

MID TERM REVIEW

Final report by Pascale Debord

Partnership Programme to support Forestry and Fishery Communities - PaFF Phase II -

Mid Term Review of the programme implemented by CEPA, NTFP-EP, RECOFTC and WWF Cambodia

Field Phase from 21/10/2019 to 06/11/2019 – Final Report Date: 27/12/2019

Table of Contents

Annexes are presented in a separate document:.....	2
List of tables	2
List of lessons learned	3
Acknowledgements.....	3
Acronyms	4
Screenshot of the Mekong Flooded Forest Landscape and places visited during the Mid Term Review	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
Summary of recommendations.....	12
INTRODUCTION.....	13
1. The context and issues the programme sought to address.....	13
2. A descriptive summary of the intervention logic of PaFF II.....	14
3. Purpose and scope of the Mid Term Review	14
4. Approach and methodology	14
RELEVANCE AND QUALITY OF THE DESIGN	16
1. The contours of PaFF II: a flexibility undermined by the complexity of the programmatic approach	16
2. A development context clearly tilting towards the fishery sector	19
3. Sectoral coordination and complementarity issues	20
4. Intervention logic, strategies and corresponding capacities.....	22
5. Logframe and indicators: a need for clarity and coherence.....	24
6. The attribution issue.....	26
7. Cross-cutting topics: gender, climate change and disaster risk reduction	26
8. Conclusion on relevance and quality of the design.....	28
EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION	29
1. Governance and management: consequences of the institutional set up of PaFF II	29
2. Stakeholder engagement	32
3. Efficiency of implementation: financial planning, rate of expenditures and delays.....	32
4. Monitoring system processes: huge consolidation exercise but cumbersome data management.....	33
5. Factors of cost-efficiency.....	35
6. Conclusion on efficiency of implementation	37
EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY – OUTCOME 1	38
1. Observations on the logframe and indicators regarding quantitative progress	38
2. Observations on capacity building of CBNRM groups	40
3. Observations on the sustainability of institutional and technical capacities of CBNRM groups.....	41
4. Observations on credit schemes	41
5. Observations on financial sustainability.....	42
6. Observations on the role of women in CBNRM groups	44
7. Conclusion on Outcome 1	45
EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY - OUTCOME 2.....	46

1. A brief analysis of outcome and output indicators under Outcome 2	46
2. Differences between Community Based Enterprises supported under PaFF II.....	48
3. Assessment of the performances of NTFP-based CBEs and sustainability of benefits	48
4. Assessment of the performance of CBETs (Ecotourism) and sustainability of benefits	51
5. Contribution of NTFP-based CBEs and CBETs to NRM	52
6. Assessment of the performance of chicken / fish raising CBEs and sustainability of benefits	53
7. Observations on cross-cutting issues: climate change, disaster risk reduction and gender balance .	54
8. Conclusion on Outcome 2	55
EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY - OUTCOME 3.....	57
1. Capacity building.....	57
2. Provincial networks/platforms: factors of effectiveness and sustainability prospects.....	58
3. Lobbying and advocating with a focus on six selected policy thematics.....	60
4. Conclusion on Outcome 3.....	64
IMPACT	65
1. Impact indicators	65
2. Contribution of CBEs to household income	66
OVERALL CONCLUSION	68
Factors of cost-effectiveness	68

Annexes are presented in a separate document:

- Annex 1 – MTR Comments on logframe indicators and suggestions for simplification and improvement
- Annex 2 - Case study on a Community Forestry (CF) credit scheme in Khasch Leav (Kratie province)
- Annex 3 - PaFF II – Outcome 2 – Case Studies
- Annex 4 - List of documents reviewed
- Annex 5 - Schedule of the Field Phase from 21 October to 06 November 2019
- Annex 6 - People met/interviewed during the field phase (Phnom Penh & provinces)
- Annex 7 - Terms of Reference of the Mid Term Review
- Annex 8 - List of extended recommendations
- Annex 9 - Social/safeguard policies of consortium partners – A brief description

List of tables

[↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

Click on the title to access the table in the report.

To return to the list of tables, click on this sign 

Table 1 - PaFF Phase II – List of Contribution Projects

Table 2 - Overall structure of the budget of PaFF II, based on outcomes

Table 3 - Allocation of SDC funds among PaFF partners

Table 4 - Quantitative Cumulative Progress (August 2017-June 2019) Against Outcome 1 & Output 1 Targets

Error! Reference source not found. Quantitative Cumulative Progress (August 2017-June 2019) Against Outcome 2 & Output 2 Targets

Error! Reference source not found. Annual financial contribution of CBEs to NRM from 2014 to 2019

[Table 7](#) - 2018 financial contribution of CBEs to NRM (analysis)

[Table 8](#) - Quantitative Cumulative Progress (August 2017-June 2019) Against Outcome 3 & Output 3 Targets

Error! Reference source not found.

Error! Reference source not found. Summary of performances of selected community-based enterprises supported under PaFF II

Table 10 - Budget Plan: Revised budget 4 years and annual as at 31/12/2018

List of lessons learned

[↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

For the complete lesson learned in its context, click on “LESSON LEARNED #”.
To return to the list of simplified lessons learned, click on this sign: ↩

- ⇒ **LESSON LEARNED #1** – Comparison between PaFF and WWF programme in Eastern Plains Landscape
- ⇒ **LESSON LEARNED #2** – Monitoring based on database vs. spreadsheets
- ⇒ **LESSON LEARNED #3** – Livelihood support and capacities

Acknowledgements

[↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

Thank you to all PaFF consortium partners for their efforts in organizing the numerous meetings of the Mid Term Review (MTR):

CEPA - Culture and Environment Preservation Association Organization

NTFP - EP – Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Program

RECOFTC - The Center for People and Forests

WWF - World Wide Fund for Nature

I am especially grateful to Sokunthea Ly (PaFF programme manager, from WWF) and to Vong Hang (provincial conservation coordinator, from WWF) for their efficient coordination of the tight field schedule of the MTR.

Pen Ratana, independent consultant, provided precious input and background information during the entire field phase. He translated all conversations during field meetings, properly conveying not just words but also ideas and impressions that emerged during interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders.


Throughout the review, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) provided useful insight and guidance.

Last but not least, I am deeply grateful to the many people, beneficiaries, stakeholders and development partners, who took time to patiently answer many questions.

Acronyms

[↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

- ADB - Asian Development Bank
- BMZ - Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)
- CBE - Community Based Enterprise
- CBET - Community - Based Eco-Tourism
- CBHE - Community-Based Wild Honey Enterprises
- CBNRM – Community-Based Natural Resources Management
- CBO - Community-Based Organizations
- CCA - Climate Change Adaptation
- CCD - Community Capacities for Development
- CEPA - Culture and Environment Preservation Association Organization
- CF - Community Forestry
- CFi - Community Fisheries
- CFiMC - Community Fisheries Management Committee
- CFiMP - Community Fisheries Management Plan
- CFiN - Community Fisheries Network
- CFMP - Community Forestry Management Plan
- CHAIN - Cambodia Horticulture Advancing Income and Nutrition Project
- CIP – Commune Investment Plan
- CPA - Community Protected Area
- DGD - Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (Belgium)
- DRAW - Disaster Resilience & Water Management Project
- DRR - Disaster Risk Reduction
- ENRC - Environment and Natural Resources Code
- EPL – Eastern Plains Landscape
- ExeCom - PaFF Executive Committee
- FA - Forestry Administration
- FAC - Forestry Administration Cantonment
- FiA - Fishery Administration
- FiAC - Fishery Administration Cantonment
- FLO – Forest and Livelihood Organization
- HH - Household
- HR – Human Resources
- IGA - Income Generating Activity
- IP - Indigenous People
- IUCN- NL - International Union for the Conservation of Nature - Netherland
- MAFF - Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
- M&E – Monitoring & Evaluation
- MFF - Mekong Flooded Forest
- MIWRM - Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management
- MoE - Ministry of Environment
- MRLG - Mekong Region Land Governance Project
- MSC - Most Significant Change
- MTR - Mid Term Review
- NGO - Non Governmental Organization
- NRM – Natural Resources Management
- NR – Natural Resources
- NTFP – Non-Timber Forest Products
- NTFP - EP – Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Program
- PaFF - Partnership Programme to Support Forestry and Fishery Communities
- PCFPCC - Provincial Community Forestry Program Coordination Committee
- PDAFF - Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
- PDoE - Provincial Department of Environment
- PDoT - Provincial Department of Tourism
- PM - Programme Manager (of PaFF)
- REDD + - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
- RECOFTC - The Center for People and Forests - formerly the REgional COmmunity Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific
- RGC - Royal Government of Cambodia
- SDC - Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
- SIDA - Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
- SHG - Self Help Group
- SRJS - Shared Resource, Joint Solutions
- ToR -Terms of Reference
- TWG-FR - Technical Working Group on Forestry Reform
- TWG-FiA - Technical Working Group on Fisheries
- WWF - World Wide Fund for Nature Organization



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

[↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

- **The context and issues the programme sought to address.** Deforestation and agricultural expansion result in the fragmentation of forests and the depletion of Natural Resources (NR). Rural communities, though very poor, are officially entrusted to protect agreed areas for a renewable period of time: Community Forestries (CFs), Community Fisheries (CFis) and Community Protected Area (CPA), respectively under the Forestry Administration (FA), Fisheries Administration (FiA) and Ministry of Environment (MoE). However, the government has limited resources for law enforcement and none for rural livelihoods. Therefore, to balance conservation and economic development, these Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) groups require substantial financial support. The Partnership Programme to Support Forestry and Fishery Communities (PaFF) started in November 2014, implemented by four NGOs: Culture and Environment Preservation Association Organization (CEPA); Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Program (NTFP-EP); The Center for People and Forests (RECOFTC) and World Wide Fund for Nature Organization (WWF). The first phase (PaFF I) was implemented in two provinces (Kratie and Stung Treng) and ended in June 2017. The second phase (PaFF II) runs from 01/08/2017 until 30/06/2021 and expands to Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear provinces. The total budget of PaFF II is USD 6.133 M, including USD 3 M from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and USD 3.133 M from other donors (“contribution projects”).
- **The intervention logic of PaFF II.** It is straightforward, relevant and comprises three components. Outcome 1 focuses on strengthening CBNRM groups: CFs are supported by RECOFTC (4 provinces) and WWF (Kratie), CFis by WWF (in Kratie) and CEPA (in Stung Treng). The purpose of Outcome 2 is to develop livelihood opportunities through Community-Based Enterprises (CBEs), based on NTFP and ecotourism (NTFP-EP) and livestock/aquaculture (WWF). Outcome 3 focuses on capacity development on NRM, support to provincial networks and policy support. The benefits of these components are expected to cumulate to contribute to the dual objective of increasing the income of 580 households, while improving NRM for 370 CBNRM groups.
- **Scope and methodology of the Mid Term Review (MTR).** The MTR covered the entire programme with a focus on Outcome 2, Outcome 3 and the management and institutional set up of PAFF. The methodology was based on interviews of key informants and focus group discussions, underpinned by a field phase of 15 days and the assessment of five criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, taking into account cross-cutting issues (gender equality, climate change, Disaster Risk Reduction -DRR).
- **Relevance and quality of the design / The programmatic approach.** PaFF II is complex by design. It is a collection of contribution projects funded by a diversity of donors, all implemented by one or several partners in one or more of the four targeted provinces and, in some cases, adjacent provinces. These projects form a programme whose time boundaries are not fixed. Hence the strategic role of SDC, which supports the entire programme, binds contribution projects together into a common and wider objective and provides the flexibility to fund thematical or geographical gaps in the programmatic approach behind PaFF II. However, though flexibility is built in the design, it cannot be fully expressed because of budgetary constraints and because planning activities in the context of the programmatic approach is a complicated, time-consuming task, which does not prevent the fragmentation and the discontinuity of PaFF support to CBNRM groups, especially in newly targeted provinces: e.g. in spite of the strong relevance of PaFF in Preah Vihear, most activities were due to end in December 2019 (same situation in Kampong Thom, not visited by the MTR).
- **Relevance and quality of the design / The development context.** The development context is fast evolving. Funds available for the fishery sector have grown since the beginning of PaFF II: the Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management Project Phase 3 (MIWRM), a large World Bank intervention implemented by the FiA, is scheduled to end in June 2021; A new EU-funded programme “Capfish” runs from 2019 to 2023 with significant budget support for the FiA. Besides, the growing importance of the MoE, in charge of Protected Areas, reduces the space for the FA and development funds are decreasing for CFs. Yet, CFs are not going to go away and are still in need of technical and financial support. The new context inevitably dictates adjustment in the strategies of PaFF partners and SDC, who are forced to re-evaluate sectoral, thematic and geographic priorities in order to maximize the relevance and impact of PaFF II.

- **Relevance and quality of the design / Sectoral coordination and complementarity.** PaFF itself is an illustration of the complementarity between well-established and experienced development partners in Cambodia. Besides, sectoral coordination on NRM is active at multiple levels. At national level, the NRM Coordination Forum is a multi-stakeholder platform initiated under PaFF II and focused on NRM in the Mekong region. At subnational level, different coordination mechanisms co-exist, in which the role of PaFF varies from significant to decisive. With respect to CFs, the coordination is rather well organized, owing effective CF networks and Provincial Community Forestry Program Coordination Committees (PCFPCCs). With respect to CFis, the FiA in Stung Treng has an effective provincial Technical Working Group on fisheries to coordinate with development partners: as a result, PaFF and MIWRM are able to complement each other in 18 CFis, out of the 25 CFis that CEPA supports. On the negative side, in Kratie, coordination mechanisms for CFis are lacking, there is no operational CFi network at provincial level and no common understanding between WWF and the FiA, which implements MIWRM and covers 13 out of the 15 CFis that WWF supports under PaFF II. That CEPA is able to coordinate with MIWRM in Stung Treng confirms the political nature of the problem in Kratie, making it complicated -if not impossible- for WWF to solve the issue, with the conclusion that supporting CFis and the FiA in Kratie may no longer be relevant and cost effective.

Relevance and quality of the design / Strategies and capacities. The programmatic approach is tailored to the capacities and skills of implementing partners, which -for the most part- match the specific tasks they are expected to perform under PaFF II. For Outcome 1, CEPA, RECOFTC and WWF have strong technical capacities and extensive experience in the overly complex and rigid formalization process of CBNRM groups. Besides, given how slow this process is, the overall duration of PaFF is relevant as it prevents progress from being stalled, except in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom, where field capacities are scheduled to be withdrawn in December 2019. Outcome 2 is about supporting livelihoods, a strong request of the target groups. However, establishing and supporting CBEs is proving difficult, as evidenced by the mixed success of CBEs under PaFF I. NTFP-EP dropped problematic sectors and now focuses on what works best (honey, ecotourism) or what is promising (traing chopsticks). The expertise of NTFP-EP in promoting the use of NTFPs and its long-standing experience with honey groups in Cambodia is useful but marketing support is not sufficient. As for WWF, it does not have a technical in-house capacity to assist in livestock and fish raising activities. Dedicated staff does not make for a lack of core skills and experience, as reflected in the underperformance of groups supported by WWF, which tends to underestimate livelihood development challenges. Outcome 3 embodies efforts to strengthen provincial governance and improve NRM policies. It is the sustainable dimension in the design of PaFF II because achievements under Outcome 3 are a condition to the long-term continuation of benefits achieved under Outcomes 1 and 2. Owing to strong core skills, PaFF partners are capable of facilitating provincial coordination and conducting most NRM-related trainings by themselves. But capacities are mixed when it comes to coordinating and contributing to law making. Research and analytical capacities are highly relevant and conducive to policy support because of in-house technical expertise, but the lack of legal expertise combined with the fact that PaFF partners are not proactive enough in seeking legal expertise when they need it, is a concern. SDC rightly believes PaFF partners are not sufficiently alert and prepared, which could lead to missed opportunities when a window opens to revise the Forestry Law.

- **Relevance and quality of the design / Logframe and indicators.** The logframe of PaFF II is globally adequate but has several weaknesses, which complicates reporting and analysis: 1/ The definition of many indicators is not rigorous; 2/ The hierarchy of indicators is not always coherent and there are redundancies; 3/ The contribution of PaFF II to gender equity (CF credit schemes, women in leadership roles, women empowerment) and DRR (systematically mainstreamed in programme activities) is real but there is no indicator to capture concrete benefits stemming from efforts in these cross-cutting areas; 4/ There are positive outcomes not captured by existing indicators (e.g. decrease in violations, encroachment); 5/ Several assumptions contradict the objectives of PaFF II; 6/ Besides, there is an attribution issue under OC1, as PaFF II takes credit for benefits related to all CFs/CFis in a given province, whether directly under PaFF II or not. The argument that supporting CBNRM networks contributes to capacities of all CBNRM groups (including those not funded under PaFF II) is valid, but it cannot be demonstrated and measured in a consistent and systematic way through existing indicators. Besides, reporting on indirect support has more negative than positive consequences (lack of transparency and accountability, no clear overview of the benefits of direct support, no control over indirect targets; challenging collection of robust data on indirect support).

Efficiency of implementation / Institutional set up of PaFF II. The choice of WWF to lead PaFF II, which requires a good institutional capacity and immense coordination capacities, is adequate. The consortium is instrumental in mitigating financial gaps, as and where identified. Besides, it facilitates the mobilization of technical competencies, irrespective of financial capacities (CEPA has no contribution project, yet it plays a key operational part). Synergies are facilitated by coordination meetings. However, management mechanisms tend to slow down strategic decision-making processes. In spite of a well-established coordination routine between partners and with SDC, much time is spent in building consensus among the four partners. This is exacerbated by the programmatic approach, which entails design and budgetary adjustments and further complicated by the fact that SDC funding and direct contributions are closely knitted together. As a result, the position of Programme Manager (a WWF staff) is often reduced to a coordinating role, generating frustration on many levels. However, there is no obvious solution to the challenge of managing PaFF because the institutional set up is quite respectful of the value of each consortium partner: in other words, the programmatic approach and management constraints are two sides of the same coin.

- **Efficiency of implementation / Financial planning, rate of expenditures and delays.** The rate of expenditures is satisfactory and there are no major delays, an evidence that the complex planning exercise and coordination efforts are effective. As of 30/09/2019 (i.e. about half-way through implementation), partners had spent 55% of the total budget of PaFF II. They tend to spend at the same rate: at this stage, differences between them are not significant. The fact that salaries account for 46% of the total budget also contributes to regular spending. A detailed itemized 4-year budget plan forms the backbone of the management system. It is used for annual planning, budgeting, monitoring of activities and reporting, thus providing coherence to implementation processes. The only marked delays in implementation stem from a lengthy assessment of communities and value chains for CBEs supported by WWF. As a consequence, the establishment of two ecotourism CBEs and the operations of two rattan collection groups are delayed.

- **Efficiency of implementation / Monitoring system and processes.** Given the magnitude and complexity of PaFF, the monitoring of activities entails the collection of a large amount of information. It is anchored to the itemized budget plan and provides a clear and synthetic overview of progress towards planned outputs. However, monitoring results and informing logframe indicators are more challenging. Indeed, monitoring - overseen by the programme Manager- is too activity-oriented and quantitative data is fragmented into many Excel tables, tailored to the monitoring systems of each partner, which complicates consolidation and integration (e.g. data on CBNRM groups and CBEs are not integrated, though each CBE is attached to at least one CBNRM group). The attribution issue (i.e. direct vs indirect support) further complicates monitoring. As a result, and in spite of an impressive programmatic approach backed by systematic and consistent monitoring of activities and outputs, analytical capacities and adaptive management are undermined by inefficient data management. The cumulative impact of various NRM strategies cannot be easily assessed and resource allocation cannot be maximized. But given that Excel is bound to be used by PaFF partners until the end of PaFF II, there is little room for improving existing monitoring processes.

- **Efficiency of implementation / Factors of cost-efficiency.** PaFF heavily depends on human resources to implement activities. Partners tend to assign staff to thematic tasks, rather than to projects. This thematic organization is an efficient response of conservation NGOs to the multiplication of short-term, small interventions, which cannot fund entire management teams. It allows a quick start of activities (most staff are already in place) and contributes to long-term institutional capacities, a major factor of cost-efficiency. Overall, the cost of PaFF II is moderate in view of the ambitious objectives, the number of partners, the geographic spread and the number of communities directly supported (71 CFs, 40 CFis and 39 CBEs). Synergies between the four partners are a necessity and have been built into the design through a carefully crafted programmatic approach, forcing partners to maximize the use of funds. Official agreements between consortium partners and relevant ministries are a necessary condition for PaFF to engage the provincial administration and line departments. However, coordination problems between WWF and the FiA in Kratie demonstrate that as much as agreements are a condition of efficiency, they are not always a sufficient one. On the negative side, cost-efficiency is reduced when partners implement activities not in line with their core skills: e.g. under Outcome 2, resources have been spent by WWF with limited efficiency and effectiveness so far; and when it comes to turning evidence into legal inputs, external legal experts may be costly but are more efficient than policy officers.

- **Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 1 / Capacities of CBNRM groups.** The attribution issue prevents a transparent overview of the quantitative progress but field interviews with CBNRM groups and provincial officials confirm the paramount role of PaFF in strengthening the institutional, technical and management capacities of these groups during the long and rigid institutional development process. Besides, capacity building of line department officials is likely to accelerate formalization processes. Even though patrolling remains the cornerstone of NRM, there is strong evidence that PaFF also contributes to mainstreaming the role of CBNRM groups into the governance of commune affairs and the provincial governance of natural resources. Besides, support to CBNRM groups is a condition of cooperation with the government as it legitimates the policy dialogue between PaFF partners and provincial and national stakeholders. Therefore, discontinuing supporting to CFs before the end of PaFF II amounts to a significant strategic risk for PaFF partners for the implementation of Outcome 3. Also on the negative side, due to the coordination issue between PaFF and MIWRM on CFis in Kratie, progress is stalled, and the situation is yet to be addressed. In Stung Treng, CEPA and the FiA coordinate to avoid duplication but the management of the Ramsar site reports that CFis, caught in between the FiA and the MoE due to a transition to CPA status, do not have community boats for patrolling, which negatively affects their technical capacities. As far as sustainability is concerned, the “chief culture” prevents proper dissemination of information and capacities from one group committee to the next. This is aggravated by: 1/ the technical complexity of official guidelines, especially of management plans; 2/ The lack of funds to implement management plans, which prevents members from exercising newly gained technical and management skills and thus risk losing them.
- **Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 1 / Credit schemes and the role of women.** Credit schemes are developed as part of a CF/CFi to support NRM and livelihoods. A necessary impetus is given by PaFF in the form of a grant, therefore entailing the opening of a bank account by the CF/CFi. This forces committee members to exercise their financial skills, which strengthens the CBNRM group as an institution and contributes to building its management capacity. Members of credit schemes take a loan to fund a productive activity of their choice, typically linked to farming, and the risk of failure is entirely theirs. Credit schemes are fairly recent, and their true benefits are yet to be assessed. But there is a consensus among PaFF field staff that they have the potential to be a cost-effective development strategy to generate income and contribute to NRM (i.e. patrolling). Besides, the mechanism is especially attractive to women and is a positive factor of gender balance, with a high proportion of active women members.
- **Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 1 / Financial sustainability.** CBNRM groups systematically complain about the lack of funds for patrolling: members very rarely contribute their fee, contributions from CBEs have started but are insufficient, none of the communes visited by the MTR ever dedicated any fund to NRM, and provincial funds are also insufficient. The key issue behind financial sustainability stems from the fact that CFs and CFis are not allowed to exploit and generate a revenue from the resources they manage, even sustainably. This issue underpins the very rationale of PaFF II, since all strategies implemented under PaFF II have the explicit objective of increasing funds for NRM. However, there is no clear indicator to measure the progress towards financial and sustainability. The prospects of financial sustainability are promising for CFis: the EU-funded intervention aims at the adoption of national mechanisms and guidelines on financial support to CFis. However, the development context is far less dynamic for CFs. Their financial sustainability is a distant prospect, which partly depends on the implementation of the national Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD +) strategy 2017-2026, yet to be funded. Hence the risk that technical and management capacities of CFs will quickly erode when activities at CBNRM level stop, especially when they are at a key stage in their formalization process.
- **Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 2 / Performances of NTFP-based CBEs.** NTFP-EP-EP currently supports 23 CBEs in Stung Treng, Preah Vihear and Kratie, 10 of which were visited by the MTR. CBEs are comprised of several members from a CF or a CFI, who come together and agree to invest time, efforts and money and share risks for a common purpose: trading of wild honey, trading of traing chopsticks, processing and marketing of wild fish-based products, provision of ecotourism services. These CBEs have a strong comparative advantage because the resource is free. The MTR confirms that of all NTFP-based CBEs, honey CBEs have best performances, as far as profit is concerned (group performance) and in terms of contribution to livelihoods (HH income). The widespread adoption of a sustainable honey harvesting protocol promoted under PaFF II also contributes to effectiveness. As for contribution to NRM, progress is being made but is still

very limited. Out of 23 CBEs, only 8 contributed to NRM in 2018, for an average annual amount of USD 77. Honey is the biggest contributor (60% of all contributions in 2018), followed by ecotourism (34%). Existing logframe indicators fail to establish a tangible link between CBEs and NRM. The production of traing chopsticks offers a good opportunity for additional income and demonstrates that, in a similar socio-economic context, there can be huge variations in group performances, owing mostly to human factors. The performances of fish processing groups demonstrate that processing is more challenging, technically and economically, as compared to trading. One group created under PaFF I stopped operating in 2018. A second group still operates, mostly for social reasons given that the contribution to household income is close to zero. As for ecotourism CBEs (CBETs), the MFF is a powerful attraction and the development context is favourable. Members of CF, CFis and CPAs are well positioned to engage in ecotourism and can fix a fair price for core services (e.g. homestay, boat tour, food service). Therefore, core ecotourism services are profitable, with boat owners drawing the highest income, as estimated by the MTR. Besides, ecotourism is an opportunity for women to earn income (homestay, food service). As a result, CBE ownership was found rather good for two CBETs out of three, which bodes well for their sustainability. On the negative side, management and marketing capacities of CBETs are still limited, plastic pollution is mostly ignored and there is a serious issue between NTFP-EP and the Department of Tourism in Stung Treng, which wants more control over PaFF activities. In comparison, ownership of honey groups by members is not always optimal. Indeed, a very competitive honey market makes it difficult for members to stick to their commitment to sell wild honey to their CBE and thus for the CBE to stick to its contract with the honey federation, which lacks the flexibility of middlemen. Members are able to maintain or raise their income on the short term, but the behaviour undermines the sustainability of honey CBEs on the long term and thus their contribution to NRM.

- **Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 2 / Performances of chicken and fish raising CBEs.** WWF supports 16 CBEs, all in Kratie, including 12 CBEs organized around animal raising (fish, chicken, cow), 3 of which were visited by the MTR. These CBEs are best described as IGAs. The collective approach to organization and management is very limited as farmers operate independently from each other. The resources (inputs) are not free. Because there is no direct linkage with NRM (the activity is not based on NTFPs), self-help groups have been formed to further contribute to livelihoods and generate interest, part of which is to be distributed to the CF/CFi for NRM. Of the two chicken groups visited by the MTR, one is not functional. The other group is functional, but the activity was not yet profitable for the two individuals interviewed by the MTR. In a third example, members of a fish raising group were having difficulties marketing their fish and needed guidance. These examples illustrate the fact that WWF underestimates the need of beneficiaries for continuous technical and commercial support from experienced practitioners. This is unfortunate because small scale livestock-based activities have the potential to contribute to a better gender balance at domestic level, assuming activities are implemented at the right scale and are profitable. There is no evidence that the performances of other IGAs (i.e. not visited by the MTR) are better because they are recent and have not been assessed by WWF. Besides, it is debatable whether efforts dedicated to developing these IGAs add value to simply developing self-help groups. Overall, the cost-effectiveness of CBE-related activities supported by NTFP-EP is higher than that of IGAs supported by WWF.

- **Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 3 / Capacity building on NRM policies and issues.** Capacity building is underpinned by a contribution project “Shared Resources Joint Solutions” (SRJS), which covers Kratie and Stung Treng. Capacity building activities target a diversity of stakeholders through a diversity of techniques, all aimed at promoting NRM, while disseminating information on key policy issues. The number of activities and variety of topics are rather impressive and reflect the magnitude of challenges when jointly tackling conservation and poverty alleviation in Cambodia. The multiplication of PaFF capacity building activities creates a constant pressure on all stakeholders and contributes to mainstreaming NRM governance into subnational conversations (commune, district, province). Many provincial officials credit PaFF for raising the capacities of communities to manage and monitor their resource base, engage and collaborate with stakeholders or raise their concerns. Chiefs of provincial CF networks confirm better ownership of NRM governance and policy topics and better confidence to discuss these topics at higher level.

Effectiveness and sustainability / Outcome 3 / Provincial networks and platforms. FA Cantonment directors and chiefs of provincial CF networks are unanimous on the excellent value (not captured by existing indicators) of regular coordination owing to PCFPCCs. Effectiveness stems from the quality of coordination

facilitated by PaFF II and the fact that CF networks are embedded in the policy framework. Besides, capacity building on NRM policy promotes communication and dialogue between stakeholders. These coordination mechanisms contribute to better governance and to solving chronic issues (e.g. encroachment and violations). The draft Sub-Decree on fisheries (under review) incorporates a chapter on CFI networks. This positive outcome can be put to the credit PaFF II. If approved, it will establish the institutional sustainability of CFI networks. On the negative side, coordination cannot happen without functional CBNRM networks, the sustainability of which is very limited and rather difficult to build because it is more than a matter of funding: as a third party, NGOs play an essential facilitation role. Sustaining these processes is nevertheless a necessity for PaFF II, because it is a condition to the effectiveness of advocacy and policy support at national level. There are other examples of effective coordination mechanisms at provincial level (e.g. a multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism for the Ramsar site, initiated by CEPA). However supra-provincial mechanisms to address illegal activities at landscape level have proved more difficult to establish than anticipated. So far WWF's efforts to establish a trans-provincial landscape committee forum have not been successful.

- **Effectiveness and sustainability - Outcome 3 / Policy support.** Through SRJS, all PaFF partners and a fifth NGO (NGO Forum) contribute evidence-based inputs into national policy and legislation revision processes. Six policy thematics have been selected under PaFF II (Simplified CF guidelines, CFI Sub-Decree, Forestry Law, Fishery Law, Environment and Natural Resources Code or ENRC, National REDD+ Strategy) but logframe indicators do not properly reflect the policy ambition of PaFF II and fail to define some of the expected benefits. Though research and analytical capacities are conducive to policy support, SDC points at a lack of capacities and coordination. PaFF partners were deemed insufficiently proactive during the preparation of the sub-decree on fisheries. SDC has committed to PaFF II with a clear objective of maximizing the use of funds by seizing every opportunity to make a strong difference in NRM governance. This entails a dynamic and proactive approach to advocacy and policy support that partners are not used to. Besides, SRJS comes to end in June 2020 but the strategy of PaFF partners beyond SRJS is yet to be clarified. Not all expected policy benefits will be achieved before the end of PaFF II, but some are already materializing. For instance, inputs from development partners, including PaFF partners, have resulted in a longer CFI agreement (from 3 to 10 years) in the draft sub-decree approved by the FiA and now under review at higher level. The simplification of CF guidelines, which PaFF partners have been advocating for many years on behalf of CFs, has now started. As far ENRC is concerned, consultations have been held since 2016 and as many as 11 versions were drafted, incorporating inputs from many development partners, including PaFF partners, under the coordination of NGO Forum. Consultations are now over but approval of ENRC is still pending. Under REDD+, the work was also coordinated by NGO Forum and led to the inclusion of communities' input into the Safeguard Information System of REDD+, which is one of the pillars of the national REDD+ Strategy.


- **Overall conclusion.** The commitment of SDC to support a long-term programmatic approach that helps NGO partners bridge gaps created by the multiplication of small short-term conservation and livelihood interventions is very valuable. Besides, it is remarkable that WWF, with limited management staff and specific constraints attached to the institutional set up of PaFF II, is able to manage such a complex programme, while maintaining satisfactory efficiency. It is a sign of strong institutional, organizational and management capacity, even if there is room for improvement, especially in the area of monitoring and evaluation. It is also a tribute to all PaFF partners, strongly committed to the success of a carefully crafted but overly ambitious programmatic approach. The development context in favour of the fishery sector complicates sectoral coordination and points to a necessity of reassessing programme priorities and reallocating SDC funds where most pressing needs are identified, but funds not available. Weaknesses in specific areas (policy support) can be overcome as long as they are acknowledged by partners and joint internal capacities are reviewed, coordinated and, if needed, temporarily augmented for a clear and pragmatic objective. Difficulties in supporting livelihoods through small scale farming are not easy to address but cannot be ignored. The initial design of PaFF II did acknowledge the sheer difficulty of developing businesses and the need for PaFF partners to be on top of activities during the entire implementation period of PaFF II to make sure CBEs are profitable from the first production cycle, since communities cannot afford to lose money. But WWF is ill equipped to support enterprises, as small as they are, and its excellent reputation and credibility may suffer. As a lesson learned, effectiveness and sustainability in livelihood development is hard to achieve and climate change now makes it even more difficult for PaFF partners to assist communities in developing livelihoods.

Summary of recommendations





[↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

The recommendations below have been simplified and shortened.

For the complete recommendation in its context, click on “RECOMMENDATION #”.

To return to the list of simplified recommendations, click on this sign: 

A complete list of extended recommendations is also provided in Annex 8.

- ⇒  **RECOMMENDATION #1 to all PaFF partners.** Support to CFs in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #2 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** Support to CFs in Kratie and Stung Treng.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #3 to all PaFF partners.** Internal capacities for policy support.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #4 to all PaFF partners.** Logframe indicators.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #5 to all PaFF partners.** Indirect versus direct support.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #6 to all PaFF partners. to all PaFF partners.** Gender-specific indicators
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION # 7 to all PaFF partners. to all PaFF partners.** DRR-related indicators.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #8 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** Support to PM and PCT.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #9 to all PaFF partners.** Reporting on indicators under Outcome 1.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #10 to all PaFF partners.** Indicator of effective under Outcome 3.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #11 to all PaFF partners.** Role of PaFF in Kratie and Stung Treng.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #12 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** Needs of CFs in Ramsar site.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #13 to RECOFTC and CEPA –** Assessment of CF credit schemes.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #14 to PM with PCT support.** NRM contribution and indicators of financial sustainability.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #15 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** In support of Recommendation #1.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #16 to NTFP-EP.** Marketing of honey and dissemination of harvesting techniques.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #17 to NTFP-EP.** Tailored support to NTFP groups and CBETs.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #18 to NTFP-EP.** Support to CBE in Koh Preah CBE.
- ⇒  **RECOMMENDATION # 19 to NTFP-EP.** Ecotourism and support to CBETs; PDoT in Stung Treng
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #20 to WWF.** Investigation of and solutions to the situation of CBETs
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #21 to all PaFF partners.** Communication on DRR.
- ⇒  **RECOMMENDATION #22 to WWF.** Strategic decision on livelihood activities.
- ⇒  **RECOMMENDATION #23 to all PaFF partners –** Double counting of beneficiaries.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #24 to RECOFTC, WWF, CEPA.** New paradigms in capacity building.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #25 to CEPA -** capacity building on NRM in Ramsar site.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #26 to PaFF partners.** Support to CF networks in Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION # 27 to all PaFF Partners –** Indicators of effectiveness of policy support.
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #28 - to all PaFF Partners –** Policy coordination beyond SRJS
- ⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #29 - to WWF.** Assessment of impact of income generating activities (CBETs)

INTRODUCTION

1. The context and issues the programme sought to address

- **In Cambodia, rapid deforestation and agricultural expansion result in the fragmentation of forests and the depletion of natural resources.** The degradation of ecosystems is fuelled by the regional timber market, large scale plantations (Economic Land Concessions) as well as settlements from migrants who clear the forest to develop small farms (e.g. cassava). Poaching, illegal fishing, logging and trade of wildlife, including that of threatened species, contribute to the loss of biodiversity. The development of the road network, which is key to breaking the isolation of rural communities, accelerates the deforestation and changes the land pattern. The planning of dams on the Mekong river itself further threatens fragile ecosystems and food security. These complex issues are compounded (or explained) by sheer poverty, a lack of clarity regarding land rights and poor governance. The environmental services performed by forests and water bodies are at stake, and so are the livelihoods of people, including an indigenous population, who still partly depends upon harvesting of Natural Resources (NR). Climate change, whose consequences are felt but not well understood and anticipated, further aggravates the situation.
- **Though existing national laws and strategic action plans stress the urgent need to better protect forests and water resources, the government has limited resources to dedicate to law enforcement and none to help improve livelihood** or provide incentives to protect natural resources, including Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs). Over the past two decades, based on the premise that local communities are in the best position to sustainably manage forest and fishery resources, the Forestry Administration (FA) and the Fisheries Administration (FiA) have nevertheless encouraged the establishment of -respectively- Community Forests (CFs) and Community Fisheries (CFis). CFs and CFis are underpinned by an official management scheme whereby the local administration (FA or FiA, both under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries or MAFF) agrees to let a rural community protect and manage an agreed area (forest or water body) for a renewable period of time (15 years for a CF, 3 years for a CFi). A similar system exists for Protected Areas (PAs) under the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment (MoE): a Community Protected Area (CPA) can manage a designated area for a period of 15 years. In March 2016, the Prime Minister transferred the jurisdiction of all protected forests to the MoE, resulting in large areas formerly administered by the FA or FiA (flooded forests), including CFs and CFis, moved under the jurisdiction of the MoE.
- **It is those rural communities and more specifically their Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) groups (i.e. CFs, CFis and CPAs) that the programme seeks to support in four targeted provinces, all part of the Mekong river basin in Cambodia:** Kampong Thom, Kratie, Preah Vihear, Stung Treng. The region encompasses several wildlife sanctuaries, biodiversity conservation corridors and a Ramsar site. At the heart of this vast region is the Mekong Flooded Forest (MFF), a unique landscape.
- **The sheer level of poverty of the targeted rural populations makes balancing conservation and economic development an impossible challenge without substantial financial support.** De facto, the protection of natural resources rests -inevitably and unfairly- on the poorest and most vulnerable: inevitably because of limited governmental resources and too few rangers; unfairly because CBNRM groups are not provided with financial means or incentives to perform their role, further complicated by the fact that CFs have often been established on degraded forest land, the management of which is even costlier.
- **To address the above issues, the Partnership Programme to Support Forestry and Fishery Communities (PaFF), was initially developed as a three-phase, eight-year programme, and started in November 2014.** Under PaFF, four NGOs (CEPA, NTFP-EP, RECOFTC, WWF) combine their competencies and experience to develop strategies aimed at helping local communities further strengthen their CBNRM groups, increase household income and financially contribute to sustainable Natural Resources Management (NRM). The first phase (PaFF I) was implemented in two provinces (Kratie and Stung Treng) and ended in June 2017. The second phase (PaFF II) runs from 01/08/2017 to 30/06/2021 and expands to two neighbouring provinces (Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear).

2. A descriptive summary of the intervention logic of PaFF II

- **This Overall Goal:** “Rural and indigenous communities and households increase their incomes and improve their resilience to economic and natural shocks by engaging in sustainable community-based livelihood approaches that protect their ecosystems and reduce pressure on their communal natural resource base.” This to be achieved through the realization of three outcomes:

- **Expected Outcome 1 (OC1): “Target communities have secure rights to their natural resources and are exercising them”.** Activities focus on the development of CFs and CFis, including those in the process of transitioning to a CPA status. CFs are supported by RECOFTC in all 4 provinces and by WWF in Kratie. CFis are supported by WWF and CEPA, respectively in Kratie and Stung Treng provinces.
- **Expected Outcome 2 (OC2): “Households in target communities increase their income through sustainable community-based forest and fisheries related enterprises and strategies”.** This component focuses on strengthening existing Community Based Enterprises (CBEs) created under PaFF I and on developing new CBEs, all attached to a CBNRM group. NTFP-EP supports NTFP-based CBEs (honey, traing -a variety of palm tree-, river fish) and CBEs involved in EcoTourism (CBET). WWF helps develop CBEs around rattan, as well as small scale farming (chicken or cow) and aquaculture.
- **Expected Outcome 3 (OC3): “National and local enabling policy conditions support secure community rights over natural resources and the development of sustainable community-based enterprises.”** This component is implemented by all four partners of PaFF and targets key stakeholders at commune, district, provincial and national levels, with a view to improve the legal and regulatory framework while building stakeholder capacities to support local communities.

- **According to the PaFF Phase II programme document, target groups** include 370 CBNRM groups (about 135,000 people); 35 CBEs benefiting 580 HouseHolds (HH, about 1,500 people); provincial landscape networks/platforms; institutional stakeholders of MFF landscape, including MaFF, MoE, Ministry of Tourism (MoT) and their branches in the provinces of Kampong Thom, Kratie, Preah Vihear and Stung Treng.

3. Purpose and scope of the Mid Term Review

- **Terms of Reference (ToRs, see Annex 7).** As per the ToR, the MTR is expected to cover the entire programme (both SDC and partners’ contribution funding) with a focus on OC2 and OC3. The assessment is based on five criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability) and takes into account cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). The MTR is intended to identify the potential programme design’s problems, assess progress towards the achievement of objectives, identify and document lesson learnt, identify risks and counter measure and to make recommendations regarding specific action that might be taken to improve, redesign or phase down the PaFF programme or part of it. It is also expected to serve as a mean of validating or filling the gaps in the assessment of the five criteria obtained from the monitoring. The MTR is guided by the following objectives:

1. Review the overall programme management and institutional set up of the PAFF consortium by looking at the synergy achieved as a result of working as a consortium, value added or comparative advantages of each consortium member, and its complement or coordination with other similar projects in fisheries and forestry such as the project funded by the EU, USAID, etc.
2. Focus Outcome 2: Assessment of the livelihood and value chain support to 35 CBE groups.
3. Focus Outcome 3: Assessment of the consortium policy dialogue on the six legislations/policies/laws and the establishment and support of the 16 provincial NRM platforms.
4. Review the social/safeguard policies of each consortium partner (refer to Annex 9).

4. Approach and methodology

- **The methodology of the MTR follows a traditional approach with a focus on design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.**

The relevance of the programme is assessed, i.e. the extent to which its objectives are consistent with

beneficiaries' requirements and the country's priorities and policies. Design-related lessons are drawn with a view to provide recommendations for the formulation of future projects. Complementarity with ongoing/planned action funded by other donors is examined. The logframe and its indicators are analysed.

Factors hampering or boosting efficiency/implementation are analysed. Special attention is paid PaFF management and institutional set up and the benefits of working as a consortium. The structure and functioning of the internal monitoring system are assessed. A cost benefit analysis is not possible, given the complexity of PaFF II, but the MTR identifies factors influencing cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

Effectiveness refers to the quantitative and qualitative achievement of outputs and outcomes, with a focus on Outcome 2 (assessment of the support to 35 CBE groups) and Outcome 3 (assessment of the policy dialogue on six legislations/policies/laws and support of 16 provincial NRM platforms).

An impact assessment is beyond the scope of the MTR, but the likelihood of positive/negative changes at impact level is assessed. Through in-depth discussions with CBEs, the economic performance of these groups -and thus the potential impact on the members (and their family) of the CBE- is examined.

Key factors of sustainability are identified and analysed: the development of capacities; ownership of the outcomes by target groups and key stakeholders; support from relevant authorities; involvement of the private sector; the role of women and indigenous groups in accessing and benefitting from natural resources. The review also assesses the extent to which the programme is supporting the strategies and capacities of the implementing partners, allowing them to continue supporting benefits.

Horizontal themes (gender balance, disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, good governance) are examined, with the understanding that some aspects are easier to assess (e.g. the role of women in NRM or value chain) than others (e.g. gender-based violence in family and community).

- **The evaluation was based on interviews of key informants and focus group discussions.** Communities were encouraged to share their views and stories, with a focus on changes in their lives and natural resources since the programme started. Further discussions with stakeholders and the staff helped determine whether the programme alone could take credit for the changes. This open and flexible dialogue between evaluators and beneficiaries is based on the Most Significant Change (MSC) technique, underpinned by the concept of participatory evaluation. It requires sufficient time to interact with people. The MSC technique is complex and cannot be fully applied during the MTR owing to time constraints but its spirit can guide the interviews. Overall, the aim is to provide a dynamic view of a complex situation.

- **The evaluation was underpinned by a field phase of 15 days and supported by a review of programme documents.** The field phase included 3.5 days in Phnom Penh, 9.5 days in provinces (Kratie, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear), 1 day of travel (to/from provinces) and 1 day for the debriefing (including preparation). The itinerary was designed to encompass a full range of activities, whatever their performance (i.e. positive or negative), meet with a wide spectrum of stakeholders and beneficiaries and provide sufficient time for each meeting. In all three provinces, meetings were conducted by the national and the international evaluators. The evaluators interviewed 107 beneficiaries (68 men and 39 women) from 13 CBEs, 4 CFs and 2 CFIs, as well as 32 stakeholders, including 12 provincial officials, 10 commune-level officials, 3 national-level officials, 3 CF network representatives, 2 private operators, 1 local NGO and 1 social enterprise. In addition, in Phnom Penh and each visited province, collective meetings were held with partners' staff (31 staff were interviewed). To broaden the perspective of the MTR, 6 representatives of the donor community and development partners were also interviewed in Phnom Penh. Representatives (3) of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) were also met. An extensive debriefing session was conducted on the last day of the mission, attended by key staff (including field staff) from all four partners and representatives of SDC.

- **Limitations.** The timeframe of the field phase of the MTR proved too short and not commensurate to the complexity and dimension of PaFF II. Given the number of partners, the variety of contribution projects, the geographic spread of PaFF, the dispersion of communities, the MTR could not *"cover the entire programme (both SDC and partners' contribution funding), meaning the works of all the partners involved in PaFF"*, as specified in the ToRs. In spite of an intensive schedule, there was not enough time to conduct individual interviews of key partner staff or to meet again each consortium partner after the field visits.

RELEVANCE AND QUALITY OF THE DESIGN

Introduction. The PaFF programme explicitly builds on a wide consensus that sustainable management of the natural resource base by rural communities depends on profitable livelihoods (household income must increase) and vice versa. The dual objective of supporting livelihoods and NRM acknowledges the importance of cumulating the effects of multiple strategies to achieve conservation. It determines a straightforward, very relevant, intervention logic comprised of three components, referred to in this report as OC1 (Outcome 1), OC2 and OC3: OC1 focuses on CBNRM groups, OC2 on livelihoods; OC3 (“enabling policy conditions”) encompasses support to CBNRM networks, capacity building of subnational stakeholders and policy support, de facto addressing important sustainability factors of the benefits expected under OC1 and OC2. Implicitly, the relevance of PaFF Phase II also stems from the achievements of PaFF Phase I, encouraging enough to justify a second phase. Besides, relevance is underpinned by four elements, which determined essential design features of the PaFF programme: a partnership between four NGOs with complementing experience and core competencies; an integrated landscape perspective aimed at balancing sustainable NRM and access to NR for livelihoods; support to livelihoods combined with NRM; capitalising on the lessons learned from the many projects implemented by the four partners.

1. The contours of PaFF II: a flexibility undermined by the complexity of the programmatic approach

- **PaFF is a programme partly funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).** The budget for Phase I amounted to USD 3.7 M, including a contribution of USD 2.1 M from SDC (57% of the total budget). The total budget for Phase II is USD 6.133 M, including USD 3 M from SDC (49%) and USD 3.133 M from other donors. The budget of Phase II is 66% higher than the budget of Phase I, reflecting a scaling up of activities in the provinces of Kratie and Stung Treng (already targeted under Phase I) and an expansion to two neighbouring provinces (Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom).
- **PaFF II is complex by design. Technically and financially, a part of PaFF II is a collection of projects funded by a diversity of donors, all implemented by one or several partners in one or more of the four targeted provinces and, in some cases, in adjacent provinces.** These are called “contribution projects”. Table 1 (below) lists ongoing or completed contribution projects, all part of PaFF II. Some projects are implemented by one partner alone (e.g. WWF or RECOFTC) while Share Resource Joint Solutions (SRJS) funded by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature - Netherland (IUCN-NL) is implemented by all four partners plus NGO Forum, a Cambodian NGO. All projects contribute to the overall objective of PaFF II, either to livelihoods or conservation, or both. With respect to the expected outcomes of PAFF II, some projects contribute to OC1 (e.g. typically all interventions implemented by RECOFTC alone), some to both OC1 and OC2 (e.g. one project funded by Belgium aid focused on CFs and one project funded by German aid focused on CFs, both implemented by WWF), while OC3 is essentially based on a single project, SRJS. Depending on the specifics of a project, either its entire budget or part of it is considered a contribution to PaFF. The list of contribution projects may evolve until the end of PaFF II. But by the end of Phase II, the cumulative financial contribution of these projects is expected to reach USD 3.133 M, in order to match the contribution of SDC. Together, these projects form a programme whose time boundaries are not fixed: some projects have already ended, some end in December 2019 and the SRJS project -which underpins OC3- ends in June 2020.
- **Hence the key role of SDC, as a donor.** The contribution of SDC does not correspond to a specific project, it supports the entire programme. It binds contribution projects together into a common and wider objective. Besides, it provides -in theory- the flexibility to fund gaps in the programmatic approach behind PaFF II, i.e. to conduct activities which complement, thematically or geographically, activities funded by contribution projects, and to continue supporting key activities developed under PaFF I. In practice, different CBNRM groups enjoy different levels of support: some were already supported under PaFF I, others have received support for the first time under PaFF II; some will be supported for the entire duration of PaFF (I & II) while others, as currently planned, will only enjoy two years of support until the end of PaFF II; some are attached to a credit scheme and/or a CBE, others are only supported in their formalization process. And others receive support from both PaFF and another development partner.

Table 1 - PaFF Phase II – List of Contribution Projects - Source: PaFF Project Coordination Team 01/11/2019 - (*) Refer to the list of acronyms

#	Name of the project	Donor (*)	Implementing Agency (*)	Total Budget	Currency	Start Date of Activities	End Date of Activities	Geographic scope	Overall objective of the project
1	Support Conservation and Livelihoods Empowerment-Up (SCALE-UP)	DGD	WWF FLO CCD	1 972 334,48	Euros	01-Jan-17	31-Dec-21	Kratie	By the end of 2021, men and women in local community residing along Mekong river in Kratie province achieve land security, enabling livelihood improvement, sustainable forest management and biodiversity protection.
2	Improving Food and Income Security of Local people along the Mekong River through sustainable natural resource management and biodiversity conservation.	BMZ	WWF	1 946 265,00	USD	01-Aug-16	31-Dec-19	Kratie	Improving Food and Income Security of Local people along the Mekong River through sustainable natural resource management and biodiversity conservation.
3	Saving the critically endangered Irrawaddy dolphin in the Mekong Flooded Forest	WWF-Singapore (WWF-SG)	WWF	50 980,00	USD	01-Apr-17	31-Jan-18	Kratie	The project's theory of change is that improve law enforcement and targeted community outreach and behaviour change the incentives for setting illegal nets in areas used by dolphin will be reduced.
4	Leading the Change: Civil Society, Right and Environment	SIDA	WWF	1 300 000,00	USD	01-Jan-18	22-Dec-22	Kratie, Mondulkiri, Kompot, Preah Sihanuk.	To strengthen technical knowledge and skill of CSOs and CBOs at national and local levels. Interventions will focus on building capacity around forest governance and the sustainable use of non-timer forest products (Livelihood improvement- based conservation).
5	Conservation of Irrawaddy River Dolphins	WWF Switzerland	WWF	276 096,00	USD	01-Jul-16	30-Jun-19	Kratie	
6	Healthy People, Healthy Place	WWF-Sweden	WWF Water Aid	4 326 959,00	SEK	01-Sep-17	31-Aug-20	Kratie	Healthy communities are engaged in sustainable livelihoods and water supply, with provincial authorities supporting the dissemination of the project approach at the national level.
7	Support for Dolphin Conservation	WWF-Belgium	WWF	19 000,00	Euros	30-Nov-17	30-Jun-18	Kratie	To monitor the Irrawaddy Dolphin in the Mekong Flooded Forest Landscape, Cambodia.
8	Share Resource Joint Solutions (SRJS)	IUCN-NL	NTFP-EP NGO Forum CEPA WWF RECOFTC	1 057 287,00	USD	01-Jul-17	30-Jun-20	National and provincial level (Kratie, Stung Treng, Ratanakiri)	It aims to bring together the different stakeholders in the Mekong landscape and help them engage in constructive dialogues to find solutions to the lack of policy coherence affecting the sustainable landscape use and management needed to safeguard water provisioning, food security, biodiversity and climate resilience.
9	Forum Syd's Programme Green Ownership	SIDA	RECOFTC	195 000,00	USD	01-Mar-2017	31-Dec-2019	Kampong Thom	Implementation Community Forestry Management Plan
10	Establishment of the pilot sites for the innovative Forest and Landscape Restoration interventions at 30 Hectares	FAO	RECOFTC	66 517,50	USD	13-Sep-2019	30-Sep-2020	Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear	Reforestation
11	Greater Mekong Subregion Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Project Output3, Capacity Building for the Ecosystem-based Adaptation in O Por Catchment Subproject, G0241-CAM	ADB	RECOFTC	163 350,95	USD	01-Jul-2017	30-Sep-2019	Mondulkiri	CPA development management (contribution only reported for operation in Phnom Penh office)
12	RECOFTC core fund	SDC, SIDA, Royal Thai Government	RECOFTC	70 498,15	USD	01-Jan-2018	31-Dec-2019	Kampong Thom Kratie, Stung Treng, Preah	CF/CPA development and implementation. Mainstreaming Gender on NRM and build gender leadership spread gender concept to all provinces/cities in Cambodia

- **However, the flexibility under PaFF II has limits, often due to budgetary constraints.** For instance, as per the design of PaFF II, in the province of Preah Vihear, RECOFTC is responsible for supporting CFs, newly created credit schemes attached to these CFs, the provincial CF network, and it also contributes to building the capacities of the provincial FA while assisting in the coordination between the provincial FA and the CF network. The MTR confirms the relevance of the contribution of RECOFTC in Preah Vihear: there is a strong demand from the FA and beneficiaries; besides, the quality of the relationship between RECOFTC staff and the FA is an evidence that NGO support is not taken for granted. However, most activities are planned to end in December 2019, for a lack of funds. More specifically: 1/ the full time Provincial CF Partnership Coordinator of RECOFTC (the only full-time staff of RECOFTC in Preah Vihear, on SDC's budget) will go, which means regular support to CFs and credit schemes will stop; 2/ support to the CF network will stop; 3/ At the same time, a contribution project funded by FAO and focused on reforestation of a number of CFs, as part of the implementation of their management plans, runs from September 2019 to September 2020.

- **The situation in Kampong Thom, where PaFF also expanded in 2017, is not better.** In this province, all activities come under the Forum Syd's "Green Ownership Programme", funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). However, according to RECOFTC, in February 2018 SIDA froze its contribution to several NGOs in Cambodia, including Forum Syd. RECOFTC was nevertheless able to continue its activities in Kampong Thom by mobilizing its core funds (including a contribution from SDC, which has nothing to do with the SDC funds allocated to PaFF). The Forum Syd programme resumed in November 2018 but now ends in December 2019. Support to CFs will also stop in this province, except for support to the CF network that will continue for a few more months. Yet, there is no evidence of a proper exit strategy in these two provinces.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #1 to all PaFF partners.** It is too late for an exit strategy but PaFF partners might want to consider further supporting CFs and credit schemes in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom until the end of PaFF II. The focus should be exclusively on CFs, which will not receive any assistance by the USAID-funded intervention "Greening Prey Lang". This recommendation is further justified below (under Relevance, "Intervention logic and Capacities" and under Effectiveness of Outcome 1. Also, see [Recommendation #15](#)).

- **Conclusion. Planning activities in the context of the programmatic approach is a complicated, time-consuming and possibly sensitive task** since a balance must be achieved between the needs on the ground, available funds and time constraints attached to the different contribution projects. However, the planned end of the support to CFs in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom illustrates the fact that the programmatic approach, though relevant, does not prevent the fragmentation and the discontinuity of PaFF support to CBNRM groups, especially in newly targeted provinces. In the view of the MTR, though a programmatic approach is highly relevant, its sheer complexity under PaFF II tends to defeat the integrated landscape approach, which is the rationale of PaFF.

2. A development context clearly tilting towards the fishery sector

- **The development context is fast evolving and creates strategic challenges.** Among key factors of change, the amount of funds available for the fishery sector has grown since the beginning of PaFF II. This is not unexpected because the Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management Project Phase 3 (MIWRM), a large intervention funded by the World Bank, started in May 2016 (i.e. a year before PaFF Phase II) and is scheduled to end in June 2021. It has a total budget of USD 16.5 M, including a substantial part (USD 11 M) for a component on "Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management" implemented by the FiA in Stung Treng and Kratie. A review of key activities under MIWRM confirms a strong risk of duplication with the PaFF programme (this is further discussed in the next chapter):

- *"Establishing community fisheries through forming approximately 70 community fisheries organizations, including management plans, demarcation of fishing areas and conservation zones, enforcement of fishing regulations, systematic monitoring and reporting, and evaluation of management plans.*
- *Providing technical support to local, provincial, and national fishery management organizations to implement their management plans.*

- *Enhancing fishing community livelihoods by constructing a fish hatchery that has the capacity to produce roughly three million fingerlings per year, providing small grants to support livelihood diversification, and constructing small-scale infrastructure identified in Commune Development Plans.*
- *Building capacity among the main management actors to more effectively co-manage fish resources in the project area and to plan and implement small-scale infrastructure development*
- *Supporting Fisheries Administration and Provincial Fisheries Administration in their operations.”*

- **Also in the fishery sector, on 01/07/2019, the EU delegation in Phnom Penh signed a financing agreement with the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)** for a new nationwide programme “Capfish” to be implemented from 2019 to 2023 and consisting of two complementary actions, one on Aquaculture (for an amount of € 25 M, implemented with Agence Française de Développement) and another on Capture (wild) Fisheries for an amount of € 87 M, including a budget support of € 35 M to the FiA. “Budget support” means the release of funds is phased in (tranches) and based on the achievement of targets attached to indicators that characterized each tranche. For the first tranche, a key indicator is the adoption of guidelines on financial support to CFis, including a one-time support of USD 15,000 per CFi (equipment, demarcation) and an annual operational support of USD 2,500 per CFi. The EU aims at the adoption of guideline in 2020 and the transfer of funds to a number of CFis as early as 2021.

- **Besides a development context clearly tilting towards the fishery sector,** Protected Areas have gained ground and the importance of the MoE, in charge of PAs, has grown over the past 3 years at the expense of the FA under MaFF. In practice, it means more and more international financial support for PAs and a raising profile for the MoE while the space is shrinking for the FA and development funds are decreasing for CFs. Yet, CFs are not going to go away and are still in need of technical, institutional and financial support.

- **Conclusion.** Changes in the development context are faster than the 4-year phase of PaFF phase. They influence the relevance of PaFF, as far as sectoral focus is concerned, and inevitably dictate changes in the strategies of development partners and donors, including PaFF partners and their main donor SDC, forcing them to re-evaluate sectoral, thematic and geographic priorities in order to maximize the impact of PaFF. A recommendation (see Recommendation #2) will be made, after sectoral coordination and complementarity issues have been discussed.

3. Sectoral coordination and complementarity issues

- **Whatever the geographic area of implementation, the number of development partners in Cambodia makes coordination a necessity and complementarity among them a factor of efficiency and effectiveness.** The PaFF programme itself is a strong illustration of complementarity between several well-established and experienced development partners in Cambodia: CEPA, NTFP-EP, RECOFTC and WWF. Rather than competing for donor funds and taking the risk of duplicating activities, these four NGOs have been working together under the PaFF umbrella since 2014. Prior to PaFF, they were used to working together and in parallel to the PaFF programme, these NGOs also cooperate (for instance, WWF runs another programme in the Eastern Plains Landscape of Monduliri, where it cooperates with RECOFTC and NTFP-EP).

- **There is plenty of evidence of sectoral coordination on NRM at different level:** national, provincial and district level. With respect to topics of interest for PaFF II, at national level, there are two Technical Working Groups (TWG), including one on Fisheries and one on Forestry Reform (respectively TWG-FiA and TWG-FR). The TWG-FR is chaired by FA and co-chaired by FAO. It is comprised of representatives from development partners, government institutions, and local, international NGOs and the private sector. It fosters a dialogue between stakeholders on forest and landscape restoration and provides recommendations for improving governance. The TWG-Fi is chaired by the FiA and co-chaired by the EU Delegation in Phnom Penh. The TWG-FR has been dormant for a few years after the MoE took over Protected Forests from the FA. Under the auspices of FAO, it is being revived. As for the TWG-Fi, it is very active, because there is a strong interest for fisheries and quite a number of sectoral development interventions. Besides at national level, PaFF partners have initiated the NRM Coordination Forum, i.e. a multi-stakeholder platform focused on NRM in the Mekong region, to exchange on existing and upcoming development interventions. The forum already took place twice (November 2018, May 2019).

- **At subnational level, different coordination mechanisms co-exist, in which the role of PaFF partners varies from significant to decisive:** 1/ provincial CF and CFI networks are fully supported by PaFF II and can be considered as grassroots sectoral coordination mechanisms; 2/ CF networks work in tandem with Provincial Community Forestry Program Coordination Committees (PCFPCC), a provincial platform linking CF networks and FA, with coordination and facilitation from RECOFTC under PaFF II; 3/ Coordination between CFIs and the FiA is not as organized as it is for CFs but Stung Treng has a provincial TWG on fisheries to coordinate with NGOs (CEPA participates under PaFF). There is also a multi-stakeholder coordination mechanism for the Ramsar site, initiated by CEPA. These mechanisms function well and are effective. There is also evidence of coordination at district level, as part of decentralisation. In Preah Vihear, representatives from three communes explain that commune investment funds are discussed at district level, in presence of development partners and confess that communes avoid allocating funds in areas covered by development partners (NRM for instance), suggesting communes have little incentive to allocate funds to NRM.
- **On the negative side, in Kratie, coordination mechanisms for CFIs are lacking.** There is no operational CFI network at provincial level and no common understanding between WWF, which supports CFIs under PaFF, and the FiA, which implements MIWRM. This is in spite of another informal, recently revived, provincial coordination platform under which 26 NGOs active in Kratie (including 6 active on NRM) share information and discuss common issues. However, the World Bank (not an NGO) is not represented. Though provincial coordination on CFI-related issues is as necessary in Kratie as it is in Stung Treng, not only there are no synergies but MTR interviews in the field pointed at a lack of coordination between PaFF and MIWRM. Indeed, out of the 15 CFIs supported under PaFF II by WWF in Kratie, 13 CFIs are also a target of MIWRM. On one side, WWF expresses frustration at the fact that MIWRM selected CFIs in Kratie, long after WWF selected the ones it would work with. On the other side, the FiA in Kratie pretends not to understand why WWF support to CFIs in Kratie has slowed. Obviously, there are political factors at play. Through MIWRM, the World Bank financially supports the FiA, which is tasked with implementing the project at provincial level, with technical assistance from experts. In contrast, WWF has counterparts in FiA in Kratie but none is remunerated by PaFF. WWF “only” contributes to building the capacities of the provincial FiA.
- **In contrast, the situation in Stung Treng is better** than in Kratie because of an effective TWG on fisheries, set up by the FiA in 2018. CEPA, the World Bank (i.e. the FiAC) and other NGOs participate to quarterly meetings during which workplans and activities are discussed to avoid overlapping and, if possible, create synergies. Stung Treng has a total 52 CFIs (50 have an agreement). Out of the 25 CFIs supported by CEPA, 18 are also targeted by MIWRM (which supports a total of 35 CFIs). As agreed during coordination meetings, CEPA assists in the legalization of 15 CFIs (agreement and management plan) and contribute to implementing the management plan of 25 CFIs (funds for patrolling, capacity building, awareness raising), besides supporting the CFI network. MIWRM also assists in the implementation of management plans with different activities and inputs (materials for patrolling, livelihood development, infrastructure).
- **Conclusion.** That CEPA is able to coordinate with MIWRM in Stung Treng confirms the political nature of the problem in Kratie. The lack of synergies between PaFF and the World Bank project in Kratie is all the more disappointing as synergies between development partners in the Mekong region is one of the expected outcomes of the NRM Coordination Forum promoted by PaFF. During the November 2018 forum, MIWRM was presented by the FiA in November 2018, with no effect as far as coordination in Kratie is concerned. The lack of interest of the FiA for sectoral coordination in Kratie makes it especially complicated -if not impossible- for WWF to solve the issue. The conclusion is that there is no point in PaFF supporting CFIs and the FiA any longer in Kratie.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #2 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** The fact that the World Bank is a powerful development partner and the government is the institutional partner forces WWF (even though the NGO is not to blame for the lack of coordination) to draw lessons from the situation and reassess its strategic priorities in Kratie. Given the development context in favour of the fishery sector coupled to coordination issues in the same sector, an overall strategic exercise is needed. PaFF partners and SDC should consider reallocating resources dedicated to CFIs and FiA in Kratie to other sectors and geographic areas. More specifically, they should consider continuing support to CFs and FA in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom. For Stung Treng, the recommendation is more nuanced. On the long run, there is no point in continuing support

to CFis in Stung Treng either. However, on the short run (i.e. until the end of PaFF II), if no one else is planning to help CFis in the Ramsar site to convert to CPAs, then it is relevant for CEPA to continue doing this. Similarly, if no one else supports the CFi network, it is also relevant to continue supporting the CFi network in Stung Treng. PaFF partners are in a better position to determine whether or not and for how long CEPA should continue operating in Stung Treng. In this province, PaFF partners need to strike a balance between the risk of disrupting fragile CFi-related coordination mechanisms if CEPA's support diminishes and the importance of maximizing the allocation of scarce programme resources to CBNRM groups which need them most.

4. Intervention logic, strategies and corresponding capacities

- **Introduction.** The relevance of an intervention does not only depend on the strategy and the quality of the design. It also depends on the capacities (technical, human, financial, logistical and organizational) of the implementing partners and main stakeholders. Do consortium partners and other stakeholders involved in the continuation of the stream of benefits have the necessary capacities to fulfil their future roles? First, we analyse the capacities that underpin the implementation of each component, which require different technical and strategic skills. Then we conclude on the adequacy between the capacities and the needs of the programme for each component.

- **Support to CBNRM groups (Outcome 1).** Three consortium partners are involved: CEPA, RECOFTC, WWF. This outcome is in line with the legal framework and PaFF partners follow the official development guidelines, which underpin the formalization/legalization process of CFs, CFis and CPAs. This is not to say the task is easy. These guidelines are known to be overly complex and rigid, making the process of transferring tenure rights to communities very slow. Hence the key role of international aid and NGOs. PaFF partners have adequate technical capacities and extensive experience in assisting CBNRM groups.

However, as the establishment of a CBNRM group progresses, further complexity kicks in. For instance, the CF system is comprised of 11 steps and step 8 alone is "CF management planning and inventory", a costly and time-consuming process that requires technical and financial capacities that communities do not have. And since CF/CFis are different (e.g. size is different, ecosystems are different, the level of conservation/degradation of the natural resource base strongly varies from one group to another), assisting a CBNRM group is inevitably a task that must be tailored to its characteristics. This is why the simplification of CF and CFi guidelines is among the policy objectives of PaFF (under OC3). To further complicate the matter, the transfer of jurisdiction of certain protected areas from MAFF to MoE has placed several CFs and CFis in a difficult position since they must now re-establish themselves as a CPA, after having painfully completed several steps under the CF/CFi development guidelines.

Therefore, relevance should not just be measured in terms of technical capacities and experience: the duration of the support and the effective presence of NGO staff at provincial level, within close reach of the CBNRM groups, is also a strong factor of relevance. To this end, long-term support such as the PaFF programme is essential, otherwise progress is inevitably stalled: indeed, due to limited capacities, provincial officials are mostly focused on law enforcement and they cannot assist in the establishment of CBNRM groups, beyond their strictly administrative role vis à vis these groups. However, and though RECOFTC is well embedded in provincial FAs and has adequate technical capacity, the fragmentation of the PaFF programme into several contribution projects results in a limitation of field capacities for the provinces of Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom: the end of a permanent field staff in December 2019 undermines the relevance of PaFF in these two provinces. Obviously, one can argue that short-term support is better than no support at all, in hope that another development partner will pick up where PaFF left. However, since the programmatic approach behind PaFF is expected to provide flexibility in planning, it remains to be demonstrated how the planning of support to CFs in these two provinces has been or is being optimized to respond to the needs of local communities. The above strengthens Recommendation #1.

- **Support to Livelihoods (Outcome 2).** Supporting livelihoods is a strong request of the target groups. It is not only a means of strengthening the sustainability of NRM by communities, it is also a condition to maintaining the long-term interest of members in CBNRM groups. The rationale behind OC2 is that a

significant increase in income from NTFPs helps communities appreciate the value of the forest and contribute to its development through a transfer of benefits. Extrapolating beyond NTFPs, the MFF is an asset that ecotourism groups can capitalize upon. Besides, helping communities with small scale agriculture is a way to reduce the pressure on natural resources. Therefore, OC2 is highly relevant. However, contrary to CBNRM groups (OC1), there are no official blueprints or guidelines to follow when establishing and supporting CBEs: this is why supporting rural livelihoods is notoriously challenging. Two consortium partners are involved in OC2. NTFP-EP supports Community-Based Enterprises (CBEs) which collect and/or transform forest products or wild fish and WWF supports CBEs, mostly focused on livestock and aquaculture.

NTFP-EP experienced mixed success with CBEs during PaFF I. Many CBEs were not functional when PaFF I ended, for a variety of reasons. Learning from Phase I, NTFP-EP dropped problematic sectors (e.g. bamboo) and now focuses on what works best (honey, eco-tourism) or what is promising (traing). NTFP-EP is a regional NGO with a branch in Cambodia, it has an expertise in promoting the use of NTFPs for forest conservation and livelihood enhancement and a long-standing experience in working with honey groups in Cambodia. Under Phase I, NTFP-EP was leading the PaFF consortium. Under PaFF II, this role was taken over by WWF. Therefore NTFP-EP now focuses on OC2 (it also plays a key role under OC3). A livelihood coordinator was recently appointed, to bridge a gap in capacities and strengthen the strategy and commitment of NTFP-EP to livelihood support. However, marketing capacities under OC2 are not up to the mark: e.g. NatureWild, a social enterprise partly supported by NTFP-EP is an asset for CBEs because it markets their honey and competes with middlemen; however NatureWild is struggling to sell branded honey (refer to “Effectiveness of Outcome 2”, part 3 “Assessment of the performances of NTFP-based CBEs and sustainability of benefits”).

In contrast, WWF has a strong institutional capacity but is first and foremost a conservation NGO. Livelihood is a means to achieve this goal. WWF does not have an in-house capacity to support rural livelihoods through aquaculture or livestock development. The latter requires extensive expertise and experience in integrated rural development, sufficient HR and a long term field presence to build capacities of beneficiaries in managing unexpected circumstances that are inevitable in livestock production: animal-health related issues, fluctuations in feed prices, cost of utilities, logistical constraints, marketing issues, problems linked to the perishable nature of processed food products, etc. WWF has dedicated staff and a very good understanding of local livelihood systems, but this does not make for a lack of core skills and experience. Especially because there isn't such a thing as a “development toolbox”. A quality value chain assessment pointing at a strong perspective of impact is not a guarantee of success.

To illustrate the point: training and technical support were provided to an aquaculture CBE in Kratie, which did not perform as expected (refer to Case Study # 13 under Annex 3). The reason for underperformance is first and foremost a matter of design: were the planned length of training and planned level of technical supervision of the first production cycle sufficient in view of the capacities of the beneficiaries? Most likely not. The same question applies to two poultry groups interviewed by the MTR. In both cases (aquaculture and poultry), unexpected events prevented target groups from enjoying planned benefits. However, it would be wrong to think that the design was fine in the first place and issues were caused by unfortunate events that were beyond the control of WWF: no, the fact that the timeframe to support livelihood is so short and the fact that “unfortunate events” are considered beyond control indicate that WWF, at the time of design, did not fully appreciate the challenges attached to supporting the development of aquaculture and animal production. In short, there are two major issues: risk mitigation plans are not strong enough because of a lack of Human Resources (HR) and the time frame is too short to address the consequences of risks when they materialize. The capacities of WWF with respect to livelihood development are further discussed under the chapter on Effective of Outcome 2 and a recommendation is made.

- **Capacity development on NRM, support to provincial networks, policy support (Outcome 3).** Judging by the positive feedback from targeted individuals who benefitted from training organized under PaFF, this is a relevant activity. The capacities of PaFF partners to conduct most NRM-related trainings by themselves, owing to strong core skills and level of experience, is a key strength of the PaFF programme. Besides, partners (RECOFTC and CEPA) have demonstrated excellent capacities in supporting and facilitating provincial coordination through various mechanisms.

Capacities are not as strong when it comes to policy support. Policy advocacy is mainstreamed in most development interventions in Cambodia, especially in conservation and NRM-related interventions because of the urgent need to improve the legal and regulatory framework for forestry, fishery and PAs. PaFF II therefore includes a policy component. Among the capacities needed to achieve relevance and impact in policy support, a research capacity is a pre-condition to any policy recommendation, which entails a strong capacity for data analysis. These two skills (research and data analysis) are needed to generate evidence that informs policy changes. On these two fronts, the capacities of PaFF partners is highly relevant and conducive to policy support because of in-house expertise: technical, scientific and/or conservation experts have access to data (from their own interventions) or, as per the needs, can engage in research projects.

Once evidence is collected, experts must work hand in hand with government officials to inform policy making. In Cambodia, the link between experts and government is not seamless because of the lack of capacities in the public sector and conflicting interests at institutional level. Technical working groups exists to facilitate communication between experts and institutional stakeholders, with a view to influence and improve policies but also to improve sectoral coordination among key actors (TWG-FIA and TWG-FR). However, there are limitations to these multi-stakeholder mechanisms and to policy consultation workshops because as useful as it is, technical and scientific expertise is not sufficient to turn evidence into a legal document. NGOs rarely have in-house legal capacities. The concern, however, is not the lack of legal expertise but the fact that PaFF partners are not proactive enough in seeking legal expertise when they need it. This suggests they either fail to assess gaps in their own capacities or they are not proactive enough with respect to implementation of policy-related activities under PaFF, at a time when important laws are under revision or about to be revised. The issue was raised insistently by SDC during the debriefing of the MTR and PaFF partners did admit a lack of coordination and proactiveness on policy efforts. This could lead to missed opportunities of impact if PaFF partners are not sufficiently prepared when a window opens to revise the Forestry Law. This is further discussed under the chapter on Effectiveness of Outcome 3.

- **RECOMMENDATION #3 to all PaFF partners.** PaFF partners need to assess their internal capacities as soon as possible and coordinate on a plan of action to strengthen these capacities, internally and/or externally, in order to anticipate and prepare for an acceleration of the reform processes in key NRM areas. As per the recommendation of SDC, they should jointly consider hiring a legal expert to review existing inputs and to advise on policy inputs in anticipation of the reform the forestry law (this recommendation is further refined under Effectiveness of Outcome 3).

- **Conclusion.** Capacities are a paramount factor of performance and sustainability. The programmatic approach has been tailored to the capacity and skills of the implementing partners, which match the specific tasks they are expected to perform within PaFF II, with two exceptions: the overall capacity of PaFF partners in coordinating and specifically contributing to law making is deemed insufficient; the capacities of WWF to effectively implement livelihood development activities are not adequate.

5. Logframe and indicators: a need for clarity and coherence

- **Introduction.** The logical framework (logframe) is a management tool for designing, planning, monitoring and reporting purposes. It translates in a synthetic manner the overall strategy that underpins development intervention and relates its various elements to one another by establishing a clear hierarchy between outputs, outcomes and higher objectives. At each level of the results chain, indicators determine how results are to be measured. The importance of a quality logframe cannot be overstated: it provides a clear and fair description of the intervention logic and facilitates monitoring, reporting and decision making. Conversely, flaws in the logframe and indicators signal monitoring and, potentially, management weaknesses.

- **The MTR assesses the progress of PAFF II against the January 2019 version of the logframe.** In Annex 1, the MTR comments on each indicator and provides suggestions for improvement. Annex 1 is not intended to replace the existing logframe but to guide partners and provide inputs that can be used in a joint exercise aimed at updating the logframe. Besides, all chapters on effectiveness (on OC1, OC2 and OC3) incorporate a review of key indicators. Therefore, what follows is mostly key findings.

- **A general comment on the intervention logic and indicators.** Interestingly, the intervention logic and logframe are structured as if PaFF II was a well contained project, not a programme. Usually, programme indicators focus on outcomes (rather than outputs). They capture cumulative benefits from individual projects under the programme. In the case of PaFF II, the intervention logic is very specific and described by many indicators, including output indicators. Besides, outcome indicators do not capture all key benefits of the various contribution projects. For instance, three contribution projects implemented by WWF are focused on the emblematic and endangered Mekong River dolphins (refer to Table 1) but there is no specific indicator -at programme level- to measure the achievements of these biodiversity conservation projects. In other words, the logframe of PaFF II is meant to reflect the benefits of the programmatic approach with a clear focus on CBNRM groups (all three components are tied to this central thematic).

- **The logframe is not bad but has several weaknesses.** Here is a summary of main issues:

- 1/ There is a lack of rigour in the definition of many indicators. Several definitions are ambiguous. Impact indicators are yet to be updated with baseline and target values. Several baseline and target values are unclear, owing to an attribution issue (discussed in the next chapter).

- 2/ The hierarchy of indicators is not always coherent. There are two main issues: the duplication of indicators (especially under OC1 and OC2), undermines the hierarchy of results and unnecessarily complicates the logframe; the hierarchy of development steps of CBNRM groups in the logframe is not aligned with the hierarchy of development steps as per the official guidelines of CF and CFis.

- 3/ In some cases, indicators are missing. For instance, there is an indicator related to CF credit schemes at outcome level, but not a single one at output level. Besides, gender and DRR-related indicators are missing in the logframe (see the discussion below).

- 4/ There are positive outcomes related to CBNRM groups, which are not captured by the logframe, such as the decrease in illegal activities (violations, encroachment) in CF and CFis.

- 5/ Assumptions anticipate factors and conditions over which PaFF partners have no control, but which are necessary to achieve expected results. In the logframe, several assumptions contradict the objectives of PaFF II. For instance, *“Community members are interested and willing to participate in capacity development activities”*: PaFF II is a demand-based intervention, therefore the assumption makes little sense; *“Management plan implementation is adequately resourced”*: when PaFF II was designed, partners knew this condition had very limited chances to be fulfilled because PaFF II is precisely aimed at building the financial sustainability of CBNRM groups; *“Guidelines for management planning reflect community interests and needs and are not prohibitively complicated, time-consuming and costly”*: it is a fact that existing guidelines are overly complicated, which is why their revision is a policy objective under OC3. In other words, there is a confusion between programme objectives and external conditions that tends to reduce accountability (a typical flaw in many logframes).

- **Conclusion.** The logframe suffers from lack of clarity and rigour at indicator level, which complicates reporting and analysis. Defining SMART indicators (Specific Measurable Achievable Relevant Time-bound) is a difficult exercise but assessing results is even more difficult when indicators are not well defined.

- **RECOMMENDATION #4 to all PaFF partners.** Building on Annex 1 and incorporating inputs from the MTR report, especially from sections #5, #6 and #7 of the section on “Relevance and quality of the design” and comments on indicators under the three sections on effectiveness (OC1, OC2, OC3), rationalize and refine indicators to improve clarity and coherence: verify the hierarchy between impact, outcome and output indicators; improve the definition of most indicators; eliminate duplicates; add indicators to capture additional positive results; check the relevance of assumptions and conditions; as for sources of data, ideally, each value (baseline, target, intermediate) should be attached to a source of information.

6. The attribution issue

- **Direct support versus indirect support.** The PaFF Phase II programme document says (pages 8 & 9): *“PaFF Phase II will build on these experiences and lessons learned from Phase I to scale up its reach and impact in Stung Treng and Kratie provinces, and to expand into Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom provinces. The scaling up and expansion is possible through the adoption of a programmatic and landscape approach that recognises that PaFF Partners can support activities to achieve PaFF objectives using a variety of projects under their management as well as coordinate and influence other stakeholders’ contribution working towards the same goal of sustainable natural resources management.”* The underlined sentence means that under the programmatic approach of PaFF II the intervention logic considers all contribution projects to be an integral part of PaFF II. As a consequence, all benefits are fully attributed to PaFF II and accounted for in the logframe. The sentence in bold entails that progress made by CBNRM groups supported by other development partners in any of the four provinces targeted by PaFF are also accounted for under PaFF II because PaFF supports provincial CF and CFi networks, which represent all CF and CFis in a given province. This is called “indirect support”. In other words, and especially under OC1, PaFF II takes credit for benefits related to all CFs/CFis in a given province, whether partners directly support these CBNRM groups or not.

- **The argument that supporting CBNRM networks contributes to the capacities of all CBNRM groups (including indirect support by PaFF partners) is a valid one,** but it cannot be demonstrated and measured in a consistent and systematic way through existing OC1 indicators. These indicators are defined to measure progress against official development guidelines steps, a progress that is not achieved by supporting CBNRM networks but through activities specifically tailored to the needs of individual CBNRM groups (e.g. demarcation, management plans). Attribution of indirect support to PaFF II poses several problems:

- Under OC1, numbers are inflated (direct and indirect values are aggregated) but this practice undermines transparency and accountability; In the documentation, baseline and target values under OC1 are aggregated for indirect and direct support, but intermediate values are disaggregated, which maintains confusion about the specific contribution of PaFF II.
- The benefits of direct support are diluted; this prevents a clear overview of quantitative results strictly attached to direct support, which is not conducive to analysis;
- Since PaFF partners have no control over projects they do not implement (indirect support), there is a risk that aggregated targets will not be achieved; And for the same reason, monitoring and collecting robust data on CBNRM groups that PaFF partners do not assist directly is a real challenge.
- It contributes to further diluting the overall ownership of PaFF by stakeholders.
- When support to CBNRM networks is discontinued, technically, indirect targets will need to be dropped as well, which will disrupt reporting against existing indicators.

- **Conclusion.** Reporting on indirect support has more negative than positive consequences. Therefore, in the view of the MTR, attributing indirect support to PaFF II for all indicators is not relevant.


⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #5 to all PaFF partners.** For the sake of clarity, accountability and transparent reporting, the MTR strongly recommends that partners stop aggregating indirect and direct data for all indicators. This suggests a revision of all values (including baseline and target values) and possibly the addition of one or two indicators reflecting expected results for all CBNRM groups as a result of support to networks only. All other indicators should be tied to direct support only. The other solution is to have a nested logframe strictly for indirect support, under OC1, with a specific set of values (baseline/target/final values).

7. Cross-cutting topics: gender, climate change and disaster risk reduction

- **Gender equality.** The programme document of PaFF Phase II underlines the importance of mainstreaming gender aspects across activities. In line with partners’ policies which strongly acknowledge the importance of gender equity, there is evidence (programme documents, trainings, composition of CBNRM groups and CBEs) that PaFF and its different contribution projects strive to carve more important roles for women in

NRM and livelihood improvement (e.g. decision-making processes, leadership roles, CBEs run by women, etc.). Besides, RECOFTC recently (March 2019) launched a Gender Co-lab program, called WAVES (Weaving Leadership for Gender Equality). It functions as a platform “to test and implement novel ideas that aim to secure gender equality in forest landscapes”. The objectives are: 1/ Equipping key actors in the region with the knowledge and capacity to understand, design and implement gender equality measures in forest landscapes; 2/ Building women’s leadership skills to support gender equality across public agencies, private sector and local and ethnic communities; 3/ Integrating gender equality into climate policy, monetary investments and actions”. It is expected that PaFF II can benefit from this initiative.

- **From a design standpoint, gender equality is currently reflected in the logframe through sex-disaggregated indicators, as and when relevant.** However, as important as they are, sex disaggregated indicators are not sufficient to convey the efforts of the partners in improving gender equality. In Cambodia, NRM is overwhelmingly dominated by men, at all institutional levels as well as in grassroots community-based organizations. Unless a number of indicators specifically focus on women alone, the achievements of PaFF with respect to gender equality may go largely unnoticed. For instance, CF credit schemes are expected to boost the role of women in contributing to NRM financing and RECOFTC says the participation of women in CF credit schemes is important (as reported in the 2018 annual progress report of PaFF II). However, the opportunity to highlight this potential benefit is missed in the existing logframe, because there is only one indicator related to CF credit schemes (under OC1) and it does not have a gender dimension (“CF Credit scheme exists and function to benefit CBNRM groups”).
- **Similarly, partners strive to encourage women in leadership roles:** but there is no indicator for women in leadership positions in the PaFF programme. CBNRM bylaws typically have a quota for women in management committees, but there is no indicator that sets a target for women in leadership position and measures the number of women who did obtain a leadership position. Without clear gender-specific indicators, positive changes (or the lack of) cannot be properly recorded. This is not to say PaFF partners fail to report on their efforts to improve gender equity: they do. However, NGOs are bound more strongly to changes when gender-specific indicators are included in the logframe.
- **Another dimension of gender equality is women empowerment.** Benefits in this area cannot be captured by mere quantitative targets. They deserve specific and systematic reporting, which entails that design acknowledge women empowerment as a clear objective. In the current logframe, this objective is not explicit. This is not to say it is absent from the strategy of PaFF II: for instance, in Annex 21 of the 2018 Annual Narrative Report, there is success story of a young woman leading the CFi network in Stung Treng. But this proof of women empowerment remains an annex to the report because there is not explicit indicator to capture this benefit, i.e. there is no indicator to measure whether and how women empowerment in NRM is demonstrated and illustrated under PaFF II.

⇒  **RECOMMENDATION #6 to all PaFF partners.** Add at least 3 gender-specific indicators in the logframe. Suggestion: Average percentage of women who are members of CF credit schemes; Number of women in leadership position in CBNRM groups; Number of women in leadership position in CBEs; Number of case studies illustrating women empowerment through a proactive role in NRM. If relevant and achievable, a policy indicator focused on gender equity can be added.

- **Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).** Rural communities who partly or wholly depend on NR for a living are especially at risk when it comes to CC and climate-related disasters. Under PaFF Phase I, a preliminary disaster risk assessment, followed by a series of Participatory Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis, was conducted. In August 2017, under the impulsion of SDC, further action was taken to better mainstream CCA and DRR into PaFF II. First, capacity gaps within the PaFF team were assessed with a view to develop a training/capacity building plan. The conclusion of the DRR and CCA Capacity Assessment Report (March 2018) is as follows: “...Notably, the respondents have a basic understanding with no application on the concept and practices of the DRR and CCA and its national legal framework and support structure. The majority of respondents have no knowledge or application on DRR/CCA tools such as Casual Loop Diagram (CLD), INVEST (ecosystem services mapping), and RSAT (hydropower assessment). More importantly, the majority of respondents have only technical knowledge but no application to provide

training and coaching CF/CFi communities and PaFF team on mainstreaming the DRR/CCA.” Consequently, building on knowledge and information developed by two other SDC-funded interventions (Disaster Resilience and Water Management in Cambodia or DRAW and Cambodia Horticulture Advancing Income and Nutrition or CHAIN), PaFF partners organized activities to strengthen the capacity of the team to mainstream DRR into the programme activities.

- **As a result, CCA and DRR are now systematically mainstreamed in programme activities.** In other words, activities are not specifically focused on CCA and DRR but CCA/DRR is incorporated, for instance as an additional topic during a technical training. This is helpful because it is likely that attendance events strictly focused on CCA/DRR would be very limited. On the negative side, the analysis of design of gender-related indicators applies to DRR-related indicators as well. None of the existing indicators provides a direct measure of the benefits of PaFF II with respect to DRR. The implicit assumption is that better livelihoods and sustainable NRM actively contribute to reducing disaster risk, which is true. However, immediate and concrete benefits stemming from DRR-related efforts are not apparent in the intervention logic and are therefore not as highlighted as they should (even though they are mentioned in narrative reports).

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION # 7 to all PaFF partners.** If DRR is an expected benefit of PaFF II, then specific DRR-related indicators must be formulated and included in the logframe. Suggestion: Number of management plans of CBNRM groups, which specifically incorporate DRR and/or climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, as a result of PaFF trainings and/or awareness raising activities.

- **Conclusion.** The contribution of PaFF II to gender equity and DRR is real but may go unnoticed because there are no indicators to capture benefits related to these important cross-cutting topics.

8. Conclusion on relevance and quality of the design

- **From a design standpoint, PaFF is a highly complex intervention. Besides, flexibility is built in the design to accommodate gaps in the programme and complement existing contribution interventions. However, in practice, complexity prevents flexibility from being fully expressed during programme implementation.** The intervention logic of PaFF II is straightforward and relevant to the objectives. Of particular relevance, OC3 embodies the sustainable dimension of the intervention logic: without building capacities on NRM and supporting policy reforms, benefits achieved under OC1 and OC2 cannot be sustainable. The development context in targeted provinces provides evidence that sectoral coordination is not optimal, with overlapping activities and duplication, if not today, tomorrow. This points to a necessity of reassessing programme priorities and reallocating SDC funds where most pressing needs are identified and funds not available, at the risk of having to reallocate funds among consortium partners.

⇒ **LESSON LEARNED #1.** PaFF builds on lessons learned from its partners. Let us compare the situation between the institutional context in MFF and in the Eastern Plains Landscape (EPL) of Mondulkiri, where WWF enjoys a special status: by virtue of a rather effective sector coordination at national level with the MoE, WWF is the key NGO entrusted with conservation objectives in Mondulkiri. As compared to MFF, the strategies in EPL are not very different (the focus is also on CBNRM groups and supporting livelihoods) but in EPL, other NGOs work under the umbrella of the WWF programme, which is restricted to one province and focuses on PAs under the jurisdiction of a single administration, the MoE. In comparison, PaFF operates in four provinces, which multiplies governmental stakeholders, and works with different categories of CBNRM group, which further increases the number of line departments to be engaged and coordinated. Besides, in the provinces where PaFF is active, there is competition between development interventions to occupy the ground. The situation is fuelled by several administrations, each with its own culture and approach to development and cooperation: Department of Tourism, Department of Environment, FA Cantonment (FAC), FiA Cantonment (FiAC). There are simply too many stakeholders with conflicting agendas, too many donors and implementing partners as a result of which coordination cannot be effective and inevitably leads to conflicts. To the complexity of the context, the response of PaFF was to: 1/ form a consortium of NGOs, which is a good practice as it limits unproductive competition; 2/ develop a programmatic approach as an integrated landscape approach is necessary. However, the scope of the programme is probably too ambitious and the decision to expand to two provinces debatable.

EFFICIENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION

- **Introduction.** In this section, the following aspects are covered and assessed: 1/ The overall programme governance, management and institutional set up of the PaFF consortium; 2/ Stakeholder engagement; 3/ Financial planning and the rate of expenditures (this includes a discussion on delays) ; 4/ The structure and quality of the internal monitoring system; 5/ Factors of cost-efficiency. Social safeguard policies refer to NGO partners (not specifically to PaFF II and are briefly described under Annex 9).

1. Governance and management: consequences of the institutional set up of PaFF II

- **Contractual modalities.** PaFF II is comprised of several contribution projects implemented by four NGOs and funded by a diversity of donors, complemented by a substantial grant of the Swiss Confederation, through SDC. Contractually, WWF is the main recipient of the USD 3 million grant of SDC, under a contract covering the period from 01/08/2017 to 30/06/2021 (i.e. 47 months). CEPA, NTFP-EP, RECOFTC have signed sub-grant agreements with WWF, in order to implement PaFF along the lines of the Phase II Programme Document attached to the main contract between WWF and SDC. Under Phase I, NTFP-EP, a regional NGO headquartered in Philippines, was the lead organisation. WWF took over the lead under Phase II.


- **The choice of WWF to lead the consortium.** As compared to Phase I, the management of Phase II is considered more efficient. PaFF I was managed by NTFP-EP out of Cambodia but the ability of the Cambodia office to manage and lead the programme was called to question. HR management issues lead NTFP-EP to restructure its HR by late 2018, early 2019, with an interim period, during which many key management positions were vacant. The impact on PaFF II was felt but nevertheless limited, since NTFP-EP no longer leads the consortium. As a local NGO, CEPA is a valuable partner but does not have the capacity to manage a large programme. As for RECOFTC, a regional NGO headquartered in Bangkok, it has a good institutional capacity and the skills to manage such a programme. However, RECOFTC is focused on forests and firmly embedded in the FA, whereas the environmental scope of the PaFF programme is broader. Therefore, the MTR confirms that WWF, with solid institutional and management skills, a range of experience in conservation in Cambodia, a strong institutional engagement with the government, a strong visibility and a permanent field presence in Kratie, is an adequate choice for the management of PaFF II.

- **The institutional set up of the PaFF programme.** PaFF is managed by an Executive Committee (ExeCom) and a Programme Coordination Team (PCT). The ExeCom is a governance body comprised of senior representatives of each partner organization and chaired by the WWF representative. It is a joint strategic management and shared responsibility mechanism, which covers programme and financial management, strategic communication and visibility, risk management, resource mobilization and conflict resolution. Operational management is under the responsibility of the Programme Manager (PM), a WWF staff, and the Programme Coordination Team (PCT), comprised of programme coordinators assigned by each partner among their staff. The PCT and the PM report to the ExeCom.

- **As compared to a regular development intervention run by a single project management unit, PaFF management is broken down into two bodies (ExeCom and PCT), a situation requiring specific coordination efforts.** However, there is no shortage of consultations between the partners. So far, since the beginning of Phase II, 6 ExeCom and 6 PCT meetings have taken place. ExeCom meetings take place after PCT meetings, generally within two weeks. Besides, 5 meetings have been held between SDC and the ExeCom, typically a few days after ExeCom meetings. The coordination routine at national level is therefore well established and is completed by a coordination routine at provincial level. However, time spent in building consensus among the four partners slows down decision making processes. This is inevitable, and it is further exacerbated by the programmatic approach: adjustments to the design and budget require not only frequent consultations among the four partners, but also with SDC and/or with the donor of the contribution project. Partners are well aware that coordination, a specific feature of the PaFF institutional set up, is time-consuming and have now restricted PCT meetings to one day (the first three meetings of the PCT lasted two days). They now put more focus on preparing PCT meetings, with a view to make them more effective.



- **Owing to slow decision making processes, the risk associated with this institutional set up is inertia**, i.e. the tendency to leave things as they are because of the complexity of assessing programme benefits, of the complication of balancing SDC and contribution funds, of the time required to reach a consensus among the four partners on strategic aspects. For instance, inertia can materialize in the level of synergies between partners themselves: while there is evidence of many synergies between them, partners also confess they could do better on certain fronts (e.g. on policy support). In other words, the management mechanism is not always sufficiently flexible to accommodate the quick changes that a four-year intervention cycle requires. However, there is no choice. The institutional set up of the PaFF programme is indeed a reflection of the programmatic approach, itself dictated by the magnitude and complexity of the conservation challenges in the MFF landscape, the need to pool a variety of complementary skills and the importance of creating local synergies among development partners to leverage scarce financial and human resources. In other words, the programmatic approach and management constraints are two sides of the same coin.

- **In this context, the position of Programme Manager is a challenging one.** The complexity of the programmatic approach and the challenging development context in targeted provinces require that frequent decisions be made by the PM, who leads the PCT. However, many responsibilities of the PCT are strategic and therefore call for close and regular coordination, because consensus is required: e.g. *“Discuss and jointly resolve programmatic challenges”*; *“Identify partnership and capacity issues and gaps in the programme and measures to address these”*. As a result, many decisions cannot be made by the PM because they must be made jointly by the four partners. As for SDC grant, WWF is *“solely responsible for the project/activities and the appropriate use of the granted contribution”* (as per the contract between WWF and SDC), which entails that WWF is also solely responsible for the use of SDC funds sub-granted to partners. In practice, owing to the programmatic approach, SDC funding and direct contributions are closely knitted together, a situation that does not contribute to the authority of the PM. Indeed, SDC does fund activities and HR to bridge gaps between contribution projects, but a closer examination of the itemized budget also shows that some of the HR funded by SDC contribute to activities whose cost is entirely or partially born by contribution projects. As shown in Table 2, the structure of the PaFF II budget highlights the role of SDC in supporting staff costs (65% for OC1, 57% for OC2, 53% for OC3, refer to Table 2). In comparison, the share of contribution projects is higher for activity-related costs (53% for OC1, 70% for OC2, 82% for OC3). Consequently, this complicates the role of the PM, who is not entitled to make any decision linked to contribution projects, the management of which is strictly the prerogative of the grant recipient.

 **Table 2 - Overall structure of the budget of PaFF II, based on outcomes**

PaFF budget		Total budget	SDC direct funding		Direct Contribution	
Description		USD	USD	% total budget	USD	% total budget
Outcome 1	Staff Costs (and staff related costs)	1 247 469	807 165	65%	440 304	35%
	Other Costs (including activities)	1 322 453	627 811	47%	694 642	53%
Outcome 2	Staff Costs (and staff related costs)	532 970	301 350	57%	231 620	43%
	Other Costs (including activities)	513 654	155 282	30%	358 372	70%
Outcome 3	Staff Costs (and staff related costs)	773 483	408 473	53%	365 010	47%
	Other Costs (including activities)	478 903	87 949	18%	390 954	82%
PaFF Management & Coordination		272 212	272 212	100%	0	0%
Operations & Administration (rent, equipment, etc.)		935 356	308 794	33%	626 562	67%
Audit		56 500	31 000	55%	25 500	45%
GRAND TOTAL		6 133 000	3 000 036	49%	3 132 964	51%

Source: based on initial budget 2017-2021 (Annex attached to the contract between SDC and WWF)

 share of SDC funding > Share of Direct Contribution
 share of Direct Contribution > Share of SDC funding

- **This situation tends to generate frustration on many levels. The position of PM tends to be considered by partners as a coordinating role.** The management function being lessened by the programmatic approach and the institutional set up, decision making on strategic issues may not be as efficient as it should and there is always a risk that issues on which consensus is not reached fast enough be eventually relegated to the background. In turn, this may prompt concerned parties to by-pass the duties and responsibilities of the PM, which further undermines the management role of the PM. Also undermining the capacity of the PM and the

PCT to make adequate and timely decisions is the lack of solid evidence of results in certain areas. Indeed, monitoring is too fragmented (each partner is responsible for monitoring and programme data are aggregated rather than consolidated,) and too activity-oriented, which is not conducive to identification of issues and adaptive management (see the section on Monitoring, below).

- **Institutional set up of PaFF programme: positive factors of efficiency.** On the positive side, a functional consortium is instrumental in addressing financial gaps, when they occur and where identified. For instance, WWF helped mitigate a delay in SDC's second instalment, which was due to audit-related issues. Besides there is evidence that the joint responsibility attached to the institutional set up is respected: e.g. when SIDA froze its financial support to several NGOs in Cambodia, including Forum Syd's programme in Kampong Thom (a contribution project under PaFF II), RECOFTC decided to use its core funding, in order to cover staff cost and continue implementing activities planned under PaFF. It should be noted that part of the core fund of RECOFTC stems from another SDC grant to the NGO's headquarters in Bangkok. Therefore, if it was not for SDC and the PaFF consortium, activities in Kampong Thom would have already been severely restricted. Besides, under PaFF II, the budget allocated to each partner depends on its planned operational involvement, not on the amount of contribution resources it can mobilize: partners which can mobilize large contributions (e.g. WWF) compensate for those which have no contribution resources (e.g. CEPA). In other words, the consortium facilitates the mobilization of technical competencies, irrespective of financial capacities. Another positive aspect of the consortium is the role WWF plays as a lead partner vis à vis partner NGOs, with capacity building in several areas: monitoring, training on landscape management, ecosystem services, green growth. Last but not least, there is evidence in the minutes of PCT meetings (and this is confirmed by field interviews) that synergies are facilitated by coordination meetings: information is shared, issues are discussed and joint actions are proposed when it emerges that partners can together achieve more than they would if they were to act separately: e.g. NTFP-EP and RECOFTC work together on a CF Management Plan to include training on NTFP; CEPA supports CFi members to travel to a training organized by WWF, etc.

- **Conclusion.** There is no easy solution to the challenge of managing PaFF II because management constraints stem from the way the programme is designed/structured. The current institutional set up does have advantages and is very respectful of the value and role of each partner in the consortium. Addressing management constraints would require a modification of the institutional set up, which might have negative consequences on the relationship between the four partners. Therefore, the situation is neither black nor white. And in the view of the MTR, the current institutional set up offers more benefits than drawbacks. Perhaps the mistake of all (partners and donor) is not to be more appreciative and respectful of the immense coordination capacity required to implement a programme of such magnitude and complexity. And considering the constraints on decision making processes with respect to implementation, the overall efficiency is in fact surprisingly satisfactory, as evidenced by the level of expenditures to date and limited delays in implementations (discussed below).

RECOMMENDATION #8 to all PaFF partners and SDC. Changing the institutional set up will not help. The focus should be on improving the quality of the dialogues between 1/ the four partners themselves and 2/ between the management of PaFF and SDC. These dialogues entail a cooperative state of mind and a convergence of purposes between mutually respecting actors. Therefore, the MTR recommends that all four partners and SDC acknowledge the extreme challenge of coordinating and managing a programme such as PaFF II by facilitating the tasks of the PM and supporting the PCT in every circumstance. Internally, each partner NGO should reflect on whether it is sufficiently cooperative; whether and how it contributes to informing and facilitating decision making at PaFF management level; whether it is fully respectful of other parties' views or whether it is encroaching upon the prerogative of the PaFF management team by being too intrusive or directive; whether it is helping less capable partners in the consortium to better cooperate and contribute. Partners should consider the implementation of PaFF II as a priority and therefore internal management and communication processes related to PaFF II (including decision making, planning, technical and financial monitoring, reporting) must be treated as priorities (this necessarily includes contribution projects). Besides, decisions made by the PM and/or the PCT must be respected and promptly executed.

2. Stakeholder engagement

- **In parallel to PaFF management structure (ExeCom and PCT), a Programme Steering Committee (PSC) was to be established to facilitate policy engagement** and alignment with government priorities, as well as to provide strategic direction to PaFF II. It was supposed to be comprised of representatives from MoE, MAFF, Provincial Governors and PaFF partners and chaired by the National Council for Sustainable Development, a cross-sectoral policy making body chaired by the MoE and other ministries involved in NRM. However, institutional sensitivities and constraints eventually lead PaFF partners to abandon the idea of a PSC.
- **Instead, the concept of PSC was replaced by a NRM Coordination Forum.** The first event took place in November 2018, the second in May 2019, co-chaired by SDC and the FA, gathering several key development partners and donors, as well as a few government officials, including officials from the FiA and the MoE. As a national coordination platform focused on NRM and especially NRM in the Mekong region, the forum is definitely useful, at least for information sharing on existing and upcoming development interventions. However, from a governance standpoint, it does not have the value of a PSC. As initially planned, the PSC might have facilitated certain implementation issues, such as the transition from CFis to CPAs in the Ramsar site. Typically, a PSC helps strengthen governmental ownership of development interventions, a benefit that PaFF does not enjoy as a programme.
- **The absence of PSC is partly compensated by the existence of strong agreements between the partners in the consortium and different ministries at national and provincial levels.** For instance, RECOFTC has an agreement with the FA that allows the NGO to be strongly embedded in this administration, both in Phnom Penh and in provinces. WWF has an agreement with the MoE at national level and also has a memorandum of understanding with the province of Kratie. These national and provincial agreements (there are many more, the purpose is not to list them all) provide the necessary conditions for partners to operate in the field and engage the provincial administration and line departments in PaFF activities. However, the coordination problems between WWF and the FiA in Kratie demonstrate that as much as agreements are a condition to cooperation between NGOs and governmental stakeholders, they are not always a sufficient one.
- **Conclusion. The absence of a PSC probably leads to missed opportunities in terms of overall governance and facilitating the implementation of PaFF II.** However, partners assessed the critical institutional situation at the beginning of PaFF II and decided that a PSC, as envisaged, could not function properly. In a way, PaFF -which targets CF and CFis- is hostage of the institutional situation stemming from the transfer of protected forests to the MoE in 2016: the FA lost resources and the TWG-FR lost relevance (but is now being revived). It is perceptible that development interventions whose main government partner is the MoE benefit from a traction that the FA, and thus PaFF II, do not benefit from. In addition, and as mentioned under Relevance, the focus is now on the fishery sector, with two large ongoing interventions and an active TWG-FiA.

3. Efficiency of implementation: financial planning, rate of expenditures and delays

- **A key document forms the backbone of PaFF management system:** it is a detailed itemized 4-year budget plan, in which each line corresponds to an activity/output (except for lines regarding staff costs and operational costs). The budget plan follows the structure of the logframe, with three parts linked to the three PaFF components (Outcomes 1, 2 and 3) while the fourth part covers the costs associated to PaFF management, equipment, overheads, audits. The same itemized plan is used for annual planning, budgeting, monitoring of activities and reporting, providing good coherence to implementation processes.
- **As of 30/09/2019, partners had spent 55% of the total budget of PaFF II** (USD 3,347,585 out of USD 6,133, 000). More specifically expenditures amounted to 52% of SDC funding and 57% of direct contributions. At that time, the programme was about half-way through implementation (26 months out of 47 months, i.e. 55% of the time had elapsed). No development intervention works exactly to plan and budget in real life and the rate of expenditure is not expected to be a linear function of time, however the fact that it coincides with the time elapsed since the start of implementation of PaFF II is a sign of efficiency. Besides, barring temporary ups and downs, partners tend to spend at the same rate: at this stage, differences between them are not significant.

- **The fact that salaries and related staff costs account for 46% of the total PaFF budget also contributes to regular spending.** The budget acknowledges a focus on capacity building for which human resources are needed: 63 staff are on the payroll of PaFF (WWF has 24, NTFP-EP has 18, RECOFTC has 10, CEPA has 10), including 20 full time positions. At the time of the MTR, only one full time position was vacant (NTFP-EP).
- **The rate of expenditures also confirms there no major delays in implementation.** Interestingly, when asked about delays, partners tend to understand “failure”. For instance, PaFF partners complain that the transfer of CFs and CFIs to CPAs is taking more time than expected. However, the reason for this delay is institutional and thus beyond their control. As far as they are concerned, they are doing their best to accelerate the change in status. Therefore, from the point of view of PaFF II, this is not a delay in implementation of activities under OC1 because partners continue to actively support these groups. Similarly, under OC3, partners lament the fact that policy processes are delayed (Environment and Natural Resource Code is drafted but not yet approved, revision of Forestry and PA laws is on hold). But PaFF partners do not dictate the timeframe of policy reforms. They can only adjust to a situation that gives them an opportunity -especially in the case of the Forestry Law- to better prepare for the day when they will be prompted for policy inputs. Another source of concern for partners is the delay in the establishment of the landscape committee: in this area, WWF did conduct activities that were expected to lead to the formation of a landscape committee across six provinces in the Mekong Region (the four targeted provinces plus Monduliri and Ratanakiri). The failure to establish a committee (further discussed under Effectiveness of OC3) is not a lack of efficiency (delay) but a lack of effectiveness (failure).
- **The only real delays in implementation are under OC2.** The assessment of communities and value chains in view of establishing new CBEs was a long process, especially for CBEs under the responsibility of WWF. The fact that several pre-existing CBEs (e.g. bamboo, resin) were dropped in 2019 (or are in the process of being dropped, e.g. fish processing) demonstrates that assessment cannot be rushed. As a consequence, the establishment of two CBETs was delayed and so are the operations of two rattan collection groups, all under the responsibility of WWF. The reason for the delays is not clear (could this be another sign of the low capacities of WWF in livelihood support?). However, the consequences of these delays on the overall performance of PaFF II are likely to be minor given that the effectiveness of other CBEs already established by WWF are deemed rather ineffective (so far) by the MTR (refer to section on Effectiveness of OC2).
- **Conclusion.** Owing to an important programmatic planning exercise, underpinned by extensive coordination efforts at PCT level, the rate of expenditures is satisfactory and there are no major delays in implementation. The main issue, as already discussed under Relevance, is the discontinuity in implementation in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom.

4. Monitoring system processes: huge consolidation exercise but cumbersome data management

- **Given the programmatic approach and the number of contribution projects, PaFF monitoring processes build on monitoring systems tailored to activities implemented by each PaFF partner.** It also builds on systems developed under PaFF I. Each partner is responsible for the monitoring of its activities, as well as for the monitoring of outputs and outcomes stemming from these activities. There is no dedicated M&E Officer at PaFF management level. It is the PaFF PM who oversees the PaFF M&E system and is the de facto M&E officer, further supporting the conclusion that the coordination role of the PM prevails over the management role. At PaFF programme level, monitoring entails: 1/ Gathering existing monitoring data from contribution projects; 2/ Collecting data on activities strictly funded by SDC; 3/ gathering or estimating data on CBNRM groups supported by other development partners in the four targeted provinces (indirect support); 4/ Consolidating these data into information aimed at supporting PaFF management and coordination among partners; 5/ Assembling all quantitative data to inform the various output, outcome and impact indicators of the PaFF logframe, as well as for reporting and future planning purposes.
- **Overall, this is a large amount of information and data that needs to be collected and consolidated, which requires a clear methodology.** This methodology is in place and is anchored to the extensive programmatic exercise completed at the beginning of PaFF Phase II. This exercise is summarized in a key document that forms the backbone of PaFF’s monitoring system: it is the same detailed itemized 4-year budget plan mentioned in the previous section. The Annual Operation Plan is aligned with this budget plan.

Each item (budget line) corresponds to an activity, which is attached to an “expected result/output” and a timetable. There are about 100 activities/items. Data used to measure the progress of activities towards planned outputs is provided by each partner. Progress against the Annual Operation Plan is monitored on a quarterly basis and reported annually, activity per activity: the annual itemized monitoring table reports on quantitative progress and, if needed (e.g. delayed activity), provides an explanation. In addition, for each activity, progress is given a colour code and a grade for a quick visual assessment (completed, partly completed, postponed). The result is a clear and synthetic overview of the progress towards planned outputs.

- **Informing logframe indicators.** In parallel to this extensive and itemized monitoring exercise, logframe indicators are informed twice a year (mid-year, end of the year) with quantitative data obtained from partners. In this process, the overall logframe is broken down into 4 Excel tables: one for each partner. Indicators are informed for each partner before data is consolidated into an overall logframe that aggregates quantitative values from all four partners and cumulates these values from the beginning of the programme.
- **The management of quantitative data relies exclusively on Excel, at partner level as well as at PaFF management level.** Excel is not a database, but it is widely used to collect data because a spreadsheet is an inexpensive and user-friendly tool. However, Excel has strong limitations when it comes to linking data from different tables, providing overviews based on specific queries, generating reports as well as allowing multiple partners to access the monitoring system. Besides, a huge number of Excel tables is fed from the different partners into the monitoring system of PaFF, making the management of quantitative data a rather cumbersome exercise at programme level. The sheer number of Excel tables complicates data consolidation and integration, which undermines analytical capacities at PaFF management level. Unsurprisingly, data is sometimes inconsistent, with documents providing several values for the same indicator.
- **To illustrate the situation, CBNRM-related data is fragmented into several Excel tables** because different CBNRM groups are supported by different PaFF partners. In addition, CF-related data itself is split into 4 tables (one for each targeted province): the reason is not clear because all 4 tables seem (the information is in Khmer) to provide the same kind of information; therefore, it should be easy to have them all under one table, with one column for the name of the province. Information on the existence of a CF credit scheme is reported in the same line as the CF itself, which is a positive point, but data on credit schemes (number and gender of members, capital, etc.) is not integrated into CF tables. However, this information is reported in annual narrative reports, except for the amount of funds contributed to CFs.
- **As for data regarding CBEs, it is also broken down into several Excel tables.** One table does provide the name and location of all CBEs supported by WWF and NTFP-EP and the name of the CBNRM group(s) to which it is attached. But there is no integration between data on CBNRM groups and data on CBEs: e.g. to see the details of a CF attached to a CBE, one needs to examine another table. NTFP-EP and WWF both maintain their own databases with no harmonization of the data they collect on CBEs. NTFP-EP supports NTFP-based livelihoods with SDC funding while WWF supports livelihoods (livestock, aquaculture) through several contribution projects. Harmonization and consolidation are indeed complicated because NTFP-EP reports on production and sales volumes at CBE level while WWF seems (the table is in Khmer) to report on production and sales at household level. Besides, the number of tables is multiplied by the number of years.
- **The attribution issue (i.e. direct vs indirect support) further complicates monitoring** as PaFF partners are expected to gather data from groups they do not support directly. For instance, in CF-related tables, groups receiving direct support are identified by colour codes and some columns do not have a title, making it difficult to sort and analyse data on direct vs indirect support. Besides, the attribution issue diminishes the clarity of the narrative reporting because it is not always clear whether and when a number cumulates direct and indirect support or simply applies to direct support. One exception confirms the rule: in the monitoring system of PaFF, data related to CFs supported by CEPA (in Stung Treng) and WWF (in Kratie) are in the same table and are not mixed with data on CFs indirectly supported by PaFF. However, the logframe aggregates direct and indirect support for CFs and annual narrative reports include aggregated numbers.
- **On the positive side, the monitoring outputs and outcomes stemming from activities related to CBNRM groups is facilitated by governmental monitoring.** The formalization of CBNRM groups follows official development guidelines and key data are official at provincial level and reliable: e.g. the size of a CF, CFI or

CPA, the date when the agreement was obtained, when the first management plan was approved, etc. These official data can be retrieved by NGOs supporting CBNRM groups. Monitoring is also facilitated by the existence of a national database for CFs. However, there is no national database for CFs yet: official governmental data exists at provincial level but is not yet organized in a national database. Also, given the longstanding support PaFF partners provide to CBNRM groups, they already have data from former interventions (e.g. PaFF phase I), which they can build upon. Given that CBNRM groups are official grassroots institutions, monitoring systems of conservation projects are easily anchored to CBNRM groups: theoretically, it should be easy to track different forms of support to these groups and analyse their cumulative impact on conservation of the natural base of a CF or a CFI. For instance, a CF can be supported by a CF credit scheme, or a CBE or both. However, the fragmentation of data hampers simultaneous tracking of benefits.

- **Lack of qualitative data to reflect the true capacity of CBNRM groups.** Official data provides information on official milestones and it is assumed that these milestones reflect the capacities of CBNRM groups. However, qualitative information such as the true operational capacity and performances of CBNRM groups are not captured by official data: e.g. whether groups have the financial and technical capacity to run a management plan; whether and how they monitor the resource base; whether committees have the capacity to solve conflicts; whether patrolling leads to a decrease in illegal activities, etc. As a result, this information is also missing in the PaFF monitoring system.
- **Conclusion on monitoring.** As a result of data fragmentation and efforts needed to navigate between tables, data consolidation is strictly limited to logframe indicators. For instance, an overview of the overall support of PaFF II to a given CBNRM group, a village or a commune is possible but time-consuming to obtain. Calculating the cumulated amount of funding available to a given CBNRM by consolidating direct financial support from PaFF (e.g. to patrolling) and funds allocated by CBEs and/or credit schemes as a result of various programme activities is possible but, again, time-consuming. As a result, and in spite of an impressive programmatic approach backed by systematic and consistent monitoring of activities and outputs, synthetic analysis is undermined by inefficient data management. The cumulative impact of various conservation and NRM strategies cannot be easily assessed and resource allocation cannot be maximized. However, given that Excel is bound to remain the technical tool for both partners and PaFF management team until the end of PaFF II, there is little room for improvement in existing monitoring processes.

⇒ **LESSON LEARNED #2** - PaFF would have been an ideal opportunity for partners to introduce a monitoring system based on a database and to adopt new monitoring concepts. However, PaFF partners prefer to continue using Excel and are reluctant to switch to databases because of the cost involved, including the cost of building the capacities of their staff to adjust to databases. Recommending that PaFF partners switch from spreadsheets to a monitoring system supported by a real database would place, at this stage of PaFF, a counterproductive financial and technical burden on all of them and would seriously complicate the task of the PM. Besides, it would take too much time to introduce new monitoring processes in the context of PaFF. However, for future large projects, it makes little sense for PaFF partners to continue working with Excel. The time and funds spent in adopting database techniques will be compensated by time and money saved in collecting and analysing data, provided collection tools in the field are also improved (tablets linked to database). Analytical capacities will be boosted and reporting facilitated. Therefore, for future programming and the sake of efficiency, partners may consider developing an integrated monitoring system underpin by a user-friendly database, articulated around CBNRM groups and fed by governmental data -as and where it exists- in addition to data generated at project level by different partners.

5. Factors of cost-efficiency

- **Even though partners manage projects, they tend to assign their staff to thematic tasks, rather than dedicate staff to projects.** Among the 63 staff supported by PaFF II, only 20 positions are full time. All other positions are occupied by specialized staff who apply their skills and experience to several projects at a time. The correspondence between programme-related approaches/strategies and the thematic assignments of staff (e.g. livelihood coordinator, law enforcement manager, landscape manager, policy officer, etc.) is an efficient response of conservation NGOs to the multiplication of short-term, small interventions, which

cannot financially support complete management teams. This thematic organization is valuable: NGO partners can develop strong internal skills and capacity, which benefit every project; skilled project staff is capable of conducting trainings on conservation-related topics, which diminishes the cost of trainings (in-house expertise); when a post is vacant, no project is affected the way it would be if the staff were full time; this is true as well of administrative and financial management staff who can be shared between projects; when a project is over, the staff is likely to be retained because salaries are funded through several interventions; when a new project starts, most of the staff is already in place and thus quickly operational (to be compared with situations when the development partner takes 6 to 8 months to recruit a team and start activities). Therefore, the thematic organization (as opposed to a project-based organization) allows immediate implementation and contributes to building long-term institutional capacities, which is a major factor of cost-efficiency.

- **Each development/conservation project is unique, because it is sector and/or country-specific, making cost comparisons very difficult.** However, between 2013 and 2017, over a duration of 4 years, WWF implemented an EU-funded project in Mondulhiri in the Eastern Plains Landscape (*“Sustaining biodiversity, environmental and social benefits in the Protected Areas of the Eastern Plains Landscape of Cambodia”*) for a total budget of € 1,772,856. This is close to USD 2 M. This project fitted into the wider programme of WWF in Mondulhiri and had objectives very similar to those of PaFF II. Under this project, WWF partnered with three NGOs, including RECOFTC, NTFP-EP and My Village. This is probably the closest comparison that can be established with PaFF: same country, same sector, same duration, same objectives and same partners (except for CEPA) including same lead partner (WWF). The difference between the two interventions? PaFF is a programme, not a project, it covers 4 provinces (the EU-funded project was only in Mondulhiri), the number of CBNRM groups and CBEs is much higher (71 CFs, 40 CFis and 39 CBEs directly supported under PaFF II against 14 CPAs and 15 CBEs developed under the project in Mondulhiri). Besides, the entire PaFF team, whether full-time or part-time position, is comprised of national staff, definitely less costly than international expertise, which was present in the EU-funded project (the manager was an international expert and WWF Germany provided administrative and strategic support). Leaving PaFF contribution projects aside, the € 1.8 M budget of the EU-funded project in Mondulhiri covering 14 CPAs can be compared to the USD 3 M contribution of SDC to PaFF II in four provinces covering 111 CBNRM groups: the comparison is favourable to PaFF II.

- **In Table 3, the contribution of SDC is broken down to show that the allocation of funds to each NGO partner over a period of 4 years is moderate in view of the ambitious objective,** making synergies between the four partners and the use of multiplier mechanisms to leverage inputs a necessity. This is what the SDC grant and a carefully crafted programmatic approach have allowed: synergies are built in the very design of PaFF II. Even though partners admit that more synergies are possible, the programme has forced them to maximize the use of funds for the benefit of stakeholders and target groups, which is a major positive aspect in the programme and a factor of cost efficiency.

 **Table 3 – Allocation of SDC funds among PaFF partners**

Source: PaFF management team for staff numbers and sub-grant agreements for budget

NGO partner	Total budget from SDC (USD), as per contract	Average budget per year (USD/year)	Number of staff (Nov 2019)	Number of full time positions (Nov 2019)
WWF	1,029,502	257,376	24	4 including 2 programme management staff in Phnom Penh
RECOFTC	750,534	187,634	10	3 staff in provinces
NTFP-EP	680,000	170,000	18	9, in Phnom Penh and in the field
CEPA	540,000	135,000	10	4, including one volunteer
TOTAL	3,000,036	750,009	63	20

- **A well-designed M&E system is a strong factor of cost-efficiency** (and cost-effectiveness) because it facilitates analysis, thus the use of resources is maximized. In the case of PaFF, there is evidence that the M&E system is not up to the mark. It is impossible to assess the extent of the negative effect it has on efficiency (and effectiveness) but the fragmentation of the monitoring system entails possible gaps in field data and a lack of overview at programme level.
- **Cost-efficiency is decreased when a partner does not have in-house expertise and the skills to train beneficiaries.** For instance, WWF staff, who has limited experience and skills with respect to livestock/aquaculture training, relied on FiA technical staff to train beneficiaries in fish raising. Judging by the poor performance of the activity at the time of the MTR, both the technical training and the overall follow up of the activity are problematic. In other words, resources have been used with limited efficiency and effectiveness so far, with the conclusion that WWF cannot be cost-efficient when it implements activities that do not correspond to its core skills. The same reasoning can be applied to policy development: NGO partners demonstrate good skills to generate evidence to inform NRM-related policy processes. However, when it comes to turning evidence into legal inputs, legal experts are more efficient than policy officers. External expertise inevitable raises the cost of inputs but the absence of adequate expertise can also dramatically undermine both cost efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
- **Also on the negative front, there is a pervasive effect to thematic organization of staff:** coordination of staff stretched between projects may be challenging at times and the replacement of staff may drag on as no one is essential to a specific project, especially in remote provinces, where it may be difficult to find or send staff.
- **Conclusion.** In spite of a weak monitoring system and the lack of in-house expertise in two areas (legal expertise for all, and livelihood development expertise for WWF), the conclusion is that given the magnitude and duration of PaFF, which heavily depends on human resources to implement activities, the programme cost is reasonable and activities under PaFF II are deemed cost efficient.

6. Conclusion on efficiency of implementation

- **Efficiency of implementation is rather satisfactory.** The current institutional set up complicates management decisions, but it is a democratic structure that keeps each NGO fully empowered under PaFF II. Besides, given a satisfactory rate of expenditures and the absence of major delays in implementation, there is no evidence that the institutional set up is not adequate. Also on the positive side, the huge programmatic exercise that underpins the implementation of PaFF II provides a good level of coherence to key management tasks such as planning, budgeting and monitoring of activities and outputs. More problematic is the overall weakness of the monitoring and evaluation system, plagued by extreme data fragmentation, a large volume of data and the attribution issue. It complicates the consolidation of data and undermines the monitoring of result and strategic analysis. Unfortunately, there is little room for improvement on this front before the end of PaFF II.

- [↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY – OUTCOME 1

- **Introduction.** This chapter focuses on CBNRM groups, supported by RECOFTC (CFs), WWF (CFs and CFis in Kratie) and CEPA (CFis in Stung Treng). OC 1 was not the focus of the MTR. The field schedule incorporated a limited number of interviews with CF (4 groups, including 1 CF credit, in total 20 people including 9 women) and CFis (2 groups, in total 15 people, including 6 women). Besides, the MTR met with several stakeholders (such as commune chiefs, provincial administrative officers) who provided a useful perspective. What follows is not a fully informed assessment, but mostly qualitative observations based on field interviews.

1. Observations on the logframe and indicators regarding quantitative progress

- **Indicators (there is more on indicators in Chapter 5 “Financial sustainability” of this section).** Table 4 (next page) presents cumulative quantitative progress (June 2019) towards OC1 (capacity building of CBNRM groups). The content comes from the monitoring system of PaFF and has not been edited. The presentation has been slightly adjusted to show all outcome and output values on a single page. A code was added to each indicator to facilitate referencing in the MTR report (codes 1 to 4 are for impact-level indicators). The one-page presentation makes it easier to spot design weaknesses such as redundant indicators (they have the same baseline, target and milestone values, e.g. Ind#5 and Ind#13 or Ind#7 and Ind#10) or an incorrect hierarchy of results (e.g. in the official formalization process, Ind#11 and Ind#12 at output level correspond to development stages more advanced than the stage described by Ind#5 at outcome level).

- **The inclusion of data related to CBNRM groups indirectly supported prevents a transparent overview of the quantitative progress under OC1.** Indeed, assessing the quantitative progress stemming from activities directly funded under PaFF (SDC funding and contribution projects) is not possible: there is a column on cumulative progress corresponding to direct support, but both baseline and target values aggregate direct and indirect support. The rationale for attributing indirect results to PaFF II has been discussed under Relevance. The MTR repeats here that OC1 indicators have been defined to measure progress against official development guidelines steps, a progress that is not achieved by supporting CBNRM networks but through activities specifically tailored to the needs of individual CBNRM groups. However, under OC3, there would be a logic to reporting the benefits of OC3 (especially from support to CBNRM networks) on all CBNRM groups in a province.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #9 to all PaFF partners** – For the sake of transparency and accountability, in the next annual progress report (covering the year 2019), when reporting on quantitative values under OC1, consider focusing strictly on direct support. Therefore, all values (i.e. baseline, target and milestone values) should reflect direct support only. There should be a column to reflect cumulative values from August 2017 to December 2019, as well as columns for annual targets and annual achievements. All data already exist in separate tables in the PaFF monitoring system: the idea is not to produce more data but to present all relevant data in parallel and from the beginning of PaFF Phase II, in order to better reflect the pace of implementation and the progress. The table should look like this:

INDICATOR DEFINITION	Baseline Jun 17	Final target Jun 21	Intermediate cumulative value Aug 17 - Dec 19	Annual target Dec 17	Intermediate annual value Dec 17	Annual target Dec 18	Intermediate annual value Dec 18	Annual target Dec 19	Intermediate annual value Dec 19
----------------------	-----------------	---------------------	---	----------------------	----------------------------------	----------------------	----------------------------------	----------------------	----------------------------------

If partners insist on reporting indirect support under OC1, there should be a nested logframe specifically dedicated to indirect support (with separate baseline, target and intermediate/milestone values).

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #10 to all PaFF partners** - Under OC3, consider incorporating an indicator that does measure the concrete benefits of supporting CBNRM networks and relevant provincial committees. For instance, an indicator could measure the change in number of illegal activities, since violations and encroachments are a key topic discussed during network meetings and raised during provincial committee meetings, provided illegal activities can be easily measured through CBNRM networks. Another relevant indicator of effectiveness is “Number of CBNRM groups whose capacity to address conflicts and violations has increased”: this is exactly where PaFF II can claim credit for ALL groups (indirect and indirect support).

Table 4 - Quantitative Cumulative Progress (August 2017 - June 2019) Against Outcome 1 & Output 1 Targets

Source "Final PaFF Milestone for 2019, 19-06-19"

code	INDICATORS	Baseline (June 2017)	Targets (June 2021)	Milestone DIRECT support June 2019 (Cumulated from August 2017)	Milestone DIRECT + INDIRECT support June 2019 (Cumulated from August 2017)
Outcome 1 - Target communities have secure rights to their natural resources and are exercising them.					
5	<u># of communities with secure access to community resources through approved CBNRM agreements</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA etc.].	134 CFs 24 CFis	185 CFs 162 CFis 24 CPAs	19CFs 20CFis 21CPA (29,773ha) 7,225people (3,366F)	153CFs 62CFi 27CPAs (31,332ha) 7,977people (3,606F)
6	<u>Area (ha) under formal agreements</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA and PAs.].	CFs 153,972ha CFis 16,488ha	CFs 241,376ha CFis 139,335ha	28,188ha 16,984ha	182,160ha 46,738.5ha
7	<u># of CBNRM group member households</u> [disaggregated by # of IPs and female-headed households, by type - CF, CFi, CPA and PAs].	CF 2,447hh CF total people 5,746 (2,893 F) CFi: 2,869hh Cfi: 10,163 people / 4726 female (262 female-headed, 90 IP)	CF 31,937hh CF total people 89,832 (45,131 F) CFi: 18,973hh 44,423 people / 17,470 female (435 female-headed, 1,374 IP)	11,017HH 29,330 people (14,787F) 3,585HH 2,058 people (314F, 1,482IP)	13,464 HH of 71CFs 35,076 people (17,680F) 9,104HH 19,591 people (8,562F, 1,572IP)
8	<u># of fisheries zones designated for conservation and/or under sustainable management.</u>	119 deep pool conservation	135 deep pool conservation	33 deep pools	170 deep pools
9	<u>CF Credit scheme exists and function to benefit CBNRM groups</u>	6 CF Credit	18 CF Credit (4 STG, 8 KRT, 6KPT)	6 CFi Credits in Stung Treng 23 CF Credits	7 CFi Credits 29 CF Credits (05 STT, 12 KPT, 02 PVH,10 KRT)
Output 1.1 - Capacity Development for communities to engage in tenure formalisation processes and sustainable NRM through training for action and coordination – 371 CBNRM groups supported					
10	<u># of communities/households</u> [# of female-headed and IP households] <u>demonstrating understanding and capacity to engage in tenure formalisation processes and sustainable NRM</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA, and PA].	CF: 2,447HH, 5,746 people (2,893 Female) CFi: 2,869HH, 10,163 people/4726 female (262 female-headed, 90 IP)	371 CBNRM groups: CF: 31,937HH, 89,832 people (45,131 Female) CFi: 18,973HH, 44,423 people/17,470 female (435 female-headed, 1,374 IP)	11,017HH 3,585HH	13,464 HH of 71CFs 9,104HH
11	<u># CBNRM groups using learned sustainable management practices in the management of their natural resources</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA and CMPZ and by forest and fisheries designations – Protected Area (PA), Ramsar, Biodiversity Conservation Corridor (BCC), etc.].	30 CBNRM groups: 15 CFs 15 CFis	371 CBNRM groups: 185 CFs 162 CFis 24 CPAs	56 CFs 25CFis 21CPA (29,773ha) 7,225people (3,366F)	71CFs 58CFis 27CPAs (31,332ha) 7,977people (3,606F)
12	<u># of ToT for resources planning and management</u>	6 ToT	16 ToT	6 ToT	12 ToT
Output 1.2: - Tenure rights of CBNRM groups are secured through legal agreement with government authorities – at least 100 CBNRM groups supported depending on RGC requirements					
13	<u># CBNRM groups formed/legalised</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA- ha of NRM area under NRM group agreement etc.].	134 CFs 15 CFis	371 CBNRM groups: 185 CFs 162 CFis 24 CPA	19CFs 20CFis 21CPA (29,773ha) 7,225people (3,366F)	153CFs 53CFis 27CPAs (31,332ha) 7,977people (3,606F)
14	<u># CBNRM groups receiving organisation and management support from authorities</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA, etc.].	133 CFs 15 CFis	371 CBNRM groups: 185 CFs 162 CFis	56 CFs 25 CFis	189 CFs 58 CFis
Output 1.3 - CBNRM groups exercise their rights over natural resource management through developed, approved, and implementation of CBNRM management plan –at least 65 groups have approved management plans, and at least 75 supported CBNRM groups implement					
15	<u># CBNRM groups with management plans developed and approved</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA and CMPZ and by forest and fisheries designations – Protected Area (PA), Ramsar, Biodiversity Conservation Corridor (BCC), etc.].	36 CFMPs 15 CFis	64 CFMPs 70 CFis	26 CFMPs 27 CFiMP	64CFMPs 58 CFiMPs
Output 1.4: - CBNRM groups exercise their rights over the resources through the implementation of CBNRM management plans –at least 75 supported CBNRM groups implement management plans					
16	<u># CBNRM groups implementing >80% of activities envisaged in management plans</u> [disaggregated by type - CF, CFi, CPA, and PA]	10 CFs 15 CFis 6 CF Credits	37 CFs 40 CFis 18 CF Credits (4 STG, 8KRT, 6 KPT)	18 CFs 25 CFis 6 CFi Credits in Stung Treng 23 CF Credits	28 CFs 40 CFis 07 CFi Credits 29 CF Credits (05 STT, 12 KPT, 02 PVH,10 KRT)

2. Observations on capacity building of CBNRM groups

- **Field interviews with CBNRM groups and provincial officials confirm the paramount role of NGOs in supporting the long, cumbersome and rigid institutional development process of CFis and CFs.** Provincial stakeholders confirm, independently from each other, that there would be no CF or CFi without support from the international donor community and development partners.
- **Patrolling remains the cornerstone of NRM**, an activity communities easily adhere to because it can start as soon as a CF/CFi is demarcated and it yields immediate results. Besides, scarce funds force groups to focus on most urgent actions, i.e. preventing violations which is best achieved through community patrolling. CBNRM groups report that violations are decreasing. They also report that joint patrols (with rangers) are sometimes organized (but not often enough for a lack of funds). In Preah Vihear, the FAC has authorized (in 2016) CFs to arrest perpetrators and confiscate the equipment, while reporting violations to the FAC. In the Ramsar site, efforts to promote coordination between the FiA and the PDoE are starting to pay off. Under PaFF II, co-management meetings have been organized by CEPA since October 2018 to facilitate communication between all parties (commune councils, police, CFis, PDoE). As a result, the PDoE admits CFis are starting to show “respect” to the PDoE and there is a plan for joint patrolling two times a month.
- **CBNRM committees are invited to and participate in commune investment planning mechanisms** to discuss their plans and activities (with hardly any effect on funding). In other words, PaFF activities contribute not only to building technical and institutional capacity but also to mainstreaming the role of CBNRM groups into the wider governance of commune affairs and into the provincial governance of natural resources.
- **On the negative side, there is a coordination issue between PaFF and MIWRM on CFis.** No less than 31 CFis targeted for support by both PaFF and MIWRM (13 in Kratie and 18 in Stung Treng) out of the 40 CFis supported directly by PaFF. The coordination issue is quite severe in Kratie where progress is stalled. It is unclear to which extent the issue was anticipated and which measures were taken to avoid duplication, but WWF rightly expresses frustration over the lack of coordination with the FiA. There is no firm evidence that a clear-cut decision regarding the reallocation of PaFF funds has been made yet to address the situation, hence Recommendation #2 (Relevance section). In Stung Treng, CEPA and the FiA coordinate to avoid duplication. MIWRM activities in the field started after PaFF II activities started, but it is CEPA which had to adjust to the situation. One would expect that the presence of PaFF II and MIWRM substantially improves the overall level of support to CFis in Stung Treng. However, the management of the Ramsar site (under the DoE) complains that CFis do not have community boats for patrolling (members use their own boat). This demonstrates the negative consequences of being caught in between two administrations (the provincial FiA is unlikely to give a boat to a community, which will eventually go under the jurisdiction of the MoE).

On the positive side, capacity building of line department officials through training of trainers probably has a positive effect on formalization processes, though it is hard to demonstrate the cause-effect relationship. In Preah Vihear, formalization processes have sped up: in 2010, a prakas (promulgation) would lead to a CF agreement in 4 years, now agreements are achieved within a year of the promulgation. It could be that NGOs are more efficient in supporting CFs but the director of the FAC also claims that staff is younger and more knowledgeable. Overall, capacities of targeted FACs are improving.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #11 to all PaFF partners.** The role and activities that WWF and CEPA will play with CFis in, respectively, Kratie and in Stung Treng until the end of PaFF II must be clarified among partners and with the FiA cantonments of both targeted provinces, in the light of existing coordination issues, possible duplications of roles and activities and, if possible, in anticipation the newly started EU-funded intervention.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #12 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** Given that PaFF partners have flexibility to allocate funds to CFis or CPAs (contrary to MIWRM, which strictly supports FiACs and CFis), reassess the urgent needs of CFis in the Ramsar site and determine whether budget can be allocated to meet their needs, in particular, the needs for boats since no support can be expected from the FiA and MIWRM, owing to the planned transition from CFis to CPAs.

3. Observations on the sustainability of institutional and technical capacities of CBNRM groups

- **The foundations of CBNRM groups are laid and will remain because CFs and CFis are official institutions.**

This institutional sustainability has weaknesses though. Indeed, discussions with beneficiaries provided ample evidence that the “chief culture” prevents proper dissemination of information and capacities from one committee to the next (this is also true for CBEs). How to make sure the functioning of a committee is not interrupted every time its members are renewed or when a chief resigns? For instance, there is evidence that official documents are not always in the hands of the committee. In Kratie, a CFi committee had not even realized it was time for re-election, until the MTR asked. Leadership skills are still rare and limited, as confirmed by the deputy director of the Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (PDAFF) in Kratie, who also insists that repeated trainings are useful and contribute to improving skills. But even chiefs are not on top of things: in Preah Vihear, the chief of the CF (also the chief of the provincial CF network) cannot tell the official duration of a management plan; in Kratie, a CFi chief does not know the number of hectares under agreement and even the date of the CFi agreement, arguing that “this information is with the FiA cantonment and was not communicated to him”. CBNRM group members acknowledge that their technical capacities lack sustainability but criticize official guidelines, especially the CFMP, for being too technical: a CF member says “we cannot do an inventory of natural resources without technical NGO support”. Complex activities under CFMP are not always well understood. An FA official at national level confirms and says guidelines are even too complicated for FAC staff, which explains why out of 636 CFs in the whole of Cambodia, only 85 CFs so far have an approved CFMP (simplification of CF guidelines is ongoing, though). Committee members have been trained but they say they lack the confidence to do the work by themselves. For CFis, the sustainability of technical capacities is especially at stake because agreements are signed, and management plans approved for a much shorter period of time (respectively 3 years and 3 years), as compared to CFs (15 years and 5 years). For both groups, committees are elected for 5 years.

- **The difficulty to sustain technical and management capacities is aggravated by the lack of funds to implement management plans.** Indeed, in matters of technical and management capacity, once basic skills are acquired through training and coaching, learning by doing is often the best capacity building mechanism. But because funds are desperately insufficient, technical and management skills cannot be exercised and are therefore at the risk of being lost. The argument that training methods should be more effective does not stand: there is ample evidence, and not just in Cambodia, that when Community-Based Organizations (CBO) do not have funds to implement key activities, members slowly lose interest in their CBO, confidence in the CBO purpose diminishes and the CBO eventually stops functioning, whatever the amount of technical support and the quality of the training.

4. Observations on credit schemes

- **Benefits of credit schemes attached to CBNRM groups (see the case study on CF credit in Annex 2).** A CF (or CFi) credit scheme operates within a CF/CFi and functions like a Self Help Group (SHG), to support livelihoods and income generation. In addition, one of its goals is to contribute a portion of the interests generated by the microcredit activity to NRM (typically patrolling). Under PaFF II, credit schemes are a strategy developed to support NRM directly (financially) and indirectly (by developing Income Generating Activities or IGAs, people are less likely to use natural resources). A precious, necessary, impetus is given to credit schemes by RECOTFC in the form of a USD 1000 grant. Therefore, a credit scheme entails the opening of a bank account by the CF/CFi, and thus forces committee members to exercise their financial skills. This strengthens the CBNRM group as an institution and contributes to building its management capacity. Given the above observation that the lack of funds seriously undermines the sustainability of management capacities because committee members do not have enough opportunities to exercise them, the opening of a bank account is an important benefit.

- **Income Generating Activities.** Besides members of credit schemes have the freedom to take a loan to fund a productive activity of their choice. Interviews (with two beneficiaries of a CF credit scheme and with several other CF members) confirm that members of a credit scheme typically use loans for agriculture-related purposes (this includes livestock). A CFi credit scheme in Stung Treng extends loans for rice seeds, fishing equipment, chicken and pig raising. The point here is the following: compared to livelihood support

organized by WWF under OC2, members of a credit scheme choose their IGA (under OC2, they are oriented among selected value chains), they fully fund the activity (under OC2, they contribute minimally) and they start at a small scale (under OC2, beneficiaries can be tempted into semi-commercial scale because the NGO pays for inputs, but they take a risk because they lack skills to operate on such a scale). Under a credit scheme, the risk is calculated by beneficiaries themselves. The MTR did not identify any negative issue with respect to credit schemes, but the number of interviews were limited and for several CBNRM groups, the activity is just starting: it is premature to draw conclusions. For groups that are a little older (for instance in O'Svay, Stung Treng), the credit group contributes USD 27.50 monthly to patrolling, which is considered a significant contribution. CEPA, which has introduced two credit schemes attached to CFs in Stung Treng, confirms this is an efficient way of supporting NRM. In Stung Treng, RECOFTC also confirms that members are putting more money into credit schemes than initially expected. Among PaFF field staff, there is a general consensus over the benefits of credit schemes, however the true benefits in terms of income have not been assessed

- **Among other benefits of CF/CFi credit schemes: the mechanism is especially attractive to women**, who are often in an administrative position in CF/CFi committees, therefore it is a positive factor of gender balance. The annual narrative report for 2018 reported a total number of 742 members for 21 CF credit schemes supported under PaFF II, including 394 women (53%). This is not very different from the average percentage of women members of a CF (among the 11,925 members of 18 CFs, which signed an agreement in 2018, 49% were women) but the big difference is that all CF women members of credit schemes are likely to be active members (they borrow and invest in an IGA) whereas it is likely that the vast majority of women members of CBNRM groups are passive members. As far as CFis are concerned, CEPA reports that 118 are members of the 7 CFi credit schemes it supports (only two are under direct support of PaFF II, others are indirect support), including 85 women (72%). The concept of SHG is not new. In many countries, it proves a successful development tool for development, and more specifically for women, with risks more limited than those attached to loans from mainstream microfinance institutions, which can be a trap for poor farmers.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #13 to RECOFTC and CEPA** – A specific assessment of CF credit schemes is needed to determine their true effectiveness on household income and gender balance.

5. Observations on financial sustainability

- **Wherever the MTR went, CBNRM groups complained about the lack of funds.** Funds for patrolling are insufficient and rare are the members who contribute their fee to the CBNRM group, though there is a provision in the by-laws, but not enforced because people are too poor. Some CBEs have started distributing a share of their profit to the NRM group they are attached to: it helps but it is insufficient.

- **The MTR met with representatives from 7 different communes in Kratie, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear. None of the communes the MTR visited ever dedicated some level of financial support to NRM**, in spite of increasing Commune Investment Funds, and even when the commune chief is a champion of NRM (RECOFTC says it happened in one commune, a first, and two CFis received funds for patrolling). The pressure from piers to allocate all funds to infrastructure development is too strong. Besides, there is a potential dilemma: the representatives of three communes explained that they have no incentive to allocate funds to NRM because coordination mechanisms at district level systematically conclude that as long as NGOs are there to fund NRM and conservation, then Commune Investment Plans will focus on infrastructure only. In other words, decentralization has had no effect so far on financial sustainability of NRM and there is no evidence that it will change in a near future. For instance, the representatives of three communes, interviewed in Preah Vihear, explained that their next focus is to fund kindergarten (infrastructure and salaries). None mentioned NRM. This is in contradiction with information gathered from national stakeholders who say that starting January 2020, commune budgets will include NRM and that districts will be invested with role and responsibilities in overseeing NRM funds.

- **Provincial funds are also insufficient:** at cantonment level (forestry or fishery), all FA officials confirm HR capacities are insufficient to follow up with communities and funds to directly support communities are extremely limited, when they exist. The FA tries to address CF issues as best as it can: in Preah Vihear, the director of the FAC has proposed to turn most of its staff into judicial police officers because more human

resources are needed to arrest people and file legal cases (currently the province has 41 technical staff, including 12 who have the status of judicial police officers; 19 more are now proposed to access this status in spite of their lower ranking in the forestry administration). The MTR was also told that the promise of the Prime Minister to allocate USD 1,000 annually to all CFs will not materialize because it is a misunderstanding.

- **The main complaint and issue behind the lack of funds stems from the fact that communities (CFs or CFIs) are currently not legally allowed to exploit and generate a revenue from the resources that they protect and manage sustainably.** In other words, one of the poorest segments of the population in rural Cambodia is entrusted by the government, without any financial means, with the daunting task of protecting and managing precious resources, which provide invaluable environmental services to the whole country. This is an issue donors and development partners are fully aware of, one that requires coordination at national level to advocate for a drastic change in the area of financial sustainability. This is the very rationale of PaFF II, which develops a dual strategy: at subnational level, PaFF II helps communities cope with a lack of funds; at national level, PaFF II advocates with other development partners for a change in the legal framework and more governmental funding for CBNRM groups. This is further discussed under “OC3”.
- **Prospects of financial sustainability. The prospects are promising for CFIs, but not very encouraging for CFs.** As mentioned under relevance, the amount of funds available for the fishery sector has grown since the beginning of PaFF II. Support to CFIs is underpinned by two large projects: MIWRM currently runs in Stung Treng and Kratie until June 2021. After June 2021, both PaFF and MIWRM will come to an end but the substantial support of the World Bank to the FiA (USD 11 M in the two provinces, according to PaFF partners) is likely to increase the capacity of the FiACs to continue strengthening CFIs locally. Besides, another major intervention has started: the EU-funded programme “Capfish” has a component on capture fisheries for an amount of € 87 M, including a budget support of € 35 M to the FiA. The first tranche focuses on the adoption of guidelines on financial support to CFIs, including a one-time support of USD 15,000 per CFi (equipment, demarcation) and an annual operational support of USD 2,500 per CFi. The EU aims at the adoption of guidelines in 2020 and the transfer of funds to a given number of CFIs as early as 2021. There is no guarantee that CFIs targeted under PaFF will get any financial support before PaFF ends. However, the objective of the EU-funded intervention is clearly to develop national mechanisms, in line with the country’s financial regulations, aimed at boosting the financial sustainability of CFIs in Cambodia. Another indicator of progress under CapFish is the amount of state budget allocated to the fishery sector at national and subnational level, with a target of a 15% increase in operational costs (i.e. not salaries). Theoretically, this is expected to increase the capacity of the FiA at national and subnational levels, among other and wider objectives.
- **The development context for CFs is far less dynamic than it is for CFIs and CPAs.** With the change in jurisdiction between MAFF and MoE in 2016, the MaFF lost a lot of ground. In the targeted areas, the transition from CFs to CPAs is ongoing (e.g. 17 CFIs are caught in the transition process in the Ramsar site). However, even though the PaFF team is frustrated about the slow transition from CFs/CFIs to CPAs, it is only a matter of time. Another sign of times, the TWG-FR, a sectoral coordination mechanism which used to be very effective until 2015, went dormant for about 3 years. It is now being revived under the auspices of FAO. Again, the key question is that of funding for the implementation of management plans and the removing the legal stumbling blocks that currently prevent CFs to draw a revenue from sustainable management of resources.
- **Financial sustainability for CFs is a distant prospect,** which partly depends on the implementation of the national Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) strategy 2017-2026. REDD+ is a long-term multi-stakeholder governance mechanism aimed at tackling climate change at global level. In Cambodia, the focus is on slowing down deforestation. The idea is to incorporate REDD+ mechanisms -as they have been designed and tailored to the situation in Cambodia- into the management plans of CPAs and CFs, another confirmation that the role of CFs and CPAs is mainstreamed into long-term forestry governance. UNDP, which implements the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility REDD+ Readiness Project, confirms the preparation phase of REDD++ is almost over. The next step is the implementation of the REDD+ strategy, which could mean financial opportunities for CFs. Funding the REDD+ strategy requires USD 200 M over a period of 10 years but, according to UNDP, there is currently little political will to mobilize these resources.

- **Financial sustainability is the cornerstone of community-based NRM.** All strategies implemented under PaFF have the explicit objective of increasing funds available for NRM. However, in the logframe there are no clear indicator to measure the progress towards financial capacity and sustainability.

Currently, three indicators are connected to financial sustainability of CBNRM groups, but their definition is too vague:

- Ind#23 (OC2): “# of CBEs have benefit sharing mechanism, and amount contributed to the NRM group management plan implementation”. This measures the number of CBEs that have a benefit sharing mechanism in their by-laws, but it does not measure the number of CBEs that do contribute substantially and regularly to their CBNRM group; therefore, the formulation is misleading; the contribution amount is mentioned in the annual progress report, but it is linked to CBEs and it does not say which CBNRM group(s) it benefits.
- Ind#17 (OC2): “# CBEs operate businesses with profit”. The assumption is that “profit” entails “profit sharing”, which is true. However, this is not an indicator of effectiveness.
- Ind#9 (OC1): “CF Credit scheme exists and function to benefit CBNRM groups”. Again, the financial intention is implicit, not explicit. In the context of PaFF, what is important is to know how much CF credit schemes contribute to NRM. CF credit schemes are new under PaFF II and therefore RECOFTC may not have had an opportunity to report on their contribution yet.

What is important, but currently missing, is an overview of the extent to which a given CBNRM is financially supported. The information exists in different documents (spreadsheets, reports) but is not consolidated and linked to CFs or CFis. Again, the point is that all quantitative data that are linked to a CBNRM group should be easily available and consolidated. Without this, it is not possible to compare the cost-effectiveness of the different strategies that PaFF partners implement to financially support NRM in the targeted provinces.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #14 to PM with PCT support.** 1/ If possible, consider producing a table (see below) that summarizes, for each CBNRM group directly supported under PaFF II a table that shows the following information: area (hectares), number of members, date agreement signed, date management plan approved if any, annual funds directly allocated to CBNRM group by PaFF partners (under various contribution projects and SDC funding, for instance for patrolling), funds from CBE (if any), from credit scheme (if any), from other development partners (if this information is available) and compare total funds available with the size of the area under management. Ideally one should also comment on the status of the natural resource base (degraded, very degraded, etc.), whether the CBNRM group benefits from governmental support (a boat for instance). The idea is to obtain an overview, as complete as possible, of financial means available to targeted CBNRM groups, on an annual basis. The table is to be updated every year. 2/ Define two indicators of financial sustainability, one for CBEs and one for CF credit schemes both at outcome level (see Annex 1 for suggestions).

CBNRM name	Province	Size CF, CFI CPA (ha)	Year agreement signed	CFMP Year approved or NA (if no CFMP)	Funds allocated under project A (USD)	Funds allocated under project B (USD)	...	Funds allocated SDC funding (USD)	Funds contributed by credit scheme (if any) (USD)	Funds contributed by CBE (USD)	Funds contributed by other development partners (USD)	Total funds available for the year (USD)	Funds available / 100 ha / year (USD)
------------	----------	-----------------------	-----------------------	---------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	-----	-----------------------------------	---	--------------------------------	---	--	---------------------------------------

6. Observations on the role of women in CBNRM groups

- **(Also refer to the section on Credit Schemes).** All partners all have a gender sensitive development strategy, especially RECOFTC, which strongly acknowledges and promotes the role of women in community forestries. As discussed under a previous section, the contribution of credit schemes developed by RECOFTC (and to a lesser extent by CEPA) to gender balance is welcome in an area (NRM) traditionally dominated by men. But the “chief” culture in Cambodia prevents many community members, including men and women, from raising their voice. Therefore, unless a woman is the chief herself (this is the case of the CFI network in

Stung Treng), the presence of women in committees does not necessarily reflect their influence. Partners argue that women do not always apply to become committee members because being part of the committee often entails a role in patrolling, which is typically a role for men. Besides, illiteracy is higher among women, which is a deterrent to taking responsibilities in a CBNRM group. There is evidence (interviews, programme documentation) that PaFF partners specifically encourage the participation of women but it does not help that the number of female field staff of PaFF II is very limited.

7. Conclusion on Outcome 1

- **PaFF is effective in strengthening the institutional capacity of CBNRM groups and developing technical and management capacities.** By definition, the objective of OC1 “Target communities have secure rights to their natural resources and are exercising them”: the key word is “exercising”, and it is implicitly an objective of financial sustainability. However, the conclusion is that prospects of financial sustainability on the short and medium terms are very limited for CFs. As a matter of fact, what communities are doing is voluntary work, which explains why most community members are passive, rather than active. Therefore, there is a specific risk that the technical and management capacities of CFs will quickly erode when activities at CBNRM level stop. Indeed, sustainability is not only a matter of capacities, it is also a matter of confidence, which can only be acquired through time and experience. The risk of erosion of capacities is not as high for CFs because financial sustainability is more promising and because the management of resources is not as complex as it is for forests. Therefore, that RECOFTC support to CF stops in December 2019 is unfortunate and has immediate concrete implications for CFs which are at key stages in their formalization process.
- **Besides, support to communities is a condition of cooperation with the government.** It brings legitimacy to the policy dialogue between PaFF partners and governmental stakeholders at both provincial and national levels. Therefore discontinuing supporting to CBNRM groups before the end of PaFF II amounts to a significant strategic risk for PaFF partners with respect to the implementation of Outcome 3.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #15 to all PaFF partners and SDC.** This recommendation supports [Recommendation #1](#). For strategic reasons, PaFF partners should continue supporting CFs in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom.

[Return to Table of Contents](#)

EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY - OUTCOME 2

- **Introduction.** Outcome 2 focuses on strengthening CBEs formed under PaFF I and on forming new CBEs. Two partners are involved in the implementation of OC2: 1/ NTFP-EP-EP currently supports 23 CBEs collecting and/or transforming NTFP (10 wild honey, 5 traing, 3 wild fish) or involved in Eco-Tourism (CBET) in the provinces of Stung Treng, Preah Vihear and Kratie; 2/ WWF supports 16 CBEs, all in Kratie, including 12 CBEs organized around animal raising (fish, chicken, cow), 2 CBETs and 2 CBEs focused on rattan collection. CBE members are attached to a CF or a CFi (i.e. CBE members are also members of a CF/CFi), but all CBEs are managed independently from the CBNRM group to which they are attached. The purpose of CBEs is to help beneficiaries generate income and to contribute to NRM by sharing financial profit, if any, with the CF/CFi.

1. A brief analysis of outcome and output indicators under Outcome 2

- **Outcome 2 is defined as** “Households in target communities increase their income through sustainable community-based forest and fisheries related enterprises and strategies.” However, none of the indicators related to this component measures HH income, which is an indicator at impact level. All OC2 indicators focus on CBEs, not on individual HHs. Therefore the definition of Outcome 2 lacks relevance.

- **Table 5 (next page) presents cumulative quantitative progress (as of June 2019) towards OC2.** The content comes from the PaFF monitoring system and has not been edited. Table 5 makes it easy to see that under Outcome 2 and Output 2, there are 3 indicators (Ind#22, Ind#23, Ind#24) that have the same baseline and targets values (11/35) as well as the same intermediate value (39). There is room for simplification.

- **One of the expected benefits of CBEs is to financially contribute to NRM but existing indicators fail to establish a tangible link between CBEs and NRM,** as mentioned in the previous section (OC1). Ind#23 is more specific than Ind#17 but still fails to measure the effectiveness of CBEs in contributing to NRM. All CBEs have a benefit sharing mechanism since they are all modelled after the same principles: they are a spin-off of a CBNRM group and their by-laws stipulate a profit sharing mechanism that includes a percentage for NRM. Therefore, it is one thing to have an indicator that measures a number of CBEs incorporating a “benefit sharing mechanism” in their by-laws (Ind#17), and another to have an indicator that actually measures how many CBEs effectively contribute substantially to NRM on a regular basis (monthly or annually, depending on the nature of the CBE). The chapter on the contribution of CBEs to NRM (below) analyses the contribution to NRM of 23 CBEs supported by NTFP-EP: only 8 CBEs contributed in 2018, for an average of USD 77 per group (for the whole year). Hence the need for an appropriate indicator of effectiveness.

- **As far as measuring the level of activity of CBEs is concerned,** a poorly defined composite indicator (Ind#19) is broken down into categories of CBEs. However, as far as quantities sold are concerned, it is not always clear whether milestones (i.e. intermediate data) reported in the logframe are quantities sold by CBEs or cumulative quantities sold by individual members. An examination of NTFP-EP monitoring tables confirms a similar lack of clarity with respect to CBE income versus cumulative income of all CBE members.

- **The indicator on sales prices is not very useful:** market prices for many products are beyond the control of PaFF partners (honey, chicken, fish) and for prices under control (ecotourism services), an increase in price is not necessarily an indication of positive performance as it may signal an increase in input price (e.g. fuel).

- There is no specific recommendation because [Recommendation #4](#) and [Recommendation #14](#) (both under the section on Relevance) already cover the issues just raised.

Table 5 - Quantitative Cumulative Progress (August 2017 - June 2019) Against Outcome 2 & Output 2 Targets
Source "Final PaFF Milestone for 2019, 19-06-19"

code	INDICATORS	Baseline (June 2017)	Targets (June 2021)	Milestone DIRECT support June 2019 (Cumulated from August 2017, excluding baseline data)	DIRECT support June 2019 (Cumulated from August 2017 including baseline data)
Outcome 2: Households in target communities increase their income through sustainable community-based forest and fisheries related enterprises and strategies.					
17	# CBEs operate businesses with profit [disaggregated by sector and product(s)]	11 CBEs	35 CBEs	32 (20 CBEs of NTFP-EP and 12 CBEs of WWF)	
18	# of communities and households [# of female-headed households] participating in CBEs [disaggregated by sector, CBNRM group type and products]	222 HH 666 people/36IP -(252 female/24 IP)	580 HH (approx. 5% female headed HH, approx. 10% IP HH) 1,515 people included 516 female (10% IP)	379 HH (110 Female HH, 48 IPHH) 2,292 people (1,148F, 223IP, 105IPF)	601 HH (110 FHH, 48 IPHH) 2,958 people (1,400F, 259 IP, 129 IPF)
19A	% of sales volume and/or sales price increased [disaggregated by sector, CBNRM group type and product(s)].	For NTFPs/CBET use existing 2016 baseline, and conduct baseline survey for new CBE	10% of sales volume and/or sales price per unit increased	All CBE products price is stable	
	Fish sauce (CBE group annual sales volume in Kg/liter)	1,085L (2017)	10% each year	350L	1,435L
	Pa'ork Trey Ka' Ek	347Kg (2017 for 2CBEs)	10% each year	347Kg in 2017 but no operation in 2018	
	Ecotourism (annual number of tourists visited)	809 tourists visited in 2016 (3 CBETs)	10% each year	4,145 tourists	4,954 tourists
	Honey (CBE group annual sales volume in Kg)	514.2 kg in 2017 (Vealkansaeng, Kraom and Kralapeas)	3% each year	2,256Kg	2,770Kg
	Traing chopstick (annual sales volume in pair)	20 bunches (200 pairs)	1000 bunches (10,000 pairs)	2,100 bunches (21,000 pairs)	
	Resin (annual sale volume, kg)	1,000 kg sold annually	2,520 kg	Not applicable	
	Bamboo		Pilot only	one CBET in CF Phnom Chamrok sat in Stung Treng	
	Agroforestry		Pilot only	Pilot with 08 farmers under CBET	
	Chicken raising (07Groups)	3,960kg	19,800Kg	3,960kg	7,920kg
	Fish raising (01group)	0	8,400Kg	8,400Kg	
	Cow raising (04 groups)	14 cows	54 cows	0	14 cows
	CBETs (02 groups)	100 tourists	450 tourists	150 tourists	250 tourists
	Rattan (02 groups)	no commercial operation	30,000 canes	7,000 canes	
19B	% of sale price increased if any	For NTFPs/CBET use existing 2016 baseline, and conduct baseline survey for new CBE	10% of sales volume and/or sales price per unit increased [Disaggregated by sector, CBNRM group type and product(s)].	Fish sauce:1L=2,600Riles Pa'Ok 1kg=30,000Riles Wild honey (good quality): 1kg = \$ 16.31 (approx. 65,240 Riles) Traing chopstick: 1bunch=5000Riles Catfish: 1Kg=7000Riles Cow: per head= \$300 Chicken: 1Kg=1,7000Riles Rattan cane:1cane=2,300Riles	Wild honey increased around 17,040Riles per kg (35%) And the rest are remained the same price.
Output 2.1 - Communities with NTFP/ Fisheries are assessed on their potential livelihood/enterprise development--50 communities are assessed					
20	# CBNRM groups assessed and trained	20 communities	50 communities	65 Communities	65 Communities
Output 2.2 - Business capacity and support for planning and management are provided and CBNRM groups have established their CBE including strategies for participation of women and IP -35 CBEs are operational					
21	# of communities/households [# of female-headed and IP households] demonstrating understanding and capacity to develop and run CBEs	222 HH 666 people/36IP -(252 female/24 IP)	580 HH (approx. 5% female headed HH, approx. 10% IP HH) 1,515 peoples included 516 female (10% IP)	379 HH (110 Female HH, 48 IPHH) 2,292 people (1,148F, 223IP, 105IPF)	601 HH (110 FHH, 48 IPHH) 2,958 people (1,400F, 259 IP, 129 IPF)
22	# of CBEs formed based on the assessment results and recognized by CBNRM committee.	11 CBEs	35 CBE	28 CBEs	39 CBEs
23	# of CBEs have benefit sharing mechanism, and amount contributed to the NRM group management plan implementation.	11 CBEs	35 CBE	28 CBEs	39 CBEs
24	# of CBEs with market linkages	11 CBEs	35 CBE	28 CBEs	39 CBEs
Output 2.3 - Six NRM/ livelihood value chains are researched, developed, and established					
25	# of product value chains developed.	4 types	At least 6 types of products	09 products	09 products
26	# of CBEs and CBNRM groups with business plans engaged with each value chain.	11 CBEs	35 CBEs	23 CBEs	34 CBEs

2. Differences between Community Based Enterprises supported under PaFF II

- **Fundamental differences must be highlighted** between CBET and NTFP-based CBEs on one side and CBEs involved in livestock raising or aquaculture on the other side.
- **CBET and NTFP-based CBEs supported by NTFP-EP are real community-based enterprises.** Several members come together and agree to invest time, efforts and money and share risks for a common purpose: trading of wild honey, trading of traing chopsticks, processing and marketing of wild-fish based products, provision of eco-tourism services. These CBEs have their own bylaws, capital and accounting system. They are expected to contribute to the income of their members through two mechanisms: 1/ by sustaining the activity of each member (e.g. buying honey from members and selling it, coordinating and marketing ecotourism services on behalf of members); 2/ by redistributing a percentage of the CBE profit to active members as per CBE bylaws. Besides, the CBE is expected to contribute a percentage of its profit (if positive) to the local CBNRM group (one CBE can be attached to more than one group). These CBEs have a strong comparative advantage because the resource is free: honey, traing or river fish for NTFP-based CBEs, and natural ecosystems for CBET.
- **CBEs based on livestock, poultry or fish production have a completely different organization and management system.** Several members of a CF/CFi come together to benefit from a livelihood activity proposed by WWF. The activity is underpinned by a value chain study and proposed by the NGO in response to a demand from beneficiaries: chicken raising, cow raising, fish raising. For efficiency purposes, the activity was designed to be implemented collectively: e.g. beneficiaries trained as a group, technical package including the supply of chicks and feed to all beneficiaries to start with. However, now that the activity is in place, the collective approach to organization and management of the activity is very limited. The MTR observed that there is no community-based enterprise per say, only individual farmers who operate independently from each other and take risks individually: they do not raise chicken or fish together, do not buy feed as a group and they market their products by themselves. In the case of chicken, one member of the group runs a hatchery that can supply chicks to other members, but it remains an independently-run business. Compared to NTFP-based CBEs, the resource (chicks, fingerlings, feed, etc.) is not free. Besides there is no natural linkage with NRM because the activity is not based on NTFP. Therefore, the link with the CBNRM group is established through a saving group (SHG), which must be formed by the beneficiaries of the activity (this is where the collective approach kicks in): a fraction of the interest collected on loans is distributed to the CF/CFi for NRM. Therefore these CBEs are not really CBEs but an Income Generating Activity (IGA) doubled with a SHG. This raises two questions: 1/ given the differences between NTFP-based CBEs and CBEs/IGAs focused on animal raising, how do they compare in terms of performances, i.e. when it comes to fulfilling their assigned objectives: contribute to HH income and to NRM? 2/ Is there an added value to the mechanism IGA + SHG compared to SHG alone?
- **To try and answer these questions, the MTR mission visited 13 CBEs:** wild honey (3), CBET (3), traing chopsticks (2), chicken (2), Fish Processing (1), Fish sauce production (1), Fish raising (1). Accordingly, 13 case studies are presented in Annex3. Case studies are not equivalent to impact assessment but together, they provide a reasonable, qualitative, and sometimes quantitative appreciation of whether and how CBEs contribute to NRM and livelihoods.

3. Assessment of the performances of NTFP-based CBEs and sustainability of benefits

- This assessment is based on interviews with 7 groups: trading of wild honey (3), trading of traing chopsticks (2), fish processing and trading of fish products (1), Fish sauce production (1).

Trading of wild honey (refer to Annex 3, Case Studies #1, #2 and #3)

- **The MTR confirms what is already known by PaFF partners: of all NTFP-based CBEs, honey CBEs have best performances,** not only as far as profit is concerned (group performance), but also in terms of contribution to livelihoods (HH income) and to NRM (see Table 6 under the section on contribution of CBEs to NRM). This is because honey trading by CBEs breaks the vicious circle of a market exclusively dependent

on the middleman: by creating a competitive environment, the CBE positively influences the price for members (at which they sell raw honey), which is an incentive to collect even more honey (if it can be found). When quantities collected and selling prices increase, it can be safely assumed that HH income also increases. It helps a lot that honey CBEs are granted USD 1200 to kick-start their operation. Without it, they would not be able to function.

- **An excellent benefit of PaFF is the adoption of a sustainable harvesting protocol for wild honey.** Honey hunters (exclusively men) are trained by NTFP-EP staff: all confirmed they used to cut the beehive entirely (i.e. they could only harvest honey once from that beehive) but were able to harvest two or three times from the same beehive after applying the protocol (which recommends leaving a portion of the beehive in place and not to burn bees). This technique alone is a strong factor effectiveness.

- **Coached by NTFP-EP, honey groups maintain accounts and, when they make a profit, they contribute to NRM.** There are management weaknesses though: CBEs are not always able to adequately calculate percentages or to explain how profit is distributed. In other words, there is room for more coaching and follow up on management capacities, something NTFP-EP knows. Besides, there is another issue: whereas there is evidence that CBEs have several clients, which is good for sustainability, the books of two groups (Case Studies #2 and #3) do not record all sales. They only record sales of honey to the Community-Based Wild Honey Enterprises (CBHE, a federation of honey CBEs, whose establishment was supported by NTFP-EP). Why is this a problem? Because CBEs which fail to record all sales unintentionally minimize their profit and thus the contribution to the CF (since it is a percentage of the profit). The third group (Prasat Teuk Khmao Wild Honey Collection Group in Kratie, see Case Study #1) did record all sales and was able to contribute USD 231 and USD 395 to NRM, respectively in 2018 and 2019. The other negative effect of not recording all sales is that NTFP-EP is not able to fully capture the effectiveness of the activity.

- **Trading of wild honey is not without ups and downs.** Wild honey is in high demand, but it is a volatile market based on weather conditions before and during the short harvest time. Indeed the availability of honey strongly varies from one year to the next (climate change is believed to have an impact) and quality can also vary tremendously during the harvesting season. CBHE buys from CBEs and NatureWild (a social enterprise) buys from CBHE, then markets wild honey to hotels and urban buyers, with a focus on quality and traceability. Before the season starts, both CBHE and NatureWild are keen to contract honey quantities at fixed prices and allow for limited price variations during the season. But while CBEs and members may be tempted to secure their positions through contracts at the beginning of the season, the dynamics of the market price for wild honey makes it difficult for members to stick to their commitment to sell their honey to the CBEs and thus for the CBE to stick to its contract with CBHE. This is because middlemen do not give up easily: as and when needed, they will fight the competition by increasing their price beyond what the CBE can offer to its members, at which point members will start selling again to the middleman. By doing so, members are able to maintain or raise their income on the short term, but they undermine the sustainability of the CBE and thus the contribution to NRM on the long run. This points at a limited ownership of the CBE by its members. It also demonstrates that though CBHE & NatureWild are key stakeholders because they help to maintain a competitive environment at grassroots level, they also lack the flexibility of middlemen, as a result of which they fail to capture quantities.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #16 to NTFP-EP.** Encourage honey groups to record all sales in their books to reflect their true profit and better contribute to NRM. Alert members on the risk of short term approaches to marketing of honey and the importance of strengthening their CBE (i.e. build ownership). If it has not been done before, convene all parties (targeted CBEs, CBHE, NatureWild, PaFF Partners and a few big buyers, the list is not exhaustive) for a one-day workshop aimed at better understanding the economic behaviour of honey hunters, identifying constraints to the marketing of traceable honey, building trust among stakeholders and strengthening the role of CBEs. If relevant and possible, consider training more households or communities on sustainable honey harvesting in targeted provinces, in order to spread good practices beyond targeted CBEs.

Trading of traing chopsticks (refer to Annex 3, Case Study # 4 which covers 2 CBEs)

- **Traing (i.e. Talipot palm petioles, from a local palm tree) is collected and processed by men, who usually make chopsticks on their spare time, in the evening.** The unit is the bunch, comprised of 10 pairs of chopsticks. They can be made with usual tools (chainsaw, knife) therefore the investment is minimal (only sandpaper). CBE members work almost exclusively on orders, hence there are no stocks. The craftsmanship is beautiful, well mastered. The role of the CBE is to buy bunches from members and sell them. This is a niche market and the market price for hand-crafted traing chopsticks is set by CBEs, which add a profit of KHR 1,000 on each bunch. NTFP-EP helped calculate a fair price for traing chopsticks (the price paid by the CBE to its members), taking into account time spent in collecting and processing traing.
- **The production of chopsticks offers a good opportunity for additional income, provided the CBE is well managed and has good marketing connections.** NTFP-EP is instrumental in building management and commercial capacities of CBEs (e.g. participation to fairs, connecting CBEs with buyers during a trip to Siem Reap). More support is needed to reach sustainability, which also depends on leadership qualities. For instance, one of the two groups (Sangkae Traing Processing Group in Preah Vihear) has a charismatic chief. This group started on its own and saw an opportunity to learn and grow when NTFP-EP offered its support. Commercially, this CBE is more effective than the other group (Chhaeb Lech Traing Processing Group, in a nearby village), which also suffers from institutional weaknesses. De facto, members of Sangkae CBE are estimated to earn an average of USD 35/month from the activity, when members of Chhaeb Lech only earn an average of USD 5/month. This example illustrates the fact that in a similar socio-economic context, there can be huge variations in group performances, owing mostly to human factors.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #17 to NTFP-EP.** NTFP-EP knows what needs to be done: continue strengthening marketing linkages for all traing chopsticks CBEs. Therefore this recommendation is mostly to stress how important it is to continue following up and tailor support to the needs of each group to accommodate emerging differences in capacities, even though groups may have been created around the same time and may have received the same amount of support from NTFP-EP. The key word “tailor” acknowledges that some groups may need extra coaching from NTFP-EP, which entails a rapid assessment of institutional and management capacities of targeted groups. This recommendation goes beyond traing CBEs and applies to all CBEs supported by NTFP-EP.

Processing of fish and marketing of fish products (Refer to Annex 3, Case Studies # 5 and # 6)

- **In 2016/2017, the group (Khsach Leav Fish Processing Group in Kratie, created under PaFF I) used to process the community’s fish surplus and produced two sorts of traditional fish products.** Technical skills were more difficult to master for one product than the other: according to members, it is one thing to produce traditional products at a small scale (20 kilos at a time) and another to make the same products on a large scale (300 kilos at a time). So, for one product the change in production scale was fatal and there is no evidence that profit was ever made. There was no contribution to NRM. And most likely, the group lost money. This production, halted in 2018, is deemed a complete failure by the group. Besides, since 2018, fish quantities have reduced and communities have had no more surpluses. Buying fish is not profitable because the cost of fish alone is well above the market price of the finished product (without even taking processing costs into account). Therefore, after two years of profitability (2016, 2017), the second line of production was also stopped. The group stopped operating in 2018 and does not wish to resume production.
- **Another group (Koh Preah Fish Sauce Processing Group in stung Treng, revived under PaFF I and continued under PaFF II) makes fish sauce.** The group is fully comprised of women. The processing facility is very well kept. Fish is purchased exclusively from CFI members and the CBE does not experience any difficulty with supply. Women fully master the manufacturing process and are in the process of registering a brand. The books are well kept and the MTR was able to assess (roughly) the profitability of the operation for two consecutive years, 2018 and 2019. However the conclusion is mixed: the CBE generates a profit and contributes minimally to the CFI but it is not generating any income for its members who nevertheless work

approximately 10 full days a month in order to process fish (according to the calculation of the MTR, they earned only USD 5.52 for the whole year in 2018, and USD 12.4 in 2019). As a result, four members left the group last year. However, the group fulfils an interesting social function: women who remain committed to fish sauce production are mostly widowed who enjoy working together. They realize the contribution to income is nil but they intend to continue working together.

- **The above examples show, unsurprisingly, that processing is more challenging technically and economically than just trading.** Purely on economic grounds, the recommendation would be to stop supporting the second group since it is an old group whose contribution to NRM and household income is close to zero. However, the social context needs to be taken into account.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #18 to NFTP-EP.** It would be a waste of time and efforts to try and revive the Khsach Leav Fish Processing Group. But as long as PaFF II operates, continue supporting Koh Preah Fish Sauce Processing Group. A visit to this CBE could be an excellent addition to ecotourism tours: it processes sustainably managed fish resources, on a lovely island, in a well-kept facility, all under the control of a group of highly committed women. It is likely that every Cambodian tourist would buy fish sauce and would spread the word about the product.

4. Assessment of the performance of CBETs (Ecotourism) and sustainability of benefits

- This assessment is based on interviews with 3 groups (Refer to Annex 3, Case Studies #7, #8 and #9).
- **The MFF is a powerful attraction for tourists and the context is favourable:** private ecotourism companies are keen to bring tourists (international and Cambodian) to MFF; the Provincial Department of Tourism (PDOT) in Kratie is supportive; guidelines for eco-tourism in upper Mekong are under development (with support from PaFF II); locally, SDC is also funding vocational training programmes in support of tourism services (project implemented by Swisscontact). Members of CF, CFIs and CPAs are well positioned to engage in ecotourism because of their intrinsic knowledge of the MFF and their focus on NRM, in line with the values that underpin ecotourism. However, while honey hunting is a traditional activity, ecotourism is not. Indeed, hosting guests requires certain skills and a collective effort to improve hygiene and cleanliness (villages are often littered with rubbish and plastics) and local infrastructure (e.g. small piers are needed to board boats). CBETs operates differently from honey CBEs: a CBET proposes at least three core services (homestay, boat tour, food service) delivered by different members. Because the market is hardly developed, there is no competition from external companies yet and NFTP-EP has helped CBETs fix a fair price for each core service, taking into account costs involved (fuel and maintenance for boat tour, food for food service) and time spent. Therefore, each ecotourism activity generates an income for the individual who delivers the service. For each service, a fraction of the cost goes to the CBET who plays a key role in coordinating -on behalf of members- with ecotourism companies, tourists, members and NFTP-EP. When annual accounts show a profit, a contribution to the CBNRM group is made (certain CBETs are attached to more than one CBNRM group).
- **The contribution of core ecotourism services to HH income varies from medium to good.** Based on information gathered from CBET members, boat owners make the highest income, compared with food service and homestay. For instance, for the Borei O' Svay CBET in Stung Treng (Ramsar site), the MTR estimated the average monthly net household income of boat owners (USD 20) versus homestay (USD 2.7). These incomes are corroborated by numbers calculated by the MTR for members of the Samros Koh Han CBET, also in the Ramsar site: average monthly net income per household in 2018 was USD 27 for boat owners and USD 1.7 for homestay. The reason could be that all tourists take a boat tour (this is why they come) but not all tourists spend the night. Group ownership was found rather good for two groups (out of three, but the third one is rather new), which bodes well for their sustainability.
- **On the negative front, management and marketing capacities of CBET are still limited.** For instance, to calculate the number of visitors, Borei O' Svay CBET cumulates the number of services provided to tourists, which is wrong since one tourist is likely to take more than one service (tourists end up being counted twice and therefore numbers in the database and in the logframe are wrong). Interestingly, this is a mistake Samros Koh Han CBET is careful not to make, by greeting tourists individually when they set a foot on the island.

- **Another issue is the amount of plastic pollution in MFF.** Tour guides and tourists have expressed negative feelings about the situation. But stakeholders, including CBET members, do not want to take responsibility. Every time the MTR asked, in Kratie or Stung Treng, the response was the same “it comes from upstream”. In the Ramsar site, communities blame tourists’ spots in Southern Laos for active plastic pollution.

- **Last but not least, there is a serious issue between NTFP-EP and the PDoT in Stung Treng.** The PDoT wants to exercise more control over the activities of PaFF II and NTFP-EP finds it is difficult to strike a balance between government commitment to programme activities (a factor of sustainability) and constraints attached to programme management (a factor of efficiency). Besides, there is a strong possibility that this might be another “political” issue, thus very difficult to solve.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION # 19 to NTFP-EP.** 1/ Strengthen administrative management capacities of CBET, even of those which are doing well: tailor coaching sessions to specific management issues. 2/ Consider exposing CBET to nearby Laos eco-tourism activities to broaden the perspective of communities. Also, consider initiating a dialogue with ecotourism stakeholders in southern Laos on plastic pollution levels. 3/ Can a solution to the issue with the PDoT be found in Phnom Penh at the MoT or via the PDoT in Kratie? Can NTFP-EP afford to ignore the attitude of the PDoT? If the answer to these questions is no, then NTFP-EP management needs an action plan to help its staff in the field.

5. Contribution of NTFP-based CBEs and CBETs to NRM

- **When it comes to regular and substantial contribution to NRM, progress is being made but is still very limited.** This chapter summarizes the contribution to NRM of 23 CBEs supported by NTFP-EP (7 of them created under PaFF I). Table 6 provides a dynamic overview over the lifetime of the PaFF programme (including Phase I). Table 7 is an analysis of the contributions in 2018. Total contributions are increasing (USD 100 in 2016, USD 619 in 2018). Honey is the biggest contributor (60%), followed by ecotourism (34%). Traing does not contribute as yet and fish processing no longer contributes in 2019 because the key contributor stopped operating. Out of 23 CBEs, only 8 contributed to NRM in 2018, for an average amount of USD 77.

Table 6 - Annual financial contribution of CBEs to NRM from 2014 to 2019 (*)

Source: NTFP monitoring system, compiled by the MTR

CBE Category	Number CBEs	total members	female members	contribution to NRM					
				2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019*
				USD					
All groups	23	475	127	0	0	100	370	619	556
Eco-Tourism	5	174	77	0	0	100	262	211	0
Fish processing	3	43	25	0	0	0	97	34	0
Wild honey	10	200	23	0	0	0	11	374	556
Traing processing	5	58	2	0	0	0	0	0	0

(*) Until September 2019. Contribution yet to be reported for eco-tourism, fish processing and traing processing.

Table 7 - 2018 financial contribution of CBEs to NRM (analysis)

Source: NTFP-EP monitoring system, compiled by the MTR

Category CBE	# CBEs	USD	%	# of CBEs having contributed to NRM	Average contribution per group having contributed (USD)	Comments
All groups	23	619	100%	8	77	
Eco-Tourism	5	211	34%	4	53	4 out of 5
Fish processing	3	34	5%	1	34	one group stopped operating in 2018
Wild honey	10	374	60%	4	94	in reality, one group contributed USD 231, see Case Study # 1 (out of 10 groups, 5 honey groups newly created in Preah Vihear)
Traing	5	0	0%	0	0	All in Preah Vihear, newly created

6. Assessment of the performance of chicken / fish raising CBEs and sustainability of benefits

- This assessment is based on 4 interviews, covering 3 groups (Annex 3, Case Studies #10, #11, #12, #13).
- The case studies covered two chicken raising groups supported by WWF and started under PaFF II: #10 and #11 are based on two interviews of individuals raising chicken as part of the same group, O' Preas Chicken Raising Group, #12 is based on a group interview of La Eart Chicken Raising Group. The groups visited by the MTR were selected by WWF.
- La Eart Chicken Raising group (Kratie) is not functional. The activity started mid 2018. So far, a total of one hundred chicken have been received by all 10 members, who have erected barns that can accommodate 200 chicken each, i.e. most members have not received any chicken. They asked WWF why chicken were not supplied and, according to them, these are the answers successively given by WWF: 1/ there is a shortage of chicks; 2/ there is a bird flu outbreak; 3/ the project has no more funds for this activity. WWF provided two incubators to one member in order to hatch eggs and supply day-old chicks to other members (they planned to raise chicken for meat). The hatchery operation just started. Interestingly, the members of the group are slowly coming to the realization that perhaps they should start buying day-old chicks from the hatchery (whose owner is part of the chicken raising group) rather than waiting for WWF to supply chicks. So far, the activity has not contributed to income generation. Contribution to NRM is not known.
- For O' Preas Chicken Raising Group (Kratie), two individuals were interviewed. 1/ One received an incubator in November 2018. It broke down very quickly. It was eventually repaired (after two months and much complications). The beneficiary thinks his business is profitable and says he makes a profit of about KHR 130,000 per month (about USD 32). However, from his books (neatly kept) and further discussions, the MTR found his income does not cover expenses and he lost about KHR 520,000 (USD 130) over a period of one year. So far, the activity has kept the beneficiary quite busy but has not contributed to raising the HH income. Besides, for several weeks, other group members could not buy chicks since the only incubator was down. 2/ A woman in the same group agreed to receive 500 chickens in November 2018, even though – she claims- she wanted to start with a smaller amount and increase the number of birds progressively. Birds were provided for free by WWF as part of an agreed package. After 14 days, 480 birds had died. In total out of 1300 birds received by 8 individuals in this group, about 200 to 250 birds survived. Subsequently, the beneficiary bought chicks to grow her activity. She now has around 100 chickens. Asked whether she thinks her activity is profitable, “yes but barely” she answers. However, the MTR estimated that over a period of one year (Nov 2018 to Oct 2019), she has lost about KHR 473,000 (USD 118). The activity is not yet profitable and has not contributed to income raising.
- In this two examples, there is no contribution to HH income and, most likely, no contribution to NRM (the MTR did not have enough time to investigate the situation of the SHGs attached to CBEs). Interestingly, both beneficiaries of O' Preas Chicken Raising Group thought they were making money. This is because the assessment of the profitability of a livestock operation can be quite complex: one activity can generate several products, each with a different production cycle (day old chicks and chicken for meat). People spend, people earn and unless there is a clear and rigorous methodology to calculate profit over a specific period of time, it is easy to miscalculate the effectiveness of the activity and overlook certain costs (e.g. utilities).
- In a third example, the Anlong Preas Kou Fish Raising Group (in Kratie, also started under PaFF II (23/10/2019) was established in March 2019 and concrete fish pen were constructed and ready by May 2019. Eager to start raising fish and recoup their investment (USD 250/individual), beneficiaries stocked them with fish almost immediately, against the advice of WWF who knew market conditions would not be ideal by the end of the 3-months production cycle. At the time of the interview, several beneficiaries were already past 4 months of production and continued feeding fish because they had no idea what to do with their fish given such low prices, owing to an abundance of fish on the market place. WWF tried to help by connecting them with a buyer who refused the fish because quantities offered were insufficient and quality was not up to the mark. Some beneficiaries complain about the growth of the fish, slower than expected. Expenditures are growing: at the time of the MTR interview, most beneficiaries had already spent about USD 200 to buy feed. They badly needed guidance.

- The example of Anlong Preas Kou Fish Raising Group (in Kratie, also started under PaFF II) confirms that WWF fails to appreciate the sheer complexity of animal (chicken or fish) production. Though there is evidence in the documentation that certain risks were identified (chicken mortality for instance) and a mitigation plan was in place, assessing risk in a strategic document and dealing with critical issues in reality are two different things. In the case of fish raising the timing of the production, the quality of fingerlings, water quality, a perfectly control growth are key factors of success. The fact that members of the fish raising group received limited training and technical follow up confirms the capacity of WWF to anticipate and react to emergency issues is insufficient. WWF can argue that the fish raising group acted against its advice. But this only strengthens the point: well prepared and guided beneficiaries would have listened to the advice. Beneficiaries lack experience and skills: they need continuous technical and commercial support and guidance from experienced practitioners. They need time to learn, make mistakes and eventually acquire capacities and confidence. Time is inherent to livelihood development processes which need full project cycles to mature. Besides, business models developed by WWF are not well understood by beneficiaries: business plans are often based on specific production capacities. However, if production cannot reach the planned capacity due to unexpected (but nevertheless frequent) events, profitability will be negatively impacted. Another factor is the lack of collective approach: for instance feed is typically the highest cost in animal production, be it chicken or fish. Yet, there is no evidence of any cooperation among the members to buy feed as a group. On the other side, there is no evidence either that the number of group members is even optimal to engage in a collective approach, be it supply of inputs or marketing of products. (e.g. assuming members of the fish group would decide to market their fish together, they would need to synchronize their production, but would they have sufficient negotiation power with existing quantities? The answer is not known).

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #20 to WWF.** Take time to investigate the situation of each group and identify technical, management and commercial issues, possibly focusing on individual situations. Mitigate these situations by finding concrete solutions tailored to each group/individuals facing issues that stem from their involvement in the IGA. Follow-up closely with existing groups until the end of the programme.

7. Observations on cross-cutting issues: climate change, disaster risk reduction and gender balance

- **Climate Change.** The following comments are not underpinned by a systematic gathering of evidence on the topics of DRR and Climate Change (CC), but by observations of a few community members from different villages met during the MTR. Climate change is believed to have an impact on livelihood activities supported by PaFF in the targeted provinces. For instance, a profitable activity of the Khsach Leav Fish Processing Group (the production of Phra Ok) had to stop after the first two years of operation. Fishermen say the fluctuations in water level had become very important and the fish catch decreased until there was no more surplus for processing. The processing activity had to stop. Communities who live by the Mekong river confirm the fast fluctuations of water level of the Mekong river. Many say lightning is more serious and frequent, heat is more intense and dengue fever more prevalent. According to them, algae are spreading, the water is more acid and tends to destroy plants in flooded areas. Honey hunters also report negative effects on bees and wild honey harvest. However, for most community members, the concept of CC is still elusive. They observe environmental changes, but few can link these changes to CC because awareness and understanding of CC is still rather low. The situation is aggravated by poor access to information and, most likely, illiteracy which is higher in rural areas. An interview with 6 CF committee members highlighted the fact that no one had a TV or a radio, only two had smartphones. Information is not disseminated. Besides the chiefs of the various CBNRM groups, knowledge is limited. And not all chiefs know about it. Those who know about CC say NGOs have played a crucial role in raising their awareness. YouTube is another source of information, for those who have a smartphone. Even those who know about CC fail to grasp the magnitude and severity of CC consequences on communities and therefore they are not prepared to mitigate, let alone to anticipate. Implicitly, they mitigate by doing their best to protect nature and better manage natural resources. Members

of a CF credit scheme say loans contribute to diversifying activities, which is -perhaps- an implicit acknowledgement of the need to develop CC mitigation strategies.

- **CCA and DRR.** This rather bleak assessment does not mean that PaFF partners have not done anything to build the awareness of community members. For instance, CBE members have been introduced by NTFP-EP to DRR Early Warning System, with a focus on hazard identification and prevention. Under OC1, hazards are supposed to be anticipated and mitigated through management plans, but funds are lacking for their implementation. CBE members are also members of a CF or a CFi and therefore have been exposed to the topics (DRR and CCA) from different angles and through different partners. But the effectiveness of activities is limited because, unsurprisingly, people tend to focus on short term socio-economic issues and have a rather fatalistic attitude with respect to climatic events.

- **Climate change makes it more difficult for PaFF partners to assist communities in developing livelihoods.** The risk (medium to high) was clearly identified in the PaFF II project document. The main mitigation strategy envisaged was rather classic: “ The project specifically addresses these risks and builds the capacity of target beneficiaries and other stakeholders to become aware, resilient and build their adaptive capacities”. As a matter of fact, PaFF partners consider -rightly- that all programme activities (whether contribution projects or SDC funded activities) contribute to mitigating the impact of climate change on local communities. As mentioned under relevance, the implicit assumption is that better livelihoods and sustainable NRM actively contribute to reducing disaster risk. However, immediate and concrete benefits stemming from DRR-related efforts undertaken by PaFF partners as a result of mainstreaming DRR into the programme design are not sufficiently highlighted.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #21 to all PaFF partners** – In parallel to the recommendation that DRR-related indicators must be formulated and included in the logframe ([Recommendation #6](#)), PaFF partners should assess whether they sufficiently communicate on successful mitigation strategies and act accordingly.

- **The role of women in CBEs.** NTFP based CBEs are focused on products harvested in the forest, which has been the domain of men since the dawn of times. In comparison, CBET offer better opportunities to women to participate in productive activities and earn income because they have just the right skills to take care of guests (homestay and food services). Similarly small scale livestock-based activities can be implemented by women while catering to domestic tasks. This can contribute to a better gender balance at domestic level, assuming activities are properly implemented, at the right scale and are profitable. Otherwise a negative experience for women might be counterproductive.

8. Conclusion on Outcome 2

- **The PaFF Phase II programme document rightly says** (page 28-29): *“Capacity development under objective 2 for the development of CBEs takes a slightly different form than for CBNRM group development as it focuses on much smaller groups of entrepreneurs. The knowledge and skills to be developed are also different and require a greater depth of training, coaching and accompaniment to ensure that best practices are consistently applied to ensure product quality and quantities on time. Accordingly, PaFF will devote considerably more time with each developing CBE to ensure they reach a sustainable operational situation. Investing only so much but not continuing support until CBEs have reached adequate maturity is wasted investment. PaFF commits to carefully select the CBEs that it supports, but then to invest appropriate levels of support over the four-year period of PaFF phase II.”*

- **This excellent philosophy implicitly acknowledges the sheer difficulty of developing businesses and the need for PaFF partners to be on top of things during the entire implementation period of PaFF II.** NGOs - and especially conservation NGOs which lack experience and skilled HR for rural livelihood development- can be tested by complex market dynamics and unanticipated technical issues that are an integral part of agriculture and livestock/aquaculture-based systems. Such issues put a lot of pressure on programme planning and management processes because they requires regular presence of field staff and both proactive (to anticipate issues) and reactive capacities (to mitigate issues). This is aggravated by an inherent pressure on NGOs involved with very poor populations: even though NGOs bear most of the investment costs, CBEs

are expected to be profitable from the first production cycle as communities cannot afford to waste time and/or lose money. Commercial and technical context can change very quickly (e.g. competition, bird flu). Private businesses are quick to adapt but not NGOs, which are bound by contracts, logframes, amendments, internal decision processes and the need to conduct surveys before they act, i.e. WWF is ill equipped to support enterprises, as small as they are, and its excellent reputation and credibility may suffer. NTFP-EP is also an NGO but is specialized in supporting NTFP-based livelihoods, far less complicated than livestock and agriculture, from the point of view of organization, management and technical capacities (i.e. consider the difference between collecting free wild honey to sell it to a middleman and constructing fish pens, procuring fingerlings and feeding fish for 3 months only to discover that the local market price is lower than the overall production cost).

- **Consequently, effectiveness is hard to achieve, sustainability even more.** Let us remember that out of 18 CBEs developed under PaFF I, only 11 had survived at the beginning of Phase II. And out of 15 CBEs developed by WWF under the EU-funded project implemented in Mondulkiri, only 6 were operational by the end of the project in 2018.

- **This section started with the following question: 1/ given the differences between NTFP-based CBEs and CBEs/IGAs focused on animal raising, how do they compare in terms of performances, when it comes to fulfilling their assigned objectives: contribute to HH income and NRM?** Based on the assessment of the MTR, NTFP-based CBEs have better performances with respect to both objectives, with the exception of fish processing CBEs. First, because group trading of traing and honey has demonstrated a capacity to generate income for members and to contribute to NRM. Second because the performances of IGAs focused on chicken raising and aquaculture visited by the MTR are poor. There is no evidence that the performances of other IGAs are better because they not been thoroughly assessed by WWF. There is no evidence either that these IGAs have contributed to NRM (one could argue that most activities are too recent).

- **The second question was: 2/ Is there an added value to the mechanism IGA + SHG compared to SHG alone?** Only a wider assessment of the performances of IGAs and SHGs can provide a firm answer. However, what is a SHG (saving group) in the context of OC2? Given that this group is attached to a CBNRM group, in what way is it different from a CF credit scheme, which operates without being tied to IGAs developed by an NGO? If it is not different and if the overall performances of IGAs supported by WWF are as low as it was found by MTR, then perhaps focusing on strengthening the capacities of SHGs would achieve the same purpose as a credit scheme: loans would support livelihoods chosen by beneficiaries themselves and interest on loans would support NRM (provided SHGs receive appropriate seed money to start with, just like CF credit schemes do).

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #22 to WWF.** WWF management and field staff must have an internal strategic brainstorming on the objective contribution of IGAs/SHGs to livelihood and conservation objectives. Then, the NGO should decide whether there is a need (and enough time) to further and more rigorously assess the true benefits of IGAs. The idea is to determine whether 1/IGAs should be further developed under PaFF II; 2/ whether SHGs capacities should be strengthened independently from support to IGAs; this could be envisaged with the help of RECOFTC, as an internal synergy. This complements [Recommendation #20](#) (solutions must be proposed to IGA beneficiaries who are experiencing difficulties).

⇒ **LESSON LEARNED #3.** Environmental conservation is a complex subject that cuts across many sciences, policies, communication, all topics at which WWF excels. But livelihood development -underpinned by social and economic sciences and participatory approaches- is equally complex and best addressed by rural development specialists. For future interventions, the NGO either 1/ needs external support and guidance to strengthen its internal capacity (with adequate training of WWF staff and additional field staff) or 2/ needs to revise its livelihood-related strategy by considerably simplifying its direct support to livelihood (e.g. support SHGs rather than CBEs) and by outsourcing elaborate livelihood activities to more experienced development partners.

EFFECTIVENESS & SUSTAINABILITY - OUTCOME 3


- **Introduction.** While OC1 and OC2 embody the strategies of PaFF to keep CF and CFis afloat and to keep their members from sinking into more poverty, OC3 embodies efforts to strengthen provincial governance and improve the national legal and regulatory context. OC3 is the sustainable dimension in the design of PaFF II because achievements under OC3 are a condition to the long-term continuation of benefits achieved under OC1 and OC2. In spite of its importance, OC3 is not reflected in any indicator at impact level because better governance and policies are only a means to an end (resilient livelihoods, sustainable NRM). Besides, current indicators at outcome level are not specific enough and fail to highlight the achievements PaFF partners pursue under OC3: (Ind#27) “# of comments and inputs for each amended legislation/policy/law are acknowledged and integrated into final draft document” and (Ind#28) “Sustainability of the key platforms at the subnational levels”. These two indicators will be further examined hereunder.

1. Capacity building

- **Outcome 3 is underpinned by a vast capacity building programme** that comprises activities funded by SDC and activities funded through a key contribution project “Shared Resources Joint Solutions” (SRJS), supported by IUCN-Netherlands and implemented by five NGOs, including all four PaFF partners (CEPA, NTFP-EP, RECOFTC, WWF and NGO Forum) under the leadership of NTFP-EP from 01/01/2017 until 30/06/2020. SRJS covers two of the provinces targeted under PaFF (Kratie and Stung Treng) plus Ratanakiri. Capacity building activities under PaFF II target a diversity of stakeholders (community members, line department officials, PA rangers, police staff, river guards, commune councillors, village chiefs, governors, high school students, study tours etc.) through a diversity of techniques (training of trainers, reflection workshops, radio programs, coaching, forum, consultations etc.). They all aim at further raising awareness on and promoting NRM and environmental conservation, while disseminating information on key policy issues. The number of activities organized by PaFF partners and the variety of topics are rather impressive: e.g. youth engagement in NRM, green economy, water governance, CCA, REDD+, roles and responsibilities of CFis in fisheries management, CF credit support for CFMP implementation, lobby and negotiation skills, conflict transformation, ecosystems services, natural capital mapping and valuing, strategic environmental assessment, international public goods, food security, community investment plan processes and commune council annual budgeting, etc. The list is not exhaustive and reflects the magnitude of development challenges and the complexity of jointly tackling conservation and poverty alleviation in Cambodia. As it turns out, PaFF partners never miss an opportunity to instruct stakeholders and impart knowledge, to increase capacities at all levels with the ultimate view of strengthening the overall governance of NRM and advocating more effectively for policy changes. A baseline survey was conducted to assess capacities of Community-Based Organisations at the start of SRJS, as well as that of PaFF partners themselves.

- **The capacity building programme is far too vast and complex for its effectiveness to be assessed by the MTR.** However, a few comments can be made:

1/ During the lifetime of PaFF, whether a line department official or a community member, the same individual will have the opportunity to attend several trainings on different topics. Though the impact of cumulated knowledge is impossible to measure at individual level, the multiplication of PaFF capacity building activities at different administrative levels in targeted provinces contributes to create a context where NRM governance related issues cannot be ignored or avoided at any level: commune, district and province. The constant pressure PaFF partners exercise on all stakeholders through multiple capacity building activities contributes to mainstreaming NRM governance into subnational conversations. One could argue that for the sake of effectiveness, there is a need to reduce the number of trainings and topics but the risk would be to lose this intellectual steamroller effect.

⇒  **RECOMMENDATION #23 to all PaFF partners** - As much as possible when counting and cumulating the number of beneficiaries from capacity building activities for monitoring and reporting purposes, avoid counting the same individual more than once.

2/ There is a sheer contrast between the scope and intensity of capacity building activities on NRM and the little confidence and apparent lack of knowledge that many CBNRM or CBE members displayed during interviews by the MTR mission: perhaps interviews were too short? Perhaps people hesitate to speak in front of the chief? Or perhaps they do not want to say anything because the chief is not present? Both MTR experts (national expert and international expert) had the same perception that there is still much room for improvement. To the credit of communities, the MTR takes a picture of the programme at a certain point in time and does not have a dynamic vision of capacities.

3/ As a matter of fact, many provincial officials interviewed by the MTR insist that capacities of communities to manage and monitor their resource base, to engage and collaborate with stakeholders or to raise their concerns have increased and credit PaFF partners for this. Interviews with the chiefs of provincial CF networks do confirm that capacity building leads to better ownership of NRM governance and policy topics and improves confidence to discuss these topics at higher level.

4/ On several occasions, the field staff of PaFF partners mention that communities lack time to attend PaFF events (this might also refer to activities under OC1).

5/ The more educated the individual, the more effective the capacity building activity; at grassroots level, disseminating information and knowledge may require repeated training sessions, for which communities have limited time. The need for repeating training is also increased by the renewal of CBNRM committees. Are traditional training sessions a limiting factor in building effective capacities at community level? Could smartphones be used to contribute to a more effective dissemination of information on NRM? The number of smartphones in targeted communities is not known but was definitely low among the CBNRM members interviewed by the MTR.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #24 to RECOFTC, WWF, CEPA.** Have PaFF partners ever considered the opportunity and cost of distributing smartphones to key committee members of selected CBNRM group in the targeted provinces (provided connection is not a major constraint)? Without abandoning traditional interactive training sessions, strengthening capacities by introducing new paradigms in capacity building could help to spread/access information more effectively (e.g. sharing information on NRM, policy issues or CC via dedicated social groups).

6/ A concern was expressed by the director of the Ramsar site, which encompasses 17 CFis, out of which 15 are supported by CEPA. The director claims the dissemination of information on NRM policies is done by speaker, out of a boat. He argues that some people hear, but some don't and insists that this is not an effective method of disseminating information on NRM. According to him, the reason for the boat equipped with a speaker is not because people do not have time to attend sessions but because funds are insufficient to organize sessions in each village.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #25 to CEPA** - In the Ramsar site, consider organizing proper capacity building sessions on NRM in each village where there is a CFis.

2. Provincial networks/platforms: factors of effectiveness and sustainability prospects

- **Given the high number of CBNRM groups spread across targeted provinces**, given limited HR of provincial line departments, provincial networks and platforms are key coordination mechanisms aimed strengthening linkages between CF/ CFis with line departments. These mechanisms operate at provincial scale but other scales of coordination exist, to address issues at landscape level for instance.
- **CF network and PCFPCC meetings.** Interviews with the directors of the FACs of three provinces (Kratie, Stung Treng, Preah Vihear) and the chiefs of the provincial CF networks of these provinces lead to the same conclusion: stakeholders are unanimous on the high value of regular coordination between CFs and FACs. The value of the coordination partly stems from the quality of coordination mechanisms. Typically, CF chiefs meet quarterly at provincial level to discuss issues of common interest. These meetings are convened,

financially supported and facilitated by RECOFTC. Clear conclusions and topics emerge from such meetings, which are then presented during a meeting of the Provincial Community Forestry Program Coordination Committee (PCFPCC). A PCFPCC meeting takes place shortly after a CF network meeting. The FAC says this approach allows for productive PCFPCC meetings. There is evidence that meetings are held on a regular basis and the level of participation is good. Minutes are produced. But most importantly, issues are solved. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that a CF network working in tandem with PCFPCC is an effective mechanism that contributes to solving ubiquitous issues such as encroachment or violations. Better communication and sharing of information lead to trust and understanding between the different stakeholders, which results in joint actions through which conflicts are solved. For instance, in Kratie, between 2017 and 2018, at least 30 hectares of land were reclaimed from private encroachment (almost every CF has an encroachment issue) and 100 chainsaws were confiscated in different communities. In Preah Vihear, planning of activities (e.g. demarcation, patrolling) and progress against previous planning are discussed during PCFPCC meetings.

- **Many factors explain the effectiveness of these meetings.** 1/ Capacity building of communities and officials on NRM policy and related issues takes different forms (training of trainers, information sessions, coaching, reflection workshops, etc.) but leads to the same result: a common understanding on technical and financial issues that plague CBNRM groups and a capacity to dialogue because stakeholders -at last- speak the same language. 2/ Financial support provided by the NGO is essential: there is a cost to provincial CF network meetings because CF representatives must be transported and hosted for a couple of nights in the provincial town but equally important is the technical facilitation of CF network meetings. It is instrumental in helping CFs raise issues in a constructive, concerted and disciplined manner. Besides, RECOFTC helps to identify legal solutions to law enforcement issues. For CFs, these meetings amount to another exercise of capacity building during which the confidence of CF chiefs is further raised. 3/ The fact that RECOFTC is well embedded in the provincial FA, owing to strong MoU between the NGO and the FA at national level, is another factor of effectiveness of coordination mechanisms. 4/ Last but not least, CF networks are part of the institutional framework as they are embedded in the National Forest Programme 2010/2029.


- **Coordination could not exist without functional CBNRM networks.** The role of PaFF II in building the capacities of these networks is also essential. But a reason why CF networks are effective is because they are given a chance to exercise their networking and advocacy skills during PCFPCC meetings. This is in contrast with the limited opportunities that CBNRM groups have to exercise their technical and management skills, because of the slow formalization process and the lack of funds to implement activities.

- **On the negative side, just as stakeholders are unanimous about the effectiveness of provincial coordination, they also agree on the fact that the sustainability of CF networks is very limited.** In Preah Vihear, the FAC claims it does not have the financial and technical capacity to link with CFs and relies a lot on RECOFTC. Without NGO support, communication may continue informally but official coordination with the FAC stops. Besides, without an operational CF network, the purpose of PCFPCC meetings is missed. In Preah Vihear for instance, a provincial CF network was created in 2013 under a previous project of RECOFTC. In 2015, the project ended and all meetings also stopped. Informal contacts continued between CF chiefs but coordination and lobbying at provincial level did not take place. Coordination meetings resumed again when RECOFTC, under PaFF II, started funding the coordination processes again. Sustainability of capacities at provincial level are also threatened by regular transfer of technical staff.

- **There are other examples of coordination mechanisms at provincial, sub-provincial level and also supra-provincial level.** Coordination between CFs and the administration is not as organized as it is for CFs but the voice of CFs is heard in Stung Treng owing to a strong CFi network (headed by a woman) and several coordination mechanisms: there is a technical working group on Fisheries under the auspices of the FiAC (coordination with NGOs), a provincial NRM platform which provides opportunities for the CFi network to raise their concern and there is also a coordination mechanism for the Ramsar site only. In Kratie, coordination mechanisms for CFs are lacking: there is no CFi at provincial level and no common understanding between the FiA, which implements the MIWRM, and PaFF. Though coordination on CFi related issues is as necessary in Kratie as it is in Stung Treng, the apparent lack of political will from the provincial FiA complicates the task of WWF. See [Recommendation #2](#).

- **Supra-provincial mechanisms have proved more difficult to initiate than anticipated.** So far WWF's efforts to establish a trans-provincial landscape committee forum has not been successful. The idea was to form a committee to address illegal activities at landscape level, i.e. across provincial borders. In addition to the four targeted provinces, WWF wanted to involve the neighbouring provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondulakiri, which belong to the large Mekong river basin. In order to move forward, the process needs backing from the MoE, but, according to WWF, the MoE argues that the process would be redundant with existing platforms. Therefore the fact that a landscape forum was held (see Table 8 below, Indicator #30) does not mean the committee will be established (the MTR did not meet any official of MoE at national level).
- **Indicators.** There is no indicator of effectiveness for CBNRM networks/platforms at outcome level: the true value of this component is not captured, though it is precisely an area where PaFF II can claim credit for all CBNRM groups, directly or indirectly supported. The current and only indicator on provincial networks/platforms is (Ind#28) "*Sustainability of the key platforms at the subnational levels*". It is poorly defined and it is not an indicator of effectiveness. See Annex 1 and [Recommendation #10](#).

Conclusion. The effectiveness of provincial CF networks and PCFPCC coordination mechanisms is excellent but the sustainability is almost nil. Strengthening sustainability is especially difficult because NGOs play an essential facilitation role, and not just because of funding. Indeed, such coordination mechanisms need technical facilitation from a third party. In the unlikely event FACs or networks themselves could fund these coordination processes, technical facilitation would still be required. Maintaining these processes is nevertheless a necessity for PaFF II, because it is a condition to the effectiveness of advocacy and policy support at national level. The processes underpin the credibility of PaFF partners and contribute to their legitimacy at national level, which is why it is an issue that RECOFTC stops its activities so early (December 2019) in the new provinces targeted under PaFF II. On the positive side, CBNRM networks are resilient and coordination processes that have gone dormant because of interrupted development can be quickly revived.

⇒  **RECOMMENDATION #26 to PaFF partners.** If anything, PAFF partners should continue supporting CF networks and provincial coordination processes in Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear until the end of PaFF II.

3. Lobbying and advocating with a focus on six selected policy thematics

- **The lack of policy coherence and the rigidity of systems on which CFs and CFis are built form the rationale of this important component of PaFF II.** The contribution of SRJS is essential since it bears most of the costs of policy-related activities. Through SRJS, PaFF partners and a fifth NGO (NGO Forum) focus on providing evidence-based inputs into the current national policy and legislation revision processes. Six policy thematics have been selected by the partners: Simplified CF guidelines; CFI Sub-Decree; Forestry Law; Fishery Law; Environment and Natural Resources Code (ENRC); National REDD + Strategy.
- **When discussing with communities, stakeholders and partners on NRM governance and policy issues, it emerges that the PaFF II programme aims at achieving much more than what the logframe and various reports reflect.** The programme is -rightly- ambitious: it implicitly acknowledges that utterly rigid laws and regulations contribute to the degradation of the natural resource base and intends to reverse the situation through the influence of its partners. The intervention logic behind OC3 (capacity building on NRM policy, provincial platforms, policy advocacy, research) is relevant but blurred (not readable) because indicators at outcome level are inadequate. More specifically, under OC3, the main outcome policy indicator is (Ind#27) "*# of comments and inputs for each amended legislation/policy/law are acknowledged and integrated into final draft document*". As worded, Ind#27 is a composite indicator (see Table 8 below) that intends to measure achievements on the front of policy reform but it does not clearly identify the sectoral weaknesses of targeted policy thematics and does not reflect the expected benefits of policy-related activities under PaFF Phase II. De facto, in the monitoring system, PaFF partners have broken down the baseline and targets values of this indicator to report on annual progress on various thematic areas. However, these values are not always clear and consistent. PaFF partners may not want to commit to specific sectoral policy changes because they do not control the legal time frame. However, by not clarifying enough the policy purpose of PaFF II, they fail to properly assert the role they play in influencing the policy framework.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION # 27 to all PaFF Partners** – Taking stock of preliminary achievements and in line with policy thematic selected under PaFF II, the role of PaFF partners in influencing the policy framework must be asserted through a mix of qualitative or quantitative indicators at outcome level, which clearly define key sectoral policy improvements required for CFs and CFIs to strengthen their sustainability. These indicators must be incorporated in the logframe, attached to coherent baseline and target values, and reported upon in a systematic manner. There should be at least six main outcome indicators, one for each of policy thematic and possibly cross-cutting indicators as well. The number of outcome indicators will significantly increase but this for the sake of clarity and accountability. The proposed indicator definitions (below) are part of this recommendation. They are merely indicative and the list below is not exhaustive.

- **Simplification of CF guidelines**; the definition could be “Extent to which CF guidelines have been simplified as a result of PaFF programme”; the baseline value should describe the status at the start of PaFF II (e.g. “rigid guidelines, CFMP technically too complicated and too costly to implement”); the target should describe what is precisely expected and intermediate (milestone values) would inform precisely on the status of the reform (draft, under review, approved, etc.) and should also inform on the number of comments and inputs provided by PaFF partners and acknowledged/integrated into final draft document, as and when appropriate.

- **Corresponding to the thematic on “CFi Sub-Decree”**, one quantitative indicator can focus on the length of the CFi agreement “Length of CFi agreement”; the measurement unit would be a number of years. Baseline value would be “3”; target value would be “15” and milestone value “10”. Another indicator could focus on the inclusion of a chapter on CFi network in the sub-decree with a formulation such as “Extent to which the CFi Sub-Decree has been modified to incorporate a chapter on CFi network”; baseline would be “no chapter on CFi Network” (exact target value to be determined). The qualitative intermediate/milestone value would report on whether or not the chapter has been included and the number of inputs from PaFF partners integrated into final documents, etc. The formulation “Extent to which...” allows to report on and claim partial achievement, given that not all expected policy changes will materialize during the lifetime of PaFF II.

- **On Forestry Law**, a qualitative indicator on the right of CFs to engage in sustainable commercial activities, e.g. “Extent to which the rights of CFs to engage in sustainable commercial activities is advanced as a result of PaFF programme” or, less specific in its formulation: “Extent to which financial sustainability of CFs has improved as a result of PaFF” (this can refer to national budget allocation, the right to engage in sustainable commercial activities, REDD+ mechanisms, etc.). In both cases, it is important to have clear and coherent baseline values and to set realistic targets.

- **Fishery Law**: given that the timeline and the dynamics of reform process in the Fisheries sector are different from the Forestry sector, it is best to have dedicated indicators on both sectors. Similar to the proposed indicator on Forestry Law, the following indicator reflects an expected improvement in the financial sustainability of CFis: “Extent to which the rights of CFis to engage in sustainable commercial activities is advanced as a result of PaFF programme”.

- **On funding of CBNRM groups**, if deemed relevant by PaFF partners and SDC, there could be a cross cutting indicator common to Fisheries, Forestry and Protect Areas laws: “Extent to which national budget formulation has been influenced under PaFF II to ensure significant budget allocations to CBNRM groups”.

- **Environmental and Natural Resources Code**. One qualitative indicator must specify core principles of people’s right to manage NR and engage in sustainable commercial activities, also incorporate landscape approach. PaFF partners are in a best position to formulate this indicator.

- **National REDD+ strategy**. The indicator could be: “Extent to which the Safeguard Information System of REDD+ is based on communities’ input, as a result of PaFF programme”.

(end of the Recommendation)

Table 8 - Quantitative Cumulative Progress (August 2017 - June 2019) Against Outcome 3 and Output 3 Targets

Source "Final PaFF Milestone for 2019, 19-06-19"

code	INDICATORS	Baseline (June 2017)	Targets (June 2021)	Milestone DIRECT support June 2019 (Cumulated from August 2017)	Milestone DIRECT support June 2019 (Cumulated from August 2017 including baseline data)
Outcome 3 - National and local enabling policy conditions support secure community rights over natural resources and the development of sustainable community-based enterprises.					
27	<u># of comments and inputs for each amended legislation/policy/law are acknowledged and integrated into final draft document before submitting to Minister for endorsement or approval</u>	Specific inputs contribute from PaFF team for the six selected laws/policies as in annex 1a to this log-frame.	At least one comment or input for each amended legislation/policy/law is acknowledged and integrated into final draft document before submitting to Minister for endorsement or approval	Inputs of the fisheries law, forestry, and protected area are integrated to be submitted to the MAFF and MoE. Inputs for Cfi sub-decree are accepted by the FiA DG.	
28	<u>Sustainability of the key platforms at the subnational levels</u>		At least 3 key platforms are sustainable at sub national level, i.e. PCFPCC	CF/Cfi Networking, PCFPCC, District Council Forums,	
Output 3.1 - Capacity development of authorities, CSO, NRM groups on NRM policies and issues is provided at national and provincial levels					
29	<u># of people from different stakeholders are trained on NRM policies and related issues</u>	57	Approx.300 attendees (20% are female)	518 (65F)	575 (65F)
Output 3.2 - 16 provincial landscape networks / platforms / forums are supported and responding to CBNRM group development priorities					
30	<u># of functioning of platforms / networks / forums [disaggregated by scale and sector].</u>	4 existing networks/platforms	4 CF networks, 2 Cfi networks, 4 PCFPCCs, 1 landscape forum, 4 PNRM	04 CF networks, 06 Cfi network (STG, Takeo, Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, KRT, Thbong Khmum) 01 Cfi Mekong Network 04 PCFPCCs 01 Landscape Forum 04 PNRM	
31	<u># of meetings of platforms / networks / forums [disaggregated by scale and sector].</u>	4 quarterly meeting/year/province	4 quarterly meeting/year/province; 2 CBE forums Annual PNRM forum by target province	10 Cfi Network meetings 29 CF Network meetings 30 PCFPCC meetings 01 CBE Forum 04 Annual PNRM in Stung Treng and Ratanakiri	
32	<u># of key stakeholders in platforms / networks / forums</u>	CF & CFis network, FAC, FiAs, NGOs	CF & CFis network, NGO, PDoAFF, PDoE, local authorities, CBEs	CFi network, NGO network (Stung Treng NGO Alliance), local authorities, P-DAFF, DoE,	
33	<u>Proof of commitment of partners to shared mission & goal [disaggregated by network / platform / forum].</u>	minute of quarterly meeting and join action of CF network	At least 4 minutes and join action plans per year	> 10 minutes of CF network meeting > 12 minutes of PCFPCC meeting > 05 minutes (3 minutes of PCFiN meeting, 1 minutes of Co-management on fishery management in Ramsar site (joint work plan) and 1 minute of PTWG-FiA on the joint annual workplan of fishery for 2019). > Minutes of Sambour Cfi network meeting in Kratie. > Minutes of District Council forums > Joint-action plan between RECOFTC and others four NGOs, (CEPA, MVI, MB, DPA) in Stung Treng to support 06 CFMPs development.	
34	<u>Proof of productivity of (multi-) stakeholder platforms / networks / forums [disaggregated by network / platform / forum and sector].</u>	NA	At least 2 stories/case study, policy brief, position paper of CF/CFis/CBE best practise per year	> 01 policy brief on contextualized of fishery, forestry and PA laws > 01 case study of PCFPCC was developed > 02 case study on :Prey Kbal Bey Community Forest Wins Award and commune council supports CF development. > 02 success stories on young Woman in Community Fishery Network and good collaboration in fishery management in O'svay. > 02 minutes of co-management workshop.	
Output 3.3 Six selected policies are input and advocated to reflect community interests					
35	<u># of key policies/laws/regulation are defined to address the concern and needs of women and indigenous people. [disaggregated by sector].</u>	1.-Revised and simplify CF guideline, 2. Cfi sub decree, 3. Forestry law, 4. Fishery law, 5. ENR Code 6. Influencing core elements of National REDD+ Strategy implementation	# of specific inputs from PaFF partners on the identified laws/policies/regulations are recommended to the policy makers.	Follow up the inputs for the fisheries law and sub-decree, ENR code and provide inputs for revision of forestry law and protected area law Continue to follow up on the review of simplifying CFMP template of CFMP and data needed.	
Output 3.4 - Policy brief, position papers, and case studies are developed, documented and disseminated.					
36	<u>Up-to-date databases on all CBNRM modalities [disaggregated by CBNRM type & sector].</u>	National CF statistic (Jan 2017) Provincial Cfi statistic	National CF statistic National Cfi statistic	Update National CF statistic for 2018 and 2019 Provide target Cfi information to CFDD for updating Cfi statistic.	
37	<u># of policy research papers [disaggregated by sector].</u>	LIVES Synthesis report	4 policy briefs (NTFP, dams, Cfi and CF) MFF report card	2 policy briefs (NTFP, dams, Cfi and CF) are produced Synthesis report is produced	

- **Assessing the effectiveness of policy advocacy and support and attributing the results to PaFF II is complicated for many reasons.** 1/ Several other development partners and donors are pushing for the same changes (hence the wider programmatic approach of PaFF). 2/ The timeframe of policy processes is longer than the PaFF programme and most expected results may not materialize during the lifetime of PaFF II. 3/ Policy advocacy is on the agenda of all PaFF partners in Cambodia. Policy advocacy activities build on experience, expertise and a strong engagement for a particular cause (e.g. NRM, biodiversity conservation) and are not necessarily implemented by dedicated policy experts but technical experts. In the Cambodian context, where reforms are slow to emerge and materialize, advocacy tends to turn into a routine exercise. 4/ Policy support entails research, data collection and analysis, turning data into inputs, linking with the public sector and policy makers in order to transform inputs into legal texts. This process stretches over a number of years, involves staff across different interventions, requires stakeholder coordination and numerous consultations and workshops with governmental bodies, all under a timeline often dictated by politics: often, the process is a black box.

- **Consequently, effectiveness can be best assessed by reviewing the means and the quality of the processes that PaFF partners dedicate to the policy support exercise.** On the front of research, data collection and analysis, the experience and expertise of partners is highly relevant and conducive to policy support. Besides, as discussed, capacity building on NRM policies and support to subnational networks and platforms strengthen the capacity of PaFF partners to provide relevant and timely inputs to policy processes. Besides, NTFP-EP (the lead organization in the SRJS consortium) has a policy officer, who is partly supported by PaFF. However, there are reasons to believe that coordination on policy efforts among PaFF partners is not optimal and opportunities for synergies are missed. SDC expresses frustration at the fact that PaFF partners were not sufficiently proactive during the preparation of the sub-decree on fisheries (now ready and reviewed by the FiA). SDC pressured partners into hiring a legal expert to accelerate activities and to help incorporate key elements (increase in the duration of the CFI agreements and CFI Management Plan, a chapter on CFI network, possibility for the CFI committee to collectively exploit designated areas for commercial purposes). SDC is now concerned that when a similar opportunity to modify the Forestry Law opens (this is likely to happen before the end of PaFF II), partners will not be in a position to react effectively because of a lack of legal expertise and insufficient coordination on policy issues. In other words, SDC points at a lack of capacities and coordination in the area of policy support. Besides, it is an issue that SRJS ends by June 2020 because the period beyond June 2020 may prove crucial for policy reforms.

- **SDC has committed to PaFF II with a clear objective of maximizing the use of funds by seizing every opportunity to make a strong difference in NRM governance and break the vicious circle of “routine advocacy”.** This entails a dynamic and proactive approach to advocacy and policy support that partners are not used to: typically, through advocacy, they contribute to the emergence of reform opportunities; and when these opportunities do emerge, they respond to the policy agenda by coaching themselves (with the help of an in-house policy officer or not) into preparing inputs which they submit, as and when required, during consultations processes. The making of the ENRC is an illustration of this. Lead by the MoE, it was legally assisted by the Vishnu Law Group and has been underpinned by many consultations with conservation NGOs, among others. But each policy process has its own dynamics and the reform of the Forestry Law may not offer the same opportunities as ENRC. When the possibility to contribute is offered, stakeholders will need to move fast and be ready to provide relevant quality legal inputs, which can be submitted for official ministerial review.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #28 to all PaFF Partners** - In view of the end of SRJS, partners must decide who will take the lead on policy support and designate a policy coordinator that will work in tandem with the PM; The policy strategy of PaFF II beyond SRJS must be designed as soon as possible and properly budgeted. This recommendation complements [Recommendation #3](#).

4. Conclusion on Outcome 3

- **Overall, effectiveness is good.** Sustainability ranges from poor (CBNRM networks) to excellent (policy support).
- **There is plenty of evidence that capacity building on NRM and support to provincial networks and platforms contribute to mainstreaming NRM in strategic conversations at subnational level and CBNRM groups into local governance mechanisms.** However the sustainability of provincial networks is not good and there is no immediate perspective of improvement because it is a matter of financial sustainability. Institutionally, CF networks are already embedded in the policy framework. The draft Sub-Decree on fisheries, currently under review at MaFF level, incorporates a chapter on CFi network. This is a positive outcome that can be put to the credit PaFF II and which will establish, if the sub-decree is approved as drafted, the institutional sustainability of CFi networks. However, in both cases (CF and CFi networks), the issue of financial sustainability remains intact and calls for further financial support from PaFF partners until the end of the programme, given the strategic importance of provincial platforms in policy processes.
- **Key benefits from provincial networks and platforms are not well captured because of a lack of relevant indicators at outcome level.** This is also the case for policy support, with a composite indicator that fails to properly convey expected policy-related benefits.
- **Not all expected policy benefits will be achieved before the end of PaFF II but some of them are already materializing:** inputs from development partners, including PaFF partners, have resulted in a change in the length of the CFi agreement (from 3 to 10 years) in the draft sub-decree that has been approved by the FiA and is now under review at a higher level. Even though it is not the 15-year duration that partners were expecting, it is a substantial improvement for CFis. The simplification of CF guidelines would be another major achievement which RECOFTC (and other partners) has been advocating for many years on behalf of CFs: the process has now started and a national consultant was hired in October 2019 by the FA to work on the topic, especially on guidelines for CF management plans. According to the FA, simplified CF guidelines will be available in 2020. As far ENRC is concerned, consultations have been held since 2016 and as many as 11 versions were drafted, incorporating inputs from many development partners, including PaFF partners, under the coordination of NGO Forum. It was a huge collective exercise, assisted by a legal firm. Consultations are now over but approval of ENRC is still pending. Under REDD+, the work was also coordinated by NGO Forum and led to the inclusion of communities' input into the Safeguard Information System of REDD+, which is one of the pillars of the national REDD+ strategy.
- **However, SRJS, the key contribution project under which most policy support activities have been conducted comes to end in June 2020** and the strategy of PaFF partners under Outcome 3 and beyond SRJS is yet to be clarified.

- [↑ Return to Table of Contents](#)

IMPACT

• **Introduction.** The intervention logic of PaFF II being relevant and straightforward, it is expected that positive results from the three components will combine over time to form impact, which is currently measured through 4 indicators. This is assuming OC1, OC2 and OC3 are effective enough to produce impact. As per the current logframe, impact is currently measured through 4 indicators:

- Ind#1: “# of households undertaking sustainable NRM-based livelihood strategies through CBNRM groups”
- Ind#2: “# of participating households in CBNRM groups that have increased their income by at least 10% through participating sustainable community-based enterprise (based on baseline of HH assessment in 2016 and HH of newly established CBEs)”
- Ind#3: “# of hectares of natural habitat conserved and managed”
- Ind#4: “# of self-governing CBNRM groups and contributing to CBNRM conservation related activities”

1. Impact indicators

• **Ind#1, Ind#2 and Ind#3 are appropriate and sufficient to describe impact provided they are correctly defined and measured.** Ind#4 is redundant with several other indicators under OC1, Besides, keeping in mind the logframe should reflect a hierarchy of results and given that CBNRM groups are a means to an end (livelihoods and conservation), Ind#4 is not appropriate at impact level.

• **Ind#1 focuses on the number of beneficiary HHs and provides a good measure of the impact provided an important point is clarified:** what is Ind#1 counting exactly? HH-members of all CBNRM groups? Or HH-members of CBNRM groups having an agreement, or an approved a management plan, or having started implementing their management plan? This clarification needs to be incorporated in the very definition of the indicator. At impact level, logically, it should not be anything less than “having an agreement”. However, given that PaFF II focuses on management plans, it would be even more relevant to measure the number of HH-members of a CBNRM group having an approved management plan. Of course, the question of direct/indirect support needs to be sorted out: baseline, target and final values should not be aggregated.

• **Ind#2. Again, in order to improve the definition of this indicator, clarification is needed about what exactly is to be measured and how.** Does this indicator measure the number of HHs, which have increased their annual income by 10% as compared to the baseline? In this case, the baseline value is “0” (by definition) and a target value must be set: is it all participating HHs, half of participating HHs (etc.)? Or does the indicator measure a change in HH income for a selected sample of HHs? In which case the definition needs to be modified: “Change in annual HH income of selected households participating in CBEs”. The measurement unit would be a percentage, with 0 as baseline value and 10% as target value.

• **Besides, a rigorous methodology is essential to measure a change in HH income.** For this indicator, the Final Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy Framework for PaFF II defines “income” as “sales revenue from existing and new enterprises”. This is ambiguous because, according to its current definition, Ind#2 is expected to measure HH income and not sales revenues from CBEs. This is important to clarify because case studies highlight the fact that CBE income does not necessarily translate into HH income (See Annex 3, Case Study #6).

• **The MTR has highlighted very different dynamics for NTFP-based CBEs supported by NTFP-EP and livestock/aquaculture-based CBEs supported by WWF** (see the section on Effectiveness of OC2, Part 2 on differences between CBEs supported under PaFF II). Therefore it would be interesting to disaggregate the final values for Ind#2 into HH incomes attached different groups. Besides, to be able to refine the level of analysis and draw useful lessons for future programming, it is necessary to disaggregate by categories of CBEs: honey, traing, ecotourism, chicken, fish, cow, etc. In 2016, NTFP-EP conducted a socio-economic baseline survey with valuable data against which HH income will be measured by the end of PaFF II. In 2018

WWF has conducted a baseline survey to measure the income of HHs, which are a part of the groups it supports.

⇒ **RECOMMENDATION #29 to WWF.** If it has not been done yet under the contribution project that provides funds for activities under Outcome 2, determine precisely how impact will be measured (methodology) for CBEs/IGAs developed around chicken raising, cow raising, aquaculture.

- **Ind#3. The definition also needs to be improved and there needs to be a coherence between Ind#1 and Ind#3.** In other words, if Ind#1 counts HHs which are members of CBNRM groups having an approved management plan, then Ind#3 should cumulate the number of hectares (terrestrial and aquatic) under approved management plans. Similarly, if partners insist on reporting on indirect support, there needs to be a clear set of baseline, target and final values for indirect support.

2. Contribution of CBEs to household income

- **Table 9 (below) summarizes the performances of selected CBEs** supported under PaFF II and visited during the MTR mission. The table is supported by 13 Case Studies that form Annex 3 and together provide a reasonable, qualitative as well as quantitative appreciation of whether and how CBEs contribute to supporting NRM and livelihoods. Case studies are based exclusively on field interviews aimed at assessing the impact on HH income. The methodology was ad hoc because it is difficult to obtain reliable, coherent data from beneficiaries. To overcome this difficulty issue, the mission spent at least two hours with beneficiaries (either with an individual or a group of individuals, depending on the context of the interview) with a view to triangulate data obtained from various sources: beneficiaries themselves, books of accounts, journals. Sometimes, an entire year of monthly expenses and revenues was reviewed, calculations were made again by the MTR to increase the reliability of the data. In some cases, no quantitative data was available or the available data was not solid enough (obvious errors, documentation missing and/or no possibility of reconciling numbers), in which case the MTR decided not to use the data. In case of IGAs, the HH income refers to gross income (sales minus cost of goods sold, which is equivalent to net income since there are no additional taxes).

- The performances of the CBEs have been discussed in detail under Effectiveness of Outcome 2. Table 9 allows for a quick visual assessment of current impact on HH income and sustainability prospects.

- **With respect to HH income, impact is deemed medium to high for honey CBEs and medium to good for traing chopsticks CBEs and CBETs.** Sustainability ranges from uncertain to good for these groups. Within a given category of CBEs, there are significant variations in performances, influenced by leadership skills (traing CBEs) and the experience of the group (two CBETs created under PaFF I perform better than the one created under PaFF II), among other factors. In the case of honey, the mere existence of a CBE -independently from the performance of the CBE- can contribute to increasing prices and thus increasing income for honey collectors because of the competition it creates.

- **Fish processing groups are a failure, from the point of view of contribution to HH income.** Interestingly, one could be sustainable because members have a strong social interest in working together as a group. Therefore the group might continue to operate as long as it is not losing any money. In which case, it is always possible that impact might form at a later stage.

- **Chicken and fish raising groups visited by the MTR have not demonstrated their capacity to contribute to HH income.** Most have been formed recently (no more than a year, end of 2018 for chicken raising) but given the package provided by WWF, there was a potential for all individuals involved in an IGA to make money out of the first production cycle, be it chicken or fish.

- **Conclusion.** At this point in the implementation of PaFF II, impact on HH income is only significant for honey, traing and ecotourism CBEs (20 out of 23 CBEs supported by NTFP-EP). Assuming all CBEs in these categories can achieve some degree of impact, they have the potential to contribute positively to the HH income of 432 members, including 102 female members (75% of them in CBETs) and 43 IPs (all in honey and ecotourism CBEs).

TABLE 9 - SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCES OF SELECTED COMMUNITY BASED ENTERPRISES SUPPORTED UNDER PAFF II

Source: case studies conducted by the MTR mission based on interviews between 21/10/2019 and 06/11/2019

GOOD	ISSUES	SEVERE DEFICIENCY	NA – not available	(*) information from the monitoring system of NTFP-EP
-------------	---------------	--------------------------	--------------------	---

CASE #	Name of group	Province	Partner	PaFF phase	CBE profit	Contribution to NRM/patrol	Contribution to HH income	Sustainability
CASE # 1 – WILD HONEY COLLECTION	Prasat Teuk Khmao Wild Honey Collection Group	KRATIE	NTFP-EP	PAFF II	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	GOOD
CASE # 2 – WILD HONEY COLLECTION	Chhaeb Lech Wild Honey Collection Group	PREAH VIHEAR	NTFP-EP	PaFF II	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	UNCERTAIN
CASE # 3 – WILD HONEY COLLECTION	Dong Plet Wild Honey Collection Group	PREAH VIHEAR	NTFP-EP	PaFF II	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM
CASE # 4 – TRAING PROCESSING	Chhaeb Lech Traing Processing Group	PREAH VIHEAR	NTFP-EP	PaFF II	MEDIUM	Not yet	MEDIUM	UNCERTAIN
	Sangkae Traing Processing Group				GOOD	Not yet	GOOD	GOOD
CASE # 5 – FISH PROCESSING	Khsach Leav Fish Processing Group	KRATIE	NTFP-EP	PaFF I	NONE	NONE	NONE	NOT SUSTAINABLE
CASE # 6 – FISH PROCESSING	Koh Preah Fish Sauce Processing Group	STUNG TRENG	NTFP-EP	PaFF I	LOW	LOW	ALMOST NIL	UNCERTAIN
CASE # 7 - ECOTOURISM	Koh Samseb Community Based Ecotourism	KRATIE	NTFP-EP	PaFF II	Not known	NONE (*)	Not known	UNCERTAIN
CASE # 8 - ECOTOURISM	Borei O' Svay Community-Based Ecotourism	STUNG TRENG	NTFP-EP	PaFF I	Not known	MEDIUM	MEDIUM / GOOD	GOOD
CASE # 9 - ECOTOURISM	Samros Koh Han Community-Based Ecotourism	STUNG TRENG	NTFP-EP	PaFF I	Not known	MEDIUM	MEDIUM / GOOD	GOOD
CASE # 10 - CHICKEN RAISING	O' Preas Chicken Raising Group (Individual # 1)	KRATIE	WWF	PaFF II	NA	Not known	NEGATIVE	UNCERTAIN
CASE # 11 - CHICKEN RAISING	O' Preas Chicken Raising Group (Individual #2)	KRATIE	WWF	PaFF II	NA	Not known	NEGATIVE	UNCERTAIN
CASE # 12 - CHICKEN RAISING	La Eart Chicken Raising Group	KRATIE	WWF	PaFF II	NA	Not known	NEGATIVE	UNCERTAIN
CASE # 13 - FISH RAISING	Anlong Preas Kou Fish Raising Group	KRATIE	WWF	PaFF II	NA	Not known	NEGATIVE	UNCERTAIN

OVERALL CONCLUSION

- A conservation programme is a long-term approach (nothing less than a couple of decades), but no donor will ever commit to such a long horizon in Cambodia. The long-term needs attached to conservation are generally met by a multitude of short-term projects, which may either overlap or leave gaps in conservation programmes because these projects are driven by donors' agenda and do not always complement. For instance, donors tend to prefer livelihood support to law enforcement, though it is debatable whether livelihood support, as a conservation strategy, is more effective than law enforcement. De facto, the contrast between the large financial requirement for conservation and the fragmentation of funds available for conservation is striking. In this context, the financial contribution of SDC is the exception that confirms the rule: through its long-term commitment to PaFF, SDC supports a programmatic approach and helps partners bridge gaps created by the multiplication of short-term "niche" interventions. Consequently, there is a strong inherent value attached to SDC funding and SDC must be commended for a vision that contributes to mitigating a major weakness in environmental conservation.
- It is also remarkable that WWF, with very limited management staff and constraints attached to the institutional set up of PaFF, is able to manage such a complex programme and coordinate such a large amount of diverse activities, while maintaining satisfactory efficiency. It is a sign of strong institutional, organizational and management capacity, even if there is room for improvement, especially in the area of monitoring and evaluation. It is also a tribute to other PaFF partners, who are strongly committed to the success of a carefully crafted but overly ambitious programmatic approach.
- Weaknesses in specific areas (policy support) can be overcome as long as they are acknowledged by partners and joint internal capacities are reviewed, coordinated and, if needed, temporarily augmented for a clear and pragmatic objective. Difficulties in supporting livelihoods through small scale farming are not easy to address but cannot be ignored. Coordination with other development partners, another problematic area, calls for strategic decisions to reallocate funds where NRM and conservation needs are the highest.
- As challenging as they may be to address, none of the above issues diminishes the overall value of the programme. This report concludes with a brief review of factors of cost-effectiveness.

Factors of cost-effectiveness

- **PaFF is built on the premise that impact and sustainability can only be achieved through the cumulative effects of multiple strategies.** However, do all strategies have the same value? The complexity of PaFF prevents a full-scale analysis of cost-effectiveness but MTR findings, combined with an examination of Table 10, which breaks down the total budget of PaFF into Outcomes and Outputs, can help to identify factors, positive and negative, of cost-effectiveness.
- **Relevance is an obvious factor of cost-effectiveness.** Conversely, when an activity ceases to be relevant, whatever the reason, its effectiveness is inevitably reduced. In the case of PaFF II, it is the cost-effectiveness of activities related to CFIs that needs to be examined, especially in the province of Kratie.
- **Staff costs are the most expensive item under each outcome**, i.e. 19% for OC1, 9% for OC2, 12% for OC3 because PaFF is all about strengthening capacities. This amounts to 44% of PaFF II budget including PaFF management staff. Therefore the cost of human resources is the single most important factor of cost-effectiveness. In the case of PaFF II, this cost is reasonable: PaFF supports 63 people including 20 full-time staff (all other staff typically contribute 30% to 50% of their time to PaFF II) for a total annual amount of USD 646,805 (total staff costs + management cost, divided by 4). Not all 4 NGOs are local organisations (RECOFTC and NTFP-EP are regional NGOs) but all 63 positions are occupied by national staff, which contributes to moderate staff costs.
- **The costliest component is Outcome 1 because of the high costs attached to developing management plans** (14% of the total budget, this is the highest budget line in Table 10, after staff costs and operations/administration). However these funds are used to assist official institutions (CFs and CFIs) in developing (or revising) their management plans, a difficult and time-consuming task since it requires an

inventory of natural resources. For any NGO involved in supporting CFI and CFs, this is a compulsory activity because it is part of the official guidelines and there is no alternative strategy. Once CFMPs and CFiMPs are developed, they remain valid for several years. In this case, cost-effectiveness can be best achieved by partnering with an experienced NGO, with a strong field capacity, so as to maximize the number of plans that can be developed within the lifetime of PaFF II. To this end, RECOFTC is the NGO of choice for CFs, having supported so many of them. CEPA and WWF also have strong skills to assist CBNRM groups. Therefore, activities under PaFF II are, most likely, as cost-effective as possible, as long as they are relevant.

- **Conversely, the lack of capacities is a negative factor of cost-effectiveness.** Let us examine the costs under Output 2.3 “Research and development initiative” (for CBEs), which is the highest budget line under Outcome 2 (after staff costs): it accounts for 6% of the total budget of PaFF II or USD 343,280, coming from SDC funding (21% of this amount, all of it for NTFP-EP) and direct contribution (79% to support groups developed by WWF). Keeping in mind the findings of the MTR (under Effectiveness of OC2 and impact), it emerges that the cost-effectiveness of activities linked to CBEs supported by NTFP-EP is higher than that of activities linked to CBEs supported by WWF. It is hard not to establish a link between this difference in cost-effectiveness and the difficulties WWF is experiencing in supporting livelihoods, likely stemming from insufficient technical capacities.
- **However, in this case, capacities are not the single factor of cost-effectiveness. The complexity of the type of enterprises developed under PaFF II is another factor.** Indeed, the more elaborate/complex the business/IGA, the costlier the research and development activities that underpin its establishment while the higher the risks of failure of the business/IGA, owing precisely to its complexity. In other words, the apparently poor cost-effectiveness of IGAs developed by WWF is a combination of insufficient capacities and business complexity. Hence a deceptively straightforward conclusion: the most cost-effective livelihood development strategies in the context of PaFF are the ones focused on simple activities. Ecotourism for instance, though not a traditional activity for targeted communities, is simple: people only have to use their own boats, homes and kitchen to be in business. Of course, the quality of the services may not be optimal at first but beneficiaries can further develop capacities as and when training opportunities are offered, and this is precisely what they are doing.
- **Extrapolating further on the inherent cost-effectiveness of simple activities,** credit schemes are even simpler to initiate and support than CBEs. They do not cost as much in terms of development and research because a SHG is almost a generic activity that any rural community can engage in, with immediate effect and minimum difficulties (provided the group is well trained and receives seed money). In the absence of an assessment of the effectiveness of credit schemes under PaFF II, it is not possible to conclude with confidence on the cost-effectiveness of credit schemes as a conservation cum livelihood strategy, but several PaFF field staff tend to agree that the intrinsic value of credit schemes is potentially higher than that of CBEs, when it comes to contributing to both NRM and HH income.
- **As mentioned under efficiency, the M&E system is a negative factor of cost-effectiveness** because it is not very supportive of management processes. More specifically, it complicates decision-making and prevents from maximizing the allocation of funds to the most effective activities.
- **The geographic spread of PaFF II is a negative factor of cost-effectiveness.** The purpose here is not to criticize the decision to expand the programme to new provinces but to note that costs are comparatively higher when human and financial resources are spread over a large area. It is the eternal question of whether to allocate resources to strengthen existing results vs. to expand into areas, which attract little funding but nevertheless need support. Aggravating the negative effect of the geographic spread on cost-effectiveness is the termination in December 2019 of activities in new provinces: part of the benefits already achieved, especially capacities, will erode more quickly because time is inherent to development and empowerment processes; confidence and capacities are built when beneficiaries have a chance to exercise newly acquired skills, which will not be the case in Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom. Having said that, communities are used to discontinuities in development support and they have learned how to cope.

Table 10 - Budget Plan: Revised budget 4 years and annual as at 31/12/2018

Source: PaFF management team – Percentages calculated by the MTR mission

	COMPONENT	SDC FUNDING		CONTRIBUTION PROJECTS		PAFF PROGRAMME	
		Total Budget Revised	Percentage of total SDC funds	Total Budget Revised	Percentage of total contribution projects	Total Budget Revised	Percentage of total programme budget
1	OUTCOME 1						
1,1	Output 1 - Capacity Development	55 864	2%	199 907	6%	255 771	4%
1,2	Output 1.2 - Tenure Formalisation	48 271	2%	70 947	2%	119 218	2%
1,3	Output 1.3 - Management plans	104 963	3%	105 421	3%	210 384	3%
1,4	Output 1.4 - Management plans implementation	416 593	14%	431 178	14%	847 771	14%
1,5	Staff Cost	814 665	27%	359 935	11%	1 174 600	19%
1,6	Technical Assistance	24 746	1%	0	0%	24 746	0%
	Sub-total Outcome 1	1 465 103	49%	1 167 387	37%	2 632 489	43%
2	OUTCOME 2						
2,1	Output 2.1 - Rapid Assessment of Community Livelihoods	2 583	0%	4 000	0%	6 583	0%
2,2	Output 2.2 - Business Capacity Development	66 216	2%	27 323	1%	93 539	2%
2,3	Output 2.3 - Research and Development Initiative	72 349	2%	270 931	9%	343 280	6%
2,4	Staff Cost	319 330	11%	263 036	8%	582 365	9%
2,5	Technical Assistance	15 000	0%	0	0%	15 000	0%
	Sub-total Outcome 2	475 478	16%	565 290	18%	1 040 767	17%
3	OUTCOME 3						
3,1	Output 3.1 - Policy Analysis Capacity Development	26 564	1%	93 908	3%	120 472	2%
3,2	Output 3.2 - Landscape Forums	47 886	2%	195 227	6%	243 113	4%
3,3	Output 3.3 - Lobbying and Advocacy	2 000	0%	67 656	2%	69 656	1%
3,4	Output 3.4 - Research and Documentation	6 000	0%	55 850	2%	61 850	1%
3,5	Staff Cost	403 707	13%	353 673	11%	757 380	12%
	Sub-total Outcome 3	486 157	16%	766 314	24%	1 252 471	20%
4	MANAGEMENT & OPERATIONS						
4,1	PaFF Management and Coordination	243 319	8%	0	0%	243 319	4%
4,2	Operations and Administration	298 980	10%	617 973	20%	916 953	15%
4,3	Audit	31 000	1%	16 000	1%	47 000	1%
	Sub-total Management & Operations	573 299	19%	633 973	20%	1 207 272	20%
TOTAL ESTIMATED PROGRAMME COST		3 000 036	100%	3 132 964	100%	6 133 000	100%