


PROJECT: « Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development into Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in BiH»



FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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Sarajevo

October, 2015



Ministarstvo za ljudska prava
i izbjeglice
Bosne i Hercegovine



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Table of contents

Table of contents.....	3
Acronyms and Abbreviations.....	6
Executive Summary	7
Programme Background	7
Project current stage of implementation – Main milestones	7
The organization of the final evaluation.....	8
First evaluation cycle: desk review	8
Second evaluation cycle: field phase.....	8
Third evaluation cycle: evaluation report and concept note	8
Relevance Assessment	8
Effectiveness (or results)	9
Efficiency (or performance)	10
Time-efficiency assessment	10
Organisational efficiency assessment	11
Impact.....	11
Sustainability	11
Added Value	11
Visibility.....	12
Horizontal Considerations: Gender Equality.....	12
Horizontal Considerations / Synergies and Complementarities	12
Recommendations	12
Introduction	14
Programme Background	14
Project current stage of implementation – Main milestones	15
The organization of the final evaluation.....	18
First evaluation cycle: desk review	18
Second evaluation cycle: field phase.....	18
Third evaluation cycle: evaluation report and concept note	18
Evaluation According to DAC Criteria	19
Relevance.....	19
External Relevance	19
Internal Relevance	23
Effectiveness (or results)	25

Overall Assessment	26
Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards reaching Project goals	27
Efficiency (or performance)	30
Financial efficiency assessment	30
Time-efficiency assessment	32
Organisational efficiency assessment	35
Impact.....	35
Sustainability	37
Other Evaluation Questions.....	39
Added Value	39
Visibility.....	39
Horizontal Considerations: Gender Equality.....	42
Horizontal Considerations / Synergies and Complementarities	42
Main Conclusions	44
Recommendations	45
Annex 1 – Bibliography.....	48
Annex 2 – List of meetings	50
Annex 3 - Assessment as per Project Indicators	53
Annex 4 – Concept Note	65
The vision	65
First Programme Component – LG Projects	65
Scope and objectives	65
Types of Actions.....	65
Relevant stakeholders.....	66
Implementation Modalities and Necessary Steps	66
Initial Budget Estimates	67
Second Programme Component - Scientific Knowhow Transfer	67
Scope and objectives	67
Possible types of Actions.....	67
Relevant stakeholders.....	68
Implementation Modalities and Necessary Steps	69
Initial Budget Estimate.....	70
Third Programme Component – MHRR strengthening.....	70
Scope and objectives	70

Types of Actions.....	70
Relevant stakeholders.....	71
Implementation Modalities.....	71
Initial Budget Estimates.....	72
Programme Gantt Chart (steps and timeframe)	73
Indicative Programme Budget.....	74
Initial Risk Assessment.....	75
Annex 5: Comments Received on the Draft Evaluation Report.....	76

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMIF	EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BIC	Business Incubation Centre
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
fYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GiZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
HDI	Human Development Index
ILDP	Integrated Local Development Project
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KM	Convertible Marka
LDC	Local Development Council
LDS	Local Development Strategy
LG	Local Government
Log-Frame	Logical Framework
M&D	Migration and Development
MHRR	Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
R&D	Research and Development
RS	Republika Srpska
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
T.A.	Technical Assistance
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	US Dollar
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WG	Working Group

Executive Summary

Programme Background

The project “*Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development into Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina*” (hereby referred to as the Project) is a “pilot intervention” which attempts to incorporate the concept of M&D at two distinct administration levels:

The local government level, through a horizontal project component; and

All other government levels (i.e. state, entity, and canton), through a vertical project component.

The Project also includes a third – support – component aimed at increasing general awareness and visibility.

As such, the Project aims at 3 main outcomes:

Outcome 1: for 10 Local Governments (LGs) local development strategies (LDS) adopted incorporating the M&D concept, and at least 10 LG projects designed and implemented in accord with these LDS (horizontal component).¹

Outcome 2: strengthened institutional capacities of key actors (mainly partner LGs, BiH MHRR and members of the inter-ministerial working group) on effective M&D mainstreaming; structured cooperation with migrants and their organisations.

Outcome 3: mainstreaming of elements of an M&D concept into strategies and action plans of various key actors in BiH (vertical component)

The main Project partners are the BiH MHRR, the Embassy of Switzerland in BiH, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The Swiss Embassy provides funding for the project, UNDP is responsible for implementing the project and MHRR, which initiated this project – i.e. submitted its draft for funding to the Government of Switzerland within the Bilateral agreement on migration between BiH and CH, provides in-kind contributions such as coordination activities.

Project current stage of implementation – Main milestones

The main milestones of the Project include:

Adoption of draft Local Development Strategies (LDS) by Municipal Councils (end of 2013)

Establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Migration & Development (March 2014)

Approval of 10 LG projects (end 2014 – beginning 2015)

Approval of 4 additional LG projects (July 2015)

Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of Migration and Development into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH (July 2015)

Drafting of Cantonal Development Strategies (September 2014 – September 2015)

Round table “Migration and Development” (May, 2014)

Training for Cantonal Governments (June 2014)

Publication “Emigration and Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Best Practices” (September 2014)

2-day training on “Mainstreaming the concept of Migration and Development” for LGs (November 2014)

Migration and Development Research Workshop (November 2014)

Workshops for LG Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigrants (February - May 2015)

Round table “Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH” (May 2015).

¹ Although we refer to this outcome as “horizontal” within the evaluation report, it also carries elements of vertical integration – i.e. ensure M&D priorities at state level are transferred down to the local level.

According to the August 2015 progress report, and subsequent information obtained from UNDP 62% of Programme budget had been expended, 7 out of 15 of LG projects/actions remained yet to be completed, and only 3 out of the 7 major other actions remained yet to be completed (manual, canton strategies, and closing conference). The Project is expected to finish on time.

The organization of the final evaluation

The final evaluation was organized in 3 distinct phases/cycles, as follows:

First evaluation cycle: desk review

The first cycle extended from the signing of the evaluation contract to the field phase. During this time, documentation was collected, studied, and evaluation questions were formulated.

Second evaluation cycle: field phase

The field phase commenced on September 3, 2015 and included detailed interviews with the main project stakeholders in Sarajevo, other donors, members of the WG M&D and a sample of project stakeholders at the local level (Municipal staff and final LG project recipients). The field phase was concluded on September 11, 2015. On September 10, a de-briefing meeting was held at the Swiss Embassy where the initial conclusions of the evaluation and a brief concept for the continuation of the project were presented to the main project stakeholders.

Third evaluation cycle: evaluation report and concept note

The third evaluation cycle lasted approximately 2 weeks. During the first week all information from the desk review and the interviews were documented, systematized and conclusions were drawn with respect to the 5 evaluation criteria. During the second week, the evaluation report and concept note were drafted.

Relevance Assessment

Relevance Assessment includes **External Relevance**, i.e. relevance to country needs and the wider environment, which examines both the project design and the activity mix (i.e. the types of actions finally implemented), and **Internal relevance**, i.e. internal consistency of project components and activities.

BiH is characterized by a **very low level of economic development with extremely unequal distribution of resources** and a **very adverse environment for development**. Even most of the social problems the country is faced with today – brain-drain, poverty, inefficient healthcare system and social protection system, etc. – are basically attributable to the low level of economic development. Amid such conditions, one could safely argue that **the most important challenge for the country today is to promote economic growth, especially with a focus on employment creation**.

At the same time, the importance of BiH diaspora as a development resource is huge not only because of its large numbers, but also because of specific characteristics of the BiH diaspora which constitute a significant development potential, such as:

- Huge remittance flows: Bosnia and Herzegovina has consistently been one of the world's top receivers of remittance flows from abroad, relative to the size of the economy;
- High savings: BiH diaspora is highly integrated in host countries and earns relatively high household incomes. The combination of high incomes and high propensity to save (approximately 25% of income is saved), leads to considerable savings;
- Transnational entrepreneurship potential; and
- Significant number of scientific diaspora members - with exceptionally high knowhow and high mobility – many of which are in academia, a field that exhibits a high degree of internationalization.

Since the M&D Project is basically a **“development-oriented” intervention**, and since economic development is the most pressing need of BiH, then it is **highly relevant** to the country's needs.

The **lack of specific focus** of the Project – which socio-economic fields are to be targeted and which diaspora resources to be mobilized - **is a disadvantage**, as it does not allow for appropriate “matching” between country needs, development opportunities offered by diaspora, and the Project’s activities. Considering the “pilot” and “exploratory” nature of the Project, one can accept such a level of ambiguity at the beginning of the Project. Future Projects need however to have a sharper focus.

With respect to internal relevance, the Project has a relatively clear hierarchy of objectives and activities, but the targets are overambitious. Also, there is a Risk Analysis, but the some risks are underestimated as indicated by the mitigation measures. The ethnic divide and the politically charged environment did not receive the attention they deserved. As a consequence, Project focus – with respect to the vertical component - had to be redefined midway through the implementation period. Finally budget allocations seem appropriate.

In conclusion, even though the Project exhibits high external relevance, the internal relevance is rather poor.

Effectiveness (or results)

The Project has been very effective at achieving outputs (see Assessment as per Output Indicator in Annex 3). The concept of M&D appears to have been mainstreamed to a large extent into local planning frameworks for the participating local governments, and the implementation of LG M&D projects has attracted considerable attention from local communities (e.g. the large numbers of interested final recipients and the increased visibility of the interventions among local communities) creating a fertile environment for the dissemination of M&D concepts and for eventually raising awareness and interest in the general public and in the local socio-economic partners. Any successor Project should capitalize on that momentum created by this Project by continuing support to the 10 assisted Local Governments.

With respect to other government levels, the evaluation has not been able to document any significant awareness raising and capacity building to mainstream M&D concepts. Of course there was capacity built within the WG M&D but it is questionable whether it will be transferred to the institutions these individuals come from.

In addition how the “Guidelines” document will be used from now on - to promote the mainstreaming of M&D into development policies at all appropriate government levels - is a question of how much awareness and buy-in will be developed within each responsible institution. The role of MHRR will be pivotal in this effort. MHRR is called to persuade other internal and external stakeholders that:

- M&D is not merely about tapping into migrant remittances and savings by appealing to their sentiments, but it is mostly about making sound investments;
- that there is great potential in migrant networks (e.g. trade connections, migrant position within companies, or in host government structures, or within academic/training structures, or within the scientific or professional community, etc) to be capitalized on; and
- there is valuable knowhow accumulated by the diaspora (e.g. entrepreneurial skills, work-related skills, organisational skills, professional skills, scientific skills, research & innovation potential, etc) that can be used for the development of BiH.

In order to do that, it will need to increase the visibility of M&D results.

In terms of the quality of the results achieved by the Project one should note that the Project did not manage to define a prominent M&D concept, and the quality of M&D initiatives at local level needs to be improved upon (i.e. future initiatives need to be based more on sound business proposals to diaspora than appealing to their sentiments).

Efficiency (or performance)

Overall financial efficiency of Project resources remains high, at least for the horizontal component. Tangible benefits have been produced only by the horizontal component of the project which amounted to approximately USD 535,000. The vertical component and the publicity and networking actions have produced no tangible benefits yet. This component has contributed so far² to:

- safeguarding of at least 250 jobs in the farming sector and the creation of 27 new jobs (to be 345 jobs in the farming sector at the end of interventions and 30 new jobs) through investments made by the first round of LG interventions (*average cost = USD 1,530 per job safeguarded/created*³ which compares very favourably with other types of investments like incentives for attracting FDI). Considering the high unemployment rate of the country, safeguarding jobs is as important as creating new ones;
- a potential annual income secured of at least USD 7,000 for each one of the above jobs⁴, i.e. a potential total annual income of USD 2,280,000 for the total final recipients (*average benefit/cost ratio = 4.26*⁵ *without including the indirect effects*). This annual income is slightly lower (at 80%) than the mean country per capita income which stands at approximately 1,300 BAM/month in 2015, i.e. USD 9,000/annually. Considering that this is mainly agricultural income, it is considered a very good income⁶; and
- the transfer of knowhow through training and knowhow transfer actions implemented by LGs for which we could not assign an accurate financial value.

It is apparent from the above figures that the financial efficiency of this component is excellent. Even if we factor in the entire Project costs (and not only the LG interventions costs) then the respective figures become:

- a USD 3150 per job safeguarded or created mean Project cost, which still compares favourably to other economic development incentives; and
- a 2.06 benefit/cost ratio, i.e. still a high efficiency rate.

Finally, implementation costs are relatively high for country standards. Considering that this unit cost concerns specialized professional services and the relative lack of effective such services in the country, it is deemed reasonable. However, it should be decreased in the future.

Time-efficiency assessment

In terms of timely implementation, the areas where most time delays were observed are:

- the implementation of LG projects (action 1.5); and
- the M&D mainstreaming roadmap (action 4.1).

Time delays concerning action 1.5 are mainly attributable to external factors (devastating May 2014 floods) while time delays concerning action 4.1 are mainly attributable to the inability to involve Republika Srpska in the M&D working group which resulted in complete restructuring both of the WG composition and the concept of developing a roadmap, and to the general elections of October 12, 2014.

Overall, the horizontal component of the Project is considered to have been more efficiently implemented – in terms of time resources – than the vertical component which was plagued by several

² Until the time when this evaluation was conducted.

³ The figure is calculated by dividing the total budget which corresponds to the interventions safeguarding these jobs, by the total number of jobs to be safeguarded by this first round of LG projects.

⁴ Income data are derived from a sample of final recipients of agricultural LG interventions (raspberries and dairy) and from the industrial workers at Remus.

⁵ The benefit to cost ratio is calculated by dividing the total estimated income with the budget of the corresponding LG interventions.

⁶ In comparison, mean manufacturing per capita income in 2015 stood at 900 BAM/month, i.e. USD 6,300/annually.

delays and upsets (i.e. changes in scope and orientation, changes in stakeholders, etc). This is of course attributable to the fact that the horizontal component was much more clearly defined from the beginning of the Project and that UNDP possessed considerable experience in implementing this type of interventions.

Organisational efficiency assessment

The evaluation confirmed beyond doubt that the deployed human resources possess strong abilities in project management and that UNDP is an efficient implementor. However, there are still questions about whether the tri-partite main partner scheme was exploited to the fullest of its potential, as MHRR appears to have played a complementary and not central role. This should be remedied in any possible future continuation of the Project, since – in the long-run - it is important that a BiH institution takes the lead in the effort to mainstream M&D into BiH policy. Thus all knowhow, implementation capacities and networks relevant to M&D will remain within BiH administration and continuity will be ensured.

Impact

LG projects have mainly contributed to local development through the creation or safeguarding of jobs and through securing a stable income for the participating individuals. Also, the new income produced by the LG projects, through its multiplier effects (i.e. through an increase in local consumption), has the capacity to create more local economic activity. However, the magnitude of such impacts is expected to be very low due to a) the lack of “critical mass” in any given locality.

Another significant impact of the LG pilot projects is the increased demand from local populations for similar interventions by the respective local governments. This means that LGs will need more resources in order to accommodate such pressures.

The last important expected impact of LG projects is on the way local communities communicate with the diaspora and on the way they incorporate M&D concepts in their local development programmes. Several interviewed Municipalities mentioned, that the M&D Project has already:

- helped them adopt a more structured approach in their communications with local diaspora;
- led to qualitative changes in their behaviour towards diaspora, such as seeking to host diaspora-related events; and
- helped them institutionalize cooperation with diaspora (through the local planning process).

Sustainability

Some types of results produced from the Project appear to be more sustainable than others. For example, the results achieved by the LG projects seem to be quite robust at least for the medium-term. The same cannot be said for the capacity-building activities, both at local level and at higher level. As “knowhow” is something possessed by a specific individual, the sustainability of the capacity building actions depends on how widely within the organization this knowhow is spread, on whether this organization has a high turnover of staff, and to what extent this knowhow is “institutionalized”. Taking these factors into account, it appears that capacity building at the local level is more sustainable than the capacity-building provided to MHRR and to the WG M&D.

Added Value

Based on the original Project design, the greatest added-value was meant to be the identification of the “niches” where an M&D approach could make a difference for development in BiH and the incorporation of appropriate policy responses in all relevant strategic/policy documents at all levels. The Project failed both at identifying these “niches” and at coordinating a mainstreaming of M&D into policy process. Therefore the largest part of Project expected added value never materialized.

As such the main added-value achieved by Project activities includes:

- the level of awareness and the effective M&D planning and implementation structures that were developed at the local level..
- the building of trust between LGs and diaspora.

Visibility

It appears that Project visibility has been rather low and anaemic at all levels but especially at national level. The Project has managed to stimulate public interest at the local level – evidenced by the large numbers of individuals that expressed interest for the LG projects – but it cannot be documented that there was any consciousness developed around the M&D concept.

Perhaps the single most important - in terms of visibility - events organized by the Project were:

- the roundtable on Migration and Development;
- the academic research workshop; and
- the roundtable “Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH”.

BiH is quite a challenging area in terms of visibility. With several donors present in the area competing for public attention and very often taking credit for interventions financed by other Programmes – especially at the local level - it is one of the hardest jobs to be accomplished. In this highly competitive environment, it appears that the Project has taken a very “distanced” and “low-key” approach.

For all practical purposes, one needs to admit that attaining exposure through local media is very difficult when trying to publicize concepts, especially new ones like M&D. Also, there was no clarity of the M&D concept that needed to be disseminated by the Project’s publicity actions which made the job even harder. As such, it is quite understandable that this component of the Communication Strategy was the least visible one.

Horizontal Considerations: Gender Equality

Even though not originally included in the Project objectives, several initiatives have actively promoted female participation, employment and entrepreneurship. Without being able to provide an accurate numerical figure, it is estimated that well over 50% of the people either touched by Project interventions or involved in Project activities were female.

Horizontal Considerations / Synergies and Complementarities

The most important synergy/complementarity of the M&D Project was with Integrated Local Development Planning project (also implemented by UNDP). The horizontal component of the Project also exhibits several synergies with other projects implemented by other agencies in the country such as the USAID/SEDA Growth Oriented Local Development (GOLD) project, and potential synergies with the PROLOCAL project by GIZ and with several SDC projects such as the MarketMakers and the Skills-for-Jobs projects.

The vertical component of the project does not exhibit synergies with other known projects by international donors in the country, but it does exhibit complementarities with the EU pre-accession assistance and especially the “Democracy and Governance” chapter.

Recommendations

The recommendations of this evaluation include the following:

- **Increase the funding and effectiveness of the horizontal component.**
- **Implement a project preparation facility**
- **Increase Project ownership by MHRR and share implementation responsibility**
- **Reinforce impacts and sustainability of results in already selected LGs through continued support**

- Include a component which will concentrate on selected systemic changes: focus on scientific knowhow transfer.
- Concentrate on a small set of indicators.

Introduction

Programme Background

Migration and Development (M&D) is a fairly new conceptual approach world-wide and for Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. Nevertheless, recent positive institutional responses, such as committed political leadership, in combination with the vast potential of BiH diaspora, have rendered this a promising area for development policy.

Yet, in BiH, coherence of migration policies is far from where it should be. The multitude of administration levels and the fragmentation of sectoral and geographic responsibility make this a difficult and complicated exercise. At the same time, due to the fact that BiH is still a restructuring economy and due to the echo of the destructive results of the 1992-1995 war in many facets of modern life, incorporation of M&D into state, entity and local policies is also hindered by a serious lack of capacity at all government levels and especially at local government level.

The impacts of migration – both out-migration and in-migration - are felt primarily at the local level. However, local governments in BiH do not currently have either adequate local policies to deal with these effects or institutional capacity to design and implement effective measures linking migration with local development.

The project *“Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development into Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina”* (hereby referred to as the Project) is a “pilot intervention” which attempts to incorporate the concept of M&D at two distinct administration levels:

- The local government level, through a horizontal project component; and
- All other government levels (i.e. state, entity, and canton), through a vertical project component.

The Project also includes a third – support – component aimed at increasing general awareness and visibility.

As such, the Project aims at 3 main outcomes:

- Outcome 1: for 10 Local Governments (LGs) local development strategies (LDS) adopted incorporating the M&D concept, and at least 10 LG projects designed and implemented in accord with these LDS (horizontal component).⁷
- Outcome 2: strengthened institutional capacities of key actors (mainly partner LGs, BiH MHRR and members of the inter-ministerial working group) on effective M&D mainstreaming; structured cooperation with migrants and their organisations.
- Outcome 3: mainstreaming of elements of an M&D concept into strategies and action plans of various key actors in BiH (vertical component)

In order to achieve the above outcomes, Project actions were structured into 5 strands as follows:

- Strand 1: through a succession of awareness raising, capacity building, technical assistance and financial assistance actions, this strand aims at helping selected LGs to develop their own local development strategies where elements of the M&D concept will have been incorporated, and to develop and implement local projects that are based on these strategies. This strand of actions completes the horizontal component of the Project. The LGs selected to participate in the Project are: Jajce, Ključ, Laktaši, Ljubuški, Maglaj, Nevesinje, Posušje, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Velika Kladuša.

⁷ Although we refer to this outcome as “horizontal” within the evaluation report, it also carries elements of vertical integration – i.e. ensure M&D priorities at state level are transferred down to the local level.

- Strand 2: through technical assistance actions this strand aims at building capacity within the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) – the responsible Ministry for diaspora issues - both in terms of policy-making and in terms of networking with the diaspora.
- Strand 3: this strand of actions aims at the establishment, awareness-raising and capacity building for a key M&D coordination structure, the inter-institutional Working Group on M&D (WG M&D).
- Strand 4: this strand aims at designing a road-map on how M&D can be mainstreamed into governmental policies at all levels (state, entity, canton). Together with strand 3 it completes the vertical component of the project.
- Strand 5: through public participation processes and awareness and publicity actions, this strand aims at encouraging public dialogue on M&D.

The main Project partners are the BiH MHRR, the Embassy of Switzerland in BiH, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Swiss Embassy provides funding for the project, UNDP is responsible for implementing the project and MHRR, which initiated this project – i.e. submitted its draft for funding to the Government of Switzerland within the Bilateral agreement on migration between BiH and CH, provides in-kind contributions such as coordination activities.

Project current stage of implementation – Main milestones

The Project commenced in July 2013 and was initially intended to finish in 24 months, but a six-month no-cost extension was given and the Project will now officially close in December 2015. The main milestones of the Project include:

- **Adoption of draft Local Development Strategies (LDS) by Municipal Councils (end of 2013)**: The first six months of implementation were primarily dedicated to the first phase of the horizontal component of the Project. The ten most migration-prone LGs within the 40 LGs already participating in the ILDP⁸ were selected to participate based on data that had been collected by MHRR through a survey conducted in late 2011 – early 2012. The Project provided technical assistance to these 10 LGs in order to incorporate the M&D concept in their Local Development Strategies. By the end of 2013, all but one of the participating Municipalities had newly adopted strategies with M&D components (Municipality of Maglaj had already adopted its development strategy in 2012 and did not participate⁹).
- **Establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Migration & Development (March 2014)**: The purpose of the WG M&D was to establish a roadmap for M&D mainstreaming into BiH strategies/policies. For that purpose, it was originally intended to include representatives from various levels of government (including representatives from entities and LGs). Initial contacts with relevant state and entity institutions were made in late 2013 and early 2014, during which it became evident that lower than State level institutions could not be involved (if the participation of RS could not be secured)¹⁰. The WG was finally formed with 17 members from the following institutions:
 - Ministry of Security BiH
 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH (2 members)
 - Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations BiH
 - Directorate for Economic Planning BiH
 - Labour and Employment Agency of BiH

⁸ ILDP offered an adequate platform to pilot the M&D approach in practice (in selected partner municipalities) during a first phase of two years

⁹ Migration and development-related inputs were however included in the implementation plan for the period 2014 – 2016.

¹⁰ The first WG meeting – in March 2014 - brought together 22 participants, including representatives of state and FBiH level institutions, partner local governments from both entities, entity AMCs, IOM, the Embassy of Switzerland and UNDP. Despite efforts made, no RS Entity representatives participated.

- Foreign Investment Promotion Agency BiH
- Agency for Statistics BiH
- Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH
- Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees BiH (3 members)
- International Organisation for Migration
- Swiss Embassy
- UNDP (3 members)

Due to the reluctance of Republika Srpska to participate, no entity-level institutions were finally included in the WG – even though the WG was initially envisaged to include members from different levels of the government structure.

- **Approval of 10 LG projects (end 2014 – beginning 2015):** During 2014 several technical assistance activities were geared towards supporting practical implementation of priority interventions stemming from the LDSs. Even though a call for proposals was launched at the beginning of 2014, the project selection process was not actually competitive as all 10 participating LGs were meant to be supported by the Project “Seed Fund” (as per the design of the Project). Hence the weight of the preparatory activities was placed on increasing local capacity at the design of project applications. This included a 2-day workshop on the “Preparation of Logical Frameworks and Budgets” in March 2014. By the end of 2014, nine out of the ten LGs had projects already approved, under implementation and having absorbed almost half (48%) of the designated funds (the project by Laktaši Municipality was approved in January 2015). All projects targeted migration-related development actions except for the Maglaj project which assisted the “Reconstruction of the Central Heating System and Procurement of Medical Equipment for the local Health Care Centre” which had been damaged by the May 2014 heavy floods. This alteration in scope was approved by the Project Board and the Swiss Embassy.
- **Approval of 4 additional LG projects (July 2015).** A favourable USD/KM exchange rate led to budget savings (from the implementation of the 10 LG projects) in the amount of USD 120,000, thus allowing for the approval of 4 more LG projects in Ključ, Laktaši, Posušje and Sanski Most. The projects were selected on the basis of a competitive call launched in May 2015. Implementation of projects commenced in July 2015.
- **Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of Migration and Development into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH (July 2015)¹¹.** This is the main product of the WG M&D and takes the place of the policy roadmap originally intended by the Project as the main steering mechanism for the vertical component. The WG was supported in this process by four experts in the field of migration and development, public policy management and economic and social development sectors.
- **(Unplanned/Additional activity) Drafting of Cantonal Development Strategies (September 2014 – September 2015)** targeted support was launched in September 2014, for six FBiH cantons that were in the process of designing their development strategies. The participating cantons are Sarajevo, Zenica-Doboj, Tuzla, Central Bosnia, Bosnia-Podrinje and Canton 10. The same process was started in Posavina Canton in March, 2015, upon the establishment of the new cantonal government. The strategies are under completion.

The Project also included several important awareness-raising activities. The most important milestones of such activities were the following:

- **Round table “Migration and Development” (May, 2014)** The round table was under the auspices of MHRR and was attended by 44 participants: 8 representatives of diaspora, 7 representatives of state-level institutions, 2 representatives from FBiH institutions, 6 representatives from partner LGs, 3 representatives from NGOs and 18 representatives from

¹¹ Hereafter referred to as “Guidelines”

International Institutions (Swiss Embassy, USAID, IOM and UNDP). The aim was to encourage dialogue among the representatives of the BiH diaspora, home-country associations, and representatives of BiH institutions at state, entity and local levels. No representatives from Republika Srpska attended the round table.

- **(Unplanned/Additional activity) Training for Cantonal Governments (June 2014)** in order to contribute to awareness raising, explore opportunities for linking migration and socio-economic development and to contribute to vertical alignment across government levels of policies and priorities in the area of M&D.
- **Publication “Emigration and Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Best Practices” (September 2014).** The publication showcased 12 successful examples of investments made (not related to the current Project), scholarships established, charity and humanitarian aid offered by BiH emigrants as well as one BiH diaspora NGO in northern America whose mission is to promote arts and sciences and offers knowhow transfer to their colleagues in BiH and one association protecting and preserving the cultural heritage of the countries of the former Yugoslavia abroad.
- **2-day training on “Mainstreaming the concept of Migration and Development” for LGs (November 2014)**
- **Migration and Development Research Workshop (November 2014).** This was the continuation of a specific activity started by MHRR and co-funded by SDC in 2011. The workshop was attended by 66 participants. All the papers presented in the workshop were published in an Almanac of Papers in February 2015. MHRR identified and invited the participants.
- **Workshops for LG Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigrants (February - May 2015)** These are capacity building activities targeting the participating LGs and included 4 workshops on roles and responsibilities of Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigration, collection and update of emigration data, communication with diaspora, role of NGOs and role of private sector in M&D plus 1 training on effective communication between LGs and diaspora. A large part of the activities was carried out by MHRR.
- **Round table “Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH” (May 2015).** This activity replaced the technical assistance to MHRR originally envisaged by the Project in order to support cooperation between MHRR and diaspora. MHRR identified and invited the participants. The round table was attended by approximately 90 participants from Austria, France, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and the USA. The round table reached the following conclusions:
 - economic empowerment of women is catalytic to development, hence further targeted public support to female entrepreneurship by relevant institutions is necessary;
 - entrepreneurial networking and communication between female entrepreneurs from BiH and diaspora through organisation of business fora, expanding of existing business associations in the country and abroad and business-to-business linkages can be beneficial;
 - achievements of female-led businesses from BiH and of diaspora must be promoted more actively;
 - migrant associations and diaspora organisations in the diaspora host countries must be strengthened, in order to function as supporters of entrepreneurs from BiH and facilitators of knowledge and business opportunities across countries; and
 - mentorship by successful diaspora female entrepreneurs to potential businesswomen in BiH is an effective means of providing future young entrepreneurs with one-to-one training, coaching and guidance.

According to the August 2015 progress report, and subsequent information obtained from UNDP 62% of Programme budget had been expended, 7 out of 15 of LG projects/actions remained yet to be completed, and only 3 out of the 7 major other actions remained yet to be completed (manual, canton strategies, and closing conference). The Project is expected to finish on time.

The organization of the final evaluation

The final evaluation was organized in 3 distinct phases/cycles, as follows:

First evaluation cycle: desk review

The first cycle extended from the signing of the evaluation contract to the field phase. During this time, documentation was collected, studied, and evaluation questions were formulated.

Second evaluation cycle: field phase

The field phase commenced on September 3, 2015 and included detailed interviews¹² with the main project stakeholders in Sarajevo, other donors, members of the WG M&D and a sample of project stakeholders at the local level (Municipal staff and final LG project recipients). The field phase was concluded on September 11, 2015. On September 10, a de-briefing meeting was held at the Swiss Embassy where the initial conclusions of the evaluation and a brief concept for the continuation of the project were presented to the main project stakeholders.

Third evaluation cycle: evaluation report and concept note

The third evaluation cycle lasted approximately 2 weeks. During the first week all information from the desk review and the interviews were documented, systematized and conclusions were drawn with respect to the 5 evaluation criteria. During the second week, the evaluation report and concept note were drafted.

¹² A list of all meetings is included in Annex 2

Evaluation According to DAC Criteria

The ToR specifies that this evaluation will follow 5 criteria: relevance, performance, results, impacts and sustainability of achievements. These criteria coincide with the 5 DAC criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability).

Relevance

Methodological note: the ToR concentrates the criterion of relevance on the following questions:

“Were the project’s objectives and outputs relevant to the needs of the country?”

“What is the project setting in terms of the political, social and institutional country context, and what are its potentials to adequately contribute to the M&D process in the future?”

“What is the project setting in the frame of other initiatives of the international community?”

However, customarily, the evaluation of relevance concentrates on 2 dimensions:

- **External Relevance**, i.e. relevance to country needs and the wider environment, which examines both the project design and the activity mix (i.e. the types of actions finally implemented), and
- **Internal relevance**, i.e. internal consistency of project components and activities.

External Relevance

The overall objective of the Project is *“to create a blueprint for mainstreaming migration into local development, enabling its subsequent transformation into implementable actions”*. It is a pilot (demonstration) intervention, which aims at:

- defining/choosing the most appropriate M&D concept to be applied in BiH considering the country’s needs and general development environment;
- designing the process through which this M&D concept will be incorporated into policy at all required administration levels (ensure policy coordination); and
- testing this M&D concept at local level to verify both implementability and results.

The ultimate goal of M&D mainstreaming - as stated on page 8 of the project document - is *to establish a favourable environment for migrants to promote and pro-actively support the country’s development in relevant domains of transition and socio-economic progress at all institutional and societal levels*. This is a very wide goal and brings more confusion than focus to the Project (i.e. does it concentrate on economic development or on social development? which domains of transition are to be targeted? institutional changes? production changes? societal/cultural changes? etc).

In view of the lack of a clear focus of the Project, we attempt in this chapter to describe – in summary - the socio-economic and institutional environment that this project operates into and the main challenges BiH is faced with today, as well as the opportunities/resources that BiH diaspora offers, and finally the possible responses to these challenges an M&D approach could entail.


Socio-economic and Institutional Environment

BiH is one of the poorest and most ethnically diverse countries in south-east Europe. It has one of the lowest GDP-capita rates, comparable only to Albania, Serbia and FYROM.

Country	GDP/capita in USD (2014 World Bank data) ¹³
Albania	5,000
Austria	51,000
BiH	5,000
Bulgaria	8,000
Croatia	13,500
FYROM	5,500

¹³ Since accuracy is not necessary but only a level of magnitude, the figures have been rounded to the closest 500 figure.

Greece	22,000
Hungary	14,000
Italy	35,000
Montenegro	7,500
Romania	10,000
Serbia	6,000
Slovak Republic	18,500
Slovenia	24,000



For a developing economy, BiH recently demonstrates very low economic growth rates (below 3% for the entire 2010-2014 period, and with an average growth-rate for the 2010-2014 period of 0.84%, comparable only to the ones in Serbia), showing a very fragile economy. All other countries in the area with comparable GDP/capita levels have demonstrated higher growth rates (FYROM 2.3%, Montenegro 1.6%, Bulgaria 1.2% Albania 2.2%) in the 2010-2014 period which was marked by the global economic crisis.

The country continues to have negative current account balances in the entire 2005-2014 period, fluctuating between USD -2,643,834,901 (2008) and USD -998,104,072 (2006), even though a progress has been marked recently mainly as a result of declining imports. At the same time, investment activity demonstrates a meagre growth – mainly thanks to foreign-financed public investments - while private investments were more or less stagnant. Foreign Direct Investment levels are very low (an average of USD 425 million annually for the 2010-2014 period, when average annual FDI inflows in Albania were USD 1,095 mill., in Bulgaria USD 1,897 mill., in Croatia USD 1,003 mill. and in Serbia USD 1,800 mill. and only in Montenegro FDI was at a comparable level of USD 574 million).

Labour market conditions are still very adverse. The public sector still accounts for the largest share in the workforce (27 % in 2013), while unemployment remains at extremely high levels (27,5% general unemployment rate and close to 60% youth unemployment rate according to ILO methodology in 2013 and 2014). The labour market situation exhibits “*structural unemployment*” characteristics as the long-term unemployed account for approximately 80% of total job-seekers.¹⁴

Necessary reforms have been progressing very slowly endangering macro-economic stability. For example, even though significant steps towards improved fiscal sustainability have been taken,

¹⁴ Even though there is no reliable data, a very significant number of workers is believed to work in the grey economy. In that framework, unemployment figures should be taken with caution.

Government still operates at a deficit amounting to approximately 2.2% of GDP and the general government debt reached 46.2% of GDP in 2013. The share of private sector to GDP amounts only to 60% showing the slow restructuring progress and the continued government influence over economic activity. The privatization process has been seriously stalled in FBiH. More recently, reforms were delayed by the General Elections in BiH and the subsequent replacements in all state-level authorities. Finally, in June 2015 the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between EU and BiH came into effect, after a protracted political deadlock, while the reform process of labour legislation was successfully started in mid-2015 by the adoption of the Labour Law in FBiH.

In spite of some recent improvement, the business registration and start-up process remains cumbersome and costly. While progress has been marked in the business infrastructure supply across the country, the lack of harmonisation of registration procedures across Entities still requires entrepreneurs to register in both Entities before they can do business in the whole country. Overall, there has been little progress in the area of industrial and SMEs policies and there is still no countrywide strategy.

The banking sector – even though it exhibits high liquidity and solvency – it does not offer financial instruments which would promote economic growth as collaterals requested often amount to double the amount of the loan. Also, the public sector finds it increasingly difficult to provide capital for business investment incentives, as effective interest rates (loans to the governmental sector) are at high levels (5.9% in RS, 7% in FBiH) due to the rapid increase in the external debt of BiH (from 2008 – 2013 it was increasing at an average rate of 14,95%).

On the human capital front, several studies confirm that the educational system remains ineffective and disconnected from the needs of the production system¹⁵, but there is no sufficient data supporting that unemployment is attributable to a lack of skills while at the same time there is plenty of data in support to the premise that unemployment is more likely attributable to the unfavourable business environment. Also, limited internal mobility of the labour force – attributable to the fragmented labour legislation and social security systems – may affect geographical unemployment fluctuations (local extremes) but not the overall unemployment rates in the country.

On the Human Development Index (HDI)¹⁶ scale, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks 86th and is considered among the countries with “high human development” performance. And even though its past performance trends are not as impressive as other countries in the region (such as Albania, for example), it exhibits a stable upward trend. The main sources of “loss” in the HDI are attributable to the “inequality in income” and “inequality in life expectancy at birth”, both of which issues are directly related to the level of economic development of the country.

All of the above describe a **very low level of economic development with extremely unequal distribution of resources** and a **very adverse environment for development**. Even most of the social problems the country is faced with today – brain-drain, poverty, inefficient healthcare system and social protection system, etc. – are basically attributable to the low level of economic development. Amid such conditions, one could safely argue that **the most important challenge for the country today is to promote economic growth, especially with a focus on employment creation**. This was also pointed out in the latest reform documents (e.g. the Reform Agenda, Mid-term Development Objectives of the Council of Ministers of BiH, etc.). In the same documents EU concluded that a protracted political deadlock, which used to last for years, in the process of BiH accession to the EU got unblocked.

¹⁵ The educational system in BiH is very fragmented. There are 14 “ministries” of education at various administrative levels. It is the cantons, the entities and the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are directly in charge over education content and funding.

¹⁶ Human Development Report 2014.

The importance of BiH diaspora as a development resource is huge not only because of its large numbers, but also because of specific characteristics of the BiH diaspora which constitute a significant development potential.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has consistently been one of the world's top receivers of remittance flows¹⁷ from abroad, relative to the size of the economy, even in spite of a generally admitted lack of accurate data because of the informal means of money transfers. As the country is "capital poor", economic development must be stimulated by foreign capital inflows – either FDI or transfers of private funds. Attracting FDI usually requires a good business climate and strong institutional frameworks, which is not the case of BiH. In the absence of a strong institutional framework, remittances consist of an important source of capital that can stimulate growth, even if a short-term one. In the case of remittances, the interesting question is how they can be redirected from covering sustenance needs (i.e. consumption) to productive investments.

BiH diaspora is highly integrated in host countries and earns relatively high household incomes. The combination of high incomes and high propensity to save (approximately 25% of income is saved), leads to considerable savings (approx. 4.5:1 savings to remittance factor) comparable to those of Kosovars, Moldovans or Albanians. However, less than one fifth of Bosnian migrants keep even a portion of their savings in BiH (demonstrating a mistrust in the BiH banking system).

Transnational entrepreneurship potential is another important resource of BiH diaspora. Even though the existing data do not historically show large numbers of BiH migrants returning to create businesses in their homeland, several characteristics of BiH diaspora show that there is considerable potential for transnational entrepreneurship among the BiH migrant populations. First the fact that the bulk of BiH migration has been directed to Western Europe and USA, countries with increased entrepreneurship culture and an orientation towards globalized markets, which inevitably has affected migrant "value-systems" and "world-views" (e.g. a proactive and entrepreneurial spirit, valuation of quality and loyalty to clients, the importance of long-term investment and planning, etc). Second, the dual citizenship status of many of the BiH diaspora which makes it easier for them to live and operate in two different countries. Third, the increased knowhow and skills (scientific, management, work-related, ability to relate to institutional structures and legal frameworks, etc) acquired by a large segment of BiH migrants. (The high degree of integration of BiH diaspora into the host societies has increased this knowhow.) In activating this potential, the interesting questions are how BiH can provide institutional stability and simple procedures for opening and operating an enterprise, and perhaps some forms of incentives.

The existence of a significant number of scientific diaspora members - with exceptionally high knowhow and high mobility – many of which are in academia, a field that exhibits a high degree of internationalization – presents opportunities for "circular migration" (through facilitating advanced studies of young BiH individuals abroad who then return to the country) and "brain-gain" phenomena (through the return of the academics themselves). The interesting policy question is to what extent these phenomena materialize by themselves and what are the prerequisite conditions in BiH for stimulating them. In general, return migration seems to occur in small numbers (in the general diaspora population) and most commonly as a retiree population, and even lower numbers (in the scientific diaspora population). The main factors for the low rates of returnees are the corruption in the BiH academic community which prevents academics from abroad to secure appointments at the local Universities, the very low incidence of University-business collaboration, the low research budgets, etc. Initial data from the small numbers of highly educated returnees show a fairly easy process of integrating into the local labour market in BiH (albeit in the government and international sectors mostly and not in academia) but very low to negative professional development and advancement prospects, attrition/resistance from their immediate environment to the application of the knowledge

¹⁷ For many years the volume of remittance inflow to BiH amounted to between 10% and 15% of BiH's GDP, and was manifold higher than the sum of Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance

they acquired abroad¹⁸ and some dissatisfaction with their financial status¹⁹. Given all the above, perhaps the greatest potential that this large scientific diaspora offers, is “brain circulation” or the opportunity for transferring scientific knowhow without returning to the country of origin or by temporarily relocating to the country of origin (e.g. guest lecturing, joint research, etc). The latter is especially important for the Research and Development (R&D) sector – which is considered to be the “locomotive” of any modern economy – and which cannot be adequately financed in a country with scarce resources like BiH. It also offers a great opportunity for the incorporation/adaptation into BiH of already developed abroad innovations and technology affecting thus country development/growth rates. This potential is reinforced by the fact that BiH scientific diaspora is perhaps the better organized/networked part of BiH diaspora in multi-ethnic and often multidisciplinary organizations, they actively participate in conferences, symposia and joint research, and have already shown many interesting samples of voluntary involvement in knowhow transfer in BiH already²⁰.

The conclusions from the above analysis are:

- Since the M&D Project is basically a **“development-oriented” intervention**, and since economic development is the most pressing need of BiH, then it is **highly relevant** to the country’s needs.
- The **lack of specific focus** of the Project – which socio-economic fields are to be targeted and which diaspora resources to be mobilized - **is a disadvantage**, as it does not allow for appropriate “matching” between country needs, development opportunities offered by diaspora, and the Project’s activities. Considering the “pilot” and “exploratory” nature of the Project, one can accept such a level of ambiguity at the beginning of the Project (initial Project design) but cannot accept this to continue during implementation, especially when T.A. activities (e.g. policy briefs), roundtables, scientific workshops, etc aiming at analyzing the current situation and at identifying opportunities for M&D application are foreseen among Project actions.
- In view of the **complicated government structure** of the country and the fragmentation of the strategic planning and policy-making authority, the **vertical component of the Project was a very relevant activity**, one that will continue to be necessary in the near and perhaps far future as well. Inability to effectively implement this component does not exhibit lack of necessity. It does raise questions regarding the appropriateness of design however (see internal relevance below).
- Finally, given the inexperience of BiH in M&D applications, the **horizontal component was very well placed as a “demonstration” application** both in order to produce some visible results that will reinforce interest in M&D approaches, and as a test of applicability of M&D interventions (see internal relevance below).

Internal Relevance

Project design correctly combines three main features/components:

- a horizontal/“demonstration” component;
- a vertical, policy oriented component; and
- a visibility/publicity component (aimed at raising awareness and promoting buy-in into the M&D concept).

¹⁸ This is a very important factor as the biggest contribution to local development that these individuals can make is through the application of acquired knowhow.

¹⁹ This, together with advancement prospects influences the propensity to return to homeland and the desire to stay (i.e. not migrate anew).

²⁰ There is evidence that individuals who come back to their country of origin for lecturing or research are likely to repeat this many times, however very few intend to return permanently.

The central component is the vertical component. All other actions aim at supporting and reinforcing the success of this central component.

Even though the horizontal and the vertical components can very well function independently, overall Project success depends on their concerted action.


There is a relatively clear hierarchy of objectives (see next page), and Project outcomes are further analyzed into specific activities. However, the success of the entire Project is premised on two axioms:

1. that all necessary levels of government will be willing to cooperate in this endeavour; and
2. that Project activities will result in clear recommendations regarding the specific development areas where the incorporation of an M&D concept offers a significant added-value.

Even though potential problems with respect to willingness of various levels of government to participate were identified in the risk analysis performed, the importance of such risks was underestimated as indicated by the mitigation measures (e.g. identify and include other relevant institutions, ensure transparency of policy-making, etc). The ethnic divide and the politically charged environment did not receive the attention they deserved. As a consequence, Project focus – with respect to the vertical component - had to be redefined midway through the implementation period.

Original budget allocations, foresaw a 73/12/15 % split between the three outcomes, an allocation which seems realistic but with a slight bias towards LG interventions²¹. Because of the aforementioned participation problems in the vertical component, the budget related to outcome 3 was finally reduced to half, while favourable exchange rates and Project revisions allowed the increase of the budget allocated to the other two components (by 44% and 22% respectively). Should the Project have been successful with the vertical component, however, the opposite budget reallocations would have been needed (i.e. to the third outcome).

²¹ Even if we factor in the increased unit costs associated with LG interventions, still a 73% share of Project resources is excessive for a Project that treats LG actions only as a “demonstration” feature, and places more importance on the vertical mainstreaming.



It is our believe that – given the fact that this is the first concerted effort²² at introducing M&D into the country - Project design was overambitious and should have set lower targets. For example, instead of vertical M&D mainstreaming it should have set a target for raising awareness at all government levels, or a target for M&D mainstreaming at a few selected government levels, etc.

In conclusion, even though the Project exhibits high external relevance, the internal relevance is rather poor.

Effectiveness (or results)

Methodological note: the ToR concentrates the criterion of effectiveness on the following questions:

"Were project actions effective in achieving project outputs?"

²² This was not the first attempt ever to include in a systemic way the concept of M&D in in BiH. The first successful attempt was the Strategy of Migration and Asylum of BiH 2012-2015. This Project was the first systematic effort aimed at various levels of government simultaneously.

“To what extent has the project managed to mainstream the concept of migration for development into local planning frameworks, as well as triggered effective implementation of pilot M&D actions at the local level?”

“To what extent has the project managed to encourage policy dialogue on migration for development among policy-makers?”

“To what extent has the project approach (intervention strategy) managed to create ownership of the key national stakeholders? Which are, in this regard, challenges to be overcome or potentials to be unlocked?”

In general effectiveness is a measure that assesses to what extent the project intervention succeeded to achieve global and specific objective(s) as well as the expected results, checking both the status of outcome and output indicators.

Overall Assessment

The Project has been very effective at achieving outputs (see Assessment as per Output Indicator in Annex 3). Almost all outputs have been attained or exceeded.

The concept of M&D appears to have been mainstreamed to a large extent into local planning frameworks for the participating local governments (but not for other LGs), but it is questionable whether this was the product of public dialogue in the local communities or the product of a purely administrative/T.A.-assisted process. In other words, the level of awareness-raising within local socio-economic stakeholders cannot be documented without an extensive survey at the participating LGs. Still, there is evidence that the implementation of LG M&D projects has attracted considerable attention from local communities (e.g. the large numbers of interested final recipients and the increased visibility of the interventions among local communities) creating a fertile environment for the dissemination of M&D concepts and for eventually raising awareness and interest in the general public and in the local socio-economic partners. Any successor Project should capitalize on that momentum created by this Project by continuing support to the 10 assisted Local Governments.

With respect to other government levels, the evaluation has not been able to document any significant awareness raising and capacity building to mainstream M&D concepts. Of course there was capacity built within the WG M&D - which has been effective in delivering a significant product (the *Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of M&D into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH*) – but:

- a) this capacity stays with the specific persons who participated in WG and it is questionable whether it will be transferred to the institutions these individuals come from; and
- b) how these Guidelines will be used from now on to promote the mainstreaming of M&D into development policies at all appropriate government levels is a question of how much awareness and buy-in will be developed within each responsible institution. The role of MHRR will be pivotal in this effort as it provides a permanent coordinating structure that can work in this direction. Critical factors for the success of this endeavour will be a) the level of ownership developed within MHRR and b) the level of political power it will manage to acquire. Concerning the first factor (i.e. the level of ownership within MHRR), there is evidence that there is increased commitment within the political structure of the Ministry and within higher administrative levels. Concerning the second factor (i.e. the level of MHRR political power), MHRR will need to increase its visibility by promoting more effectively the success stories related to M&D interventions. LG projects can provide an easy and quick way to do this. However, MHRR should persuade other internal and external stakeholders that:
 - M&D is not merely about tapping into migrant remittances and savings by appealing to their sentiments, but it is mostly about making sound investments;
 - that there is great potential in migrant networks (e.g. trade connections, migrant position within companies, or in host government structures, or within academic/training structures, or within the scientific or professional community, etc) to be capitalized on; and

- there is valuable knowhow accumulated by the diaspora (e.g. entrepreneurial skills, work-related skills, organisational skills, professional skills, scientific skills, research & innovation potential, etc) that can be used for the development of BiH.

MHRR should also show the magnitude of development results that M&D approaches produce as compared to other conventional instruments (i.e. the comparative advantage) in order to stimulate interest in these approaches. Results always “speak louder”. One field of intervention that could produce visible results quite quickly and at a relatively low cost, is the scientific cooperation / scientific knowhow transfer area. It has been documented that there is great interest and potential within BiH scientific diaspora to participate in initiatives established in this direction but there are several hurdles to be overcome in BiH. However, should these hurdles be overcome and a future Project component in this area is successful, the benefits to promoting M&D concepts will be manifold as the impacts within BiH economy will be significant (it can produce ripple effects) and long-lasting and the visibility of the initiative will be extremely high.

Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards reaching Project goals

Effectiveness in producing quantitative outputs/results does not always mean that one is actually achieving his/her goals. It is more like “going through the motions” and “taking the steps”, but it is unknown whether the “destination” has been reached. For that purpose, it is imperative that the evaluation includes an assessment of the “quality” and of the “contribution” of produced outputs towards the achievement of Project goals.

Two of the major goals of the Project were a) to define the most appropriate M&D concept for BiH and b) to design a process through which this M&D concept would be incorporated into policy at all required administration levels. This was primarily the objective of the vertical project component and it involved preparatory actions (policy briefs, public dialogue and trainings) and the design of a roadmap (i.e. a plan, with clearly defined steps, which would show exactly what needed to be done at various administration levels in order to reach to the point where integration of M&D into policy would be possible at all levels). Instead of the roadmap – for reasons that have already been mentioned – the “Guidelines” document was prepared instead. Now, this is an entirely different type of document, and even though it represents the most pragmatic solution to a major problem (which was the inability to involve both entities in the process), it has two serious shortcomings:

- The document is not legally binding, neither does it relate to any specific public policy issues, nor does it make specific recommendations of actions that need to be undertaken for mainstreaming to be achieved. It is some sort of a “how-to manual” which shows how M&D considerations can be integrated into policy but without making any choices, allowing for the full spectrum of possible actions. Even though in the first part it underlines several obstacles to M&D mainstreaming, it does not offer any specific solutions for overcoming these obstacles, which include:
 - the lack of statistical information/mapping of diaspora development potential;
 - the lack of institutional capacities in BiH administration and their insufficient knowledge of M&D concepts;
 - difficulties in policy coordination (due to complex internal administrative and political environment, and lack of cooperation with institutions from host countries);
 - sporadic and informal communication with diaspora and difficulties in building trust and mobilizing emigrants; and
 - ad-hoc inclusion of diaspora from the development of BiH strategic documents.

In the second part, the document provides a step-by-step guide of how M&D concepts can be incorporated in the various stages of the policy-making cycle, often ignoring these obstacles²³. Even in cases where the aforementioned obstacles are addressed, (e.g. the issue of migration statistics or involvement of diaspora in policy consultation processes), a vast spectrum of possible treatments is offered, without prioritizing any actions/approaches (i.e. which ones are more urgently needed, which ones are more important, which approaches are more effective, etc) and without naming the institutions with which responsibility rests for such action. For example, it is mentioned in the document that a prerequisite for effective inclusion of diaspora into consultation processes is the *adequate mapping/identifying of representatives of diaspora and establishment of efficient communication channels with them*. But who should be responsible for doing the mapping? Who should establish these communication channels? Is it everybody (state institutions, entity institutions, LG institutions)? And what is an *efficient communication channel*? How should diaspora be involved in the consultation process? Through naming a representative to sit in a policy development board? Through inviting the diaspora to comment on a policy draft (through which channel)? This lack of operational character of the document diminishes its effectiveness in obtaining meaningful M&D mainstreaming into policy as all the choices are left to the specific policy makers. An example on how these recommendations can be applied is offered by the BiH Science Development Strategy which is currently under revision. A representative of the Ministry of Civil Affairs participated in the WG and in the drafting of the “Guidelines” document. As a result of this exposure, it was decided to include in the Expert Advisory Council - which advises the Ministry on science-related issues – and in the working group in charge of drafting the new strategy a diaspora representative. However, there are no provisions for inviting the diaspora to participate in the public consultation process when the draft document will be publicized on the Ministry’s website. This vividly shows that the “extent” to which recommendations of the “Guidelines” document are adopted by each policy-making institution, depends on the institution’s determination to embrace M&D as a concept. Even in the final part of the document – where a *horizontal and vertical coordination model* is proposed – the mechanisms suggested by the “Guidelines” are still very vague and lack operational character. For example, the suggested “coordination mechanism” consists of two “bodies” (An Inter-institutional body and An Advisory Board) and a “focal point” within the Cabinet of the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers. In essence, all the coordination work is supposed to be done by two committees - that meet either regularly or on an ad hoc basis - and one person? And which is the administrative structure that provides all the necessary support? What is the role envisaged for MHRR²⁴? And how exactly will the “coordination mechanism” coordinate M&D mainstreaming into policy-making? These issues are not specified.

- Also, due to the general nature of the document, no specific concept of M&D is promoted. Instead the document takes a maximalist stance in defining both the development concept and the M&D potential that are of relevance:
 - “Development” is defined as *the increase in economic welfare of the population but also of their intangible quality of life and living standard; and*
 - “M&D potential” is defined as including *economic resources (remittances, savings, philanthropy, etc), human capital (knowledge and skills) and social capital (networks such as associations, links between country of origin and host country, etc, norms and trust).*

²³ For example, it first mentions the lack of sufficient information on diaspora as an obstacle but in the second part it says that MHRR has taken significant steps for mapping the diaspora, and publications and databases on diaspora are available on the MHRR web site.

²⁴ In several parts of the document it is mentioned that MHRR should have a “key role” in mainstreaming MHRR, but this role is nowhere defined.

As such, the document does not contribute towards the definition of the most appropriate M&D concept for BiH but it leaves this topic open.

The non-binding nature of the document has many implications on the likelihood that M&D concepts will be eventually incorporated into policy in BiH, the most important of which is the necessity to develop in the next 3-4 years “buy-in” in all relevant institutions (i.e. increased level of awareness, political will and commitment, ownership of the process, etc). Since compliance will be on a voluntary-basis, and since there are no strategic choices made as to the M&D concept to be promoted (lack of clear focus), another implication is that increased coordination effort will be necessary in order to eventually align all these M&D policies and ensure synergies. This cannot be done by “committees” and “focal points” –as the suggested implementation structure by the “Guidelines” - but a strong administrative structure with the necessary skills and powers and strong political guidance is required.

As it stands now, there is no such administrative and/or political structure. MHRR – which is the closest to a central coordinating institution – has no crystallized views as to the appropriate M&D concept, neither does it possess sufficient support capacity. Also, the experience of the M&D Project has shown that the “top-down” approach does not work very well in BiH. Then, how will policy mainstreaming happen? On a simply voluntary basis? The potential multitude of policies that could result through such a process, could delay the manifestation of any real development results, since it may result in excessive fragmentation of sparse public resources into a variety of strategic objectives (e.g. other institutions will be interested in stimulating migrant financial contributions, other will be interested in “brain gain” policies, etc). Eventually, it is foreseeable that – through successive approximation – there will be policy convergence, and a dominant M&D policy concept will emerge in BiH, however one cannot estimate how long this process may take.

The third major goal of the Project was to test the selected M&D concept at local level to verify both implementability and results. Since there was no particular M&D concept selected by the vertical component, the participating Local Governments were left open to select and develop their own M&D concepts.

A quick examination of a sample of Local Strategic Planning Frameworks, reveals that the quality of the M&D related analysis and strategies incorporated is not very high. The issues are barely touched-upon, there is no serious analysis of the development potential that local diaspora may bring to the locality or past historic records of contributions from diaspora to local development (with the exception perhaps of the building permits statistics, and estimates of annual remittances) neither does the SWOT analysis concentrate on the M&D dimension (it is just another typical SWOT).

As a result, most LG interventions ended up adopting rather simplistic concepts of M&D: fourteen LG projects incorporated financial contributions from the diaspora (co-financing), nine incorporated skills/applied knowhow transfer, four projects included product placement by companies abroad, and only two involved comprehensive productive investments (one new investment and one old investment which expanded the size of their workforce). Most diaspora contributions (co-financing and knowhow transfer) were motivated by either family ties or the emotional ties of the involved diaspora to their homeland. The more significant investments however were based on sound business decisions and more systematic contacts with diaspora. For example, the focus of the investments in Posušje were guided by LG contacts with the diaspora resource (company Vagros Zagreb d.o.o. which trades primarily fruit) which eventually became their project M&D partner.

Interventions very rarely mobilized other local economic development “actors” apart from the Municipality itself (such as Business Incubation Centers, accelerator facilities, etc), with a few exceptions: a couple cooperatives and a couple NGOs. As a result a considerable part of expertise

(i.e. on the profiles²⁵ of past successful examples of investments from the diaspora) and connections²⁶ were not mobilized.

The experience of the LG projects shows that the most commonly implemented M&D concept capitalized on the strong feelings of BiH migrants towards their country of origin. This concept, even though easily implementable, offers no long-term potential. This means that in the future, M&D concepts to be implemented at LG level need to evolve into schemes that will be more based on mutual benefit (for the LG and the diaspora) and less on philanthropy.

Nevertheless, LG projects showed that – even at this rudimentary level – M&D concepts are very much implementable and can produce many significant development results such as:

- safeguarding or the creation of jobs; and
- ensuring a respectable and secure income for final recipients.

These are definitely important development results that require our attention and any successor Project should capitalize on this experience.

Efficiency (or performance)

Methodological note: the ToR concentrates the criterion of efficiency on the following questions:

“Were project actions efficient at achieving project outputs?”

“To what extent are key stakeholders/final beneficiaries satisfied with the project implementation, specifically in terms of the Swiss/UNDP/MHRR support and what are specific expectations for potential follow-up assistance?”

In general, efficiency is a measurement of performance in achieving the goals by using available resources/inputs. Resources/inputs that are customarily taken into account in an efficiency evaluation are: financial resources, time resources, and organisational resources. With respect to financial resources, an efficiency evaluation would compare the outputs/results achieved per financial unit from the Project to other types of similar interventions. This however requires comparable data from other evaluations in BiH, which is extremely difficult to find as most evaluations conducted are not published.

With respect to time resources, efficiency evaluation usually evolves around whether actions were implemented in time and in an appropriate sequence. All such information is available from the Project progress reports.

Finally with respect to organisational resources, efficiency evaluation concentrates on whether human resources were sufficient, on the quality of the experts involved and on the organisational scheme used to implement the intervention. Hence this evaluation focuses on the comparative advantages of the tri-partite main partner structure, UNDP as an implementing partner, on the human resources deployed, and on the ability to cooperate with other actors.

Financial efficiency assessment

UNDP management fee is 8% on top of the Programme budget, which is an affordable cost. Contrary to consultancy companies - which are profit driven - UNDP has a strong development orientation and focuses on long-term changes in the Programme area.


If all implementation costs are added (including project management staff and operational costs), the cost of running this Project comes up to 30% of total budget²⁷. (Out of this cost, only 51% is staff-related, while 49% covers overhead and operating expenses). Per person/day, the average implementation cost comes to USD 364 which compares favourably to international project

²⁵ For example, Intera Technology Park indicated a 35-40 years of age cohort and a primarily business background – not an academic background – as the main characteristics of successful diaspora investors according to their sample, and the business community as the main channel for acquiring such information.

²⁶ Such as organizations involved in “scouting”.

²⁷ Initially it was 39% of total Project cost.

management fees but it is still high for the country. Considering that this unit cost concerns specialized professional services and the relative lack of effective such services in the country, it is deemed reasonable. However, it should be decreased in the future. A considerable part of management expenses are attributable to the fact that there are too many actions to be implemented (i.e. the Project structure is complicated relative to its budget size). Possible future reductions can come from a) a simplified Project structure, b) a reduced Project management team (2 positions would be more sufficient) and c) by taking advantage of MHRR resources (e.g. shifting implementation responsibility for some actions to MHRR).



Still, overall financial efficiency of Project resources remains high, at least for the horizontal component. Tangible benefits have been produced only by the horizontal component of the project which amounted to approximately USD 535,000. The vertical component and the publicity and networking actions have produced no tangible benefits yet. This component has contributed so far to:

- safeguarding of at least 250 jobs in the farming sector (projected to come up to 350 by the end of the Project) and the creation of 27 new jobs (projected to come up to 30 by the end of the Project) through investments made by LG interventions (*average cost = USD 1,530 per job safeguarded/created* which compares very favourably with other types of investments like incentives for attracting FDI). Considering the high unemployment rate of the country, safeguarding jobs is as important as creating new ones;
- a potential annual income secured of at least USD 7,000 for each one of the above jobs, i.e. a potential total annual income of USD 2,280,000 for the total final recipients (*average benefit/cost ratio = 4.26 without including the indirect effects*). This annual income is slightly

lower (at 80%) than the mean country per capita income which stands at approximately 1,300 BAM/month in 2015, i.e. USD 9,000/annually. Considering that this is mainly agricultural income, it is considered a very good income²⁸; and

- the transfer of knowhow through training and knowhow transfer actions implemented by LGs for which we could not assign an accurate financial value.

It is apparent from the above figures that the financial efficiency of this component is excellent. Should we factor in the entire Project costs then the respective figures become:

- a USD 3150 per job safeguarded or created mean Project cost, which still compares favourably to other economic development incentives; and
- a 2.06 benefit/cost ratio, i.e. still a high efficiency rate.

Time-efficiency assessment

In terms of timely implementation, the areas where most time delays were observed are:

- the implementation of LG projects (action 1.5); and
- the M&D mainstreaming roadmap (action 4.1).

Time delays concerning action 1.5 are mainly attributable to external factors (devastating May 2014 floods) while time delays concerning action 4.1 are mainly attributable to the inability to involve Republika Srpska in the M&D working group which resulted in complete restructuring both of the WG composition and the concept of developing a roadmap, and to the general elections of October 12, 2014. While the time delays with respect to action 1.5 are insignificant concerning the efficiency of implementation (as they could not be foreseen), the delays experienced with respect to action 4.1 bear many and multidimensional consequences for any future continuation of the Project. The main lesson learnt in this area is that policy-making and especially policy coordination among the many administrative structures in BiH is not a linear exercise but a highly political process. The interethnic divide – which is still much alive – creates a competitive and uncooperative environment marked by a lack of a shared vision in the country's future. This environment results in mistrust, which manifests at many levels (e.g. between the entities) – including mistrust towards country institutions (at all levels) by the BiH diaspora itself. This means that the task of mainstreaming M&D into policy-making is not a simple one and will take a long time to be completed. As such, these delays are not considered an *implementation failure* but a *design failure*, as the Project design failed to recognize political realities in BiH and failed to see the mainstreaming exercise as the highly political and complicated consensus-building task that it is. Instead, it was planned as a linear sequence of “well-defined” and “controlled” tasks.

In the future, any attempt to continue with the effort to incorporate M&D concepts in BiH policies and to coordinate these policies from one administration level to another need to **concentrate more on raising awareness and building consensus** about the appropriate M&D concept and less on the exercise of policy-making itself. After all, the essence of mainstreaming M&D into policy is not about including M&D measures in strategies and action plans (any measures) but about making smart and focused choices from a wide array of M&D possible actions (the ones that suit better BiH needs) and concentrating country resources into these few choices (i.e. ensuring convergence of such policies at state, entity and local level).


Also actions 1.2 (public discussions in partner LGs) and 4.2 (National/regional networking) were in essence cancelled - as there is no evidence that any specific activities were implemented – the first one attributable to the tight timeframe of the LDS planning exercise and the second one most likely attributable to the problems associated with the establishment and function of the WG M&D. Finally, action 2.3 (T.A. to MHRR to improve cooperation with diaspora) was replaced by the roundtable on

²⁸ In comparison, mean manufacturing per capita income in 2015 stood at 900 BAM/month, i.e. USD 6,300/annually.

Female Entrepreneurship at the request of MHRR. These are also considered design failures as Project design failed to diagnose the real needs of MHRR, while it was over-optimistic with respect to LDS planning timeframes.

However, there is a failure associated with the implementation of the Project, as it seems that UNDP lost valuable time at the beginning of the Project trying to locate experienced migration-experts in BiH both to staff the Project team and for ensuring T.A. inputs. These difficulties encountered, compounded by other unforeseen factors (such as the floods, the elections, the reluctance of RS to participate in the WG), produced a “snowball” effect compressing times of other tasks, forcing the implementation team on occasion to either abort or postpone some of them (as in the case of the LG public discussions on M&D or the trainings for the WG). Subsequent decisions to use own (UNDP) resources for Project management and to concentrate on other specialties for T.A. inputs (i.e. development experts, economists, etc) proved to be successful.

Overall, the horizontal component of the Project is considered to have been more efficiently implemented – in terms of time resources – than the vertical component which was plagued by several delays and upsets (i.e. changes in scope and orientation, changes in stakeholders, etc). This is of course attributable to the fact that the horizontal component was much more clearly defined from the beginning of the Project and that UNDP possessed considerable experience in implementing this type of interventions.



(note: originally planned times are depicted in black, while actual implementation times in blue)

Organisational efficiency assessment

Based on the Agreement signed with the Embassy of Switzerland, UNDP BiH was assigned the task to implement the Project. The advantages of UNDP as an implementor include: the political neutrality of a UN agency to work in a sensitive multi-ethnic environment, as well as its technical capacity to deliver desirable results in an efficient and effective manner.

Also, the comparative advantage of UNDP was the fact that UNDP incorporated the team that was running since 2007 the Integrated Local Development Project (ILDP) - covering 40 Municipalities, all of which coincide with the partner LGs in this Project – which offers support to local development planning. Hence, this implementation arrangement offered continuity and capitalisation of the experience offered through ILDP in terms of achieving complementarities and maintaining institutional memory.

The evaluation confirmed beyond doubt that the deployed human resources possess strong abilities in project management. The core team are professionals that have either been working for UNDP or used to work for other international organizations in BiH (e.g. OSCE). This team is supported by other UNDP staff that provide services like quality control, publicity, etc. UNDP also possesses an extended network of local offices, established service provision mechanisms (e.g. cars and drivers, translators, etc) which can become very handy during Project implementation and long-term relations with local governments in the area (i.e. needs less time to establish rapport and good working relations). Partly due to the established long-term working relations, the core team seems to be working well with the supporting UNDP staff and be using to the fullest extent all the other UNDP service mechanisms.

Despite UNDP being an efficient project implementor, there are still questions about whether the tri-partite main partner scheme was exploited to the fullest of its potential. Even though MHRR was the initiator of the Project, it appears to have played a complementary and not central role (mostly through the organization/implementation of a number of activities such as the Research Workshop, the roundtables, 4 workshops for LGs, the preparation of promotional material, etc.) As such, it never managed to develop ownership of the Project. This should be remedied in any possible future continuation of the Project, since – in the long-run - it is important that a BiH institution takes the lead in the effort to mainstream M&D into BiH policy. Thus all knowhow, implementation capacities and networks relevant to M&D will remain within BiH administration and continuity will be ensured.

Impact

Methodological note: the ToR concentrates the criterion of impact on the following question:

“What are the positive or negative, intended or unintended, changes brought about by the pilot project interventions?”

Since impacts are long-term indirect effects and hence non-observable, the present evaluation section only reports on “likely impacts”, i.e. areas where there is significance evidence that intended or unintended impacts are likely to manifest. The evidence offered below is derived from the desk research, and the interviews conducted by the evaluator during the field phase.

LG projects have mainly contributed to local development through the creation or safeguarding of jobs and through securing a stable income for the participating individuals. Provided that the economic activities - where investments have been made – remain sustainable in the future²⁹, the new income produced by the LG projects, through its multiplier effects (i.e. through an increase in local consumption), has the capacity to create more local economic activity³⁰ (i.e. more jobs and more income) especially in the service sector, and thus contribute to decreasing (or hinder the aggravation of) local unemployment rates and to improving quality of life at least for the recipients of assistance and their immediate family surroundings. However, the magnitude of such impacts is expected to be very low due to a) the lack of “critical mass” in any given locality (i.e. the huge geographic dispersion of such investments) and b) the propensity of people to save (due to the fairly good interest rates in the BiH banking sector) which decreases the amounts directed to local consumption and hence the multiplier effect. It is recommended that in the future there is greater geographic concentration of resources in order to produce more visible results and a critical mass which can strengthen multiplier effects.

To what extent these savings may in the future lead to re-investment in productive activities³¹ – which has a greater potential for producing economic development results than consumption – is largely unknown as there are no such quantitative data that would allow us to make estimates. Since this is very important to know, it is recommended that follow-up evaluations and impact assessments of the Project provide documentation for such behaviours and systematically measure their magnitude/incidence.

Increased local incomes have no potential of producing inflationary pressures on common goods and services through increases in local consumption – due to the relatively small amounts involved – and the only possibility for inflationary pressures to manifest is through the real estate market – if individuals start purchasing property, and only in the long-run.

Another significant impact of the LG pilot projects is the increased demand from local populations for similar interventions by the respective local governments. As “word” spreads through the community, people become more aware of the development opportunities and start to exert pressures on the LG to continue and expand the coverage of these programmes. This means that LGs will need more resources in order to accommodate such pressures.

Also, people often try to copy any successful investment made by their neighbour. This means that most of the pressure from local communities will be for the continuation of the same types of interventions (e.g. raspberry farms). At this point in time it appears that there is still plenty of room for such investments to expand without compressing product prices, but this cannot be done indefinitely. Hence, LGs should in the future carefully monitor the markets which they target through the assisted investments by performing all the necessary studies.

²⁹ Which depends on how carefully these investments have been chosen (also see section on sustainability)

³⁰ International literature shows that even though short-term multiplier effects are usually negligible, medium to long-term effects are known to be significant (from 1.2 to 1.6 multiplier coefficients). The magnitude of such effects depends however on the trade-openness of the society. In societies open to international trade, very often increased consumption is directed to import goods.

³¹ Except for real estate investments which do not produce and long-term sustainable economic activity.

The last important expected impact of LG projects is on the way local communities communicate with the diaspora and on the way they incorporate M&D concepts in their local development programmes. Several interviewed Municipalities mentioned, that the M&D Project has already:

- helped them adopt a more structured approach (i.e. specific topics to discuss every year) in their communications with local diaspora;
- led to qualitative changes in their behaviour towards diaspora, such as seeking to host diaspora-related events (e.g. the 2015 Business Forum for Diaspora which will be held in Banja Luka and is considered a major achievement by the Prijedor LG³²); and
- helped them institutionalize cooperation with diaspora (through the local planning process).

Many LGs expressed that the greatest challenge for future M&D interventions is to mobilize significant knowhow/skills transfer, which is very much needed due to the mismatch between offer and demand on the local labour markets³³. This could result in even higher positive impacts in local economies. For that to be successful, they need to establish a monitoring system³⁴ of supply and demand of skills in the economy.

Sustainability

Methodological note: the ToR concentrates the criterion of sustainability on the following questions:

To what extent are the results sustainable? Will the outputs lead to benefits beyond the lifespan of the project?

How could project results be further sustainably projected and expanded, having in mind the prospective contribution of the M&D concept for local, as well as broader country development?

What are, if relevant, after-project possible priority interventions and general recommendations, which could further ensure sustainability of project's achievements?

In general, the notion of sustainability examines for how long the results and impacts from a certain intervention persist and the conditions which are necessary in order to ensure them.

Some types of results produced from the Project appear to be more sustainable than others. For example, the results achieved by the LG projects seem to be quite robust at least for the medium-term. There seem to be no survival concerns for the farming investments, the employment initiative at the Remus company shows no immediate threats for the new jobs created as the company is expanding into other types of automotive parts, and the apparel manufacturing firm in Nevesnje seems to be profitable and with good survival prospects (secured markets in Montenegro).

The same cannot be said for the capacity-building activities, both at local level and at higher level. As “knowhow” is something possessed by a specific individual, the sustainability of the capacity building actions depends on how widely within the organization this knowhow was spread (i.e.

³² BHdiaFOR was not created by Prijedor LG. It was created by NGO “Naša perspektiva” (Our Perspective), members of the BHdiaFOR Group, and of a number of numerous other stakeholders from BiH and diaspora. Prijedor was the host of one BHdiaFOR annual events. What is important here is the change in attitude: LGs now seek to be involved in events like this one.

³³ Which mismatch is apparently aggravated by the limited mobility of BiH human resources.

³⁴ Initially the system would observe only demand (i.e. the system will be re-active), but in the long-run it would be able to produce forecasts (pro-active system)

how many people participated), on whether this organization has a high turnover of staff (i.e. how often employees change), and to what extent this knowhow was “institutionalized” (i.e. it was incorporated into standard procedures). Taking these factors into account, it appears that capacity building at the local level is more sustainable than the capacity-building provided to MHRR and to the WG M&D. In addition, sustainability of the results achieved by the WG (i.e. implementation of the “Guidelines”) is very questionable (see remarks about the “optional” nature of the document above).

Combining these two conclusions, it appears that there is greater sustainability potential at the local level than anywhere else. Therefore, it comes as a logical conclusion that this area of intervention needs to be strengthened in the future. This can be done through³⁵:

- more financial assistance;
- other types of support (e.g. incubation, start-up acceleration, advice on licensing or branding, marketing studies, etc) to either assist in the process of designing the LG projects or participate in the LG projects as a “third pole”;
- more systematic³⁶ knowhow/skills transfer from the diaspora in areas needed by the local economic systems;
- matchmaking services in cases where the local diaspora does not have the resources the LG needs; and
- more focus on trade relations than financial contributions as an M&D instrument.

³⁵ Many of these are the views of the LGs interviewed.

³⁶ E.g. through institutionalized vocational training or life-long learning.

Other Evaluation Questions

Despite the fact that the following evaluation considerations were not included in the ToR, it was considered important to include them in the present report.

Added Value

Based on the original Project design, the greatest added-value was meant to be the identification of the “niches” where an M&D approach could make a difference for development in BiH and the incorporation of appropriate policy responses in all relevant strategic/policy documents at all levels (from state to local) in a coordinated manner that would allow for the highest benefit to be derived. The Project failed both at identifying these “niches” and at coordinating a mainstreaming of M&D into policy process. Therefore the largest part of Project expected added value never materialized.

However, some Project components did work quite well, and namely the horizontal component. As such the main added-value achieved by Project activities includes:

- the level of awareness and the effective M&D planning and implementation structures that were developed at the local level. It may be that the M&D approaches adopted during this first cycle were rather simplistic, but almost all LGs interviewed indicated their desire to embark into more sophisticated projects in the future.
- the building of trust between LGs and diaspora. This has been one of the main impediments in establishing proper communication channels between diaspora and government. Most interviewed LGs indicate that they have been successful at establishing good relations and trust with the diaspora³⁷.

Visibility

It appears that Project visibility has been rather low and anaemic at all levels but especially at national level. The Project has managed to stimulate public interest at the local level – evidenced by the large numbers of individuals that expressed interest for the LG projects – but it cannot be documented that there was any consciousness developed around the M&D concept. For most final recipients, this was “just another local development” project³⁸.

Perhaps the most important reason for that was the insufficient attention the communication and publicity dimension received from the beginning of the Project (i.e. from the Project design). This lack of emphasis was manifested in the delayed drafting of the Communication Strategy (end of 2014) and was compounded by the lack of an aggressive approach to visibility/publicity actions.

The Communication Strategy itself, even though it correctly specifies the categories of “messages” to be communicated as:

³⁷ The fact that diaspora registries still have very few registrations sheds some doubts on LG claims, but this remains to be proven over the long-run.

³⁸ Measuring of change in perception about the M&D concept was not planned by the Project. Also, activities conducted within the project were often identical to types of activities implemented as part of general support to local development. This is why final recipients could not see the difference.

- project key results; and
- the M&D concept;

it fails to correctly identify the messages to be propagated (very ambiguous or general and frequently “negative” instead of “positive” messages) and defines the widest possible spectrum of audiences.

The same vagueness or lack of appropriate targeting characterizes the audiences and messages related to the M&D concept. Instead of communicating a specific M&D concept, the key messages to be communicated are defined as:

- BiH is a market with emerging opportunities³⁹;
- Processes are on-going that will create safe environment for investments⁴⁰;
- Migrants represent development potential with increasing recognition;
- Migrants do make a difference with their expertise and experiences⁴¹;

while it is not clear who the target audiences should be (general public? state administration? entity administration? other stakeholders?).

Four key communication approaches are defined by the Communication Strategy:

- holding a press-conference publicizing the M&D policy road map (i.e. the “Guidelines” document);
- organizing events⁴² and media coverage to mark the mainstreaming of M&D into municipal and cantonal planning documents;
- a press event to show the positive side/success story of the LG projects (seed fund) combined with other tools (press releases, brochures, etc.); and
- promotion – through ceremonies, newspaper articles and web-sites of Project partners and involved LGs - of assistance redirected to support recovery efforts in three partner localities affected by floods.

While the above approaches are rather poor (they could be enriched with other more creative approaches), in credit to the Communication Strategy one should say that they do cover the main milestones that need to be publicized, and that the spectrum of communication tools proposed under section 2.6 include a fairly good mix of publicity means.

However, many of these activities (e.g. the press-conference for publicizing the “Guidelines” or the events for promoting LG projects⁴³ or ceremonies to mark recovery efforts from floods, etc) and many publicity tools (e.g. the newsletters) were never used by the Project. The main publicity means used so far included:

- the conventional media (newspapers, radio, TV);
- websites, Facebook, twitter; and

³⁹ Correct but irrelevant for an M&D concept.

⁴⁰ Perhaps true but it refers to all investments and not to investments by migrants in particular. Hence not related to an M&D concept directly.

⁴¹ This message implies that the M&D concept chosen for BiH is to capitalize on migrant knowhow. However, knowhow and experience were not capitalized to any significant degree and mostly, they were not promoted adequately. The only 2 instances of actual promotion were the “success stories” publication (which effectively showed how diaspora has made a difference in the past) and the “women entrepreneurship roundtable” which only publicized the “potential” for making a difference.

⁴² Without specifying the types of events.

⁴³ A final event to promote results will be organized next month

- printed material (brochures and publications).

Until mid-September 2015 (when the field phase of the evaluation was concluded) the Project had been publicized through:

- 128 media reports/articles (including all media: radio, TV, newspapers);
- 1 video reporting on the Remus company project in Sanski Most (2 other videos were under production: the Nevesinje project and the “women entrepreneurship” roundtable); and
- 1 brochure (MHRR leaflet “Migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina”), 2 infographics and 1 publication (Emigration and Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Best Practices).

Perhaps the single most important - in terms of visibility - events organized by the Project were:

- the roundtable on Migration and Development;
- the academic research workshop; and
- the roundtable “Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH”.

Out of all these events, perhaps the most successful in terms of visibility was the roundtable “Women Entrepreneurship” which managed to gather around 90 diaspora participants from 8 different countries. On the contrary, the first roundtable – whose main aim was to raise awareness and encourage dialogue among principal stakeholders in M&D - did not manage to attract enough attention from the government sector⁴⁴ which consists one of the most important stakeholders for a mainstreaming project such as this. Finally, even though the academic workshop was very well attended and publicized through the “Almanac of Research Papers”, the scientific content of the papers makes them “less accessible” to the general public and even to many policy makers. In order for the material from this workshop to be used for visibility purposes, it would have to be put in “layman’s” language.

BiH is quite a challenging area in terms of visibility. With several donors present in the area⁴⁵ competing for public attention and very often taking credit for interventions financed by other Programmes – especially at the local level - it is one of the hardest jobs to be accomplished. In this highly competitive environment, it appears that the Project has taken a very “distanced” approach often staying in the “shadows” instead of in the “public eye”. For example, the reconstruction of the Health Center in Maglaj was celebrated in July 2015 by the Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to BiH unveiling a commemorative plaque, together with the Mayor of Maglaj and the Director of the Health Care Centre. Even though the event was publicized by the UNDP site, there is no mention anywhere of the M&D Project’s contribution.

In order to prevent misrepresentation or lack of exposure by the media, local journalists need to be constantly trained and reminded. This has not been done very diligently by the Project which must do a better job in the future. Also, other events – e.g. ambassadorial visits – can provide a vehicle to increase media exposure and should be exploited in any future project. Finally merchandising - which has proven

⁴⁴ Out of the 71 persons initially invited – excluding the representatives of the Project partners - only 47 attended, out of which 8 were state administration representatives, 9 LG representatives and only 3 diaspora representatives, while the main bulk of participants was from NGOs, businesses, regional/local development agencies, etc.

⁴⁵ The EU included

to be quite effective for visibility purposes in numerous other projects - should be considered for future use especially for the LG component.

For all practical purposes, one needs to admit that attaining exposure through local media is very difficult when trying to publicize concepts, especially new ones like M&D. Also, there was no clarity of the M&D concept that needed to be disseminated by the Project's publicity actions which made the job even harder. As such, it is quite understandable that this component of the Communication Strategy was the least visible one.

Overall, Project visibility is considered to have been weak and needs to be strengthened in the future. Political "buy-in" and the effectiveness of mainstreaming M&D concepts in policy-making will heavily depend on how visible will be the achievements and contributions of this Project.

Horizontal Considerations: Gender Equality

Even though not originally included in the Project objectives, several initiatives have actively promoted female participation, employment and entrepreneurship. As such, one should note:

- The majority of agricultural development initiatives equally supported male and female employment⁴⁶ as the entire family worked on the agricultural holdings.
- Several LG initiatives specifically promoted female entrepreneurship, such as the apparel manufacturing business in Nevesnje, and the shoe-maker in Laktaši.
- Many of the diaspora members co-financing LG investments were women.
- The composition of the WG M&D (55% female).
- The large numbers of female participants in the trainings, in the scientific workshop and in the roundtables, with the "women entrepreneurship" roundtable being the highlight.

Without being able to provide an accurate numerical figure, it is estimated that well over 50% of the people either touched by Project interventions or involved in Project activities were female.

Horizontal Considerations / Synergies and Complementarities

The most important synergy/complementarity of the M&D Project was with Integrated Local Development Planning project (also implemented by UNDP). ILDP provided an excellent platform for the launching of the M&D horizontal component: already established good working relationships with the LGs, largely trained Municipal staffs in the planning cycle and methodology, already established participatory bodies and processes of local strategic planning underway. The "matching" between the two projects was fairly good, as indicated by the fact that 9 out of the 10 participating LGs successfully incorporated M&D concepts in their LDSs and the last one in their action plan. However, as discussed before, the quality of the planning documents – and especially the analysis and priority-setting sections – were of a fairly low quality with respect to the M&D component, which was vastly attributable to the fact that LDSs were at an advanced stage of development when the M&D Project started. Hence the full potential of "matching" the two projects could not be realized. Of course, this can be remedied – in the next round of LDS development - to the extent that analysis and planning of M&D concepts is incorporated in the standard planning methodology.

⁴⁶ However, it was not possible to determine whether this was registered employment.

The horizontal component of the Project also exhibits several synergies with other projects implemented by other agencies in the country such as the USAID/SEDA Growth Oriented Local Development (GOLD) project, which promotes local economic development planning, improvement of public service delivery and reforms that improve the business climate, public-private partnerships and other business/employment creation initiatives. The project targets 48 Municipalities, 6 of which overlap with the M&D Project.

Finally, there is potential synergy of the horizontal component with the PROLOCAL project by GIZ⁴⁷ which promotes public-private partnerships and a business-friendly environment, and potential synergies with several SDC projects such as the MarketMakers⁴⁸ and the Skills-for-Jobs⁴⁹ projects.

The vertical component of the project does not exhibit synergies with other known projects by international donors in the country, but it does exhibit complementarities with the EU pre-accession assistance and especially the “Democracy and Governance” chapter.

⁴⁷ Only one Municipality participates in both the PROLOCAL and the M&D projects: Laktasi.

⁴⁸ The project partners with RDAs, and not LGs. Possible geographic overlaps with the M&D Projects are not known.

⁴⁹ Which aims at reforming VET.

Main Conclusions

The M&D mainstreaming Project is considered highly relevant to the area needs and fairly well structured with mutually reinforcing and complementary components and actions. It addresses a fairly wide spectrum of needs (mostly economic and institutional) and includes both short-term (LG projects) and long-term interventions (vertical component).

The internal consistency of the programme – i.e. hierarchy of objectives - is also quite satisfactory even though the risk factors originally identified were underestimated with almost destructive results for Project implementation. The distribution of resources (LG component) presents a fairly good geographic pattern and was done according to transparent criteria.

The programme exhibits very high degree of effectiveness, especially regarding immediate outputs. Programme effectiveness regarding the achievement of sought after results is hampered by other, often uncontrollable factors (such as politics and ethnic tensions). Still, considering the general conditions in the area, one should admit that – even at the level of results – programme effectiveness can be considered fairly satisfactory.

Efficiency is the strongest suit of the programme. UNDP has proved to be very effective, possess a strong development-orientation, has good knowledge of the area conditions and brings to the programme valuable institutional memory. The organizational structure and the operating procedures followed are very appropriate (as they provide both good control and flexibility), human resources are highly skilled, and communication and reporting procedures used are very effective. In terms of time-efficiency, the two main sources of delays and Project upsets were the floods and the inability to bring to WG M&D the entity institutions (due to reluctance on behalf of RS).

The two most important impacts achieved by the programme are:

- increased capacity created in beneficiaries - mainly in Municipal administrations – with respect to preparing and implementing M&D projects; and
- significant quality of life improvements in the participating LGs.

Economic development interventions have not produced as yet significant impacts as they a) are longer-term results, and b) do not exhibit sufficient concentration of resources or “critical mass”.

In order to help identify and quantify these impacts an impact assessment study is necessary within 2 years from the completion of the Project.

Sustainability of programme results varies greatly. Perhaps the most sustainable of all programme results are LG projects. Capacity building interventions are less sustainable and especially at the MHRR and WG level.

Programme visibility and publicity is perhaps the weakest aspect of the programme especially at national level. As such, the Project has not managed to produce any significant awareness except for the 10 partner LGs. This is also the greatest added-value achieved by the Project.

Recommendations

Increase the funding and effectiveness of the horizontal component.

LG projects have been the ones that have so far produced tangible and visible results. Also, LG projects can concentrate development effects at specific localities (e.g. the ones that are the most in need) while projects at higher administrative levels cannot geographically direct resources and hence run the risk of creating unbalanced development patterns (i.e. investments may concentrate in already developed localities). In addition, as we already mentioned above, MHRR will need to use the increased visibility of such results in order to convince other state institutions and other levels of government for the utility of M&D mainstreaming and become successful in coordinating the necessary policy changes.

Increasing the budget of the “seed fund” is one of the necessary changes in order to direct more financial resources to investment projects. We recommend increasing it from approximately 30% that it is now, to 60% of Project budget (i.e. for a 1 million USD total Project budget, to direct USD 600,000 to local projects). But we also need to increase the effectiveness of these resources:

- by increasing the leverage of diaspora-related resources; and
- by increasing the indirect and multiplicative effects of the investment and the sustainability of the investments.

Currently, the average financial leveraging rate in LG projects has been 14.4% (13.3% from diaspora resources and 1.1% from various other resources) while M&D Project contributed 69.8% of the funds and LGs 15.8%. However, this leveraging rate varies considerably from 0% to 29.4%⁵⁰ for the diaspora contribution and from 0% to 7.8% for the other sources contribution. In order to increase the efficiency in the use of the funds, but also visibility and credibility of the migration-related effect, leveraging should raise to approximately 30% on the average⁵¹ while keeping LG contributions to 15%. Of course, this would be difficult to do (and non-desirable) if interventions continue to appeal to the “migrants’ sentiment or patriotism” in order to raise financial resources. There should be a shift to more “good business” projects, i.e. projects that are based on sound business propositions to the diaspora (such as, for example, transfer of part of the production of a diaspora-owned/managed foreign company to BiH, production of goods which will be placed on foreign markets by a diaspora-owned/managed foreign company, contract farming schemes with diaspora-owned/managed foreign companies, outsourcing schemes, etc). Such projects can ensure higher leveraging levels and increased sustainability at the same time.

Under this scenario, a 1 million USD future M&D Project, directing USD 600,000 to LG projects, could leverage another USD 180,000 from diaspora and other sources and USD 90,000 from LGs raising the total LG budget to USD 870,000. Assuming that future projects will be equally effective with the current ones, this could translate into safeguarding at least 750 jobs or creating over USD 5 million in annual incomes.

Finally, it is advisable to select all future LG projects via competitive calls in order to increase both the effectiveness and the sustainability of their results. If a 4-year Project is approved for the future, we recommend having 3 distinct calls (one per year) at years 1, 2, and 3.

Implement a project preparation facility

In order to increase the quality of the projects presented through the calls for proposals, it may be appropriate to set-up an LG project preparation facility within the M&D Project which will run all through the duration of the Project. This facility could for example select – together with the local

⁵⁰ Even though efforts were made by the evaluator, it has not been feasible to attribute an accurate financial value to in-kind contribution – such as training and knowhow transfer. As such, this amount does not include the value of in-kind contributions.

⁵¹ We recommend leveraging rates not fall under 20% and not to exceed 40% on an individual LG project basis.

government concerned - productive sectors and/or specific products or other activities (e.g. vocational training, or organisational restructuring, or purchase of royalties for specific production processes, or establishment of business services, etc) that can be of strategic importance to local economic development and at the same time relevant resources can be found at BiH diaspora.

This would have two distinct benefits: a) achieve a higher quality of LG project proposals, and b) enhance the ability of local beneficiaries to apply for other sources of funding (e.g. EU funding).

The evaluator suggests that MHRR should participate in the project preparation facility since they will maintain a database on diaspora-related resources and hence they will be able to provide the necessary “matching” services.

Increase Project ownership by a BiH institution: share implementation responsibility

The M&D mainstreaming Project is about increasing development prospects of the BiH people. Hence, even though it may be more efficient to leave matters into the hands of UNDP at the current stage, ultimately a BiH institution should take ownership of the Project and the entire process too. As it relates to both migration and development, the appropriate institution should be either one that has responsibility over migration and diaspora issues, or one that has responsibility over economic development issues. At state level, there is no umbrella institution that has responsibility over all economic development issues (there is a Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, a Ministry of Finance and Treasury and a Foreign Investment Promotion Agency) neither is there central economic development planning. In the area of migration, responsibilities are more clearly delineated: despite the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has some responsibility for “*coordination and cooperation with emigrated citizens*”, the Ministry of Human Right and Refugees seems to be the most logical institution with which Project ownership should lie as it is responsible for “*formulating the BiH policy related to the diaspora*”, and “*formulating and implementing the BiH policy in the field of return of refugees and displaced persons*”. In addition, MHRR has already been involved in the first M&D mainstreaming Project. MHRR initiated activities in the area of M&D in BiH.

Project ownership can be developed by one of the following two approaches:

- i) through increased oversight, i.e. more active involvement in planning and activity design, monitoring and evaluation or results; or
- ii) through increased involvement in implementation.

It is our opinion that MHRR should increase oversight of both the M&D Project and eventually the entire M&D mainstreaming process.

For this, it primarily needs to develop a sound monitoring and evaluation capacity, i.e. a reliable and frequently updated data system on diaspora, on diaspora-related resources used for development purposes in BiH, on outputs and results achieved through these interventions, etc. In addition, it should develop evaluation and impact assessment capacity in order to periodically conduct assessments on results and impacts of the use of diaspora-related resources. Such information is useful both for planning purposes and for visibility purposes. Therefore, in the short-run we recommend that MHRR develops two data collection and monitoring systems: a) one that will collect quantitative and qualitative information on the BiH diaspora and their characteristics and resources, and b) a system that will document all diaspora-related interventions implemented at local level, whether financed by this particular Project or not⁵².

Second, it needs to reinforce its coordinating role both at the state level and at the entity level. Effective policy cannot be “dictated”. It is not a technical task (that can be broken down into

⁵² The system should be able to sort interventions by source of funding in order to perform different types of analyses.

clearly defined steps) but more of a question of developing political commitment and often the acquisition of more *“political muscle”* (in order to have enough “clout” to affect policy direction).

However, we believe that – since the country is on an EU-accession path – in the long-run it would be very beneficial for MHRR to also develop implementation capacity, as it will be the responsible institution for handling programmes co-financed by the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) once BiH becomes a member-state. Hence, it is good idea to start developing implementation capacity by taking over implementation responsibility for some of the Project actions (i.e. learn-by-doing).

Reinforce impacts and sustainability of results in already selected LGs through continued support (through successor or follow-up projects)

Continuing and increasing support to the already assisted LGs, reinforces the sustainability of the produced results, allows the opportunity to the LGs to “fine-tune” their M&D approaches and creates the critical mass that is needed in order to produce secondary development impacts in local societies. Such an approach can help increase the visibility of the Project and attract more interest in M&D concepts at all institutional levels, which is the first step to creating sufficient awareness and commitment for M&D mainstreaming to happen.

Include a component which will concentrate on selected systemic changes: focus on scientific knowhow transfer.

Doing everything at once (i.e. a maximalist approach such as the one adopted by the Project initially) rarely works. However, doing only one thing (i.e. a minimalistic approach) does not work either. Concentrating only on LG projects entails the risk that the M&D concept will be conceived as “just another local development intervention”. Hence, the Project needs to expand into another type of M&D initiative. Perhaps the easiest to implement (due to the relatively low financial resources required and the high willingness of diaspora to cooperate) is knowhow transfer, whether scientific or skill-related.

Concentrate on a small set of indicators.

In order to increase Project effectiveness, Project log-frame should select a small number of strategically selected indicators around which the whole Project strategic approach will be built. This will enable better and easier monitoring throughout the programme. The set of indicators should not exceed 2-3 result indicators and 3-7 output indicators.

Annex 1 – Bibliography

Project Documentation:

- The Programme Documents;
 - Migration and Development: Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development into Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Project document) final version;
 - Annual Work Plan (AWP) 2013-2014;
 - Revised AWP (July 2014);
 - AWP 2015;
- The Logical Framework:
 - Project LogFrame Matrix – Annex 1 in “Project Document”;
 - Project LogFrame – Planned vs. Achieved (August 2015 Update)
- Annual Progress Reports:
 - September – December 2013;
 - January – December 2014;
 - Progress Update Report (August 2015);
- Communication Documents:
 - Communication Strategy (September 2014);
- Financial Documents:
 - Initial Project Budget – Annex 3 in “Project Document”;
 - Budget Update – September 2015;
- Terms of Reference Documents
 -

Project Deliverables:

- Policy Briefs and concept notes:
 - Policy brief 1: Mainstreaming Migration into Development Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Key Concepts and International Experiences (March 2014);
 - Policy brief 2: Situational analysis of economic development policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Identifying policies for effective mainstreaming of migration into development (June 2014) and Situational Analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Emigration Potential for the Social Development Sectors (June 2014);
 - Original and revised Concept Notes on Policy Consultation Process and Action Plan;
 - Analytical Note on Mainstreaming the Concept of Migration and Development into Local Development Strategies;
- Manuals and Guidelines:
 - Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development in Design and Implementation of Public Policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 2015);
- Other Documents:
 - Excerpts from the local development strategies for Velika Kladuša, and Posušje.

Background Documents:

- Emigration and Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Best Practices;
- Almanac of Research Papers;

- Brochure: Migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Conclusions from roundtables;
- Other (miscellaneous) documents:
 - Strategy of Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
 - Strategy on Migration and Asylum of BiH 2012-2015 and 2014-2020;
 - Draft Social Inclusion Strategy;
 - Swiss Cooperation Strategy in BiH 2013-2016;
 - The scientific diaspora as a brain-gain option: exploring the case of BiH;
 - Maximizing the development impact of migration-related financial flows and investments to BiH;
 - Global Migration Group handbook on Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A handbook for policy-makers and Practitioner.

Annex 2 – List of meetings

Meeting at	Date/time	Participants
Thursday, September 3, 2015		
Embassy of Switzerland	08.30 – 10.00	Joseph Guntern, Head of Cooperation, Azra Šarenkapa, Programme Officer and Regula Babler, Governance and M&D Advisor, Embassy of Switzerland
UN House	10.00 – 10.30	Zahira Virani, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP
UN House	10.30 – 11.15	Adela Pozder-Čengić, Rural and Regional Development Sector Leader, UNDP
BiH Government building	11.30 – 13.00	Ruzmira Tihić Kadrić, Assistant Minister and Isma Stanić, Head of Section for Economic, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, Sector for Emigration, BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees
UN House	13.00 – 13.45	Alma Šunje, Programme Officer, International Organization for Migration (member of the M&D Working Group)
UN House	14.00 – 15.00	Meeting with project staff
Mostar, Intera	17.15 – 18.00	Željko Matković and Goran Dodig, Intera Technology Park (other relevant initiatives)
Friday, September 4, 2015		
Posušje LG	09.00 – 10.00	Ivan Miličević, Posušje Municipality Focal Point / Coordinator for Diaspora
Eko Hercegovina	10.15 – 11.00	Martin Soldo, Director, Agricultural Cooperative Eko Hercegovina (project final recipient)
Net Press Company	14.00 – 15.00	Sanja Kovač, Nevesinje Municipality Focal Point / Coordinator for Diaspora and Ms. Nataša Čalić, Owner (project final recipient)
FBiH Ministry	15.45 – 16.20	Zdravko Čerović, Assistant Minister, FBiH Ministry of Development, Entrepreneurship and Crafts
Monday, September 7, 2015		
Prijedor LG	08.00 – 09.00	Nataša Zorić, Prijedor City Focal Point / Coordinator for Diaspora and Ms. Zinaida Hošić, Head of Department for Economy and Agriculture
Various places	09.00 – 11.30	Visit to project final recipients (a dairy farmer and a greenhouse producer)
Austronet Company	12.00 – 12.45	Omer Žerić, Austronet Company, Prijedor (Diaspora investment featured in Project publication “Success Stories”)
Sanski Most LG	14.15 – 15.45	Amer Mezetović, Focal Point / Coordinator for Diaspora
Agrisan	16.00 – 17.30	Senad Hadžibajramović, representative of Agricultural Cooperative Agrisan and greenhouse producers (project final recipients)
Tuesday, September 8, 2015		
Terra Sana	08.00 – 09.00	Ermina Islamčević, Azemina Bulić representatives of Terra Sana NGO (project final recipients)

Remus Co.	09.00 – 09.30	Adnan Čekić, representative of Remus Company (project final recipient)
Ključ LG	10.15 – 11.15	Nedžad Zukanović, Mayor, Amir Hadžić, Municipality Focal Point / Coordinator for Diaspora and Hamdija Dučanović, Botonjić Šukrija, Azra Kujundžić, Armin Čahut, Municipal Development Team
Various places	11.15 – 12.15	Visit to project final recipients (raspberry producers)
Ključ LG	12.15 – 13.00	Senad Šehić, Velika Kladuša Municipality Head of Office for Diaspora
Jajce LG	14.00 – 15.00	Edin Hozan, Mayor, Dijana Duzić, Jajce Municipality Focal Point / Coordinator for Diaspora and Amila Hadžić, Faruk Mecavica, Municipal Development Team members
Wednesday, September 9, 2015		
UN House	09.00 – 10.00	Armin Alijagić, Naša Perspektiva NGO (organiser of BHDiaFor, indirect participants in project activities)
UN House	10.15 – 11.15	Nirvana Pištoljević, representative of Bosnian-American Academy of Arts and Science – BHAAAS (indirect participants in project activities)
BiH Agency for Work and Employment	11.30 – 12.30	Siniša Veselinović, Head of Section, BiH Agency for Work and Employment (member of the M&D Working Group)
BiH Government building	12.30 – 13.30	Predrag Jović, Deputy Minister, BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees
UN House	15.00 – 15.45	Mirjana Nikolić, Senior Expert Associate for Science, BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs (member of the M&D Working Group)
Mistral Technologies Co.	16.00 – 16.45	Faruk Damir Saračević, Mistral Technologies Company (Diaspora investment)
UN House	17.00 – 18.00	Meeting with the project team
Thursday, September 10, 2015		
UN House	09.00 – 10.00	Ismar Čeremida, UNDP Economic Development Specialist
USAID	11.00 – 12.00	Almedina Šuvalija, Deputy Chief of Party, and Saša Kotlica, Private Sector Expert, USAID/Sida GOLD Project (other relevant initiatives)
UN House	13.00 – 14.00	Debriefing meeting with project team
UN House	14.00 – 15.00	Nino Serdarević (expert engaged by the Project / professor at the Faculty of Economics, Zenica University)
Embassy of Switzerland	15.00 – 17.00	Debriefing meeting with project partners
Friday, September 11, 2015		
UN House	08.30 – 09.15	Pavle Banjac, Head of Communications Office, UNDP
FIPA	09.30 – 10.30	Jelica Grujić, Director, Foreign Investment Promotion Agency

UNITIC – Measure Project	11.00 – 12.00	Nermin Oruč (project beneficiary + initiator of the MA programme in the field of migration; currently working for USAID Project Measure)
UN House	13.00 – 14.00	Skype with Majda Pehadžić, Diapora investor in LG initiative
UN House	14.30 – 15.00	Skype with Sana Alajmović, Executive Director, “Sigrid Therapeutics”, Sweden (participant in the Round Table “Women Enterpreneurship in BiH and Diaspora”)
UN House	15.30 – 16.00	Skype with Naida Ribić, BH Business Club, Netherlands, President (participant in the Round Table “Women Enterpreneurship in BiH and Diaspora”)
UN House	16.00 – 16.45	Zana Karkin, BIT Alliance (other relevant initiatives – retraining programme in the IT sector)

Annex 3 - Assessment as per Project Indicators

Based on the LogFrame Matrix, Project outcomes are measured through 21 output indicators, 5 outcome/result indicators and 1 impact indicator, which are far too many for a project of this size and scope. This practice is not advisable as it uses far too many resources for monitoring and reporting on the indicators. In addition, it often causes Programme managers to lose sight of Project central goals (i.e. they tend to see “the trees but not the forest”). For the next Project we recommend limiting the number of indicators to 5-10 strategically selected ones expressing the essence of what it is the Project is trying to achieve.

In addition, the indicator system lacks clarity (indicators are many times overlapping and very often ambiguously defined) decreasing its value in terms of monitoring and mostly in terms of evaluation. The following table comments on several problems with the indicator system and presents the recommended solutions. (The criticism in the following table does not touch on the issue of Intervention Logic, i.e. whether Project objectives and expected results have been defined correctly, an issue that has been handled under the “Relevance” criterion).

Hierarchy Of Objectives	Key Indicators	Evaluator Comments
Impact (Overall Goal)	Impact Indicators	
Contribute to establishing a favourable environment for migrants who are willing to promote and pro-actively support the country's development in relevant domains of transition and socio-economic progress at all institutional and societal levels.	By 2015, BiH country migration policies are vertically aligned through a functional inter-institutional mechanism, inputs for the design of a new migration policy and mainstreaming of migration within ten local development strategies.	The main target is to establish a “favourable environment” for migrants to promote the country's development. Vertical alignment of policies with respect to M&D is only a means (a step) to achieving the target and cannot be used in order to measure attainment of the target. More appropriate indicators would be survey-based scores of migrant perceptions on “how favourable” the country environment is for: • return migration, • making investments, • knowhow transfer, • joint research and innovation, • and other fields where migrant support is sought after. Such survey-based indicators are known to be used in areas where there are no published data, or in areas where we refer to an “environment”. They are usually composite indicators, and consist of several components. These components are usually scored on a standard (1-10 or 1-100 scale) and

Hierarchy Of Objectives	Key Indicators	Evaluator Comments
		the composite indicator is the weighted aggregate of these components. Should the Project decide to use such an indicator, there should be a baseline measurement at the beginning on the next Project and a final measurement at the end of the Project attempting to show the progress that has been achieved.
Outcomes	Outcome/Result Indicators	
Outcome 1 Policies for an effective integration of migrants contributions to the country's development are outlined and mainstreamed into local development strategies of at least 10 LGs, visible projects have been designed (including relevant budget allocations) and are under implementation.	R1.1 By the end of 2013, migration policies mainstreamed into at least 10 integrated local development strategies adopted by respective Municipal Councils/Assemblies. R1.2 Successfully implemented at least 10 priority initiatives originating from local development strategies and tackling migration for development with focus on local employment creation, SME development and administrative services for migrants.	Indicator 1.1 is appropriately designed (specific and time-bound) Indicator 1.2 could be improved upon (it is not time-bound)
Outcome 2 Capacities of key actors at relevant governmental levels (mainly partner LGs, MHRR and members of the inter-institutional working group / WG M&D) on effective M&D mainstreaming are strengthened; cooperation with migrants and their organisations is being structured in municipal planning schemes.	R2.1 Inter-institutional mechanism for mainstreaming migration (WG M&D) comprising relevant state, entity and local government representatives and socio-economic partners established by the end of 2013. R2.2 Initial awareness and capacities for mainstreaming migration into development are created at relevant government levels and among socio-economic partners.	Outcome 2 consists of 2 parts: - capacity-building of key actors, and - structured LG cooperation with migrants and migrant organisations Indicator 2.1 only covers one of the key actors for which capacity-building is envisaged and hence the necessity to complement it by indicator 2.1. Still, this leaves the second part of this outcome not depicted by any indicator. In addition, indicator 2.1 does not measure the capacity of the WG to mainstream M&D into policy but only the existence of the WG. Since the sought after result is the strengthening of capacity, a survey-

Hierarchy Of Objectives		Key Indicators	Evaluator Comments
			based indicator should have been used along the lines of the one suggested as an impact indicator above. Indicator 2.2 is very ambiguous: it does not define how “awareness”, and “capacity” are measured, neither does it name the “relevant government levels” and the “socio-economic partners” relevant to the Project. It is understandable that – since this is a pilot action – it was largely unknown, when the LogFrame matrix was drafted, who these stakeholders were going to be, but once it was determined at a later stage, the indicator should have been revised. Also, there should be a clear mechanism to measure awareness and capacity (e.g. through questionnaires targeting the participants).
Outcome 3 Key elements for the definition of a valuable M&D mainstreaming concept are identified, validated and integrated into complementary action plans of different key actors in BiH (governmental institutions, civil society organisations, associations of municipalities and cities / AMCs, private sector, migrants’ organisations).		R3.1 Inter-institutional mechanism / WG M&D prepares and disseminates country-wide guidelines and policy inputs for mainstreaming migration into development.	The indicator falls short of what is described by outcome 3, since it covers the “identification” and “validation” aspects of the M&D mainstreaming concept, but does not cover the “integration into action plans” aspect. Hence, a second indicator would be necessary in order to measure to what extent this M&D concept has been incorporated in strategies and action plans. In addition, the indicator is not time-bound.
Outputs (per outcome) and costs		Output Indicators	
Output 1	M&D elements visibly embedded into the integrated development planning schemes of 10	O1.1 Assessed and analyzed potentials and challenges in relation to migration within 10 partner local governments. O1.2 Migration for development priorities consulted with relevant socio-	There are actually two outputs described in the first column: - The first one refers to the M&D component within each one of the 10 LDSs, and - The second one to the establishment of concrete

Hierarchy Of Objectives		Key Indicators	Evaluator Comments
	selected LGs (partner municipalities of ILDP); the LG's effectively set priorities and regimes for the inclusion of migrants' contributions to local socio-economic development.	economic stakeholders in 10 partner local governments. O1.3 At least 10 public discussions in all 10 local communities on migration and development organized. O1.4 10 local development strategies including migration for development priorities adopted by respective Municipal Councils/Assemblies by the end of 2013. O1.5 Built capacities for migration and development of at least 10 focal points within partner local administrations. O1.6 At least 10 fully-fledged project proposals originating from adopted local development strategies and addressing migration for development prepared. O1.7 At least 300 citizens, both men and women, from 10 partner local governments are positively influenced by the implemented priority initiatives focusing on local employment creation, SME development and administrative services for migrants.	interventions which capitalise on migrant contributions (i.e. the LG projects) There are too many (4) indicators measuring the first output (the indicators actually correspond to the various stages of the planning process), one of which (indicator O1.4) is identical to R1.1, which of course raises the issue of how well outputs and expected results are described in the first place. If the sought-after output is the incorporation of M&D priorities in the 10 LG development strategies, then the only output indicator that should have been included is: <i>10 local development strategies drafted incorporating M&D-related priorities and measures</i>. (The issue of adoption by Municipal Councils is irrelevant to this indicator) The second output is measured by indicator O1.6. It is relatively well defined but not time-bound. Indicator O1.5 does not correspond to any described outputs, and indicator O1.7 is an attempt to quantify the qualitative aspects of the second output. However, since the focus of this output is on "<i>migrant contributions to development</i>" it would be more appropriate if the indicator measured e.g. leverage of financial and in-kind resources.
Output 2	Resources for supporting M&D based on relevant country policies are being provided and respective inter-institutional mechanisms are established ;	O2.1 By 2014, produced at least 2 policy recommendations/ guidelines on vertical mainstreaming of migration into development. O2.2 Provided assistance to the MHRR in formulation of future (2014-2020) strategic priorities in the area of migration and development. O2.3 Strengthened MHRR capacities for facilitating	This output actually consists of two parts: - resources for supporting M&D provided, and - inter-institutional mechanisms established. The third part described under the first column is actually not an output at all. Due to this inherent weakness, indicator O2.3 is very ambiguously defined and hence not

Hierarchy Of Objectives		Key Indicators	Evaluator Comments
	the mainstreaming of M&D in the vertical dimension is in progress.	cooperation with BiH Diaspora.	useful either for monitoring or evaluation purposes. Indicator O2.1 corresponds to the first part of the output and is clearly defined. Indicator O2.2 has no reference whatsoever to the second part of the output, since it accounts for technical assistance provided to MHRR and not to the establishment of inter-institutional mechanisms. But even if we accept this change in scope, the indicator is still very badly defined: how do we measure the technical assistance provided? Is TA the expected output or specific elements of the 2014-2020 MHRR strategy?
Output 3	The inter-institutional working group (WG M&D) for coordinating the M&D mainstreaming process and for enhancing focused cooperation between key stakeholders is set up and is functioning.	O3.1 At least 5 meetings of the inter-institutional mechanism for mainstreaming migration into development. O3.2 At least 3 trainings for inter-institutional mechanism on mainstreaming migration into development. O3.3 A study visit to expand institutional stakeholders' understanding of migration for development organised.	The expected output as described under the first column is almost identical to R2.1. Apart from the establishment of the WG (which is measured by R2.1), the expected output 3 also concentrates on the "functioning" aspect, i.e. on the outputs of the capacity-building actions targeting the WG and on the procedures of the WG itself. In that sense, the three indicators selected are appropriate and well defined.
Output 4	A national M&D "policy road map" is defined and under implementation; a first conceptual frame for M&D in BiH is outlined.	O4.1 By 2015, agreed Road Map with recommendations related to the creation of a more coherent policy framework, as well as vertical mainstreaming of migration to the local level; O4.2 Established connections of exchange and learning with national and regional M&D networks.	The actual outputs as described under the first column are: - The roadmap, and - A conceptual framework of what M&D should be for BiH Therefore, O4.1 should actually measure the roadmap (all else in the definition of the indicator is redundant) and indicator O4.2 should measure whether there is 1 clear M&D concept defined for BiH policy. The current O4.2 bears no relation whatsoever with the expected outputs as described in column 1.

Hierarchy Of Objectives		Key Indicators	Evaluator Comments
Output 5	The awareness and the knowledge about M&D potentials for BiH's development are increased among the public and the key project partners.	O5.1 Manual on mainstreaming migration into local development planning and implementation cycle (including steps, challenges, success stories, tools, vertical integration, etc.) as a knowledge tool is produced and widely disseminated among all institutional stakeholders. O5.2 By 2015, one round table and one academic research workshop organized on migration and development, where at least 100 representatives of governmental, non-governmental and academic stakeholders take part. O5.3 By 2014 multimedia video-clip produced and aired by at least one state/entity broadcaster. O5.4 By 2014, at least 5 TV/radio appearances promoting potentials of migration for development. O5.5 Up to 3 success/awareness-raising stories identified in relation to migration potentials for development and widely broadcasted. O5.6 At least 2 thematic/promotional publications. O5.7 At least one national event to promote good practices and lessons learned from mainstreaming migration for development at the local level.	Output 5 is actually not an output but a result (see relevance evaluation). The real expected outputs are the awareness raising activities and materials to be produced by the Project. As such, indicators O5.1 – O5.7 are appropriately defined.

Nevertheless, in order to establish Project effectiveness one needs to examine whether the quantitative targets set for the above indicators have been attained or not.

Attainment of output indicators

As it is evident from the following table most output indicator values were either attained by the Project – by the time this evaluation was conducted – or well on their way to attainment. Only on 2 occasions the evaluation could not document attainment of outputs.

Output Indicators / set targets	Attained Values	
Project Horizontal Component		
O1.1 Assessed and analyzed potentials and challenges in relation to migration within 10 partner local governments.	Socio-economic analyses were performed for 10 local development strategies including aspects relevant to migration potentials and challenges.	YES
O1.2 Migration for development priorities consulted with relevant socio-economic stakeholders in 10 partner local governments.	Consultations on M&D priorities were carried out in 10 partner local governments. Diaspora representatives participated.	YES
O1.3 At least 10 public discussions in all 10 local communities on migration and development organized.	Public discussion on M&D was not organised in the form of distinct events; the only public consultation procedure followed was the one foreseen for Local Development Strategies before their approval by Municipal Councils/Assemblies and through the composition of the Local Development Councils (LDC). Even though the members of LDCs were exposed to M&D concepts, there is no information regarding how much of the public discussion (through the public consultation process) revolved around M&D matters.	NO
O1.4 10 local development strategies including migration for development priorities adopted by respective Municipal Councils/Assemblies by the end of 2013.	Nine local development strategies (Jajce, Ključ, Laktaši, Ljubuški, Nevesinje, Posušje, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Velika Kladuša) including M&D priorities were adopted by respective Municipal/City Councils/Assemblies. The Local Development Strategy of Maglaj Municipality was adopted prior to Project start, thus M&D-related inputs were included in the implementation plan for the period 2014 – 2016.	YES
O1.5 Built capacities for migration and development of at least 10 focal points within partner local administrations.	Focal Points /Coordinators for Emigration were introduced in 10 partner LGs, and their capacities were enhanced through the provision of TA for the development of the local development strategies, a two-day M&D training, ten practical work sessions focusing on the design of projects, a joint two-day workshop on preparation of logical framework and budget, 4 workshops on roles and responsibilities of Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigration, collection and update of emigration data, communication with diaspora, role of NGOs and role of private sector in M&D plus 1 training on effective communication between LGs and diaspora.	YES
O1.6 At least 10 fully-fledged project proposals originating from adopted local development strategies and addressing	Based on the adopted local development strategies, 10 priority LG interventions were identified and developed into project proposals, but because of the floods Maglaj Municipality abandoned their original project idea and requested support for an unrelated project (recovery of the local Health Care Centre). Thanks to savings	YES

migration for development prepared.	realized by the depreciation of the euro versus USD in 2015, additional 4 LG projects were made possible.	
O1.7 At least 300 citizens, both men and women, from 10 partner local governments are positively influenced by the implemented priority initiatives focusing on local employment creation, SME development and administrative services for migrants.	The first 11 LG projects – relevant to M&D – that were implemented contributed to: the creation of 30 jobs, and enhanced income streams for 345 agricultural households. This corresponds to at least 345 employment positions and perhaps more, if we account for family members that usually help in agricultural activities. Another 4 projects from the second round are expected to contribute to the creation of additional 12 jobs, and enhanced income streams through agriculture for another 85 households LG institutional capacities for cooperation with diaspora were enhanced, via diaspora registries, diaspora-related sub-domains on official websites, design of relevant information materials targeting diaspora, promotion of cooperation initiatives with diaspora through media, etc. The establishment of LG Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigration was an important institutional innovation.	YES
Vertical component		
O2.1 By 2014, produced at least 2 policy recommendations/guidelines on vertical mainstreaming of migration into development.	Two policy briefs were prepared: - A background paper on mainstreaming migration into development strategies in BiH, looking into key concepts and international experiences, and - Situation analyses in the economic and social development sectors exploring the emigration potential as well as relevant legal, institutional and policy frameworks for effective mainstreaming of migration into development in BiH.	YES
O2.2 Provided assistance to the MHRR in formulation of future (2014-2020) strategic priorities in the area of migration and development.	Tailored technical support was offered to the MHRR and specifically to its Sector for Emigration in the process of design, management and evaluation of a public grant scheme in the area of migration for development. The MHRR has not requested support for the formulation of future strategic priorities related to migration and development.	NO
O2.3 Strengthened MHRR capacities for facilitating cooperation with BiH Diaspora.	Instead of technical assistance to support cooperation with BiH Diaspora, the MHRR requested a second round table with Diaspora representatives. The roundtable Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH was organised in 2015.	NO
O3.1 At least 5 meetings of the inter-institutional mechanism for mainstreaming migration into development.	During the period from March 2014 to June 2015, the M&D WG had 4 meetings. M&D WG feedback on the Draft <i>Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of M&D into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH</i> was done via written procedure. For all practical purposes it can be counted as a meeting.	YES
O3.2 At least 3 trainings for inter-institutional mechanism on mainstreaming migration into	One training on M&D (1.5 day) was organised closely linked to the M&D WG meetings. The M&D WG members were also introduced to some basics of the public policy-making cycle as part of the second meeting.	NO

development.		
O3.3 A study visit to expand institutional stakeholders' understanding of migration for development organised.	A study visit to Ireland took place in September, 2015.	YES
O4.1 By 2015, agreed Road Map with recommendations related to the creation of a more coherent policy framework, as well as vertical mainstreaming of migration to the local level;	Even though a draft paper for the development of a roadmap was initially designed, the roadmap idea was eventually abandoned. The <i>Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of M&D into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH</i> document prepared by the M&D WG actually replaced the roadmap. Given the pilot nature of the Project and the institutional complexities in BiH, this seems to be a more pragmatic solution. The document is expected to be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of 2015 for adoption.	YES
O4.2 Established connections of exchange and learning with national and regional M&D networks.	Even though Project progress reports mention that linkages were established with relevant global as well as BiH initiatives in relation to relevant project activities, it was not possible to verify this during the course of the evaluation.	Inconclusive
Support actions		
O5.1 Manual on mainstreaming migration into local development planning and implementation cycle (including steps, challenges, success stories, tools, vertical integration, etc.) as a knowledge tool is produced and widely disseminated among all institutional stakeholders.	It appears that an expert has been engaged for the drafting of the manual. No manual has been produced yet.	NO (by the time of the evaluation)
O5.2 By 2015, one round table and one academic research workshop organized on migration and development, where at least 100 representatives of governmental, non-governmental and academic stakeholders take part.	One round table "Migration and Development" with Diaspora representation and one academic research workshop were organised in 2014. The total number of participants was 123 (57 participants for the roundtable and 66 participants for the academic workshop). In addition the roundtable "Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH" was organised in 2015 and attended by approximately 90 successful female entrepreneurs from diaspora (Austria, France, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and USA)	YES
O5.3 By 2014 multimedia video-clip produced and aired by	1 multimedia video-clip has been aired by the Una-Sana Canton TV station.	YES

at least one state/entity broadcaster.		
O5.4 By 2014, at least 5 TV/radio appearances promoting potentials of migration for development.	There were over 20 appearances in local media in partner LGs, focusing on promoting potentials of migration for development.	YES
O5.5 Up to 3 success/awareness-raising stories identified in relation to migration potentials for development and widely broadcasted.	12 success/awareness-raising stories were identified and published. During the course of the evaluation it was not possible to document how widely this publication was disseminated.	YES/ inconclusive
O5.6 At least 2 thematic/promotional publications.	The Project has produced 4 thematic publications: Emigration and Development of BiH – Best Practices; Almanac of research Papers – Migration in Function of Development; leaflet on migration and development and the role of MHRR; 2 infographics for BiH diaspora and the M&D Project. Three of the publications can be considered “promotional” Material. The Almanac of Research Papers: is too specialized to be considered “promotional”. The Project is also preparing 2 more publications: a manual on mainstreaming M&D into local development planning, and an overview of success stories based on the implementation of LG projects.	YES
O5.7 At least one national event to promote good practices and lessons learned from mainstreaming migration for development at the local level.	A closing Project workshop is scheduled for November 2015.	NO (by the time of the evaluation)

Attainment of Result Indicators

Outcome/Result Indicators	Attained Values	
Project Horizontal Component		
R1.1 By the end of 2013, migration policies mainstreamed into at least 10 integrated local development strategies adopted by respective Municipal Councils/Assemblies.	Result indicator R1.1 has been attained – for all practical purposes – as M&D components have been incorporated in the nine Local Development Strategies adopted by the respective Municipal Councils of Jajce, Ključ, Laktaši, Ljubuški, Nevesinje, Posušje, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Velika Kladuša and M&D components have been incorporated in the already approved prior to the start of the Project Maglaj Municipality LDS (action plan for 2014-2016).	YES
R1.2 Successfully implemented at least 10 priority initiatives	Also result indicator R1.2 has been attained, as 14 LG projects stemming from the LDSs (M&D component) in	

originating from local development strategies and tackling migration for development with focus on local employment creation, SME development and administrative services for migrants.	nine Municipalities were approved and financed by the Seed Fund of the Project. Most of these projects had either been successfully completed by the time this evaluation was conducted, or were under completion. There were no critical LG projects.	
Project Vertical Component		
R2.1 Inter-institutional mechanism for mainstreaming migration (WG M&D) comprising relevant state, entity and local government representatives and socio-economic partners established by the end of 2013. R2.2 Initial awareness and capacities for mainstreaming migration into development are created at relevant government levels and among socio-economic partners.	Result indicator R2.1 was attained – even though with a slight delay as to the target timeframe and the initial intended composition. The evidence from the evaluation is mixed concerning result indicator R2.2. It appears that both awareness and capacity to mainstream M&D into development policies has been considerably increased for all the stakeholders who participated in the horizontal component (i.e. partner LGs), but there is no evidence whether this also applies to socio-economic partners involved in local planning processes as the public discussion activities planned at the 10 participating LGs did not materialize due to the tight timeframes for the approval of the LDSs. Also, the level of awareness seems to vary from LG to LG: for some municipalities M&D is almost synonymous to tapping into remittance/savings resources as co-financing to local development initiatives and at the most soliciting some knowhow transfer in the form of practical skills training. Very few LGs have gone as far as tapping the potential of diaspora for trade and networks. Hence, there is more work to be done in the future in trying to expand these concepts of M&D at local level (both in terms of stakeholders involved and in terms of the types of interventions envisaged). At the WG level, it appears that there has been some awareness and capacity built, as manifested by the main product of this working group, which is the <i>Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of M&D into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH</i>. However, since this process was heavily supported by external experts, it is hard to establish the level of capacity built within WG M&D. Since representatives from state institutions were included in the WG, it is assumed that awareness and capacity built within the WG is also transferred – to some extent - to these institutions. However, this is a hypothesis that cannot be tested without the use of a systematic evaluation tool such as a survey. Hence the evidence collected during this evaluation is inconclusive and a more systematic assessment needs to be made in	PARTLY

	the future. It is recommended that – should this Project continue – a baseline survey is conducted at the beginning of the successor Project in order to document the level of awareness in the relevant institutions. There is no evidence whatsoever of any awareness or capacity built at entity level institutions as they only participated at some roundtables, while the process of mainstreaming M&D into cantonal strategies is again heavily supported by external experts and the evaluation cannot verify the level of awareness and capacity created at cantonal institution level. (Again, a survey would be needed in order to document this.) The absence of RS institutions from any such processes also creates an issue of geographically unbalanced awareness and capacity raising, even though this seems to be outside the control of the Project. The complex administration architecture has hindered to a high degree complete implementation of the vertical component, which was finally implemented in a fragmented manner. Should efforts continue – through a successor Project - to vertically integrate M&D concepts into development policies, the role of MHRR will become critical.	
R3.1 Inter-institutional mechanism / WG M&D prepares and disseminates country-wide guidelines and policy inputs for mainstreaming migration into development.	Indicator R3.1 has been attained to a significant extent as the <i>Guidelines/Recommendations for Mainstreaming the Concept of M&D into Design and Implementation of Public Policies in BiH</i> has already been prepared and is expected to go to the Council of Ministers for adoption within 2015. However, overall effectiveness will depend on if, how fast and how these Guidelines will be applied by all relevant institutions at state, entity, cantonal and local level. Since the Guidelines are not compulsory for any institution, incorporation of the M&D concept mainly depends on the level of awareness and sensitivity developed within each institution and on the level of political power of MHRR. Both of the above are largely affected by the visibility of M&D interventions and especially of their results.	PARTLY

Annex 4 – Concept Note

The present section was required by the evaluation ToR.

The vision

The next M&D Project should concentrate on specific M&D applications in order to increase visibility through the attainment and promotion of concrete results.

It should transform from a “project” to a “programme”: i.e. have a longer duration (4 years are recommended) and include recurring activities (such as regular calls for proposals). It should also include a regular monitoring and evaluation activity. The budget is recommended to increase to approximately USD 2.3 million.

First Programme Component – LG Projects

Scope and objectives

The first component should build on the experience gained by the 10 LGs during the pilot phase for planning and implementing M&D projects with an immediate local development impact, and push for more sophisticated approaches than the ones implemented during the pilot phase. The main objective is to achieve tangible development results that – if promoted appropriately – can create enough interest in M&D concepts that will speed up the mainstreaming of M&D concepts by other institutions.

Types of Actions

The actions to be included are:

- A project preparation facility (PPF): this facility will provide technical assistance – on an as needed basis - to LGs for the conceptualization of their new projects, for performing all necessary analyses and research, for assisting them in finding suitable partners, for designing the implementation methodology, etc. The project preparation facility will be a continuous activity extending throughout the entire duration of the new M&D Project. The purpose of the PPF is to help LGs prepare M&D projects of a higher quality. Projects prepared with the assistance of PPF will not automatically qualify for funding from this Project. They will have to apply through a competitive call. Participation in the project preparation facility will not be compulsory (except for new LGs; see comment below). The PPF should consist of a “pool of experts” who will provide their services on an as-needed basis. The experts will be pre-preselected on the basis of a specific ToR and will be given short-term assignments (based on their skills and availability), i.e. the PPF will function like a “framework contract”. Both physical persons (individuals) and legal persons (consultancies, organisations, institutes, BICs, etc) can be included in the PPF. Experience in development will be a prerequisite. Experience in M&D will be optional. All experts included in the “pool” will be provided a one-day training to familiarize them with the programme, the M&D concept, etc.
- LG projects to be implemented by the participating local governments. Compared to the projects funded by the pilot M&D Project, the new LG projects should be based more on mutual benefit for leveraging diaspora contributions and should try to tap into a wider spectrum of diaspora resources such as product placement and trade networks, transfer

of organizational, management and product innovations, apprenticeships and other forms of skills improvements, etc They should also try to motivate more complex business relationships like contract farming, vertical integration of production, etc.

Relevant stakeholders

Target groups/final recipients

From BiH: businesses and individual entrepreneurs, farmers, the unemployed, social enterprises, NGOs, business support structures (associations, business fora, business infrastructure facilities, etc)

From the diaspora: businesses and individual entrepreneurs, farmers, diaspora organizations, university and other training facilities, collective business structures (associations, business fora, etc)

Beneficiaries

The eligible beneficiaries should be the 10 local governments that already participated in the pilot phase. Considering the proposed increase in budget, up to 4 new LGs could be included (selected according to the same criteria), however, due to the fact that all calls will be competitive, they might find themselves at a disadvantage. Should project partners opt for increasing the number of beneficiaries, then it should be compulsory for the new beneficiaries to participate in the project preparation facility for at least the first year.

Implementation Modalities and Necessary Steps

This component should be run by one implementing partner/body (UNDP) and a Programme Steering Board. This is necessary for increasing transparency. UNDP, as the implementing partner, should set up a 2-person programme team (composed of a programme manager and a programme assistant) which will be responsible for:

- Drafting the calls for proposals and all accompanying material (application forms, instructions to applicants, implementation manual, project selection criteria and scoring sheets, etc); announcing the calls and answering questions to interested applicants during the call period; receiving applications, verifying eligibility and scoring;
- Suggesting to the Steering Board which projects should be selected, which ones should be rejected and which ones should remain on a reserve list for further development;
- Performing all contractual and financial management actions;
- Performing all required controls (including on-site inspections);
- Drafting annual progress reports and monitoring programme indicators;
- Drafting the ToR for the composition of the PPF, opening a call and selecting eligible applicants;
- Management of the PPF (i.e. assignment of short-term assignments to pool of experts) according to requests received from partner LGs;
- Performing all other tasks necessary for the proper management of the Component (e.g. provision of information, publicizing material on UNDP and other relevant websites, etc)

The Programme Steering Board should have not less than 3 members and not more than 7, it should meet at least once a year and otherwise as often as necessary. It will be responsible for:

- making the decision on the final selection of LG projects based on the suggestion by UNDP;
- monitoring the progress of Component activities on the basis of reports prepared by UNDP; and
- making decisions about changes in the timing, scope, budget allocations, etc of Component activities and on the necessity of including other actions such as e.g. conducting an impact assessment, etc.

Steering Board members should come from the Swiss Embassy, MHRR, UNDP (perhaps the Deputy Resident Representative), IOM, and representatives from relevant State institutions.

All new LG projects should be selected through 3 competitive calls in order to ensure that the best proposals are selected. The calls should be launched a) at the six month mark, b) at the 18 month mark, and c) at the 30 month mark from the beginning of the programme, and should have a one year implementation period. Calls should stay open for 3 months, and project selection should not last for more than one month. Project selection criteria and scoring methodologies should be included in the call. Project proposal scoring should be done by UNDP and final selection of projects by the Programme Steering Board.

Initial Budget Estimates

The total budget for the LG projects should be approximately USD 1,000,000 and the maximum budget for PPF USD 100,000 (any unallocated budget from PPF can be used for other activities during the last semester of the programme). Hence, the total budget for the first component should be at the maximum USD 1,100,000.

The average budget per LG project should be raised to USD 70,000 (55% M&D programme contribution, 15% LG contribution and 30% contribution from diaspora and other sources) with a maximum budget of USD 80,000 (budget ceiling). This would approximately allow for financing 25-26 LG projects over 3 years. The contribution from diaspora could also include in-kind transfers such as free training, transfer of patents, donations of machinery, etc. All in-kind transfers would have to be valued using an objective methodology.

Second Programme Component - Scientific Knowhow Transfer

Scope and objectives

The second component should capitalize on the significant scientific resources of BiH diaspora and promote the transfer of knowhow. It could be called “knowhow transfer” or “brain gain” or “circular migration” programme depending on the elements it will include. This component should aim at transferring to BiH knowhow that can be easily applied, i.e. used for the production of new goods and services, for the creation of new business activities in BiH, for the upgrade of existing goods and services, etc. This component presents potential complementarities with other SDC initiatives such as the Skills-for-Jobs (a VET reform project) and with the Youth Employment Project (to the extent it provides a link between market demand for skills and skills supply).

Possible types of Actions

Examples of the types of initiatives that can be included in this component are:

- short term adult education in sectors/objects where there is a need in the market (potentially sectors/disciplines that have experienced a huge “brain drain”) in order to increase skills for employees/professionals, should include “train-the-trainer” element to ensure sustainability e.g. 6 weeks course, via videoconference, or 4 weeks lecturing at local institutions;
- creation of “open university” where local academia side-by-side with diaspora academia will offer long-distance courses and degrees to BiH students of any age; preferably, the courses and degrees should be in areas where there is high demand by the market and short supply by the local educational system.
- academic diaspora -to-local business short-term training courses on technological, organizational, etc issues; best training participants could be awarded a “study visit” abroad to witness in person the application of taught objects
- joint research between BiH scientists and diaspora scientists (the research to be funded would have to be applied or at a stage where it could easily lead to commercialization); this activity could be complemented with other types of support aiming at the creation of spin-off companies based on the research results (such as venture capital, management support, etc);
- creation of one or more sectoral “centers of excellence” with participation of BiH diaspora; the centers should at the minimum provide: support/expertise to the sector/business line, guidance, i.e. standards, methodologies, tools and knowledge, shared learning, i.e. training and certifications, skill assessments, etc., and governance, i.e. allocating resources (money, people, etc.) to most valuable projects and creating economies of scale.
- facilitating testing and application in BiH of innovations stemming from research conducted by diaspora (e.g. in medicine, pedagogy, consumer products, etc)
- creation of an “international human resources placement center” which would primarily work at: a) recruiting members of the diaspora for staffing permanent positions in BiH businesses or institutions, or for participating on short-term projects, b) recruiting BiH students at foreign higher education institutes for staffing positions in BiH businesses, institutions, etc, and c) would facilitate the temporary assignment of BiH individuals (preferably either already employed individuals which need to obtain specialized knowhow, or highly educated and/or to-be-entrepreneurs currently without employment) at businesses, institutions, etc abroad in order to gain experience (e.g. internships, etc) or at foreign higher education institutes for specialized studies, with the obligation to return and accept employment in BiH for a min number of years (e.g. doctors who will staff health centers at remote areas, etc). The center could use IT technology (web listings, CVs on line, etc), newsletters, personal contacts, annual events, etc as tools for this “matching”.

A maximum of 2 schemes will be implemented by this component composed of one or more of the above indicative initiatives.

Relevant stakeholders

Beneficiaries

Implementation Modalities and Necessary Steps

This component should be run by one implementing partner (preferably by MHRR) and the Programme Steering Board. The following steps are necessary for implementing this component.

- **Focus Group:** a large focus group (it could be virtual) should be formed composed of two parts: a) the scientific and highly educated diaspora interested in providing knowhow, and b) local institutions that are interested in receiving knowhow (they could be Universities or other educational/training institutes, professional or industry associations, business support facilities, institutions of the public domain, individual businesses or entrepreneurs, etc). The size of this focus group could amount to several hundreds individuals/organizations. The purpose of establishing this focus group is to define the “niches” where knowhow transfer is both “feasible” (i.e. there is both a provider and a recipient) and “useful” (i.e. it is highly necessary, or expected to have a large added-value, etc). All participants will be asked to register and respond to a structured questionnaire (one for the knowhow providers, and one for the knowhow recipients) indicating the types of knowhow offered/needed, time availability, possible mode and frequency of transfer, etc. The data from both questionnaires will be analyzed to find the “common ground”, i.e. the sectors/disciplines/types of knowledge, which can meaningfully be transferred. This can be done entirely through an electronic platform. This electronic platform will also be useful for partner selection during the project preparation process (see below “calls for proposals”).
- **Expert Group:** from the members of the focus group, a short team should be formed which will be responsible for selecting – based on the information provided from the questionnaires – the types of initiatives (maximum 2) that can be implemented with the potential of producing results within the duration of the M&D programme. The expert group will be supported by MHRR and perhaps other external experts, if the group asks for information/analyses which are not readily available.
- **Best Practices International Conference:** in order to assist the expert group in making informed decisions, a “best practices” conference will be organized during the summer of 2016 (in order to ensure availability of academics). Representatives from other countries who have implemented such schemes from around the world will be invited to present how the schemes were implemented, what results they produced, and share with conference participants their “lessons learnt”.
- **Drafting of scheme descriptions** (activities, beneficiaries, implementation modality, timeframe, budget)
- **Set-up of an implementing mechanism:** MHRR should be the implementing partner for this component. However, as they do not possess all the necessary implementation capacity, there should be a mentoring activity from UNDP to MHRR to assist them in setting up the appropriate structures and procedures. This activity should run parallel to the implementation of the 2 schemes.
- **Implementation of 2 schemes:** 2 different competitive calls for project proposals should be launched, one for each scheme to be implemented. For each project at least one participant from the diaspora and one participant from BiH will be required. Project proposals will need to detail all activities, expected results, timeframe and budget. MHRR

will evaluate all proposals received and make the initial selection. The Steering Board will make the final selection decision.

- Final conference: during the summer of 2019 a closing conference announcing the results of this component will be organized. A selection of the most interesting projects will be presented. Representatives from relevant Public Institutions (at state, entity, canton, or other level) will be invited to attend.

Initial Budget Estimate

The total budget for this component should be approximately USD 700,000. Out of this budget, USD 600,000 should be directed to the 2 schemes to be financed. The budget size of each scheme will have to be proportionate to the unit cost of the activities foreseen and the rough estimate of initial interest expressed (from the focus group).

Third Programme Component – MHRR strengthening

Scope and objectives

The third component aims at increasing MHRR capacity in monitoring M&D activities in the country (documenting them, following their survival, analyzing their impacts thematically and geographically, etc), in promoting the added-value of M&D activities in order to attract interest, increase awareness about M&D and increase the visibility of MHRR as a key institution in the process of mainstreaming M&D into policies. All these are prerequisites, if MHRR is to play a key role in the process of mainstreaming M&D as per the “Guidelines” document which may soon be adopted by the Ministerial Council.

Types of Actions

Two main types of actions are suggested: creating M&D monitoring activity at MHRR, and coordination of M&D mainstreaming

- Establishing M&D monitoring capacity involves the creation of appropriate tools, and the undertaking of monitoring and evaluation activities. As such, this action contains the following activities:
 - Design of a database to include information on all M&D activities in the country (whether stimulated by this programme or not). The purpose of this database is to provide – at any given time – updated information about the number and incidence of such activities, their characteristics, their sustainability and their results and impacts. It is meant as an “inventory” of migration’s contribution to local development. There are many difficulties in ensuring exhaustiveness (i.e. coverage of all possible activities) and objectivity (i.e. collection of the data following rigid statistical methods) of the database, but this is not essential as it is not meant for undertaking statistical analyses, but provide the “population basis” for conducting such analyses in the field. As such, this database could start with a small number of such activities (e.g. investments, humanitarian aid and philanthropy from members of the diaspora, activities undertaken by diaspora organizations, etc, i.e. the better known activities at national or local level which can easily be recorded through a survey) and become enriched in the future (e.g. snowballing methods could be used).
- Developing monitoring capacity mainly means to conduct a series of evaluations and impact assessments which will document the effectiveness, impact and added-value of M&D interventions compared to other development interventions in the country. At least

four such studies are suggested, but MHRR may decide to also conduct thematic or special purpose evaluations/assessments as well. These studies include:

- The mid-term and final evaluation of the new programme. They are necessary in order to both monitor and assess the programme's progress and provide information on whether "retargeting" or other changes in the design of the programme are needed, but also in order to document the programme's achievements. This is an important piece of information that needs to be widely and actively promoted.
 - Impact assessments of the LG projects from both the pilot Project and the new programme. As impacts take time in order to manifest, it is usually recommended that impact assessments are conducted 1-2 years after the end of the intervention. Impact assessment will not only provide information on side-effects and unintended impacts but a measurement of the influence of the projects on variables of interest like unemployment, quality of life, etc. They can use either cross-sectional methods or time-series methods ("before" and "after" the intervention).
 - Finally, it is important to widely disseminate the results. Publicizing the studies or key figures from the database on MHRR website or by printing relevant publications is not sufficient. High visibility events are also required that can attract the attention national media. Such an event can be the closing conference of the programme. The closing conference should not only "showcase" the most interesting interventions but also promote the results as documented by the evaluations and the impact assessment studies. It is also recommended to provide an "international" note to this event by inviting a "key-note" speaker from some other country known for its experience in M&D approaches.
- The role MHRR is going to play in the M&D mainstreaming process is not clearly defined by the "Guidelines" document. The most likely role is to provide a monitoring mechanism which will track the progress made in the country in mainstreaming the concept of M&D into policy. Of course, this does not mean to measure how many strategies and action plans include M&D interventions, but to measure "which M&D concepts" are incorporated, how well they are transformed into action, the level of "awareness and commitment" of the institution to M&D approaches, etc. For that purpose, MHRR needs to conduct at least two assessments: one to establish the baseline conditions at the beginning of the new programme, and one towards the end in order to measure the distance covered.

Relevant stakeholders

The target groups of these activities are:

- Any and all (individuals, businesses, organizations) involved in M&D activities for the database
- Final recipients of LG projects for the evaluation and impact assessment studies
- All government institutions for the M&D coordination action


Implementation Modalities

This component should be run by MHRR.

Initial Budget Estimates

The total budget for this component should be approximately USD 115,000 (approximately 75% of this amount to be spent on baseline studies, evaluations and assessments).

Programme Gantt Chart (steps and timeframe)



Indicative Programme Budget

Component/Activity	Total Budget in USD
Component 1	1,100,000
PPF (design and maintenance of electronic databank of pool of experts, expert fees)	100,000
LG projects (seed fund)	1,000,000
Component 2	700,000
Focus Group (electronic platform, questionnaires, analysis of results)	20,000
Expert Group (cost of meetings, T.A experts fees)	10,000
Best Practices Conference (organization of conference, travel cost for guest speakers)	20,000
Drafting of schemes (T.A. expert fees)	10,000
Knowhow transfer projects (scheme fund)	600,000
Mentoring (cost of 1/3 time of one senior expert for 36 months)	40,000
Component 3	115,000
Database of M&D initiatives	15,000
Midterm evaluation	10,000
Impact assessment of pilot	20,000
Final evaluation	15,000
Impact assessment (1st & 2nd round) LG projects	20,000
M&D baseline awareness assessment	10,000
M&D final awareness assessment	10,000
Closing conference	10,000
Monitoring & coordination activities (meetings, materials, etc)	5,000
Project Management	319,600
Project Manager	120,000
Project Assistant	86,400
Overhead (i.e. facilities, travel, etc)	103,200
Consumables, publications, banners, etc	10,000
Subtotal	2,234,600
GMS (8%)⁵³	178,768
Total	2,413,368

⁵³ The amount of GMS depends on which part of the budget actually is handled by UNDP. If it is decided by project partners that only Component 1 goes through UNDP books, then GMS is 88,000 USD.

Initial Risk Assessment

Even though most interviewed LGs indicated that they were successful at establishing trust between them and this local diaspora, the fact that diaspora registries still have only a few number of registrations shows that there is still some scepticism towards BiH government. This lack of trust may hinder LG projects to develop their full potential (i.e. diaspora may hesitate to invest in BiH in more substantial ways).

Another risk that may hinder second component activities may be the lack of cooperation from local academia – if activities that involve them are included and they end up feeling threatened in any way.

Limited MHRR experience in implementation is also a potential risk but it is easily mitigated.

Annex 5: Comments Received on the Draft Evaluation Report

No	Commentator	Comment	Evaluation text of reference	Action taken
1	UNDP	And MHRR and Embassy of Switzerland?	Disclaimer	“or MHRR or the Embassy of Switzerland” added
2	UNDP	We would suggest not to refer to the 1992-1995 war as civil.	Programme Background	Word “civil” deleted.
3	UNDP	Although we refer to this outcome as “horizontal” within the evaluation report, in general it also carries elements of vertical integration – i.e. the purpose of this outcome was also to ensure priorities and migration for development policy framework existing at state level (in the Strategy and its Action Plan) are transferred down to the local level policy framework (strategies), budgeted for and implemented, thus practically contributing to the implementation of the state-level sector/specific strategic framework.	Programme Background / Project Outcomes	Footnote 7 was added: “Although we refer to this outcome as “horizontal” within the evaluation report, it also carries elements of vertical integration – i.e. ensure M&D priorities at state level are transferred down to the local level”
4	UNDP	Rather Diaspora, not all migration issues. Or emigration.	Programme Background / Strand 2	Word “migration” replaced by “diaspora”
5	MHRR	MHRR, which initiated this project – i.e. submitted its draft for funding to the Government of Switzerland within the Bilateral agreement on migration between BiH and CH, signed by the two governments concerned in 2009	Programme Background	Added: “MHRR, which initiated this project – i.e. submitted its draft for funding to the Government of Switzerland within the Bilateral agreement on migration between BiH and CH, provides in-kind contributions such as coordination activities”.
6	UNDP	We can refer to the intervention as “Project”	Title: Programme current stage of implementation –	“Programme” replaced by “Project”

			Main milestones	
7	UNDP	The selection process was conducted based on the reviewing the partner local governments already taking part in the ILDP (40) and selection of those 10 with highest level of diaspora.	Main milestones / Adoption of draft Local Development Strategies	Text revised to reflect process accurately.
8	SDC	ILDP offered an adequate platform to pilot the M&D approach in practice (in selected partner municipalities) during a first phase of two years		
9	UNDP	The Local Development Strategy of Maglaj Municipality was already adopted in 2012, thus migration and development-related inputs were included in the implementation plan for the period 2014 – 2016, while this aspect remain to be addressed in the upcoming revision of the Strategy.	Main milestones / Adoption of draft Local Development Strategies	Footnote 9: Migration and development-related inputs were however included in the implementation plan for the period 2014 – 2016.
10	UNDP	Please revise, originally the WG included also representatives of FBiH Entity institutions as well as LGs from both entities and entity Associations of Municipalities and Cities. Below is the clarification. The Working Group was originally established at its first meeting in March 2014. The meeting brought together 22 participants (10 female and 12 male), including representatives of state and FBiH level institutions, partner local governments from both entities, entity AMCs, IOM, the Embassy of Switzerland and UNDP. Despite efforts made, commitment and readiness on behalf of the RS Entity representatives to engage in the inter-institutional consultations remained unconfirmed by the end of 2014. Thus, the policy the concept note on policy consultations process was revised in February 2015 and it was decided that the BiH MHRR, namely its Sector for Emigration, would continue with the already initiated consultations, focusing only on the relevant state level institutions and including adequate expert support. In April 2015, the Working Group continued its work in a reconstructed format, bringing	Main milestones / Establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Migration & Development	Text revised to show clearly that originally representatives from entities and LGs were included. Also, footnote 4: The first WG meeting – in March 2014 - brought together 22 participants, including representatives of state and FBiH level institutions, partner local governments from both entities, entity AMCs, IOM, the Embassy of Switzerland and UNDP. Despite efforts made, no RS Entity representatives participated.

		together 10 representatives from state level ministries and institutions, as well as representatives of IOM, Embassy of Switzerland and UNDP.		
11	UNDP	Pls adjust, as entity-level institutions were invited but the RS Entity representatives have decided not to participate. Below is an excerpt from the progress report. [.....]	Main milestones / Establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Migration & Development	Text revised
12	UNDP	By the Project Board as well, including also the MHRR.	Main milestones / Approval of 10 LG projects	Text revised
13	UNDP	Unplanned/additional activity	Main milestones / Drafting of Cantonal Development Strategies	Added
14	UNDP	Same as above, but it adds value to the vertical dimension	Main milestones / Training for Cantonal Governments	Added
15	MHRR	Add that MHRR identified and invited the participants, and that this was a continuation of the specific activity which MHRR started on its own, and SDC co-funded, back in 2011 – before this project started.	Main milestones / Migration and Development Research Workshop	Text revised to show MHRR involvement.
16	MHRR	Add that a large part of the activities related to the workshop was carried out by MHRR	Main milestones / Workshops for LG Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigrants	Added.
17	MHRR	Add that MHRR identified and invited participants of the Roundtable on Female Entrepreneurship, and that this event was a MHRR initiative	Main milestones / Round table “Women Entrepreneurship in Diaspora and BiH”	Text revised to show MHRR involvement.
18	UNDP	It might be interesting to have a section within the report, which captures feedback from diaspora. Also, some reflections in terms of gender equality, where	Evaluation According to DAC Criteria	Even though there were some interviews conducted with members of the diaspora, the

		relevant. Partnerships and synergies dimension is also interesting looking into (both with other projects in the country, as well as regionally), or potentials in this area for future consideration.		approach lack any scientific rigidity and we cannot include a section called “Feedback from Diaspora”. Such an assessment would require a survey, which was not part of this evaluation. Sections on Gender Equality and on Synergy/Complementarity were added.
19	MHRR	It should be added that in late 2014 and early 2015, after the General Elections in BiH, the state-level authorities were replaced, and that in June 2015, finally, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between EU and BiH came into effect, after a protracted political deadlock of all development-related processes in the country	External Relevance / Socio-Economic and Institutional Environment	Text addition & footnote 14: “Even though there is no reliable data, a very significant number of workers is believed to work in the grey economy. In that framework, unemployment figures should be taken with caution”.
20	MHRR	Add that the number of workers working in the so-called “grey area” (i.e. effectively working in grey economy but not-registered as officially employed) is highest in Europe, so that the mentioned official unemployment figures should be taken with a reserve. Add that the process of reform of labour legislation has been started successfully by adoption of the Labour Law in FBiH in mid-2015.		
21	MHRR	Add that the educational system in BiH is fragmented and that there are 14 ministries of education at various administrative levels. It is cantons, entities and the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are directly in charge of the field of education and of its funding from public funds they manage.	External Relevance / Socio-Economic and Institutional Environment	Footnote 15: “The educational system in BiH is very fragmented. There are 14 “ministries” of education at various administrative levels. It is the cantons, the entities and the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are directly in charge over education content and funding.”
22	MHRR	In the course of 2015 this has been set out in latest reform documents (e.g. the Reform Agenda, Mid-term Development	External Relevance / Socio-Economic and	Added to the text.

		Objectives of the Council of Ministers of BiH, etc.), whereas the EU concluded that a protracted political deadlock, which used to last for years, in the process of BiH accession to the EU got unblocked.	Institutional Environment	
23	MHRR	Add that for years now the volume of remittances inflow to BiH amounted to between 10 and 15% of BiH's GDP.	External Relevance / Socio-Economic and Institutional Environment	Footnote 17: "For many years the volume of remittance inflow to BiH amounted to between 10% and 15% of BiH's GDP, and was manifold higher than the sum of Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Assistance"
24	MHRR	Add that the volume of remittances has been manifold higher for years now than the sum of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the Official Development Assistance (OSA) received by BiH		
25	MHRR	This was not the first attempt to include in a systemic way the concept of M&D in relevant processes and programmes in BiH. Namely, the first successful attempt in this regard, with a more long-term effects, was the Strategy of Migration and Asylum of BiH 2012-2015, which was adopted. One of the eight objectives of this Strategy refers to linking migration with development, and MHRR did this on its own. It was based on this strategy that the present project was made.	Internal Relevance	Footnote 22: "This was not the first attempt ever to include in a systemic way the concept of M&D in in BiH. The first successful attempt was the Strategy of Migration and Asylum of BiH 2012-2015. This Project was the first systematic effort aimed at various levels of government simultaneously."
26	UNDP	Second of the previously mentioned?	Effectiveness / Overall Assessment	Text revised to make references clearer.
27	UNDP	A bit unclear?		
28	UNDP	First of the previously mentioned (related to ownership)?		
29	MHRR	Reformulate this given that, as it stands now, it may seem to someone that MHRR know it, whereas it does indeed. So: MHRR should persuade other internal and external stakeholders that...	Effectiveness / Overall Assessment	Text revised.
30	UNDP	This was mainly due to the late project approval and start, as in most cases the planning processes were well under way with strategies close to be completed.	Effectiveness / Assessment as per Project Indicators / Attainment of output	The evaluation simply states the attainment/non-attainment of the indicator. No text revision

			indicators / O1.3	necessary.
31	UNDP	Not sure what these are? Local Development Teams and Partnership Groups are the core planning bodies at the local level.	Effectiveness / Assessment as per Project Indicators / Attainment of output indicators / O1.3 / reference to LDCs	LGs interviewed referred to the main “body” where local stakeholders participate as a “Local Development Council”. If incorrect, please provide correct terminology.
32	UNDP	Please add: 4 workshops on roles and responsibilities of Focal Points / Coordinators for Emigration, collection and update of emigration data, communication with diaspora, role of NGOs and role of private sector in M&D plus 1 training on effective communication between LGs and diaspora.	Effectiveness / Assessment as per Project Indicators / Attainment of output indicators / O1.5	Text added
33	UNDP	Please correct, it is related to 11 LG projects from the first round. Another 4 projects from the second round are expected to contribute to the creation of additional 12 jobs, and enhanced income streams through agriculture for another 85 households	Effectiveness / Assessment as per Project Indicators / Attainment of output indicators / O1.5	Text revised
34	UNDP	?	Effectiveness / Assessment as per Project Indicators / Attainment of output indicators / O5.6	Typo corrected
35	UNDP	14 projects without taking into account Maglaj.	Effectiveness / Assessment as per Project Indicators / Attainment of output indicators / R1.2	Correction made
36	MHRR	Rather “ad hoc inclusion” instead of “exclusion of diaspora” because, for example, MHRR has included diaspora in consultations in the course of drafting of strategic documents	Effectiveness / Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards	Correction made

			reaching Project goals	
37	SDC	It confirms that strengthening capacities of different institutions is highly needed. If relevant institutions participate in the work of WG it is expected to get their answer what and how is possible in BiH environment	Effectiveness / Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards reaching Project goals (referring to "lack of operational character of "Guidelines" document")	No text revision necessary. To the evaluator, this finding does not necessarily mean that capacity strengthening is required in each Ministry where M&D concepts need to be adopted, but it means that a strong central coordinator is needed (e.g. MHRR) to enforce / stimulate the process.
38	MHRR	Both an official request to include a member of the scientific diaspora in the Council for Science of BiH, as well as an official request to include a representative of the Sector for Diaspora in the Working Group in charge of drafting a Revised Strategy for Development of Science in BiH were made by MHRR, after MHRR Sector for Diaspora received the relevant information from the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Both MHRR official requests concerned were approved by the Ministry of Civil Affairs then.	Effectiveness / Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards reaching Project goals (referring to the BiH Science Development Strategy)	Text added.
39	MHRR	But MHRR has distributed material and invited advice from diaspora representatives re scientific diaspora.		The necessity for MHRR action shows that the relevant institution has not fully embraced the importance of diaspora participation.
40	UNDP	Worth saying though that the project approval and start were delayed, thus these planning processes were well underway when mainstreaming was initiated.	Effectiveness / Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards reaching Project goals (referring to quality of M&D sections of LG Strategies)	Despite of the causes, the fact remains that M&D elements in LG strategies were not very well developed. Further work is needed in order to have more meaningful analyses in the future.

41	UNDP	if so, please explain what was naïve about it and give examples of how it could have been done in a more sophisticated manner, either here or under recommendations.	Effectiveness / Quality elements of outputs produced and their contribution towards reaching Project goals (referring to LG interventions)	Term “naïve” replaced. It is mentioned in the text that future project should not simply appeal to the emotional ties of diaspora with BiH. They should be based on “sound business propositions”.
42	UNDP	Could you pls clarify the calculation? Do you take into account the entire amount of mgmt., operational costs and staffing? It might give a wrong impression, so maybe to specify that this is an indicative amount covering team day, rather than person day? Plus including all costs, such as premises, rental and maintenance of equipment, fuel, DSAs, communications, overhead...	Efficiency / Financial Efficiency (referring to management unit cost)	Yes, all costs related to management are included, i.e. staff costs, operational costs and overhead costs. Should this be an outsourced activity, any private company would have included all these costs in their person-day fee. This is standard practice.
43	UNDP	Measured by what? This is a gross amount for three-people team.		For example, considering that the average wage in BiH is a lot lower than the avg wage in the EU.
44	SDC	The pilot phase required stronger engagement of staff. The future management size will depend on the project structure.	Efficiency / Financial Efficiency (referring to proposed size of management team for future Project)	Yes, this is partly true. In the future, many processes will already be established thus decreasing the management needs.
45	UNDP	Would argue against it, as the scope and intensity of local-level or horizontal component activities required one full time person to ensure effective oversight and smooth implementation, in particular having in mind geographically very dispersed partner local governments.		The current Project implemented 15 projects over a period of more or less 1 year. The future Project proposes the implementation of around 25 projects over a period of 3+ years. Also, many procedures are also in place. There is no need for 1 full-time person for the LG projects. The same person can handle other activities as well.

46	UNDP	Agreed, but at the time of project design, it was not as obvious that the RS entity representatives would not join the consultations organised at the state level. This was rather a later position taken by the RS Government not to take part in any consultations/WGs at the BiH level.	Efficiency / Time Efficiency	This is not entirely true. From the beginning of the Project several risks were identified, among which: a) complex, dysfunctional and multi-tier governance structure hampering communication and coordination of activities; b) prejudiced and hatred charged rhetoric; and c) identified stakeholders express no interest in participating. The problem is that the mitigation measures foreseen in the Project design were not always realistic.
47	SDC	Framing a consistent M&D approach (concept) for BiH in cooperation with a wide range of actors, under the lead of MHRR, and following standing policies, requires a step wise scheme over the coming years. Therefore it was planned to implement project in two phases; this in order to pilot and validate conceptual elements in practice during a first term, and to apply them in consistent follow up actions during the second term.		It appears that a 3-step approach is more realistic: a) the pilot Project, b) a follow-up Project building on MHRR capacity and M&D visibility, and c) a final step promulgating the M&D concept to other relevant stakeholders.
48	MHRR	Diaspora is a political issue on which there had been no consensus in the past, whereas the area of M&D is not such an issue, as confirmed by the strategic document adopted at the state level – i.e. the Strategy of Migration and Asylum, whose one of 8 objectives in total refers to M&D, as well as		The issue is not to simply adopt documents (strategies, action plans, etc) saying that M&D actions will be undertaken, but to agree on which ones are the M&D

		by a number of conclusions adopted by the Council of Ministers that define certain obligations for institutions in BiH in the area of M&D.		priorities for the country (e.g. is it brain-gain? Is it attraction of investments? Etc). As such choices affect the portfolio of specific Ministries, consensus is going to be very hard to achieve.
49	SDC	MHRR has been involved from the planning to implementation but there were no concrete requests; one of the reasons is that M&D is a fairly new approach in national and international cooperation; also without clear M&D concept it is difficult to diagnose real needs of the institutions.		MHRR was the initiator of the Project, and responsible to a large extent for Project design and should have known their needs.
50	UNDP	Maybe not the best example, as the LG study visit as a separate activity was cancelled due to the floods. Nevertheless, participants of two originally envisaged study visits were brought together in a joint study visit to Ireland.	Efficiency / Time Efficiency (referring to the 2 study visits)	Perhaps not. Example changed.
51	SDC	Decision has been taken to cancel visit to Switzerland also for another reason: within another CH project so called BiH Platform in Switzerland for coordination of activities of BiH Diaspora in Switzerland and communication with BiH is being established. We considered that a visit would be more useful after establishment of the Platform		
52	SDC	The main reason: ILDP offered an adequate platform to pilot the M&D approach in practice; it was a window of opportunity to start concrete pilot actions in selected partner municipalities of ILDP, testing M&D as part of local development strategies,	Efficiency / Organizational efficiency (referring to role of UNDP as the implementing agency)	Text revised
53	UNDP	Also supported by the Government of Switzerland		
54	UNDP	As well as optimisation of resources, specifically for the planning process in target localities		

55	SDC	The project was a joint proposal by MHRR and UNDP, thus this para should be given a bit a different turn: for this pilot project, no alternative implementer was discussed, and MHRR ownership was to a certain extent given from the beginning (even if – maybe - not exploited at its full potential).		
56	MHRR	This is not true. The project was initiated by MHRR. Draft project was prepared by MHRR and approved for funding as such by SDC within the agreement between the two countries on migration partnership. UNDP was included in the project later and there has never been discussion on an alternative implementing agency. On the occasion of signing of the contract on implementation between SCD and UNDP, MHRR was excluded and its role in the project was never defined, which we consider a major failing and omission. MHRR's position is that the project is its ownership, as pointed out throughout the entire implementation period. At all times one person from MHRR as a minimum was engaged in the implementation of the project concerned – not only in coordination activities. A number of activities were implemented to a large extent by MHRR itself (i.e. the Research Workshop, roundtables, 4 workshops for municipal coordinators, preparation of content of the promotional material, etc.	Efficiency / Organizational efficiency (referring to role of MHRR)	Text revised
57	UNDP	Could you please clarify what is meant by this? In terms of effectively taking an implementation function of a given project component? Or in what sense? The MHRR was greatly involved, from the project development to its implementation, including consultations over conceptualisation of activities, changes in the approach, 90% of TORs and related selection of experts, etc. Such an approach was adopted to effectively benefit from the MHRR M&D expertise on one hand, but also to contribute to their capacity strengthening, should they take over	Efficiency / Organizational efficiency (referring to lack of ownership by MHRR)	“Ownership” means having the ultimate responsibility for the results achieved by an intervention. If there was “ownership” by MHRR, first they would not claim that their role was never clearly defined (see comment 56), and second no-one would refer to their involvement as [an approach ... adopted to ... benefit from MHRR M&D

		implementation of similar interventions.		experience]. The institution that has “ownership” is the one that “provides direction and makes choices”, not one that “contributes”.
58	SDC	It is also Swiss approach to strengthen BiH Institutions; MHRR is principal partner of the project; In terms of future planning I would also be grateful for clarification what is it exactly.		Ownership is more “a state of mind”. It allows an institution to feel that the Project is theirs. In practical terms it means: d) Increased oversight; and e) Increased involvement in implementation. (see section on recommendations)
59	MHRR	BHdiaFOR is not an achievement of the unit of local self-governing unit of Prijedor. It is the achievement of the NGO “Naša perspektiva” (Our Perspective), members of BHdiaFOR Group, and of a number of numerous other stakeholders from BiH and diaspora. Prijedor was a host of one BHdiaFOR annual event, and another unit of local self-governance is a host each year (i.e. last year it was Sarajevo, this year it will be Banja Luka).	Impact	Footnote 32: BHdiaFOR was not created by Prijedor LG. It was created by NGO “Naša perspektiva” (Our Perspective), members of the BHdiaFOR Group, and of a number of numerous other stakeholders from BiH and diaspora. Prijedor was the host of one BHdiaFOR annual events. What is important here is the change in attitude: LGs now seek to be involved in events like this one.
60	MHRR	The volume of funding spent to strengthen the capacity should be taken into account here, too. Most was, by far, spent to strengthen the capacity at the local level whereas very little was spent at higher administrative level, MHRR included. We kindly ask for this to be pointed out	Sustainability	The greater sustainability potential conclusion at the LG level is based on 2 parameters: a) the sustainability of the results produced by the LG projects, and b) the degree of institutionalization of “M&D

				knowhow” received as part of their capacity-building. The volume of Project spending only marginally affects sustainability, as it is mostly determined by the qualitative and not the quantitative aspects of the assistance.
61	MHRR	And also building trust between MHRR and local governments	Added-value	This has not been indicated by the LGs that were interviewed.
62	UNDP	Measuring of change in perception about the M&D concept was not planned and would have required a separate M&E activity to be conducted. Activities conducted within the project were often identical to types of activities implemented as part of general support to local development. This is why final recipients would not be able to see the difference.	Visibility	We agree with the comment. It was added as footnote 38.
63	UNDP	It refers to project results in general	Visibility / Communication Strategy	OK. Footnote and text referring to LG project results deleted.
64	UNDP	This refers to “sub-messages further developed in order to suit each of the previously defined target audiences”, where entity governments, NGOs and Academia represent only two of five groups/audiences. These two are included as stakeholders that have interest in the issue or can/could influence furthering of the M&D concept.		
65	UNDP	Please see the clarification note above		
66	UNDP	ibid		
67	UNDP	Specific results were achieved at a later stage of the project and could have not been in the focus of communication activities before that stage.		
68	UNDP	Raising awareness and particularly increasing the appeal to invest are hardly irrelevant messages when aiming to		

		stimulate investments.		
69	UNDP	With regards to footnote 26, Promotion of the knowhow was done in two cases: publicizing success stories about migration related development (at the beginning of the project); and women entrepreneurship workshop. The latter attracted significant media interest, seen in number of news articles/reports and guest appearance on national news broadcaster.	Visibility / Communication Strategy	Text was added to footnote 41.
70	UNDP	These are communication tools, not strategies, and there are others that are not mentioned here but were implemented.	Visibility / Communication Strategy	We are referring to what is called by the Communication Strategy as “Key Communication Approaches”, not to the “tools”. The correction was made.
71	UNDP	ibid		
72	SDC	A final event to promote results will be organized next month	Visibility actions	Added as footnote 43.
73	UNDP	With regards to footnote 28 Taking into account total number of media outlets in country is misleading. There are 20-30 media that have significant audience, which are in focus of media monitoring done for the project. Therefore, the number should not be considered low as presented here. Also, it is misleading to do a monthly average of number of reports/articles and draw a conclusion that it is a low rate. Specific timing of PR and communications activities was following the dynamics of the project implementation.	Visibility actions	Comment accepted. Footnote deleted.
74	UNDP	Not the best example, as the MD contribution was used to provide for medical equipment and partially for the heating unit. There is a separate news on the UNDP website on the event organised to mark the MD and the Gov of Switzerland contribution, organised in Dec 2014, with the representatives from the Embassy, the Mayor and the Health Care Center	Visibility actions	It is a very good example. Good visibility means that every opportunity for exposure is capitalized on. Even though the article does refer to the ceremony

		Director: http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/12/01/dom-zdravlja-maglaj-dobio-neophodnu-medicinsku-opremu-zahvaljuju-i-finansijskoj-podrci-vicarske-vlade.html The EU contribution was used to reconstruct the entire building, therefore the plaque.		performed for “handing over” the building to Maglaj LG, the fact remains that it is published on the UNDP web-site and there is no mention what-so-ever of the contribution of the M&D Project. Nobody prevented UNDP from including a line about the M&D project contribution, just like nobody prevented the Project from requiring from LGs to clearly mark Project contributions (e.g. no greenhouse had any marking saying that it was financed by the Project, neither did any milking machine, nor Remus had any poster saying that they received financing for the training, etc.)
75	SDC	You already mentioned that this is a hard job, but constantly to train journalist sounds very optimistic.	Visibility actions	This is exactly the job of a publicity officer: to remind the press of what the Project is doing, how they need to refer to the Project partners, etc.
76	UNDP	This was not in the focus of the project, where it is specified what actions are to be undertaken regarding visibility. We can argue that training of journalists should have been envisaged when the project was designed.		
77	UNDP	This segment explains some of the communications challenges and perhaps could be mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.	Visibility	We think it is better to include it as a conclusion and not as an opening remark. It will also be included in the executive summary.
78	UNDP	Second component, communicating about the project results was possible at a later stage of the project, when results	Visibility	We agree with the comment.

		were achieved. Also, since results made impact at a micro-level, it was not possible or foreseen to create interest of media at national level.		
79	UNDP	Greater involvement and lead of domestic organizations are essential for success in communicating about the M&D concept and project potentials and results.	Visibility	It is the Project's responsibility to publicize Project results. Involvement of other organizations certainly helps but they cannot "lead". We disagree with the comment.
80	MHRR	Visibility of MHRR was not satisfactory – in the next project attention should be paid to visibility of MHRR	Visibility	The evaluation examines the visibility of the Project activities and Project results. It does not concentrate on visibility of the Project partners per se.
81	MHRR	We do not agree with the statement on ethnic tensions. It is rather about politicization and a politicized environment. Why was it not mentioned that people from local self-governance units from all parts of BiH participated and had excellent cooperation, without any "ethnic tensions" between them whatsoever.	Main Conclusions	Ethnic tensions and divisions are repeatedly pointed out by various international documents (such as the OSCE report on 2014 elections). It is not the assessment of the evaluator. Also, the fact that LGs from both entities participated is no proof that there are no ethnic tensions.
82	MHRR	Although UNDP has been strongly oriented towards development, it was noted that they were insufficiently familiar with the area of migration, so that a necessary link between migration and development was not achieved throughout the project.		It is the assessment of the evaluator that the project management team did not need to have "migration-related" expertise. Seeking such expertise for was a mistake that affected implementation time efficiency.
83	UNDP	In general, please note that these projects were not planned as economic interventions in the first place; rather – the		The fact remains that most LG activities were economic

		project envisaged financial resources to support legitimate priorities defined by local governments and their communities in the area of migration for development. Important observation could be that majority, if not all of the seed fund projects of local governments went in the economic development sector (as compared to, for example, cultural exchange and bonding with diaspora communities; soft exchange activities, etc.). That is also something to capture within the evaluation report.		development actions.
84	UNDP	From our viewpoint, attention can also be placed on the fact that for the first time the project assisted systemic mainstreaming of the notion of M&D into local strategies and importantly – within the annual implementation plans and the municipal budgets. Therefore, even if there is no project seed fund available, local governments still plan and budget for actions in this domain, as per specific local needs and potentials. Also, the same applies for the established focal points within local governments (institutional structure). These could be seen as the most important systemic change introduced from the local governance viewpoint, having in mind that in essence the intervention has been designed as a pilot project to support mainstreaming of M&D into local policy frameworks (structures, processes, strategies, budget).		This is pointed out when talking about “institutionalization” of capacity building in LGs.
85	MHRR	The project did not envisage either adequate or sufficient activities aimed at strengthening the capacity of MHRR, or of other institutions at higher administrative level		The evaluation pointed out that this was a design deficiency of the Project. MHRR as a co-designer also bears part of the responsibility for this.
86	MHRR	Add after “Programme visibility” and “Key stakeholder and owner of the project – MHRR”, whereas visibility of UNDP, SDC and local units of self-governance was a bit better		The purpose of the Visibility Assessment is to judge how successfully the Project was promoted; not the Project partners.
87	UNDP	And perhaps also analyse and learn from these success stories and design and apply adequate support measures,	Recommendations /	Perhaps.

		as well as facilitate adequate policy framework/assistance by other relevant institutions	Horizontal Component	
88	UNDP	Based on the initial efforts, we can also analyse results from the public grant scheme and consider matching of public (MHRR) resources, so as to sustain results and increase the funds.	Recommendations / Horizontal Component	This is a good idea.
89	UNDP	Recommended grant amount or number of projects to be supported?	Recommendations / Horizontal Component	See comment 100
90	MHRR	Instead of “should” and “needs to” and similar, it should be stated that “the evaluator suggests to MHRR to consider”, etc.	Recommendations / PPF	Text amended.
91	MHRR	MHRR strongly disagrees with this statement.	Recommendations / MHRR ownership (referring to statement about UNDP efficiency)	The statement is about efficiency. The evaluation has produced ample evidence that UNDP is an efficient implementor while there is little to no evidence regarding how efficient MHRR would be as an implementor. We stand behind the statement.
92	UNDP	This is the responsibility of the Ministry of Security, please correct.	Recommendations / MHRR ownership (referring to responsibility for migration and asylum policy)	After checking the Bosnian text of the Law, this text is deleted.
93	MHRR	MHRR initiated activities in the area of M&D in BiH, and in particular such activities that focused on linking diaspora with development. This is the subject area MHRR is in charge of (by law), and this is its strategic orientation. MHRR conceived the idea and initiated the M&D project concerned.		Comment accepted.
94	SDC	It was the case in the current project.	Recommendations / MHRR ownership (referring to MHRR involvement in planning)	Increased oversight does not only mean involvement in planning but also in activity design, monitoring and evaluation of results.
95	MHRR	MHRR fully agrees with this recommendation. We have	Recommendations / MHRR ownership	

		requested this all the time.	(referring to MHRR increased oversight)	
96	UNDP	Considering that the MHRR is not in charge of immigration and asylum policy, is this statement still valid?	Recommendations / MHRR ownership (referring to AMIF and MHRR implementation capacity)	MHRR does seem to have many responsibilities that are relevant for AMIF, such as: a) implementation of activities to meet obligations concerning the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms b) coordinating, directing and monitoring within the Commission for refugees and displaced persons, activities of entities and other institutions in BiH
97	MHRR	MHRR IS indeed in charge of emigration, which, in the case of BiH, stands for a major part of the migration (cycle). MHRR also shares its mandate on readmission with the Ministry of Security of BiH, so that there is an urgent need to build MHRR's capacity for implementation, as it has been pointed out by MHRR all the time		
98	MHRR	Set out that this part – drafting of the Concept Note on the next project phase was requested by TOR	Annex 3 / Concept Note	OK
99	UNDP	What is the purpose of competitive call if we are to offer PPF support? Knowing our LGs they will all opt for PPF to increase their chances. Then we can look at it as a competition among experts engaged and assigned to support LGs through PPF?	Concept Note / PPF	PPF assistance is provided in order to increase the quality of the proposals. Experts engaged in this activity will show LGs how to improve on their ideas. They will not generate their own project proposals, hence it will not be a competition among experts. Also, receiving assistance from PPF does not necessarily mean that the LG proposal will be approved by the M&D project, but it may be able to compete for financing from another source. Another use of PPF is to improve on a proposal

				that was rejected by a certain call.
100	UNDP	Average grant amount? Number of projects to be supported? Co-financing?	Concept Note / First Component	Avg 70,000 USD per LG project (max 80,000 USD) of which 55% will be the M&D Project contribution, i.e. 38,500 USD (1 million USD divided by 38,500 = 25.97 LG projects.)
101	SDC	CH has the same approach setting the steering board for entire project	Concept Note / Steering Boards	If it makes things simpler, the 2 steering boards can be merged in one. However, caution needs to be used in regards to the composition of the board: we need representatives who are not involved in the day-to-day management of the Project.
102	UNDP	As per UNDP standard practice, Project Boards are set up for the entire project, not its components. If this is a separate body to approve the selection and oversee only the implementation of local projects, then it should be clearly distinguished from a standard Steering or Project Board which brings together partners from beneficiary institutions, donors and implementation agency/ies. What would be the role of IOM in this set up? Usually it is a programme level position – sector leader who takes part in the Steering Board on behalf of UNDP.		
103	UNDP	1 M project + 150 K by LGs + 300k by diaspora and other = 1.45 M (ca 20 projects if the maximum grant amount is considered?)	Concept Note /	See comment 100
104	SDC	Switzerland supports the Project Skills for Job and market makers (fact sheets attached). Where do you see complementary actions/synergies? (briefs enclosed to the email)		
105	UNDP	Can it be a focus group including this many individuals/organisations?	Concept Note / focus group	First, this is going to be a “virtual focus group” meaning that no actual meetings will take place. Second, it depends on the tools that will be used in order to draw conclusions from the focus group. For example, you cannot use Delphi on such a large group, but

				you can use electronic platforms and several surveying tools.
106	MHRR	This is by no means acceptable for MHRR. If MHRR would consider it necessary, then an independent expert would be engaged.	Concept Note / Budget / mentoring cost	Comment accepted.
107	UNDP	GMS or overhead should be calculated on the entire programmable amount. What is overhead above vs. GSM?	Concept Note / Budget / GSM	The decision to calculate GSM on the entire budget or only on Component 1 needs to be made by Project partners (i.e. they need to decide whether UNDP will manage the entire Project budget or only Component 1). Overhead includes direct operating costs like utilities and other cost of facilities, travel, etc.
108	MHRR	MHRR's main objection re UNDP's work are expenses which are too high indeed!		8% GSM is not unreasonable.
109	MHRR	On the basis of what (evidence) was such conclusion made?	Concept Note / Risks	MHRR has not managed a large number of projects in the past covering the whole spectrum of project management activities required (calls, guidelines, selection, contracting, monitoring, evaluations, etc). For the grant scheme, they recently received capacity building assistance. If the term "lack of experience" is what bothers, we can change it to "limited experience".