



InovAgro Project Phase 3 Midterm Review Final Report

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Executive Summary

This report, commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), summarizes a mid-term review (MTR) of the InovAgro project, which has worked since 2011 to build a more robust agricultural market system to the greater benefit of poor male and female farmers in northern Mozambique. The MTR stands at the mid-point of InovAgro's third phase and was thus able to look back across the life of the project, assessing its accomplishments against the state of the agricultural market system in late 2010, contextual changes since then, and project adaptations that have occurred as InovAgro evolved through partnerships and tactics to become more effective over time. The report provides detailed findings by each of InovAgro's four components – Input Access, Commodity Trade, Financial Access and Enabling Environment – as well as separate treatment of land and gender issues that affected project implementation.

The main findings of the MTR are as follow:

Relevance: Inovagro clearly has an excellent reputation among other development actors and private sector partners. Farmer groups interviewed for the MTR also rated the project highly. The MTR finds that this reputation is partly due to the project's performance and partly due to its design – in other words, its relevance to the major challenges of agricultural market development in northern Mozambique. InovAgro is an appropriately designed market systems project that has played a vital role in building a more robust network of seed distribution and offtake actors in the region. **It has represented well the SDC's interests, adapted smartly over time to maintain its relevance as circumstances in its operating have changed, and will likely serve as a foundation upon which future successful development efforts will be built.** The MTR finds that the decision to work with CATs, when many development actors demonstrate a kneejerk aversion to "middlemen," was particularly smart and unique and contributes strongly to InovAgro's relevance.

Effectiveness: In most areas, InovAgro is **surpassing annual targets or has already surpassed phase targets. It is difficult to imagine that it will not be able to achieve its objectives by the end of 2020.** However, the MTR did note issues with data quality that make this a qualified judgement pending a deeper review of the project's data aggregation and attribution strategies. In addition, InovAgro's logframe achievements should be viewed in light of questions regarding the sustainability of impacts and the need to test exit strategies, as noted below.

Efficiency: InovAgro produces **tangible benefits for a large number of people.** With an average budget size for an SDC mandate, reaching 7,420 farmers in the first year of Phase 3 (Outcome Indicator 1.2 – above target) is an efficient use of funds. This performance puts the project on course to surpass its phase target of 17,640 farmers with increased sales. The financial benefit of increased value of commodity sales for smallholder farmers is also evident – 228,122,500 MZN as of the end of 2018 (Outcome Indicator 1.1), which already surpasses the phase target of 172,115,871 MZN.

The only intervention area of questionable efficiency is the FA support, which is labor and cost-intensive but has only managed to influence approximately 12,000 farmers to buy one large truck (or around 28MT) of seeds.

Impact: The MTR finds that InovAgro's push to extend market outreach for input access and offtake are its strongest features, although the impacts of individual partners are highly variable and we have some questions about additionality (see the discussion on Output Marketing, above).

It should also be noted that market system projects have performed very poorly in similar contexts. It has proven challenging for many projects to achieve smart market systems work in thin markets that have traditionally received large volumes of traditional donor

assistance. **InovAgro will stand out, in this regard, as likely having achieved significant impact where many others have failed.**

Sustainability: InovAgro's untested exit strategies create a tension between theoretical sustainability (likely) and empirical sustainability (unknown). Projects working with successful partners are often surprised when seemingly beneficial behaviors cease with the withdrawal of project support. So, while many of InovAgro's exit strategies are credible on paper, they need to be purposefully tested in the limited time remaining before the project closes. For this reason, it is difficult for the MTR to judge the question of the sustainability of InovAgro's work – both the continuation of current benefits and the replication and expansion of new behaviors to greater numbers of beneficiaries.

This is not a negative judgement. Rather, **it is a call for the project to complete its work by testing its exit strategies – the sooner the better.**

Recommendations: The MTR formulates three recommendations for InovAgro and several additional recommendations that should be considered for a follow-on mandate.

Recommendation 1: Test exit strategies for inputs access, output marketing, financial access and private seed inspectors – InovAgro has not yet moved to wind down the majority of its partnerships and prove the sustainability of the new behaviors it has sought to facilitate. With one more complete growing season (starting in November) followed by one more complete buying season, the time to wind down support is imminent. The MTR cannot over-emphasize this point.

The SDC office in Mozambique has stated a desire to continue supporting APROSE in the future, so there is less need to withdraw completely from InovAgro's enabling environment work at the moment. However, to test the private seed inspector model, InovAgro should cease any additional support for these actors then examine whether companies take on the full costs of fielding and expanding this service.

Recommendation 2: Direct resources to knowledge capture and external sharing – InovAgro should come to be, for many its activities, a textbook example of good market systems programming in thin markets. The project already has a mandate to share information and has started to do so. With a rapid reduction of support to partnerships it will have more time for its staff to work on knowledge capture. This should include case studies, new research, workshops and blogs, among other outputs. More detail on recommended areas for knowledge capture and sharing are in the main text.

Recommendation 3: Conduct an independent data quality review – The MTR found several issues in the project's data that invite questions about data accuracy. In order to dispel these questions and allow the project to finish strongly, we recommend that InovAgro hire an independent consultant to thoroughly review the data collection and attribution methodology for each indicator and help the MRM team remedy any problems.

Recommendations for a New MSD Programme:

InovAgro's decade of work on agricultural market system development in northern Mozambique offers a large number of useful lessons for future programming. Much of this captured in the Scoping Study. The list below distills these lessons into a brief set of recommendations:

- Continue with seed company support to build a market for high-quality seed in addition to a fuller distribution network that reaches rural villages;
- Continue with commodity trader support that meets at least one of the three benefit criteria discussed above (expansion, redundancy and improved performance);
- Focus on financial access for businesses and reach VSLAs via banks, instead of directly through local service providers;

- Continue with APROSE support, providing a necessary space for multi-stakeholder dialogue regarding systemic constraints to the development of the seed sector;
- Consider supporting expansion of private sector seed inspector scheme;
- Explore the possibility of engaging local government authorities as solution-seekers involved in exploring and piloting solutions to development challenges, rather than as gate-keepers who give permission for activities but add little value;
- Build a project with a more explicit structure oriented toward rapid adaptation, with an expanded technical focus on reducing transaction costs around farming households.

The principle conclusion and recommendation concerns the need to draw down activities in the brief period remaining before InovAgro closes. SDC has expressed a preference to see InovAgro stand on its own, without assuming that some activities could continue into a planned follow-on programme. In that light, the MTR makes recommendations that consider only InovAgro's timeline with project closure in December 2020.

1. Introduction

InovAgro is an agricultural market systems development (MSD) project funded by the SDC in Mozambique. Currently in its third phase of implementation, InovAgro began its first phase in January 2011, following a six-month design period in 2010. Its second phase, building on learning and achievements from its first phase, began in January 2014 and ran until December 2017. Its current three-year phase finishes in December 2020, after which the project will close. InovAgro is implemented by a consortium of DAI and COWI.

As an MSD project, INOVAGRO works at the 3 levels of the agricultural market system in Northern Mozambique:

- The core market where farmers and buyers interact, making the connection between private sector and small-scale farmers to facilitate linkages and transactions;
- The policy and/or enabling environment level with Government and other stakeholders, focused on improving the performance of the seed sector;
- The supporting functions, including a focus on the capacities of actors such as commodity traders, agro-dealers and financial service providers.

Thus, the project divided itself into four components: Input access, Commodity trade, Financial access, and Enabling Environment.

In addition, in keeping with the adaptive habits of MSD projects, InovAgro has evolved over its three-phase lifespan to focus on more productive partnerships that show greater promise for impact on the beneficiary population, rural farmers in northern Mozambique.

SDC commissioned the 2019 Mid-term Review (MTR) of InovAgro in order to:

- Evaluate the sustainability of InovAgro's work (TOR Objective 2);
- Review Phase 3 progress to date (TOR Objective 1);
- Evaluate the degree to which the project managed knowledge well, for both internal improvement and external knowledge sharing (TOR Objective 3); and
- Make strategic and tactical recommendations for the remainder of Phase 3 and a new SDC project that would begin following the close of InovAgro's (TOR Objective 4).

It also asked for special consideration of land tenure and gender, which receive separate treatment in the report below.

1.1 Methodology

The MTR consisted of a document review and interviews conducted in Mozambique with a wide range of actors. Fieldwork for the study took place in August 2019, ending with a debrief to SDC, InovAgro and Strategic Advisory Committee staff. The MTR coincided with a Scoping Study to inform the programme that would follow InovAgro, allowing the consultants to combine questions related to both the Scoping Study and the MTR into individual interviews. Interview subjects included international development actors; large, medium and small businesses working on input retail, offtake and processing; seed companies; and groups of farmers in Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia provinces in northern Mozambique. See Annex 2 for a list of key informants and farmer groups.

The MTR followed the SDC's Evaluation Policy (2018), using the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability) to structure evaluation questions and findings. In addition to the OECD/DAC definition of sustainability (i.e. whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn), the MTR overlaid a definition relevant for MSD work that characterizes sustainability as the degree to which current behaviors lead to expanded behavior change among new actors.

1.2 Context in Northern Mozambique

Mozambique has been slow to develop to the benefit of its largely rural population. Against a backdrop of extractive colonial rule until 1976, 16 years of civil war and despite years of development efforts by the national government and international organizations, significant and basic challenges remain. In 2018, Mozambique scored 180th of 189 countries in the United Nations' multi-factor Human Development Index. While it has made progress since its first index score in 1990, it started from a very low point and many other countries have far outpaced it. This theme – building slowly from a very low starting point – characterizes the country's history and its current development challenge.

InovAgro focused its technical activities on the three coastal provinces of the northern region of Mozambique – Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia provinces (see map). Together, they were home to approximately 13.3 million people as of the 2017 census.¹

Agriculture is the only feasible option for inclusive economic growth in northern Mozambique, where the overwhelming majority of households rely on farming for their primary income.² For smallholders, low productivity and high transaction costs conspire to keep most households mired in a high-risk, low-return pattern of production.

In its 2016 Annual Report, the project wrote, “In 2010, when InovAgro started, certified seed was provided mainly through government and NGO subsidized programs, with very little actual direct sales from seed companies to the farmers.” The underdeveloped state of input distribution within Mozambique, especially in the northern region, laid the backdrop for InovAgro's focus on the principle underlying constraint of low productivity – from the beginning the project sought to find opportunities to boost access to high-quality seed and other inputs.

With the Mozambican government backing out of seed distribution shortly after the project began, InovAgro was perfectly positioned to partner with private companies and build the market for high-quality seed. It took advantage of this opportunity. In the same report, it stated that

“[T]oday, the supply of certified seed to farmers is dominated by the private sector. It is still not as dynamic as it should be, but it is progressing. InovAgro's assistance to the seed companies has helped them discover and develop markets, improve their distribution systems, access new basic seeds, and change their approach to marketing.”

This characterization of the seed sector is still accurate. In other words, much progress has been made, but much remains to be accomplished.

In addition to seed companies, traders and agricultural input retailers are becoming more numerous, reaching out further to isolated villages, but their business practices are still rudimentary and their ability to embed information and other services into their relationships



¹ See Presentation: Resultados Definitivos, Instituto Nacional De Estatística, Maputo, Abril 2019.

² FAO indicates that 55% of the national population relies on agricultural and livestock for most household revenue, and northern Mozambique is poorer and more rural than the rest of the country: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-br891e.pdf>

with farmers is low. Large buyers have operated in Mozambique for centuries – indeed, internationally marketing Mozambican output was the rationale for the Portuguese to take it as a colony in the first place – but they play a passive role in the country's development. Value addition is negligible, limited to a few large basic processors working in cashews, maize, pigeon pea and other commodities, plus small and medium-sized traders who mill maize and keep it until later in the season when prices rise. Almost no one processes vegetables. While recent oil and gas discoveries offshore promise significant increases in national income, there is strong skepticism regarding the degree to which energy extraction investments will actually benefit the majority of the population.

2. Findings

2.1 Inputs and Extension

2.1.1 Observations on Models and Sustainability

Seed companies – InovAgro works with seed companies in Mozambique to promote awareness of the benefit of using improved seed and to make high quality seed available to smallholder farmers. The project partners (or has partnered) with at least nine companies, including Seedco, Klein Karoo (K2), Pannar and Phoenix, to carry out promotions by means of demonstration plots and field days. InovAgro also works with these partners to build a larger distribution network to retail seeds to farmers through the country's growing agrodealer network. The typical partnership includes an explicit cost share for the effort required to execute these activities, with each seed company paying for approximately 60 to 80 percent of the cost against InovAgro's contribution of the remaining 20 to 40 percent.


The MTR team interviewed representatives from Seedco, K2 and Phoenix. All three companies expressed strong appreciation for, and satisfaction with, the partnership with InovAgro. They commented on the project's ability to understand their needs as seed suppliers, combined with InovAgro's ability to link companies with reputable agrodealers in small towns. One company representative stated that "without InovAgro's support and initiative, [the company] would not be able to achieve what we have in the Nacala Corridor." The others echoed similar sentiments – it is reasonable to conclude that InovAgro significantly accelerated the marketing and distribution of high-quality seed in northern Mozambique. In fact, this is likely the project's greatest achievement over its three phases.

Seed companies also recognize that a significant amount of work remains to build a commercially viable, dynamic and well-resourced market for the sale of high-quality seed in Nampula, Zambezia and Cabo Delgado districts. One company representative estimated that, given the low starting point of almost no use of high-quality seed, it would take at least one more generation to cement farmer preferences for high-quality seed over retained seed, although Inovagro is clearly in a position to catalyze the acceleration of this 'generational learning' to something less than a generation. Meanwhile, building steady relationships with increasing trust between seed wholesalers and retailers will take more time.

This raises the issues of sustainability and exit. Under most circumstances, a market systems project would scale down its support during the final phase of intervention. Scaling down allows a project to test its partners and gauge the sustainability of new behaviors fostered by project interventions. But, considering both the amount that remains to be done to build the market for high-quality seed and the fact that a new SDC-funded market systems programme will be (likely) be launched in 2021, is this the right strategy for InovAgro?

Chart 1, below, shows the number of demonstration plots established by partner seed companies and sales of seed (in metric tonnes) against the left vertical axis, and field day attendance by farmers plus InovAgro's investment into seed company operations against the right vertical axis. The trendline for project support (yellow) is basically flat over the last four years – that is, the project has not shown a scale-down in funding allocations for seed

promotion in advance of closure at the end of 2020. Meanwhile, partners have steadily increased their efforts at farmer outreach (as indicated by the establishment of demonstration plots) and sales have increased, albeit not at the pace of demonstration plot expansion.



If InovAgro and SDC want to test the sustainability of new behaviors by seed companies (investing in demo plots and extension officers, for example), the project will need to immediately reduce the volume of support provided to seed companies and agrodealers ahead of the November 2019 agricultural season. In the opinion of this review, InovAgro will not substantively disrupt the seed market by withdrawing support in the final year of its implementation (i.e. one year won't matter much in light of the long-term nature of the challenge ahead). In addition, this reduction (even cessation) of funding will allow InovAgro and SDC to gauge the degree to which InovAgro's support has influenced fundamental changes in:

- The willingness of seed companies to continue investment in marketing and extension aimed at smallholder farmers in northern Mozambique;
- The ability of agrodealers to maintain strong commercial relationships with seed companies.

InovAgro's learning from a final test of its partnerships will richly inform other actors working in the same space, in addition to the SDC's new project. In short, the benefits of ceasing support for seed companies in the last season likely outweigh the costs – it is time to test the project's exit strategy for supporting seed companies.

Agrodealers – In addition to supporting seed companies to network with agrodealers, InovAgro also works directly with many local agrodealers who retail directly to smallholder farmers in their area. The project provides support for upgrading of shops (shelving, painting and signage) as well as informal advice on business management. This is a central feature of the project's strategy for facilitating the development of a strong commercial network for improved seed distribution, and seed companies also expressed the need for a strong network of agrodealers as key to supporting their sales. As of the end of the 2018-2019 growing season, InovAgro had worked with 22 seed companies and agrodealers, helping support the expansion of the retail network to 46 new agrodealer shops.

InovAgro was certainly correct to pursue the strategy of identifying and linking agrodealers to seed companies, as well as supporting the improved performance of agrodealers, themselves. However, the support was done in a somewhat disorderly fashion, resulting in

a lost opportunity for complementarity between seed distribution and InovAgro's work to boost household savings for improved seed purchases. Instead of linking savings groups with Fundos Agricola (FAs) to local agrodealers, the project instead linked savings groups directly with seed companies. This led to two problems:

- Some savings groups grew accustomed to paying wholesale prices for seed and voice strong aversion to buying from agrodealers because of the agrodealer markup (which is a necessity for the agrodealer to recovery costs and make even a modest profit);
- Some savings groups have grown frustrated with late seed deliveries after making orders through village-based agents (VBAs) directly with seed companies. The problem is that savings-group members typically place small orders, which seed companies either cannot handle or do not prioritize. Local agrodealers would likely have been more responsive to these order sizes, or they would direct customers to alternatives if there were stock-outs.

Perhaps it makes sense to link savings groups directly to seed companies in areas where there are no viable agrodealers. However, it seems to make more sense to focus FA work in areas where agrodealers already operate to avoid outcomes that negatively affect the expansion of the broader agrodealer network. InovAgro argues that it was forced to link savings groups directly to seed companies in areas where there were no viable agrodealers, but is that not just an argument to focus Fund Agricola work in areas where agrodealers already operated? If the savings group activity were more widespread, this could have had a negative impact on the pace with which the agrodealer network was able to grow (more on this issue in the Financial Access section, below).

Lastly, as with InovAgro's partnership with seed companies, the upcoming agricultural season offers the project the chance to dramatically scale-down its support for agrodealers and thereby test its exit strategy, which essentially relies on continued relations between seed companies and agrodealers, and agrodealers and farmers.

SDAE partnerships – Another component of InovAgro's work includes the involvement of extension officers from local government District Economic Activity Service (SDAE) offices in demonstration plots and field days. The project pays for at least part of the transportation cost these officers incur to attend project-facilitated events. Interviews with a small number of SDAE officers cast doubt on the likelihood that public extension officers will continue outreach without the support of InovAgro or other actors, owing at least in part to the Mozambican government's budget challenges. One director of a district SDAE office indicated that "maybe another five years" would be needed before his office could fund such activities on their own – and even then, he was vague on the mechanism by which his office would develop that capacity.

InovAgro had no choice but to work with SDAE offices in each district in which it operated, but the SDAE role was mostly as a gate-keeper, not a partner in solution seeking. There is little indication that it has been possible for InovAgro to influence any sustained change in the behavior of local governments.

2.1.2 Impact of InovAgro's Work on Input Access

The MTR team judges that the Input Access component of InovAgro is of high impact. Clearly there is much more to be done, but just as clearly the project played a pivotal role in building what exists of a nascent commercial seed distribution system, where before there was nothing of the kind. Again, this is likely the project's most profound contribution to the development of the wider agricultural market system in northern Mozambique.

We see three main systemic changes:

- New relationships between seed companies and agrodealers;
- New relationships between seed companies and farmer groups – although this is problematic, as discussed above;
- Reduced cost of farmer access to high quality seed and greater farmer appreciation of the importance of paying for seed – although it is impossible for us to assess the degree to which appreciation has spread and will be sustained.


The challenge of assessing the sustainability of any perceived improvement in willingness to pay for high-quality seed is another reason for InovAgro to test its exit strategies for its Input Access work in the period remaining prior to project closure. This, along with capitalization on its learning over three phases, should be InovAgro's priority at this point.

2.2 Output Marketing

2.2.1 Observations on Models and Sustainability

InovAgro supports local commodity traders, or CATs, under the rationale that a more liquid and dense market for offtake will incentivize smallholder farmers to boost production. Support focuses on encouraging CATs to expand their buying post (BP) network, in addition to support for technology adoption and other business improvements. To date, InovAgro has partnered with 30 CATs and continues to actively support 27 of them. The other three CATs opted out of project support to focus on existing buying posts or to expand to new buying posts outside of the project's focal areas.

InovAgro's support for CATs has evolved over the last two years. From 2016 through 2018, the project supported CATs with funds for, or the direct provision of, wooden pallets, bags, digital scales, hygrometers, price boards, support for meetings with buyers, and the payment of licenses. During the 2019 buying season, InovAgro trimmed this list to include only digital scales, price boards and a promise to buy canvas drying sheets (still unmet), in addition to support for meetings with buyers and other CATs. Meanwhile, its overall support for CATs has remained steady – see the yellow line in Chart 2, below.



The MTR team interviewed 8 CATs who had worked with InovAgro. For the most part, there is a strong benefit to the support the project has provided – this is especially obvious when visiting a new buying post in a previously unserved village, where residents previously walked or bicycled long distances in order to reach a buyer. However, there were also cases of questionable additionality, such as a trader in Lioma who had 30 buying posts when he began receiving InovAgro support but has not expanded this number. He also buys only in villages where several other traders also operate and agrees prices with other

traders before buying. The sum total of InovAgro's support to this trader is equal to approximately one month of his net profit during the buying season. It is justifiable to work with a large number of varied actors to find out which perform best, and under what circumstances. However, InovAgro's team should have evaluated and culled some partners who were not contributing to the expected outcomes of the interventions. So, the MTR team agrees with InovAgro's effort to cast a wide net in partnering with many CATs but at this stage one should ask which partners yielded the greatest benefit.

InovAgro has led the way for other actors to follow this model in northern Mozambique, and it would be an extremely useful piece of learning (and one already somewhat advocated by InovAgro's June 2019 CAT study) to identify the conditions under which CATs benefit smallholders, as opposed to the conditions under which there is no great benefit. Anticipating this study, the MTR team sees three potential conditions under which CAT support benefits smallholder farmers:

1. **Expansion** – a new trader in previously unserved village, giving access where before farmers carried food long distances for sale.
2. **Redundancy** – more robust networks serving sellers, with redundancy in case of business failure. This allows the village residents to continue enjoying the same level of market access despite the loss of a link. It is a feature of market resilience and important in an area with sole proprietorship traders and high uncertainty.
3. **Improved performance** – project support (in some way) facilitates more efficient and competitive traders offering better prices to farmers in villages already served.

Also, as with seed company and agrodealer support, at this stage in InovAgro's programming, and with the outcomes it has achieved, it is time to scale down support to CATs so that the project can watch and learn what these actors do. Do they stop expanding their buying posts? Do they retreat back to their previous number of posts? InovAgro's technical leadership made this point early in the process of the MTR, so it should not be a difficult step for the project to take.

Lastly, there is some confusion regarding the number of new buying posts being supported by the project. Project data seems to conflate old and new buying posts, while the indicator (Output Indicator 1.2) clearly refers only to new buying posts (Chart 2, above, only includes data for new buying posts). During the in-country debrief for the MTR the InovAgro team explained the discrepancy, but the explanation does not fit the data provided by the field team. There is clearly a significant amount of benefit to this activity, and a significant amount of work has gone into boosting CAT performance in the project area. However, there is a need for InovAgro to review its data and come up with a cleaner and easily justified count for new buying posts supported by the project.

2.2.2 Impact of InovAgro's Work on Output Markets

The MTR team judges that InovAgro's work promoting Output Marketing has, in many cases, had significant impacts on smallholders – both for income (reducing the cost of trade) and for quality of life (simply making trade easier). As mentioned above, a more detailed study analyzing exactly how, and under what circumstances, smallholders benefitted from CAT support would be very useful.


Two observable systemic changes are underway related to off-taker buying. One, there is likely increased trust between farmers and traders when they are able to have repeat transactions – in other words, a change in the quality of relationships. Another systemic change involves CAT expansion to underserved communities when farmers are able to develop entirely new relationships with buyers – in other words, a change in the network of relationships available to actors in the market system.

2.3 Financial Access

2.3.1 Observations on Models and Sustainability

InovAgro started in 2015 to work with existing savings groups to advocate for a set-aside fund, called the Fundo Agrícola (FA). The intention behind the FA is to help savings groups keep a small amount of savings in a separate fund to be used only for the purchase of seed before the planting season. Unlike the general savings fund, the FA is not meant to be lent out to group members and savings do not accrue interest over the savings cycle – it is a straightforward concept. InovAgro propagated the practice through contracts to local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) experienced with the Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) methodology, and which also kept large networks of groups they had worked with in the past. These networks formed the starting point for InovAgro to spread the practice of FAs with training by its NGO partners.

As the practice of keeping FAs was nonexistent prior to InovAgro's initiative, the starting point for savings was zero. Chart 3, below, shows the trajectory of group membership and savings for individuals (mostly women) participating in VSLAs that keep FAs, with significant takeoff in 2017. However, this also coincides with a significant increase in the volume of funding InovAgro devoted to training these groups, leading to a question about whether the model can be expanded over time to new groups without additional support from one development actor or another.



In addition, although these groups were not formally saving for seed purchase at all prior to InovAgro support, the overall volume of seed purchases (almost 28,000 kg) is small for a population of 12,000 members (or 2.3 kg per member). These two considerations – the difficulty of expanding the FA model without additional funds, and the small overall volume of seed purchased per FA member – lead to reasonable questions about whether this is an activity that is worth InovAgro's effort. It is also questionable from a market systems perspective that might ask whether having a project pay for direct training to farmers is not a return to the direct service provision the systems movement tried to leave behind.

However, a few points are worth mentioning:

- The FA intervention was never meant to be the main thrust of InovAgro's effort to generate demand (that falls under partnerships with seed companies and agrodealers);
- There is a strong gender and social inclusion aspect to this work, as these groups are mostly constituted of women who may thereby gain greater agency over decisions around seed purchase (a study in 2020 to analyze any gender-related

- changes to agency resulting from FAs would be appropriate). It is also in keeping with InovAgro's mandate to reach the rural poor;
- This could prove, over time, to be a huge influence on demand for seed and household ability to pay for it at the appropriate time (anecdotal reports from implementing NGOs indicate high interest from other groups in replicating the idea), but that impact would not likely be demonstrable in the near future.

Currently, spreading the FA methodology is the main focus of InovAgro's work to improve access to finance and savings, although the project in previous phases worked with a few formal financial institutions, such as Banco Oportunidade de Mocambique, to facilitate farmer access to credit. In addition, the project is currently in discussions with BancABC to help it develop an agent-banking model that would use agrodealers and CATs as agents. It is also in discussions with Hollard Insurance to spread access to an input-focused insurance product, currently marketed to a few InovAgro beneficiaries via Mutiana Investments.

2.3.2 Impact of InovAgro's Work on Financial Access

At this stage, the FA initiative seems marginal, and the MTR team wonders whether InovAgro's efforts (and resources) could have been better placed in more work to build out the agrodealer network. Note also the concern, described under the Input Access section, about the project's tendency to jump local agrodealers by connecting savings groups directly to seed companies, instead of connecting them to local agrodealers. In sum, perhaps it is a good thing for InovAgro to encourage other adopters of this methodology to devote attention to agrodealers and FAs together – otherwise, why generate demand that cannot be reliably met?

As with InovAgro's other components, it would be good to test the degree to which the methodology expands, the groups continue savings, and those savings are used to purchase seeds, following project support. In other words, the coming period prior to project closure is the time to test an exit strategy for FAs.

2.4 Enabling Environment

2.4.1 Observations on Models and Sustainability

APROSE – InovAgro has worked at the policy level on seed issues since 2012 with its main initiative being the National Seed Dialogue Platform, which became the Association for the Promotion of the Seed Sector (APROSE) after the platform's formal registration in 2016. APROSE is a multi-stakeholder platform for dialogue involving government, civil society, international organizations and the private sector – basically anyone with a strong interest in making high-quality seed available to Mozambican farmers. When InovAgro started its first phase, there was no platform for actors from such a diverse set of backgrounds (and interests) to gather and discover common interests. APROSE provided this space for exchange, as well as the first opportunities for many actors to sit at the table with government representatives.

Since its inception, APROSE has supported the ongoing process of reforming Mozambique's legislation around seed production and trade, held events focused on promoting investment in the seed sector, developed media materials publicizing the advantages of using improved seed, and guided the legal process for authorizing the use of Private Sector Seed Inspectors by players in the seed industry. It also claims to have played a role in reducing the volume of seed handouts by NGOs and other actors in Mozambique, although it is impossible for the MTR to verify or refute this claim.

The SDC, InovAgro and other actors see APROSE as a vital platform for discussion. Although seed companies voiced some concerns about APROSE's ability to represent their

interests, it can be argued that this goal is better accomplished by an industry-specific group like the Mozambican Seed Traders Association (MOSTA). APROSE is not sustainable on the basis of member dues but is not intended to be sustained – its donors (which are several) are content to continue funding the platform as it provides a unique space for attention to a wide variety of policy priorities by government, the private sector, development actors and other relevant players in the seed market.

Private Sector Seed Inspectors – One of APROSE’s (and InovAgro’s) significant policy accomplishments was the operationalization of Private Sector Seed Inspectors, who can perform the inspection and quality verification duties normally provided by agents of the National Seed Authority but who are funded (with some cost share by InovAgro) by seed companies, themselves. This capacity provides for the performance of a vital role where the government shows itself to be incapable of stepping in. In other words, it is a good idea with little alternative, as the National Seed Authority lacks the capacity to do it.

Under this program, six seed inspectors have been certified and four are still operating. One seed company interviewed for the MTR voiced concerns about the potential for corruption, given incentives caused by the fact that the seed sector is effectively paying for its own police. However, the opportunity for corruption is no greater than that provided by government agents performing the same service. Again, this is a reasonable solution in the face of limited government capacity.

In order for this model to prove sustainability, more inspectors will need to be trained, certified and employed with only the financial support of the seed companies. As yet, the model remains untested.

2.4.2 Impact of InovAgro’s Enabling Environment Work

APROSE clearly provided a useful platform for a large number of diverse stakeholders (42 stakeholders, by the most recent count available in project documents) to coalesce around challenges facing the seed sector in Mozambique. Given the obvious importance of the sector, APROSE is a relevant and useful body. Some of the claims provided to the MTR team, such as the influence it had in reducing free seed distributions nationwide, are impossible for this review to refute or verify. Other initiatives, such as the fielding of private sector seed inspectors, will have strong impact over time.

In terms of systemic change, the MTR team sees one accomplished and one potential change:

- APROSE introduced a private sector-led regulatory function into the Mozambican market, opening the way for new actors to perform a vital function, seed inspection and certification.
- The private sector seed inspectors, themselves, will potentially have systemic impact, but given the low number of working actors and their relatively recent introduction into the market, it is too early to say to what degree they will be able to influence changes in market performance.

2.5 Evaluation of Progress to Date

2.5.1 Progress against Targets

InovAgro’s Phase III logframe (see Annex 1) includes 34 indicators in total: 2 impact indicators, 14 outcome indicators and 18 output indicators. Benchmarking the project’s performance against targets as of the latest date for complete data, October 30, 2018, InovAgro is exceeding its targets for 2018 or for the entire phase with half of its indicators (see the table, below). It is on target with nine indicators and behind target with only 4

indicators. An additional four indicators have nothing to report thus far. This is a strong performance for the project in its first year of the final three-year phase.

	Exceeding all phase targets (4)	Exceeding 2018 targets (13)	Meeting 2018 targets (9)	Falling behind 2018 targets (4)	N/A (4)
Impacts	1	2			
Outcomes	1.1, 5.1	1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 3.3	1.3, 4.3, 5.2	3.1	4.1, 4.2, 4.3
Outputs	2.2	1.1, 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2.2	4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3	2.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.3	4.2.1

For the purposes of the MTR it would be convenient to have access to 2019 performance data, but that is not available as of the writing of this report.

2.5.2 Data Quality Analysis

The MTR team conducted a rapid data quality assessment. We found that, in key activities such as the annual surveys of farmer performance (which inform the impact indicators and many of the outcome indicators), InovAgro has strong methodologies in place to accurately capture and report information. We were also satisfied in discussion with Monitoring and Results Measurement (MRM) staff that InovAgro performs sufficient random checks of results reported by partners. Generally, InovAgro's MRM system is robust.

However, we did detect issues regarding attribution around partner performance, particularly related to CATs. For example, from the data sheets provided for review, InovAgro seems to be attributing all CAT BPs to its support, while Output Indicator 1.2 clearly calls for reporting only new BPs – this is problematic when a CAT enters project partnership with many BPs already under operation. A discussion on this topic during the debrief brought forth an explanation that was different from the one provided by project management days earlier, and that also did not match the data provided. This leads to more questions, such as the degree to which the same problem may lie with CAT sales data (Outcome Indicator 1.1) – is InovAgro attributing 100 percent of CAT sales to its support, or is it reasonably discounting that data to adequately report only performance that occurs “as a result of project facilitation,” as the logframe footnote requires? Also, does the data around input sales (Outcome Indicator 3.1) have the same problem? And what about additional agrodealer outlets (Output Indicator 3.2)?

Lastly, 2018 data for Outcome Indicator 5.1 indicates that five organizations were influenced by InovAgro's MSD awareness raising efforts to implement “additional and/or improved market development interventions.” The notes for this data detail three local NGOs training VSLAs on the FA technique, Helvetas and Lurio University in Nampula. The three local NGOs can be counted, depending on whether FAs are considered an improved market development intervention – that is a decision appropriately left to the project. However, Helvetas' office in Mozambique disagrees with the assessment that they were influenced to change practices as a result of InovAgro, while Lurio University was contracted to provide business training to CATs. It is hard to justify the inclusion of the latter two actors among the group of organizations that qualify under this indicator.


In conclusion, while the MRM system is largely robust, it would be prudent for InovAgro to bring an independent consultant to thoroughly review the data collection and attribution methodology for each indicator – this would help to resolve any data quality issues.

2.6 Knowledge Management

2.6.1 Strategic Adaptation in InovAgro

InovAgro's strategy has shifted considerably since it started Phase 1 in January 2011, reflecting learning that the project team was able to internalize and translate into a steady evolution of new activities.

The project began with a focus on outgrower schemes, working with three large companies in the pigeon pea and soy markets. With a disappointing performance by its partners following two strong seasons, the project shifted gears in Phase 2 to work on input markets. This coincided with the Mozambican government's decision to gradually reduce annual distribution of seed, giving the private sector an opportunity to grow within that vacuum and meet demand for high-quality seed. As this strategic shift required a large network of responsive local agrodealers, InovAgro also began working with local seed retailers to strengthen their operations and extend their outreach through satellite retail points.



Shortly after the transition to working with input actors, InovAgro recognized the gap in its strategy following the closure of its outgrower work and began working with CATs. It continues this work to the current period, but tactically adjusted its support to reduce assistance to CATs from 7 items to only 3 (see Output Markets discussion, above, for details).

Alongside these strategic shifts in input and output markets, InovAgro also experimented with the smartest way to facilitate access to capital. Beginning with a focus on formal financial institutions in the first phase, the project shifted away from these partnerships in the second phase to start its work on FAs. That FA-focused support continues, and InovAgro is now considering adding partnerships with financial institutions seeking to experiment with agent banking and to extend microinsurance to smallholder farmers.

Throughout the three-phase cycle, InovAgro has maintained its focus on the enabling environment for seed in Mozambique. The centerpiece of this focus has been the dialogue platform that evolved into APROSE, but this work also included support to the National Seed Authority as well as a pilot activity focused on land tenure.

2.6.2 Influence on Other Actors

InovAgro has a tremendous amount of learning to share with other development players, especially those operating in northern Mozambique. In recognition of its experience, it is highly respected by a wide variety of actors, from NGOs to small retailers and multi-national trading companies, one of whom characterized the project as “clearly very useful.” One does not often hear this level of praise about a development project. Another actor pointed out that “there’s a tendency in Mozambique to do things without proper studies – not InovAgro.” In sum, the project stands out for the quality of its work.

At the same time, the MTR team noted some concern that “InovAgro doesn’t share enough” the learning it has generated. While it has recently embarked on a process for influencing

other development players to take a more market-systems approach, clearly there is much left to do in this regard. It is impossible for the MTR to have a fair and complete view of the influence the project may have had, so this report will not make a judgment on that question. What is clear is that InovAgro has a significant opportunity to influence practices within the development sphere in Mozambique and should capitalize on its reputation and its learning to ensure that it exercises this influence in the time remaining in its third phase.

2.7 Issues of Special Attention

2.7.1 Land tenure

The uncertainty of land tenure in Mozambique continues to be a struggle for smallholder farmers, especially in areas like the Beira and Nacala corridors, where a growing number of large investors and business are moving in to build commercial farming operations. In general terms, communities in Mozambique usually have either customary (traditional) occupation rights and/or good faith occupation, where most of the smallholder farmers thorough the country obtain access to land mainly through these two types of occupation rights.

Because customary and/or good faith occupations are not delimited or demarcated, it leaves room for conflicts with the communities, if community consultation is not done in a participatory way involving all the parties and ensuring everyone has access to information.

As a result of the growing tensions in area of project support, Inovagro decided to launch a pilot intervention, alongside a local NGO, Terra Nossa, and provided support in community delimitation in “hot spots”³ in Namarroi and Mocuba districts, in Zambezia.

The pilot intervention intended to support community delimitation in “hot spots;” strengthen community land management in project locations; develop (in case of no network) or leverage (in case of existing network) community “paralegal” networks in the project locations for demand creation activities (promoting identification document acquisition and land title by community members); and facilitate access to information on land tenure system for protecting farmers in project locations and leveraging economic opportunities in the delimited areas.

The MTR team did not visit the four communities that benefited from support in land delimitation. Project documents indicate more than 17,200 community members had their lands secured. Furthermore, through the partnership with Terra Nossa, four land management committees were trained in land law and regulations, management of local natural resources and building negotiation skills as a way to promote local capacity. With the help of the project, a paralegal network of 57 individuals was established to help stimulate demand for land titles in their communities and support farmers to obtain identification documents. In the delimited areas the project also supported communities by promoting economic opportunities, which linked these communities with seed companies through markets and fairs, while supporting agro-dealers to set up shops closer to the districts in order to be able to provide inputs to the communities.

During field interviews with farmers, the MTR team was able to gather three different positions from smallholder farmers. First, the overwhelming majority of farmers mentioned they felt insecure in regard to their lands; second, other farmers that had felt insecure where now in the process of having their lands delimited and/or demarcated by other actors, such as Terra Amiga, Promer and SUSTENTA; third, another group of farmers who had their plots within municipal areas and as such did not feel their plots were under threat.

Overall, the MTR team is of the opinion that since land titling is of great concern in the country, the information and experiences from the pilot should be shared with other donors and organizations that intend to support communities in the process of land titling. The

³ The project defines a “hot spot” as a community that may be under external threats on their use of land and natural resources inside InovAgro district of facilitation.

team is also of the opinion that no further activities in regard to land tenure should be pursued during the last year of the project, since the last year should essentially be closing down the project. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that there are other projects, such as SUSTENTA, with a budget of USD 65 million towards land titling in Mozambique and that InovAgro should, as stated previously, be able to share best practices and thus should diminish the risk of duplication of efforts.

2.7.2 Gender and Social Inclusion

InovAgro has incorporated an understanding of gender norms into its programming at a reasonable, though not exceptional, level. In 2018, the project hired a gender specialist to help design a Gender Strategy Report, and has worked to incorporate gender dimensions into its interventions on FAs, access to inputs and output marketing. Furthermore, through the land titling pilot, the project pushed for a higher number of women to be part of the intervention. InovAgro held two workshops on gender capacity building: one was with all their partners, and another with the project team. With the project team (which is almost exclusively male), there are also periodic talks and discussions on gender capacity building.

Land Titling: Northern Mozambican culture is more patriarchal than the rest of the country, and as such women are generally less privileged when it comes to access to land. In many cases when inheriting land from the family, the land is usually possessed by either a husband or an uncle – mostly male figures around the women. The support provided by InovAgro has helped to ensure that both men and women have their land rights legally guaranteed.

Input Access: The project works closely with seeds companies to: 1) offer smaller packaged of seeds, since in most cases women manage smaller amounts of money and it is important to have them access inputs in prices they can afford, especially since horticulture seeds and some grains are usually under women responsibility; and 2) ensure planting techniques and trainings are given in a simpler way, given the high prevalence of illiteracy amongst farmers, and especially women.

Output Marketing: Inovagro also supports entrepreneurship and has been working with SDAE to identify female CATs. Currently the project supports three female CATs, which represents 10 percent of the total number of CATs supported by the project, through capacity building. More broadly, supporting CATs to expand their BP network alleviates farmers' burden of taking their products to district markets, reducing distance walked and potentially increasing women's agency over the use of cash from produce sales.

Financial Access: As per support on FAs, the number of savings groups has increased, where the majority of the members are women, however there is a growing interest of men in taking part in the savings groups. Through the support on FA the project has promoted female leadership in these groups, where some decide if men can be part of certain groups or not.

Changes in Gender Norms: During interviews with the farmers, the MTR team was told that gender norms regarding participation in transaction and saving activities for both men and women are not changing. Farmers said that both men and women were responsible for purchasing seeds, at markets, in fairs and from agro-dealers, when the latter are available closely and with reasonable prices. They also noted that the sale of the products was an activity that both men and women participated, even if it included having to walk long distances and women are still expected for the burden of care work, and that is mostly not shared (looking at cooking, taking care of children, farming etc). When the MTR team interviewed women during women-only focus groups sessions, participants said that household management was something done by both husband and wife and that both would plan how to spend the money.

3. Conclusions

Relevance: *the degree to which InovAgro is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.*

Inovagro clearly has an excellent reputation among other development actors and private sector partners. Farmer groups interviewed for the MTR also rated the project highly. The MTR finds that this reputation is partly due to the project's performance and partly due to its design – in other words, its relevance to the major challenges of agricultural market development in northern Mozambique. InovAgro is an appropriately designed market systems project that has played a vital role in building a more robust network of seed distribution and offtake actors in the region. It has represented well the SDC's interests, adapted smartly over time to maintain its relevance as circumstances in its operating have changed, and will likely serve as a foundation upon which future successful development efforts will be built.

The only actor who spoke poorly of the project was a CAT in Ribuaue who was upset that InovAgro was no longer providing a large volume of assistance to his business – he appeared to be refusing to take responsibility for the success or failure of his own enterprise. Aside from this one actor, the MTR finds that the decision to work with CATs, when many development actors demonstrate a kneejerk aversion to them, was particularly smart and unique and contributes strongly to InovAgro's relevance.

Effectiveness: *a measure of the extent to which a programme attains its objectives.*

In most areas, InovAgro is surpassing annual targets or has already surpassed phase targets. It is difficult to imagine that it will not be able to achieve its objectives by the end of 2020. However, the MTR did note issues with data quality that make this a qualified judgement pending a deeper review of the project's data aggregation and attribution strategies. In addition, InovAgro's logframe achievements should be viewed in light of questions regarding the sustainability of impacts and the need to test exit strategies, as noted below.

Efficiency: *a measure of the results – qualitative and quantitative – in relation to inputs.*

InovAgro produces tangible benefits for a large number of people. With an average budget size for an SDC mandate, reaching 7,420 farmers in the first year of Phase 3 (Outcome Indicator 1.2 – above target) is an efficient use of funds. This performance puts the project on course to surpass its phase target of 17,640 farmers with increased sales. The financial benefit of increased value of commodity sales for smallholder farmers is also evident – 228,122,500 MZN as of the end of 2018 (Outcome Indicator 1.1), which already surpasses the phase target of 172,115,871 MZN.

The only intervention area of questionable efficiency is the FA support, which is labor and cost-intensive but has only managed to influence approximately 12,000 farmers to buy one large truck (or around 28MT) of seeds.

Impact: *the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.*

The MTR finds that InovAgro's push to extend market outreach for input access and offtake are its strongest features, although the impacts of individual partners are highly variable and we have some questions about additionality (see the discussion on Output Marketing, above).

It should also be noted that market system projects have performed very poorly in similar contexts. It has proven challenging for many projects to achieve smart market systems work in thin markets that have traditionally received large volumes of traditional donor assistance. InovAgro will stand out, in this regard, as likely having achieved significant impact where many others have failed.

Sustainability: *a measure of the degree to which the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Additionally, market systems work considers the likelihood of benefit increasing over time (with the replication of behaviors) as a key aspect of sustained systemic change.*

InovAgro's untested exit strategies create a tension between theoretical sustainability (likely) and empirical sustainability (unknown). Projects working with successful partners are often surprised when seemingly beneficial behaviors cease with the withdrawal of project support. So, while many of InovAgro's exit strategies are credible on paper, they need to be purposefully tested in the limited time remaining before the project closes. For this reason, it is difficult for the MTR to judge the question of the sustainability of InovAgro's work – both the continuation of current benefits and the replication and expansion of new behaviors to greater numbers of beneficiaries.

This is not a negative judgement. Rather, it is a call for the project to complete its work by testing its exit strategies – the sooner the better.

A rating of each project component by OECD/DAC criterion is in the table below:

	Relevance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Impact	Sustainability
Inputs	High	High	High	High	Medium
Outputs	High	High	High	High	Medium
Financial Ac	High	Low	Low	Low	Medium
Enabling En	High	High	High	Medium	Medium

4. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Test exit strategies for inputs access, output marketing, financial access and private seed inspectors – InovAgro's input access and output marketing components show relatively flat trajectories of project support to date (see the yellow lines in Charts 1 and 2). The FA support even increases, proportionately with savings volumes (see Chart 3). In other words, InovAgro has not yet moved to wind down the majority of its partnerships and prove the sustainability of the new behaviors it has sought to facilitate. With one more complete growing season (starting in November) followed by one more complete buying season, the time to wind down support is imminent. The MTR cannot over-emphasize this point.

The SDC office in Mozambique has stated a desire to continue supporting APROSE in the future, so there is less need to withdraw completely from InovAgro's enabling environment work at the moment. However, to test the private seed inspector model, InovAgro should cease any additional support for these actors then examine whether companies take on the full costs of fielding and expanding this service.

Recommendation 2: Direct resources to knowledge capture and external sharing – InovAgro should come to be, for many its activities, a textbook example of good market systems programming in thin markets. The project already has a mandate to share information and has started to do so. With a rapid reduction of support to partnerships it will have more time for its staff to work on knowledge capture. This should include case studies, new research, workshops and blogs, among other outputs.

Areas for knowledge capture and external sharing should include (but not be limited to):

- 4.1 Partner behaviors after the cessation of project support – in other words, what happens with partner activities (especially seed company extension and marketing)

- after InovAgro stops providing cost-share funding for their continuation. Even more importantly, why do these results occur?
- 4.2 Related to the first question, how broad and sustained are changes in farmer perception of the value of investing in high-quality seed?
 - 4.3 As discussed in the Output Marketing section of this report, InovAgro's CAT partners are highly differentiated from one another. This provides the project with the opportunity to evaluate under what circumstances smallholder farmers benefit from project support to CATs.
 - 4.4 Have FAs led to any gender-related changes in agency around seed purchases? In other words, has the (predominantly female-led) practice of setting aside funds for seed led to changes in the degree to which women feel empowered to make decisions regarding crop production?
 - 4.5 Lastly, as much of InovAgro's work has focused on building more robust distribution networks (for both inputs and outputs), it would be interesting for the project to take a further step and explore the dynamics of those networks in more detail. In particular, what are the transport and distribution costs for seed and other consumables as they move from medium to small towns, and from small towns to villages? How robust are these links (served by one or multiple actors)? How much demand is met by current practices?

Recommendation 3: Conduct an independent data quality review – InovAgro deserves an accurate measure of its performance and impact on beneficiaries. The MTR found several issues in the project's data that invite questions about data accuracy. In order to dispel these questions and allow the project to finish strongly, we recommend that InovAgro hire an independent consultant to thoroughly review the data collection and attribution methodology for each indicator and help the MRM team remedy any problems.

Recommendations for a New MSD Programme:

InovAgro's decade of work on agricultural market system development in northern Mozambique offers a large number of useful lessons for future programming. Much of this captured in the Scoping Study. The list below distills these lessons into a brief set of recommendations:

- Continue with seed company support to build a market for high-quality seed in addition to a fuller distribution network that reaches rural villages;
- Continue with commodity trader support that meets at least one of the three benefit criteria discussed above (expansion, redundancy and improved performance);
- Focus on financial access for businesses and reach VSLAs via banks, instead of directly through local service providers;
- Continue with APROSE support, providing a necessary space for multi-stakeholder dialogue regarding systemic constraints to the development of the seed sector;
- Consider supporting expansion of private sector seed inspector scheme;
- Explore the possibility of engaging local government authorities as solution-seekers involved in exploring and piloting solutions to development challenges, rather than as gate-keepers who give permission for activities but add little value;
- Build a project with a more explicit structure oriented toward rapid adaptation, with an expanded technical focus on reducing transaction costs around farming households.