



EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE DCAF TRUST FUND FOR SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN NORTH AFRICA (TFNA) – 2012 - 2020

DRAFT FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Executive Summary.....	v
List of Acronyms	ix
1. Introduction	1
2. Description of TFNA country programmes activities (Descriptive summary).....	3
3. Methodology used for the evaluation	11
3.1. Methodology of the evaluation	11
3.2. Methodological limitations.....	12
4. Review and analysis of main findings	14
5. Evaluation conclusions.....	49
6. Evaluation recommendations	55
6.1. Strategic Recommendations.....	55
6.2. Operational Recommendations	56
Annexe 1: Terms of reference.....	58
Annexe 2: Evaluation Matrix	68
Annexe 3: Document review	75
Annexe 4: List of persons consulted (in alphabetical order).....	84
Annexe 5: Framework of SSR national and TFNA interventions.....	87
Annexe 6: Review of the DCAF's Tunisia Portfolio (Fall 2020)	89
Annexe 7: Presentation of initial Findings and Conclusions (December 2020).....	92

Figures

Figure 1: Structure and management of the tfna (TOR, 2012) **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

Figure 2: Theory of the change of the Trust Fund for North Africa 3

Tables

Table 1: Mixed methods used by the evaluation..... 11

Table 2: Operations disbursements vs received contributions (DCAF, 2017-2020 – Sept.) – Millions of CHF 30

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Executive Summary

This Executive Summary will be presented in two parts: presentation of the evaluation findings and conclusions. The introduction section to the report provides rationale and objectives of the evaluation and expected results.

Historical juncture

The TFNA was created as a response to the important political juncture that took place in North Africa in 2011. The Arab Spring prompted the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance to establish a Trust Fund for North Africa in June 2012, allowing it to rapidly assist the governments of Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia with the security sector governance and reform. The goal of the outreach and programming is to work towards effective, accountable security and justice systems that can have a chance in reducing the risk of conflict, strengthening the social contract between the state and its people, and providing a solid foundation for political, social and economic development.

Ten years later, the four countries followed vastly different and even divergent paths in their political, social and security development, which explains some of the outcomes identified during the evaluation process. Specifically, TFNA programming has had to adjust to the situation on the ground in each country, while delivering innovative, well-researched, flexible and highly praised programming that is tailored to the local context. The TOR drafted almost ten years ago remain sound and valid but need some adaptations to the current context and realities.

Findings of the evaluation

The Trust Fund has made progress in interacting with security sector actors in each respective country but is not always in a position to address all SSG/R deficits; its interactions with central state authorities have faced important limitations, and it therefore allowed different levels of involvement.

For example, the interaction with the highest authorities dealing with SSG/R is significant in Tunisia, emerging in Libya and quite hesitant in Morocco, despite the programmatic efforts undertaken by DCAF in this regard and its increasing capacity in working with oversight institutions. The TFNA model of engagement remains relevant to respond to countries' requests for assistance, respecting their policy and political orientations and decisions. The results achieved so far must be thus viewed as a function of trust and confidence building with local partners. Geared by the principles of neutrality and independence, DCAF is perceived to be listening very carefully to its governmental and civil-society partners and is seen as an inclusive partner that contributes to security governance and provision in a conflict sensitive and contextualised manner. Involved in long term, programmatic and policy support processes related to SSG/R initiatives in each country targeted by the Fund, the TFNA pursues pragmatic and partners-driven approaches, using a wide array of tools and methodologies, where each response adapted to a specific context and needs analysis.

Regarding the relevance of programming, TFNA interventions are well connected to the national SSG/R frameworks in TFNA donor countries, grounded on solid research and are viewed to be complementary with the programming of other donors active in the same countries. The evaluators assessed that the Theory of Change, which guides the TFNA programming remains valid, but it would benefit from minor updates regarding gender, and civil society organizations. The TFNA remains a flexible instrument that can take different shapes in light of the relevance of the needs expressed by the partners.

The effectiveness of the Trust Fund activities can be described as satisfactory, given the circumstances. TFNA has a good record of outputs and outcomes achieved in each country. In Tunisia, the Fund has established solid relations with security sector actors and institutions which allowed the design and implementation of about 30 projects when the evaluation was taking place. In Morocco, the number of partners, MOUs and activities has steadily increased and the level of confidence of the partners is high. In Libya, the programming is obviously limited due to the civil war but institutional interest from central authorities sounds receptive and promising. In Egypt, the TFNA has limited activities: managing the security sector observatory Marsad Egypt, which was moved to Facebook due to government blocking in August 2017. Products which are transversal to each country (Marsad SSR Observatories in three countries, Legal Database) represent iconic contributions of DCAF in the region.

DCAF can count on a dedicated team of sound intellectual quality and professionalism. However, its **efficiency** is negatively impacted by the lack of official administrative status in any of the three countries. This complicates its relations with some actors and adds to the cost of programming and labor, increases difficulty in recruitment, obligation to work remotely (Libya) or by regularly flying to Morocco. To ensure that the balance between budget forecasting and donors' contribution gets properly aligned the evaluation suggests that a mid-year StC/DCAF meeting would implement a mid-year budget review to ensure secured financing for the TFNA operations.

Impact: TFNA activities and products are change contributors, impact of which depends on local ownership. The Fund's 'tools of change' range from training sessions to sophisticated databases, websites, development of guides and user manuals, video production and other instruments. While TFNA's proactive contributions to good security sector governance constitute the main pillar of the TFNA's work, the degree to which it has been able to engage and make a difference in areas like PVE or gender integration seems more limited. The capacity of the TFNA to invest in multiple aspects of a given topic through multiple entry points goes beyond a "one-time intervention" and ensures that different projects in a given sector can be complementary one from another. Gender and Youth sensitive approaches within DCAF's programming will reinforce the TFNA's inclusivity in the SSG/R areas in each respective country.

The sustainability of the Trust Fund's programmes and projects is very much context driven and depends on the effectiveness of its products designed to inch the three countries closer to effective, accountable security and justice systems. Sustained change goes along with empowerment of partners and requires confidence building and mutual ownership. The TFNA has the capacity to invest on the long term with its partners who in return, recognize the capacity of the Fund to support them effectively. To this effect, DCAF

has signed several MoUs with a growing number of institutional partners, as well as with Ministries and Parliaments. The programming tools contributing to the desired change are carefully designed based on local research, with a suitable entry points in mind. However, the change will ultimately depend on the governments' political goals and ownership.

Recommendations of the evaluation

Strategic recommendations

Recommendation 1: The TFNA, with the support of members of DCAF's Foundation Council and TFNA donors, should reach diplomatic and/or administrative agreements with the countries it works in.

Recommendation 2: The TFNA should consider adjusting its TOR to better reflect current realities of its contextual environment 10 years after their adoption.

Recommendation 3: The ToC of the TFNA should be complemented with a "gender rights approach" and reflect civil society's role in Effective Oversight and Adequate Legal and Policy Framework.

Recommendation 4: The TFNA should consider the possibility to position senior national advisors in each of TFNA countries where it has no official representation.

Operational recommendations

Recommendation 5: After a short HR organizational review, the TFNA should consider recruiting additional resources to strengthen its research and operational functions as well as to facilitate the introduction of a MEL function in all its programming.

Recommendation 6: A technical group of TFNA StC and management should review *mid-year* budget figures to assess the level of achievements of each country scenario in a given year, expected contributions and inform the group of donors accordingly.

Recommendation 7: DCAF and the TFNA leadership should reassess the process for programme design, planning, approval and implementation in order to ensure a more efficient decision-making process.

Recommendation 8: With the support of the StC, and as per the original TOR of the Fund, the TFNA should commission an independent "*lessons learned and review exercise of the entire DCAF TFNA*:"

Recommendation 9: With the support of the Gender and Security Sector Division, the TFNA staff should be offered further training on Gender integration in SSG/R and a review of all projects conducted with a gender lens.

List of Acronyms

CAWTAR	Center for Arab Women Training and Research
CdP	Comité de Pilotage
CNAI	Conseil National d'Accès à l'Information
CEDHD	Centre d'Études en Droits Humains et Démocratie
CNDP	Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Données à caractère personnel
CREDIF	Centre de Recherches, d'étude et de documentation et d'information sur la femme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DGPAP	Direction Générale de l'Administration Pénitentiaire
DIDH	Délégation Interministérielle aux Droits de l'Homme
ENSA	École Nationale Supérieure d'Administration
ESFI	École Supérieure des Forces Intérieures
ESG	École Supérieure de Guerre
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Mission
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GNA	Government of National Accord
HQ	Headquarters
INAI	Instance Nationale d'Accès à l'Information

ICPC	Instance Centrale de Lutte contre la Corruption
INLUCC	Instance Nationale de la Lutte Contre la Corruption
INPT	Instance Nationale pour la Prévention de la Torture
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
LAHRR	Libyan Association for Human Rights and Scientific Research
LOE	Level of Effort
MdP	Maison de la paix
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation for Development
OPCAT	Optional Protocol of the Convention Against Torture
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PSJP	Policing and Security Joint Program
QA	Quality Assurance
RBM	Results-Based Management
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SCG	Strategic Capacity Group
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSR	Security Sector Reform
StC	Steering Committee
StG	Steering Group

SWOT	Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TFNA	Trust Fund North Africa
ToC	Theory of Change
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
UFE	Utilization-Focused Evaluation
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Sector Resolution
UNSMIL	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Libya
USA	United States of America
VPN	Virtual Private Network

EVALUATION REPORT

1. Introduction

Background and objectives of the evaluation

The Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) is dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governance the rule of law and respect for human rights. In 2011, North Africa witnessed important political change. In their search for a new future, societies in North Africa identified security sector reform as necessary for ensuring democratic transition, restoring public confidence into the state and its institutions, and prevent violence. In response to the demand for expertise in security sector governance and reform, DCAF's Foundation Council endorsed the establishment of a Trust Fund for Security Sector Development Assistance in North Africa (TFNA) in June 2012, allowing rapid and flexible responses to request for assistance from the governments of Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The four countries originally benefiting from the TFNA support followed vastly different and even divergent paths in their political, social and security development. The flexibility of the Fund has allowed DCAF to increasingly develop context-specific interventions, reflecting the differences among the countries.

The TFNA works as both a steering instrument and a pool funding mechanism. Through the TFNA's Steering Committee (StC), member states provide strategic guidance to and oversight over the TFNA's interventions. They also contribute financially on an annual or pluri-annual basis, both to the TFNA's general window, as well as to all or one or more of the four country-specific windows.

In 2015, the StC commissioned the first external evaluation of the TFNA to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Trust Fund's interventions. The evaluation also considered the structure and functioning of the TFNA and provided recommendations at the strategic and operational set-ups. In October 2019, the StC commissioned a new external evaluation of the TFNA, considering that the timing was appropriate to re-evaluate the funding mechanism while keeping the same criteria of as for the first evaluation, but with a particular emphasis on assessing impact at the outcome level. The evaluation aimed to assess: the interventions of the Trust Fund; the Outcomes, Outputs and Processes/Activities outlined in the TFNA's Theory of Change; the existing and on-going Country Strategies for Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia; other TFNA planning and M&E documents.

For the second external evaluation of the TFNA, DCAF selected a team of two persons, Mr. Yvan Conoir, Team Leader (TL) (Canadian) and Ms. Emna Sammari (Tunisian) to conduct the evaluation. An inception report confirmed the methodology to be adopted and proposed an Evaluation Matrix to guide the work of the consulting team. The Team Leader managed to conduct face-to-face interviews in Geneva during the beginning of the Data Collection Phase (September 2020) and to interview 13 persons. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a local lockdown, both travel to Tunisia and Morocco as well as in-person

meetings within the country were impossible. Also, travel to Libya was not possible nor envisaged due to the security situation. Thus, Ms. Sammari and Mr. Conoir undertook virtual interviews with governmental officials, civil society representatives, officials of regional or international organizations (EU, UNSMIL) and diplomatic representatives of donors present on the StC, in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia (as well as in the USA, Turkey and Canada where some consultants working for the TFNA reside), in English, French or Arabic, for a final total of 57 meetings.

At the end of the data collection process, the members of the Steering Committee, DCAF staff and leadership participated in a review session to discuss the preliminary evaluation findings and conclusions (December 2020). Since then, the evaluation team developed the Draft and then Final evaluation reports, integrating comments and suggestions from both StC members and DCAF management team.


2. Description of TFNA country programmes activities (Descriptive summary)

The following section provides an overview of the main activities of the TFNA Country programmes, as required by the TOR of the evaluation. It is not exhaustive but is reflective of the main activities of TFNA in the three main countries of concentration of focus, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia with some comments on the activities of the Marsad Egypt information channel in Egypt.

The description of the activities of the programme highlights the way DCAF has been using the ToC to frame its intervention in each country and the coherence that it provides in designing the interaction between the various activities engaged. Further comments on the ToC will be provided within the report.

The description also highlights the variety of tools and methods that are being used by TFNA teams to promote the SSG/R agenda in each country.

FIGURE 1: THEORY OF THE CHANGE OF THE TRUST FUND FOR NORTH AFRICA



TUNISIA

TFNA has supported the development of three main programming areas in Tunisia. These are: effective oversight, adequate legal and policy framework, and responsive security. This section illustrates relevant activities that have been undertaken since the last evaluation in 2016.

Effective Oversight

Parliamentary and Independent Oversight Strengthened

Parliament (ARP):

- Support to the Special Commission on Security and Defense to initiate a self-evaluation process.
- Organizing workshops on Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Community for members of the Parliamentary Committee of the Organization of the Administration and Armed Forces' Affairs (COAAFA) and the Committee on Security and Defence (CSD).
- Training and capacity building initiatives for the parliamentary Special Commission on Security and Defense to promote role in the democratic transitional process and its skills on crisis management, cybersecurity, access to information in the security sector, the budgetary and financial control of the security sector.

Tunisian Institutions:

- Development of a Guide on the use of forensic evidence in investigations of allegations of torture and mistreatment; study trips and trainings for the legal and medical experts.
- Training on the Istanbul Protocol for members of the National Committee for the Prevention of Torture; Training and capacity building initiatives for 27 prison doctors on Mandela Rules.
- Production of two studies: one on the guarantees of non-repetition (comparative experiences with the Instance de Vérité et Dignité) and one on institutional reforms in Tunisia.
- Training on good governance of the defense sector and the Tunisian regulatory framework to fight corruption for security sector agents.
- Webinars on fighting against corruption amidst the COVID-19 pandemic for Tunisian and Moroccan authorities.

Other actors:

- Signing of a grant contract between the EU and DCAF for the implementation of the « *Appui à la mise en place du contrôle démocratique sur le secteur de la sécurité en Tunisie* » project (this project is not under the governance of the TFNA).
- Mapping of the legal and institutional framework related to police ethics control in Tunisia, against the background of international standards and comparative practices in other countries.
- Training and capacity building initiatives for the Ministry of Interior, including special units on communication.

Effective Communication and Information Sharing

- Development of an online platform on the criminal justice system in Tunisia.

- Updating the platform of *Marsad Tunisia*.
- Training and capacity building initiatives to promote journalistic skills on crisis communication for better coverage of SSR/G issues; Trainings to strengthen journalists' knowledge of the criminal procedures.
- Organization of various conferences on different SSG/R topics (cybersecurity, fight against fake news, media reporting on child security issues, etc.).
- Production of videos to highlight the legal and practical consequences of Article 49 of the Tunisian Constitution for good governance of the security sector.
- Training and capacity building initiatives to the Ministry of Interior, including special units on communication.
- Online training to Penitentiary authorities on security sector reform and governance.
- Signature of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National Authority for Access to Information (CNAI) to increase the effective implementation of the right of access to information in the security sector.
- Training and capacity building initiatives to promote skills of the National Authority for Access to Information on the classification/declassification of documents and their impact on the right of access to information.

Adequate Legal and Policy Framework

Regulatory assistance and policy framework in place:

- Cooperation Framework with the Ministry of justice and a comprehensive action plan to support the ongoing reform of the Criminal Justice (not yet signed).
- Training and capacity building initiatives for the Ministry of Justice on creating an integrated digital system to standardize the classification of criminal offenses.

Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies

- Strengthening the role of female politicians in SSR/G processes with the partnership of an NGO, Aswat Nissa.
- Organizing a conference on Women, Peace and Security discussing best practices to implement UNSCR 1325 in Tunisia.
- Organizing a roundtable about the gender perspective in law- and public policy making related to security issues.
- Renewing the cooperation with the Ministry of Women, Families, Childhood and Seniors to develop a study on the degree of gender equality in SSR and building the capacity of the national observatory to counter violence against women.

Responsive Security

Support to managing change of security providers

- Signature of an MoU with the Ministry of Interior to support the ministry to roll-out its two-year training program on good governance and integrity building.

- Participating in workshop with Belgian experts involved in the drafting of the recent Minister of Interior 'Plan national de sécurité 2016'.
- Assessing the Ministry's equipment requirements and identify facilities for the future media centre.
- Study trip to communication officers to benefit from comparative experience in terms of crisis communication.
- Coaching sessions to Strengthening external communication of the Tunisian National League of Policewomen.
- Promotion of a culture of prevention of violence and respect for human rights through trainings to juvenile justice actors, action-oriented research and studies on violence and on GBV and masculinities.
- Integration of gender approach and practices into strategies and action plans in security sector.
- Supporting Tunisian institutions and civil society stockholder's through research, consultations (Tunisian authority of Fighting against Corruption ...).
- Gender self-assessment within security sector institutions.
- Elaboration of a corruption risk assessment and training plan with the Minister of Interior.
- Trainings on strategic planning for the penitentiary department of the Ministry of Justice.
- Identification mission of the needs of prison agents (dealing with detained women and minors), elaboration of a training manual and provision of training.

LIBYA

The TFNA has supported the development of three main programmatic areas in Libya. These are: effective oversight, adequate legal and policy framework and responsive security. This section will illustrate relevant activities undertaken since 2016.

Effective Oversight

Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies:

- Strengthening relations with political actors (members of the Constitutional Assembly, the National Dialogue Commission, the House of Representatives and other key security institutions) and the international community.
- Contribution to the revision and amendment of the Libyan Political Accord (LPA)
- Supporting the implementation of the UNSMIL new action plan by providing expertise and input.
- Contribution to the seminar on Hybrid actors in MENA, organized by Chatham House in Minster Lowell, UK.

- Contribution to a workshop organized by UNSMIL and the Strategic Capacity Group on *Designing an Inclusive Approach for SSR and DDR in Libya*.
- Co-organisation of a Regional Meeting on *Conflicts, Pandemics and Peacebuilding*: with the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Production of a study on *Understanding armed groups in Libya: new perspectives for SSR in a conflict environment*.

Support to information sharing

- Developing the online Security Sector Observatory *Marsad Libya*.
- Training and capacity building initiatives to promote journalistic skills to better understand SSR-related topics and the role of media in the governance of the security sector.

Adequate Legal and Policy Framework

Regulatory assistance and policy framework in place

- Development of an online Legal Database related to the Libyan security sector and a new website for the Libyan Criminal Justice System and the Migration Legislation infographic.
- Publishing the first unofficial translation of the latest Libyan draft Constitution, approved by the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA).
- Training of Libyan surveyors from the Libyan Association for Human Rights and Scientific Research (LAHRR) for the access to detention centers controlled by the Libyan Judicial Police.
- Cooperation with the Danish Demining Group (DDG) to organize a training on Community-Based Oversight Mechanisms, aimed at local elected officials and civil society members in three Libyan municipalities (Tripoli, Misrata and Zuwara).

Responsive Security

Security needs met and policy framework in place

- Providing a platform for technical dialogue as well as capacity-building initiatives to support relevant Libyan stakeholders (governmental officials, civil society, researchers, academics and more) from all segments of society in identifying and articulating key security needs and developing implementation mechanisms to address them.
- Undertake research projects on unexplored facets of the Libyan conflict, in order to explore context-appropriate avenues of work towards the formulation of long-term plans for sustainable SSR/G.
- Host policy forums and expert conferences on hybrid security, SSR and DDR in conflict environments, interim security arrangements and more, in cooperation with other international organizations, think tanks and policy centers.

Security providers have the capacity and knowledge to address security needs efficiently

- Trainings for LJP officials on Mandela Rules, Bangkok rules, and more broadly international standards and good practices in matters of detention.
- Support the design process of the standard induction curriculum to be delivered to all new LJP recruits by the LJP training unit.
- Relevant Libyan ministries are supported through consultative sessions to identify reform needs, and subsequent targeted workshops to support the formulation of strategic plans for reforms.

MOROCCO

TFNA has supported the development of three main programmatic areas in Morocco. These are: effective oversight, adequate legal and policy framework, and responsive security. This section will illustrate relevant activities undertaken since 2016.

Effective Oversight

Parliamentary and Independent Oversight Strengthened

Parliament:

- An MoU was discussed with the House of Representative to support the parliament in developing its oversight capacity of the security sector and establish a cooperation framework (not yet signed in 2020).

Moroccan institutions:

- Signature of a MoU with the Moroccan Authority to Fight Against Corruption (2016)
- Training and capacity building initiatives to the Moroccan Authority to Fight Against Corruption, the National the Royal Gendarmerie, the national customs, and Justice sector (MoJ, office of Public prosecutor) and their key managers, on countering corruption. Establishing a Working Group on integrity building and strengthening their dialogue on integrity policies and methods. Webinar between the anti-corruption authorities from Tunisia (INLUCC) and Morocco (INPPLC) to addressing the challenges of fighting corruption in a state of emergency.
- Signing of two Memoranda of Understandings with the National Commission for the Control of Personal Data Protection (CNDP) and the Commission on the Right of Access to Information (CDAI) to support their mandates.
- Submission of recommendations to relevant Moroccan authorities (e.g., Ministries of Justice and Interior, Parliament, Police, the CNDP) on how to strengthen personal data protection in the Moroccan security sector.
- Launch of a data visualization platform on a cartographic background, detailing the number of complaints, requests of information and assistance addressed to the CNDP and the CDAI, and improve their communication with the public.
- Training sessions on crisis communication, organised with the National School of Administration (ENSA) to improve the capacities of senior professionals from the

security sector, the justice sector, and other key administrations, communicate effectively and transparently, including on social media.

- Conclusion with ENSA of a memorandum of understanding which aims at enhancing cooperation in capacity building and awareness-raising activities on security governance, security sector reform, crisis management, and crisis communication.
- Training and capacity building initiatives to promote journalistic skills on SSG/R, and investigative journalism with civil society, and young journalists.

Adequate Legal and Policy Framework

Regulatory assistance and policy framework in place:

- Training and capacity building initiatives to the Forensic Doctors Association and Moroccan Society of Forensic Medicine in the field of forensic evidence; promoting the use of forensic evidence in the prosecution of cases of rape and sexual violence, promoting the use of forensic evidence in investigations on torture.
- Debate on Codes of Conduct for the Police and the Royal Gendarmerie.
- Publication with the assistance of Moroccan experts in psychiatry, prison health a study on legal reference collection, including international and national standards on prison conditions and managing health in detention.
- Providing expert services to ensure compliance of the tracing/tracking application to identify persons infected by COVID-19 with data protection principles and regulations.

Responsive Security

Security needs met and policy framework in place

- Design and conduct, together with Moroccan youth CSOs engaged on security-related issues, a gendered assessment of youth security needs.
- Design and conduct workshops, involving CSOs and local authorities, to identify new mechanisms and concepts of community safety, and produce concrete action points.
- Conducting with UN Women and civil society associations a study on the effective implementation of Law 103.13 on violence against women, and revise policies to make them gender- responsive.
- Development of recommendations for the Security and Justice Sector to better address gender-based violence during COVID-19 crisis and related lockdowns.
- Webinar with civil society on gender-based violence during Covid-19 pandemic.

Security providers have the capacity and knowledge to address security needs efficiently

- Training cycle and guidelines developed and implemented for public prosecutors to strengthen their capacity to control security sector, prevent abuses, and oversee excessive use of force.
- Design and conduct trainings of magistrates, prosecutors and law enforcement officers on evidence-based investigations to prevent ill- treatment and abuses.
- Developing guidelines for magistrates, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, forensic doctors, on best practices in investigating torture and ill-treatment.
- Training cycle for prisons doctors, psychologists, and other penitentiary specialised staff to better detect, prevent, and report, on mistreatment and torture cases.
- Training cycle on crisis management principles and SSG developed for ENSA and delivered to active and future civil servants.
- Design and delivery of studies to support the national debate on SSG/SSR, including on recent COVID-19 crisis management national policy.

EGYPT

The TFNA has limited activities in Egypt. DCAF manages the security sector observatory Marsad Egypt (www.marsad.eg). The website was blocked for users based in Egypt in August 2017. Then DCAF has been using Facebook (more than 550 000 followers at the end of 2020), to publish full-text articles from Marsad and encourage users to subscribe to the daily newsletter service. The use of VPN by Egyptian users provides a way to circumventing the website block.

3. Methodology used for the evaluation

3.1. Methodology of the evaluation

The design and conduct of the evaluation are utilization-focused (UFE), participatory and used mixed-methods. The main objective of the UFE approach is to be useful to its intended users. With all the limitations encountered with the COVID-19 pandemic, the evaluation managed to be participatory, working closely with members of the StC, relevant staff from the TFNA at country and HQ levels working on TFNA funded programmes. The pursuit of a participatory approach was made possible through an extensive use of virtual communication channels. In order to adapt to the situation, a mixed-method approach was adopted allowing to collect and triangulate different data sources through both quantitative and qualitative techniques in order to ensure a comprehensive and evidence-based assessment.

TABLE 1: MIXED METHODS USED BY THE EVALUATION

METHODOLOGY	DESCRIPTION	PHASES
Preliminary Desk Review	Review the body of documentation provided by DCAF to assess data sources, quantity, quality, and completeness, identify main gaps and measures to address them.	Inception Phase
Inception Mission	The evaluation team discussed with senior MENA and TFNA management and country/thematic program officers assignment objectives, methodology, workplan, sources of data, limitations, constraints, lists of stakeholders. A preliminary list of contacts of potential interviewees in each respective country was elaborated.	
Stakeholder mapping	Stakeholder mapping – presented in the Inception report - supported data collection purposes (interviews/focus groups, fieldwork) and ensured that all parties were well identified in their relation to DCAF. The mapping informed the finalization of the evaluation matrix and the development of data collection tools.	
Evaluation Matrix	Once previous steps completed and the scope refined, the team finalized the matrix (key questions, sub-questions, indicators, data collection and analysis tools). The Matrix is presented in Annex 2 .	
In-depth Document Review	Systematic desk review of key documents provided by DCAF -and other partners-, (strategies, reports, agreements, reviews, M&E data, training sessions reports and materials, publications, financial reports/financial statements, etc.) to assess TFNA's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, etc. A presentation of the bibliography collected at this stage is presented in Annex 3 .	Home-based data collection activities
Skype/Zoom/Phone semi-structured interviews	With the support of respective DCAF offices (Tunis and Libya Office) as well as respective Country managers (Morocco, Libya), the evaluation team finalized the List of contacts of potential interviewees in each respective country (as presented in Annex 5). With the intent to collect qualitative data from donors, partners, institutions to complete the desk review, in-depth interviews were conducted with key stakeholders identified in each country to explore specific issues (i.e., results, governance, synergies, strategies...).	

METHODOLOGY	DESCRIPTION	PHASES
	<p>DCAF Office and/or Country managers sent official presentation letters to all interested stakeholders and continued insisting on ensuring that the evaluation could get access to most of the suggestions. Therefore, with the support of DCAF and some StC members, some 57 interviews were conducted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 interviews with DCAF staff in Geneva • 5 interviews with StC Embassy representatives (Virtual and in Geneva) • 21 interviews for Tunisia (DCAF staff, institutional representatives and diplomats) • 7 interviews for Morocco (Institutional representatives and diplomats) • 11 interviews for Libya (DCAF staff, institutional representatives and diplomats) 	
Presentation of questionnaires	Some stakeholders were invited to share their comments through confidential questionnaires to collect additional data. This procedure was meant to complete the regular data collection process as well as to deepen some specific points that could not be easily answered through classic interviews techniques.	
Pre-departure debriefing	The TL met DCAF staff in Geneva at the end of a three days visit in Switzerland and provided a debriefing on some emerging issues as well as presenting the calendar of the data collection and reporting phase.	
Data management	The team aggregated and triangulated data per question and indicator based on evaluation matrix and data sources obtained.	Data analysis phase
Reporting and restitution	Once data has been aggregated, triangulated and analyzed, the team discussed the findings with TFNA Team and TFNA StC members (by videoconference) before starting to draft the report. The presentation was supported by a PPT presentation which is presented in Annex 7 . Based on the feedback received, the evaluation team (ET) prepared the Draft and Final Report.	Reporting phase

3.2. Methodological limitations

Considering the COVID-19 context, the evaluation team had to adapt its methodological approaches to the situation in order to engage with so many stakeholders in four different countries. Most face-to-face meetings for interviews with stakeholders had to be adapted to phone and virtual meetings due to travel restrictions, local lockdowns and meeting restrictions. Virtual meetings have inherent limitations (limited duration of the interview, inability to socially exchange beyond the interview, etc.) that may limit data collection. As anticipated in the Inception report, the Team leader of the evaluation was not able to deploy to Tunisia nor to Morocco because of the COVID-19 pandemic (access to Libya was anyhow not possible due to the ongoing conflict and safety restrictions on travel to the country). Similarly, Ms. Emna Sammari, was not able to physically visit any of the

Tunisian stakeholders due to local lockdown and meeting and mobility restrictions. The only face to face interviews were the ones undertaken in Geneva at DCAF HQ.

At the country level, there were some clear distinctions in the data collection process despite all the efforts undertaken by DCAF staff to ensure the widest coverage possible. The data collection process allowed for a diverse representation of stakeholder interviews with varied results. In Tunisia, there was strong representation from institutional as well as non-state representatives (all meetings were virtual although some representatives moved to DCAF office for this purpose) while in Morocco, mainly representatives of independent institutions were available, and in Libya only international partners and local academics in Libya were interviewed.

4. Review and analysis of main findings

Relevance

1.1 Evaluation question: Are the TFNA Interventions linked to the development and reform priorities of security sectors actors?

Finding 1: TFNA has done progress in interacting with security sector actors in each respective country but is not always in a position to address all SSG deficits (Q.1.1.1 and Q.1.1.2)

1. The TFNA has made important progress in its interactions with security sector actors in most of the countries covered by the TFNA although there remain important limitations in terms of access and participation in their reforms. This has been historically the case in Egypt, where the government has, since 2017, progressively tightened its legislation on NGOs, closed down NGO offices and limited access to the internet. Although DCAF managed to continue its access to its Marsad Egypt website on Facebook and VPN users and subscribers, the TFNA has very limited contacts, if any, with SSR actors in Egypt. DCAF informed the Steering Committee that *the situation in Egypt continued to present little prospect for security sector reform*. In Morocco, DCAF has done important progress in its work with key national oversight institutions committed to access to information, prevention of torture, anti-corruption and cyber-criminality and management of prisons. However, after building trust and confidence with key Ministries such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign affairs or the Parliament, the main obstacle for the TFNA remains to get access to the Ministries of Interior or to the Ministry of Defense. In Libya, because of the complex military and political situation, DCAF has had a limited access to security sector actors. It has succeeded to support the Libyan Judicial Police, which manages Libyan detention centres in many areas. The strategy of the TFNA has been to remain engaged with international actors, in coordination forums, as well as to explore new avenues with civil society and media actors. Engagement with local security actors provided an opportune avenue to support Community-Based Oversight Mechanism, in partnership with the Danish De-mining Group (DDG). Emerging prospects for cooperation with Ministry of Justice as well the Ministry of Interior pave the way for increased engagement with security sector actors. In Tunisia, DCAF cooperation agreements with key institutions - Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women, Families, Childhood and Seniors - engage the institution in a constant dialogue on sensitive and strategic security sector issues: cybersecurity, intelligence, corruption, counter terrorism. DCAF has progressively developed the capacity of the Parliament to increase its oversight over security sector institutions.

2. The degree of involvement of the TFNA with central authorities seems to be related to the number of years invested in building trust and confidence with local partners. It is also related to local political contexts. In Tunisia, the success of the revolution has been making SSR a priority while SSR in Morocco is reform process, granted by highest authorities. The TFNA responds to requests as much as the partners ask for assistance. The involvement of the Tunisian Ministry of Interior with DCAF on fight against corruption in the security sector is seen by our interlocutors as a sign of high level of confidence.

Although the evaluation could not formally exchange with state officials in Morocco and Libya, all interlocutors in Tunisia support a strong buy-in of DCAF's work from Tunisia authorities, a growing positioning in Libya and a growing buy-in of the Morocco state authorities for TFNA's SSG/R initiatives. Also, from most observers and stakeholders the evaluation team talked to (diplomatic representations, institutional authorities, StC members), DCAF initiatives are well aligned with its Theory of Change and SSR/G priorities. The Fund is using multiple entry sectors to widen the scope of its interventions: corruption/integrity, legal database, forensic, human rights, detention, children's rights, fight against torture, legal reform, etc. In all countries, the TFNA approach and interventions try to be sustainable, needs-driven and accompany the partners on a collaborative journey.

1.2 Evaluation question: Do the TFNA interventions correspond to the strategic priorities of donors?

Finding 2: TFNA interventions are well connected to donors' SSR/G priorities in DCAF's countries of operations

3. As presented in Annex 5, a careful review of the TFNA donors' frameworks of security sector reform policy show that SSG/R interests and policies are well supported by TFNA interventions, particularly in the following sectors: 1) Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight; 2) Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies; 3) Support to communication and information sharing. France and Germany also support regulatory assistance. These countries priorities or additional programmes take place outside the TFNA.

4. Country focus also varies from one country to another, and the amount of funding can vary in time. Geographical focus is mainly as follows:

- a. **Belgium** – Tunisia (last contribution received in kind in 2017)
- b. **Luxembourg** – Moderate regional focus (but confirmed in 2020 (StC Meeting) that next contribution will be *earmarked* to Tunisia as it was the case in 2018-2020)
- c. **Netherlands** - Tunisia and Libya – (not earmarked until 2019; *earmarked* since 2020)
- d. **Switzerland** – Tunisia gearing to a more regional focus (not *earmarked* since 2020 after years of earmarking on Tunisia until 2019)
- e. **France** – Morocco and Tunisia (contribution dates back to 2018, *earmarked*)
- f. **Germany** – Tunisia and Morocco, and a special emphasis on Libya (*not earmarked*)

Finding 3: TFNA interventions are complementary with other contributing and non-contributing donors in TFNA countries – they play a key role in supporting financial, capacity building and training initiatives (Q 1.2.2 and Q 1.2.3)

5. TFNA interventions are not *designed* to be complementary to other contributing and non-contributing donors' programming although this evaluation team understood that informal meetings at the ministerial level (Tunisia) and other institutional (formal/informal) communications (between donors and TFNA) ensure that duplication is prevented between international stakeholders, particularly in light of the "Responsive security" pillar of the ToC of the TFNA.

6. The 2020 DCAF ISSAT report (Sept. 2020) summarizes the extent to which **contributing** and **non-contributing** TFNA donors participate in SSG/R in its countries of intervention. It illustrates that the donors who provided the largest contributions throughout the years (**Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland**) are very heavily involved in SSG/R in the three countries where the fund is involved, *mostly through international (UN) or bilateral channels*. However, the extent to which donors cooperate *between themselves* and/or with DCAF remains limited. After complete review of the donor commitments in North Africa, ISSAT (2020) concludes that *Coordination between donors on the strategic level is limited. Even those with almost identical or overlapping strategic interests and values, design and implement programming with only minimal mutual consultation*.

7. Below is a summary of the representation of TFNA donors and other contributors supporting SSG/R initiatives in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. They illustrate the wide variety of organizations and initiatives developed into the SSG/R sector in North Africa.

LIBYA

- i. SSG/R and Stabilisation: focus on Migration, Border Security and management, and Violent Extremisms (Support to community security by **UNDP**, as well as Danish Demining Group/ SCG and DCAF on urban community-security in three cities of Libya), **EU & Netherlands**
- ii. Policing and Security Joint Programme (PSJP) – joint UNMSIL/UNDP multi-year programme funded by numerous donors, namely **Netherlands, Germany, Italy** and the USA
- iii. Justice support: EU, Sweden and **Netherlands** (through UNODC)

8. EU institutions manage more than half of foreign assistance for SSG/R in Libya. In addition to the EU, UNDP projects are mainly funded by the **Netherlands and Germany** (with complementary contributions from the US, UK and Italy). **Netherlands** also supports projects implemented through civil society organizations, and **Germany** also provides bilateral support to demining activities.

MOROCCO

- i. EU granted Advanced status to Morocco, which entails donor assistance to Morocco's security and justice system, particularly about providing training and capacity building support (**France and Belgium**)
- ii. Improving Morocco's internal security effectiveness: Police training and capacity building (EU, **Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain** and the US)
- iii. Defense cooperation: **France, Belgium, Spain, USA, UK** in partnership with NATO

- iv. Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE): **Belgium, France, Netherlands**, UK, USA and EU
- v. Justice Support: Prison Reform, Judiciary reform, Access to justice Juvenile Justice – EU, **Belgium, Germany, Netherlands**, Sweden, **France, Switzerland**
- vi. Security Sector Oversight – Denmark, Sweden and **Switzerland**

9. ISSAT notes that *the US, UK, France, Germany, Spain* are major bilateral donors for security and justice reform and tend to prefer bilateral delivery (training, capacity building or through implementing agencies)

TUNISIA

- i. Good governance and civilian oversight – the TFNA (**France, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland**);
- ii. Anti-Corruption: Instance Nationale de lutte Contre la Corruption (INLUCC) is supported by **Netherlands**
- iii. Community-based policing: US, UK and **Netherlands** support UNDP-led efforts to improve community-based policing in Tunisia
- iv. Women, Peace and Security: **Netherlands** provides funding for UNDP programming in support of UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans
- v. Access to Justice: The **Netherlands** supports efforts through UNDP to increase access to justice for women
- vi. Prisons: the **Netherlands** supports efforts to prevent radicalisation in Tunisian prisons (other donors support improvements in detention facilities)
- vii. Police, Garde Nationale, Border management: The **German Federal Foreign Office** supports Tunisia through its own Federal Police
- viii. Violent Extremism (PVE/CVE): The EU, the **Netherlands and Switzerland** support PVE/CVE work.

10. Key donors supporting the *effectiveness of security and justice* delivery include **France, Germany**, the UK and USA. Donors supporting *governance reforms* include the **Netherlands**, Sweden, **Switzerland, Germany** and the US. The EU support both effectiveness and governance reforms. **Germany and Netherlands** provide most of their funding through multilateral actors – UNDP - or international organizations (DCAF). Coordination of efforts of donors is undertaken mostly through the **G7+ mechanism**.

Finding 4: The TFNA seems to be playing only a marginal role in harmonization/ coordination role in the area of SSR (Q. 1.2.4)

11. The review of the TFNA's role in the countries of interest does not provide evidence that the TFNA plays a coordination role in the area of SSR in any of the countries. However, its expertise and capacity are highly appreciated by interested stakeholders in Tunisia and Libya. In Morocco, there is no coordination at all of SSG/R issues by other actors than the Royal Forces, Police or Gendarmerie. In Libya, there is a definite interest from UNSMIL to see DCAF playing an increasing role in advising, counseling and building

up capacities. DCAF participated in early 2020 in a workshop with UNSMIL and the Strategic Capacity group on *Designing an Inclusive Approach for SSR and DDR in Libya*. However, local political dynamics do not allow to see DCAF playing a lead coordination role in this regard, nor is this possible or even envisaged according to TFNA TOR. In Tunisia, DCAF participates to the SSG/R policy debates with representatives of the G7 and other interested state representatives. The development of national legal database (Libya, Tunisia) is coordinated by the TFNA and each national team is coordinating their development with local experts. The production of verified information on SSG/R through the Marsad websites on Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and more broadly North Africa as a whole is also coordinated by DCAF.

1.3 Evaluation question: Does the TFNA Theory of Change remain relevant?

Finding 5: TFNA Theory of Change remains relevant although some elements could be revised (Q 1.3.1 and Q 1.3.2)

12. A Theory of Change is a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. The TFNA Theory of Change supports five processes:

- *Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight* – the best illustration in this regard is provided by the work undertaken in Tunisia whereby the Tunisian Parliament has improved its oversight of SSG/R issues with the adoption of specific tools and practises. In Morocco, with the support of oversight bodies, the security sector has developed effective procedures and mechanisms to reinforce integrity and promote accountability.
- *Support to communication and information sharing* – this is illustrated in various instances throughout the implementation of the Marsad website, and the training of journalists on SSG/R issues. Some civilian organizations, and security or justice institutions, have adopted more effective and transparent communication approaches, as a result. In Tunisia or Morocco, tools and mechanisms are adopted to enhance increased access to facilitate the information of a wider public on security issues.
- *Regulatory Assistance* – The TFNA technically supports the drafting of legislation or legal reform proposals. It also coordinates the development of legal databases in all three countries of the TFNA to support justice and SSG/R stakeholders' work.
- *Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies* – Dialogue, experts' facilitation support and research open new avenues of cooperation between newly created institutions (like in Tunisia and Morocco) and SSG/R actors in various domains (judicial, detention, avoidance of torture, communication, integrity, etc.). Inclusive dialogue also covers initiatives with civil society or marginalized groups (gender, youth, community safety, local populations) to promote a better dialogue with SSR institutions.
- *Support to managing change of security providers* – security providers have a better understanding of SSG/R principles in Tunisia and Morocco through inclusion of courses, training and dissemination of guidelines and publications. Capacity building

of specific personnel and support to strategic planning improve best practises in each thematic sector (detention, forensic).

13. The opinion of the evaluation team is that the TFNA Theory of Change remains valid. At each national level, it addresses prevailing deficits in the security sector. There are important contextual differences that will shape the form of an institutional deficit in a given country. Consequently, the best strategies to address them also differ. The Theory of Change should be associated with an accompanying Results Framework that would help each national team to better reflect how they tackle each deficit and whether the answers provided remain relevant, adequate and effective. There are some areas of improvement that could be better reflected within an evolving ToC:

- The progressive integration of a gender marker within the TFNA programming should also be reflected throughout the TFNA Theory of Change.
- The need to ensure that a more inclusive approach of all possible SSR actors is better reflected in the ToC. In particular, the role of oversight institutions and the role of civil society organizations in oversight and policy development should be better reflected. Their growing importance should be illustrated, particularly in Morocco and Tunisia.

14. TFNA processes and activities are geared towards the implementation of the Theory of Change of the Fund. The ToC forms a good basis to ensure clarity on results and to establish the causal relationship between activities and outputs on the one hand and the outcomes that are produced on the other hand.

1.4 Evaluation question: Does the TFNA properly reflect local context and inclusivity?

Finding 6: TFNA activities are based on solid research that is grounded in the local context (Q 1.4.1)

15. The TFNA initiatives are usually grounded on solid preparatory research, which range from a stakeholder review to more sophisticated analytical research. TFNA research can lead to publications that will inform the work of DCAF, and other parties, in a given country. As an illustration, recent publications led by external experts on behalf of DCAF will lead SSG/R stakeholders in Libya to have a better understanding of local security sector actors (militias, tribal groups, communities and governmental bodies) and of the political economy of local/national conflicts. DCAF's role in facilitating access to local, national or international knowledge and expertise, is a key feature recognized by all interlocutors of the evaluation. It is the capacity to organize the connections and the linkages between its international experience, other countries know-how or expertise and/or past similar initiatives undertaken that add value to a thorough understanding of the local context.

16. Some other parameters need to be taken into consideration: the longevity of The TFNA's leadership in Tunisia as well as most of its national team provides the team with a deep experience and the knowledge of the local context. This feature is reckoned by most diplomats interviewed, and many value the background information that the TFNA team is able to bring to their attention to increase their understanding of a particular political or SSG/R trend.

17. In the case of Morocco, oversight institutions and civil society organizations are of the opinion that DCAF has a thorough understanding of the local context and politics. Their cooperation and support in interpreting the context and the issues at stake allow DCAF to value the time required to gain trust and credibility with each partner as well as to guide its programmatic development.

18. Things are a little bit different in Libya. Previous in-country experience of the TFNA team leader in Libya, associated with a small remote team of Libya experts, provide an in-depth understanding of the national context and its dynamics. Strong connections built up with local and international stakeholders (United Nations, European Union, international Think Tanks, international NGOs) allowed DCAF to propose a contextualized and prudent approach in its 2021 Country Strategy.

Finding 7: Work remains to be done to ensure inclusivity in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of gender and youth activities and results (Q 1.4.2)

19. The OECD/DAC has developed Gender markers to collect data on projects and programmes that support gender equality. The Gender marker is a key tool in the context of the promotion of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 5), which aims at empowering all women and girls. The TFNA's TOR of 2012 do not even include the word gender in their constitutive document. However, DCAF country office in Tunisia can now count of a dedicated resource to ensure that gender is further integrated within all proposals in Tunisia. DCAF has proposed that all projects should be marked and that at least one project should be rated "2", which means that the project would be fully labelled Gender and Security and that all the other projects proposed by DCAF in Tunisia should also be rated "1", implying that current and future projects would be thoroughly reviewed at the light of this objective.

20. In this context, progress have been made to increase inclusivity of gender and youth. The dedication to increase gender responsiveness throughout the TFNA programming is seriously improving. It will require additional support from DCAF Gender and Security Division in Geneva. The objective of having at least one Marker 2 project (DAC/OECD) within the Tunisia programme, in parallel of having all other programmes labelled as Marker 1 reflects a resolve to insert gender as an inclusive component of TFNA programming. In Morocco, the justice and security sector has started adopting a gender and security approach in their decisions and practises. DCAF has been undertaking missions to gather support from public authorities and civil society organisations for a study assessing the judicial response to allegations of gender-based violence at national level and is planning to conduct a study of the effective implementation of Law 103.13 on violence against women in 2021. Active dialogue is also taking place with Women's Rights NGOs such as Jossour and the *Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc*. At the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, actors of the civil society as well as Moroccan authorities have adopted set of guidelines and recommendations to improve the security and justice sectors' response to violence against women, and equip civil society's organizations with tools and methods to improve their advocacy. In Libya, DCAF also developed a new initiative about gender and border security mapping for EUBAM with the Gender and Security Division.

21. Similar efforts are being taken in support of youth initiatives: in Tunisia, the TFNA support will lead the youth protection agency to publish a mapping of protection mechanisms. Relevant expertise will be provided to juvenile justice actors in order to see juvenile justice and youth protection mechanisms cooperate on early detection and rehabilitation of youth violence, in relation with national efforts to fight against violent extremism and PVE.

22. Organizational efforts have yet to be undertaken in this regard both at HQ (Gender and Security Division) as well as country level, but concrete programmatic steps have already taken place in all three countries to ensure the TFNA programme becomes more gender sensitive. These efforts should be reinforced through general training of country personnel so that every project officer could integrate gender sensitive programming throughout its portfolio. It should also take the form of a current and past review of all projects in Parliamentary oversight, Justice, Interior, Defense, Youth and Protection of Minors as well as Gender and security sectors. Gender sensitive rating could be attributed to each current and future project or programme in consultation with respective stakeholders.

1.5 Evaluation question: Are TFNA interventions flexible enough to effectively respond to emerging threats?

Finding 8: The TFNA remains a very flexible instrument when necessary to adapt to exceptional circumstances or situation (Q.1.5.1)

23. The TFNA is perceived by all stakeholders to be a flexible instrument. This flexibility can take various forms such as participating to technical or policy debates at the request of national institutions, identifying external expertise and research in support of institutional needs, or providing a rapid review of the various DCAF's response in the MENA Region and proposing short-term and new initiatives in the countries of the TFNA. For example, the Fund participated and facilitated discussions on SSG at the local level in Morocco, and the *Institut National d'Accès à l'Information* (INAI) urgently mobilized its board to examine a draft decree on common rules related to the processing of public information. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, concrete interventions (confirmed with the evaluation through interviews) were taken, such as: a) Support to the *Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Données* (in Morocco) to formulate an informed legal opinion on the compliance of technological responses to the COVID-19 crisis; b) review of Protection of Minors and Child detention in times of COVID-19 (in Tunisia) and facilitation with key institutional child protection stakeholders to ensure children's rights during crises; c) online workshop on community-based oversight mechanisms in three cities of Libya in support of municipal officials at the forefront of their efforts to contain the spread of the virus. Aside of the Covid-19, one international interviewee mentioned the flexibility of the DCAF team to easily adjust itself and respond to emerging matters, be it borders control and migration, increased criminality or terrorism.

24. There is another illustration of the flexibility of the fund to face difficult times.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced DCAF Tunisia to withdraw its international staff for obvious health and security reasons out of Tunisia. It also prevented the two other country managers from Libya and Morocco to travel to meet with their

partners. Interviews conducted in this regard with the TFNA staff as well as with other stakeholders tend to prove that:

- i. National staff was very well able to handle most of the programmatic work that had been undertaken, as well as to adapt to the new administrative, time and logistical constraints created by the COVID-19 pandemic, with the exception of political sensitive discussions (that anyway could have hardly taken place as before);
- ii. Communication between TFNA managers and their partners on the ground continued, if not improved or intensified through virtual means. This has allowed to continue the work undertaken, and even to develop new initiatives.

The capacity to efficiently adapt the TFNA responses and engagements under COVID somehow illustrates the capacity and the flexibility of the Fund to accompany change processes through various operational models.

Effectiveness

2.1 Evaluation question: To what extent have the Outputs and Outcomes been achieved (from 2016 up to now)?

Finding 9: The TFNA has a good record of outputs and outcomes achieved in each country

25. The TFNA has a good record of **outputs** in each country. In Chapter 2, the evaluation presents a *Description TFNA Country Programme Activities*, which describes past activities since 2016. Finding No. 21 presents a review of the tools and methodologies used to implement TFNA's programming, the so-called 'change contributors'.

26. In each country, the progress from outputs to outcomes has taken different paths depending on the contextual limitations, such as conflict (Libya), local political conditions (Tunisia), or limited access to security forces to promote security sector reform. However, working remotely in Libya limited the progress of DCAF programming but also allowed the Fund to take on a new role regarding international actors. In Morocco, in the last four years, the number of partners, Memoranda of Understanding and activities has steadily increased. As of fall 2020, the number of projects in place or in the pipeline in Tunisia was close to 30, in all sectors of the Theory of Change, ranging from large to small projects (defined *per se* in terms of money investments, ranging from 15,000CHF to 200,000CHF). An illustrative list of the Tunisia's TFNA portfolio is presented in **Annex 6**.

27. At the **outcome level**, the team assessed the Fund's ability to induce transformation in each particular context. In **Libya**, for example, the security situation, limiting the presence on the ground, prompted DCAF to develop a new strategy to reach Libyan actors in cooperation with international stakeholders. This guides the Fund to contribute to security and SSR programme development of EU, UN, Think Tanks and other multilateral actors. Interviews with international stakeholders claimed that DCAF's

work to “*increase policy coherence*” and to help international actors develop a *strategic vision* of the means, policies and resources could support SSR/G in Libya. International civil servants working in Libya reported to the evaluation team that “*DCAF really can expand our understanding and they can continue to shape change for better*”. Through its research and publications, DCAF makes a difference in filling the *knowledge gap* that prevails among national and international actors. Another UN interviewee stated that “*DCAF should contribute to the mapping made by various think tanks, cross-pollinate and have people collaborate as a group to prevent duplication of efforts and support UNMIL’s international assistance*”. Another outcome that emerges as a sustainable contribution relates to the Libyan Legal Database. The online database of all legislation governing the Libyan security sector has an impact, which goes beyond Libya. For example, EU civil servants confirmed that they are using the database for their own legal trainings. Similarly, local Libyan officials confirmed to the evaluation team that the legal database is now in use in Libyan courts and universities. Last but not least, the investment in local approaches to security governance may lead additional cities and communities to develop their own specific security sector approaches.

28. In **Morocco**, DCAF recognizes that there are, and will be, “*limited prospects for working directly with security forces to promote security sector reform*”. The Fund focuses on oversight institutions, with the understanding that this sector is one of the big gaps that needs to be addressed, as well as finding other entry points where international legal obligations may create momentum for change. Since 2016, DCAF has worked with relevant ministries (Justice, Health, Interior and the General Directorate for Penitentiary Administration and Rehabilitation) to improve the capacity of prison personnel to carry out their responsibilities in line with international standards and best practises on detention and anti-torture. Reported evidence (in the absence of formal statistics) has led the team to believe that initiatives undertaken by DCAF (trainings, production of guides) ensure greater compliance with human rights standards by penitentiary staff. A high-ranking official stated that “*since the production of the Guide pratique à l’attention des Médecins pénitentiaires, magistrates and doctors understand each other’s concerns better*”. After years of building trust and credibility, DCAF recently signed an MoU with the Prisons Administration (DGAPR). In the same vein, DCAF is engaged with the Office of the Public Prosecutor to train Moroccan prosecutors to effectively integrate and implement human rights guarantees in their professional practices, in particular with regard to the fight against forced disappearances and arbitrary detention and the prevention of torture. DCAF also provided advice to support the newly created national mechanism for the prevention of torture, in support of the implementation of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) in Morocco. Similarly, DCAF’s support to the *Instance Nationale de la Probité, de la Prévention et de la Lutte contre la Corruption (INPPLC)*, the oversight institution in charge of combatting corruption in the country, resulted in the increase of cases in the fight against corruption of Moroccan security forces. Also, in partnership with two oversight institutions, the Director of the *Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Données à caractère personnel* and of the *Conseil National d’Accès à l’Information* recognizes that DCAF’s investments in capacity building, expertise sharing and technological support have positioned these organizations as a key actor

related to data management and oversight in the context of Covid-19, and is now being consulted on this issue by Ministries of Interior and Ministry of Defense.

29. In **Tunisia**, DCAF's presence has established extensive relations with security sector actors and institutions. Some outcomes with oversight institutions are relatively similar to the ones implemented in Morocco. DCAF's partnership with the Ministry of Justice has led to the production of a medical-legal guide to improve the use of forensic evidence in cases of alleged torture. This guide contributes to more coherent investigations and documentation of allegations of torture and ill-treatment. With the Tunisian Directorate General for Prisons and Rehabilitation of the Ministry of Justice, and the Directorate General of Child/Youth Protection under the Ministry of Women, a new joint committee supported by DCAF identified ways to improve rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile offenders. The MOU signed with the Ministry of Interior aims at improving integrity and fighting corruption. The General Director of Governance and Prevention of Corruption informed the evaluation team about the *considerable contribution of DCAF in the field of governance and prevention of corruption*, as well as being *inspired by various experiences presented by DCAF on how to strengthen ethics in the security sector, and how to elaborate specific codes of conduct in this respect*. As a result of DCAF's program with the Ministry of Interior in its fight against corruption and organized crime, the Ministry entered into partnership with oversight institutions with the National Agency to Fight Corruption (INLUCC) and the Access to Information Agency (INAI). Last but not least, after years of outreach and programming (training sessions, legal advice, policy reviews), Tunisian parliamentarians have progressively been able to play a more active and informed role in security sector oversight. In 2020, members of the Security and Defense Commission initiated a debate on the role of the Parliament in overseeing the security sector, particularly of the security forces, responsible for enforcing measures adopted by the executive power during the Covid-19 pandemic. This demonstrates an increased oversight of parliamentarians over the security and defense actors.

30. Throughout this review of outcomes, it appears that the TFNA has been more successful in supporting the development of parliamentary and independent oversight (Morocco, Tunisia), supporting communication and information sharing (three countries), ensuring the development of regulatory assistance (three countries) and an inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies (Tunisia, a bit less in Morocco and Libya) than supporting change of security providers (Tunisia). This reflects some difficulties of the Fund in some countries to get access to and develop sustained working relations with some security sector actors (Military, Police and/or Gendarmerie), mostly because of the political pace of reform processes. The strategies adopted by DCAF in Morocco and Libya are the product of the limited prospects for working directly with security forces.

Finding 10: The dynamics of the security, political or institutional environments are real challenges in achieving outputs and outcomes (Q 2.1.4)

31. There is a wide variety of obstacles hindering the achievements of outputs and outcomes of certain TFNA initiatives. We will not expand on the political impossibility of DCAF to enter into Egypt or on the consequences of the Libya conflict on the limitations of DCAF's activities in this country. The main recurrent obstacles in Tunisia are usually of political nature: frequent changes of governments, general volatility of the political

situation, local authorities' lack of support, relatively low efficiency of the Parliament, which leaves the MPs without power or resources to properly exercise their representative functions and oversight responsibilities. Moreover, after eight years of experience, it is very clear to every stakeholder that the pace of reform in SSR remains very slow.

32. In Morocco, DCAF is progressing well in its cooperation with key national oversight institutions such as the National Human Rights Council or the anti-corruption authority and others. The organization seems to be well respected as a possible key partner for independent oversight authorities, established by the 2011 constitution. They value the fact that acceptability and public recognition requires a lot of patience and that the step-by-step approach, which has been implemented was indeed the way to build up trust and confidence. Although there does not seem to be any major administrative or programmatic obstacles in working and dealing with national institutions in Morocco, the main bottleneck lies with the difficulty to get access to key Ministries to improve an inclusive dialogue with the executive institutions. DCAF has excellent contact with the Foreign Affairs, Justice sector (MoJ, and the Office of Public sector) but steady progress continues to be made by DCAF to explore openings for a more direct engagement with the Ministry of Interior and to the Ministry of Defense.

2.2 Evaluation question: Is the TFNA targeting the right stakeholders?

Finding 11: DCAF targets the *right* stakeholders in each country although work remains to be done in Morocco and Libya to scale up with government institutions (Q.2.2.1)

33. Instead of inquiring whether the TFNA systematically targets the right stakeholders, the proper question to ask is whether the targeted stakeholders enable TFNA's progress towards an increased level of involvement and outreach. After eight years of involvement in Tunisia, DCAF has reached a level of engagement with top institutions (Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women, Families, Childhood and Seniors), which is quite remarkable. DCAF cooperation agreements on some key SSG/R issues have engaged the institution in a constant dialogue on sensitive and strategic issues: cybersecurity, intelligence, corruption, counter terrorism. Since the inception of the TFNA, DCAF has also engaged with the Parliament, to improve oversight over security sector institutions, and trained the parliamentary committees on the topic. With the civilian sector, DCAF has entered into different arrangements with local actors, advocacy NGOs and professional organizations to deal with issues related to youth crime prevention, gender and good security governance, or communication in times of crisis.

34. In Morocco, institutions seem to remain reluctant to open a wider debate on security sector legislation or oversight, making DCAF's intervention at a higher level more challenging. However, significant progress has been made with national institutions covering the right to access to information, prevention of torture, anti-corruption, cyber criminality. Training cycles of senior civil servants influence their understanding on communication in times of crisis. In Libya, prospects for increased cooperation with Ministry of Justice (already a partner), Ministry of Defence (Humanitarian Affairs

Department of the MoD), as well as the Ministry of Interior (MoU signed) pave the way for an increased cooperation in the years to come. Moreover, the solid connections that DCAF has forged with UNSMIL, other regional organizations (EU) and other Think Tanks, create sound conditions for longer-term involvements. DCAF's specificity and expertise has been praised by all international stakeholders, the evaluation team talked to in Libya.

Finding 12: The TFNA maintains a solid reputation and has built up strong relations of confidence in each country (Q. 2.2.2)

35. It is evident that work remains to be undertaken to reach higher levels of institutional cooperation in Morocco and Libya. Nevertheless, DCAF has recently signed an MOU with the Ministry of Interior in Libya and discusses a possible MOU with the Parliament in Morocco. It has strong commitments with the Ministry of Justice, the General Prosecutor and Prisons administration in Morocco. DCAF progresses in a pragmatic approach and uses solid entry points. Each institution the evaluation team interviewed valued the possibility to be supported by a credible, trusted and expert organisations.

36. Regarding the willingness to cooperate further with DCAF, all the interlocutors raised solid arguments as follows: building trust and confidence – no top-down approach, great capacity of listening, engaging with research (with Think Tanks, with ISSAT or other actors); long-term investments – no need to rush to close a project, mutual estimates for the years to come; confidence that possible funding will support the development of further initiatives; adherence to guiding principles (neutrality, local ownership, inclusivity, gender equality) that many of the interlocutors highlighted with respect. The possibility to cooperate with TFNA in the long term remains a key element of flexibility of the Fund that also respects the pace of reforms in each country.

Finding 13: Although the TFNA covers various similar initiatives throughout North Africa, it can hardly be seen as an integrated regional programme (Q. 2.2.3)

37. The TFNA covers in principle all of the North Africa countries – but is currently having active programmes in three countries -, and works very remotely with another one (Egypt – currently with very narrow perspectives for reform in the security and justice sectors). Its title - Trust Fund North Africa - should logically see DCAF being interested in investing in other North Africa countries, as well. This is a concern for members of the StC to understand what are the conditions that prevent the TFNA from investing time and energy in new potential countries, like Algeria and Mauritania, all members of the Arab League and of the *Union du Maghreb Arabe*. The evaluation team understands that political obstacles may be limiting immediate developments in this regard. Assessing the situation in Libya, the evaluation team also understands that working in such a difficult environment calls for a sound level of resilience, patience, step-by-step approach, research of bottom-up and/or top-level entry points that require an investment. All of this takes longer time than usual.

38. The TFNA has developed some innovative initiatives, which are increasingly popular. The Marsad websites in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt benefit from the extensive use of social media across the region and provide unlimited access to security sector information aside the official channels in English, French and Arabic. The three Marsad

websites have had a significant success and enjoy increased audiences. Marsad Tunisia is the second source of information on SSR in Tunisia and Marsad Libya has an audience over 700 000 viewers, while Marsad Egypt still retains more than 550 000 followers on Facebook.

39. The TFNA – and DCAF – is also involved in research and policy dialogue in cooperation with an Italian think tank ISPI (the MED dialogue initiatives). The TFNA provides access to research materials to support discussions among politicians and policy makers of the region. In some specific thematic sectors TFNA initiatives witness experts from various countries sharing expertise on key concepts, ideas or practises related to detention reform, torture prevention or building integrity of security forces. As an illustration, in 2020, DCAF convened the anti-corruption authorities from Tunisia (INLUCC) and Morocco (INPPLC) to a webinar addressing the challenges of fighting corruption in a state of emergency. Similarly, in December 2020, DCAF organized a webinar with the two National Preventive mechanisms against torture, CNDH (Morocco) and the *Instance Nationale de Prévention de la Torture* (Tunisia) within a COVID context. Also, in 2019, DCAF presented its work on forensic medicine to the first Maghrebian Congress of Forensic Medicine. The possibility to share at a regional level research, experience and progress achieved in each country are illustrations that the TFNA can play an important role in fostering regional initiatives. Building bridges between institutions, which work in similar thematic sectors is a promising trend that can expand further. But as one DCAF official comments: “*one major obstacle hampering regional approach is the structural weakness of regional cooperation between the Arab League and the Union du Maghreb Arabe*”.

40. These initiatives are built up more on an *ad hoc* basis than through a structured and articulated regional policy and programme framework. One diplomatic representative of the TFNA countries has highlighted the fact that the lack of official status in some countries of the Fund can also be seen as a limiting factor to initiate regional institutional initiatives.. Members of the StC have also recognized in one of their meetings that “*it was not possible to only apply a regional approach – engagement must be guided by individual country strategies*”.

2.3 Evaluation question: Are TFNA progress indicators relevant?

Finding 14: The TFNA has significantly improved the quality of its indicators (Q.2.3.1 and Q.2.3.2)

41. Over the years, the issue of monitoring TFNA outputs and outcomes, associated to the concept of value for money, have become a major concern to the Steering Committee members. To support TFNA funding on the long run, the members legitimately require more visibility on programme results. The members believed that accountability to their respective constituencies was sometimes hard to establish. As expressed by one diplomat, *My government wants to know where did the money go!*

42. In the period covered, and particularly after the 2018 evaluation of DCAF undertaken by the firm Universalis, DCAF has taken important decisions regarding the implementation of Results-Based Management or RBM within the design, implementation and reporting of its programming, including with the TFNA. DCAF Operations Department

produced for the first time (in July 2020) Guidelines related to Results-Based Project Design, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning. A dedicated position to support the integration of RBM principles within DCAF programming was created. A Guidance Note prepared for the Nov. 2020 TFNA Steering Committee details further series of indicators as well as the possible tools that should be deployed to feed these indicators. The variety of techniques suggested in the document illustrates the proposal to increase MEL dedicated capacities within DCAF teams to generate better reporting.

43. In parallel of the development of new RBM and M&E guidelines, the introduction in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya of Monitoring Report Templates at the outputs, immediate and intermediate outcomes level are a good illustration of the work implemented by DCAF. It provides clear baselines, description of progress achieved and, sources of information. The number of RBM reports vary from one country to the other and not all countries demonstrate outcomes each year. TFNA staff, particularly in Tunisia express a strong demand for improved RBM training.

44. At the TFNA level, Annual Report 2019 was presented to the StC in April 2020. The presentation of the planning documents for 2021 to the StC in November 2020 are a good illustration of the way forward: it provided the definition of key indicators (mostly quantitative) and explained how they support better reporting on results. To further conceptualize the changes taking place at intermediate or impact levels, the evaluation will later present recommendations that should strengthen the capacity of the TFNA team to better report and consolidate its reports to the StC at the outcome level.

Efficiency

3.1 Evaluation question: Does TFNA allow efficient use of human, financial and other resources?

Finding 15: TFNA's human resources are solid and efficient. Growing needs invite for a sensible growth of personnel (Q. 3.1.1)

45. It is relatively easy to count the number of human resources who are working on a permanent basis for the TFNA for Morocco and Libya. Experienced country managers are accompanied with national (Libya) or younger personnel (Morocco and Libya) that supports them in daily operational, communication, research and liaison activities. However, national and international stakeholders (Morocco, Libya) recognize the need for DCAF to envisage a more robust presence on the ground, as soon as conflict or political conditions so permit, to deepen their hold on local and national realities, expand their network and invest in longer term programming.

46. To support local initiatives, prepare operational activities, network in a manner which could be more culturally or politically appropriate, DCAF has used a suitable model of representation in the past, which proved to be effective in supporting its entry to a given country. For some years, DCAF's team supporting SSR development in Mali had its work facilitated with the support of a local representative (former Gendarmerie Inspector General) who knew everyone in town, was well respected, very well informed of local SSG/R issues and could open doors through a wide range of contacts within Ministries, État-majors, etc. In the absence of DCAF formal representation in one country, this

avenue could be prudently explored in Morocco, in order to express the willingness of the organization to be present on the long run, as well as to act locally on issues that are better dealt with in a person-to-person discussion than through digital means.

47. In Tunisia, the team remains diverse, gender-balanced and well represented regarding the thematic expertise. The team is perceived by all external stakeholders as intellectually and professionally sound, which represents a very strong asset for DCAF's work. However, contracted staff remains a serious concern, as DCAF must hire its personnel through a local private human resources company. This generates additional administrative and overhead costs. Also, international personnel remain in Tunisia as tourists. There is a clear need to articulate and conclude an *Accord de Siège* with the Tunisian government. Each national or international professional is well invested in a specific thematic sector. At times, DCAF teams are experiencing a significant workload, which could be alleviated through the availability of additional human resources, in Tunisia, as well as in Morocco and / or Libya.

Finding 16: Without an improved country presence, it remains difficult for DCAF to invest in mid- to long-term programming and build local trust in a sustainable manner (Q. 3.1.2)

48. This question is closely linked to the question of the status of DCAF in a given country. (See Finding No 33). The opinions collected on this situation are diverse and our interlocutors have mixed feelings. As an illustration, in Libya, the absence of country presence is both seen as a *new way of working*, while other observers agree that the political and SSR/G dynamics in the country may require a more permanent presence on the ground.

49. The pros and cons of an in-country presence are as follows:

- a) It is difficult to invest in a country where it is challenging to obtain a formal diplomatic or administrative status. Nevertheless, local agreements with the host country allow DCAF to operate within local laws, including as an employer. The importance of the programming of the Tunisia country office continues to legitimize the presence of the office and helps with the maintenance of physical and social links with all local stakeholders.
- b) The review of COVID-19 impact on the TFNA's activities suggest that the pandemic has not stopped the work undertaken in Morocco or Libya, particularly when TFNA's teams managed to continue working virtually or rely on the local field expertise. A good illustration has been the work undertaken by DCAF with the Danish Demining Group in Libya whereby training was conducted at distance with local community safety groups. Talking with various stakeholders, it became obvious that the contacts between Morocco and Libya managers and their partners have never stopped and some even found an advantage in pursuing virtual relations as it deepened their personal and professional interactions with their counterparts.
- c) The cost of working remotely from a neighbouring country has financial implications. The necessity to keep up a remote office in Tunis remains valid as

long as the security situation will not allow national and international staff to return to Tripoli.

Finding 17: The annual budgeting process and budget forecasts is evolving towards a more realistic approach (Q. 3.1.3)

50. Budget forecasting of DCAF has transitioned from a rigid and overly ambitious approach to a more sensitive and harmonized approach since 2019. It is more grounded on sound evidence and on analytical review of what is possible. For the last years, the Low scenario and the High scenario have theoretically generated Low case financial scenarios to High case financial scenarios for TFNA budgets. Financial reporting of TFNA activities regularly ensured that the level of implementation of TFNA was generally below or equal to 60 percent of the *Low case* scenario. Implementation rates vary either from an overestimation of DCAF's capacity to implement planned activities, or from unexpected constraints that automatically delay the implementation of planned activities. One has to recognize that the political instability in Libya, the political crisis in Tunisia or the COVID-19 lockdown in Morocco are good illustrations of situations that put planned activities on the hold. Additionally, the longer-term nature of engagements that go beyond calendar years impacts the traditional way of accounting for implementation rates.

51. For some years, the level of annual contributions to TFNA was higher than the levels of expenses of the Fund for the same year, and it provided a reasonable margin of manoeuvre. This caused the donors to question the rationale behind the necessity to keep up such a high level of funds in DCAF's Treasury. The expenses and contributions have moved in two opposite directions with the progressive growth of the operations and the progressive decrease of the total contributions received during the same period:

TABLE 2: OPERATIONS DISBURSEMENTS VS RECEIVED CONTRIBUTIONS (DCAF, 2017-2020 – SEPT.) – MILLIONS OF CHF

	2017 (CHF)	2018 (CHF)	2019 (CHF)	SEPT. 2020 (CHF) ¹
Operations	2 M	2,3 M	2,5 M	2.2 M
Contributions	4,2 M	2,6 M	2 M	1,9 M

52. With disbursements higher than contributions in 2019, the balance available logically diminished to 3,5 million CHF in 2020 from the peak of 4,2 million CHF at the start of 2019. At the end of December 2020, the balance of funds was expected to be of CHF 2,8M. Should this trend continue, donors should be realistic that as long as contributions will be inferior to expected operations, there may be a risk that future operations of the TFNA, a pool funding mechanism, could be hampered by an anticipated lack of secured financial resources.

¹ According to the figures presented to the last December 2020 StC, Operations: 1.5M spent and an estimated 700K to be spent in 2020; Contributions: 1.1M received (Luxembourg, Netherland, Switzerland) and expected 500K to 800K by Germany, for a maximum amount of 1.9 M

53. The evaluation team understands that a safe practise is to approve a budget, which is already funded as a result of the funds available or known to be in the pipeline. Faced with two distinct trends: an increase in disbursements and a possible reduction in contributions, the evaluation team is of the opinion that the budget should not only be presented and approved in October, but that a mid-year technical review should take place (late Spring). That would review the most likely scenarios in each country to ensure that, in the case of best scenario, all funding options will be made possible. In case of the contrary, DCAF would then inform the donors about the evolution of the low-case scenario. This effort at accountability will also better inform the respective capitals of each donor to anticipate their financing, the risks associated of any possible under-financing in case of rapid growth in the country or regional programming, and any other related adjustments required to continue supporting TFNA operations for the coming years.

Finding 18: The interaction between donors, partners and TFNA is perceived to be quite effective (Q. 3.1.4)

54. Interaction with donors take place at two levels: from capitals to DCAF HQ or from the field level to DCAF representation (Tunisia or Libya). There are therefore some differences on the quality and the effectiveness of communication channels between the diplomatic representations (on the field), diplomats at the headquarters, DCAF headquarters, and DCAF field missions, which generate some misunderstanding about the flow and quality of the information provided. The evaluation team noted that the diplomatic representations who wanted to be regularly briefed about the evolution of DCAF initiatives had a very close, personal and interactive dialogue with DCAF office in Tunis. Some Embassies also often call DCAF for more inside information as DCAF is perceived to have a better access to some ministries or organizations. In general terms, the interaction between partners, donors and TFNA are perceived as being transparent, fluid and useful.

Finding 19: TFNA programming does not specifically integrate Do No Harm principles within its programming (Q. 3.1.5)

55. The new Guidelines of DCAF on Results-Based Project Design, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (2020) integrate the concept of Do No Harm in its methodology based on OECD² (2010) international standards, with the objective that DCAF staff will use the principle to protect its sources, the anonymity of the data produced and the absence of being quoted. Many stakeholders noted with a pinch of humour that the *Swiss essence* of DCAF personnel is well perceived in its relations with its partners: impartiality, neutrality, diplomacy, tact, no imposition of preconceived ideas and absence of pursuit of particular agendas. This has, on some occasions, led DCAF to technically support confidential (political) processes at the request of some its partners or ministerial partners.

56. The evaluation team never received comments or perceptions that could lead to the idea that DCAF may have exposed its beneficiaries to some kind of harm. Local community security training in Libya have taken place at distance and by introducing international civilian police principles. Legal, counselling or research work and studies

² OECD (2010) Do No Harm: international support for state building, OECD, Paris

undertaken by DCAF in support of Tunisian or Morocco institutions has, according to the instances the evaluation team talked to, never seemed to have affected the physical or social integrity of their beneficiaries.

3.2 Evaluation question: Have previous external evaluation recommendations been integrated since 2016?

Finding 20: Most of the recommendations of the 2016 evaluation have been integrated in the TFNA governance and processes (Q.3.2.1. and 3.2.2)

57. There were three strategic recommendations and four operational recommendations presented by the 2016 evaluation. Most of them have been formally adopted by the TFNA and, when not, there seems to be sound reasons not to do so.

58. Strategic Recommendations:

Explore synergies between the TFNA and donor activities. After the evaluation, TFNA meetings were expanded to enable other embassy and ministry staff to attend. Communication was improved through sending out quarterly fact sheets. DCAF Tunis became in charge of holding biannual Ambassador's dinners, in connection with the StC meetings. Embassies of members of the TFNA integrate a visit to DCAF when delegations from HQ or their countries of origin visit Tunisia. They try to ensure that DCAF's work is complementary to some of their other investments in the SSR/SSG sector. Complementarity is not synergy *per se* but ensures that money is wisely spent without duplication between donors. DCAF maintains regular exchanges with donor embassies. The degree of understanding of DCAF activities at the field level depend on the interest of diplomatic personnel in DCAF activities.

- *Consider partner country involvement in a TFNA Governance structure.* The decision of the StC to not associate partner country representatives to the Steering Committee meetings remained firm throughout the years. However, the TFNA took advantage of some StC meetings to organize side events involving partner institutions, which was very appreciated by donors.
- *Regional activities and programmes.* DCAF legitimately considered that developing regional programmes did not make much sense (see Finding No. 13). Project managers and DCAF management have identified areas where such regional cooperation could be beneficial and made use of regional exchanges on specific topics (detention management, torture prevention, access to information, fight against corruption).

The very nature of the TFNA's work remains political and is tailored to the national context. Any regionalization of activities would have to be conditioned to strong and advanced national programmes. DCAF notes that there has historically been very little interest among in-country partners to pursue such regional programmes, mainly for reasons of political sensitivity. This seems to have remained as relevant today as it was in 2016.

59. Operational recommendations:

- *Develop and apply a tool for assessing the relevance and added value of new activities, in order to mitigate the risk of thematic dispersion.* After the evaluation, a matrix was developed but never approved by senior management. It was tried several times to bring in external capacity that could help communicate externally about the TFNA's work and context, but the initiative did not progress either. However, the development of a Monitoring Report Template significantly addressed this point by detailing respective immediate outcomes with given baselines, measure of progress achieved and alignment with the pillars of the MENA Theory of Change.
- *Develop and apply tools to measure the immediate outcomes of capacity building activities.* The idea that the *immediate outcomes* of capacity building activities could be *measured* is somewhat idealistic, considering the number of potential factors that may affect the implementation of said activities. Existing tools for measuring satisfaction with training and events are in place and have been used. The next step, out of DCAF control, is to know whether or not the right people were in the room and to what extent they are subsequently willing and able to apply the new knowledge of best practise in their work. The second question would be to assess to which extent the DCAF's partners would be willing *to be evaluated*, some time after a given training.
- *Allocate more time to short-term expert missions in order to allow them to familiarize themselves with local needs and customs.* In Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya, one way to prevent this problem is to call for experts with whom DCAF has already worked, often using the same experts for same sectors of expertise. This allows a strong contextual understanding and interviews with a lot of partners who praise the high quality of the experts recruited to support a change process of their institution.
- *Design activities in a way that they have built-in multiplier effects, hence contributing to the sustainability of the TFNA capacity development activities.* This can usually be dealt with technical support activities but is more difficult to realize in a dynamic political environment whereas people change rapidly from one position to the other (for ex. Tunisia Parliamentary Committees). Partnerships with civil society and academic institutions allow the implementation of sustainable capacity building and training interventions towards selected audiences and institutions (Tunisia & Morocco).

Impact

4.1 Evaluation question: To which extent TFNA operations contribute to change in targeted countries?

4.2 Evaluation question: Did TFNA interventions contributed to produce key positive changes?

Finding 21: TFNA processes, activities and products are change contributors but the extent they produce it varies, depending on context (Q 4.1.1 & 4.1.2)

60. TFNA activities and processes lead to change to some extent in each country but they are, of course, very context driven. Change needs to be associated with its possible

impact on SSG/R institutions, policies and programmes, which is more difficult to assess on the long-term.

61. Changes are the results of the association of tools, processes and methodologies, which then become “change contributors”. These change contributors have to be assessed in the context of each particular country. When reviewing these factors of change with DCAF partners, the strong point that emerged from the interviews is the overwhelming praise for the seriousness, ethic and professionalism of DCAF teams. In the three countries of the TFNA, despite some limits in the operationalization of its programming (for instance, the absence of physical in-country presence), stakeholders highlighted the relevance of the means and activities the organization is using in each country.

62. To promote change in each country, partners identified the following tools of change (activities and processes) used by the TFNA (with examples):

- a. *Training sessions, workshops and conferences:*
 - i. Presentation and set-up of international standards (for example, Nelson Mandela rules in the detention centres, implementation of the OPCAT, in Morocco), best practises, means of implementation and monitoring. Online training to Penitentiary authorities on SSR/G (in Tunisia).
 - ii. Institutional training for targeted audiences related to SSG. (For example, in Tunisia: *École supérieure de guerre (ESG)*; *École supérieure des Forces Intérieures (ESFI)*; or training of Libya Judicial Police officials on the Mandela rules, Bangkok rules; or regular training of senior civil servants at the *École Nationale Supérieure d'Administration* in Morocco).
 - iii. Exploration and design of new policies or processes, such as the implementation and training of the Community-Based Oversight Mechanisms, in support of civil society members in three Libyan municipalities.
 - iv. Organization of various conferences (Tunisia, Morocco) on different SSG/R topics (cybersecurity, media reporting on child security issues, fight against fake news, etc.)
- b. *Capacity building:* Supporting institutions in the early stages of their mandate (such as the INPT in Tunisia or the CNDP and CDAI in Morocco), or professionals (journalists in Libya were briefed on SSG/R issues), or Community-Based groups (community groups in Libya).
- c. *Delivery of expertise:* Sending experts in support of highly technical or sensitive issues (like Swiss Forensic experts sent to Morocco to support the development of a *Guide pratique à l'attention des Médecins pénitentiaires en matière de prévention de la torture et de soins de santé des détenus*).
- d. *Development of informational websites:* The Marsad websites, which inform an ever-growing number of people across Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, are unique information products and fill an enormous gap in feeding institutions and civil society with unique information on SSR. The number of users grows in each country and this proves the in-country and outside-country deep interest in Marsad.
- e. *Legal database:* the development of legal databases set up in Libya and Tunisia provides legal officers, academics, practitioners and legislative authorities with updated and translated (into English or French) legal documents.
- f. *Development of Guides, Research, Studies, Observatories and Video production:*
 - i. Development of multilingual (Arabic and French) guides for training and professional development in thematic sectors, such as the development of guidelines for magistrates, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, forensic doctors, on best practises in investigating torture and ill-treatment, and gender-based violence ((Morocco).

- ii. The National Observatory to counter violence against women (Tunisia) in Tunisia will support studies on gender equality in SSR.
- iii. The latest *Understanding armed groups in Libya: new perspectives for SSR in a conflict environment* will put DCAF at the forefront of innovation in terms of rethinking SSR programming in Libya with all concerned stakeholders.
- iv. Production of videos to highlight the legal and practical consequences of Art. 49 of the Tunisian Constitution for good governance of the security sector.
- g. *Study trips*: Professionals are brought to other countries (for example to Switzerland) to review implementation of policies and processes on particular thematic to widen their vision, understanding and appreciation of how can change be translated from one country to the other. DCAF invited legal and medical experts being trained on a new *Guide on the use of forensic evidence in investigations of allegations of torture and mistreatment*.
- h. *International conferences and workshops*: the TFNA participates in some regional events, like the MED Dialogue initiative, which promotes dialogue on security across the MENA region and allows stakeholders from various horizons to exchange views and opinions on the evolution SSG/R throughout the region.
- i. *Counselling*: DCAF leadership or officials are often formally or informally being called to counsel politicians, civil society officials or diplomats on sensitive issues of concern to SSR/G.

63. This brief summary of the TFNA activities, products, operations and processes illustrates the capacity of TFNA teams to interact and work with a wide variety of actors in different countries, through different formats, using different methodologies and technologies, by calling external and internal expertise and by demonstrating a sound capacity of implementation. To conclude *how* these interventions actually *contribute* to change, other factors obviously need to be taken into account: context, time of implementation (recent, past), prevailing logical or results-based frameworks, criteria and indicators designed for monitoring and evaluating. It is easier to monitor the growing number of Marsad's subscribers than to appreciate the extent to which detention personnel adequately respect the OPCAT in each country. A presentation of the main anticipated outcomes was presented in Finding 9. But, as Finding number 34 explains, the evaluation team believes that all activities implemented through the country programmes need to be properly measured through a range of evaluation instruments (user surveys, stakeholder surveys, beneficiaries' surveys, field visit interviews, series of interviews per institution, etc.). These methods would capture with greater accuracy the extent to which projects and programmes have *really* generated change, and to which degree. This is part of the original TOR of the TFNA to commission a review exercise of the entire DCAF TFNA (point 25) to put these achievements into a broader national and regional perspective.

64. *However*, throughout the interviews conducted by the evaluation team with governmental (Tunisia) and institutional representatives (Morocco, Libya), there are some

common change features that can be *attributed* to the TFNA as they reveal *social and institutional changes* of the beneficiaries.

- a. A *strong ownership by partners and stakeholders* of the tools, instruments, products that have been shared, given, implemented or set up by the TFNA. This is very clear throughout all the processes and activities presented below.
- b. An *enhanced cooperation and practises* between the actors working on similar issues and concerns (be it integrity, fight against torture or corruption, or implementation of Mandela rules in detention centers). For example, previous findings expressed the extent to which doctors and magistrates had increased their cooperation on forensic issues, or how fiscal and security forces had improved their cooperation in fighting against corruption.
- c. An *enhanced level of practise* in each respective sector by using new instruments in their professional lives.

4.2 Evaluation question: How do TFNA's interventions compare to those of other actors working on same or similar topics?

Finding 22: TFNA interventions are different from what other donors usually implement: they can use time as a resource and one intervention can have a multiplier effect (Q 4.2.1)

65. The TFNA's work on mid- to long-term processes can have a sustainable impact in the long run. As an illustration, TFNA support of Marsad website or of the creation of legal databases in Libya and Tunisia are unique products and investments that distinguish themselves by serving a wide range of institutions, security providers and interested stakeholders. Interviewees mentioned that these tools have a profound influence on the understanding and perceptions of their readers or practitioners.

66. The second distinctive element of TFNA is the capacity of the Fund to invest in *multiple* aspects of a given problem through multiple entry points. Change of practise, attitude, or behavior in regard to the practise of torture, detention rules, protection of women or juvenile in the justice system are supported through a series of interventions throughout the years. As an example, the conception of a *Guide pratique à l'attention des médecins pénitentiaires* can lead by extension to a project supporting the organization of medical support in prisons or another project supporting the use of forensic evidence. As another illustration, the delivery of trainings and workshops to the *Instance Centrale de Lutte contre la Corruption (ICPC, latter INPPLC)* and other SSR actors in Morocco, the production of reference toolkits and the establishment of a Working Group on Integrity has strengthened the specialised investigation capacities within the new INPPLC and its security partners. All these projects are complementary to one another but do not need to be embedded in one unique project with a fixed duration of time. In this context, DCAF plays a key role in the process of accompanying its partners towards sustainable change.

67. Another feature of DCAF's work noted by different stakeholders is the capacity of TFNA teams to produce a systematic and solid approach to capacity development (this point was also mentioned in the 2015 evaluation), e.g., to first develop awareness and consensus within stakeholder organizations before moving on more practical capacity

development. For example, DCAF would support the youth protection agency to develop a mapping of protection mechanism prior entering into further capacity development to share expertise with juvenile justice sectors.

Finding 23: The impact of TFNA on key performance indicators (such as PVE, good governance, gender integration) is hard to measure (Q 4.2.2)

68. The degree to which the TFNA has been proactive on PVE, Good governance or Gender integration within SSR depends on the lens of the observers and of course of the capacity of these to *measure* any impact in this regard. There has been limited involvement in Morocco on PVE and none in Libya. In Tunisia, DCAF implements a project to strengthen the role of youth and women in the prevention of violent extremism³. A policy paper on dimension of PVE is published based on local experiences later to be disseminated to ministries of Education, Interior, Social Affairs, Youth and Women NGOs. Also, provision of expertise as well as training workshops for juvenile justice actors is expected to see juvenile justice and youth protection mechanisms cooperate on early detection and rehabilitation of youth violence.

69. Gender integration within SSR is another programming topic of DCAF in Tunisia and Morocco aiming at a better integration of gender approach and practises into strategies and action plans in the security sector. The evaluation team has assessed the improvements of gender integration (Finding No 6) within SSG/R initiatives in Tunisia but reaching the stated objectives have yet to be implemented. A gender self-assessment report within security sector institutions⁴ will be drafted by the end of 2021, which should include recommendations for a potential action plan. Another initiative will identify the needs of prison agents to recognize the specific needs from women and minors in order to take them into account through the elaboration of a training manual and provision of training-workshops. In Morocco, over the last years, DCAF has built a strong network with the security sector and civil society advancing human rights, making it well positioned to support the implementation of the law 103.13 to fight violence against women. The conduct of a study on the effective implementation of the Law on violence against women should improve the justice and security sectors response to gendered security needs. Training of CSOs working on the advancement of women's rights in Morocco, in cooperation with UN Women, helps mainstreaming a gender and security perspective into their activities.

70. Good governance is cross-cutting of many of the initiatives that DCAF develops in Libya (training of journalists, of Libyan Judicial Police, or Civilian Oversight Mechanisms) or Morocco (with oversight institutions – CDAI, INPPLC, CNDP and similar security and justice institutions being trained on SSG/R). In Tunisia, governance is at the heart of a vast array of projects building capacities of Ministries and national institutions (INLUCC, INAI, Ministries of Interior and Defense with a governance focus in their high-level training programmes).

³ *Projet d'appui au renforcement du rôle des femmes dans la prévention de l'extrémisme violent en Tunisie*, of an amount close 98,000CHF

⁴ *Projet d'auto-évaluation sur l'intégration de genre dans le secteur de la sécurité*, of an amount of 45,000CHF

4.3 Evaluation question: How are lessons learned under TFNA interventions collected, shared, and learned?

Finding 24: Generating and sharing lessons from previous programming can be systematized in order to better implement new programming.

71. It became clear during the data collection phase that TFNA teams were particularly knowledgeable of the policy developments, the opportunities and threats, linked to each Ministry, partner institution, or from a given sector of intervention. Lessons are thus drawn from professional or institutional experience, and from the work undertaken with national stakeholders (for example, various Committees of the Tunisian Parliament). At the regional or country level, lessons were not systematically or properly reflected in the project reports but, according to the TFNA staff, were used internally to guide the development of new initiatives.

72. The generation of lessons learned (as a *process*) would benefit from a more systematic and structured exercise that can be achieved through regular monitoring or evaluation. This process should be more rigorous and follow a specific calendar, take advantage of programmatic opportunities or events, be organized through structured meetings with colleagues and TFNA team or with external stakeholders (donors, international organizations, etc.). In this sense, the process of generating lessons to be learned – and their respective sharing with in-country or HQ teams – requires to be driven by a professional officer, in charge of extracting the lessons through each respective sector of the organization in association with TFNA partners. This role and function should be part of the proposed implementation of a MEL position for the TFNA that should also further train local staff and operational managers. The new MEL guidelines lay out a more rigorous and regular process for capturing, analyzing and sharing lessons learned. Lessons captured in a given year for the TFNA should be reflected in the results reports prepared by each country.

Sustainability

5.1 Evaluation question: Are TFNA's interventions designed to produce sustainable change?

Finding 25: The extent to which TFNA's interventions produce sustainable change depends on a context. The factors that may impede sustainability are multiple and well reflected in the TFNA's work (Q 5.1.1 and Q.5.1.4)

73. TFNA's interventions in any of the three countries are so diverse that the measure of 'sustainable change' needs different instruments to assess them. We have seen the range of processes, activities and products that are 'change contributors' in Finding 21. But the extent of which these actions are generating sustainable change depends on a context that determines whether the end users are using their new knowledge, expertise and know-how in the right direction; whether the newly trained magistrates will adopt new training materials (Morocco and Tunisia); whether local authorities (in Libya and Tunisia) will integrate the concepts of community safety within their practise; or whether security sector institutions will follow recommendations of a gender-self assessment to increase their gender sensitiveness. Change in Libya is something that is *expected*, e.g., all actors

consulted are hoping to work towards a State and Ministries that will respect the rule of law and start organizing themselves in a more effective and professional manner. Creation of the Legal database will support the work of lawyers, justice ministry officials and other administrative layers of the Libya state that require to support and ground its action on legal basis. All these questions can be answered through the implementation of a MEL policy that we recommend later in this report, with given human and financial resources to guide the work of DCAF. The current efforts made by DCAF on the implementation of a MEL guideline for operations and the identification of a divisional MEL focal point are steps supporting this direction and training of staff should support a better integration of MEL throughout the TFNA.

74. The factors that impede sustainability of results are multiple and are well reflected in the TFNA reports: political dynamics and volatility is the most common issue in Tunisia and Libya; change of policies and staff within ministries, particularly at senior level is also very common and can lead to the paralysis of some initiatives; institutional fragility or absence of institutionalization; lack of capacities to accept, absorb and implement reforms, or lack of necessary frameworks and mechanisms to sustain the implementation of reforms. Many note the generally low pace of reform in SSR, which is sometimes compared to a work of Sisyphus with the promotion of initiatives by national stakeholders often not completed and then started again often for the sake of pretending that reforms are taking place. Rotation of personnel within partner organizations can also lead to loss of institutional memory, interest as well as capacities. Of course, the conflict in Libya is *the* major impediment that prevents from investing massively in a war-torn country, then the wise approach to prepare light strategic plans, with realistic objectives. In Morocco, the traditional power balance between Le Palais and the civilian administration is presented as a bottleneck that can last for a long time.

Finding 26: By signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with institutional and civil partners, the TFNA creates the conditions for sustainable in-country partnerships (Q 5.1.2)

75. For many partners, signing a MOU with DCAF is the end-result of sustained and solid partnerships pursued throughout the years and a strategy to promote the sustainability of DCAF's investments. In Tunisia and Morocco, DCAF has signed a number of conventions (from one year to three years) with Ministerial and institutional and civil society partners, from one to two partners at the same time (Ministry of Interior and INLUCC in Tunisia). In Tunisia, conventions have also been signed with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and another one is in preparation with the Ministry of Justice and illustrate the institutionalization of DCAF partnerships with state institutions.

76. In Morocco, after months of negotiation, DCAF recently (February 2021) signed a MoU with the Administration of Prisons (DGAPR) to support their efforts in updating their strategy, identifying solutions to the problem of overcrowding, and strengthening coordination with the justice sector. A convention has been signed with the Commission for the Control of Personal Data Protection (CNDP) and the Commission on the Right to Access to Information (CDAI) to share expertise and make the growing working relation official. Another one was signed with the National School of Administration (ENSA), in order to participate to the continuous learning and education of young and senior officials

of the Moroccan Justice and Security sectors on how to manage communications in times of crisis. Two other conventions signed with the *Centre d'études en Droits Humains et Démocratie* (Morocco) as well as the *Instance Nationale pour la Probité la Prévention et la Lutte contre la Corruption (INPPLC)* consolidate professional relations and articulate plans of action that will guide the work of DCAF in the years to come. Other MoU is pending a signature to support Parliamentary oversight in Morocco.

77. In Libya, other sectoral partnerships with the Danish Demining Group (Community-Based Oversight Mechanisms in three cities of Libya) or EUBAM have enabled the delivery of trainings of trainers on international detention standards, or earlier in its cooperation with the Ministry of Justice of Libya, to support the training of Libya Judicial Police officers. In December 2020, DCAF signed an MOU with the Ministry of Interior of Libya (and also received authorization to work with the Ministry of Defense the same month).

78. The increased number of conventional agreements signed with relevant Ministries, oversight or academic institutions illustrate the capacity to ensure sustained and solid partnerships that lead to increased capacity of effecting and producing more sustainable change.

Finding 27: The TFNA does not have an explicit exit strategy per se but should consider exiting when conditions of empowerment have been reached or, at the contrary, when progress seems too far to be reached (Q 5.1.3)

79. An exit strategy is a deliberate policy that sets up conditions to be filled when an objective has been achieved or, at the contrary, when conditions are no longer present to hoping pursuing a dedicated objective. Moreover, exiting can be the result of adverse conditions, the conflict in Libya being the perfect illustration of this scenario, forcing the organization to work since then on a remote basis. The opinion of the evaluation is that the TFNA still pursues various objectives with distinct partners, but no country strategy seems to have explicitly designed an exit strategy. On the contrary, although political hurdles in each country could force DCAF to reconsider its partnership with some of its partners, the main asset of the Fund – the possibility to invest programmatically on the long-term – generates new operational modalities.

80. When facing the impact of the conflict on its activities, in Libya, the strategy has been to continue working with the institutions, which had a national representation (e.g., the Ministry of Justice), and to cooperate with other partners involved with local SSG/R (community safety governance) in three important cities. In Morocco, the number of initiatives has steadily progressed over the last two years and interlocutors met by the evaluation did not see any programmatic reason to put an end to the development of the seeds that have been sown together.

81. However, the evaluation believes that DCAF *could* fix up limits to the duration of an investment with a given partner along with precise criteria: years of involvement in capacity building of an institution; numbers of people trained so that DCAF's involvement is no longer required, achievement of objectives that no longer require support, effects produced, etc. As stated later in this report, the definition of indicators that should guide the introduction to an exit strategy to a programme or line of activity should be guided by

some principles of: a) How could DCAF's experience in any related field in other countries inform the TFNA about the right number of years to support a process or an institution?; and b) Should exiting conditions be formally part of MOUs signed with various partners, and what kind of criteria should inform the decision to exit?

5.2 Evaluation question: Is the TFNA designed to empower local stakeholders independently?

Finding 28: Local stakeholders' empowerment is a long-term process that requires mutual ownership and confidence building (Q 5.2.1)

82. Empowerment is a slow and multi-step process. The TFNA deals with a wide range of partners, from a State Ministry or a Parliament to local civil society organizations. The review of TFNA activities through the lens of its stakeholders gives the impression that planned activities and objectives are repetitive from one year to the other, illustrating their continuity and the duration of efforts to achieve results. Moreover, empowerment process requires mutual trust, information sharing and respect of the independence of the partner's decisions. DCAF partners usually point out favorably the fact that the organization respects their independence.

83. All interviewees (as well as written notes received from senior officials in this regard) assert that DCAF is respected for what it is: a demand-driven organization, fully respectful of the choices and strategies undertaken by the partners, able to design, support or accompany policy frameworks, support legal reforms, training of users in new tools and policies. National institutions on human rights, against torture, women's organizations, trust DCAF for what it does in helping them to reach certain level of capacity, information and expertise sharing, feeding policy debates with information from other countries, organizing site visits: all the variety of the tools put in place generate a progressive empowerment of local stakeholders. National administrations reached by the evaluation in Tunisia and Morocco appreciate that DCAF accompany their partner organization without interfering in the way they wish to proceed. This way of proceeding improves ownership and empowerment.

84. Measuring empowerment is a difficult exercise and to which extent local stakeholders are empowered through DCAF's support should be one of the key question that a new MEL officer could tackle: how many years does it take so that a given institution becomes free of DCAF's support; how many years should an academic institution (like ENSA in Morocco) or institutional representation (like the Maison de la Communication in Tunisia) be accompanied to guarantee their staff or trainees master *Communication in time of crisis*? And then, through a proper assessment of the level of empowerment, when should DCAF say 'no' to a given request? Many of these points can hardly be assessed from outside. The design of an evaluation strategy with the proposed MEL position should include the design of indicators and a working plan to assess the level of empowerment of local stakeholders.

Finding 29: Transfer of activities and processes to local partners needs to be tailored to local contexts (Q 5.2.2)

85. Transfer of activities and processes to local partners should be organized in a timely and organized manner and ensure that local partners should be empowered with the right

tools and know-how in order to continue their work with the newly acquired tools. TFNA's transfer of activities to local partners should not lead to a loss of neutrality, independence or quality. In dynamic and volatile political environments, like is the case in Libya, the respect of principles of neutrality and independence from external political forces remains key and the organization safely remains aligned on international criteria of recognition (UN, bilateral donors). In Morocco or Tunisia, contribution agreements or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) define the extent of the cooperation and what is expected of each party.

86. DCAF's products, such as the guide for detention officials (Morocco) or specific training materials (for example, DCAF organized no less than 10 *different* training sessions for INLUCC in Tunisia) are, after their conception, widely disseminated among the stakeholders' staff and partners. That said, DCAF does not have much control over how such products may be used once released and made public. Activities following training sessions, particularly training of trainers, could be negotiated *prior* their implementation, for the sake of quality control or assurance, and be part of the contribution agreements signed between DCAF and its local partners. Institutions can then empower themselves by providing continuous education or training with their trained managers, which is the ultimate objective of a given capacity building initiative. This question of transferring activities and processes to local partners should be on the agenda of the Lessons Learned exercise that will be conducted by the MEL position to be created.

Structure and functioning of the TFNA

6.1 Evaluation question: How effective is the structure and functioning of the TFNA?

Finding 30: The structure of the TFNA is functional through its various business models. Its financial practises seem adequate (Q 6.1.1 and 6.1.2)

87. The TFNA uses a mix of different business models, which are not always designed deliberately but depend on the varied context in different partner countries. The way DCAF works in North Africa is represented in three models: in Tunisia, there is one important field office; in Libya, there is a remote national office covering its programmatic activities from the neighboring country or from Switzerland; and in Morocco, a flying country manager does regular and frequent trips while being based in Geneva. All models have their pros and cons either in terms of proximity, financial and programmatic efficiency, and relations with national stakeholders. The presence of a strong thematic international / national team in Tunis presents obvious advantages regarding the management of its portfolio of close to 30 projects (current and in pipeline). All local stakeholders interviewed in this evaluation recognized that a more permanent and regular presence would more ideally support DCAF's access and programme development in Libya, once security conditions are restored. Some kind of local presence would be appreciated by DCAF's partners in Morocco, but the evaluation team shares the opinion of DCAF that without any kind of official diplomatic or statutory recognition, there would be no need to invest in further in permanent representation. In Morocco, DCAF consolidates its presence by signing different convention agreements with its local partners but going higher could remain a difficult challenge to tackle for years. Although it remains obvious that the *scale* and *scope* of DCAF's operations may grow further with a fixed representation on the

ground, the current remote working model seems to function well. Some stakeholders even recognize that the COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened their communication with their respective programme managers. The DCAF Libya team has been *designing new programmes in order to capitalize, where possible, on the ability to work remotely*.

88. Current DCAF / TFNA financial practises seem properly aligned with best accounting principles (as per DCAF Independent auditor's report in 2019). However, one point deserves to be mentioned, as it evolved between 2019 to 2020, the fact that as of January 1, 2020, the TFNA depository bank started debiting negative interest from the TFNA bank account because it surpasses the threshold of CHF 2M. The evaluation was informed that this represented an estimated amount of CHF 5,000 last Fall 2020. The evaluation did not explore further how this financial cost could be mitigated in the future.

Finding 31: DCAF's project and approval system limits the functioning of the TFNA funded programme (Q 6.1.1)

89. The TFNA chain of design and approvals for Projects and Activities for the Tunisia programme is a six layers ladder (Project officer (development)> Team Leader in Tunis (approval)> Project Officer HQ (revision/support)> Head of the North Africa desk (recommendation)> Head of MENA HQ (approval) > Head of Operations HQ (endorsement). The chain of project and approval system is meant to have two layers only (proposal at the field office level and approval at the Geneva level) but the number of reviews generate delays and some frustrations from DCAF partners and staff in Tunisia. In the other TFNA countries, the layers can be less heavy due to country teams' configurations. There are good reasons for this lengthy chain of command: quality assurance, alignment of project to the TFNA Theory of Change, relevance and coherence of activities within the approved programme, quality of the proposals, budgetary control, involvement of DCAF expertise in support of proposed initiatives, etc.

90. In response of what is perceived to be a lengthy approval and review process the Tunisia team believes that there should be ways to give greater responsibility to the Tunisia Office and make it more accountable of its programming initiatives and decisions, particularly when it comes down to the activity level. Small size projects of relative financial importance (30 to 40K) are being approved once through the chain of approval *and* subsequent conferences or workshop activities related to the implementation of the same project *still* need to be revalidated again as activities. All this process is perceived to be highly time consuming and sometimes not responsive enough to the urgency of some requests presented to the DCAF Office in Tunisia, Libya or Morocco.

91. *No one* is questioning the rationale of having DCAF HQ keeping control and authority about the general orientations, sectors of activity, programme design of TFNA at the country level. However, it is strongly believed that a certain level of decentralization could ease and facilitate decision-making, as well as to be better responsive when necessary. The chain of programme and activities approval should then focus on:

- a. The possibility of the Tunis office to approve (budget, content) planned *activities* once *programmes / projects* have been approved by DCAF HQ. A similar approach should be envisaged for the Libya and Morocco programmes.

- b. The possibility for the Tunisia, Morocco or Libya offices to decide of some *financial disbursements* (with a *higher amount* of money than currently prevailing) that would support rapid response initiatives at the request of some of their national partners.

92. However, DCAF management recognizes that these proposals may be challenged by DCAF's policies to keep large amounts of funds in local bank accounts, nor to allow the use of these based on the discretion of local offices (a legal matter in accordance with the laws under which DCAF operates, which is Swiss law).

Finding 32: The Steering Committee of TFNA is more than ever an effective oversight mechanism (Q 6.1.3)

93. The review of the Steering Committee oversight past and current practises demonstrate an evolution of the oversight role of the TFNA. Progressively, the StC has questioned key governance, financial, programmatic or reporting issues of the Fund that, in their opinion, limited their understanding or the accountability of the Fund to their respective constituencies. With very few and temporary exceptions, the dialogue between donors is dynamic as well as results- and solutions-oriented. Therefore, lots of improvements have taken place in the design of the planning and reporting formats of the Fund, as well as with the willingness to see SMART indicators supporting the reporting of TFNA activities. The number of two StC meetings per year is perceived to be adequate. Ad Hoc meetings can also be organized on top of those StC meetings. The possibility given at the field level to have StC representatives accessing some key partners or stakeholders of DCAF also allows a better understanding of some TFNA activities undertaken.

94. DCAF has also been responsive in sharing advance information or forward planning for the StC meetings. Supported by an analytical review of possible threats and opportunities, the practise of providing country scenarios helps diplomats and officials to better review in a condensed format the various scenarios that may take place in each respective country.

Finding 33: Despite numerous efforts, TFNA remains without an official recognition in each of the countries it works in (Q 6.1.4)

95. The biggest frustration of former and current TFNA leadership has indeed been the lack of recognition of an official status of DCAF in the three countries the organization works in. Diplomatic efforts have been undertaken both in Libya and Tunisia as well as at the Geneva level to push this agenda forward. It is worth noting that some Foundations working in Tunisia are granted an official diplomatic status. In Morocco, the Head of the MENA division as well as the Director of DCAF have taken the opportunity to sign an MOU with national institutions as well as meeting with the Parliament with the perspective to sign an MOU with it. However, these courtesy meetings have not facilitated the opening of the doors of the Ministry of Interior nor the Ministry of External Affairs in Rabat. This is the paradox of the TFNA programme being engaged with so many national stakeholders in three distinct countries and still not having the privilege to benefit of a legal status or official registration in any of the partnering countries. DCAF has launched what is called

its “dossier international” to precisely address the issue of the legal status and registration of DCAF local representations.

Finding 34: Responding to new programmatic functions should lead to the creation of new positions (Monitoring and Evaluation, operations and/or research) within the TFNA staffing structure (Q 6.1.5)

96. Seen from Geneva, the structure of the TFNA Team in Tunisia seemed a little bit over inflated. However, after a careful review of the workload and tasks associated with each programme officer, the evaluation is of the opinion that the TFNA team in Tunisia has the appropriate capacity to deal with its programmatic work. However, understanding that each and any official was basically doing everything in the implementation in each of the programmes under their responsibility, one important remark point emerged: the possibility to support some of the key programme personnel with additional staff, interns or researchers. To better refine an idea expressed by many, DCAF Tunisia should lead the initiative to undertake a quick organizational assessment to assess the ratio *Level of effort delivered vs Human resources deployed* to ensure that the right level of resources supports the increased level of commitments for the three countries of the TFNA. The review should also assess the ratio between operating costs and project/activities costs, as well as between the size of the team and the size of annual delivery and implementation rates.

97. Last but not least, in order to respond to many of the issues raised during this evaluation, e.g. how can we better design indicators, monitor outputs, measure outcomes, assess impact, draw lessons learned from the TFNA experience, etc. the evaluation realized that: a) The culture of evaluation was not properly addressed in the TFNA programme, as well as institutionally; b) Progress is being undertaken with the drafting and sharing of a new DCAF Monitoring and Evaluation and Learning policy; c) There will be an increasing need to properly monitor, explain and show results expected from TFNA initiatives.

98. As a conclusion, it is strongly recommended that the TFNA should hire the services of a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) specialist who would support various functions: introduction of the new M&E Guidelines within the preparation, design, implementation and evaluation of TFNA programmatic initiatives; ensure that all indicators designed in the new Results Chain templates will be properly fed with evidence and adequate information; organize summative and formative evaluations of significant past and current programmes undertaken by the TFNA, starting in Tunisia, and later in the other two TFNA countries. This MEL officer could also properly address an objective of the TOR of the TFNA, which is that the StC “*may also commission an independent lessons learned and review exercise of the entire DCAF TFNA*”. The StC has commissioned two external evaluations in eight years and should now envisage to commission a wider exercise to assess lessons learned and outcome / impact for each specific window of the programme, as recommended by the TOR of the Fund (Point 25).

6.2 Evaluation question: Is the TFNA still a flexible and relevant instrument?

Finding 35: Flexibility of the TFNA is perceived to be one of its key assets by most stakeholders (Q 6.2.1)

99. Flexibility and adaptation to change is one of the most celebrated qualities of the TFNA. The trust fund is praised for the way it adapts to local political, institutional and

programmatic changes. Officials who recall the fact that the TFNA was born out of the unique situation of the Arab spring noted that *the trust fund is an incredibly apt tool for the security sector reform field. /.../ SSR support must constantly adapt itself to the political context and on the one hand, respond rapidly to new requests for assistance, and on the other, be able to slow down where there are political or institutional blockages and reluctance to engage*. Contrary to some organizations that are compelled to maintain a certain spending rate and thus face incentives to implement less useful activities, the trust fund enables DCAF to only engage on initiatives that make sense and add impetus to institutional reforms. The ISSAT study on Security & Justice Sector Governance in North Africa (2020) emphasizes in a similar manner the *Trust Funds most often managed by multilaterals help manage risks – including political and reputational risks – for bilateral actors supporting SSG/R programming*.

Finding 36: Nearly 10 years after their creation, TFNA TOR remain sound and valid but could be adapted to new realities (Q 6.2.2 and Q 6.2.3)

100. In the context of the evaluation, the question of reviewing the TORs of the TFNA was never raised as a serious concern by the donors neither by DCAF leadership. Reviewing the various components of the TFNA's TOR, it appears that:

- The contextual component of the TOR should be adapted to the context of 2021 (10 years after the events that triggered the creation of the TFNA). DCAF's official name should also be adjusted. Involvement in SSR should also namely stipulate SSG/R;
- The fact (para 6) that the TFNA targets explicitly five windows should also open the door to new countries. The evaluation interlocutors highlighted that it was difficult at the moment to consider expansion into new countries;
- Point 7, in light of the current trends of TFNA donors towards increased *un-earmarking*, it should be made explicit that this funding mechanism should be the preferred funding option for current or future StC members, in order to maintain the Fund's flexibility;
- Assistance to civil society organizations (para 8) could be more explicit to reflect concerns of the organization to reach out women, youth and/or concerned civil society components (e.g., human rights activist, journalists, etc.);
- The overall governance structure has remained the same throughout the existence of the Fund. Quality of the performance of each component should not lead to propose further changes (with the exception that there is no statutory policy for exiting members of the StC who no longer support financially the TFNA).

101. The revision of the TFNA TOR should be a participatory exercise that should invite all interested parties (StC members, DCAF) to review its various components: scope, objectives, operational and financial modalities. A small, dedicated technical group (one or two donors, TFNA and DCAF staff) could suggest and make proposals for an upcoming StC meeting.

5. Evaluation conclusions

Relevance

102. The TFNA has made progress in its interactions with security sector actors in most of the countries covered by the Fund throughout its capacity to access ministerial actors in all countries covered by the Fund and to accompany reform process. Nevertheless, there have been some limitations in terms of access to and participation in the countries' reforms for various contextual limitations. It has been impossible for DCAF to work in Egypt for many years. In Morocco, DCAF has done significant progress in its work with key national oversight institutions committed to access to information, prevention of torture, anti-corruption, cyber-criminality, and management of prisons. However, after building trust and confidence with key Ministries, the main obstacle for the TFNA remains to get access to the Ministries of Interior or to the Ministry of Defense. In Libya, because of the complex military and political situation, DCAF has had a limited access to security sector actors although it managed to support the Libyan Judicial Police to improve detention conditions and plans to improve stakeholders' knowledge and capacities in relevant Libyan ministries. In Tunisia, DCAF cooperation agreements with key institutions – Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Women, Families, Childhood and Seniors – engage the institution in a constant dialogue on sensitive and strategic security sector issues: cybersecurity, intelligence, corruption, and counter terrorism. DCAF has also progressively developed the capacity of the Parliament to increase its oversight over security sector institutions. Although the evaluation could not formally exchange with state officials in Morocco and Libya (while the evaluation shared opinions with some in Tunisia), there seems to be a strong buy-in of DCAF's work from Tunisia authorities, a growing positioning in Libya and a light buy-in of the Morocco authorities for SSG/R initiatives. The Theory of Change of TFNA remains valid and should be updated with some minor adjustments (integration of a gender marker, better reflection of the role of civil society organizations in oversight and policy development).

103. TFNA activities are based on solid research that is grounded in the local context. This feature is reckoned by most stakeholders as well as diplomats met during this evaluation. Many stakeholders value the background information that the TFNA team is able to bring to their attention and to increase their understanding of SSG/R trends. However, while in progress, work remains to be done to ensure inclusivity in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of gender and youth activities. The dedication to increase gender responsiveness throughout the TFNA programming seems serious but this remains still a long way to go that will require additional support from DCAF Gender and Security Division in Geneva.

104. At last, the TFNA is perceived by all stakeholders to remain a flexible instrument when it needs to adapt to exceptional circumstances or situations. This flexibility can take various forms, from engaging in policy debates, identifying external expertise and research in support of institutional needs, to providing a rapid review of the various DCAF's responses in the MENA Region in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Effectiveness

105. TFNA presents a reasonable record of outputs and outcomes in each country. The progress from outputs to outcomes has taken different paths in different countries, as it is influenced by contextual limitations, such as conflict in Libya, or local political conditions in Tunisia, or by the limited access to security forces to promote security sector reform in Morocco.

106. At the outcome level, the Fund's ability to induce significant transformation depends on the particular context. In **Libya**, conflict and safety concerns changed the way DCAF's strategy is being implemented. This has led DCAF to develop a strategy on influencing international actors, cooperating with EU, UN, Think Tanks and other multilateral actors to security and SSR in Libya, as well as approaching and starting working with Libyan institutions. DCAF works to *increase policy coherence* and to help international actors develop a *strategic vision* of the means, policies and resources, supporting SSR/G in Libya. In **Morocco**, although there may be *limited prospects for working directly with security forces to promote security sector reform*, DCAF has invested its energy with oversight institutions and found institutional entry points where international legal obligations may create momentum for change. Since 2016, DCAF has invested with relevant ministries (Justice, Health, Interior and the General Directorate for Penitentiary Administration and Rehabilitation) to improve the capacity of prison personnel to carry out their responsibilities in line with international standards and best practises on detention and anti-torture. It also engaged with the Office of the Public prosecutor to train Moroccan prosecutors to integrate and implement human rights guarantees in their professional practices. Also, DCAF's investments in capacity building, expertise sharing, and technological support have helped key national organizations to properly process data management in the context of Covid-19. DCAF's partners are now being consulted on this issue by Ministries of Interior and Ministry of Defense.

107. In **Tunisia**, DCAF's presence has allowed the trust fund to establish solid relations with security sector actors and institutions. Some outcomes with oversight institutions are relatively similar to the ones implemented in Morocco: DCAF's partnership with the Ministry of Justice has led to the production of medical-legal guide to improve the use of forensic evidence. With the Directorate General of Child/Youth Protection under the Ministry of Women, a new joint committee supported by DCAF identifies ways to improve rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile offenders. Also, the MOU signed with the Ministry of Interior aims at improving integrity and fight corruption, and the Ministry entered into partnership with oversight institutions with the National Agency to Fight Corruption (INLUCC) and the Access to Information Agency (INAI).

108. The dynamics of the security, political or institutional environments have been real challenges in achieving outputs and outcomes. The conflict in Libya has limited the dialogue with SSG/R authorities. The main obstacles in Tunisia have usually been of political nature: frequent changes in government, general volatility of the political situation, absence of support of local authorities, relative inefficiency of the Parliament, which leaves MPs powerless and without resources. In Morocco, DCAF has been progressing well in its cooperation with key national oversight institutions. However, the main bottleneck lies with the difficulty to get access to key Ministries such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense.

109. DCAF in each country targets most of the *right* stakeholders that it can access and uses various institutional entry points to build up confidence and start investing in reforms support, capacity building and training. This work is supported by a solid reputation of professionalism, ethic, respect, expertise, peer-to-peer investment, all this under strict principles of neutrality and impartiality. DCAF progresses in a pragmatic approach and each of the institutions the evaluation interviewed valued the possibility to be supported by a credible, trusted and expert organization. Interlocutors interpreted the ingredients of DCAF's reputation as follows: building trust and confidence, no top-down approach, great capacity of listening; investment on the long term; the adherence to a set of guiding principles (neutrality, local ownership, inclusivity, gender equality) that many of the interlocutors highlighted with respect.

110. The Marsad websites (3 countries) as well as the Legal Database (2 countries) can be described as cross-cutting initiatives with particular national focus. Although TFNA deploys expertise, research capacity and dialogue on regional initiatives led by other stakeholders (international conferences, workshop), the programme of the Fund can hardly be described as an integrated regional programme. However, there are some clear synergies between similar national initiatives in some sectors and the possibility to cross-pollinate at a regional level research, experience and progress achieved in each country.

111. To better respond to the Steering Committee's need to be better informed on outputs and outcomes of TFNA, DCAF has progressively invested some efforts in the definition of indicators that will properly inform outputs, immediate and intermediate outcomes in the years to come. The production of Guidelines related to Results-Based Project Design, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning and the creation of a dedicated position to support the integration of RBM principles within the organization will further support better planning and reporting on TFNA achievements and progress.

Efficiency

112. The TFNA works with a dedicated team of professionals both at the HQ as well as at the field level, perceived to be of sound intellectual quality and professionalism, which represents a very strong asset for DCAF's work. However, the evaluation team believes that a small HR review should lead to the possibility to add some additional expertise (research, operations) to the TFNA teams.

113. Lack of diplomatic and institutional representation complicates its relations with some actors. This position limits DCAF's efficiency: higher costs of labor, difficulty to recruit highly skilled profiles, obligation to work remotely. This situation hampers a harmonious in-country development. However, the evaluation shares the opinion expressed by some members of DCAF's team that there should not be any physical installation in any of the countries without office without clear commitments from the host states that DCAF be given a legal in-country status.

114. Budget forecasting for TFNA, after years of financial projections that were leading the Fund to usually disburse an average of 60% of its Low Case Scenario, is coming back to a kind of equilibrium between disbursement forecasts and donor's contribution, on a yearly basis. Low- and high-case-scenarios remain relevant as SSG/R environment and actors may evolve either more slowly either unpredictably, so the need to keep some

financial flexibility to address any unexpected event or request. To ensure that the balance between budget forecasting and donors contribution get properly aligned (one and the other ensuring that all legitimate requests could be adequately addressed), it is suggested that a StC/DCAF Committee would organize a mid-year budget review to inform all parties of the evolution of the scenarios.

115. TFNA interactions with donors, partners and TFNA countries have usually been categorized by a high level of transparency and fluidity although some channels of communication could be improved at the field level (particularly by inviting diplomats of the StC to have a closer look at the projects/ programmes put in place).

116. The implementation of the TFNA so far did not seem to have done any harm to persons or institutions. At the contrary, geared by the principles of neutrality and independence, DCAF is perceived to be listening very carefully its governmental and civil-society partners, more than some other partners who have distinct political or programme agendas or interests. DCAF protects the confidentiality of the data. It also refrains from communicating publicly on the work or achievements reached with a partner or another.

117. Most of the recommendations of the 2016 evaluation have been integrated into the TFNA governance structure and processes. Some of them have not been followed (*partner countries involvement in a TFNA governance structure*) or have received marginal support (*regional interventions*). Others have been properly followed, like *exploring synergies between the TFNA and donor activities*, or progressively developing a tool for assessing the relevance of new activities.

Impact

118. TFNA processes, activities and products are change contributors. The tools of change that have been identified by the evaluation are numerous and varied, from training to the development of sophisticated database, websites, delivery of expertise, development of guides, research, studies, observatories, or video production. The extent to which they produce change, at which level of effectiveness and efficiency needs to be properly measured through a range of evaluation instruments that will require additional efforts from the Fund. There are some common features that can be attributed to the TFNA, as they reveal social and institutional changes of DCAF's partners: a) a strong ownership by partners and stakeholders of the tools and products implemented or set up by the TFNA; b) an enhanced cooperation and practises between the actors working on similar issues and concerns; and c) an enhanced level of practise in each respective sector by using new instruments in their professional lives.

119. The degree to which the TFNA has been proactive on PVE, good governance or gender integration within SSR is somehow limited to a certain number of initiatives undertaken in each of the three countries covered. Gender integration is an emerging programming axis of DCAF in North-Africa, aiming at a better integration of gender approach and practises into strategies and action plans in the security sector. Good governance is a cross-cutting issue to most of the initiatives that DCAF undertakes in Libya, Morocco, or Tunisia.

120. Lessons learned can be better extracted and applied through increased monitoring, evaluation and learning supported by dedicated human resources. A rigorous review

process led in partnership with interested stakeholders and DCAF team can draw significant lessons learned and have them shared with external stakeholders.

Sustainability

121. The TFNA collection of tools, activities and processes are indeed good change contributors. However, it is the extent to which change has been taking place, which is difficult to measure, understanding that each change takes place in a specific context, history and political environment. Strong permanent outputs of TFNA will support change for a long period (such as the Legal Database). Others will need to be measured with more sophisticated tools, including a dedicated MEL capacity. The current efforts made by DCAF on the implementation of a MEL guideline for operations and the identification of a divisional MEL focal point are steps supporting this direction.

122. DCAF has signed a significant number of Memoranda of Understanding with a growing number of institutional partners, as well as with Ministries (Tunisia) or Parliaments (Morocco – to be signed, Tunisia). This process is embedding shared understanding of the programmatic objectives to be accomplished by DCAF and its partners over a given period. It also provides a shared vision of what should be done in the future.

123. There is no apparent need to consider developing exit strategies with most TFNA partners and no criteria prevails at the Fund's level to decide *when* and *how* such an exit should take place (except for projects / activities that no longer require technical assistance). As far as the programme objectives are concerned in each sector of SSG/R, there seems to be ample space to continue investing within each of the pillars of the ToC as each initiative usually generates new needs and entry points. As pointed out throughout the evaluation, SSR/G processes in North Africa still need quite a lot of support for years to come – which renders the consideration of exit strategies meaningless.

124. Empowerment of partners is a long-term process that requires mutual ownership and confidence building. After listening to a wide range of stakeholders, the evaluation concludes that DCAF is respected for what it is: a demand-driven organization carefully listening its partners, fully respectful of the choices and strategies undertaken by them, and able to design, support or accompany policy frameworks, legal reforms, institutional or civil-society organizations trainings and other knowledge production or management initiatives, with respect and discretion. Yet, the MEL position at DCAF should design a methodology to appreciate what are the local conditions, in each country, to reach a *level of empowerment* that would lead to a possible *exit strategy* that would decide of the way the organization could transfer activities and processes.

Structure and Functioning

125. With three different business models, the TFNA presents a variety of organizational arrangements, which range from a full-fledged office to flying country managers doing remote programming. For mostly political (Morocco) and security reasons (conflict in Libya), it is not possible to consider the feasibility to deploy three physical offices. Country managers who work remotely are currently able to follow up programme implementation and development through virtual means and communications. The fact that DCAF has no official recognition in any of the countries where it works hampers its development and

generates multiplies administrative hurdles at the field level (HR, Finances, Administrative toll, etc.).

126. To ease and reduce administrative and bureaucratic delays of each office, DCAF is invited to review the decision-making chain of control and revision of the TFNA programme initiatives. By maintaining strict control and oversight over general programming, DCAF could also consider decentralizing some of the decision-making process (activity level and small/quick initiatives) to the field so that DCAF's responsiveness gains in time and accountability.

127. The TFNA StC seems to have gained on oversight and control effectiveness of the way the programme progresses. In association with the general development of RBM rules and principles throughout DCAF as an organization, it proposed that better tools be put in place in order to generate a better understanding of the outputs, immediate and intermediate outcomes generated by the TFNA as well as a better regular reporting of DCAF progresses. To better support these new processes, DCAF deserves to create a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) position at the field level that would design indicators, monitor outputs, measure outcomes, assess impact and draw lessons learned from the TFNA experience.

128. Aside of the constraints identified in the evaluation, it appears that the TFNA remains a flexible instrument and is unanimously perceived as such. Also, the TORs of the TFNA remain sound and valid but need some adaptations to the current context and realities. This adaptation could be designed in conjunction with members of the StC.

6. Evaluation recommendations

6.1. Strategic Recommendations

Recommendation 1: (Finding 16 and 33): The TFNA, with the support of members of DCAF's Foundation Council and TFNA donors, should reach diplomatic and/or administrative agreements with the countries it works in.

The lack of international representation of DCAF in the three countries covered by TFNA limits the expansion of its programming and its interactions with senior levels of political and administrative representations in all three countries. This issue prevails since the birth of the Fund and dedicated efforts from TFNA friends and donors should ease and facilitate an official recognition of DCAF in Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya.

Recommendation 2: (Finding 36): The TFNA should consider adjusting its TOR to better reflect current realities of its contextual environment 10 years after their adoption.

The TOR of the TFNA, who bear a strong historic perspective associated to its creation, should be adapted to better reflect current realities of 2021. This initiative should be undertaken in a participatory manner with member states and DCAF HQ prior being submitted to the Steering Committee in 2021.

Recommendation 3: (Finding 5): The ToC of TFNA should be complemented with a gender-rights approach and reflect civil society's role in Effective Oversight and Adequate Legal and Policy Framework.

The ToC of the TFNA remains very valid in consideration of its past and current achievement. However, there are some areas of improvement that could be better reflected within this dynamic instrument:

- The progressive and important integration of a gender marker within TFNA programming should also be reflected throughout DCAF processes and activities.
- The role of civil society, youth and gender organizations in oversight and policy development should also be better reflected within the ToC as a valid reflection of its growing relevance.

Recommendation 4: (Finding 16): The TFNA should consider the possibility to position senior national advisors in each of TFNA countries where it has no official representation.

One of the weaknesses of the TFNA organizational structure comes jointly from the lack of diplomatic or professional representation of the organization in Morocco and Libya as well as the difficulty to optimize their work in a more efficient manner with field stakeholders. Historically, DCAF has found ways of organizing a national presence in a given country by recruiting local advisors with SSG/R relevant experience in their country of origin. Similarly, for the two countries concerned, local advisors could be identified by DCAF in order to connect, gather information, participate to local fora, interact and deal with local stakeholders on behalf of DCAF, under control and supervision of the TFNA country managers. As an illustration, this solution was adopted by DCAF in Mali prior to

the organization of a local office and it presented enormous advantages for the progress of DCAF's work in this country. A Human Resources analysis could be initiated to assess, which kind of local support would be needed.

6.2. Operational Recommendations

Recommendation 5: (Finding 34): After a short HR organizational review, TFNA should consider recruiting additional resources to strengthen its research and operational functions as well as to facilitate the introduction of a MEL function in all its programming.

The evaluation has assessed the need for TFNA to undergo a short organizational and tasks review of its personnel to assess how additional local resources could better support its functioning, operations and research capacities. The TFNA should also recruit a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) officer in order to perform various functions such as: introduction of the new M&E Guidelines within the preparation, design, implementation and evaluation of TFNA programmatic initiatives; ensure that all indicators designed in the new Results Chain templates will be properly supported by the evidence and adequate information; organize summative and formative evaluations of significant past and current programmes undertaken by the TFNA.

Some topics of interest for a new MEL officer have already been raised in this report: how to measure sustainable change for each category of stakeholders; the empowerment of local stakeholders; lessons learned of past transfers of activities and processes.

Recommendation 6: (Finding 30): A technical group of the TFNA StC and management should review *mid-year* budget figures to assess the level of achievements of each country scenario in a given year, expected contributions and inform the group of donors accordingly.

Low- and high-case scenarios have direct budget implications when it comes to implementation. The TFNA supports long term SSR/G initiatives but also requires visibility on its funding one year to another. A technical committee composed of the StC and TFNA leadership should ideally review existing financial figures in May/June. They could figure out the budgeting needs and then call for further contributions if required.

Recommendation 7: (Finding 31): DCAF and TFNA leadership should reassess the process for programme design, planning, approval and implementation to ensure a more efficient decision-making process.

It is important for DCAF HQ to retain control and oversight over the strategic, programmatic, and managerial developments of the TFNA. However, the programme and project chain of command is quite cumbersome and is sometimes not facilitating the quick implementation of programmes, projects, and subsequent activities. Therefore, it is suggested to improve the accountability of the TFNA field teams as well as to accelerate the decision-making processes by: a) giving the possibility to field offices/programmes to approve (budget, content) planned *activities* once *programmes/projects* have been approved by DCAF HQ; and b) to contemplate the possibility of delegating to field offices authority to decide on some *financial disbursements* that would support rapid response initiatives at the request of some of its national partners.

Recommendation 8: (Finding 36) With the support of the StC, and as per the original TOR of the Fund, the TFNA should commission an independent *lessons learned and review exercise of the entire DCAF TFNA*.

The original TOR of DCAF recommend the commission of an *independent lessons learned and review exercise of the entire DCAF TFNA*. This represents an exercise, which goes very much beyond a simple summative evaluation and that requires MEL capacity to support an extensive and lengthy exercise (surveys to various categories of stakeholders, perception studies, focus group discussions with beneficiaries, etc.). The commissioning of this exercise would be a perfect way to illustrate how the Fund has produced or generated *substantive change* and has *impacted SSG/R practice* throughout its 10 years of existence in the region.

Recommendation 9: (Finding 7) With the support of the Gender and Security Division, TFNA staff should be offered further training on Gender integration and conduct a review of all projects implemented with a gender lens.

To fulfill the objectives of using Gender Markers within DCAF/TFNA programming, time and energies from the Gender and Security Division should be invested in the training of all TFNA Staff. A revision of all current and incoming initiatives should provide a better gender lens to the TFNA programming and all projects should then be gender marked.

ANNEXES

Annexe 1: Terms of reference

DCAF Geneva Centre
for Security Sector
Governance



Terms of Reference

*For the External Evaluation of the DCAF Trust Fund for Security Sector
Development Assistance in North Africa (TFNA)
2012-2020*

May 2020

1. Background

About DCAF

The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) is an organisation dedicated to improving the security of states and their people within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. DCAF contributes to making peace and development more sustainable by assisting partner states, and international actors supporting these states, to improve the governance of their security sector through inclusive and participatory reforms. It creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, provides legal and policy advice and supports capacity-building of both state and non-state security sector stakeholders.

DCAF's Foundation Council comprises 63 member states, the Canton of Geneva and six permanent observers. Active in over 70 countries, DCAF is internationally recognized as one of the world's leading centres of excellence for security sector governance (SSG) and security sector reform (SSR). DCAF is guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, local ownership, inclusive participation, and gender equality. For more information please visit www.dcaf.ch.

About the TFNA

In 2011, North Africa witnessed important political change. In their search for a new future, societies in North Africa identified security sector reform as necessary for ensuring democratic transition, restoring public confidence into the state and its institutions, and prevent violence.

In response to this heightened interest in and demand for expertise in security sector governance and reform, DCAF's Foundation Council endorsed the establishment of a Trust Fund for Security Sector Development Assistance in North Africa (TFNA) in June 2012.

The TFNA allowed to rapidly and flexibly respond to requests for assistance from the governments of Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

Eight years on, the Fund continues to support comprehensive reform programmes, by implementing projects to improve parliamentary oversight, put in place accountability mechanisms and improve integrity of security institutions. It works towards strengthening citizens' access to information, enabling the inclusion of youth and gender perspectives into security policies, and generally building trust between citizens and authorities. The four countries originally benefiting from DCAF TFNA support followed very different, sometimes divergent, paths in their political, social and security development. The flexibility of the Fund has allowed DCAF to increasingly develop context specific interventions, reflecting the differences among the four national contexts.

The TFNA works as both a steering instrument and a pool funding mechanism. Through the TFNA's Steering Committee, member states provide strategic guidance to and oversight over the TFNA's interventions. As a pool-funding mechanism, the TFNA strengthens international coordination on security and justice sector reform in the region, in line with the OECD DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

Donors contribute either to the TFNA's general window, or to one of the four country-specific windows. The TFNA does not accept any other form of earmarking. Current members include Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.

For more detail, see the annexed Terms of Reference for the Trust Fund, and the TFNA website (www.dcaf-tfna.org).

In 2015, the Steering Committee commissioned a first external evaluation of the TFNA conducted by Blomeyer & Sanz during the months December 2015 to March 2016. The objective was to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Trust Fund's interventions. In addition, the evaluation also considered the structure and functioning of the TFNA. The final report highlighted several findings and provided recommendations at strategic and operational levels¹.

In October 2019, the TFNA Steering Committee decided to commission a new external evaluation of the TFNA, considering that the timing was appropriate to reevaluate the mechanism, four years after the first evaluation and eight years since its inception.

2. Focus and purpose of the evaluation

In line with the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance, the evaluation seeks to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Trust Fund's interventions. In addition, the evaluation will consider the structure and functioning of the TFNA. Guiding questions pertaining to each of these six criteria are outlined in the following section. Evaluators shall be expected to complete these with additional questions that they may find necessary to enable a comprehensive evaluation.

The evaluation shall serve to gather lessons learnt in order to inform the strategic steering, programming, planning, implementation and knowledge management of the TFNA.

The evaluation aims to assess the interventions of the Trust Fund for North Africa in relation to the Outcomes, Outputs and Processes/Activities outlined in the TNFA's Theory of Change, the Country Strategies 2017-2019 for Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and other TFNA planning and M&E documents. Thus, the evaluation shall help determine the extent to which the activities conducted have contributed towards the achievement of the following outcomes: (1) Effective Oversight; (2) Adequate Legal and Policy Framework; and (3) Responsive Security.

¹ The report will be made available to the selected evaluator.

3. Evaluation criteria and questions

The evaluation must be guided by, but not limited to, the following questions, grouped per evaluation criteria:

1. Relevance *(the extent to which the activities are suited to the priorities and policies of the target groups, recipients and donors).*

- a) Are the TFNA interventions linked to the development and reform priorities of security sector actors in the partner countries? And how? Are they designed to efficiently identify and address relevant SSG deficits?
- b) Do the TFNA interventions correspond to the strategic priorities of donors? Are the TFNA interventions complementary and/or synergetic with the other programmes of the contributing donors, or programmes supported by other donors? To what extent has the TFNA been able to achieve its intended goal to contribute more towards donor harmonisation/coordination in the area of SSR, and more towards bridging identified gaps? To what extent TFNA interventions have been designed / implemented in coordination with donors and other international actors?
- c) Does the TFNA Theory of Change remain relevant in regard to efficiently address SSG/R in the partner countries? If not, what changes would be required?
- d) Are the processes and activities of the TFNA geared towards intended outputs and outcomes?
- e) Which factors/criteria have been chosen to ensure proper contextual analysis and understanding to support TFNA interventions? Are they relevant? Are they based on risk analysis and mitigation matrix?
- f) Are TFNA interventions designed in an inclusive manner? If so, do they reflect diversity (political, geographical, religious, social, gender, age, etc.)?
- g) Are the TFNA interventions flexible enough to effectively respond rapidly and efficiently to emerging threats and needs, specifically including, but not limited to, those emerging from new crises (i.e. COVID 19 pandemic).

2. Effectiveness *(the extent to which the activity attains its objectives):*

- a) Have Outputs and Outcomes under the TFNA been revisited and adapted to better support locally owned processes and address contextually relevant and changing needs?
- b) How relevant and effective are the indicators used to measure progress under the TFNA? Do they contribute to ensuring effective Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning? What changes may be necessary?
- c) To what extent have the Outputs and Outcomes been achieved? What are the main (enabling/constraining) factors influencing achievement/non-achievement of Outputs/Outcomes and why?

- d) Is the TFNA targeting the right stakeholders? In the right way? Has it contributed to building relations of trust, thus placing itself as a long-term and trusted reform partner in the target countries?
- e) To what extent is the TFNA a regional programme? Is there a strategy/rationale for regional engagement and what regional results (if any) have been achieved?
- f) What is the importance/impact of in-country presence (long term/short term) and country offices for the effectiveness of TFNA interventions?

3. Efficiency *(assessing the outputs – quantitative and qualitative – relative to the inputs).*

- a) Does the TFNA allow efficient use of human, financial and other resources? What is the relation between budgetary implementation rates and activity implementation rates over the past years?
- b) How efficient and innovative is the TFNA approach (interacting with its partners, both donors and target countries), and how is this reflected through the impact made on Security Sector Governance (SSG)? How efficient is the annual budgeting process and budget forecasts under the TFNA to enable effective responses and delivery of programmes?
- c) To what extent recommendations from the previous external evaluation have been integrated since 2016?

4. Impact *(the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended).*

- a) Are the TFNA processes, activities and products (publications, online resources, etc.) contributing to change? If yes, how (concrete example)? If no, why and what changes should be introduced?
- b) What are key positive changes to which TFNA interventions contributed to or which they have produced? Is the TFNA using convincing context-specific methodologies to make value change in the countries where it operates?
- c) How do the TFNA's interventions compare to those of other actors working on the same or similar topics? How does it complement its donors' support strategies to SSR/G in the relevant countries?
- d) How are lessons learned under TFNA interventions collected, shared and used?
- e) What is the transversal impact of the TFNA on key performance indicators such as: prevention of violent extremism; good governance gender integration within SSR, etc. (qualitative as well as quantitative analysis).
- f) Has the TFNA incorporated efficient measures to ensure the application of Do No Harm principles?

5. Sustainability *(the extent to which the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn):*

- a) To which extent has the TFNA been able to ensure inclusivity in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities and results?
- b) Are the TFNA's interventions designed to produce sustainable change? How?
- c) Has the TFNA produced results that are sustainable beyond its direct engagement? Does the TFNA incorporate an exit strategy of countries / region in its interventions?
- d) Is the TFNA designed to empower local stakeholders continue processes independently? If yes, how?
- e) Can the TFNA transfer certain activities/processes to local partners without risking the loss of neutrality, independence or quality? If yes, how?
- f) What are the factors that may impede sustainability of results and cannot be addressed through project management?

6. Structure and functioning of the TFNA

- a) How effective is the structure and functioning of the Trust Fund (pros/cons of the trust fund modality; adequacy and possible implications (legal and practical) of existing financial practices, including roll-over of funds from one year to the other; adequacy of the steering mechanism; adequacy of the presence of DCAF in the respective countries / remote management; adequacy of the monitoring system, etc.)?
- b) How flexible is the TFNA mechanism to adapt quickly to new crises and respond efficiently to emerging threats and needs (i.e. Example of the COVID 19 pandemic and its consequences on security sector governance).
- c) How relevant and valid do the TFNA ToRs continue to be? Do they require any changes? If yes, which aspects and why? How these may be improved?
- d) How efficient and systemic is the reporting process? Are existing templates sufficient?

As the TFNA has been operational for eight years, it might by now be possible to assess the Outcome level (which was not the case for the previous evaluation that focused on activity and output levels)². Therefore, the focus of this evaluation shall be on Outcomes and Outputs. To the extent possible, the evaluator(s) shall document examples of demonstrated Outcomes or Outputs

² The terms Outcome, Output and Processes/activities refer here to those outlined in the TFNA Theory of Change.

which have contributed to significant progress towards Outcomes. The evaluation team is expected to develop a detailed research methodology in order to address the 6 evaluation criteria listed above.

4. Scope

The evaluation shall cover all four TFNA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt).

5. Methodology

The selected evaluator(s) shall present in their proposal their methodological approach. The evaluator(s) shall perform the evaluation rigorously and objectively to generate valid information and conclusions. The methodology is expected to include the following components:

- Desk review of TFNA planning and M&E documents (Theory of Change, country strategies, results planning, narrative and financial reporting) and other relevant documentation (MoUs with local partners, media reports, strategies and policies, press statements from partners, etc.)
- Desk review of TFNA “products” (reports, publications, online databases and other web resources, etc.);
- Field visits to Geneva and Tunisia, including:
 - ✓ Interviews with DCAF staff in Geneva and Tunis;
 - ✓ Interviews and focus group discussions with key security sector stakeholders and beneficiaries from all stakeholder groups (including workshop/training participants) in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya;
 - ✓ Interviews with local media, civil society organisations and experts;
 - ✓ Interviews with donor representatives.

6. Management of the evaluation

The TFNA Steering Committee shall, as assisted by the TFNA secretariat, determine the detailed framework of the evaluation. All practical and logistical aspects for the implementation of this evaluation shall be ensured by the Secretariat.

The Steering Committee shall:

- ✓ approve the Terms of Reference of the external evaluation of the TFNA;
- ✓ review and comment on the draft evaluation report;
- ✓ review and approve the final evaluation report; and
- ✓ explore and approve how the findings and recommendations of the final evaluation report can be applied to TFNA planning and programming.

The TFNA Secretariat shall:

- ✓ Launch the call for offers, receive and evaluate them, proceed to the final selection based on a selection report;
- ✓ review the inception report;
- ✓ provide the evaluation team with the necessary documentation and contact details for beneficiaries and stakeholders; collect feed-back and comments from Steering Committee members on all draft reports submitted by the evaluators and channel them to the later for action;
- ✓ circulate the final evaluation report to the Steering Committee for approval;
- ✓ handle contractual matters and provide other assistance as needed for the smooth implementation of the evaluation.

7. Deliverables

Expected deliverables include:

- An inception report which defines the process, methodology and timeline of the evaluation (evaluation matrix and criteria, evaluation questions grouped by indicators, indicators, information sources, risk mitigation plan, assumptions, etc.) (max. 8 pages);
- Draft and final evaluation reports of maximum 25 pages A4 (without annexes), including an executive summary of no more than 2 pages, to be submitted in hardcopy and electronically. The report must be well written, proofread, and presented in print-ready format using Arial font size 12;
- An oral/visual presentation of the findings to the TFNA's Steering Committee.

The structure of the final report shall be based on the following approximate indications:

1. Executive summary (max. 2 pages)
2. Introduction (incl. the functioning, structure and aims of the TFNA, objective of the evaluation, tender procedure for selecting the evaluator, selection of the evaluator) (max. 1 page)
3. Description of the four TFNA country programmes (max. 2 pages)
4. Methodology used for the evaluation (incl. main evaluation questions and assessment criteria, techniques, access to beneficiaries and limits to the evaluation) (max. 1 page)
5. Analysis of the collected information (in response to previously established evaluation questions and criteria) / up to 10 pages
6. Evaluation results – Up to 5 pages

7. Evaluation conclusions (evaluation of the collected information and the observed results) – up to 3 pages
8. Evaluation recommendations – up to 3 pages
9. Annexes including terms of reference, evaluation plan, documentation review, list of beneficiaries consulted, interviews, focus groups etc.

All reports and submissions shall be made in the English language.

8. Process and timelines

The evaluation is expected to take place during the second semester of 2020. Any delays that may result from events beyond DCAF's and/or the selected evaluator's control, shall be mutually communicated and agreed upon. In such case, the TFNA Steering Committee shall be duly informed. The following tentative schedule shall apply:

Activity	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
Call for proposals						
Assessment of bids and selection of evaluator (DCAF)						
Provision of relevant documents to the evaluator						
Desk review and preparation of inception report (evaluator)						
Review of inception report (DCAF)						
Information collection in Geneva (for Morocco and Egypt) and Tunis, and on Skype with DCAF and relevant stakeholders. (evaluator)						
Write first draft of evaluation report (evaluator)						
Review of first draft evaluation report (DCAF)						
Submission of draft report to the TFNA Steering Committee and approval at the SC Autumn meeting (DCAF)						
Finalise evaluation report (evaluator)						

9. Criteria for bids (selection of evaluators)

Applicants can be a firm, a professional evaluator or a group of professional evaluators, who stand in no direct or indirect relationship to the Trust Fund's past, current or planned projects. The proposed evaluator(s) shall have demonstrable experience in programme evaluation in relevant contexts, including evaluating projects in the field of development assistance to governance, preferably in the security and justice sector. The proposed evaluator(s) should be able to work in both English and French. Ability to work in Arabic, would be a distinct advantage.

Demonstrable experience, language capacity and the technical offer will represent 70% of the points allocated within the selection process.

10. Cost proposal

Proposals should include a detailed financial offer in CHF covering daily rates, travel and accommodation costs for field visits and any other incurred expenses.

The financial offer will represent 30% of the points allocated within the selection process.

11. Annexes

- Terms of Reference for the DCAF Trust Fund for North Africa (TFNA)
- TFNA Theory of change

Annexe 2: Evaluation Matrix

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
Relevance	1.1 Are the TFNA interventions linked to the development and reform priorities of security sectors actors?	1.1.1 How are TFNA interventions linked to the development and reform priorities of security sector in each respective country?	Extent to which TFNA interventions are linked to security sector development in each country	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports Opinions of national partners Opinions of Donors Opinions of non-contributing international actors/donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), donors and other international donors/ stakeholders
		1.1.2 Have the TFNA teams been able to <i>identify</i> and <i>address</i> SSG deficits?	Degree to which the TFNA addressed SSG deficits in each country		
	1.2 Do the TFNA interventions correspond to the strategic priorities of donors?	1.2.1 To what extent TFNA interventions have been designed/implemented in coordination with donors and other international donors?	Degree of coordination of TFNA interventions with (non) contributing donors and other international stakeholders		
		1.2.2 Are the TFNA interventions complementary and/or synergetic with other programmes of the contributing donors?	Extent to which TFNA interventions are complementary to contributing donors		
		1.2.3 Are the TFNA interventions complementary and/or synergetic with other programmes of non-contributing donors?	Extent to which TFNA interventions are complementary to non-contributing donors		
		1.2.4 To what extent has the TFNA been able to achieve its intended role to contribute more towards donor harmonisation/ coordination in the area of SSR?	Degree to which the TFNA was able to contribute to donors harmonization and coordination in the SSR sector (national/regional)		
	1.3 Does the TFNA Theory of Change remain relevant?	1.3.1 Is the TFNA ToC adequate to efficiently address SSG/R in the partners countries?	Extent to which the ToC remains relevant to the eyes of TFNA management, staff, donors and partners	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports	Documentary review

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
		1.3.2 Are TFNA processes and activities geared towards intended outputs and outcomes?	Degree to which TFNA processes are perceived (Staff, S/Holders, Donors and national partners) to be geared towards outputs and outcomes	Opinions of national partners Opinions of Donors Opinions of non-contributing international actors/donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff	Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), donors and other international donors/ stakeholders
	1.4 Does the TFNA properly reflect local context and inclusivity?	1.4.1 Which factors/criteria were put in place to ensure proper contextual analysis and understanding in support of TFNA interventions?	Nature of factors/criteria put in place to ensure a proper contextual analysis		
		1.4.2 Are TFNA interventions designed in an inclusive manner, reflecting local diversity (political, geographical, religious, social, gender, age, etc.)	Extent to which TFNA interventions are designed in an inclusive manner (quote examples)		
	1.5 Are TFNA interventions flexible enough to effectively respond rapidly to emerging threats?	1.5.1 Did TFNA responded rapidly and efficiently to emerging threats or new crises (for ex. COVID-19 pandemic)	Evidence of TFNA responses explicitly responding rapidly and in a relevant manner to an emerging threat?		
Effectiveness	2.1 To what extent have the Outputs and Outcomes been achieved (from 2016 up to now)?	2.1.1 Have Outputs and Outcomes been achieved in each respective country?	Number and nature of outputs and outcomes achieved per country since the last evaluation (2016)	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports Opinions of national partners	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, Nationals/ holders (TFNA
		2.1.2 Have Outputs and Outcomes been revisited and adapted to better support locally owned processes?	Degree to which outputs and outcomes support locally owned processes		

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
		2.1.3 Have Outputs and Outcomes been contextually relevant and changing needs?	Degree to which outputs and outcomes are relevant to each specific context	Opinions of Donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff	countries), and donors
		2.1.4 What are the main (enabling/constraining) factors influencing achievement/non-achievement of Outputs/Outcomes and why?	Nature of factor influencing TFNA results Prioritization of factors enabling or hindering achievements of outputs		
	2.2 Is the TFNA targeting the right stakeholders?	2.2.1 Has TFNA targeted the right stakeholders in each respective country in relation to its ToC?	Extent to which the TFNA has targeted the right s/holders	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), and donors
		2.2.2 Has the TFNA built up and maintained confidence relations to expect working on the long term in each respective country?	Degree of confidence building between TFNA and national/international stakeholders	Opinions of Donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff	
		2.2.3 Can one say that the TFNA is a regional programme (strategy? Results?)?	Extent to which the TFNA appears to have a regional strategy (or not)	Opinions of national/ international partners	
	2.3 Are TFNA progress indicators relevant?	2.3.1 Do TFNA indicators adequately capture projects' outputs and outcomes?	Degree to which TFNA indicators adequately capture projects' outputs and outcomes		
		2.3.2 Do TFNA indicators contribute to an effective MEL?	Extent to which indicators support an effective MEL		
Efficiency	3.1 Does the TFNA allows efficient use of human, financial and other resources?	3.1.1 Is the TFNA deploying enough human, financial and other resources to reach its objectives?	Extent to which financial processes support effectively TFNA operations Variability of HR resources in relation to TFNA developments and processes	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports Opinions of Donors	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, Nationals/ holders (TFNA

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
		3.1.2 What is the importance/impact of in-country presence (long term/short term) and country offices for the effectiveness of TFNA interventions?	Degree to which presence or non-presence of a DCAF office influences TFNA's work Perceptions of s/holders related to the effectiveness of TFNA operations in relation with TFNA's physical presence/absence	Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff Opinions of national partners	countries), and donors
		3.1.3 How efficient is the annual budgeting process and budget forecasts in providing effective delivery of programmes?	Extent to which the annual budgeting process is providing effective delivery Relation between budgetary implementation rates and activity implementation rates		
		3.1.4 How efficient and innovative (interaction with donors, partners and TFNA countries) is the TFNA approach?	Perceptions of donors & national s/holders in relation to TFNA's effective impact on Security Sector Governance		
		3.1.5 Has the TFNA incorporated efficient measures to ensure the application of Do No Harm?	Extent to which the TFNA has explicitly/purposefully integrated Do No Harm measures		
	3.2 Have previous external evaluation recommendations been integrated since 2016?	3.2.1 To which extent the recommendations of the 2016 external evaluation been followed?	Evidence that the recommendations of the 2016 evaluation have been adequately followed	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports Opinions of Donors StC Minutes Evaluation of the TFNA, 2016	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), and donors
		3.2.2 Have the recommendations of the 2016 evaluation deemed useful and relevant?	Extent to which DCAF/TFNA recommendations have been deemed useful and relevant		

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
Impact	4.1 To which extent TFNA operations contribute to change in targeted countries?	4.1.1 Are TFNA processes, activities and products contributing to change (examples)?	Evidence that TFNA processes, activities and products contribute to change	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports Opinions of Donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Local Staff Opinions of national partners and s/holders	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), and donors
		4.1.2 Did TFNA interventions contributed to produce key positive changes?	Degree of evidence that TFNA interventions produced key positive changes		
		4.1.3 Are context specific methodologies used by TFNA producing value changes in its countries of operation?	Nature of specific methodologies implemented by DCAF that produce value changes		
	4.2 How do TFNA's interventions compare to those of other actors working on same or similar topics?	4.2.1 Degree to which the TFNA complements its donors support strategies to SSR/G in the relevant countries	Nature of differences and singularity of TFNA interventions in comparison to other donors' initiatives		
		4.2.2 Has there been any cross-cutting impact of the TFNA on key performance indicators such as PVE, Good governance Gender integration within SSR?	Degree to which the TFNA has been directly or indirectly supporting cross-cutting performance indicators (PVE, Governance, Gender)		
	4.3 How are lessons learned under TFNA interventions collected, shared, and used?	4.3.1 How are lessons learned collected and presented? 4.3.2 How are lessons learned reflected within TFNA programing and reporting?	Evidence that the program has collected, shared and used lessons learned		

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
Sustainability	5.1 Are the TFNA's interventions designed to produce sustainable change?	5.1.1. How are the TFNA interventions able to produce sustainable change? 5.1.2 Has the TFNA produced results that are sustainable beyond its direct engagement? 5.1.3 Does the TFNA incorporate an exit strategy of countries/region in its interventions? 5.1.4 What are the factors that may impede sustainability of results and cannot be addressed through project management?	Extent to which the TFNA ensure inclusivity in the design, implementation, M&E of activities and results Nature of the TFNA exit strategies (pros/cons) Perceptions related to the nature of factors hindering sustainability of results	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports Opinions of Donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff Opinions of national partners	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), and donors
	5.2 Is the TFNA designed to empower local stakeholders independently?	5.2.1 How can the TFNA could better support local stakeholders' empowerment? 5.2.2 Can the TFNA transfer certain activities/processes to local partners without risking a loss of neutrality, independence, or quality?	Nature of means and policies able to support local s/holders' empowerment Extent to which the TFNA can transfer activities/processes to local partners in respect of neutrality/independence principles		
	5.3 To which extent has the TFNA been able to ensure inclusivity in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities and results?	5.3.1 How is the TFNA integrating inclusivity in the design and implementation of its activities? 5.3.2 How is the TFNA integrating inclusivity within its MEL activities and results?	Nature of means and practise supporting inclusivity within the design, implementation, MEL activities and results		

CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	DATA COLLECTION MEANS
Structure and functioning of the TFNA	6.1 How effective is the structure and functioning of the TFNA?	6.1.1 What are the pros and cons of the current structure of the TFNA? 6.1.2 Are current financial practices still adequate? 6.1.3 Is the StC an effective oversight mechanism? 6.1.4 What are the pros and cons of having DCAF present in, or working remotely from, TFNA countries? 6.1.5 Has the TFNA an effective M&E system in place? 6.1.6 Is the reporting process efficient and relevant? 6.1.7 Are existing templates sufficient?	Perceptions (DCAF/TFNA Personnel and Donors) of the TFNA structure) Extent to which finance rules are perceived to be legally adapted and practical in their operations Perceptions (DCAF/Donors) of the StC structure, operations, oversight, and decision-making process Perceptions related to the presence/absence of DCAF in 3 out of 4 TFNA countries Extent to which TFNA/Donors are satisfied with the M&E and reporting systems in place (pros/cons/SWOT)	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports DCAF Financial documentation StC Minutes Opinions of Donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff Opinions of national stakeholders	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), and donors Face to face interviews (Geneva) Financial analysis M&E Analysis
	6.2 Is the TFNA still a flexible and relevant instrument?	6.2.1 Is the TFNA adapting itself quickly to new crises or emerging threats and needs? 6.2.2 Are the TOR of the TFNA still relevant? 6.2.3 Should the TOR of the TFNA require changes, of which kind, and under which rationale?	Extent to which the TFNA reacts in an effective, swift and relevant manner to new crises/needs/threats Perceptions related to the TFNA TOR relevance/proposed changes by internal and external stakeholders	DCAF and TFNA General and Country Reports StC Minutes Opinions of Donors Opinions of TFNA Management and Staff	Documentary review Skype/Zoom/ Phone calls with DCAF personnel, National s/holders (TFNA countries), and donors Face to face interviews (Geneva)

Annexe 3: Document review

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Annexe 4: List of persons consulted (in alphabetical order)

DCAF Geneva

Mr. AYOUB Ayman, Deputy and now Head, MENA Division, DCAF
Ms. BEILLEAU Carole, TFNA Manager, MENA Division, DCAF
Mr. CELLINO Andrea, Head of North Africa Desk MENA Division, DCAF
Mr. DOWNES Mark, Director, Operations, DCAF
Mr. GALLET Archibald, Program Manager (Libya)
Mr. GUERBER, Thomas, Director DCAF
Ms. HENRY, Alizée, Programme Officer, Tunisia
Mr. LAFERTE, Alain, Programme Manager, Gender Division
Ms. LAGOUTTE Cécile, Programme Manager, Morocco
Ms. MAGGI, Roberta, Programme Assistant (Libya)
Ms. ROBINSON, Abigail, Programme Management Advisor
Ms. SAMSON Felicitas, Finance Officer, MENA Division, DCAF
Mr. WATKINS, Robert, Head, MENA Division, DCAF

TFNA Steering Committee (StC)

Ms. AYARI, Nosra, Program Officer, Swiss Development Cooperation, Tunis, Tunisia
Ms. DOUWES, Olivia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands
Ms. MELLINA, Nadia, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Grand-Duché du Luxembourg
Mr. GRAFF, Willy, Country Director, Swiss Development Cooperation, Tunis, Tunisia
Mr. Von WEYHE Ferdinand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany

Libya

Mr. ALALOUL Abou Ajila, Judicial Police, Brigadier General, Head of Strategic Planning
Ms. ALBASHA Faiza, University of Tripoli, Criminal Justice expert, Professor
Ms. AWAD, Nur, Programme Assistant, Programme Assistant, DCAF Office in Libya
Mr. BADI Emadeddin, DCAF & Atlantic Council, Advisor for Libya/Consultant; Senior Non-Resident Fellow (Atlantic Council)
Ms. BERGH, Sanne, Danish Demining Group: Community Safety Coordinator
Mr. GALLET, Archibald, Programme Manager (Libya)
Mr. SAIED Ahmed, MARSAD Project, Manager
Ms. SCARCELLA Luana, Judicial Police Support Programme, EUBAM

Mr. SHALGHOUM Ahmed, Head of Libya Programme, Geneva Call,
Mr. SIRUR Harsha, Strategic Capacity Group (SCG): Regional Director
Mr. SYMONS John. A., DSR/SSR International Coordinator, UNSMIL

Morocco

Ms. AGUEZNAY Chafika, Directrice, Coopération internationale, *École Nationale Supérieure d'Administration*

Mr. Yassin BAZZAZ, *Institut Prometheus pour la Démocratie et les Droits Humains* :
Coordinateur

Mr. BELKOUCH Habib, *Centre d'études en Droits Humains et Démocratie (CEDHD)*,
Président

Mr. CHOKAIRI Yassir, *Instance Nationale de la Probité, de la Prévention et de Lutte contre la Corruption (INPPLC)*, Directeur, Partenariat et développement

Mr. HACHI Mohamed, *Délégation interministérielle aux Droits de l'Homme*, Chef de la
Division de la Coopération internationale

Mr. SEGHROUCHNI Omar, *Commission nationale de contrôle des données à caractère personnel*, Président

Mr. SEGHROUCHNI Omar, *Commission pour le Droit d'Accès à l'Information*, Président

Tunisia

DCAF

Ms. BEN YEDDER Imen, Responsable du programme Genre

Ms. BOUJEH Wided, Responsable du programme Réformes institutionnelles :

Mr. BUCHMAYER Stefan, Directeur

Ms. MANSOUR Zeined, Responsable du programme de la Jeunesse

Mr. Samir MARMOURI, Responsable du programme Réforme de la Justice

Mr. POULIN Maxime, Directeur adjoint:

Mr. SANCHEZ CAMPOS Eduardo, Responsable des programmes d'appui à la Police et
sécurité:

Government of Tunisia

Mr. AKROUT, Amiral, ancien conseiller principal à la sécurité, Présidence de la
République :

Mr BELKHIR Néjib, Directeur général, Cellule centrale de gouvernance, Ministère de
l'Intérieur

Mrs. BOUSSEMA Raja and Mrs Amel KOUBÂA, Ministère de la Justice :

Mr. JRAD Slim, Présidence du Gouvernement : Directeur général de la Gouvernance et
de la prévention de la corruption

Mr. MIHYAR Hamadi, Ms RABED and Ms RAHOUIYA, Ministère de la Femme, de la Famille, de l'Enfance et des Seniors : Délégué général and assistants,

Tunisian Institutions

Ms. BACHA Najet, Instance Nationale de lutte Contre la Corruption (INLCC) : Rapporteur générale

Ms. FEKI Neila, Commission Nationale de Lutte Contre le Terrorisme (CNLCT) , Chargée de la coopération internationale

Mr. JARRAY Fethi Instance Nationale de Protection contre la Torture (INPT) , Président Instance Nationale d'Accès à l'Information (INAI) : Mr. Imed HAZGUI, ancien président

Civil Society Organizations

Ms. ALLANI Najla, CREDIF, Centre de recherches, d'étude et de documentation et d'information sur la femme: Directrice

Mr. BEGLUK Hari ASWAT NISSA , Chargé de programmes

TFNA member country diplomats in the region Embassy of Germany in Tunisia

Ms. OEZBEK Eliza, Political Counsellor,
Embassy of Germany in Libya (in Tunisia)

Mr. GUDISH David, Counsellor
Embassy of Netherlands in Tunisia

Ms. JAMAILI Qazal, First Secretary, Security and Rule of Law

Mr. SONNEMANS Ronald, Former First Secretary – Security (2016-2019)
Embassy of Switzerland in Tunisia

Ms. AYARI Nosra, SCC Programme Officer

Mr. GRAFF Willy, Country Director, Swiss Development Cooperation
Embassy of Switzerland in Morocco

Mr. MORIER Pierre-Yves, First Secretary
Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères de France

Mr. MALAGOUEN Sufyane, Département de la Gouvernance démocratique
Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN (Geneva)

Mr. BOUTADGHART Abdellah, Ministre Conseiller

Annexe 5: Framework of SSR national and TFNA interventions

DONOR COUNTRY	FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICY	TFNA INTERVENTIONS RELATED TO COUNTRIES' SSR FRAMEWORK ⁵	SOURCES
Belgium	SSR mainly falls under the <i>Peacebuilding</i> subcategory of the peace and security policy umbrella. SSR is seen as supporting peace processes and ensuring lasting peace. The creation of inclusive dialogues around conflict resolution and prevention, and the fight to impunity are sub priorities within the peacebuilding framework.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies • Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight • Support to communication & information sharing <p>Geographical focus: Tunisia and to a lesser extent Egypt</p>	Official website ⁶ Steering Committee Minutes
Luxembourg	SSR falls under the thematic priority of <i>Strengthening inclusive governance</i> , i.e., to ensure the equal access to and efficient delivery of quality public services through building more responsive and accountable public service institutions. Strengthening and supporting the participation of civil society organizations in governance structures, and promoting inclusive and rights-based environments, are prioritized avenues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies • Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight • Support to communication & information sharing <p>Geographical focus: Not a strong focus on the NA region.</p>	Official website Steering Committee Minutes
Netherlands	SSR activities fall under the <i>Security and rule of law</i> priority area. The latter more precisely focuses on human security, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting inclusive peace and legitimate political governance. The underlying objective is to contribute to the building of effective legal orders, which constitute inherent conditions to economic growth and development. Inclusiveness and gender considerations are also at the core of Dutch priorities, especially	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to managing change of security providers • Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies • Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight <p>Geographical focus: Libya and Tunisia</p>	Official website Steering Committee Minutes

⁵ Only activities and processes which correspond *the most* to donors' priorities appear here.

⁶ Websites: Germany: <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/ausussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/nahermittlererosten/05-transformationspartnerschaft>; France: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/development-assistance/french-official-development/>; Switzerland: <https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/deza/en/home/countries/north-africa.html>; Netherlands: <https://www.government.nl/topics/development-cooperation/the-development-policy-of-the-netherlands/security-and-the-rule-of-law>; Belgium: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy_areas; Luxembourg: <https://cooperation.gouvernement.lu/en/cooperation-au-developpement.html>

DONOR COUNTRY	FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM POLICY	TFNA INTERVENTIONS RELATED TO COUNTRIES' SSR FRAMEWORK ⁵	SOURCES
	in the field of political processes and decision-making.		
Switzerland	<p>SSR falls under the objective of supporting political and economic transitions in North Africa. More precisely, it is anchored in the <i>Democracy and human rights</i> line of action and is operationalized to, first, combat poverty, contain fragility and strengthen resilience, and second, to enhance good governance.</p> <p>In the last years, the prevention of violent extremism and access to information appeared as new important areas of intervention.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies • Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight • Support to communication & information sharing <p>Geographical focus: Up until 2019, the focus was on Tunisia, but recent decisions allow to suggest the focus is now more regional</p>	<p>Official website</p> <p>Steering Committee Minutes</p>
France	<p>SSR falls under the area of intervention <i>Strengthening human rights, stability and peace</i>. Maintaining international stability is the underlying objective, and the promotion and reinforcement of the rule of law is one of the means to attain it. The promotion of gender equality is highlighted as a cross-cutting priority.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight • Support to communication & information sharing • Regulatory assistance <p>Geographical focus: Morocco</p>	<p>Official website</p>
Germany	<p>SSR falls under the area of <i>Transformation Partnership with the Arab World</i>, where the promotion of democracy and civil society, human rights, and guidance on constitutional and judicial matters and administrative reforms, are, notably, priority areas.</p> <p>Germany more broadly supports democratization and reform processes in the North African region through a multi-pronged approach.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to the development of parliamentary and independent oversight • Support to communication & information sharing • Regulatory assistance • Inclusive dialogue on security needs and policies <p>Geographical focus: Tunisia and Morocco, and a special emphasis on Libya</p>	<p>Official website</p> <p>Steering Committee Minutes</p>


Annexe 6: Review of the DCAF's Tunisia Portfolio (Fall 2020)

PROJETS EN COURS	BUDGET	PROJETS À VENIR	BUDGET (ESTIMATIF)
Projet d'appui au processus de réforme du Code pénal (Wided et Samir)	45'000 CHF	Projet d'appui au personnel pénitentiaire en matière de prise en charge des groupes vulnérables privés de liberté (Imen, Zeineb et Samir)	120'000 CHF
Projet d'appui au processus de traitement des statistiques pénitentiaires (Samir)	91'000 CHF	Projet d'appui au renforcement des garanties de non-répétition des violations des droits humains, dans le cadre du processus de la justice transitionnelle (Samir)	60'000 HF
Programme d'appui INAI (Wided et Aliya)	35'000 CHF	Évaluation du projet d'appui à l'utilisation des preuves médico-légales (Samir et Wided)	35'000 CHF
Projet d'appui au renforcement du rôle des femmes et des jeunes dans la prévention de l'extrémisme violent en Tunisie (Imen et Eduardo)	97'879 CHF	Projet d'appui au comité national pour l'harmonisation des textes juridiques relatifs aux droits de l'Homme avec les dispositions de la constitution et avec les conventions internationales ratifiées dans le domaine du secteur de la sécurité et de la justice. (Wided)	50'000 CHF
Programme d'appui au développement de la bonne gouvernance et de l'intégrité (Wided et Eduardo)	200'000 CHF	Projet d'appui à la formation de l'ESFSI (Eduardo)	20'000 CHF
Projet ONSHOR - MinInt sur les données ouvertes (Wided et Aliya)	121'550 CHF	Projet d'appui à la commission nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme (CNLCT) pour la révision de la stratégie nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme 2016-2021 (Eduardo et Samir)	35'000 CHF


PROJETS EN COURS	BUDGET	PROJETS À VENIR	BUDGET (ESTIMATIF)
Projet DCAF - Min Affaires Locales-: Renforcer le rôle des collectivités locales dans l'analyse et la réponse aux besoins locaux de sécurité (Zeineb et Zied)	196 840,25 CHF	Projet d'appui au développement d'une culture de la sécurité (Eduardo)	55'000 CHF
Renforcer la visibilité et la communication du corps des DPE (Zeineb et Zied)	82 679,14 CHF	Projet de modernisation du processus de production des statistiques judiciaires de criminalité (Wided)	40'000 CHF
Projet DCAF - DGPE : Renforcement des capacités des Délégués à la Protection de l'Enfance (DPE) en matière de planification, d'exécution et de suivi des visites des centres de détention pour mineurs (Zeineb et Zied)	125 659,42 CHF	Projet mise à jour de l'index de la législation du secteur de la sécurité + Élaboration des feuilles de recherches sur la G/RSS (Wided et Aliya)	40'000 CHF
Création de site web DGPE et recrutement consultant com (Zeineb et Zied)	19 992,00 CHF	Projet d'appui à l'organisation de la médecine carcérale (Samir et Wided)	30'000 CHF
		Projet d'appui au fonctionnement du MNP dans la prévention de la torture et la promotion des droits humains (Samir)	15'000 CHF
		Projet d'appui à la planification stratégique du système judiciaire et pénitentiaire (Samir)	45'000 CHF
		Projet d'auto-évaluation sur l'intégration de l'approche genre dans le secteur de la sécurité (Imen avec appui de Samir, Wided, Wided et Eduardo)	45'000 CHF

PROJETS EN COURS	BUDGET	PROJETS À VENIR	BUDGET (ESTIMATIF)
		Projet d'appui à l'observatoire national de lutte contre les violences à l'égard des femmes (Imen avec appui de Samir, Wided, Wided et Eduardo)	50'000 CHF
		Projet d'assistance à la mise en place d'un système de prise en charge des acteurs de violence (Imen avec appui de Samir, Wided, Wided et Eduardo)	50'000 CHF
		Projet d'évaluation de l'intégration de l'approche genre au sein du parlement (Imen)	36' 685.7 CHF
		Projet d'appui au Bureau de soutien au système de la justice pour les enfants en matière de planification stratégique (Samir, Zeineb et Zied)	61'000 CHF
		Appui à l'Institut Supérieur de la Magistrature ISM dans le renforcement des capacités des juges de la famille et de l'enfance en matière des garanties des droits des mineurs durant la procédure pénale (Zeineb, Zied et Samir)	40'000 CHF
		Appui au ministère des droits de l'homme dans la promotion de la sécurité électorale (Zeineb et Zied)	40'000 CHF


Annexe 7: Presentation of initial Findings and Conclusions (December 2020)




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4

INITIAL FINDINGS – EFFECTIVENESS (I)

- OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES (EXHAUSTIVE PRESENTATION WILL BE PRESENTED PER PILLAR OF THE TOC IN THE REPORT)
 - TFNA GENERALLY REACHES ITS OUTPUT OBJECTIVES – OUTCOMES MEASUREMENT IS MORE DIFFICULT IN THE HISTORIC ABSENCE OF REGULAR M&E TOOLS
 - OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES SUPPORT LOCALLY OWNED PROCESSES
 - MOROCCO INSTITUTIONS WORK IN A BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE
 - LIBYAN CITY COMMUNITIES SUPPORT LOCAL SECURITY
 - TUNISIAN INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTED FOR BETTER OWNERSHIP (TORTURE, CORRUPTION, BUT ALSO MOD, MOI AND MOJ)
- MAIN FACTORS OF INFLUENCE:
 - « ATTITUDE » – FLUIDITY, SERIOUSNESS, PROFESSIONALISM, NO INTERFERENCE, DEMAND-DRIVEN PROCESSES, QUICK RESPONSE, « SWISS SPIRIT », QUALITY OF TEAMS, EXPERTISE, FIND THE RIGHT EXPERTS, ETC.
 - CONSTRAINTS: STATUS, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, FLUIDITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, COVID-19, PROJECT/PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (SEE EFF.)

5

INITIAL FINDINGS – EFFECTIVENESS (II)

IS DCAF TARGETING THE RIGHT STAKEHOLDERS?

- THE TFNA USUALLY TARGETS INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN
 - PROVIDE CHANGE (MOI, MOJ, MOD, JOURNALISTS, SECTORAL OR EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURES)
 - SUPPORT RIGHTS AND CAPACITIES OF RIGHTS BEARERS (TORTURE, YOUTH, WOMEN, MOJ)
 - IMPROVE SECURITY THROUGH COMMUNITY-DRIVEN INITIATIVES (LIBYA)
- NOT ALL STAKEHOLDERS TARGETED/Y ACCESSIBLE – NOT ALL ENTRY POINTS FUNCTIONAL (Morocco & Libya) – NEED TO SCALE UP WITH REGALIAN INSTITUTIONS AND ADAPT ITSELF TO EVOLVING CONTEXT
- ALTHOUGH REGIONAL CONNEXIONS PREVAIL IN SOME SECTORS, TFNA CAN HARDLY BE PRESENTED AS AN INTEGRATED REGIONAL PROGRAMME – STRATEGIES REMAIN STRONGLY TIED TO NATIONAL CONTEXTS
- TFNA PROGRESS INDICATORS HAVE WELL IMPROVED (RESULTS FRAMEWORK/ IMMEDIATE OUTCOME REPORTING) – CULTURAL / INSTITUTIONAL MAJOR SHIFT – LACK OF MORE QUALITATIVE DATA TO PROPERLY MEASURE OUTCOMES

6

INITIAL FINDINGS – EFFICIENCY (I)

IS THE TFNA DEPLOYING ENOUGH HUMAN, FINANCIAL AND OTHER RESOURCES TO REACH ITS OBJECTIVES?

- DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODELS TO ADAPT TO CONTEXT-SPECIFIC SITUATION
 - ORGANIZED TEAM (TUNISIA) – FUNCTIONAL, SOLID, ARTICULATED, COHERENT
 - ADHOC TEAM (MOROCCO) – LIMITED REPERCUSSION AND COHERENT INTERACTION
 - REMOTE TEAM (LIBYA) – ADAPTED TO CONTEXT – COULD SWITCH INTO « ORGANIZED » OR « ADHOC » MODEL
 - NEED TO CONSIDER PHYSICAL PRESENCE BUT WITH CONDITIONS OF QUALITY/QUANTITY, INSTITUTIONALIZATION (MOROCCO AND TUNISIA)
- TFNA HAS STRENGTHENED ITS INTERNAL COHERENCE BY HIRING NEW STAFF (HQ/RELD) – SHOULD CONSIDER EXPANDING FURTHER THE CONTENT ADMINISTRATION OF ITS TEAM IN TUNISIA – SHOULD ALSO REINFORCE THE INTEGRATION OF RBM FOR ALTERNATIVE MEMBERS
- ANNUAL BUDGETING PROCESS/FORCASTING EVOLVES:
 - LOW AND HIGH CASE SCENARIOS START MOVING TO A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH ADAPTED TO PROGRAMME REALITIES (AND NOT TO « LAST YEAR » SUBJECT)
 - SHOULD MOVE TO ADJUST IMPLEMENTATION RATES TO LOW CASE SCENARIOS PROJECTIONS
- INTERACTION WITH DONORS/PARTNERS – GENERALLY POSITIVE UPS AND DOWNS IN PERCEPTIONS OF DCAFS WORK REFLECT THE VERTICAL VS. HORIZONTAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS – NEED TO « OPEN THE DOORS » TO ALLOW DONORS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND INTERNAL DYNAMICS/PROGRAMMES
- APPLICATION OF « DO NO HARM » INTEGRATED INTO 2020 NEW RBM GUIDELINES – STAKEHOLDERS APPRECIATE THE « SWISS ESSENCE » OF DCAF AND THE RESPECT OF IMPARTIALITY, NEUTRALITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLES INTO AN APPROACH PROGRAMMING/DELIVERY – LOCAL COMMUNITY SECURITY INITIATIVES RELY ON PRELIMINARY VETTING OF COMMUNITY PARTNERS (LIBYA)

7

INITIAL FINDINGS – EFFICIENCY (II)

HAVE PREVIOUS EXTERNAL EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN INTEGRATED SINCE 2016?

- RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2016 EVALUATION INTEGRATED TO SOME EXTENT
 - Effective Management Response Plan (Oct. 2016)
 - Synergies between TFNA and donors activities – Good level of interaction but could be improved
 - Partner country involvement in the TFNA Governance structure – Not pursued
 - Regional activities and programmes – Inter-country cooperation/initiatives initiated but limited scope
 - Tool for assessing relevance and added value of new activities – Development of tools to measure the immediate outcomes of capacity development activities
 - Long internal (DCAF) / external (Donors) debate – progressive application, new RBM culture with emphasis on improving M&E mechanisms – lack of monitoring tools with partners
 - Allocate more time to short-term expert missions – somehow anecdotal... best is to reemploy experts who already know institutions/partners (Tunisia)
 - Design activities that have built-in multiplier effects – effective through training/capacity building activities but difficult to monitor at outcome level

8

INITIAL FINDINGS – IMPACT

TO WHICH EXTENT TFNA OPERATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO CHANGE IN TARGETED COUNTRIES?

- WHAT IS CHANGE ?
 - ADVISING/SUPPORTING DESIGN OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE (DATABASE), LEGAL EXPERTISE AND LEGAL COUNSELLING,
 - TRAINING KEY ACTORS (MAGISTRATS, HAUT FONCTIONNAIRES, INSTITUTIONS) ON INTERNATIONAL NORMS/STANDARDS THAT INCREASE IN EACH COUNTRY RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, WOMEN/YOUTH RIGHTS
 - INCREASED OVERSIGHT BY PARLIAMENTARY AND CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS OVER SSG/SSR PROCESS
 - KEY ISSUE HOW DO WE CAPITALIZE ALL THE WORK UNDERTAKEN ? INTERNAL MEL OFFICER WITHIN TFNA ?
- HOW DO TFNA'S INTERVENTIONS COMPARE TO OTHER ACTORS ?
 - THE FUND WORKS ON THE « TEMPS LONG » VS OTHER ACTORS WORKING WITH PROJECT CALENDAR/DEADLINES
 - RECOGNIZED CAPACITY TO CREATE AN ADDED VALUE WITH HIGH LEVEL EXPERTISE/PROFESSIONALS (SHOLDERS)
 - SOMEHOW (AND IN COMPLETE OPPOSITION WITH DIPLOMATS/UN/IO STAFF), TFNA SENIOR LEADERSHIP ALSO WORKS ON THE « TEMPS LONG » AND HAS ACQUIRED AN EXPERIENCE THAT CAN BE HARDLY BE CHANGED
 - CAPACITY TO « BE PRESENT » WITHOUT « BEING THERE (STATUS) » - A LASTING PARADOX IN EACH COUNTRY

9

INITIAL FINDINGS – SUSTAINABILITY (I)

ARE THE TFNA INTERVENTIONS DESIGNED TO PRODUCE SUSTAINABLE CHANGE ?

- SUSTAINABLE CHANGES ?
 - EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT (ToC, 1st Pillar – *Parliament, Media and Civil Society are fulfilling an active oversight*)
 - STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL (CORRUPTION, TORTURE, INFORMATION CONTROL...) AND CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT (HUMAN RIGHTS, YOUTH, JOURNALISTS) APPEARS TO BE SUSTAINED BY NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS
 - STRENGTHENED CAPACITY OF SECURITY INSTITUTIONS, JOURNALISTS, CSOs TOWARDS IMPROVED COMMUNICATION ON SSG/SSR
 - MARSAD IMPROVES UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL/EXTERNAL ACTORS ON SSR ISSUES
 - LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK (ToC, 2nd Pillar – *Security Sector Guided by a Framework of Laws, Policies, Codes...*)
 - IMPROVED CAPACITY OF JUDICIAL/POLICE/PRISON/SSR ACTORS TO UNDERSTAND LEGAL DATABASE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES – SERIES OF TOOLS DEVELOPED FOR EACH SPECIFIC ACTORS IN 3 COUNTRIES
 - INCLUDES DIALOGUE WITH NEW PARTNERS (MOROCCO, LIBYA) AND INSTITUTIONS (TUNISIA) HAS A LEVERAGE EFFECT ON NEW INITIATIVES AND INTERVENTIONS
 - RESPONSIVE SECURITY ((ToC, 3rd Pillar – *Security Providers are Responsive to the Security Needs of the Population*)
 - MORE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS – CHANNELLED THROUGH TRAINING, RESEARCH, CAPACITY BUILDING, TEACHING INSTITUTIONS – WOULD REQUIRE IMPROVED PERCEPTION SURVEYS

10

INITIAL FINDINGS – SUSTAINABILITY (II)

- EXIT STRATEGY ?
 - NO PARTICULAR INTEREST IN ANTICIPATING EXIT STRATEGIES
 - STILL IN A DEVELOPMENTAL MODE (MOROCCO, LIBYA), LOOKING FOR NEW ENTRY POINTS/CHANNELS WHEREVER POSSIBLE
 - MOROCCO AND LIBYA IN A REMOTE MODE THAT COULD LAST - FLEXIBILITY LIMITS COSTS OF ANY EXITING DECISION
- FACTORS THAT IMPEDE SUSTAINABILITY
 - POLITICAL INSTABILITY (TUNISIA, LIBYA)
 - LACK OF POLITICAL WILLINGNESS TO PROGRESS ON SSG/SSR AGENDA (MOROCCO)
 - COMPETITION – VARYING INTERESTS OF DONORS TO CHANNEL ASSISTANCE THROUGH OTHER INSTITUTIONS
 - UNDERSTANDING OF SSG/SSR BY LOCAL SHOLDERS (LIBYA) ?
- FACTORS THAT SUPPORT SUSTAINABILITY
 - INCREASED POLITICAL COMMITMENTS WITH KEY REGALIAN MINISTRIES (TUNISIA)
 - SIGNING OF MOU WITH AN INCREASED NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS AND CSO (MOROCCO, TUNISIA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (LIBYA)

11

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONNING OF THE TFNA (I)

HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE STRUCTURE AND THE FUNCTIONNING OF THE TFNA ?

- DIFFERENT BUSINESS MODELS TO ADAPT TO CONTEXT SPECIFIC SITUATION
 - ORGANIZED TEAM (TUNISIA) – FUNCTIONAL, SOLID, ARTICULATED, CONNECTED
 - MOBILE TEAM (MOROCCO) – LIMITS REPRESENTATION AND CONSTANT INTERACTION
 - REMOTE TEAM (LIBYA) – ADAPTED TO CONTEXT – COULD SWITCH INTO « ORGANIZED » OR « MOBILE » MODEL
- FUNCTIONNING LIMITED BY LACK OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN EACH COUNTRY
- LACK OF LEGAL STATUS IMPACTS STAFF STATUS, HUMAN RESSOURCES, REPRESENTATION, ETC.
- STEERING COMMITTEE HAS REINFORCED ITS OVERSIGHT WITH TIME – PROVIDES NEW ORIENTATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT IMPROVE REPORTING, TRANSPARENCY, RBM CULTURE AND FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT

12

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE TFNA (II)

- DCAF TFNA INTERNAL PROGRAMMATIC DECISION MAKING PROCESS SHOULD IMPROVE
 - INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OVER THE PROGRESSION OF WORK AND ACTIVITIES SEEMS ADEQUATE
 - BUT A SIX LAYERS DECISION MAKING PROCESS CAN GENERATE DELAYS, LACK OF IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FLEXIBILITY AND FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS
 - JOINT DECISIONS SHOULD BE AT THE PROJECT LEVEL (WITH ACTIVITIES APPROVED) – THEN FIELD OFFICE SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHEDULED/BUDGETED ACTIVITIES
 - NEW FINANCIAL CEILINGS ALLOCATIONS WOULD IMPROVE FLEXIBILITY OF THE LOCAL RESPONSE
 - ORGANIZATIONAL HR REVIEW COULD LEAD TO INCREASE HUMAN RESOURCES
 - RBM CULTURE NEEDS FURTHER TRAINING – THE SAME WITH GENDER INTEGRATION WITHIN PROJECTS
 - M&E SYSTEM HAS IMPROVED UNDER STC INTEREST/PRESSURE
 - REPORTING PROCESS HAS IMPROVED OVER TIME – INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY

13

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE TFNA (III)

IS THE TFNA STILL A FLEXIBLE AND RELEVANT INSTRUMENT?

- CAPACITY TO ADAPT TO RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS
 - RESPONSE TO COVID-19 – CATCHING UP WITH NATIONAL RESPONSES, NEW DYNAMICS AND VOLATILITY OF CONTEXT
 - ADAPTATION TO THE NEW 2020 CONTEXT (EXTERNALIZATION OF ACTIVITIES; « NEW WAYS OF DOING »; NEW AVENUES (SSR/PEACEBUILDING)...)
 - *“TFNA is an incredibly apt tool for the security sector reform field. SSR support must constantly adapt itself to the political context and on the one hand: respond rapidly to new requests for assistance, and on the other: be able to slow down where there are political or institutional blockages and reluctance to engage »*
 - NO DEMAND TO CHANGE THE TORs OF THE TFNA – BETTER NEED FOR FURTHER INCLUSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIVITIES

14

INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (I)

- STRATEGIC
 - CONTINUE INVESTING IN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO REGULARIZE DCAF STATUS IN THREE COUNTRIES!
 - CONTINUE INVESTING IN « OPPORTUNISTIC INITIATIVES » AS A MEAN TO STRATEGICALLY POSITION TFNA IN LIBYA; IDENTIFY A « STRATEGIC INITIATIVE » THAT COULD HAVE MOROCCO AS ITS « HUB » THAT COULD SUPPORT THE OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF DCAF IN MOROCCO
 - DESIGN « CAPITALIZATION EXERCISES » WITH SELECTED INSTITUTIONS/ADMINISTRATIONS TO CAPTURE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS LEARNT
 - ENSURE REGULAR FORMAL MAPPING OF DONORS/OTHER ENTITIES PROGRAMMING IN SSG/SSR TO REFINE SYNERGIES AND COMPLEMENTARITIES (WHEN POSSIBLE)
 - CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY TO HAVE A « NEUTRAL/RESPECTED/SSR KNOWLEDGEABLE » OFFICIAL ON THE GROUND TO SUPPORT REMOTE TEAMS IN MOROCCO AND LIBYA (NETWORKING/RESEARCHING/CONNECTING...)

15

INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (II)

- OPERATIONAL
 - CONTINUE INVESTING IN RBM AND GENDER TRAINING INTEGRATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF FIELD TEAMS (A BOVE ALL TUNISIA)
 - REVIEW THE PROJECT/PROGRAMME CHAIN OF COMMAND/DECISION MAKING PROCESS TO REDUCE DELAYS AND INCREASE LOCAL OWNERSHIP (FIELD) –
 - INCREASE FINANCIAL CEILING OF « AUTONOMOUS SPENDING » FOR THE TUNISIA FIELD OFFICE
 - SI-HOLDERS PERSPECTIVE: « CONTINUE INVESTING ON THE LONG TERM WITH PATIENCE, DETERMINATION AND EXCELLENCE »...

16