

## Annex 1 Terms of Reference



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA  
**Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC**  
Humanitarian Aid and SHA

# Terms of reference

## "External review of SWISS RESCUE"

### 01.09.2019 to 31.01.2020

Berne/July 2019

## 1 Purpose of this document

This document contains the requirements relating to the mandate for the project "External review of Swiss Rescue." At least three bids shall be collected. The bidder offering the best value for money will be awarded the mandate.

## 2 Goal and content of the mandate

### 2.1 Introduction

Saving lives and alleviating suffering – This is the mandate of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (HA). It is the expression of Switzerland's long and internationally recognized humanitarian tradition. In the Swiss HA's operations, the humanitarian needs of the affected population are consistently put in the center.

Operating before, during and after crisis and disasters, the HA assumes the following triple role:

- Implement projects as a pragmatic and effective operational actor in the field;
- Be a reliable and flexible humanitarian partner and donor for humanitarian organisations;
- Be an advocate for the respect of the humanitarian law and principles.

In order to implement its mandate, the HA has various instruments at its disposal: 1. The Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit; 2. Financial contributions to humanitarian partner organisations; 3. The provision of relief goods as well as 4. Dialogue and advocacy in order to facilitate access and ensure the respect of international law.

The main asset of the Swiss HA is its Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit, a voluntary unit with a pool of approximately 700 experts. These experts can be deployed at any time to wherever assistance is needed, whether it is in crises, natural disaster or armed conflicts. They can be used for the following tasks: 1. Carry out rapid response actions after sudden and onset disasters; 2. Implement humanitarian projects on its own (direct actions); 3. Provide technical expertise to partner organisations (secondments) and 4. Support the HQ or Swiss representations abroad during crisis. 2018 the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit celebrated its 45<sup>th</sup> birthday. It is in this context that the HA launched a process on the future of its operational arm, the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit.

## **2.2 The Future of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit: Context and Rationale**

Since the establishment of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit in 1973, the humanitarian landscape has changed. The past years have shown an increase in the number of conflicts and humanitarian crisis. In addition, humanitarian crisis tend to be more complex and last longer. According to OCHA, 86% of the overall humanitarian funding was for instance invested in responses to protracted crisis lasting longer than five years in 2018. As a consequence, emergency aid is increasingly becoming a longerterm need and must be combined with development cooperation measures.

At the same time, a behavioral change of affected countries can be observed with regard to natural disasters. Many disaster prone countries have strengthened their coping mechanisms and are increasingly willing and capable to deal themselves with the crisis management and response. As a consequence, affected countries tend to be increasingly hesitant to request or accept international assistance or become very selective in terms of support, mainly focusing on neighboring countries and regional actors (e.g. ASEAN, AHA, ERCC etc.).

These changes have consequences and require adaptations from all humanitarian actors, including the Swiss HA. It is against this background that the Swiss HA has launched a process on the future of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit. The overall goal of the process is to strengthen the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit as the operational arm of the Swiss HA taking into account the changing environment and parameters. In order to pursue this goal, the Swiss HA defined a series of short and long-term measures. The measures have been defined along the 4 tasks of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (see above under chapter 1. Context). With regard to the rapid response instruments, the HA decided to commission an external, independent and prospective review of the Swiss Rescue Chain.

The scope and concrete objectives of this review will be outlined in chapter 2.4.

## **2.3 Swiss Rescue**

Swiss Rescue is one of the rapid response instruments that the HA can deploy abroad after sudden onset disasters. In addition to Swiss Rescue, the Swiss HA has also multi-sectoral Rapid Response Teams at its disposal, which can be deployed in variable configuration and expertise for swift interventions after sudden-onset disasters.

Founded in 1981, Swiss Rescue is made up of eight private and public, civilian and military partner organizations (Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit, Swiss Seismological Service, Swiss Air Rescue, Swiss Search and Rescue Dog Association, Swiss Armed Forces/Rescue Troops, Swiss red Cross, Swiss International Airlines and Zurich Airport). It is specialized in locating and rescuing victims from the rubble left by earthquakes abroad and in providing initial emergency medical care. In particular, Swiss Rescue focuses on rescue operations in collapsed buildings and confined spaces, a domain internationally labeled “Urban Search and Rescue” (USAR).

Today, Swiss Rescue is composed of 76 people (generalists and additional specialists, dog handlers, rescuers and emergency doctors) and 8 search dogs, and has 18 tons of material at its disposal (technical equipment and infrastructure). Swiss Rescue can be ready for take-off within ten to twelve hours after a decision is taken to deploy and can operate autonomously for up to ten days. The last full deployment of Swiss Rescue in its entirety goes back to 2009 as a response to the earthquake in Padang (Indonesia). Elements were deployed 2011 after the tsunami in Fukushima (HazMat) as well as 2017 after the earthquake in Mexico City (support by structural engineers).

Swiss Rescue fulfills the standards of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) and was classified as a Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Team in 2008. It has been reclassified as heavy team once so far in 2014. The next reclassification is planned in 2020. In 2016, the Swiss HA has decided to downsize Swiss Rescue by one third from 109 to 79 staff. The rationale of this decision was to become more agile, reduce material and personal costs while complying with the minimal INSARAG standards required to be eligible as a heavy USAR-

Team. In doing so, the Swiss HA reduced the size of its Swiss Rescue to a level comparable with other INSARAG-member states.

Due to its experience in deploying, exercising and training the Swiss HA has in addition – through engagement of several members of Swiss Rescue – been supporting countries and partner institutions with the development of national and international Rapid Response / USAR teams according to the INSARAG-Guidelines. In this regard, Switzerland supported for example internationally deployable USAR teams, including achievement of the INSARAG Classification (IEC), in China (IEC in 2009), Jordan (IEC in 2013) and Morocco (IEC in 2014). Besides, capacity building projects have been implemented on regional or national level, however without achieving an INSARAG IEC, such as in Central America, India (finalized in 2017) and Mongolia (ongoing, until end 2021). Furthermore, Swiss HA, in cooperation with its USAR experts, has been engaged with mentorships for INSARAG ReClassifications (IER) in Russia (IER in 2016), Jordan (IER in 2018) and Armenia (ongoing, IER in 2020).

On the multilateral level, the Swiss HA assumes the global chairman of INSARAG and is represented by the Swiss Delegate for Humanitarian Aid. Under the United Nations Umbrella, INSARAG aims to establish minimum international standards for USAR teams and methodology for international coordination in earthquake response. The global chairman of INSARAG leads the advocacy on the implementation of the INSARAG Hyogo Declaration and the UN General Assembly Resolution 57/150 on “Strengthening the effectiveness and coordination of international urban search and rescue assistance”. The global chairman of INSARAG is also responsible for the promotion of the INSARAG methodology and guidelines globally amongst countries and organisations and promotes participation in all INSARAG bodies. Finally, he actively coordinates the activities of the Steering Group together with the INSARAG Secretariat and chairs the annual meeting of the INSARAG Steering Group.

## **2.4 Purpose, objectives and scope of the review**

### **Purpose**

The purpose of this review is mainly prospective (future-oriented) and formative (learning-oriented). The review shall hence allow SDC to learn from the review’s findings and provide information useful for decision making about the future orientation of Swiss Rescue. The management response to the review and its findings will be assured by the head of Swiss Humanitarian Aid. The review will be published.

### **Objectives**

Considering the evolving global environment, the main objective of the review is to determine the relevance and added-value of Swiss Rescue’s contribution to

- i) The core mandate of SDC/HA which is saving lives and alleviating suffering
- ii) Switzerland’s engagement in USAR capacity building and
- iii) Switzerland’s multilateral engagement at INSARAG

Based on these findings, the review shall draw conclusions and formulate recommendations on how to position Swiss Rescue in light of the future orientation of Switzerland’s international cooperation as foreseen in the federal dispatch 2021-24 (currently in preparation). Accordingly, the review considers (i) the global environment and humanitarian needs, taking into account other USAR actors, (ii) the Swiss added-value as well as (iii) the Swiss interests in maintaining her Humanitarian tradition.

### **Scope**

The scope of this review is limited to Swiss Rescue. The conclusions and recommendations of the present review may however have implications for Switzerland’s position and approach to USAR in general, including response to disasters, engagement in USAR Capacity building (national and international) and Switzerland’s role within INSARAG. The analysis of these implications shall form

integral part of the present review. The recommendations may also comprise changes in role, size and structure of Swiss Rescue.

The other rapid response instruments such as the multi-sectoral rapid response teams shall be part of a future overall review of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit. They are excluded from this review.

## 2.5 Indicative review questions

The preliminary review questions are defined as follows:

Relevance/Appropriateness respective to the mandate:

- a. To what extent is Swiss Rescue **relevant and appropriate** to save lives and alleviate suffering after earthquakes in urban areas abroad?
- b. What are the **preconditions** necessary for Swiss Rescue to be relevant and appropriate?
- c. What is the **added value** of Swiss Rescue when looking at the global developments regarding USAR (type of disasters, other actors etc)?
- d. What would be **options** to maintain/increase the relevance and appropriateness of Swiss Rescue in future?

Relevance/Appropriateness respective to the other instruments:

- e. To what extent is Swiss Rescue relevant and appropriate to support Switzerland's engagement in **USAR capacity building**?
- f. To what extent is Swiss Rescue relevant and appropriate to support Switzerland's engagement on **multilateral level** (INSARAG)?
- g. In how far is Swiss Rescue **politically** relevant on national and international level (Switzerland, EU, global)?
- h. To what extent is it possible to use Swiss Rescue capacities (search, rescue, medical, management and logistics) in other disasters than earthquakes?
- i. How could Swiss Rescue capacities support other rapid response instruments such as the multi-sectoral Rapid Response Teams?
- j. To what extent a reconfiguration of Swiss rescue could affect our relations with other governmental entities (Swiss Armed Forces), business community (Swiss, Zurich Airport), academia (Swiss Seismological Service) and NGOs (Swiss Red Cross, REDOG)?

Effectiveness:

- k. Are the results achieved (directly and indirectly / operationally and politically) justifying the costs of the instruments?
- l. Would there be more cost-effective options/instruments/modular solutions?

The review team will be tasked to propose the final review questions in the inception report.

## 2.6 Methodology and process

### Methodology

The independent review team will assess the review objectives and questions in a **neutral and objective** way. Selected steps from within developmental evaluation (see Michael Quinn Patton 2010) are to be considered when appropriate.

The review team shall review and assess existing facts, processes, tools and instruments (summative part). Their findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be evidence based and formulated in an open constructive non-judging manner. The review team shall use or develop adequate rubrics and instruments for assessing all information, interviews etc. within the review. The review is expected to make use of a series of **different methodological instruments**, such as the following:

- Review of relevant documents from SDC, partners and other donors, as well as international research.

- Interviews and/or focus group discussions with SDC staff in Bern, members of the Swiss rescue and potential other stakeholders in Switzerland
- Interviews with relevant persons representing multilateral partners, other donors, partner countries and other actors in USAR (incl. INSARAG secretariat and INSARAG certified actors)

The review team will develop a **rigorous and appropriate methodology** during the inception phase, together with a **Theory of Change** which will set the framework for the review. The **indicative review questions** are only suggestions and shall be reviewed by the review team during the inception phase. The **Advisory group** (AG, see section 2.8.2) shall be involved in reviewing and refining the **recommendations** to the SDC/HA senior management – while the responsibility remains within the review team.

The review team will be asked to propose **tasks** suitable to answer above review question.

However, the tasks shall include:

- Analyse Swiss Rescue's deployments in the past 30 years and identify patterns.
- Review high-impact earthquakes during the past 30 years, the international response involved (with or without Swiss contributions) and identify patterns: which country assisted with which USAR instruments?
- Analyse the selectivity of affected risk-prone countries in terms of international assistance and their national capacities and identify patterns.
- Analyze the influence of Swiss Rescue on the Swiss engagement in USAR capacity building and on the multilateral engagement in INSARAG.
- Compare the Swiss USAR capacities to the actual emergency response environment, needs and trends.
- Compare the Swiss USAR capacities to other (western European) states with similar emergency aid capacities and identify steps they have taken/are going to take in order to adapt to the changing emergency response environment.
- Exchange with the seven other partners of Swiss Rescue.
- Exchange with the INSARAG community (incl. the secretariat, members and ex-members)

## Process

The following work plan suggests the dates and responsibilities for the different activities of the review process. This work plan will eventually be adapted by the review team during the inception phase.

Activity	Date (tentative)	Responsibilities
1 <sup>st</sup> AG meeting: Kick-off in Bern (with review team) + first round of interviews for inception phase (in Bern and by phone)	1 <sup>st</sup> half of September 2019	AG / Review team
Elaboration of the Inception Report: review objectives and questions, review design, methodology	2 <sup>nd</sup> half of September 2019	Review team
2 <sup>nd</sup> AG meeting: Feedback to Inception Report (with review team)	1 <sup>st</sup> half of October 2019	AG / Review team
Finalization of the Inception Report (incl. AG comments)	1 <sup>st</sup> half of October 2019	Review team
Desk study, interviews with stakeholders, partners, focus group, workshops, e-discussion if relevant, Data analysis	Oct-Nov 2019	Review team
Draft report	November 2019	Review team
3 <sup>rd</sup> AG meeting: Feedback on draft report. Review of conclusions and recommendations (with review team)	1 <sup>st</sup> half of December 2019	AG / Review team
Final Report	2 <sup>nd</sup> half of December 2019	Review team
Presentation at SDC/HA Senior Management	January 2020	Review team
Presentation at SDC Directorate	January 2020	Review team

SDC/HA Management Response	February 2020	SDC/HA Senior Management
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## 2.7 Deliverables

The following deliverables are required:

### Inception Report

The review team prepares an Inception Report - after an initial review of relevant documentation and some initial interviews. It shall present:

- the results of first round of interviews and desk review
- conceptual framework(s) to be used in the review (including a draft Theory of Change which presents SDC's logic regarding the thematic priority areas)
- the key review questions and methodology
- analytical framework for answering the review questions with rubrics or assessment scales that will be used for assessing the information, data sources and collection, sampling and key indicators
- first list of interviewees

The Inception Report also includes a **timeline for the review process**. It shall explain the **strengths, weaknesses and limitations** of the review approach and the **means used to address** these limitations. The review team should suggest a **tentative structure** of the final report.

The Inception Report should be written in English and should **not exceed 15 pages** excluding annexes. It will be addressed to the SDC/HA senior management, but will be discussed with the advisory group in Bern.

### Review Report by Review Team

A fit-to-print **review report**<sup>1</sup> in English containing **findings, conclusions and recommendations**, whereby the conclusions must be clearly derived from the findings and the recommendations be clearly based on the conclusions.

The review report should not exceed **30 pages** (including an executive summary; excluding annexes). The report should contain **clear references** of the important information / data available in the annexes. The **executive summary** (abstract) should correspond to the DAC-Standards and should not exceed **2 – 3 pages**.

Additionally, a **short and concise presentation (PowerPoint)** shall be prepared by the review team for SDCs use.

## 2.8 Roles and responsibilities during the review

### SDC/HA Senior Management

SDC/HA senior management (i) approves the terms of reference, (ii) expresses their stand on the review recommendations through the management response and (iii) ensures appropriate information of the review results to the SDC Directorate.

<sup>1</sup> According to the formatting guidelines of the SDC Review and Corporate Controlling Division



### Advisory group (AG)

The advisory group (AG) accompanies the review process. The AG comments on the review design (terms of reference, draft inception report) and the draft review report. At the 3<sup>rd</sup> AG meeting (see

2.6.2), the AG validates the review findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The review process will include periodic engagement of the AG members and/or other relevant SDC staff for following activities:

- Provide support to the review team in better understanding SDC's approaches, structures and working processes.
- Comment the Terms of reference and Inception Report and provide feedbacks to the draft review report.

The AG is composed of representatives of the relevant divisions/sections of the SDC/HA (Rapid Response, Human resources, Logistics, Multilateral affairs) as well as some members appointed ad persona. The AG is chaired by the HA chief of staff and his deputy.

### Review Team

SDC/HA will contract a review team that is independent<sup>2</sup> of the FDFA, especially of the SDC, and has not been involved in activities covered by this review.

The review team should offer expertise regarding review and partnership development, innovative thinking, the ability to combine established methods with new approaches and to critically discuss, evaluate and share results with stakeholders throughout the review process.

The review team shall consist of a **team of at least two experts** with complementary expertise and experience. More particularly, the experts are expected to bring along the following review and subject matter expertise and experience:

- In-depth knowledge of the humanitarian system with its actors, trends and challenges
- In-depth knowledge of the international disaster relief environment, in particular USAR and INSARAG
- Knowledge of the Swiss political environment relevant for USAR
- Established network of contacts with state and non-state actors active in the field of emergency relief.
- Experience in conducting similar reviews
- Experience in collaboration with humanitarian state actors, sensitivity for political implications within Switzerland and on international level and strategy (big picture)

Furthermore, the evaluators are expected to have:

- Ability to work and communicate in English, plus excellent writing skills in English. German and French comprehension is required (good reading skills). Good communication in German and French is an additional asset.

The Chief of staff of the Humanitarian Aid and his deputy will act as points of contact to the review team.

## 2.9 Volume of the mandate

A total number of **60-80 working days** between September 2019 and January 2020 (see chapter 2.6.2) may be allocated to the independent review team. These working days should include visits to Switzerland. If applicable, TVA must be offered separately.

All the price details must be indicated in Swiss Francs (CHF) excl. VAT. The price excl. VAT includes in particular insurance, allowances, social costs, transport, customs etc.

The bidder will not be reimbursed for any costs arising from the preparation or submission of bid.

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<sup>2</sup> Independence means that the members of the review team shall not have worked for the FDFA, especially the SDC, in the past five years (except having conducted other external review mandates) or have any other strong linkages or dependencies with the FDFA or the Swiss rescue.

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 Greece forest fires 2007.docx  
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 INSARAG Guidelines\_Vol I\_Policy\_version 1.0\_04 September 2019\_NG.docx  
 INSARAG Short presentation.pptx  
 INSARAG-Swiss Participation 2014-2019.docx  
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 Italy wildfires 2017.docx  
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 Japan EQ 2011.pdf  
 Links for Evaluation Swiss Rescue.docx  
 Mandat RR .docx  
 Mexico earthquake 2017.pdf  
 Montenegro wildfires 2017.pdf  
 Mozambique, cyclone Idai 2019.docx  
 Mozambique, cyclone Kenneth 2019.docx  
 Nepal earthquake 2015.docx  
 Nias 2005 final report.docx  
 Organigramm\_H-R\_Feld\_ab\_1.10.2019.pdf  
 Organisational Chart Humanitarian Aid and SHA.pdf  
 Pakistan earthquake 2005.docx  
 Pakistan floods 2011.pdf  
 Peru EQ 2007.docx  
 Philippines Typhoon Haiyan 2013.docx  
 Philippines Typhoon Sendong 2011.docx  
 Portugal wildfires 2017.docx  
 RK\_-\_Joint\_training\_plateform\_-\_HazMat\_Specialists.docx  
 RK\_-\_Joint\_training\_plateform\_-\_Medicals.docx  
 RK\_-\_Joint\_training\_plateform\_-\_Search.docx  
 RK\_-\_Joint\_training\_plateform\_-\_Structural\_Engineers.docx

RK\_-\_Spezialkurse\_Rettung.docx  
RK\_-\_Stabs•bung\_Management\_RK\_(Copie).docx  
RK\_Basic\_Kurs\_und\_Training\_Kurs\_Head\_Material.docx  
RK\_Einführungskurs\_Rettungskette\_Schweiz\_(Copie).docx  
RK\_Support\_(Copie).docx  
RK\_TK\_Chief\_Rescue.docx  
RK\_Training\_Kurs\_Chief\_Operations.docx  
RK\_Training\_Kurs\_Rescue.docx  
RK\_Training\_Kurs\_Section\_Leader\_-\_OSA.docx  
RR\_Einsatzinstrumente\_und\_-grundsätze\_2016.docx  
Rules\_of\_engagement\_Rapid\_response\_SDC\_english.docx  
SKH-Fachgruppen\_per\_feb2019.docx  
SR\_and\_RRT\_staff\_with\_dual\_function.xlsx  
SRdocumentlist.txt  
Statistics\_continuous\_education.xlsx  
Statistics\_deployments\_2004-18.xlsx  
Swiss\_Emergency\_Relief.pdf  
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Swiss\_Rescue\_Organigram\_RK\_CH\_2012.pdf  
Swiss\_Rescue\_Module\_2010.pdf  
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Thailand\_Tsunami\_DVI\_2005.docx  
The\_Balcans\_floods\_2014.docx  
The\_Balcans\_migration\_2015\_2016.docx  
Weiterbildungsreglement\_SKH\_2014.pdf

### Annex 3 List of persons interviewed

Name	Organisation	Position
ACEVES Germán Pinto	Latin America	Regional Disaster Assistance Program, USAID/OFDA-LAC
BASABE Pedro	SDC-HA	Senior Regional DRR and Rapid Response Advisor; SDC-SHA Hub for SE Asia and the Pacific
BERNASCONI Jean-Luc	SDC-HA	Deputy Head of Humanitarian Aid Department and Head of Division Europe, Asia and Americas
BESSLER Manuel	SDC-HA	Head of Humanitarian Aid Department and Head of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) and Deputy Director General of SDC
CAPILI Arnel	AHA-Center (ASEAN)	Deputy Executive Director AHA; UNDAC and ERAT Member
CASTELLANOS Xavier	IFRC Asia-Pacific	Head (based in Kuala Lumpur)
CHADRAABAL Ariunaa	Mongolia	Col. Head of Foreign cooperation division, NEMA
CHANG Winston	OCHA, designated representative	Global Lead, Office of the INSARAG Secretariat, Response Partnership Section, Emergency Response Support Branch
CHRISTEN Stefan	Swiss Army / Rescue Troops	Brigadier General
DROZ Simone	SDC-HA	Policy focal point INSARAG, ECHO, OCHA
EUGSTER Sebastian	SDC-HA	Deputy Head of Division Europe, Asia and Americas
FLUECKIGER Silvio	SDC-HA	Deputy Head of Humanitarian Aid Department and Chief of staff
FRISCH Toni	ex SDC-HA	Former Head of Humanitarian Aid Department
FUENTES Patricio	USAR consultant from Chile	Contracted by SDC in support of USAR Capacity building in LA + CA
GASS Thomas	SDC	Head of South Cooperation Department and Vice-Director of SDC; Former Ambassador to Nepal
GRUZKO Isaac Oxenhaut	Mexican Red Cross	National Coordinator Ambulances, Rescue Services and Relief
GUJAN Regina	SDC-HA	Deputy Head Multilateral Division
HARYADI Yopi	Indonesia (MFA)	INSARAG Indonesia Focal Point Indonesia, Deputy Director for Cooperation BASARNAS
HASLINGER Florian	Swiss Seismological Service (SED)	Deputy Director
HERRERA Claudia	CEPRENENAC	Executive Secretary
HILDEBRAND Josua	Airport Zurich AG	Head Apron- & GA Services; Flight Operations
HORNISBERGER Linda	REDOG	
JACKSON Ronald	CDEMA	Executive Director

JOERIMANN Flisch	SDC-HA	Program Officer Rapid Response
LANG Lisa	SDC-HA	Co-Head of Human resources
MEILE Cornelia	ex SDC-HA	Former Co-Head of Human resources
MENDEZ Roberto	SDC	Regional DRR Advisor and UNDAC Member
MUELLER Rudolf	UNOCHA	Chief, Emergency Response Support Branch and INSARAG Secretary
NIGG Reto	SDC-HA	Deputy Chief of staff
NISSEN Lars Peter	ACAPS	Director
OTT Rudolf	SDC-HA	Deputy Head of Section Logistics and Equipment Head of expert group "Logistics"
PEDOTTI BUCHER Patrizia	SHA/HA	Programme Officer Assistant
PFISTER Matthias	SDC-HA	Program Officer Swiss Rescue; Head of expert group "Rescue"
RAMBERG Britta	Sweden (MSB)	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
RHODES STAMPA Sebastian	UNOCHA	Chief Emergency Response Section at UNOCHA
SAIZ-OMENACA Victoria	Indonesia (OCHA Humanitarian Advisor Team)	new Head of OCHA Indonesia/ ASEAN Liaison Office
SANDERSON David	Profesor, University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia.	Author, Urban Humanitarian Response, HPG Good Practice Review # 9, ODI
SCHLACHTER Roland	SDC-HA	Coordinator of SHA expert groups
SCHMACHTEL Christoph	OCHA Regional Office Panama	INSARAG-UNDAC Focal point Americas
SCHNYDER Adrienne	SDC-HA	Former policy focal point INSARAG, ECHO, OCHA
SOBRI Ridwan	Indonesia (PMI - Red Cross)	Deputy Head of Disaster Management
SOCHOR David	SDC-HA	Head of Rapid Response Section; Operational focal point INSARAG
TSCHURR Simon	SDC-HA	Deputy Head of Rapid Response Section; Program Officer USAR Capacity Building
VILLALOBOS Francisco Castellanos	Mexico	Protección Civil Coordination and firefighters Guadalajara, México
VON DAENIKEN Beat	Swiss Red Cross (SRC); ex SDC-HA	Head of International Cooperation
WICKI Arno	ex SDC-HA	Former Head of Multilateral Division, currently Ambassador of Switzerland in Chile
ZERMEÑO Jose Antonio Monroy	Mexican Red Cross	CEO
ZUBER Anton	SDC-HA	Co-Head of Human resources



## Annex 4 Methodological tools

### Evaluation questions matrix and interview guide

Evaluation question, comment	Corresponding Task	Questions/information sought	Response
Please fill in interviewee/source data and responses or info from documents (with ref to page if relevant). Use one column per source. Not all rows are relevant for all sources. Evaluation questions are highlighted, and developed in questions/information sought on the rows below each EQ. The EQs are intended to be answered by analysis of the responses to the more detailed questions.		Respondent/source information:	
		Document: Author+year or title	
		Interview: Last name, first name	
		Position	
		Organisation	
		Sex	
		Date of interview	
		Interviewer	
		Questions relating to main mandate (save lives etc.)	
a. To what extent is Swiss Rescue relevant and appropriate to save lives and alleviate suffering after earthquakes in urban areas abroad?			
Review and analysis of SR deployments. Collect and collate information from deployment reports, categorise using rubrics (see Annex) to assess relevance and appropriateness. Complemented by interviews with SHA and SR staff.	1) Analyse Swiss Rescue’s deployments in the past 30 years and identify patterns.	Do the USAR deployments have common characteristics and how these changed over the years?	
		Have deployment methodologies been influenced by emerging international standards? Examples of this? Swiss Rescue influence on how these have developed?	
		Has Swiss aid policy changed over the corresponding time period and how has that influenced USAR deployments?	
		Has the pattern of disaster events changed over the corresponding time period and has this influenced USAR deployments? How?	
		Other comments	
b. What are the preconditions necessary for Swiss Rescue to be relevant and appropriate?			
Analysis of collected data, complemented by interviews with Swiss Rescue members, discussion with AG etc. for improved understanding.	2) Review selected high-impact earthquakes during the past 30 years, the international response involved (with or without Swiss contributions) and identify patterns: which country assisted with which USAR instruments?	How has the pattern of international response to high-impact earthquakes changed over the time period?	
		What are the major differences in approach/intervention style that can be identified as influenced by new stakeholders in the field?	
		Are there new approaches that Swiss wishes to support?	
		Other new approaches that are contrary to Swiss overall intentions (refer Theory of Change)?	
	3) Analyse the selectivity of affected risk-prone countries in terms of international assistance	Summarise evidence that host governments selectivity has increased and describe what has changed.	
Are these changes specific to SR USAR, USAR in general, to disaster			

	and their national capacities and identify patterns.	response in general, or to host government attitudes towards international cooperation in general?	
	Contextual analysis that refers to the tendency of host governments to be selective in terms of which international resources are allowed access to the disaster zones	What is the motivation for the resistance? Is it e.g. directed against Swiss Rescue, part of a general trend or motivated by wish to support the emergence of host country capacity?	
		What is the position of the Swiss government in relation to such expressions of host government ambitions? Does the Swiss government seek to overcome such resistance or seek to understand and support the underlying intentions?	
		Other comments	
c. What is the added value of Swiss Rescue when looking at the global developments regarding USAR (type of disasters, other actors etc)?			
Document review and interviews with INSARAG (for contextual analysis, global development). Analysis of response to questions a and b. Interviews with SHA.		What are the major contributions of SR?	
		What is the added value of SR at the global level?	
		What are the major gaps observed in national USARs and through past interventions? Has SR filled these gaps?	
		Other comments	
d. What would be options to maintain/increase the relevance and appropriateness of Swiss Rescue in future?			
Analysis of responses to EQ a,b,c plus explorative interviews. Contextual analysis. Explorative interviews with SR members and INSARAG to assess comparative advantages, and with SDC, MFA to identify Political will.		What is needed for - keeping SR as relevant as today - making SR more relevant/ appropriate in the future?	
		Given the present context, what is needed for SR to be politically relevant (related to host government acceptance "selectivity", Swiss development aid policy)	
		To what extent does SR have the necessary resources (preconditions) to be relevant and appropriate in relation to the present context (resources in terms of e.g. human resources, physical resources, logistical resources)	
		Given the present context, what is needed for SR to be relevant in relation to need (development of needs in disaster events)	
		Other comments	
h. To what extent is it possible to use Swiss Rescue capacities (search, rescue, medical, management and logistics) in other disasters than earthquakes?			
	5) Compare the Swiss USAR capacities to the actual emergency response environment, needs and trends.	Which competencies (knowledge, skills, behaviour) of USAR team members that are transferable to other disasters? What are the competency gaps? What happens when there are no disasters? How are the team managed currently?	
		Are SR resources applicable to other contexts, to add value, what are	

		relevant resources for this?	
		<i>Other comments</i>	
i. How could Swiss Rescue capacities support other rapid response instruments such as the multi-sectoral Rapid Response Teams?			
		Which resources that SR have can be used by other rapid response instruments? How does the dual function team work?	
		How would SR resources need to be developed or changed to be used by other rapid response instruments?	
		<i>Other comments</i>	
Questions relating to the other instruments			
e. To what extent is Swiss Rescue relevant and appropriate to support Switzerland's engagement in USAR capacity building?			
<i>NB! We are interpreting the question as referring to Swiss Rescue's relevance for USAR capacity building, NOT as referring to relevance of Swiss Rescue for Switzerland's engagement in USAR capacity building.</i>	4) Analyze the influence of Swiss Rescue on the Swiss engagement in USAR capacity building and on the multilateral engagement in INSARAG.	Map Swiss investments in support of capacity building and SR contribution to these.	
		What is the character of support of capacity building: - Are there MoUs, or clear legal agreements - contextualisation - work practice, technical information and shared language amongst USAR members, - USAR capacity building follows USAR's capacity development cycle	
		How many USAR capacity building assessments have been conducted, in which countries? What are the outcomes of the assessments?	
		What is their capacity building strategy? Are the competencies in USAR team clear between emergency and preparedness? Or are the profiles able to do both emergency and preparedness work?	
		Contextualise the Swiss investments by comparing them with overall investments in USAR capacity building.	
		Research the viewpoint of: – OCHA – regional INSARAG – Host governments who have received USAR capacity building – other states with similar USAR capacities to get their viewpoint on USAR capacity building	
		<i>Other comments</i>	
f. To what extent is Swiss Rescue relevant and appropriate at a multilateral level (INSARAG)?			
Question interpreted to refer to whether Swiss rescue engagement is appropriate and	4) Analyze the influence of Swiss Rescue on the Swiss engagement	Map Swiss investments in support of the establishment of the INSARAG structure.	

relevant to overall INSARAG functioning	in USAR capacity building and on the multilateral engagement in INSARAG.	How many INSARAG members are accredited nationally or through INSARAG? What are the strengths and gaps of accreditation process?	
		Research the viewpoint of: – OCHA – regional INSARAG – other states with similar USAR capacities to get their viewpoint on INSARAG activities	
		Questions to INSARAG members who have benefited from the support: - What was the value added of the support? What changed? - What would make the support more effective?	
		Questions to INSARAG members who have not benefitted from the support: - Would you seek support? - What specific support would you seek? - What hinders you from seeking support?	
		Other comments	
g. In how far is Swiss Rescue politically relevant on national and international level (Switzerland, EU, global)?			
	8) Exchange with the INSARAG community (incl. the secretariat, members and ex-members)	Find out the perspective of the newer members	
		Find out the perspective of members who are no longer members	
		Find out the perspective of regional structures	
		Find out the perspective of INSARAG HQ including its relationship with OCHA, specifically cluster system including a couple of cluster co-leads in order to give a cross functional perspective on USAR.	
		Other comments	
j. To what extent a reconfiguration of Swiss rescue could affect our relations with other governmental entities (Swiss Armed Forces), business community (Swiss, Zurich Airport), academia (Swiss Seismological Service) and NGOs (Swiss Red Cross, REDOG)?			
	7) Exchange with the seven other partners of Swiss Rescue.	Map partner perceptions of current direction of USAR capacity development	
		Identify suggestions for improvements in current approach	
		Identify consequences of potential changes in current approach	
		Other comments	
Questions relating to effectiveness and cost-effectiveness			
k. Are the results achieved (directly and indirectly / operationally and politically) justifying the costs of the instruments ?			
Analysis based on response all to other questions This is an evaluative question and we will not		How are the results currently measured?	
		Assess results achieved based on data from other questions: Descriptive statistics (if enough events) or description of results	

give a yes or no to it - we will present our view as point of departure for future discussion.		Assess cost of the instrument: How much does an intervention cost? What is the cost range for the interventions – min – max? What are the fixed costs for being on standby?	
		Compare costs and achieved results	
		Other comments	
I. Would there be more cost-effective options/ instruments/ modular solutions.			
For this question, we will look at cost structure, discuss alternative options with the same or similar sturcture, and discuss alternative strategic options, compare with other USAR capacities, non-USAR rapid response mechanisms etc.	6) Compare the Swiss USAR capacities to other (western European) states with similar emergency aid capacities and identify steps they have taken/are going to take in order to adapt to the changing emergency response environment.	Give examples of steps others have taken to transform or adapt. What have been the main motivation? What has been more/less successful?	
		Link the contextual analysis to trends in disaster events both earthquakes and other types of emergencies.	
		Use world humanitarian Summit documentation along with IFRC annual disasters report and OCHAs corresponding reports as source material	
		Include reference to the Nexus debate. This issue is to be included in the research of the viewpoints of different stakeholders as described in task E above.	
		See if it is possible to make some kind of cost comparison between USAR interventions and lower cost life-saving/ alleviation of suffering interventions	
		Other comments	

## Annex 5 International responses to High-Impact Earthquakes 2003-2018

The table shows a mapping of Mapping Earthquakes and International Response during the 15-year period from 2003 to 2018. The information is taken from: UNOCHA/INSARAG; [https://vosocc.unocha.org/GetFile.aspx?xml=rss/4118y8o8\\_22245\\_11.html&tid=4118&laid=1&sm=](https://vosocc.unocha.org/GetFile.aspx?xml=rss/4118y8o8_22245_11.html&tid=4118&laid=1&sm=) Downloaded April 2020.

Where information is missing, we have not been able to find data.

Country	Year	Casualties	Country GOV/NGO	Response team(s)	Capacity (INSARAG classification)	Aid team sent	Capacity	No. sent	Duration (days)
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>4439</b>	France GOV	Military Units of French Civil Protection HUSAR UIISC1	Heavy IEC USAR team	Water purification team	67	40	30
							67	40	
<b>Nepal</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>8200</b>	China GOV	China International Search and Rescue (CHN-1)	Heavy IEC USAR team		82	62	13
			Estonia GOV	Estonian USAR	Medium IEC USAR team		43	15	3
			Finland GOV	FINN RESCUE TEAM	Heavy IEC USAR team		74	29	
			France GOV	7th French Battalion for Civil Protection	Heavy IEC USAR team	Water purification team, structural engineer in European structural engineer team	67	40	16
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA B-National accredited team	Heavy National USAR team		65-75	2	14
			Italy GOV	HUSAR Italy	Heavy IEC USAR team	Structural assessment experts and AMP support	77-85	10	20
			Netherlands GOV	USAR NL	Heavy IEC USAR team		61	62	8
			Poland GOV	USAR POLAND	Heavy IEC USAR team		76	83	13
			Qatar GOV	Qatar Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		87	3	4
			Russian	Central Airmobile Rescue			599	71	18



			Federation GOV	Team of EMERCOM of Russia					
			Singapore GOV	Singapore Operation Lionheart Contingent	Heavy IEC USAR team		60-79	60	14
			Turkey NGO	AKUT Search and Rescue Association	Medium IEC USAR team		350	20	5
			Turkey NGO	GEA				13	9
			Turkey GOV	Istanbul AFAD 1 USAR Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		71	36	7
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	68	
			USA NGO	Empact Northwest Urban Search and Rescue Task Force	No IEC or national classification	Light and medium USAR in conjunction with Canadian Teams	48		8
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Fairfax County	Heavy IEC USAR team	Medium Augment USAR	72+DART		17
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Los Angeles County Fire	Heavy IEC USAR team	Medium team	72+DART	57	18
<b>Japan</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>24384</b>	Australia GOV	Australia Task Force 1 (Queensland)	Heavy IEC USAR team	Canine S & R	75	2	10
			Australia GOV	Australia Task Force 2 (New South Wales)	Heavy IEC USAR team		72	72	10
			China GOV	China International Search and Rescue (CHN-1)	Heavy IEC USAR team		82	15	9
			France GOV	7th French Battalion for Civil Protection	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR & CBRN	67	25	20
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA A- National accredited team	Heavy National USAR Team		64-300	64	21
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA B-National accredited team	Heavy National USAR Team		65-75	7	21
			France GOV	Military Units of French Civil Protection HUSAR UIISC1	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR & CBRN	67	65	20

			Italy GOV	HUSAR Italy	Heavy IEC USAR team	NR Detection (Nuclear Radiological)	77-85	6	6
			Korea GOV	Korea Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		60	107	12
			Singapore GOV	Singapore Operation Lionheart Contingent	Heavy IEC USAR team	Man search team	60-79	6	6
			Switzerland GOV	Swiss Rescue	Heavy IEC USAR team	Reduced rescue team (search component)	78		
			Turkey GOV	Istanbul AFAD 1 USAR Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		71	35	7
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	65	
			USA NGO	Empact Northwest Urban Search and Rescue Task Force	No IEC or national classification	Light USAR & assessment	48		7
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Fairfax County	Heavy IEC USAR team	Heavy USAR	72+DART	9	
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Los Angeles County Fire	Heavy IEC USAR team	Heavy team	72+DART	75	9
<b>Haiti</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>316 000</b>	Chile GOV	USAR Bomberos de Chile	Medium IEC USAR team		43	41	7
			China GOV	China International Search and Rescue (CHN-1)	Heavy IEC USAR team		82	50	14
			Colombia GOV	USAR Colombia SNGRD	Medium IEC USAR team		70	37	20
			France GOV	7th French Battalion for Civil Protection	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	116	40
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA A- National accredited team	Heavy National USAR Team		64-300	40	15
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA B-National accredited team	Heavy National USAR Team		65-75	40	15
			France NGO	Pompiers de l'Urgence	Medium IEC USAR	USAR team	113	20	15

				Internationale	team				
			Germany NGO	@fire - International Disaster Response Germany	No IEC or national classification		20-30	24	6
			Germany NGO	I.S.A.R. Germany	Medium IEC USAR team		50	30	10
			Greece NGO	Hellenic Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification		20	10	8
			Hungary GOV	Hungarian National Integrated Organisation for Rescue Services	Medium IEC USAR team		78 (80)	3-5	10
			Iceland GOV	Icelandic International USAR Team	Medium IEC USAR team		38	38	
			Italy GOV	HUSAR Italy	Heavy IEC USAR team		77-85	10	20
			Korea GOV	Korea Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		60	25	10
			Netherlands GOV	USAR NL	Heavy IEC USAR team		61	60	8
			Poland GOV	USAR POLAND	Heavy IEC USAR team		76	63	12
			Qatar GOV	Qatar Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		87	28	21
			Russian Federation GOV	Central Airmobile Rescue Team of EMERCOM of Russia	Heavy IEC USAR team		61/599	44	26
			Spain GOV	Emergencia Respuesta Inmediata Comunidad de Madrid	Medium IEC USAR team		34	18	9
			Spain GOV	Spanish Emergency Military Unit USAR	Medium IEC USAR team		41-61	37	14
			Switzerland GOV	Swiss Rescue	Heavy IEC USAR team	Reduced rescue Team			
			Turkey NGO	AKUT Search and Rescue Association	Medium IEC USAR team		350	10	9
			Turkey NGO	GEA				9	7

			United Kingdom NGO	ERT Search & Rescue	No IEC or national classification	Team of USAR Medics	40-60	6	8
			United Kingdom NGO	Rapid UK	No IEC or national classification		100	9	12
			United Kingdom NGO	Search and Rescue Assistance in Disasters	No IEC or national classification		10-24	9	10
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	67	11
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Fairfax County	Heavy IEC USAR team	DART	72+DART	DART	16
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Los Angeles County Fire	Heavy IEC USAR team	Heavy team +	72+DART	72	16+
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>1117</b>	Australia GOV	Australia Task Force 1 (Queensland)	Heavy IEC USAR team	S & R	75	75	7
			China GOV	China International Search and Rescue (CHN-1)	Heavy IEC USAR team		82	41	18
			Germany NGO	I.S.A.R. Germany	Medium IEC USAR team		50	30	7
			Hungary GOV	Hungarian National Integrated Organisation for Rescue Services	Medium IEC USAR team		40 (80)	3-5	7
			Japan GOV	Japan Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR team	60-70	65	7
			Korea GOV	Korea Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		60	41	8
			Qatar GOV	Qatar Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		81	20	7
			Swiss GOV	Swiss Rescue	Heavy IEC USAR team		118	118	4
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	67	7

<b>China</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>87 652</b>	Belarus GOV	Republican Special Response Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		64	3	3
			Japan GOV	Japan Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR team	60-70	61	6
			Korea GOV	Korea Disaster Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		60	41	8
			Russian Federation GOV	Central Airmobile Rescue Team of EMERCOM of Russia	Heavy IEC USAR team	SAR / field hospital	599	41 / 30	7 / 17
			Singapore GOV	Singapore Operation Lionheart Contingent	Heavy IEC USAR team		60-79	55	5
			USA GOV	US Agency for Intenational Development-Fairfax County	Heavy IEC USAR team		72	6	4
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>5749</b>	Australia GOV	Australia Task Force 2 (New South Wales)	Heavy IEC USAR team		72	10	10
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA A- National accredited team	Heavy IEC USAR team		64-300	4	10
			Qatar GOV	Qatar Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		87	50	17
			UAE GOV	UAE USAR	Heavy IEC USAR team		88	65	10
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>1303</b>	France GOV	HUSAR FRA A- National accredited team	Heavy IEC USAR team		64-300	1	14
			Russian Federation GOV	Central Airmobile Rescue Team of EMERCOM of Russia	Heavy IEC USAR team	SAR	599	38	13
			Singapore GOV	Singapore Operation Lionheart Contingent	Heavy IEC USAR team		60-79	54	6
<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>76 213</b>	Austria GOV	Austrian Forces Disaster Relief Unit	Heavy IEC USAR team		197	65	56
			China GOV	China International Search	Heavy IEC USAR		82	90	32

				and Rescue (CHN-1)	team				
			Estonia GOV	Estonian USAR	Medium IEC USAR team		43	8	7
			France NGO	Pompiers de l'Urgence Internationale	Medium IEC USAR team	USAR team	113	12	10
			Germany GOV	I.S.A.R. Germany	Medium IEC USAR team		50	15	7
			Hungary GOV	Hungarian National Integrated Organisation for Rescue Services	Medium IEC USAR team		40 (80)	3-5	10
			Japan GOV	Japan Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR team	60-70	49	9
			Jordan GOV	Jordan Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	Light team	130-140	13	15
			Malaysia GOV	Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		101	27	12
			Netherlands GOV	USAR NL	Heavy IEC USAR team		61	60	8
			Poland GOV	USAR POLAND	Heavy IEC USAR team		76	22	7
			Qatar GOV	Qatar Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		87	60	17
			Russian Federation GOV	Central Airmobile Rescue Team of EMERCOM of Russia	Heavy IEC USAR team	SAR	599	65	18
			Singapore GOV	Singapore Operation Lionheart Contingent	Heavy IEC USAR team		70-79	44	12
			Turkey NGO	AKUT Search and Rescue Association	Medium IEC USAR team		350	11	7
			Turkey GOV	Istanbul AFAD 1 USAR Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		71	21	15
			Turkey NGO	YY – GEA Search and Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification		350-370	12	7



			Ukraine GOV	Mobile Rescue Center of Ukraine	Heavy IEC USAR team		64	90	30
			UAE GOV	Dubai Police Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification		60	27	7
			UAE GOV	UAE USAR	Heavy IEC USAR team		88	65	10
			United Kingdom NGO	ERT Search & Rescue	No IEC or national classification		40-60	10	14
			United Kingdom NGO	Rapid UK	No IEC or national classification		100	27	12
			United Kingdom NGO	Search and Rescue Assistance in Disasters	No IEC or national classification		10-24	12	7
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	65	
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Fairfax County	Heavy IEC USAR team	DART	72+DART	72+DART	10
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>1001</b>							
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2266</b>	Austria GOV	Austrian Forces Disaster Relief Unit	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR	197	39	7
			Austria NGO	Search and Rescue Unit Vorarlberg	Medium IEC USAR team		40	15	6
			Brazil GOV	Corpo de Bombeiros Militar do Distrito Federal	No IEC or national classification		300	30	
			China GOV	China International Search and Rescue (CHN-1)	Heavy IEC USAR team		82	30	9
			Czech Republic GOV	Czech Urban Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		68	13	4
			France NGO	Groupe d'Intervention Catastrophe	No IEC or national classification				
			France GOV	HUSAR FRA A- National accredited team	Heavy National USAR Team		64-300	20	8
			France NGO	Secouristes Sans Frontieres	No IEC or national classification		70-100	18	3

			France NGO	Unité de Secours et de Recherches Internationale	No IEC or national classification		28	13	5
			Iceland GOV	Icelandic International USAR Team	Medium IEC USAR team		38	16	
			Japan GOV	Japan Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR Team	60-70	60	7
			Korea GOV	Korea Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		60	21	8
			Poland GOV	USAR POLAND	Heavy IEC USAR team		76	26	4
			Russian Federation GOV	Central Airmobile Rescue Team of EMERCOM of Russia	Heavy IEC USAR team		599	32	5
			Spain GOV	Emergencia Respuesta Inmediata Comunidad de Madrid	Medium IEC USAR team		34		
			Sweden GOV	Swedish International Fast Response USAR Team	No IEC or national classification		70	64	5
			Switzerland GOV	Swiss Rescue	Heavy IEC USAR team		78	100	
			Tunisia GOV	Tunisian Special Unit (Civil Protection)	No IEC or national classification		75	30	7
			Turkey GOV	Istanbul AFAD 1 USAR Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		71	15	7
			Turkey NGO	YY – GEA Search and Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification		350-370	5	8
			United Kingdom NGO	Rapid UK	No IEC or national classification		100	12	6
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		67	65	
<b>Iran</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>31 000</b>	Austria GOV	Austrian Forces Disaster Relief Unit	Heavy IEC USAR team	USAR	197	120	7
			Austria NGO	Search and Rescue Unit	Medium IEC USAR		40	15	6

				Vorarlberg	team				
			China GOV	China International Search and Rescue (CHN-1)	Heavy IEC USAR team		82	38	6
			Czech Republic GOV	Czech Urban Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		68	18	3
			Denmark GOV	Danish Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		81	39	10
			France NGO	Secouristes Sans Frontieres	No IEC or national classification		70-100	56	15
			Jordan GOV	Jordan Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	Light team	130-140	7	10
			Korea GOV	Korea Disaster Relief Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		60	24	8
			Norway NGO	Norwegian Search and Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification		35	29	7
			Poland GOV	USAR POLAND	Heavy IEC USAR team		76	28	4
			Russian Federation GOV	Central Airmobile Rescue Team of EMERCOM of Russia	Heavy IEC USAR team		599	85	5
			Slovak Republic GOV	Search and Rescue Team of Slovak Fire and Rescue Corps	No IEC or national classification		35		6
			Switzerland GOV	Swiss Rescue	Heavy IEC USAR team				
			Turkey NGO	AKUT Search and Rescue Association	Medium IEC USAR team		350	5	7
			Turkey GOV	Istanbul AFAD 1 USAR Team	Heavy IEC USAR team		71	28	10
			Turkey NGO	SAR Team of Search and Rescue Association	No IEC or national classification		420	15	11
			Turkey NGO	YY – GEA Search and Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification		350-370	5	11
			Ukraine GOV	Mobile Rescue Center of Ukraine	Heavy IEC USAR team		80	64	45

			UAE GOV	Dubai Police Rescue Team	No IEC or national classification	60	37	7
			United Kingdom NGO	Rapid UK	No IEC or national classification	100	15	6
			United Kingdom GOV	UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team	Heavy IEC USAR team	67	65	6
			USA GOV	US Agency for International Development-Fairfax County	Heavy IEC USAR team	Heavy USAR		17

## Annex 6 Indonesia case study

### 1 Background

#### 1.1 General

Indonesia is one of the world's most natural disaster-prone areas and is at risk in terms of multiple hazards, including flooding, earthquakes, landslides, tsunami, volcano eruptions and cyclones. Over the last 30 years, there have been an average of 289 significant natural disasters per year and an average annual death toll of approximately 8,000.

The Government of Indonesia spends USD 300 to USD 500 million annually on post-disaster reconstruction. Costs during major disaster years reach 0.3 percent of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and can reach as high as 45 percent of GDP at the provincial level. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the government allocated more than USD 7 billion for reconstruction in Aceh and Nias and approximately USD 2 billion following the 2010 Mount Merapi volcanic eruption. In 2018, Mount Sinabung which lies in the northern part of Sumatra island had a major eruption. There were no fatalities or serious injuries resulting from the eruption but volcanic ash and small rocks fell in at least five districts and destroyed agricultural crops within the affected zones. In 2016, a 6.4 magnitude earthquake struck off Pidie Jaya district in Sumatra Island, killing at least 90 people and damaging more than 200 houses. That same year, floods and flash floods occurred in the provinces of South, West and Central Kalimantan, Bengkulu, and Gorontalo, flooding 3,550 houses for several days<sup>3</sup>.

Indonesia was hit with several major earthquakes and tsunamis in 2018 with the first major ones striking off Lombok on 29 July 2018. These were followed by earthquakes, tsunami and liquefaction in Central Sulawesi on 28 September 2018, damaging hundreds of thousands of houses in both areas and displacing hundreds of thousands of people.

Climate change is also recognized as a key threat to Indonesia's development, especially for lower-income groups. Rising sea levels and changing weather patterns may lead to increased uncertainty in water availability, food production, and disruptions to transport, commerce, and urban development.<sup>4</sup>

Some of the key players directly relevant and related to earthquake operations in Indonesia are The National Search and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS), Indonesian Red Cross Society (PMI), ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA Indonesia) and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (See Table 1: Key Players in Indonesia). These agencies in addition to SDC–SHA Hub for SEA and the Pacific were interviewed for this case study.

#### 1.2 Government Priorities

The 2004 tsunami was a major turning point for the Government of Indonesia in addressing disaster risk management (DRM). Following the event, the country enacted a law on disaster management in 2007, and the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) was established in 2008. Support for DRM has grown, with NDMA's budget

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<sup>3</sup> The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, (GFDRR) <https://www.gfdr.org/en/indonesia>, downloaded 2020-04-24

<sup>4</sup> IFRC (2019) "Real Time Evaluation Indonesia: Earthquakes and Tsunami (Lombok, Sulawesi)", Final Report, January 2019

allocation for disaster management increasing 500 percent from 2010 to 2014.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the new 2015-2019 development plan outlines the country's disaster management policy, which aims to reduce risk, increase the resilience of national and local governments, and support communities facing disasters.

To further advance its DRM agenda, national priorities include:

- Improving the understanding and use of disaster risk information;
- Enhancing community-driven development;
- Strengthening urban resilience;
- Developing disaster risk financing and insurance mechanisms; and
- Continuing initiatives to strengthen the resilience of school infrastructure.<sup>6</sup>

### 1.3 Indonesia USAR

Indonesia is one of International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) members. The Indonesian Rescue Medium Team has successfully undergone an intensive field exercise as per the External Classification of USAR Team under the INSARAG guidelines from 25 to 29 November 2019 in Indonesia. Experts from New Zealand, Malaysia, Japan, United States, Australia, Russia Federation and UK (and with Singapore mentor) participated as classifiers.<sup>7</sup>

Interviews with all the respondents for this case study reaffirm that the Indonesian government is prioritising internal capacity building to strengthen the nation's earthquake response mechanism. This includes strengthening internal coordination mechanisms and internal capacity to respond with the support of external actors. In the case of USAR, Singapore is seen as the closest support and capacity builder. According to BASARNAS and PMI respondents, Indonesia has intentionally adopted a medium USAR capacity ambition despite the high needs in the country mainly for the reason of being agile, both domestically and within ASEAN. This decision was apparently taken on the advice of Singapore, the USAR mentor for Indonesia. A few ASEAN neighbouring countries maintain heavy USAR teams<sup>8</sup> therefore it is perceived that support is readily available should there be a need to mobilise heavy USAR support in Indonesia. Furthermore, the USAR teams in Asia have had experience working with Indonesia on prior disasters (For a brief profile of USAR Teams in Asia see Table 2 below).

### 1.4 Swiss Rescue collaboration with Indonesia to date

In October 2009, a full-strength Swiss Rescue heavy USAR team was deployed to Padang, Sumatera in Indonesia<sup>9</sup>. Since 2009, there has not been any other Heavy USAR team deployments to Indonesia. However multi-sectoral teams were deployed in 2018 as part of the Rapid Response Team (RRT) support from SHA<sup>10</sup>. This deployment was coordinated by the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (SHA) Hub for South East Asia and the Pacific, which worked closely with the Swiss Embassy in Indonesia.

Based on this and previous experience a process of establishing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for mutual assistance in case of natural disasters has been initiated

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<sup>5</sup> Willitts-King B, (2009) "The Role of the Affected State in Humanitarian Action: A Case Study on Indonesia" Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, February 2009,

<sup>6</sup> Juillard, H. and Jourdain, J. (2019); IFRC (2019); HAG (Humanitarian Advisory Group) and Pujiono Centre (2019)

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.insarag.org/154-en/iec/iec/764-iec-medium-indonesia-rescue-team-inasar> downloaded 2020-04-24

<sup>8</sup> INSARAG website/USAR Directory lists the following countries in Asia Pacific as heavy USAR: Australia, New Zealand, China, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Japan

<sup>9</sup> Indonesia Padang, Sumatera Earthquake, 2009, Summary Report of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid

<sup>10</sup> Earthquake and Tsunami, Indonesia 2018, Rapid Response Operation Report, Swiss Humanitarian Aid



between the Swiss Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.<sup>11</sup> This MoU process will formalise bilateral protocols and the procedures for coordination in possible future Swiss responses to Indonesian needs.

### 1.5 Changing operational context

According to the interview respondents from AHA, BASARNAS, OCHA, PMI who have been directly involved in many disaster responses in Indonesia, the disaster trends, volume and frequency have changed in Indonesia. The country faces floods, droughts, earthquakes and internal displacements, etc. The capacity at national level has increased and there is an increasing national sovereign behaviour in Asia. Government to government cooperation in the Asia region remains open and is foreseen to be increasing. This view is supported by some of the lessons learned papers and evaluation reports on Indonesia.<sup>12</sup> The set up of regional coordination centres such as AHA is also an evidence of greater regional collaboration and ASEAN solidarity.

Views of PMI, AHA and Basarnas are that there is a swift change in the way emergency response is managed. 10-15 years ago, international assistance outside of Asia would come to Indonesia with their own resources as fast as possible however Indonesia has stronger capacity to respond. This includes the recently medium classified Indonesia's USAR that has a wider mandate beyond 'urban' search and rescue or earthquake operations. Indonesia's USAR team also responds to other emergencies such as floods, aeroplane crashes, etc and have established their specific roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis other disaster response mechanisms in Indonesia. Given the frequency and multitude nature of disasters, USAR team exclusively for search and rescue in earthquake operations is deemed as "not flexible and versatile", hence the wider mandate to be equipped to respond to other disasters.

Internally within Indonesia, government and non-government agencies are paying attention to cultural fit and context-based support that suits their own context. The international standards are perceived to be too high and there is a tendency to move towards adoption of national or regional standards as reported by AHA Center. IFRC and OCHA views however differ from this view in that the need for regionalisation of standards is seen as a potential source of compromising quality and standards of response, potentially impacting the most vulnerable groups. OCHA and IFRC respondents affirm that the concept of the "localisation agenda" is not fully understood by many agencies in Asia including agencies such as PMI, AHA. There is a confusion over the term "local". There is a tendency to interpret localisation as 'doing it locally without any international support'.<sup>13</sup>

A review of the INSARAG External Classification (IEC) of the USAR teams in Asia indicate the increase in available IEC classified teams in Asia over the past ten years (See Table 2: Brief Profile of USAR Teams In Asia). For example, in the past ten years, Malaysia, Singapore, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand have been classified as heavy USAR. All these USAR teams have a wider scope going beyond search and rescue in post-earthquake contexts. Some of these USAR teams were / are also deployed in other disasters (natural and man-made) such as tsunami, typhoon, building collapse, air plane crash<sup>14</sup>. Interviews with BASARNAS, PMI and SDC-SHA Thailand affirm that USAR teams in Asia are making efforts to be agile and flexible, and in so doing increasing their relevance beyond earthquake search and rescue operations.

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<sup>11</sup> Flückiger et. al. (2019) Monitoring Mission, follow up on Emergency Operation in Palu/Jakarta, Indonesia, Back to office report

<sup>12</sup> See for example Juillard, H. and Jourdain, J. (2019); IFRC (2019); HAG (Humanitarian Advisory Group) and Pujiono Centre (2019)

<sup>13</sup> Williams S. (2016) "Five reasons why the "localisation" agenda has failed in the past - and four reasons why things may now be changing", Start Network

<sup>14</sup> INSARAG [https://vosocc.unocha.org/USAR\\_Directory/MemberCountriesOverview.asp](https://vosocc.unocha.org/USAR_Directory/MemberCountriesOverview.asp)

The changing nature of modern conflicts, natural disasters and crisis situations has gradually called for various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.<sup>15</sup> According to the IFRC respondent, there is a major investment on the military by various stakeholders including by the Red Cross Movement. Military capacities are playing an increased role in the humanitarian sector, however this does not mean that international military support is accepted, and its involvement is very much dependent on the context.

There is also a growing involvement of private sector stakeholders that want to go beyond Corporate Social Responsibility and beyond merely providing funds<sup>16</sup>. In other words, private sector is playing an active role and contributing in various other ways by providing provide their skills and knowledge, technology, systems, etc.

The common perception of AHA, IFRC and OCHA is that the Swiss Rescue needs to better understand the operating context in Indonesia and attempt to broaden its engagement on the ground with the different key actors in order to increase its relevance. This said, all interviewed for the case study acknowledged a continued need for Swiss Rescue.

## **2 Analysis and Conclusions**

### **2.1 Missed opportunity**

Overall, based on the respondents' views, Swiss Rescue in particular has missed the opportunities to establish relationships with the key players in Indonesia despite having engagement with SDC-SHA Hub for SEA and Pacific and the Swiss Embassy in Indonesia. SDC-SHA Hub for SEA and Pacific respondent is of view that there is strong coordination with the key players in Indonesia including OCHA, however this may not be exclusive to Swiss Rescue. While the key players in Indonesia and the region (PMI, Basarnas, AHA , IFRC and OCHA) do not regard Swiss Rescue as a key contributor to their earthquake response, they do highly regard Swiss Rescue as a potential partner and welcome it as contributor. Furthermore OCHA for example is a crucial and willing entry point for Swiss Rescue to be deployed, however this relationship is not fully maximised to the advantage of Swiss Rescue. None of the respondents from Indonesia are aware of what services Swiss Rescue could provide and how. This could be due to internal communication problems within these agencies or lack of consistent and continuous messaging around Swiss Rescue from SHA or the Swiss Embassy in Indonesia.

Despite having a local presence, the visibility of Swiss Rescue is seen as low. One of the possible reasons for this may be that the Swiss Embassy is more focused on development work than humanitarian work or specifically USAR work. A lack of dedicated Swiss Rescue expert or liaison person in the country or in the region could also be a contributing factor for this missed opportunity.

### **2.2 Shift in operating ways with focus on national and regional solidarity and capacity**

The Indonesian government found the international response to Aceh to upset local customs and local operating ways etc. This has generated a significant shift in how international humanitarian response is seen by the government. In the 2016 earthquake, the Indonesian government imposed more restrictions. The Indonesian government does

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<sup>15</sup> ECHO (2018) Civil Military Relations in Humanitarian Crises, accessed 2020-04-26, [https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations_en)

<sup>16</sup> "The role of the Private Sector in Humanitarian Action: Progress and Prognosis The Humanitarian Leadership Academy and HSBC, 2019", Humanitarian Leadership Academy

not want to receive any new actor that cannot guarantee the credibility of the international assistance.

International organisations can come in if they work with any local organisation or have an existing local presence. There is a strong emphasis on being flexible and understanding the host government (line ministries, local authorities etc.), the operating contexts and the local culture and customs and the key stakeholders and their power dynamics on the ground. Having a bilateral agreement with the host government in the form of a MoU alone is regarded as insufficient. In addition there is a need for relationship building and clarifying protocols and preparedness prior to the disasters. Staff turnover within relevant agencies has to be considered so that the relationship is both institutionalised and maintained in terms of the individual office bearers.

### **2.3 Prioritise, pre-position, recreate**

SDC/HA should establish relationship and trust with the various players in Indonesia. SDC/HA should find the biggest value added and focus on the specific comparative advantage that could be useful in Indonesia and the region. This could be in the form of capacity building of Indonesia USAR, providing quality assurance and support with upholding standards and principles.

SDC/HA needs to be more connected, need to understand the dynamics of other stakeholders including government relations and working in the regional multilateral environment. Urban disasters are multi-dimensional and SDC/SHA must be prepared for this. Switzerland has a tendency to focus on long term capacity building which could be leveraged to build relationships, knowledge sharing and increased visibility.

The new approach therefore as seen in Asia is to strengthen more national capacity and less international operations. This is not so easily accepted and understood by international community in general, and interviewees emphasize that SDC/SHA need to accept and understand this shift and find its niche and relevance accordingly.

SDC/SHA has clear procedures and structures and heavy investments in training. Decision making is decentralised and quick; in neighbouring countries in Asia this may not be the case. Hence, there is a potential opportunity if SDC/SHA could reach faster than others through rapid decision making, pre-positioning key staff/materials and concluding agreements with host governments before disaster events take place. This can be compared to for example the case of USAR Singapore where Singapore is not earthquake prone (no direct experience of managing disasters in their own country), the need internally for heavy USAR is limited, however they have made themselves relevant in the region by establishing relationships, providing capacity building support and broadening their scope of work.

SDC/SHA will only be relevant if it can recreate, re-prioritise and pre-position itself in light of all the changes mentioned above.

**Table 1: Key Players / Stakeholders**

Some of the key players that are directly relevant and related to earthquake operations in Indonesia are tabulated below. The relationship and opportunities columns are based on interviews conducted with the respondent representing these agencies:

Agency / Presence	Role/Purpose	Relationship with Swiss Rescue	Opportunities
<p>The National Search and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS)</p> <p><u>Local</u></p>	<p>BASARNAS is a government agency tasked to assist the Indonesian government (President) in search and rescue activities.</p> <p>The INSARAG focal point for Indonesia is represented by one of BASARNAS senior management team staff.</p> <p>According to Basarnas, Basarnas scope of work goes beyond urban search and rescue. Basarnas is involved in search and rescue activities for all types of disasters (natural and man-made) in Indonesia.</p>	<p>Basarnas has received support from USAR Netherlands, USAR Australia and USAR Singapore, as their mentor, has supported Indonesia's USAR accreditation process. Singapore only provides technical advice (soft) without any equipment (hardware) support.</p> <p>According to the Basarnas respondent, Basarnas is familiar with Swiss Rescue and has participated in INSARAG meetings, however it does not have any regular contact or an established relationship with Swiss Rescue.</p> <p>Furthermore, according to respondent from Basarnas, Basarnas is unfamiliar of the type of support Swiss Rescue could add value to Indonesia.</p>	<p>Basarnas is open to establishing long lasting relationship with Swiss Rescue, especially from capacity building perspectives.</p> <p>Given that Basarnas is in the process of professionalization of USAR team nationwide in Indonesia, providing capacity building support (soft and hardware) could be an entry point for Swiss Rescue. Furthermore, urban resilience is high on Indonesia government's agenda which could also be an opportunity for Swiss Rescue.</p> <p>According to Basarnas respondent, while formality is emphasised, Basarnas relies on verbal and informal culture and relies heavily on personal relationships. These need to be formalised.<sup>17</sup></p>
<p>Indonesian Red Cross Society (PMI)</p> <p><u>Local</u></p>	<p>PMI is a humanitarian organisation that plays an auxiliary role to the government in the humanitarian sector. PMI is mandated to be the first responder during disasters.</p> <p>PMI works closely with the IFRC, The National Agency for Disaster Countermeasure, (BNPB), Ministry of</p>	<p>The PMI is unfamiliar with what the Swiss Rescue could offer specifically.</p> <p>According to the PMI respondent, the Indonesian government has its own criteria to welcome foreign assistance. Swiss is very welcome, usually through collaboration with the Swiss Embassy in Indonesia. Indonesian government</p>	<p>The PMI has informal relationship with the Swiss Rescue. The PMI perceives the Swiss Rescue as relevant.</p> <p>The PMI sees the opportunity of involving with the Swiss Rescue in the preparedness phase. For example orientating its rescue team / volunteers on the latest tools and machineries. In Palu the Indonesian search</p>

<sup>17</sup> The cultural aspects are confirmed in regional management literature; see for example, McClelland I., Hill F. (2019).

	Social Affairs (MOSA) and other actors such as Basarnas and OCHA.	is not keen to work with those without local presence therefore existing and continuous relationship is key to future collaborations.	and rescue team was not fully equipped to reach areas where there was liquidation. In this case heavy equipment were needed and the Indonesia team was not equipped to do so.
OCHA Indonesia <u>Local and Regional</u> (ASEAN)	<p>OCHA coordinates the humanitarian action in Indonesia to ensure crisis affected people receive the assistance and protection they need.</p> <p>OCHA works to overcome obstacles that impede humanitarian assistance from reaching people affected by crises, and it provides leadership in mobilizing assistance and resources on behalf of the humanitarian system.</p> <p>According to OCHA respondent, the government of Indonesia is very open working with UN/OCHA Indonesia and enjoys a cordial relationship. OCHA recognizes Indonesia government and the key actors such as Basarnas and PMI are leading the process in DRM while OCHA plays a supportive and facilitative role.</p>	<p>The OCHA representative has contact with Swiss Embassy in Indonesia and with the SDC-SHA representative in Thailand, however unaware of what Swiss Rescue could offer and how this offer could be made.</p> <p>According to the OCHA respondent, other donors take advantage of OCHA more than SHA and Swiss Rescue.</p>	<p>The OCHA in Jakarta is the liaison office to ASEAN and OCHA Indonesia representative is highly aware of Swiss contributions to OCHA/UN. This according to the OCHA respondent, could be an entry point for not only Indonesia, but in the ASEAN region.</p> <p>SHA / Swiss Rescue could draw more and "use" OCHA to leverage connections in affected countries. In Indonesia, according to the OCHA respondent, Basarnas could benefit from more capacity building which is also confirmed by Basarnas in the interview. Basarnas has the physical infrastructure but the human resources quality and capacity can be further improved.</p> <p>The government of Indonesia according to the OCHA Indonesia representative would appreciate the different perspectives, expertise and knowledge that Swiss could potentially bring.</p> <p>Swiss being champions of international humanitarian principles could play a huge role as accountability and principles is still a huge challenge in Asia. Asia Pacific donors could learn from European donors about people centered approach and protection principles, etc. According to the OCHA respondent, AHA is also missing the true meaning and understanding of humanitarian principles and focusing on developing new guidelines that is of 'regional' standards.</p>

<p>AHA Center</p> <p>The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management</p> <p><u>Regional (ASEAN)</u></p>	<p>AHA - The AHA Centre is an intergovernmental organisation, established by the ten ASEAN Member States with the aim to facilitate cooperation and coordination of disaster management amongst ASEAN Member States, which is legally binding.</p>	<p>AHA respondent is familiar with USAR / INSARAG but not specifically Swiss Rescue. The interview suggests that AHA director has contact with SHA but this appears not to be institutionalised or fully established throughout the AHA center.</p>	<p>AHA predicts disasters of huge scales including earthquakes in Asia (Philippines, Indonesia, etc).</p> <p>In the event of huge scale earthquake, support may be needed beyond the region however currently have no established relationship with European countries. The requests go through OCHA as USAR Coordination Cell (CC) will be managed by OCHA/UNDAC.</p>
<p>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) Asia Pacific</p> <p><u>Regional (Asia Pacific)</u></p>	<p>IFRC Asia Pacific Zone Office facilitates the humanitarian activities of National Societies in Asia and Pacific such as Indonesian Red Crescent Society (PMI).</p>	<p>IFRC respondent stated that IFRC in general is very familiar with Swiss Rescue and SHA. Swiss government is perceived by IFRC as not pro-active, but reactive. Swiss Red Cross for example tends to operate in unilateral manner as compared to other Red Cross societies.</p>	<p>IFRC view is that there are missed opportunities where SHA and Swiss Rescue should be more pro-active, agile and reinvent itself. SHA should strategize on the countries Swiss Rescue wants to work in and IFRC is ready to work with Swiss Rescue/SHA where needed. According to IFRC's projection and trends, the countries in Asia that may be hit by urban disasters are Philippines, Japan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Mongolia, and Myanmar. In terms of reinventing itself, Swiss Rescue should also be prepared to respond to terrorism threats that affect urban resilience.</p> <p>According to IFRC's respondent, Swiss USAR's unique experience working with the military could be used to share with other countries in Asia.</p>

**Table 2: IEC Classifications for USAR teams in Asia**

IEC CLASSIFICATIONS FOR USAR TEAMS IN ASIA				
Country	Insarag Classification (USAR Team)	IEC Year	Emergencies Responded Scope	Last Deployed
Australia	Heavy Australia Task Force 1 (Queensland)	IEC 2008; IER 2013; IER2 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Solomon Islands Cyclone Ita floods, 2014, Mar</li> <li>Queensland Australia Cyclone Marcia, 2014, Feb</li> <li>Japan Earthquake, 2011, Mar</li> <li>New Zealand Christchurch Earthquake</li> <li>Queensland Floods , 2010, Dec</li> <li>Indonesia Earthquake, 2009, Sep</li> <li>Samoa Tsunami, 2009, Sep</li> <li>Australia, Cyclone Hamish, 2009</li> <li>Australia, Cyclone Larry, 2006</li> <li>Taiwan Earthquake, 1999, Sep</li> </ul>	Queensland Australia Cyclone Nathan, 2015, Feb
	Heavy Australia Task Force 2 (New South Wales)	IEC 2012; IER 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tropical Cyclone Debbie, Australia, 2017, Mar</li> <li>Tropical Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu, 2015, Mar</li> <li>Japan Earthquake, 2011, Mar</li> <li>New Zealand Christchurch Earthquake, 2011, Feb</li> <li>Samoa Tsunami, 2009, Sep</li> <li>Indonesia earthquake, 2006, Mar</li> <li>Indonesia Tsunami 2004, Dec</li> <li>Sri Lanka Tsunami, 2004, Dec</li> <li>Taiwan Earthquake, 1999, Sep</li> <li>Turkey Earthquake , 1999, Aug</li> </ul>	Tropical Cyclone Gita, Tonga, 2018, Feb
China	Heavy China International Search & Rescue (CHN-1)	IEC 2009; IER 2014; IER2 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Japan Earthquake, 2011, Mar</li> <li>New Zealand Christchurch Earthquake, 2011, Feb</li> <li>Pakistan Floods, 2010, Aug</li> <li>Haiti Earthquake , 2010, Jan</li> <li>Indonesia Earthquake, 2009, Sep</li> <li>Pakistan Earthquake, 2005, Oct</li> <li>Indonesia Tsunami 2004, Dec</li> <li>Iran (Bam) Earthquake, 2003, Dec</li> <li>Algeria Earthquake, 2003, May</li> </ul>	Nepal Earthquake, 2015, Apr
	Heavy China International Search & Rescue (CHN-2)	IEC 2019	No Emergencies Responded Listed	
Indonesia	Medium Indonesia Search and Rescue Team	IEC 2019	No Emergencies Responded Listed	
Japan	Heavy Japan Disaster Relief Team	IEC 2010; IER 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indonesia Earthquake, 2009, Sep</li> <li>China Earthquake, 2008, May</li> <li>Pakistan Earthquake, 2005, Oct</li> <li>Thailand Tsunami 2004, Dec</li> <li>Morocco earthquake 2004, May</li> </ul>	New Zealand Christchurch Earthquake, 2011, Feb

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Algeria Earthquake, 2003, May</li> <li>Taiwan Earthquake, 1999, Sep</li> <li>Turkey Earthquake, 1999, Aug</li> <li>Columbia Earthquake, 1999, Jan</li> <li>Egypt Collapse of Building, 1996, Oct</li> <li>Malaysia Collapse of Building, 1993, Dec</li> <li>Bangladesh Cyclone, 1991, May</li> <li>Iran earthquake 1990, Jun</li> <li>Philippines earthquake 1990</li> </ul>	
South Korea	Heavy Korea Disaster Relief Team	IEC 2011; IER 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Haiti Earthquake, 2010, Jan</li> <li>Indonesia Earthquake, 2009, Sep</li> <li>China Earthquake, 2008, May</li> <li>Myanmar Typhoon, 2008, May</li> <li>Thailand Tsunami 2004, Dec</li> <li>Iran (Bam) Earthquake, 2003, Dec</li> <li>Algeria Earthquake, 2003, May</li> <li>Taiwan Earthquake, 1999, Sep</li> <li>Turkey Earthquake, 1999, Aug</li> <li>Cambodia airplane crash 1997, Sep</li> </ul>	Japan Earthquake, 2011, Mar
Malaysia	Heavy Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team	IEC 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Philippines Landslide 2006, 2006, Feb</li> <li>Pakistan Earthquake, 2005, Oct</li> <li>Indonesia Riau forest fires, 2005</li> <li>Indonesia Tsunami 2004, Dec</li> <li>India earthquake 2001, 2001, Jan</li> <li>Turkey Earthquake, 1999, Aug</li> <li>Indonesia forest fires 1997, Sep</li> </ul>	West Sumatra Padang, Earthquake, 2009, Oct
New Zealand	Heavy New Zealand USAR	IEC 2015	No Emergencies Responded Listed	
Philippines	Subic Metropolitan Authority		No IEC or National Classification	
Singapore	Heavy Singapore Operation Lionheart Contingent	IEC 2008; IER 2013; IER2 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Japan Earthquake, 2011, Mar</li> <li>New Zealand Christchurch Earthquake, 2011, Feb</li> <li>West Sumatra Padang, Earthquake, 2009, Oct</li> <li>China Earthquake, 2008, May</li> <li>Indonesia earthquake, 2006, Mar</li> <li>Pakistan Earthquake, 2005, Oct</li> <li>Indonesia Earthquake, 2005, Mar</li> <li>Indonesia Tsunami 2004, 2004, Dec</li> <li>Thailand Tsunami 2004, 2004, Dec</li> <li>Taiwan Earthquake, 1999, Sep</li> <li>Malaysia Collapse of Building, 1993, Dec</li> </ul>	Nepal Earthquake, 2015, Apr
Pakistan	Pakistan Rescue Team	IEC 2019	No Emergencies Responded Listed	



## Annex 7 Swiss Rescue deployments

Source: Geschichte\_der\_Rettungskette\_Schweiz ENG. (2019) PDF document provided by SHA.

Year	Team	Country		Team size Persons	Dogs	Number of locations	Number of lives saved
1982	USAR Team	Nordyemen	5.8	40	14	-	3
1983	USAR Team	Türkei	6.7	45	18	-	-
1985	Advanced Team	Italien, Dammbruch	-	13	9	-	-
1985	Advanced Team	Kolumbien	-	13	9	-	-
1985	USAR Team	Mexiko	8.1	40	12	-	11
1986	USAR Team	El Salvador	5.4	54	15	-	2
1988	USAR Team	Armenien	7.0	37	20	-	25
1989	Advanced Team	USA, San Francisco	7.1	13	9	-	-
1990	USAR Team	Iran	7.2	6	0	-	-
1991	USAR Team	Costa Rica	6.0	4	3	-	-
1992	USAR Team	Türkei	6.2	84	21	-	6
1995	USAR Team	Japan	7.2	25	12	18	-
1995	USAR Team	Griechenland	6.1	57	8	8	1
1995	Advanced Team	Türkei	6.8	8	3	14	-
1997	Advanced Team	Iran	7.1	9	3	15	-
1999	USAR Team	Türkei	7.3	98	18		12
1999	USAR Team	Greece	5.9	8	3	14	3
1999	USAR Team	Taiwan	7.6	77	15	18	11
1999	USAR Team	Türkei	7.2	92	15	26	1
2001	USAR Team	Indien	7.9	52	9	45	8
2001	(RERT)	Peru	8.4	12	0	-	-
2003	USAR Team	Algerien	6.8	91	9	-	-
2003	USAR Team	Iran	6.6	21	4	-	-
2009	USAR Team	Indonesien	7.9	115	18	-	-
2010	Advanced Team	Haiti	7.0	6	0	-	-
2011	US(AR) Team	Japan	9.0	23	9	-	-
	<b>Totals</b>	<b>MENA 5 EUR 9* Asia 5 Americas 6</b>		<b>1042</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>83</b>

\* Includes Turkey and Armenia


## Annex 8 Cost estimates 2013-2018 for SDC/HA's USAR engagement

Summary of costs related to Swiss Rescue (USAR, capacity building and INSARAG), 2013-2018.

Source: Summary of Excel document "Swiss Rescue Cost Overview", update 2019-11-11, compiled by SDC-HA finance staff and shared with the evaluation team.

Costs 2013 - 2018	Non-HR costs full period		Annual average
	Estimated costs	SAP Actuals	Average annual costs including salaries
Exercises		310 251	111 709
Trainings, Courses		493 859	82 310
Warehouse Infrastructure	200 000		200 000
Equipment, Logistics	500 000		500 000
HQ Staff (SR overall, if not considered above)			1 134 000
<b>SWISS RESCUE total</b>			<b>2 028 018</b>
INSARAG		183 255	108 543
DACHL		43 073	7 179
HQ Personnel (if not considered above)			18 000
<b>NETWORKING total</b>			<b>133 721</b>
USAR CB Projects (Morocco, Armenia, India, Mongolia)	4 785 300		797 550
SIMEX		206 829	70 472
INSARAG IEC / IER Mentorships (Russia, Jordan)	24 000	27 334	38 556
HQ Personnel (if not considered above)			180 000
<b>USAR CAPACITY BUILDING total</b>			<b>1 086 577</b>
<b>OVERALL total</b>			<b><u>3 248 317</u></b>

## Annex 9 Swiss Rescue Theory of Change with comments



Please find above the Theory of Change shared with the team and used in ToC based discussions with some of the key informants (primarily Swiss Rescue current of former staff).

Review team comments to the assumptions of the ToC include;  
INSARAG engagement clearly requires a classified USAR capacity.

Maintaining a Heavy USAR capacity is seen by some as crucial to capacity building credibility. However, much of capacity building is institution building in a more general sense thus lessening the importance of USAR capacity for credibility.

The assumption that USAR capacity building has contributed to establishing other USAR teams is clearly confirmed.

The assumption that coordination, standardisation and empowerment of members improves preparedness and response is confirmed *for the specific USAR niche*. The report argues that humanitarian needs are not well addressed by that standardised response mechanism.

The assumptions regarding access and acceptance have been found to generally be false. Swiss Rescue is not deployed as a Heavy USAR team.


The Swiss Rescue heavy USAR team contribution to saving lives and alleviating suffering is found to be close to zero. The report argues that the capacity building and multilateral support do contribute.

# Annex 10 Swiss Rescue USAR organogram

Version: 01.12.2017  
Update: 01.01.2020

## SWISS RESCUE - ORGANIGRAM

V 1.6



Swiss\_Rescue\_Organigram\_official\_20200101\_V1.6.xlsx

SDC Humanitarian Aid - Rapid Response

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## Annex 11 The Swedish USAR choice

Sweden first participated in an international USAR operation in Armenia in 1988, with a team from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency. Over the years that followed Sweden invested in building USAR capacity. The Swedish capacity, with dedicated national material preparedness, drew its human resources from four municipal rescue services and the national disaster response surge system. In 2008, the instrument was INSARAG classified as a heavy USAR team. In 2009, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency was merged with three other government agencies to form the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and the new entity was tasked with maintaining the preparedness.<sup>18</sup>

Following deployments made in Nepal, in 2015, re-establishing the previous Swedish INSARAG classified Heavy USAR capacity was regarded as too expensive and MSB commissioned an internal evaluation of its USAR capacity seeking a cheaper alternative.

The evaluation<sup>19</sup> contrasted restoring the heavy USAR capacity with two alternative new designs, based on domestic needs while allowing for the possibility of international deployments. To the extent feasible, the capacity maintained was to be "generic" i.e. possible to deploy in response to multiple disaster types.<sup>20</sup> The new USAR instrument was therefore to be founded on existing domestic rescue components rather than USAR specific techniques and materials. It was thought that, in addition to efficient and more effective interventions, the new model would lead to staff that were more motivated and better prepared as they could be used in multiple types of interventions. This would increase quality in the long term as staff became more experienced.

In 2016, MSB had arrangements with four municipalities rescue services for USAR preparedness. The evaluation suggested designating three municipalities' rescue services as national resources, one in each metropolitan city region to ensure geographic spread. Stockholm and Gothenburg resources would also be used for international capacity if needed. Equipment would be kept in the three cities, with an additional set of more specialised equipment in a central warehouse for international use.

The evaluation report presented two alternatives for the new USAR concept. The first alternative was a national support resource which could be utilised as an international INSARAG classified MEDIUM team, and enrolled in the EU Civil Protection pool. National equipment could be domestically funded while international capacity could be financed through the EU. An enrolment in the EU Civil Protection pool would require a higher degree of readiness but would also make increased financial support from the EU possible. A total staff of 135 (mainly based in the three municipality emergency services) with 4 material sets (one stored in national warehouse) was considered within an establishment cost of CHF 2,2 million and an estimated annual budget of approximately CHF 0,5 million. Some cost increase for the three municipalities was seen as likely.

The second alternative was a national resource for search and rescue in collapsed buildings, supporting municipal emergency services. Alternative 2 implied that MSB would lose the opportunity to affect international USAR responses to emergencies where MSB will contribute with other types of interventions. Alternative 2 did not have to conform to INSARAG guidelines and might in the long term create difficulties for international cooperation in the event of a national request for assistance. MSB would no longer participate in DRR projects in USAR as it was assumed that host governments would require INSARAG qualification to support their own development. With a national resource

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<sup>18</sup> Bäckström, C-J; Christoffersson, (2006).

<sup>19</sup> Hamrén, A-K (2016).

<sup>20</sup> The analysis of domestic risks to be addressed focused on land/mudslides, terrorist attacks, dam failures and large scale transportation related accidents, for example tunnel accidents. Hamrén, A-K (2016) pp 16-18.

without international capacity, MSB would no longer be able to participate in the development of Beyond the Rubble. This alternative would also limit future opportunities for Nordic cooperation. Furthermore, a risk that staff might lose interest if overseas opportunities are limited was identified. However, excluding international deployments might ease recruiting of dog search teams. A total staff of 100 (mainly based in the three municipality emergency services) with 3 material sets was considered within an establishment cost of CHF 1,5 million and an estimated annual budget of approximately CHF 0,3 million. Some cost increase for the three municipalities was seen as likely.

In the previous structure, MSB was responsible for recordkeeping, training and contracting Emergency services for USAR. In the new concept, the selected municipal Emergency services themselves were to be responsible for mobilizing in case of a domestic intervention. A national support resource would be established based on the national risk profile. The selected municipal Emergency services would be responsible for maintaining preparedness for national interventions. It was hoped that this would create awareness among the municipalities of the risks attached to USAR related events. If national intervention was needed, MSB could support the interventions with specialist staff recruitment etc. Both alternatives would cost less than the restoration of a heavy USAR capacity.

In October 2016, Sweden decided to develop a modified domestic USAR capacity in line with alternative two described above. In consequence Sweden has withdrawn from its membership in INSARAG. MSB international capacity building support is reoriented towards DRR in general rather than being USAR specific.

## Annex 12: Map of high impact earthquakes 1982-2018



The stars represent the location of earthquake events and the numbers in the stars, the number of events with more than 500 dead during the period 1982 – 2018. Indonesia stands out with seven events. The circles illustrate the location of USAR teams. Based on data from <https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1>.