, networking, research and publications and training workshops, all essential outputs of ECEP. SDC and EISA should realistically assess what can be achieved with the remaining funding for 2010 and ensure that the planned activities reflect this. Consideration should also be given to the previous recommendation in terms of assessing priorities for expenditure.

Interviews

Dr Khabele Matlosa, director of research, EISA

Belinda Musanhu, Programme officer, EISA

Titi Pito, Manager EPP, EISA

Denis Kadima, Executive Director, EISA

Section 7

Project relevance, efficiency and effectiveness in achieving planned outcomes

Project objectives

The PEMMO project stipulates the following objective:

“The overall objective of the programme (project) is to help entrench PEMMO through encouraging its use by civil society groups at both domestic and regional levels to encourage the assessment of elections from a clear and objective basis. A further objective is to introduce the document to all electoral stakeholders including EMBs and political parties, in all the countries having elections, in order to ensure its prior acceptability as an assessment tool in all countries having elections.”

EISA funding proposal to SDC and contract annexure PEMMO project

The project objective as stated above was recognised and reaffirmed by all the partners interviewed and they supported its clarity of focus. “The objectives of PEMMO are clear.” (Thoahlane). Belinda Musanhu, project coordinator at EISA expressed that PEMMO’s objectives were clear, direct and focused and it provided both EISA and its partners with direction and a framework that was both achievable and relevant.

The ECEP project has as its objective,

“To contribute to strengthening democracy and capacity in the SADC region by providing support and training to election practitioners. Capacity building will include networking, practical observation, mentoring, exchanges and training and will be implemented at national and regional level.”

EISA funding proposal to SDC and contract annexure ECEP project

ECEP enhances capacity to **support, manage** and **monitor** elections. Titi Pitso the Manager of EPP at EISA says that ECEP “aims to provide technical assistance to NGOs/EMBs/ political parties who are involved in electoral work or who want to be involved in electoral work. ECEP was needed to deepen the work of PEMMO.”

The Director of EISA describes ECEP as “ the programme which supports electoral practitioners beyond mere electoral observation (PEMMO) . Its uniqueness can be found in the fact that, at the moment, it is essentially the only regional programme which supports EMBs (election admin), political parties (election monitoring) and CSOs (various technical areas to improve electoral integrity) to become better in their respective areas of focus. At the moment SADC, AU and SADC PF work only in the field of EO. ECEP has positioned EISA not only in EO but also to be a unique resource for the region in EO and management. Thanks to ECEP, EISA is recognised and consulted by all the major continental, regional and national election stakeholders. We train the AU observers, SADC observers, PAP observers and national EMBs, CSOs and political

parties. We are in the process of providing the same services to ECOWAS and the Eastern African Community. No other African NGO does it at this scale. SDC must be given credit providing to EISA long term funding which has gradually made this possible.”

Partners in-country were less able to articulate the objectives of ECEP than they were with PEMMO. They understood it as a more technical long term project that went beyond electoral observation but many understood it as an extension of PEMMO with more focus on training. In effect this assessment is accurate. As ECEP was essentially demand driven and tailor made to meet with specific needs of each country it was expected that the objectives would not be uniformly known in the region None of the partners felt that their work with EISA had changed direction substantially and all were comfortable that they were still the main implementers of the objectives of the project in their countries. All saw the project as relevant.

The methodology adopted by ECEP was to utilise networking, training, conferences , mentoring, work exchanges via internet, publications, peer support and field work to achieve the objectives. The expected beneficiaries were all 14 SADC countries and would focus on EMBs, political parties and civil society organisations.

Project outcomes

PEMMO has as its outcomes; PEMMO is one of the key tools in assessing elections by national and regional observers, PEMMO is launched in countries, PEMMO is distributed and popularised in countries and EISA’s capacity to support electoral processes in the region is enhanced. (PEMMO logframe)

ECEP builds upon these outcomes and has as its own; PEMMO continues to be one of the key tools in assessing elections by national and regional observers, EMBs management of the electoral process improved, CSOs understanding and management of election observation are improved, CSOs deploy observer missions specifically for the monitoring of the voter registration process, political parties observe elections in a professional and credible manner and are able to substantiate their claims, a regional workshop with party representatives identify elements for the development of new curricula and training materials for political party agent training, local elections receive due attention and are observed, EISA’s capacity to support electoral processes in the region is further enhanced, they remain up to date on global and regional election issues and their ability to assist EMBs is enhanced. (ECEP logframe)

Project outcomes for both PEMMO and ECEP were largely achieved with PEMMO being widely known and utilised in election observation missions in the region, its wide distribution and dissemination and EISA’s credibility being enhanced by their promotion of PEMMO in observer missions and training. Respondent all recognised that PEMMO is an effective tool for assessing elections and EMBs in the region that were interviewed promote its use. All CSOs know and use PEMMO in their electoral work and said that they had greatly benefitted in their election knowledge through being part of election observation missions. This was seen as an excellent networking opportunity and both

EMBs and CSOs said they learnt important lessons when visiting other countries on how to be more efficient and effective in managing/supporting and observing elections. There is less information on whether political parties know and utilise PEMMO and whether PEMMO has contributed to them being able to observe elections in a professional and credible manner. Outcomes that were not widely achieved were the observation of local government elections and the development of the political party training manual has not been completed, but it is in process. EISA has been an active and important partner in the ACE Knowledge Network and this has exposed their staff to best international practice and ensured that they are at the cutting edge of contemporary electoral practices and developments.

To assess effectiveness the evaluation needed to consider the strengths that EISA brought to the project and whether the objectives had been achieved or whether there was a reasonable expectation that the objectives would be achieved if the project (in the case of ECEP) is still ongoing. All of the respondents which included civil society in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho and EMBs in Zambia, Lesotho and Malawi said that the PEMMO and ECEP projects had been effective and demonstrated this in three important areas:

- Full participation of stakeholders in the electoral process, including civil society and political parties;
- The region holding elections that are seen as more credible and professional than in the past;
- Enhanced conflict management skills that promoted political tolerance and decreased the likelihood of conflict and violence;
- Improved knowledge and understanding of technical electoral processes such as voter registration and parallel voter tabulation that enables EMBs and other electoral stakeholders to ensure a credible and competent election that meets best practice standards

We should note that it is difficult to attribute all positive outcomes to the effectiveness of the project as there are always external factors that contribute towards more meaningful elections. These could include higher voter participation due to political party campaigns that speak to the voters, decreased voter apathy as the elections are highly contested and political will by government to effect democratisation through elections. Respondents recognised this but reinforced that the project contributed substantially to the objectives and thus proved effective.

Some of the areas that ensured the effectiveness of the project were listed by the respondents as; Research, networking, training and reporting

EISA is seen as having particular skills in these areas that both civil society and EMBs have benefited from.

The research unit at EISA regularly publishes on electoral and democracy issues in the region that are consistently of a high standard and are widely distributed. Chipfunde – Vava from ZESN typifies the view on EISA’s research and publications, “research is EISA’ s niche. Observer missions their strength. EISA has much technical skill and

knowledge. I pray they don't lose Khabele (Matlosa, Director of Research. He is an asset." Particular mention was made of the Journal of African Elections which is highly regarded and provides an effective tool for knowledge transfer.

The networking skills that EISA brought to the project enabled cross border (country) learning and ensured that observer missions represented a diversity of experience, countries, EMBs, civil society, political parties and were always gender sensitive. This last point was interestingly referred to as being important by many respondents who felt that often organisations pay lip service to gender equality but that EISA actually practices it (Makhotu, Chipfunde-Vava, Mwansa, Chilesa).

Training skills and expertise were also commended and partners felt that this contributed substantially towards better knowledge and that the observer missions trained by EISA were better equipped to observe and report on elections. Belinda Musanhu who did the day to day work on the project received particular mention as she was committed to the training and deployment of observer missions. All respondent said that they had a very good working relationship with her and the professionalism contributed to the effectiveness of the project (Msosa, Chipfunde-Vava, Rubvuta).

The accountability mechanisms that EISA had in place requiring reports from their partners were also commended. This practice of reporting is one that EISA has instilled in all its staff and requires that its partners provide reports on any work undertaken with EISA, this includes observer missions, workshops, symposium attendance, etc. Particular mention was made of the reports required from the observer missions and that how this enabled EISA to produce a quality composite report. Reporting requirements are a practice that most of the NGOs interviewed said they have now adopted in their everyday work and that this has led to them being more accountable and effective as there is a record of that they have done and they are able to assess potential or actual challenges and can strategically intervene if required.

Sustainability

Sustainability of the project is dependent on the state and its citizens accepting that regular free and fair elections are an intrinsic part of the political life of the country. When governments are changed through the ballot as a reflection of the will of the people and when the results are accepted by all political players and the EMB is above reproach in its conduct and is seen as being independent of any political opinion or interference then the ECEP and PEMMO project and, indeed all EISA' electoral work, will be sustainable. Currently the region is far from this position where even in those countries that exhibit democracy, it is fragile. Democracy has not become imbedded in their everyday political life. The factors above are largely dependent on political will and maturity and EISA's contribution to strengthening political parties, EMBs and civil society is but one, albeit an important, contribution towards sustainability.

The ability of civil society to be sustainable is an ongoing issue that donors attempt to address regularly. It is a difficult issue as the very nature of NGOs is that they are not for profit and provide services and represent communities. Most often these communities

are voiceless, marginalised and poor and to expect them to be able to contribute towards the work of the NGO is unlikely.

However an argument could be made that EISA has partners in this project that have budgets to organise and manage elections and that to deliver an election meets the criteria of free fair, credible and legitimate they need training and information sharing of a particular standard that EISA is able to deliver. It should be noted that all the EMBs interviewed said that it would be extremely difficult for them to pay for this kind of training and that even paying for the publications they receive from EISA would be difficult. Furthermore observer missions will always have to be donor supported as EMBs do not provide for these.

Mr Thoahlane said that he was confident that if EISA established an electoral training institute that charged for its services there would be a demand for these services. However it is more likely that to establish an institute would require donor support before it would be able to generate sufficient funds to even consider becoming sustainability. This would require long term commitment from a funder.

Sustainability issues should also be considered in the determining whether the projects funded under this grant are now entrenched as ongoing practice in the EMBs and CSOs. To a large extent the knowledge and skills transfer that has taken place is sustainable so long as those staff remain at the EMBs and CSOs. While these staff acknowledge that they should also ensure knowledge management and conduct training workshops for other staff this does not always occur. Often it is one or two staff per EMB or CSO and a few regular representatives from civil society who attend and participate in EISA's activities. This is a concern and the knowledge sharing should be wider to underpin sustainability. Sustainability will only be achieved when countries have embedded in their practice the holding of free, fair and credible elections. The region is still a long way from achieving this if we use Angola, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and recently Mozambique to illustrate the deficiencies in good electoral practice.

Donors will continue to find it difficult to ensure sustainability of the projects they support and in the majority of projects their funding will be require on an ongoing basis. They may be able to find ways to decrease their funding over a period of time, through other donors deciding to support the project, but realistically any complete withdrawal of their support would negatively impact the project. The ECEP project is a case in point as currently it is unlikely that it would be able to continue unless donors continued to support it.

Cost effectiveness

Whether the outcomes have been achieved in a cost effective manner is difficult to assess in terms of Rands and cents. The project delivered in line with the budget and where there was insufficient money for activities they raised funding from other donors and used alternative donor funding to supplement activities contained in the logframe. To assess cost effectiveness the questions should be asked whether this project can contribute to peace and political sustainability? If the answer is yes then it could be

perceived as being cost effective. All indications are that the region would be poorer if it had not had ECEP and PEMMO and thus the projects have contributed substantively to a more peaceful region.

Recommendations

Assess EISA's particular skills and expertise in delivering projects of this nature

Partners articulated clearly that the effectiveness of the project was a result of EISA utilising its strengths to achieve the objectives. An organisation should be in a position to assess what their strengths are in an objective and nuanced manner. One the ways to assess an organisation's strength is through peer critique. In this instance partners were unanimous that research, networking, training and accountability mechanisms were EISA's strengths. These should be utilised to ensure effectiveness and should form part of the project plan at inception or, during the life of the project at an appropriate interval if they are not already being utilised in the project implementation.

A frank assessment should be done to determine whether necessary skills are not present or are a weakness of the organisation. The partners did not articulate any skill that the project needed that EISA did not possess.

Capacity and skills of project staff need to be realistically planned for and incorporated into the project-

An effective project is one that provides sufficient expertise and skills in the oversight, management and coordination. EISA should ensure that such staff are employed through market related reimbursement and sufficient benefits including recognition that this type of work requires long hours and extreme commitment. For instance organising and deploying an observer mission requires weeks of work at close to 18 hours a day. This may result in overload and burn out and the attrition rate of professional skilled staff would be high. Sufficient quality time off and support structures should form part of EISA's approach to employment.

Donors should recognise that one or two staff members are insufficient to achieve the deliverables in a project of this nature and should be willing to include budget line items for salaries and benefits for a realistic number of staff.

The large number of queries that EISA receives for electoral training could be better met if they establish an external reference team of qualified people who could be called on to conduct this training. This was suggested by Khabele Matlosa and it is recommended that the feasibility and financial implications of this are considered

Sustainability of NGO projects is realistically difficult to achieve and should be acknowledged by donors-

Donors must recognise that projects of this nature will only be sustainable when elections are conducted as an essential component of democracy and that political parties accept the results of the elections. There are countries such as Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa that are largely achieving electoral sustainability but countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC, Swaziland and Mozambique still have a way to go before the holding of free and fair elections is a natural and intrinsic component of democracy.

Section 8

EISA's institutional development

Strategic orientation

Based on its analysis of the democracy and governance context in Africa as well as its own internal competencies and institutional gaps, EISA re-looked its vision and mission and developed a strategic framework to enable it to best respond to these challenges. Two strategic goals were identified. The first goal meets EISA's newly defined thematic of governance, elections and democracy and the second goal to ensure that the organisation has internal capacity to meet these goals. ECEP project's objectives, contribute to meeting these two strategic goals.

EISA holds an annual staff retreat where the organisation reflects on, interrogates the relevance of its projects in relation to its vision, mission and strategic objectives and plans its forthcoming year's projects. This report is presented to the Board for discussion and endorsement. The EISA Board Chairperson is invited to, and since the inception of the SDC supported project, has attended two annual retreats.

Programme Management and Organisational Set up

The revised organisational structure is better equipped to meet EISA's broadened scope of work on elections, democracy and governance. A Programme Director oversees two thematic areas: Elections and Political Processes (EPP) under whom the SDC project falls, and Governance Institutions and Processes. The ECEP project is overseen by the Programmes Director and more specifically by the Manager of the Elections and Political Processes. A designated staff member in this department has responsibility for the ECEP programme.

EISA has several structures in place to ensure accountability. In brief these include:
EISA Board – The Board has overall responsibility for the organisation. The majority of members come from African countries. The Board is governed by EISA's Articles of Association and a Board Charter which sets out the term of office of Board members. An Audit Remuneration and Risk Committee, a sub-committee of the Board, meets prior to every Board meeting (and if necessary on an ad hoc basis). A financial report is presented to the Board at each meeting. An annual report is published reporting on the programmes and includes its annual financial report displaying transparency and public accountability. The Management Committee comprises the Executive Director, the Directors of Finance, Programmes and Operations, the Managers of EPP and Governance Institutions and Processes and the Field Office Country Directors who attend quarterly meetings. Monthly meetings provide a platform for senior staff to share and interrogate programmatic, financial and administrative issues. Staff meetings are held quarterly after each Board meeting to brief staff on Board decisions pertaining to the organisation. Ad hoc meetings are called issues as required.

Organisational policies

EISA HR policies cover a range of topics including grievance and disciplinary procedures, a vehicle policy, internal and external consultancy work, an HIV/Aids policy, a sexual harassment policy and a Gender policy. The latter policy was supported by SDC which included funding for facilitators to conduct a workshop on gender related issues in 2007.

Co-ordination with country partners and beneficiaries

EISA selects partners based on specific programmes. Partnerships are beneficial to the organisation allowing for opportunities for information sharing as well as peer learning. For example the SDC project supported the secondment of an EISA staff member to a regional EMB (in this case to Botswana) to gain firsthand election experience. In turn partners learn from EISA. This was endorsed by the Executive Director of FODEP who noted in the interview that “the regional learning that we have acquired can be applied nationally”.

EISA requires partner organisations to provide supporting documentation and reports where it has given support as EISA in turn has to report to donors. EISA has strict controls in place. For this project the project manager, (Belinda Musanhu) would request payment based on supporting documentation from the relevant partner, signed off by the EPP Manager and finally by the Finance Director before the disbursement is made. EISA also required partner’s to provide reports of events. EISA insistence on accountability is recognised by partners. ZESN for example mentioned that “EISA places great emphasis on reporting and accountability”.

Stakeholder analysis

EISA’s long history of working with EMBs, political parties and civil societies makes it easier for the organisation to identify appropriate stakeholders. Recently this has extended to regional and continental bodies such as the AU and the PAP. A database of partners, experts has been developed, which EISA consults for specific activities. Where EISA engages in a country for the first time, a fact-finding mission by senior staff is undertaken to identify the appropriate stakeholder and context.

Monitoring and Knowledge Management

Monitoring: Internally EISA projects are monitored through:

Proposals and logframes – In particular the logframes are used to assess the extent to which the programme outcomes are met. Workplans are prepared according to the logframe and reassessed quarterly

Quarterly departmental and Board reports – enable staff to track activities according to timelines and keep the Board up to date on EISA’s ability to deliver according to donor requirements

Monthly Manco reports

Donor reports

Monthly financial reports –allow senior staff to track expenditure against the budget and address any problems as to under or over expenditure.

Audit reports – an annual audit is conducted unless donors require specific audits

Performance appraisals are conducted annually. This enables staff to check that they are meeting the specific outcomes identified in their performance objectives set at the beginning of each year. Performance objectives are prepared based on project proposals and logframes as well as goals set at the annual retreat.

Externally monitoring is done through donor reporting requirements, independent donor evaluations and regular feedback from stakeholders.

Knowledge management and Information sharing

EISA has various processes in place internally and externally to manage knowledge.

Internally this facilitates:

- safeguarding institutional memory;
- sharing and updating programme information with staff;
- cross departmental and project learning
- avoiding duplication in either developing relevant material or providing a particular service
- keeping management and staff updated

Externally this facilitates sharing knowledge between and with its partners and the wider public

Internally EISA stores knowledge technologically in the form of:

- electronic storage and electronic filing,
- knowledge repositories such as databases of all EISA partners and experts
- conventional and traditional method of hard copies
- Elbi database, a catalogue that contains all EISA library information. This is mainly accessed by staff at programme officer level and above and externally by individuals, academics, EMBS organisations etc
- Quarterly Board reports, workplans, financial reports, annual and donor reports are prepared

The organisation however has recognised that preserving institutional memory is a crucial. To this end it is in the process of finalising a practical guide on programme conceptualisation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation for each of the programmes which will be finalised by the end of this year. This will enable new staff and even current staff to understand how each project works should they be required to either assist or assume a different position.

Externally EISA's knowledge and information is available to the public mainly through its website which houses detailed SADC comparative country information (the constitution, legal framework, electoral laws, election results etc), an updated continental election

calendar, reports and publications. Its library is utilised by a range of stakeholders and its publications distributed continentally and beyond.

EISA and gender mainstreaming

The EISA gender policy has been developed to systematise the process of gender mainstreaming and creating an environment for making gender equality a basis. Internally women make up 55% of EISA head office staff, of which two out of eight senior staff are women. Field Offices do not fare so well with only 10 out of 31 Field Office staff being women. This is largely due to the country context where the level of skills is unevenly distributed amongst men. At its inception in 1996, 5 out of 6 staff were women.

As the needs and skill base of EISA has developed over the years in response to organisational demands (such as language requirements, expertise) the criteria for selection has had to be extended to meet these demands. Supported by SDC, external consultants facilitated a gender workshop to sensitise staff on gender issues and to interrogate the gender policy. Following the workshop a sexual harassment policy was formulated facilitated by an external consultant. When recruiting staff, cognisance is taken of the EISA gender policy. However this has had to be balanced with project demands and the necessary skill. EISA's publications, manuals etc display a gender sensitivity and gender is mainstreamed in terms of examples, case studies and information. EISA, supported by another donor, has, since 2007 run capacity building programme for women to enter political life in Madagascar. This is the first gender focussed programme that EISA has run. Gender is mainstreamed into all other programmes

Lessons learned

The main achievements and lessons learnt in terms of project management and co-ordination can be briefly summarised as: The emphasis on corporate governance through the formulation and adoption of a Board Charter, the reformulation of its vision, mission, goals and objectives, the recognition that partnerships enhance its work and provide a platform for mutual exchange of skills and information, the interaction with partners including the Pan African Parliament, EMBS and CSOS has enabled EISA to improve its expertise, knowledge and skills. In addition from interviews with staff, strengthening its partnerships with EMBs, CSOs and other institutions such as the PAP has enabled all these stakeholders has lead to improvements in the conduct of elections, especially with the PEMMO as the basic guideline

Recommendations

- Increased staff capacity – while EISA has competently delivered on the project outputs, all staff interviewed acknowledged the need for additional capacity. In order to meet the demands of this (and other projects) staff work long hours and over weekends, to make sure that they do deliver.
- More EISA support and collaboration with partners on projects and not only the ECEP project expressed by partners.

- Facilitate more stakeholder buy-in at country level to ensure great national ownership as this could lead to long term sustainability, rather than solely rely on EISA.
- Sufficient funding to attract and retain skilled staff. Given that EISA is an international organisation it has to compete with other organisations of this ilk, for example International Idea, the UN etc, and has to be able to offer attractive remuneration packages otherwise it will not be able to do so.
- Finalisation of the institutional manual

Section 9 Summary of key recommendations, proposed scenarios and conclusion

A number of key recommendations are summarised below. Two scenarios are presented contained in each section of the evaluation report. This final section summarises two possible scenarios for SDC to consider in taking forward their relationship with EISA in the future.

Summarised recommendations

The following key recommendation emanate from the evaluation:

- Invite EISA to submit a funding proposal for 2011-2014, which may include a baseline study. The baseline will assess what the current situation and will provide information on what needs to be done geographically and substantively in the region. It will also provide important benchmarks against which future evaluations can compare progress and achievement of indicators. The funding proposal would include a logframe with outcomes, indicators and risks and assumptions.
- The proposal should focus work on “closed” countries that have particular challenges to the sustainability of elections. These are Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the DRC. The work in these countries should target EMBs, civil society and political parties. This does not mean that other countries that have more “open” political and social contexts should be ignored but rather that the focus should be on the former and priority given to them.
- Conduct a needs assessment of political parties in the region as they have not been beneficiaries of the project to the same extent that EMBs and CSOs were.
- Establish a group of electoral experts that can be utilised to support EISA’s work when EISA has capacity limitations in responding to requests for electoral training and support work in the region and the continent.
- Request EISA to facilitate a meeting of the other two key funders on this project, DFID and SIDA, to enable the three donors to explore the possibility of a joint project with EISA that has a common objective, reporting requirements and evaluation.
- Ensure EISA has sufficient capacity to conduct the project. This may mean appointing a second staff member to co-ordinate the project.
- Support EISA to work closely with SADC organs that will advance electoral democracy and sustainability in the region.

Scenario 1 – continuation of the relationship in the 2011-2014 funding period with a particular focus “closed” countries and political parties in the region

In the body of the report it is evident that there are a number of strategic changes that could take place at this stage of ECEP’s life. These include a renewed focus on capacity building work with political parties, a revised plan for working more intensively in ‘closed’ societies such as Angola, Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Closed societies are

those societies that have barriers to effective participation in elections and democratic governance, civil society that is weak and EMBs that are more inclined to be aligned to the incumbent. They are historically countries that EISA has found it more difficult to work effectively in due to these constraints.

Zimbabwe requires particular efforts with the EMB, as it has previously not engaged with EISA. Civil society in Zimbabwe has worked closely with EISA and does not need the same degree of attention. Ongoing of this nature is required because of the cyclical nature of elections and the high staff turnover in EMBs and CSOs

Other traditional partners of EISA would still require ongoing support but should not be the primary focus of the project. The methodology of deployment of observer missions, training in various aspects of electoral processes, knowledge management, research and publication, networking and enhanced capacity for EISA are all still relevant means to achieving the objective of ECEP. These pay testimony to the appropriate conception of the project. The changes required are minimal and would be relatively easy for EISA to implement. EISA would be advised to investigate the viability of establishing an electoral training institute that could offer ongoing professional electoral training and support to its partners, perhaps at a fee depending on the affordability of its partners of such. To best respond to increased requests for training that EISA has indicated it has been receiving a roster or reference team of external experts should be established that may be called upon from time to time to deliver particular services.

EISA is advised to continue to widen its pool of potential donors for democratisation and electoral work. This may not result in absolute sustainability but will provide a valuable lifeline to EISA should a major donor decide to decrease their support in the future.

The meeting with DFID and SIDA is key if this option is adopted as there should be a joint project for the forthcoming funding period that consolidates the current ECEP and PEMMO projects.

Scenario 2 – Extension of project into the African continent for the period 2011-2014

SDC has demonstrated that it is a donor that is committed to long term projects and relationships with appropriate partners. EISA's work has become synonymous with SDC and this should be exploited for the benefit of countries outside of the southern African region that seek EISA's support as well as in countries that illustrate a heightened need for democracy and governance and electoral support. It is recommended that this third scenario be explored by SDC as one that best meets its commitments to the continent.

EISA's new vision for its future work is "An African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment". Their mission is "EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, a human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa".

Two strategic goals of EISA would resonant strongly with SDC, namely, to “strengthen governance processes and representative institutions in order to entrench participatory democracy” and “consolidate EISA’s authority and credibility in order to provide sustained leadership in the democracy and governance sector in Africa”.

A programme that reached outside of the region as well as working in southern Africa would support four of EISA strategic objectives:

1. To enhance electoral processes to ensure their inclusiveness and legitimacy
2. To strengthen governance institutions to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes
3. To promote effective citizen participation in democratic processes to strengthen institutional accountability and responsiveness
4. To create a culture of excellence within EISA that leads to consistently high quality products and services

Some of the activities that should be considered by SDC are similar to those already contained in ECEP and include”

- Supporting EISA’s direct electoral assistance to EMBs in Africa through training workshops, networking, capacity building, research, writing and publications and knowledge management
- Develop and share particular knowledge and expertise in certain key areas that include but are not limited to voter registration audits, parallel voter tabulation, electoral management, electoral conflict management and methodologies to increase voter participation in election processes
- The deployment of independent observer missions composed of a variety of stakeholders from EMBs, civil society and political parties. Associated with these missions is the provision of high quality training that enables professional and non-partisan reporting
- Strengthening the existing strategic partnerships between EISA and bodies like the African Union Commission, the Pan-African Parliament, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), providing technical assistance to their electoral support programmes and electoral assistance units
- Enhance EISA’s capacity to conduct the above activities by supporting their ability to attract high quality staff and to retain these staff. Essential is a recognition that a sufficient number for staff be retained for a project of this nature. EISA should be able to assess the required number of staff but at the least there should be two full time programme staff that manage the project ton a day to day basis supported by a senior administrator. The current management and oversight would be sufficient
- Further strengthening of EISA’s internal governance and management systems as the organisation extends its work
- Delivering enhanced staff development and training programmes

Both of these options would provide EISA with sufficient support to enable them to continue with and consolidate the work they have been doing to entrench democratic election in the region and the continent.

ANNEXURE 1

EVALUATION TOOL: EISA'S PROGRAMME ON ENTRENCHING THE PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION MANAGEMENT, MONITORING AND OBSERVATION AND ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF ELECTION PRACTITIONERS TO SUPPORT, MANAGE AND MONITOR ELECTIONS (ECEP)

This evaluation questionnaire is divided into four sections; section A contains questions that will indicate the impact of the project and will be administered to all stakeholders that may have been part of the evaluation, i.e. EMBs, civil society and political parties in each of the five countries, viz. Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Section B will focus on output assessment questions. In sections A and B there are questions relating to specific challenges and recommendations for improvement. Section C addresses the organization capacity of EISA and provides the evaluator with two sets of data, EISA as seen through the lens of the partners/stakeholders that they worked with on this programme and EISA's own assessment of their organizational capacity as it relates to this programme.

There is a final section D that deals with generic questions that may not have been asked in the first three sections.

The sections cover both the PEMMO and ECEP programmes as the two interact naturally and any distinction made at the questionnaire stage would be artificial. After explaining the purpose of the evaluation the following questions will be administered:

SECTION A - OUTCOMES

- 1 What do you understand the objective/s of the ECEP and PEMMO programmes to be? Note has been taken that partners would not necessarily have the objectives of the programme or be aware of these. Thus the evaluator will read the objectives as contained in the proposal and will then enquire whether these are understood to be the objectives.
- 2 Are these objectives in line with the work that you (EMB, political party or civil society organization) are doing? Explain
- 3 How do you think these objectives contribute to the deepening of democracy in your country and your region?
- 4 Do you think the programme has contributed to the deepening on democracy in your country and/or region? Explain
- 5 Do you think that the programme has contributed to enhancing electoral capacity? Explain

- 6 The ECEP and PEMMO programmes have a number of outcomes (read these from the ECEP and PEMMO logical framework). Please comment on whether these outcomes have been realized?
- 7 How has the attainment of these outcomes benefited your organization/political party?
- 8 What are the challenges that you (your organization/political party) has faced in achieving the outcomes?
- 9 What are the greatest successes you have achieved through meeting the outcomes?

SECTION B - OUTPUTS

- 1 What specific activities have you undertaken (with EISA) to achieve the objectives of ECEP and PEMMO programmes? List these please. Note – the logical framework will be used by the evaluator to guide these questions. Each activity specified in the framework will be addressed.
- 2 Specify EISA's role in these activities?
- 3 What was the result of these activities? e.g. if a training workshop on PVT took place the result would be that people were trained in PVT
- 4 How have these activities contributed to enhancing you and your organisation's/political party's capacity to support, manage and/or monitor elections
- 5 What are the challenges that you (your organisation/political party) has faced in implementing the specific activities?
- 6 What are the greatest successes you have achieved through the implementation of the specific activities?

SECTION C – EISA/s ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY

- 1 Who at EISA have you worked with on this programme?
- 2 Describe your working relationship with them and with EISA as a whole?
- 3 Has EISA provided the deliverables in a timeous and professional manner? Explain
- 4 Has EISA monitored the progress of the programme over the period it has taken place? Explain how this has been done?
- 5 How do you report to EISA on the progress of the programme?

- 6 Has EISA been able to assess whether there is a need for strategic changes to take place during the period of the programme? If yes, explain how these changes were made?
- 7 What are the main challenges to working with EISA on this programme?
- 8 What do you think EISA has brought to this programme that other regional electoral civil society organisations would not have been able to bring to this programme?

SECTION D – Generic questions

- 1 Do you know what the budget is for the particular activities you have implemented with EISA?
- 2 Do you think that the deliverables represent good value for money? Note this question can't be asked if 1 above is unanswered.
- 3 Is there anything you would do differently if you had the chance to undertake this programme again?
- 4 Are there any other inputs you would like to make that have not been covered in the above questions?