

SDC's Emergency Relief and Early Recovery Response to 2007 Floods and Cyclone SIDR



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External Review Report

based on a review mission in Bangladesh
from 12.07. – 25.07.2010

by

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The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of SDC HQs and Coof nor the view of involved partner institutions in Bangladesh. Some of the findings, interpretations, and conclusions may possibly have resulted differently if the authors had had more time for deeper research and the possibility to talk to a wider range of persons. Due to the number of projects and activities reviewed, some of the interpretations and conclusions are keenly generalized and do self-evidently not apply for all the projects and activities of SDC's post floods and post SIDR emergency relief and early recovery response.

iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym	Full name / meaning
AFIP	Agro-forestry Improvement Partnership
BDRC	Bangladesh Red Crescent
BEES	Bangladesh Extension Education Services
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDMP	Comprehensive Disaster Management Project
CfL	Cash for Livelihood Project (SDC)
CLP	Chars Livelihoods Project
CMES	Centre for Mass Education in Sciences
COOF	Cooperation Office (SDC)
CP	Cluster Platform
CS	Cooperation Strategy (SDC)
DAE	Department of Agriculture Extension (of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management)
DAM	Dhaka Ahsania Mission
DISTRICT	The 64 districts in Bangladesh are subdivided into → subdistricts (<i>upazila</i> or <i>thana</i>).
DIVISION	Bangladesh is divided into 7 administrative divisions, each named after their respective divisional headquarters. Divisions are subdivided into → districts.
DLS	Department of Livestock Services (of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management)
DMB	Disaster Management Bureau
DMIC	Disaster Management Information Centre
DNMS	District Nursery Malik Sammittee
DoF	Department of Fisheries (of the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
GoBD	Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh
HA	Humanitarian Aid, SDC Humanitarian Aid Department
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HQs	Headquarters
IC	Intercooperation, Swiss Foundation for Development and International Cooperation

ICRC/IFRC	Int. Committee of the Red Cross / Int. Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies
LEAF	Livelihoods, Empowerment and Agro-forestry
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoFDM	Ministry of Food and Disaster Management
NFPCSP	National Food Policy Capacity Strengthening Programme (www.nfpcsp.org)
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
RC	Regional Cooperation, SDC Regional Cooperation Department
ROI	Return on Investment
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SHA	Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SDC)
SRC	Swiss Red Cross / Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz
SUBDISTRICT	The totally 493 subdistricts in Bangladesh are subdivided into → unions.
THANA	→ Subdistrict (also <i>upazila</i>)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNION	Area within each police station (except for those in metropolitan areas, where unions are called → wards). Each union consists of multiple villages.
UNMA	Upazila Nursery Malik Sammittee
UPAZILA	→ Subdistrict (also <i>thana</i>)
WARD	In the metropolitan areas, police stations are divided into wards, which are further divided into mahallas.
ZILA	→ District

iv. Executive Summary

Background

During the period June to September 2007, two waves of flooding affected in Bangladesh more than 10 million people of whom about 400'000 were forced to leave their homes. The floods caused extensive damages to standing crops which were washed away twice. On 15 November 2007, cyclone SIDR hit the south-western districts of Bangladesh causing extensive damage to properties and assets. Over 6.8 million people affected in 31 districts, with a death toll of over 3'300 persons.

SDC, which has been working through the Regional Cooperation Department in Bangladesh since 1971, provided emergency and early recovery assistance to the victims of the two 2007 floods and of cyclone SIDR, for a total amount of around CHF 7,563 million. The funding was allocated jointly by the Regional Cooperation Department (70%) and Humanitarian Aid Department (30%) as part of and in line with SDC's Cooperation Strategy 2008-2012 for Bangladesh.

The **purpose** of this review was to appraise and validate SDC's disaster response package and to contribute to the discussion of possible changes in the strategic focus of Humanitarian Aid in Bangladesh. Special attention was also given to bridging of disaster response activities towards longer term recovery and development endeavours. The **objective** of the review was to establish an overview on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of SDC's post 2007 flood and cyclone SIDR emergency relief and early recovery actions, also including performance issues. The **scope** was predefined by the basket of executed projects and activities. Due to the limited time resources for the execution of the review, the basket was prioritized and it was decided to **focus** on six of the largest projects to be looked at in detail and to be visited during a field trip. The chosen projects represent a 90% of the total invested joint funds of SDC.

The **review team** was formed by a Swiss and an Italian consultant. Both consultants are socio-economists with broad experience in the field of international cooperation and humanitarian aid. Each of the consultants disposed of a total time budget of 22 days for preparatory work, field mission in Bangladesh and elaboration of this review report. To achieve the objectives set, a standard **review methodology** was used. All findings, discussions, conclusions and recommendations in this report build on documents review, interviews with key persons of SDC's institutional framework in Bangladesh, discussions with SDC staff in Dhaka as well as at SDC HQs in Berne. Two field trips of totally eight days were conducted to the districts of Khulna and Bagerhat (south), and to the district of Sunamganj (north), providing the possibility to assess the projects effectiveness and have exhaustive discussions with beneficiary groups, most of them mixed, some others exclusively women groups.

Findings and conclusions

Relevance: The SDC post Floods and Post SIDR response was relevant in relation to identify and address needs, geographical and households targeting and in incorporating a long term vision in the emergency and rehabilitation interventions. Despite the clear encouraging impacts identified in the field, the relevance of the intervention was built along the way and was not the result of a clear initial analytical process which would have triggered the design of more comprehensive and integrated intervention.

Effectiveness: The Swiss supported interventions were effective mostly in relation to gender equality, community empowerment, income generation and usage of innovative approaches that should be shared and disseminated as best practices.

Though the overall SDC intervention has a clear positive connotation, endogenous SDC limitations, such as the lack of previous collaboration between the RC and HA departments, have had a qualitative impact mostly in relation to monitoring and follow up of activities. In relation to the quality of intervention, special attention should be given to direct transfer skills, knowledge and approaches to partner local organization, rather than limiting capacity building to on 'the job' knowledge transfer.

Financial Efficiency: SDC funded emergency relief and early recovery activities seem to be reasonable efficient (compared to common standards), although a detailed financial analysis could not be done. Budgeting and financial reporting should be improved considerably by setting up and consequently claiming correspondent standards when working with implementing partners. A targeted capacity building with SDC's main national partner NGOs would also directly benefit SDC in strengthening its own monitoring skills and capacities.

Division of Labour: Investing considerable financial resources in few large indirect implementing partners (intermediaries) such as UNDP and FAO is considerably more efficient than investing small amounts with many small direct implementing national partners. However, this higher efficiency is at the cost of transparency and management control. For SDC, the strategic mix of small but locally well established national and/or regional implementing partners (such as Ashroy and Rupantar) and large international agencies (such as UNDP or FAO), has provided high flexibility and rich alternatives according to the changing environments.

Return on Investment: Most of the SDC funded early recovery activities – including such with purely humanitarian character – triggered recurring income and therefore generated a positive return on donors' investment. This is mainly due to the multiplier character of most of the early recovery activities, investing in income generating and capacity/awareness building tools and methods.

Networking & Coordination: SDC disposes of a widespread networking framework that helps considerably in addressing effectively and efficiently the needs of Bangladeshi government and population for development aid as well as humanitarian aid. It worked out to be sustainable also in emergency situations. Networking and inter-institutional coordination of SDC is considerable at a political and strategic level, but comparatively underdeveloped at the operational level. National implementing partners don't have equally access to high level networks. However, at an operational level they cooperated in favour of effectiveness and efficiency, well coordinated by SDC and SDC's intermediate partner organizations UNDP, FAO and IC (donor driven and pragmatic cooperation).

SDC internal cooperation: RC and HA co-funded and jointly implemented an emergency relief and early recovery response to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR. This is an innovative approach absolutely in line with the goals of ongoing SDC-wide re-organization and therefore could be a prototype of inner-institutional and inter-departmental collaboration. However, improvements are necessary to generate additional benefits for the countries and populations in need.

Management capacities of local partners: In Bangladesh, SDC disposes of a well established network of implementing partners. Their management competences are well developed for effective regional cooperation as well as for humanitarian aid activities. Yet, mainly national NGOs lack a common understanding of basic result oriented management principles and could benefit of correspondent training in LFA/PCM methodology. Monitoring and financial reporting must be improved in order to meet internationally established benchmarks, nevertheless it's SDC's task to define and communicate its minimal requirements as well as to give support where needed to enable partner organizations appropriately.

Recommendations

Needs	1. Training 2-4 national officers in needs assessments to be deployed with Interagency Assessment Teams as observers or even, if the technical skills exist within SDC, as members.
	2. Organizing basic needs assessment training for partner NGOs
	3. Organizing sharing sessions among SDC partner organizations or working papers on the different approaches SDC has been supporting in the post flood and post SDR response, e.g. training on cash based intervention in emergency and recovery for SDC partner and non-partner organizations.
Targeting	4. Implementing emergency and rehabilitation projects within the framework of existing projects (and areas) may hinder the targeting of the most affected areas and most affected households in absolute terms. It is recommended to detach the response for existing initiatives as separate projects.
	5. Though financial resources are often scarce, the vulnerable non poor should also be supported. The targeting approach of the Cash for livelihoods may represent an excellent initiative and should be promoted.
	6. Given limited resources, coverage could eventually be increased by lowering the amount of in-kind or cash contribution to the individual beneficiary.
Alignment with CS & LRRD	7. Through basic training and the widespread acceptance of SDC partners, awareness campaigns are an efficient and effective instrument for DRR. Expanding such activities should be a priority mostly in areas where long term projects are being implemented.
	8. Trainings for partners and SDC on planning strategies and interventions to maximize LRRD.
	9. Defining the amount of financial resources to be invested at the earliest stages and prepare a comprehensive and integrated package of interventions.
Gender, empowerment & capacity building	10. Gender equality needs to be further strengthened in the SDC response by securing the gains with a longer term presence (basic activities such as awareness trainings etc).
	11. As discussed in the 'needs' subtopic, an effort should be made to make sure that community committee (such as Cluster Platform), represent all members of a community and not just CBO's members.
	12. Promoting the replication of interventions (such as Cash for Livelihoods) by implementing trainings and sessions which address conceptual and operational issues.
	13. Impact oriented shift is needed in the monitoring, evaluation and report writing, for both local partners and IC. Trainings on M&E and report writing (what SDC needs to see in the report) should be organized.
Effectiveness	14. It is recommended that clear financial and technical guidelines are prepared for future management of RC resources in HA interventions.
	15. It is recommended that a strategy to minimize such HR discontinuity is developed by, for instance, empowering and delegating responsibilities to national senior staff.
	16. It is suggested that as soon as the decision is taken to intervene, an assessment of the total resources available is made and committed to facilitate the design of the intervention as an integrated package.
Financial efficiency	17. A diligent budgeting and financial reporting must be postulated from all partner organizations, providing them with clear requirements and minimal standards for budgeting and reporting.
	18. SDC should improve considerably its monitoring capacities – especially during high pressure emergency and early recovery phases – in order to enforce claimed standards and best practices within their national and international implementing partners.
	19. With regard to an optimization of overhead and implementing costs, CHF 1 mio. are the absolute minimum for the implementation of a cash based intervention. Acceptable become overhead and implementing costs in cash based projects of at least CHF 2 mio. and more.

Return on investment	20. The return on investment on productive assets (such as livestock or agricultural assets) can considerably be raised by giving additional advice and support to the beneficiaries on how to use and make best benefit of the donation (technical trainings).
	21. FAO's farmer schools project should be extended to livestock training and, especially in the Bagerhat and Khulna districts, also to fishery and aquaculture. Farmers' schools dedicated to small livestock production could address particularly women.
	22. Projects that include multiplier components should be favoured. The donation of production goods should – if possible and appropriate – be preferred over non-durable goods.
HR efficiency & division of labour	23. Regularly working with national NGOs such as Ashroy and Rupantar, and building up permanently their management skills 'in peace time',
	24. When it comes to investment of large amounts and the task of reaching millions of beneficiaries in a wide area, working through intermediaries like UNDP or FAO is much more efficient.
	25. An ongoing and close networking with large international partners such as UNDP or/and FAO possibly enhances the transparency and facilitates the collaboration in future emergency relief and early recovery operations. This could be reinforced by associating a secondment of members of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit to these organizations (as done in the case of UNDP seconding a Swiss monitoring expert).
Networking coordination	26. In emergency situations, an additional person (e.g. member of SHA) – not directly involved in operations and management – should guarantee an ongoing networking and coordination.
	27. Cooperation amongst SDC's implementing partners may be enhanced and pushed by appropriate project setup and contracting (donor driven) as well as by the establishment of formal and informal platforms for a mutual exchange on experiences and best practices.
SDC internal cooperation	28. RC's and HA's co-funding and joint implementation of emergency relief and early recovery projects should become a standard approach, specifically in COOFs run by RC and with an established network of implementing partners.
	29. The (SDC) internal procedures as well as the corresponding internal coordination and cooperation mechanism between RC and HA, have to be formalized in order to be prepared for an appropriate response to upcoming emergencies.
	30. Special focus should be dedicated to define systematic and joint monitoring/follow-up methods with clear allocation of responsibilities.
	31. If there is no permanent humanitarian coordinator based in the COOF, HA should from the beginning deploy a responsible person to support COOF staff during the entire phase of planning, set up and implementation as a binding link to HQs/HA and to ensure consistency and continuation of operations. High turnover of personnel must be avoided.
	32. The documentation and appraisal of projects' achievements should be systematically planned and carried out in order to capitalize experiences and draw lessons learnt both for RC and HA (knowledge management).
management capacity & implementation	33. Direct implementing partners should be supported in result oriented planning and management of projects (logical framework approach LFA, project cycle management PCM) according to internationally established standards (e.g. as defined by Worldbank, ECHO or UN-organizations). SDC HQs provides correspondent workshops for COOF staff and their national partners.
	34. SDC should define and communicate clear minimal requirements concerning monitoring and reporting (cf. recommendation 18). Where needed, national partner NGOs should be provided with correspondent tools and/or capacitating in order to meet these requirements.
	35. At the end of any similar emergency relief and early recovery package, SDC should set up a proper evaluation and validation/appraisal of its achievements, including a decent documentation for the institutional knowledge management – a basic requirement for any RC or HA project of comparable size.

1 Background of Review

1.1 Context

During the period June to September 2007, two waves of flooding affected in Bangladesh more than 10 million people of whom about 400'000 were forced to leave their homes to nearby high land. The floods caused extensive damages to standing crops which were washed away twice. A total of almost 360'000 hectares of crops were destroyed and over 530'000 hectares were partially damaged. Poor farmers lost their assets including the agricultural inputs and could not recover without material support to restore their livelihood.

On 15 November 2007, cyclone SIDR¹ hit the south-western districts of Bangladesh causing extensive damage to properties and assets of poor people. The cyclonic storm affected more than 6.8 million people in 31 districts with a death toll of over 3'300 persons. A further 1'180 people were reported missing and some 34'500 were injured. An estimated 465'000 livestock heads died, including small and large ruminants. Serious damages were also observed in the fisheries and shrimp production sector².

SDC, which has been working through the Regional Cooperation Department (RC) in Bangladesh since 1971, provided emergency and early recovery assistance to the victims of the two 2007 floods and of cyclone SIDR, for a total amount of around CHF 7,5 million. The funding was allocated jointly by the RC and Humanitarian Aid Department (HA) as part of SDC strategy in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Humanitarian Aid, included as special themes in SDC's Cooperation Strategy (CS) 2008-2012 for Bangladesh by including a specific DRR Program 2010-2012.

1.2 Purpose and objectives

SDC's response to the above mentioned disasters of 2007 was developed step by step, resulting in a comprehensive package of projects and activities.

The purpose of this review was to appraise and validate SDC's disaster response and to contribute to the discussion of possible changes in the strategic focus of HA in Bangladesh. Special attention was also given to bridging disaster response activities towards longer term recovery and development endeavours.

The main objective of the review was to establish an overview on relevance³, effectiveness⁴ and efficiency⁵ of SDC's post 2007 flood and cyclone SIDR emergency relief and early recovery actions, also including performance issues.

1 For more details related to 2007 floods cf. Annex E, related to cyclone SIDR cf. Annex F

2 Source: FAO (2009); Emergency Response and Early Recovery for Flood- and Cyclone-Affected Farmers in Bangladesh (Report)

3 The relevance of a programme (and its projects) exemplifies to what extent its objectives and themes respond to essential needs of the defined beneficiary groups.

4 The effectiveness appraises to what extent planning and implementation of the actions (according to agreed plans with implementing partners) correspond to tangible results (outcomes) within the working context.

5 The efficiency appraises to what extent provided means (mainly finances) are economically and timely implemented (converted into adequate results / outputs).

The specific objectives of the review were⁶:

- Achievements of emergency relief and early recovery response of SDC are critically assessed with a close look into well selected specific (representative) actions
- Elements for well informed decision making on design and implementation approach of future emergency and early recovery activities are provided, good practices documented
- Potentials and limitations for linking relief, recovery and development (LRRD) are critically analyzed; also in the frame of the new DRR program 2010-2012
- The mix of selected partners for the implementation of the emergency relief and early recovery actions of SDC is critically analyzed
- Recommendations on future orientation of SDC's HA program in Bangladesh are presented

1.3 Scope and focus

The **scope** of the review was predefined by the basket of executed SDC's emergency relief and early recovery activities as listed in the table below. A total amount of CHF 7'563'000 was granted to be invested from 2007-2010. SDC's RC contributed a 70% of the funds, HA a 30%.

Table 1: Emergency relief and early recovery activities⁷

Action / Name of project	Implementer	7F- Referenz	CHF (according to CP) ⁸
Assistance to post flood rehabilitation			
Rehabilitation assistance to flood victims of Tangail district	BURO	7F-03331.02	352'000 (RC)
Recovery of installations at schools	CMES	7F-03333.04	67'000 (RC)
Recovery of livelihoods of extreme poor flood-affected families associated with LEAF/SAAKTI	Intercooperation	7F-03402.02	534'000 (RC)
Recovery of nurseries associated with AFIP	Intercooperation	7F-03804.01	172'000 (RC)
Emergency Response and Early Recovery for flood- and cyclone-affected farmers	FAO (DAE, DLS, DoF)	7F-05979.01 (actions 1&2)	2'180'000 (RC)
Rehabilitation of flood and cyclone affected poor / Recovery of livelihoods and productive structures	UNDP (DAM, Prodipon, BEES)	7F-05979.01 (actions 3&4)	2'000'000 (RC)
Assistance to Cyclone SDR affected population			
Emergency relief for cyclone SDR victims	SRC/BDRC	7F-05955.01/02	220'000 (HA)
Emergency relief for the cyclone SDR affected victims in Khulna and Bagerhat districts	Rupantar & Ashroy	7F-05978.01	348'000 (HA)
Livelihood support for cyclone SDR affected people in Khulna and Bagerhat districts	Rupantar & Ashroy	7F-06011.01	560'000 (HA)
Secondment of monitoring specialist to UNDP Dhaka	SDC/UNDP	7F-06029.01	65'000 (HA)
Cash for livelihood project SDR (CfL)	SDC/HA	7F- 06087.01/02	1'000'000 (HA)
Strengthening SDC Coof Dhaka with a specialized HA expert	SDC/HA	7F-06030.01/02	449'000 (HA)
Total disbursements:		RC	5'305'000
		HA	2'642'000

⁶ cf. Terms of Reference in annex G

⁷ For detailed information related to objectives, target area and population and main results of these projects cf. annex D

⁸ According to the amount figuring in the signed credit proposals. Effectively spent amounts may at the end slightly differ (less).

The focus of the review was accorded jointly with SDC. Due to the limited time resources for the execution of the review, the above shown list of projects was prioritized using mainly the criteria of projects' relative importance within the entire emergency relief and early recovery package. Six of the largest projects (in terms of invested financial resources and size of the projects) were finally selected to be looked at in detail and to be visited during a field trip to selected areas of implementation (marked bold in the table above). The chosen projects represent a 90% of the total invested joint funds of SDC.

1.4 Approach and methodology

The review team was formed by a Swiss and an Italian consultant, the former based in Switzerland while the latter living and working in Bangladesh since more than two years. Both consultants are socio-economists with broad experience in the field of international cooperation and humanitarian aid. Each of the consultants disposed of a time budget of 4 days for preparatory work, 13 days for carrying out the field mission in Bangladesh, and another 4 days for finalizing the review report.

In order to accomplish the tasks formulated above, a standard review methodology was used. The findings, discussions, conclusions and recommendations in this report build on documents review, interviews with key persons of SDC's institutional framework in Bangladesh. Additional information was gained from discussions with SDC staff in Dhaka as well as at SDC HQs in Berne⁹.

Basic information on the post monsoon floods 2007 and the cyclone SIDR 2007, as well as on the projects forming part of the consolidated response of SDC's emergency relief and early recovery activities specifically, was gained through the study of key documents¹⁰.

A first field trip was conducted from 14.07.-18.07.2010 to the districts of Khulna and Bagerhat, followed by a second field trip to the district of Sunamganj from 19.07.-21.07.2010. Besides interviews with key persons at municipal (Upazila), communal (Union) and village (Ward) level, several beneficiary groups and representatives of community based organizations were visited for an assessment of their views and opinions related to the emergency relief aid and early recovery response given by SDC and its partner organizations.

The time consuming travelling to communities in Khulna, Bagerhat and Sunamganj districts (by airplane, car, ferry and speed boat) helped to get a general idea about existing and possible difficulties concerning road quality, communication, transport facilities and accessibility to and from remote areas in Bangladesh.

1.5 Limitations and constraints faced

1.5.1 Limited resources and availability of written documentation

At the beginning of the assignment, the review team pointed out that the range of projects to be reviewed, forming part of SDC's emergency relief and early recovery package, seemed over-ambitious given the setup and duration of the review. Therefore, a prioritization of the projects was done in favour of more quality instead of quantity (cf. chap. 1.3).

9 All institutions and persons consulted for this report are listed in annex B.

10 All literature consulted, mentioned and quoted in this report is listed in the bibliography in annex A.

SDC's documentation and management of projects related documents (reference documents) needs to be improved. More than a few key documents were received only during the review mission. Therefore, the beforehand preparation of the review team as well as a sound analysis especially in financial aspects was seriously hampered.

1.6 Structure and content of report

The present review report is organized in six chapters following the thematic logic as given in the TORs: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, performance issues and considerations related to the future orientation of HA and DRR. Each chapter is split in subtopics, each one starting with a short introductory note, followed by findings and discussion and concluding with recommendations.

At the end of the report, we synthesized our conclusions resulting in considerations related to the future orientation of SDC's cooperation/humanitarian aid portfolio, the integration and mainstreaming of DRR and the bridging, meaning the linkage of relief, recovery and development (LRRD).

2 Relevance

This section of the report will present key findings and recommendation in relation to the relevance of the SDC strategy in the aftermath of the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR. The relevance of the strategy and actions is being assessed by addressing the three key sub-topics: needs, targeting and alignment with SDC strategic goals and LRRD (Linking Relief, Recovery and Development).

2.1 Needs (identification and addressing)

Introduction: The relevance and significance of any intervention is directly linked to the needs that are being addressed (which defines the type of intervention) and how these needs have been identified. In the past years several tools have been developed to identify the needs of the affected communities and households and at the same time to maximize their voice and involvement in the process. Furthermore, major international organizations have developed joint guidelines and joint field assessment missions, with the purpose of harmonizing and better coordinating their actions as well as to maximize the usually scarce financial resources.

In the aftermath of the devastating 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR, the international community in partnership with the government of Bangladesh organized two major assessments to identify the most affected areas, the immediate and midterm needs as well as potential interventions¹¹.

Findings and discussion: Not all SDC funded projects for the post Floods and post SIDR intervention were based on UN or government led assessments. When the other smaller¹² projects are looked at in detail, the assessments on which are based have been implemented by local partners (such as Ashroy and Rupantur), international partners (Intercooperation, in collaboration with their local NGOs) or by the SDC team (Cash for Livelihoods projects). It appears that these local level assessments have also happened in close collaboration with local (Upazila and Union) officials and more importantly with the affected communities.

While discussing with several communities, in both SIDR and Floods affected areas, the satisfaction of having been involved in the needs assessment was a common remark. The extent of their involvement varied mostly in relation to SDC presence before the disaster. For instance, in the IC interventions, the existence of well established community structures, central to the SDC-IC long term development projects in the area, maximized people's involvement by allowing the communities themselves to implement a door to door assessment of losses. The leading role of the affected communities was instead not present to such extent in the SIDR areas, where the SDC was not implementing any long term interventions before the disaster.

The selection of the type of intervention, of actions to address the needs was also different among the SDC funded projects. In the FAO and UNDP guided projects, the national and interagency assessments represented the source of information for selecting the approaches to address the identified needs. Such approaches were also implemented on a wider scale, when compared to other SDC supported projects. Affected communities also appeared to be more involved and influential in the design of the approaches for smaller projects (Ashroy, Rupantur and IC).

11 In the case of the floods, the UN agencies implemented a joint assessment and a consolidated plan which was presented to Donor agencies. In this context, SDC selected the FAO rehabilitation project in conjunction with other donors such as the Belgian and Spanish Government. With the FAO, also the UNDP project (after cyclone SIDR) were based on the Needs, Loss and Damage Assessment Report implemented in early 2008.

12 In financial terms, where less financial resources have been allocated. Refer to Table 1

The participants to the focus group discussions mentioned that they were part of selecting, for instance, the items to be distributed for the emergency relief as well as rehabilitation actions (such as the livelihoods packages in the Ashroy and Rupantar projects or in the IC-LEAF rehabilitation project). The extent to which the community have been involved in the selection of the overall approach rather than the 'items' to be distributed, was unclear. In our review, communities were not fully involved in the type of intervention, such as using cash or a combination of cash and in kinds rather than only in kinds, because these options were not fully presented and explained to them.

The SDC strategy in responding to the 2007 Floods and Cyclone SIDR was based on well structured and comprehensive interagency assessments in some cases (FAO and UNDP) as well as on more localized evaluations. Though it seems that the strategy addressed the identified needs, SDC should influence partner organization to consider (and discuss with the communities) alternative but well documented instruments which are sometimes more effective and efficient. The instrument of 'cash' has in fact been sidelined and limited to cash for livelihoods activities (directly implemented by SDC) and cash for work. It is widely accepted that 'cash instruments' can be expanded to area which are the realm of traditional in kinds-standard distributions which in some cases do not consider the particularity of each households, and their losses and needs. Not being aware, or not knowing the pros and cons as well as the variety of possible interventions where cash can be used, has also narrowed the discussion with the community on the 'actions' to address their needs.

Nevertheless, it is important to say all interviewed community members have expressed clear satisfaction to the actions taken as well as the quality of the support given was remarkable when compared to previous or other organization's support in the same disaster. It is also evident that SDC took for granted several assessments without a quality control¹³ which could have been easily achieved by investing more human resources in this assessment phase.

Recommendations (needs):

1. Training 2-4 national officers in needs assessments to be deployed with Interagency Assessment Teams as observers or even, if the technical skills exist within SDC, as members. Being part of the assessments will increase the influence of SDC in considering alternative instruments options.
2. Organizing basic needs assessment training for partner NGOs.
3. Organizing sharing sessions among SDC partner organizations or working papers on the different approaches SDC has been supporting in the post flood and post SIDR response, e.g. training on cash based intervention in emergency and recovery for SDC partner and non-partner organizations.

¹³ The idea of 'quality control' was instead integrated to the SDC funded UNDP project, where 1 international expert was seconded with M&E responsibilities.

2.2 Targeting (geographical, beneficiaries and coverage)

Introduction: Any intervention or project needs to narrow down the targeting areas and households. This process is often open to criticism if not derived from a sound methodology, well accepted assessments as well as from fully involving the communities. The SDC supported intervention had to go through a narrowing down and targeting process, at different levels: these processes also define the significance of the SDC strategy.

Findings and discussion: The selection of geographical areas for the SDC supported post flood and post SIDR response was based on the several nationwide assessments prepared after each disaster. In the case of SIDR, most of the SDC projects were localized in Bagerhat, one of the four¹⁴ most affected districts, as per Government data.

The existing, long term interventions supported by SDC, such as the LEAF project, in the post floods, defined the main areas of operations for the rehabilitation response. In the case of the 2007 floods, the prioritization of the districts where to implement the rehabilitation response was, except for the FAO project, limited to the existing area of operations. The BURO Tangail, CMES, LEAF and AFIP project areas were prioritized and supported. Such prioritization and selection happened in close collaboration with local authorities and local implementing partners

The selection of beneficiaries for all projects was very transparent and it appeared that even non-beneficiaries (in the visited communities where FAO distributed livestock) have unanimously accepted the final beneficiary's lists. In some projects, such as the FAO interventions, Participatory Rural Appraisals were implemented in all selected areas and the most affected and poor households had been prioritized to receive in kind support (fishery, livestock or agriculture inputs). A different approach was used for actions such as 'cash for work' and 'cash for livelihoods'. All partners considered all households of the selected communities as potentially beneficiaries and even guaranteeing, in the cash for work, a minimum number of days/work per households. In the cash for livelihoods project also, no inclusion (selection) criteria existed to be part of the list of beneficiaries (the communities selected were the most affected) as everybody had been more or less equally affected. After a validation process, around 95% of households in each selected community received the cash grant to restore and recover lost livelihoods assets.

In the IC managed projects instead, even if community consultation was important, as for the geographical selection, the beneficiaries were selected within the communities where the LEAF project is currently being implemented. The existence of a grassroots community level 'representative' structure did speed up the selection process for the beneficiaries of the rehabilitation packages. On the other hand, while investigating the fundamental nature of the representativeness of these structures, it was discovered that not all households in a community were represented. The Cluster Platform, the community level committee, is in fact formed by representatives of grassroots CBOs: an average of 50%¹⁵ of households was not represented.

The selection of areas to be supported in the post floods and post SIDR was sound and integrated the results of nationwide and local assessments. In the case of IC rehabilitation projects, the use of an existing intervention has the potential negative effect of reaching the relatively most affected communities rather than the most affected areas in absolute terms.

14 With the three other districts Pirojpur, Patuakali and Barguna

15 In one community visited out of a total of 220 households, 135 are members of CBOs and therefore represented in the Cluster Platform; in the second community out of a total of 277 households, only 118 are part of CBOs.

Following the same line of analysis, the use of, such as in the case of LEAF, pre existing community structure which have some structural weakens of not representing the whole community, but only CBOs members, might not target the most affected households in the community but the most affected within the members. Nevertheless, in the LEAF rehabilitation project, also non members¹⁶ have benefited from the distribution of in kinds.

More in general, the participatory and community based approach in selecting beneficiaries was very well accepted also among the non beneficiaries. In particular the approach used in the Cash for livelihoods, the selection of the all the households in one community (with the exception of few cases which are receiving similar support by other organizations) was the most effective in terms of coverage, recovering the whole community and supporting also the vulnerable non poor, which are usually neglected in emergency and recovery projects.

Recommendations (targeting):

4. Implementing emergency and rehabilitation projects within the framework of existing projects (and areas) may hinder the targeting of the most affected areas and most affected households in absolute terms. It is recommended to detach the response for existing initiatives as separate projects.
5. Though financial resources are often scarce, the vulnerable non poor should also be supported. The targeting approach of the Cash for livelihoods may represent an excellent initiative and should be promoted.
6. Given limited resources, coverage could eventually be increased by lowering the amount of in-kind or cash contribution to the individual beneficiary.

2.3 Alignment with SDC strategic goals and LRRD

Introduction: Emergency and recovery interventions need to be part of a broader set of goals and strategic objectives as well with global goals and frameworks. In this particular case, the SDC Cooperation Strategy and major international commitments such as the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)¹⁷ and Millennium Development Goals (MDG)¹⁸ should steer the intervention. Furthermore, emergency and recovery actions also need to promote the LRRD concepts and avoid paternalistic top down approaches which may hinder self recovery.

Findings and discussion: By comparing the objectives and expected outcomes of the credit proposals of the projects within the 2007 post floods and post SIDR SDC response with the overall strategic objective of the SDC cooperation strategy 2008-2012, it is clear that all interventions attempted to increase the targeted households and communities capabilities for 'enhanced employment and income' and 'decision-making processes'.

16 In the community of 220 households, a total of 82 packages were distributed: 56 to CBOs members and 26 to non members.

17 cf. www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm

18 cf. www.undp.org/mdg or www.un.org/millenniumgoals or <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/home.do>

If we consider instruments such as cash for work, or cash for livelihoods, distribution of livelihoods kits, distribution of livestock or agriculture inputs (and trainings) which have been at the core of the rehabilitation projects funded by SDC, the vision of SDC's Cooperation strategy is fully integrated in their 2007 post floods and post SIDR actions.

Furthermore, the SDC partners' successful attempts to maximize the targeted communities role in the selection and process design fully contribute to longer terms changes in people's role in the decision making process.

The emergency and rehabilitation interventions also upheld to different extents, the key guiding principles of the SDC DRR program. In some projects, such as the gender sensitive DRR awareness campaign or the Children awareness campaign in the SIDR affected households or in the crops protection techniques of the FAO project, such principles were clearly visible.

Furthermore, considering the SDC cooperation strategy strategic objective fully in line with MDG 1 (poverty) and 2 (employment), and the SDC DRR goal in line with the action lines of the Hyogo Framework, we can state that the SDC response incorporated globally accepted visions and frameworks for actions.

Some examples of the usefulness of integrating DRR principles and strategies in the post SIDR response are the impacts of the 2009 Cyclone Aila. Though Aila and SIDR are different disaster in terms of events and impacts, all communities have highlighted how, by having been 'prepared' after SIDR and being more 'aware', were able to reduce their losses and protect lives in the Aila disaster. Such strength ('we are now ready and we are not scared anymore') emphasized by several community also reinforces empowerment process initiated by the partner organizations during the response phase.

On the other hand, DRR principles of 'protecting lives and livelihoods and reduce economic losses resulting from exposure to natural disasters' were blurred in long term projects such as LEAF and AFIP. While livelihoods resilience was significant in protecting livelihoods from regular shocks, disastrous covariate shocks have not been given the necessary importance. This has result in the need of an ad hoc intervention (rehabilitation projects) after a major disaster to protect and save the gains of previous years. In a country like Bangladesh where major disasters are too common, DRR perspective cannot just be mainstreamed but needs to become a regular additional project component.

Linking Relief, Recovery and Development in Bangladesh means promoting income generation activities, community participation in decision making processes (such as community empowerment in the LEAF project) capacity building of local communities (such as with FAO model on Field Farmers Schools) and civil society partners and loss avoidance (Disaster risk reduction) in future disasters. In the SDC response, these elements were present but not in a fully integrated and complementary matter.

Improved well-being and economic, social and political participation of the poor and poorest and of future generations, based on enhanced employment and income and improved access to services, opportunities and decision-making processes.

SDC cooperation strategy Bangladesh 2008-2012 p.12

*The goal of the DRR programme is to **protect lives and livelihoods** and **reduce economic losses** resulting from the exposure to natural disasters (including the challenges of climate variability and climate change), thus contributing to less human suffering, poverty reduction and a more sustainable and equitable development in the region.*

SDC DRR Programme for Bangladesh 2010-2012, Draft p.12

In the LEAF and AFIP rehabilitation projects for instance the DRR component was not clearly visible and the lack of such component was probably the cause of the need of the intervention.

In this context, in the LRRD concept, the role of 'Cash' is central: while cash is used as tool to acquire lost (or new) assets for income generating activities, it has promoted people's empowerment by allowing them to decide how to use the money, on what and when. A more comprehensive discussion will be presented in the final chapter of the report.

Recommendations (alignment with strategic goals & LRRD):

7. Through basic training and the widespread acceptance of SDC partners, awareness campaigns are an efficient and effective instrument for DRR. Expanding such activities should be a priority mostly in areas where long term projects are being implemented.
8. Trainings for partners and SDC on planning strategies and interventions to maximize LRRD.
9. Defining the amount of financial resources to be invested at the earliest stages and prepare a comprehensive and integrated package of interventions.

2.4 Conclusions (relevance)

The SDC post Floods and Post SIDR response was relevant in relation to identify and address needs, geographical and households targeting and in incorporating a long term vision in the emergency and rehabilitation interventions. Despite the clear encouraging impacts identified in the field, the relevance of the intervention was built along the way and was not the result of a clear initial analytical process which would have triggered the design of more comprehensive and integrated intervention.

3 Effectiveness

This section will comment upon the effectiveness of the SDC response in the aftermath of the Post floods and Post SIDR. The effectiveness in this section denotes the effect of the SDC response on capacity building, gender and community Participation, key achievements and prominent examples of the SDC and its partner's work.

3.1 Gender and community empowerment

Introduction: Gender equality and community empowerment are global goals which (should) drive the design of any intervention and can have important long term impacts on people's lives. The extent to which these themes are integrated in any intervention defines therefore the sustainability of effects and impacts.

Findings and Discussion: All projects visited and documents reviewed consider gender and community involvement a mean to build people's capacities, as major cross cutting issues in the implementation. In the case of Gender for instance, all projects have favoured the integration of women in local committee and designed income generating schemes by selecting items which are usually used by women: sewing machines, livestock kits and so on.

Other schemes such cash for work implemented by several SDC partners have promoted equal the involvement of women¹⁹. Particularly in the FAO projects all beneficiaries of livestock kits (chicken, ducks and goats) were women.

Apart from the transfers of in kinds or cash, women were also central actors in community committees, where they are the majority, and other important DRR awareness activities with multiplier effects in the community. This also contributed to equip the community with vital and practical knowledge and skills useful in disaster and pre-disaster times.

The most palpable result was women's ability and willingness to stand up and give opinions and share their knowledge on specific issues. In the IC supported initiatives during our field visits, women were presenting the past achievements of the projects and jumped in discussions even interrupting male members.

Women's role in these projects cannot be separated by the SDC's partner's extensive work in community empowerment, as gender equality was framed into a broader attempt to maximize community involvement by setting up committee and initiating community led assessments. A striking example of community empowerment as a result of capacity building by the partner NGOs was the case of several villages (around 30), which over a very short period of time and led by the cluster platforms (LEAF project) acted to build overnight an embankment to avoid the early (flash) floods of April 2010, destroying their crops.

Financial empowerment of women, by promoting women livelihoods appears to be the starting point for gender equality. Women's role in fully contributing to the household's economic life is central in favouring massive changes which will improve people's lives as a whole. When financial empowerment happens within a 'community empowerment framework', where women also become more socially important, such as through the participation in committee or awareness trainings, the impact will be more sustainable and resilient.

19 In the UNDP cash for work scheme, around 30% of the total beneficiaries were women.

These changes are the results of structural behavioural changes in communities: such changes need to be reinforced in time and cannot be limited to starting off interventions without integrating reinforcing elements.

For example, in the IC projects, the long term presence of NGOs and gender focused intervention and the continuous support given to women over time has strengthened the impacts of the interventions, when compared to areas where SDC supported projects did not have a long term presence.

Recommendations (gender & community empowerment):

10. Gender equality needs to be further strengthened in the SDC response by securing the gains with a longer term presence (basic activities such as awareness trainings etc).
11. As discussed in the 'needs' subtopic, an effort should be made to make sure that community committee (such as Cluster Platform), represent all members of a community and not just CBO's members.

3.2 Capacity building

Introduction: Transferring knowledge and expertise to civil society organization defines the extent to which disasters or more in general development can become people led and move away exogenous support. Nevertheless the building of capacities of partners and communities is sometimes sidelined as returns are often not immediate and difficult to assess. Community empowerment, as described in previous section refers to community capacity building and has already been dealt with in the previous section.

Findings and Discussions: SDC did not appear to have clear strategy in building the capacities of partner organizations. Instead, several SDC supported projects have benefited by an 'implicit' learning process in the area of budgeting and financial matters directly related to project implementation. In other aspects such as the SDC direct implemented Cash for Livelihoods project (CfL project), the partner NGOs were part of the implementation, but it appears that no formal training was implemented.

To what extent can the SDC partner organization implement on their own similar interventions to the ones implemented in the post SIDR and post floods? Answering this question will allow to define the extent to the changes in the capacities of the organizations SDC has been working with.

The collaborating between the RC and HA at Dhaka level, even if hindered by human resources and capacities, represented the way forward in similar event. In Bangladesh, where disasters are common and can destroy investments of several years, Humanitarian Aid and DRR become an important theme in RC operations

Cash as a tool, instrument in rehabilitation interventions, is clearly a major speciality of SDC. While intervention such as cash for work are increasingly becoming more and more common, Cash for livelihoods projects are still underestimated and believed to be risky and not effective. By using international and national evidence, SDC can act as a catalyst for promoting the use of cash in similar contexts

While International Organization, governmental (UNDP, FAO) and nongovernmental (IC), are usually technically sound and do not require external support from SDC, smaller national organizations (e.g. Ashroy or Rupantar) will require more direct support on specific activities.

Continuing on the example of the CfL project, it appears that partners had a major role in community mobilization and targeting but key activities such as negotiations with banks as well as the conceptualization of the strategy were in the hands of the SDC implementing Team. Local partners have shown their expertise in community awareness trainings, community mobilization, distribution of relief goods which suggests that minor capacity building interventions are needed.

Recommendations (capacity building):

12. Promoting the replication of interventions (such as Cash for Livelihoods) by implementing trainings and sessions which address conceptual and operational issues.
13. The review of some reports, suggests that a more impact oriented shift is needed in the monitoring, evaluation and report writing, for both local partners and IC. Trainings on M&E and report writing (what SDC needs to see in the report) should be organized.

3.3 Effects, prominent examples and specialities

Introduction: Any intervention needs to have important effects on the targeted populations; it needs to trigger changes which that improve the households' well being. The effects and prominent examples are the result of actions and instruments which combined, produce (or help to produce) changes. The 'specialities' refers to specific instruments which have been identified to have the largest and significant effects on people's lives.

Findings and Discussions: As glimpsed in the previous paragraphs, SDC supported response has undoubtedly caused positive effects on people's lives.

By the analysis of the (final) reports of the SDC supported projects and by the team's observation in the field visits, targeted communities and households have been able to recover from the impact of disasters, restart their livelihoods and even moving upward. In many cases for instance (UNDP, Ashroy and Rupantar), by organizing cash for work interventions, communities have been able to repair roads and restart regular pre disaster activities, such as accessing markets, sending kids to schools. Also by transferring cash, as part of the cash for work schemes and cash grants, households have been able to address their basic needs as well as invest in income generating activities.

Similarly, where in kind goods (such as livestock and sewing machines) have been transferred, the beneficiaries, mostly women, have been able to generate additional resources and improve their living standards. When these transfers have been integrated to technical trainings, such as in the case of FAO farmers' schools, the beneficiaries have highlighted that their income has increased of 15-20% when compared to previous years. In some cases, mostly within the FAO livestock beneficiaries, several households have spontaneously opened bank account and started saving money for future investments in productive and human assets.

In addition to the major effects presented here, it is important to highlight several processes and approaches which have contributed to the clearly positive overall impact of the SDC supported intervention:

- Integration in the emergency and rehabilitation intervention of key elements to promote bridging between recovery and long term development (LRRD) and of long term vision in designing rehabilitation initiatives (such technical trainings)
- Unique (Financial) collaboration between the Regional coordination and Humanitarian Aid - Departments within SDC: major RC investments in Humanitarian Aid actions.
- Fast set up and innovative (Partnership with private bank for a temporary mobile banking system) implementation (and M&E) of SDC directly implemented interventions (Cash for Livelihoods) with important spill over effect for the targeted communities (as shown in the Cash for Livelihoods documentation).
- Widespread beneficiary satisfaction in all geographical areas and in all interventions which suggest a high degree of relevance and effectiveness in SDC supported projects.

These highlights are the results of innovative ideas (such as the cash for livelihoods) as well the strategic position of the SDC has a donor and implementing agency which have guaranteed a smooth and effective implementation of all activities.

Recommendations (effectiveness):

14. Despite the excellent effects resulted by the 'financial' collaboration between RC and HA, the lack of a precise 'modus operandi' in relation to fund management, monitoring responsibilities²⁰ and documentation of project achievements, was counterproductive. It is recommended that clear financial and technical guidelines are prepared for future management of RC resources in HA interventions.
15. On the same line, the discontinuity of personnel in the HA intervention might have contributed to the weaknesses mentioned above, and interfered with a proper management of the SDC intervention. It is recommended that a strategy to minimize such HR discontinuity is developed by, for instance, empowering and delegating responsibilities to national senior staff.
16. The lack of a pre-defined sum²¹ to be allocated to the emergency and rehabilitation response, has contributed to the fragmentation of the interventions. It is suggested that as soon as the decision is taken to intervene, an assessment of the total resources available is made and committed to facilitate the design of the intervention as an integrated package.

3.4 Conclusions (effectiveness)

The effectiveness of the Swiss supported interventions is remarkable mostly in relation to gender equality, community empowerment, income generation and usage of innovative approaches that should be shared and disseminated as best practices. Though the overall SDC intervention has a clear positive connotation, endogenous SDC limitations, such as the lack of previous collaboration between the RC and HA departments, have had a qualitative impact mostly in relation to monitoring and follow up of activities. In relation to the quality of intervention, special attention should be given to direct transfer skills, knowledge and approaches to partner local organization, rather than limiting capacity building to on 'the job' knowledge transfer.

²⁰ The major effect was the difficulty for the consultant team to trace the logic behind the projects and to obtain reports directly from some SDC partners

²¹ The resources allocated for the post Sidr and Post Floods were fragmented and made available throughout several months

4 Efficiency

In this section of the report we present and discuss findings related to how the resources allocated to the post 2007 Floods and cyclone SDR interventions by SDC and its partner organizations have been used. Efficiency here means to what extent the initial inputs have been converted into adequate outputs and were economically and timely implemented. The efficiency is being assessed mainly by addressing the use of financial resources. In addition, the return on investment and the 'division of labour' between SDC and its implementing partners have also been examined. Some key figures (benchmarks) will also be presented with the aim to contribute to a better understanding of the use of money by breaking down big numbers to a more comprehensive size.

4.1 Financial efficiency

Introduction: Despite the fact that a thorough analysis of the financial efficiency under the given setup of this review was not possible (cf. chap. 'Limitations and constraints faced' and first paragraph of 'findings and discussion' below), here we attempt to review and present some key figures by manipulating numbers in the reports, well being aware of the limited significance and danger of possibly 'having compared apples with pears'. Therefore, all calculated and presented financial figures have to be read and interpreted with due caution.

Findings and discussion: Generally, the financial budgeting and reporting (with few exceptions) was inadequate and this did not allow us to go into any detailed analysis of expenditures. In some cases, where the budgets or final reports presented financial details (e.g. operational or overhead costs), it was nowhere clearly declared what costs exactly these items include and/or exclude. Nevertheless, all expenditures in goods for in-kind donations and the cash for work expenses paid to beneficiaries were very good documented in all projects (extended and detailed lists of purchases and donations).

It is common that in highly complex emergency situations, a meticulous budgeting may not be feasible. However, it's hardly explicable that in the final reporting major figures are missing and expenditures into the hundreds of thousand or even millions cannot be objectively traced.

Sketchily looked at, budgeted or reported overhead costs of SDC and implementing partners are (with some exceptions) within reasonable range and operational costs in relation to the coverage – geographical and beneficiaries – seem to be level-headed too. The table 2 on the next page shows the absolute overhead and operational costs (summed up) per beneficiary as well as overhead and operational costs as a percentage of the total costs of the projects.

Table 2: Overheads and implementing costs of emergency relief and early recovery activities

Action / Name of project (shortened)	OC+OH per beneficiary	Operational costs (OC)	Overhead (OH)	Source
Assistance to post flood rehabilitation				
Recovery of nurseries with AFIP (IC)		7%	1%	Credit proposal
	9.50 CHF			Completion report
Recovery of livelihoods with LEAF/SAAKTI (IC)	0.45 CHF	12%	3% ²²	Completion report
Rehabilitation assistance of Tangail District (BURO)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	not documented
Recovery of installations at schools (CMES)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	not documented
Emergency Response and Early Recovery (FAO)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	not documented
Rehabilitation / Recovery of livelihoods (UNDP)	1.35 CHF	n.a.	10% ²³	Completion report
Assistance to Cyclone SIDR affected population				
Emergency relief for cyclone SIDR victims (SRC/BDRC)	2.65 CHF	13%	9%	Completion report
Emergency relief for SIDR victims (Ashroy & Rupantar)		6%	11% ²⁴	Credit proposal
	2.90 CHF			Completion report
Livelihood support for SIDR victims (Ashroy & Rupantar)		6%	8%	Credit proposal
	1.50 CHF			Completion report
Cash for Livelihood in SIDR affected communities (SDC)		12%	7%	Credit proposal
	12.80 CHF			Completion report
Average:	4.45 CHF	8%	7%	

The overhead and operational costs per beneficiary in the AFIP recovery project of IC were high when compared to the other projects. On the other hand, the money given as a grant to the nursery associations was given as an interest-free loan to the nursery owners mostly affected by the 2007 floods and once repaid to the associations and turned into a revolving fund, this money will be of future benefit being used half for further emergencies and half for productive purposes.

In the long run, the future returns on investment will in such a manner reduce the initial overhead and implementing costs per beneficiary to a minimum amount. Additionally, IC and its local partner NGOs did a diligent (but costly) monitoring, visiting every single beneficiary to assure the proper use as well as the repayment of the given loan.

When the SDC direct implemented CfL project is examined, the comparatively high overhead and implementing costs per beneficiary are obvious. This is mainly due to the meticulous precision in its implementation process, which is to a great extent standardized by SDC's Cash Workbook²⁵. None of the other reviewed projects invested as much energy and diligence in controlling and quality assurance as the CfL project team did. Fact which is justifiable taking in account the relatively

22 Including external audit imposed by SDC

23 Including the costs of the seconded monitoring expert by SDC

24 SDC overhead costs in HQs Switzerland

25 cf. www.sdc-cashprojects.ch/en/Home/SDC_Cash_Workbook

high cash grant paid to the beneficiaries (BDT 15'000 equivalent to 100 day-wages or more than 3 monthly salaries).

The CfL project is the best monitored, evaluated, documented and validated of all projects, such providing profound insights on the use of distributed cash grants by the beneficiaries and lessons learned for future projects.

However, with the same team, a CfL project with twice or three times the number of beneficiaries could have been implemented with only slightly elevated operational costs, such having reduced considerably its overhead and average costs per beneficiary.

Recommendations (financial efficiency):

17. In order to allow a serious analysis of invested funds, a diligent budgeting and financial reporting must be postulated from all partner organizations, providing them with clear requirements and minimal standards for budgeting and reporting.
18. SDC should improve considerably its monitoring capacities – especially during high pressure emergency and early recovery phases – in order to enforce claimed standards and best practices within their national and international implementing partners.
19. With regard to an optimization of overhead and implementing costs, one million Swiss francs have to be considered to be the absolute minimum for the implementation of a cash based intervention. Acceptable become overhead and implementing costs in cash based projects of at least CHF 2 million and more.

4.2 Return on investment

Introduction: In an emergency context, a calculation of the return on investment (ROI) may not be appropriate at all, since the objective of any emergency relief is purely humanitarian and aims at saving lives and assets. But, when it comes to early recovery and rehabilitation activities, the ROI becomes an issue since many of the projects aim to re-establish the livelihoods and means of production of targeted population. The success of an intervention can – among others – is measured by the ROI on beneficiaries' balance. If the investment (the means of production donated to the beneficiary) triggers a nonrecurring or recurring income that can be charged against the value of the donation, a positive ROI is given, and the donors' investment show a multiplier effect. If beneficiaries don't achieve to benefit from the donated means of production, the investment generates no ROI and is not effective since its objective (to generate income) is not achieved.

Findings and discussion: In the early recovery phase, most of the visited projects concentrated on the provision of productive assets for the targeted beneficiaries, in such manner aiming to re-establish their basis of production and trigger recurring incomes. The largely applied cash for work approach seemed to achieve this objective for the individual beneficiary only partially, since the allowed number of working days per beneficiary was always limited (up to 25 days) and day-wages (BDT 150-200) were relatively low in comparison to the huge needs and the costs of productive assets. Nevertheless, monitoring data of the Ashroy and Rupantar cash for work projects as well as of the UNDP cash for work projects showed that a good part of the earned money was invested in some income generating means or activities, equally for men and women.

Some of the projects funded or co-funded by SDC, documented the return on their investment specifically. In the FAO project, a total estimated benefit from the project intervention in the live-stock sector is reported to sum up to more than US\$ 12'281'000 (or about US\$ 49 per beneficiary household)²⁶. In the same FAO project, it was estimated that the value of crops and vegetables that were produced with the assistance of the project summed up to US\$ 19'695'000 (or about US\$ 63 per beneficiary household)²⁷.

On the other hand, the UNDP project reports in total 629 km of roads repaired, along with eight embankments and dams, 88 educational institutions, 126 religious centres and 1'656 ponds, canals and gardens. The cash for work approach therefore created vital employment that aided the affected local economy to recover. Though the return on this investment may perhaps not be broken down to the individual, clearly, the positive impacts have been substantial for the recovery of the communities.

No monitoring data was available to systematically assess the ROI of distributed winter and spring vegetable seeds and other agricultural inputs of the Ashroy and Rupantar early recovery assistance, nor could we systematically assess the productive use of distributed toolkits for craftsmen, rickshaw vans, repaired power tillers or country boats. However, during our interviews with beneficiaries the appropriateness and usefulness of this assistance often was emphasized.

Since the cash grant given by SDC's CfL project was substantially higher than the money to be earned participating in cash for work programs, almost all beneficiaries invested big parts of it in productive assets and started or re-started income generating activities. The majority of beneficiaries invested in agriculture for paddy production on leased land, very little portion invested in vegetable and other crops. Most of those who invested in livestock bought a cow. An evaluation after a year showed that investments in aqua culture and fishing as well as the trade to local markets returned about double the money invested. On the other hand, investments in livestock seemed to help more re-establishing subsistence economy and giving comparably low returns.

The prevention of the loss of lives and assets may be regarded as ROI as well. Therefore, all project activities with an awareness and/or capacity building component on how to protect lives and assets from damage or loss in future disaster situations, will most probably have a positive ROI in a near or far future. Quite impressive was our perception of people's awareness on how to protect their assets in case of cyclone alarm; everywhere we asked in the Bagerhat and Khulna district, people mentioned Ashroy's capacity and awareness building activities of the past years. Many of the beneficiaries we talked to mentioned that they had been instructed by their children who had received correspondent instructions in school through Rupantar's project activities. This is not a guarantee that in a future cyclone no lives or assets will be lost or damaged, but the chances to overcome next cyclone with less damages and fewer death tolls are today higher as the result of an effective capacity and awareness building. In fact, many people could already during cyclone AILA benefit from better preparedness.

Another example of efficiently invested funds was the FAO's farmer school project (in collaboration with the NGO Muslim Aid) where cyclone SIDR affected farmers during several months were instructed and capacitated in the better use of agriculture assets and inputs. This education 'in classes' spontaneously triggered some spin-offs.

26 It was assumed that 325'000 cattle that received Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) vaccines would contribute 5 Kg of meat each due to saved from the disease. It was also estimated that 25 litres of milk would be added from the milking cows due saved from FMD that has severe effects on milk production.

27 Total estimated production and price based on the conventional data was taken into consideration while estimating the quantity and value of the produce from crops cultivated with the help of the project inputs.

Resulting better earnings than before, some of the farmers formed saving groups and established revolving emergency funds, and most of them did teach continuously their neighbours and/or relatives in what they had learned in the FAO's farmer school, such multiplying acquired knowledge.

Recommendations (return on investment):

20. The return on investment on productive assets (such as livestock or agricultural assets) can considerably be raised by giving additional advice and support to the beneficiaries on how to use and make best benefit of the donation (technical trainings).
21. FAO's farmer schools project showed excellent results. It should be extended to livestock training and, especially in the Bagerhat and Khulna districts, also to fishery and aquaculture. Farmers' schools dedicated to small livestock production could address particularly women.
22. Projects that include multiplier components should be favoured since one invested Swiss Franc will trigger more effect, or more beneficiaries will be reached than with projects that do not rely on multiplier effects. The donation of production goods should – if possible and appropriate – be preferred over non-durable goods.

4.3 Human resources efficiency and division of labour

Introduction: Emergency relief and early recovery activities are intensive in the use of human resources. Highly complex circumstances after disasters require special knowledge and skills. In such kind of situation, additional efforts are needed to cope with an often sheer unlimited workload. Additionally, the complexity of the situation often obstructs traditional and convenient operating principles, but demands innovative ways or new methods. Efficiency in the use of human resources is therefore imperative. However, it's hard to be measured in absolute terms since benchmarks for an objective comparison are absent. Due to the missing facts and figures concerning the use of human resources in SDC's response to the 2007 post flood and post SIDR, we were not able to assess the related efficiency during this emergency relief and early recovery activities. Instead, as SDC, like most international agencies, works in Bangladesh through other international organizations as well as through local NGOs and in cooperation with governmental institutions, we could appraise the efficiency of the 'division of labour' between SDC and its partner organizations.

Findings and discussion: SDC disposes of a well established institutional network in Bangladesh, due to the long lasting regional cooperation program. After the 2007 floods and SIDR, SDC consequently made use of this network to address the needs of affected population in an effective way, as we described in the sections above. Responding to the emergencies through existing partners like UNDP, FAO, IC or SRC, CMES, Ashroy, Rupantar or BURO Bangladesh was not only effective, but also efficient by making reasonable use of a division of labour. There were mainly two ways of division of labour to be observed:

Working with direct implementing partners such as Red Cross, CMES, BURO Bangladesh, Ashroy or Rupantar, SDC made direct use of their nationwide community based network on a grass root level, and therefore addressed the targeted population in need directly.

Working with UNDP, FAO and IC on the other hand, SDC addressed the beneficiaries more indirectly, since these organizations are intermediaries who themselves dispose of an own predefined national network of preselected, qualified and well known local NGOs.

When comparing the number of beneficiaries reached, working with direct implementing national partners was more challenging and needed far more human resources and therefore was less efficient than working through the big intermediaries. This is intuitively comprehensible since time and human resources consuming tasks (such as the selection, qualifying, contracting, monitoring and controlling of implementing partners) were delegated to UNDP, FAO and IC, who then took charge against payment of a fee. Working with and through UNDP, FAO and IC, SDC was able to address a multiple number of beneficiaries through a few big 'quasi contractors', with the evident disadvantage of less or lost transparency and minimal management control over the implementation of the commissioned emergency relief and early recovery activities. However, UN-organizations usually apply standard procedures up to date and according to the standards, and their projects are as a rule well monitored and documented. The same should be assumed for IC, since they are internationally active around the world and do charge the correspondent fees.

The community based approach of national grass root level NGOs may not be efficient with regard to the use of human resources, but it guarantees high participation and empowerment of the target population, resulting – as shown earlier – in widely accepted solutions accompanied by high satisfaction of the beneficiaries. Efficiency may in that way be 'sacrificed' in favour of high relevance. The working together with these NGOs has the positive side effect of supporting the use of local resources, since they follow a community based approach.

In emergency situations, international agencies normally back up their regular on site teams with experts from abroad, who admittedly often lack knowledge concerning the environment of the host country but bring in specific expertise in managing such situations. So did SDC deploying to Bangladesh members of the Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) for short time support of the COOF as well as for the direct implementation of the CfL project. Due to the militia nature of the SHA, a high turnover of these personnel is more the rule than the exception. In the case of the CfL project, special circumstances boosted this turnover what resulted to have a negative effect on the human resource efficiency, but not on the effectiveness of the project.

Recommendations (HR efficiency & division of labour):

23. Regularly working with national NGOs, and building up permanently their management skills 'in peace time', enhances the availability of quickly operational standby capacities for future emergency situations and the efficiency of the cooperation with these partners.
24. Working directly with national partner NGOs makes much sense in order to target specific beneficiary groups or geographical areas where those national partners are active and well anchored. When it comes to the investment of large amounts and the task of reaching millions of beneficiaries in a wide area, the working through intermediaries like UNDP or FAO is much more efficient²⁸.
25. An ongoing and close networking with large international partners such as UNDP or/and FAO possibly enhances the transparency and facilitates the collaboration in future emergency relief and early recovery operations. This could be reinforced by associating a secondment of members of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit to these organizations (as done in the case of UNDP seconding a Swiss monitoring expert).

28 We are not talking about effectiveness. As we have seen during our field visits, small partner NGOs have been equally effective in their emergency relief and early recovery activities as big international organizations.

4.4 Conclusions (efficiency)

Overall financial efficiency of the SDC funded emergency relief and early recovery activities seem to be reasonable (compared to common standards), although a detailed financial analysis could not be done. Budgeting and financial reporting should be improved considerably, what could be supported by SDC by setting up and consequently claiming correspondent standards when working with implementing partners. A targeted capacity building with SDC's main national partner NGOs would be as helpful as an improvement of SDC's own monitoring skills and capacities.

Investing considerable financial resources in few large indirect implementing partners (intermediaries) such as UNDP and FAO is considerably more efficient than investing small amounts with many small direct implementing national partners. However, this higher efficiency is at the cost of transparency and management control. For SDC, the strategic mix of small but locally well established national and/or regional implementing partners (such as Ashroy and Rupantar) and large international agencies (such as UNDP or FAO), has provided high flexibility and rich alternatives according to the changing requirements.

Finally, most of the SDC funded early recovery activities – including such with purely humanitarian character – triggered recurring income and therefore generated a positive return on donors' investment.

5 Performance

In this section of the report we present and discuss findings related to the networking and coordination within the institutional networking framework of Bangladesh. We also examine cooperation processes and management performance (including monitoring & evaluation, documentation) between SDC and its partner organizations as well as within SDC.

5.1 Networking, coordination and cooperation

Introduction: Since SDC records a longstanding presence in Bangladesh, it's well known and recognized within the international community of regional cooperation as well as within governmental authorities at national and regional levels. SDC disposes nowadays of a widespread networking framework that helps considerably in addressing effectively and efficiently the needs of Bangladeshi government and population for development aid and other international support. But is this network also useful in emergency situations, and to what extent and how was it used by SDC during its response to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR?

Findings and discussion: We consider that SDC's networking and coordination performance to be substantial at a political and strategic level, also due to its long-lasting presence in Bangladesh. SDC's representatives are regularly present in donor meetings and other 'high level' coordination networks. However, the intensity of this presence as well as the quality and benefit of the networking often is subject to personal relationships of the organizations' representatives – finally, every networking is 'people business'. Frequent turnovers in high rank personnel are hindering long lasting personal partnerships and close and smooth cooperation.

Having this facts in mind, the fast reaction (to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR) of the recently established new head of cooperation in the summer of 2007, is remarkable and only explicable by the well established network prepared by his predecessors and by his own wide experience on how to move in similar context. The quick setup of the first emergency relief response with IC, Ashroy or Rupantar (amongst others) clearly shows the advantage of having viable standby partners that are well and wide spread community based in targeted regions. As pointed out in previous sections above, SDC was able to respond to the needs of the affected population in a relevant way. The well working cooperation between SDC and the UN-organizations FAO and UNDP then allowed to setup an emergency relief and early recovery package at large scale, reaching far more than a million persons in need with only two contracts and one single credit proposal at SDC's HQs in Bern.

While examining the networking and coordination at an operational level, SDC does not appear to have fully contributed the same intensity and quality as at the political and strategic level. The lack of the needed human resource might have played a part in this. For Instance, as already mentioned in the relevance's section, SDC did not actively participated in joint needs assessment of UN agencies and the Bangladeshi government, as well as in the different UN-clusters setup during the emergency phase.

With regard to SDC's national and regional implementing partners (such as Ashroy and Rupantar), only on rare occasions they have access to high level networks and coordination platforms on international or national level. Though, in order to compensate this missing opportunities, they are much more involved on operational coordination – be it with other NGOs or with local authorities on regional and communal level.

However, coordination not always means cooperation. Differences in guiding principles, vast competition in fund raising as well as power struggles often limit the willingness to real cooperation of national (and international) NGOs, with sometime the result of hampering the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian aid and regional cooperation and causing redundancy and doubling of efforts. Despite this, within SDC's selected partners no such redundancy could be identified – to the contrary; SDC's funding and setup of its projects promoted close cooperation among the implementing partners.

Recommendations (networking, coordination & cooperation):

26. Networking and coordination on an operational level (such as in UN-clusters or in joint assessment missions) should be enforced, although correspondent human resources must be freed or put at disposal additionally. Specifically in emergency situations, an additional person (e.g. member of the SHA) – not directly involved in operations and management – should guarantee an ongoing networking and coordination in order to improve relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of SDC's emergency relief and early recovery response.
27. Cooperation amongst SDC's implementing partners may be enhanced and pushed by appropriate project setup and contracting (donor driven) as well as by the establishment of formal and informal platforms for a mutual exchange on experiences and best practices.

5.2 SDC internal coordination and cooperation

Introduction: For the first time at this level, SDC's RC and HA co-funded an emergency relief and early recovery package. Being an innovative approach, SDC COOF in Bangladesh was challenged both by new demands and unusual processes. The results of this innovative approach must be considered remarkable, although several major or minor difficulties had to be overcome first. Some of them could have been avoided; others must be avoided in future as they are known and analysed. We'll try to list the most important ones and draw lessons learnt.

Findings and discussion: First, the assessed achievements in the field are evidence of a successful coordination and cooperation between HA and RC mainly initiated by the head of regional cooperation in Bangladesh and supported opportunistically by HQs. The subsequent coordination and cooperation between the two departments at SDC's HQs in Bern at one hand, and between HQs and the COOF in Bangladesh on the other could be a prototype of inner-institutional and interdepartmental collaboration. As mentioned before analogously, SDC's interdepartmental networking and coordination is well established at a political and strategic level.

At an operational level, when it comes to real cooperation, SDC's operational divisions cannot yet rely on long-standing and institutionalized processes. In the case of the assessed emergency relief and early recovery response to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR, this fact led to different inconsistencies and/or minor problems in HQs as well as in the COOF at field level. Although we list below some of the observed consequences in a quite generalized manner, they do not at all apply for all projects or activities.

Without paying much attention to individual reasons and/or responsibilities, (from our point of view) an unclear allocation of responsibilities under unusual circumstances, combined with a relatively high turnover of HA personnel in the field, resulted in:

- ▶ unsystematic or missing monitoring and follow up of operations
- ▶ unsystematic or missing evaluation and quality assurance of projects
- ▶ partially insufficient or missing progress and final reportings
(from implementing partners towards SDC and from SDC COOF towards HQs)
- ▶ unsystematic and partially incomplete filing of documents in HQs and COOF
(it seemed that HQs and COOF do not apply the same systematic in filing documents, or at least the existing filing systematic is not documented for new personnel in order to allow them to track and find easily the documents filed by their predecessors)
- ▶ unmethodical or missing documentation of projects' achievements
- ▶ no individual or overall appraisal/validating of achievements, therefore no learning from gained experiences (yet could be initiated by this review)

On the other hand, this unusual way of innovative interdepartmental funding and implementation, resulted in relevant achievements of a dimension that never would have been within reach neither by RC alone nor by an isolated HA operation. Aristotle's dictum 'the whole (thing) is greater than the sum of its parts', in this concerted emergency relief and early recovery response to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR became true. All positive aspects have already been mentioned in the sections above, but changes that address the weakness presented earlier are not insurmountable and necessary in order to generate more valuable synergies in favour of increased efficiency and effectiveness.

Recommendations (SDC internal coordination & cooperation):

28. RC's and HA's co-funding and joint implementation of emergency relief and early recovery projects should become a standard approach, specifically in COOFs run by RC and with an established network of implementing partners.
29. The procedures necessary in return, as well as the corresponding coordination and cooperation mechanism, have to be formalized in order to be prepared for an appropriate response to upcoming emergencies.
30. Special focus should be dedicated to define systematic and joint monitoring/follow-up methods with clear allocation of responsibilities.
31. If there is no permanent humanitarian coordinator based in the COOF, HA should from the beginning deploy a responsible person to support COOF staff during the entire phase of planning, set up and implementation as a binding link to HQs/HA and to ensure consistency and continuation of operations. High turnover of personnel must be avoided.
32. The documentation and appraisal of projects' achievements should be systematically planned and carried out in order to capitalize experiences and draw lessons learnt both for RC and HA (knowledge management).

5.3 Management capacity and implementation

Introduction: In Bangladesh, SDC has long lasting working experience with direct implementing partners such SRC, BURO Bangladesh, CMES, Ashroy or Rupantar, and know quite well their individual strengths and weaknesses with regard to management skills and capacities. Instead, while working with intermediaries like IC, FAO or UNDP, SDC has to rely on their experience with their preselected, qualified and approved national partner NGOs without being aware of their individual competences. This section examine how the national implementing partner NGOs performed in the SDC funded response to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR?

Findings and discussion: As a result of our field visits and based on documentary studies, we found enough evidence to consider the management competences of Ashroy and Rupantar and the national/local partners of IC, FAO and UNDP sufficient and adequate for effective performance according to SDC's requirements²⁹, whereby IC and the UN-organizations came closest to international standards of good practice specifically what concerns the planning and methodical monitoring. However, in none of the reports we found enough data related to the use of resources to assess their management/implementing efficiency.

Their final operational reports are all well detailed in terms of listing activities, explaining procedures and describing own performance. Needs assessment, targeting, tender and purchase of goods and services as well as their distribution are well documented. But as mentioned before, detailed financial reporting is comparatively poor in all reports and did not meet our requirements for a proper assessment of their resource allocation and overall management.

As for comparison, SDC/HA's management performance within the CfL project was outstanding and should be taken as a benchmark. Evidence in the field and project's documentation attest highly professional and systematic procedures (at any stage of the project implementation) as well as effectiveness and efficiency in the allocation of resources and overall management (including monitoring, evaluation and validation/appraisal of achievements and problems). The CD prepared at the end of the project, allows the tracing of every single step from the very beginning (TORs for the assessment, first assessments, project ideas and alternatives, risk analysis etc. etc.) up to the end of the project (results of final evaluation workshop, media information, project fact sheet, etc.).

Recommendations (management capacity & implementation):

33. Direct implementing partners should be supported in result oriented planning and management of projects (logical framework approach, project cycle management) in order to establish a common understanding of guiding planning and management principles according to internationally established standards (e.g. as defined by Worldbank, ECHO or UN-organizations). SDC HQs provides correspondent workshops for COOF staff and their national partners.
34. SDC should define and communicate clear minimal requirements concerning monitoring and reporting (cf. recommendation 18). Where needed, national partners should be (individually) provided with correspondent tools and/or capacitating in order to meet these requirements.
35. At the end of any similar relief & early recovery package, SDC should set up a proper evaluation and validation/appraisal of achievements, including a decent documentation for institutional knowledge management – a basic requirement for any RC or HA project of comparable size.

29 The other organizations SRC, BURO Bangladesh, CMES we did not assess (cf. chap. 'focus of review').

5.4 Conclusions (performance and cooperation)

SDC disposes of a widespread networking framework that helps considerably in addressing effectively and efficiently the needs of Bangladeshi government and population for development aid as well as humanitarian aid. It worked out to be sustainable also in emergency situations. Networking and inter-institutional coordination of SDC is considerable on a political and strategic level, but comparatively underdeveloped on the operational level. National implementing partners don't have equally access to high level networks. However, on an operational level they cooperated in favour of effectiveness and efficiency, well coordinated by SDC and SDC's intermediate partner organizations UNDP, FAO and IC (donor driven and pragmatic cooperation).

RC and HA co-funded and jointly implemented an emergency relief and early recovery response to the 2007 floods and cyclone SIDR. It's an innovative approach absolutely in line with the goals of REO and therefore could be a prototype of inner-institutional and interdepartmental collaboration. However, improvements are as necessary as possible to come by in order to generate not only synergies but also make proper use of them for the benefit of countries and populations in need.

In Bangladesh, SDC disposes of a well established network of implementing partners. Their management competences are well developed for effective regional cooperation as well as for humanitarian aid activities. Yet, mainly national NGOs lack a common understanding of basic result oriented management principles and could benefit of correspondent training in LFA/PCM methodology. Monitoring and financial reporting must be improved in order to meet internationally established benchmarks, nevertheless it's SDC's task to define and communicate its minimal requirements as well as to give support where needed to enable partner organizations appropriately.

6 Future orientation of Humanitarian Support Programme

This section, by building on the success presented earlier, will suggest key pillars on which to build the future orientation of SDC Humanitarian Program: DRR and LRRD, Partnership and Coordination and SDC Whole Government Approach.

As already mentioned, some of the achievements and cohesiveness of the 2007 post SIDR and post floods response have been rather fragmentized than planned. And planning is the result of a rigorous thinking and conceptual process in pre-disaster periods, where being prepared will define the quality of future interventions.

6.1 DRR and LRRD: learning from HA interventions

In the case of DRR, the draft DRR program contains elements of a critical analytical process of the Bangladesh context and suggests key areas of expansion. The SDC DRR strategy does not build upon the successes of DRR activities in the previous SDC humanitarian response (2007 floods and SIDR) such as the awareness campaign by SDC partners, the crop protection techniques of the FAO, the community empowerment approach of IC.

By defining and sharing key approaches, achievements and learning of the SIDR and post floods interventions, SDC will be able to incorporate key elements of the HA actions in RC projects, where, as suggested earlier, DRR and more in general 'protection' mechanisms for the targeted communities did not seem to be very effective. HA should lead not simply the mainstreaming and integration of DRR concepts in development programs, but the set up of ad hoc DRR components and action lines.

The LRRD also needs to be thought through. This review presented striking and low cost approaches that have built households' assets, intended as physical as well as human, to move out of poverty. The importance of cash to rebuild productive assets, technical trainings to increase agriculture production as well as the extensive work in empowering community to reinforce their role as major stakeholders in development, needs to be considered in any future humanitarian interventions. Financing projects in normal times which strengthen DRR in terms of community based awareness and disaster response and of building resilient assets (such as FAO's initiatives) should be considered to be financed.

*The programme is focused on **three action lines**:*

A: *Mainstreaming DRR within SDC and its partners' development projects / programmes*

B: *Public awareness and preparedness to improve response capacity at community and at individual level*

C: *Empowerment through capacity development of responsible agencies at national and local levels*

SDC DRR Programme for Bangladesh 2010-2012, Draft p.14

6.2 Partnership – Coordination

The DRR draft program has identified several gaps and potential areas of interventions which can also be expanded to the relief and recovery realm. These gaps cannot be addressed by SDC alone, but through a multi-stakeholder approach, where SDC can assume a facilitating role. This will require extensive networking and strategic partnerships with major national and international stakeholders such as universities, International Organizations, government departments, large programs (CDMP and CLP) for seminars, approaches sharing exercises, conferences and so forth.

The mix of partners of the 2007 response represents a good starting point but need to be extended to major government programs and research centres.

All strategic partnerships set up in 'peace times', with major international or national organization will be useful for immediate response activities as well as for effective coordination if a major disaster strikes in the future of Bangladesh.

6.3 SDC whole government approach

The successful and innovative strategy pursued by the SDC in Bangladesh, which allowed to shift resources from RC budget to humanitarian aid purposes and allocate them needs oriented, though improvement are needed, should be systematized as a standard practice, rather than just as an exception to the rule.

A more sophisticated 'modus operandi' has to be set up such as contingency plans or clear predefined financial procedures and allocation of responsibilities between RC and HA (other ideas have been presented earlier in our recommendations).

Does a RC-HA cooperation make sense? 'Yes definitely' we think.

The RC-HA cooperation in Bangladesh clearly produced positive results; the challenge ahead is improving pre-disaster planning for future operations of similar purpose and size, in order to act more result oriented than input driven. A present and future RC-HA cooperation is beneficial to both departments and should be expanded to technical exchange (learning and approaches) rather than just to financial cooperation. Such a cooperation – especially in a disaster prone country like Bangladesh – may result in 'safety net' for RC's long-term projects, preventing mayor fall backs in development projects caused by natural disasters (e.g. LEAF or AFIP).

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11a	SDC/HA (2007)	7F-06030.01 / Credit Proposal. Strengthening of Humanitarian Aid in COOF
11b	SDC/HA (2008)	7F-06030.02 / Credit Proposal. Administrative costs of humanitarian programme in Bangladesh
11c	SDC/HA (2010)	7F-06030.03 / Credit Proposal. Administrative costs regional DRR coordinator
11d	SDC/HA (2010)	7F-06030.04 / Credit Proposal. Administrative costs assistant coordinator and DRR coordinator south asia
11e	SDC/HA (2010)	Operational final report on Strengthening of Humanitarian Aid in COOF
11f	SDC/HA (2010)	Operational final report on Administrative costs of humanitarian programme
7F-06215 Community based DRR Program in cyclone SIDR affected areas. Multipurpose cyclone shelters (SDC/HA)		
12a	SDC/HA (2008)	7F-06215.01 / Credit Proposal CB-DRR Program in cyclone SIDR affected areas
12b	SDC/HA (2010)	Presentation on community based Disaster Risk Reduction Program
12c	SDC/HA (2010)	Presentation on community based multipurpose cyclone shelter in Sarankhola
7F-06366 Cash for Livelihood project in AILA affected communities in Khulna and Bagerhat districts (SDC/HA)		
13a	SDC/RC (2009)	7F-06366.01 / Credit Proposal. Cash for Livelihoods project AILA
13b	SDC/HA (2009)	7F-07195.02 / Credit Proposal. CfL project AILA - Small Actions
13c	SDC/HA (2009)	Project Outline (Project document) for CfL AILA
13d	SDC/HA (2009)	Presentation of results of baseline monitoring (before cash distribution)
13e	SDC/HA (2009)	Presentation of results of monitoring of use of cash (after cash distribution)
13f	SDC/HA (2010)	Report of final evaluation workshop CfL AILA
13g	SDC/HA (2010)	Presentation of CfL project AILA final results
13h	SDC/HA (2010)	Presentation of CfL project AILA Small Actions
General documents		
14a	Collins (2009)	Portfolios of the poor. How the world's poor live on \$3 a day.
14b	DMIC (2007)	Cyclone SIDR-damage information (as of 19 Dec 2007)
14c	GoBD (2007)	Consolidated damage and loss assessment, lessons learnt from the flood 2007 and future action plan
14d	GoBD (2008)	Cyclone SIDR in Bangladesh. Damage, loss and needs assessment for disaster recovery and reconstruction
14e	Hoque (2010)	Evaluation report on gender sensitive community based disaster awareness and preparedness program
14f	InfoResources Focus (2009/2)	Disaster Risk Reduction: A gender and livelihood perspective
14g	Jones (2008)	Final report on DFID's disaster response mechanism
14h	SDC/HA (2010)	SDC Disaster Risk Reduction programme for Bangladesh 2010-12
14i	SDC/RC (2007)	SDC gender guideline for SCO-Bangladesh and its partners
14j	SDC/RC (2008)	SDC Cooperation Strategy Bangladesh 2008-12

B. Persons and organisations consulted

Where	Organization	Whom
Dhaka	SDC COOF	Joseph Guntern , Head of Cooperation (RC/HA) Matthias Anderegg , Regional DRR Coordinator South Asia (HA) Farid Hasan Ahmed , Senior Programme Officer DRR/HA & Livelihoods
Khulna	SDC office	Niaz Nazim Chowdhury Avi , former PO Cash for Livelihoods Project
Bern	SDC HQs	Jacqueline Schmid , Programme Manager Bangladesh RC Andreas Graf , Programme Officer Bangladesh HA Barbara Rothenberger , Focal Point DRR HA / former PO Bangladesh ³⁰ Karl-Friedrich Glombitza , former DRR Coordinator South Asia (HA) ³¹ Edwin Brunner , former DRR Coordinator South Asia (HA)
Dhaka	UNDP	Steven Goldfinch , Programme Officer BMM Mozharul Huq , Senior Advisor Disaster Management Mohammad Sifayer Ullah , Programme Analyst Disaster Management
Dhaka	Intercooperation	ATM Azmul Huda , Deputy Delegate Marcus Jenal , Programme Officer
Sunamganj	Intercooperation Regional Office	AK Osman Haruni , Regional Coordinator (and field staff) Zahid Hasan , Project Manager Sudipta Chowdhury , Programme Assistant
Sunamganj	DNMS UNMS	Mohammad Fozlur Rahman , President Sunamganj DNMS Muhammad Luftar Rahman , President Bishwamvarpur UNMS
Khulna	Rupantar	Rafiqul Islam Khokan , Founder and Executive Director (and field staff)
Khulna	Ashroy Foundation	Momotaz Khatun , Founder and Executive Director (and field staff)
Bagerhat	Muslim Aid	Shafiqul Islam , Livelihood Coordinator
Dhaka	FAO	Adrianus (Ad) Spijkers , FAO Representative in Bangladesh Mohammad Abu Sayeed Mia , Livestock Production Specialist Nan Mon , Operations Officer
Khulna	FAO	Mr. Janangir , Field Officer Barisal (and field staff)

³⁰ by phone

³¹ ibidem

C. Executed activities / Itinerary 11.07. – 25.07.2010

When		Where	What
06.07.10	Morning	Bern, Ausserhollingen HQs SDC/RC	Briefing with PO SDC/RC (Herrmann)
	Afternoon	Bern, Köniz HQs SDC/HA Dhaka, SDC/Coof	Briefing with PO SDC/HA (Herrmann) Briefing with head of SDC/HA (Ragno)
11.07.10		Basel – Zürich – Dubai - Dhaka	Travel Switzerland – Bangladesh (Herrmann)
12.07.10	Afternoon	Dhaka, SDC/Coof	Briefing with heads of SDC/RC and SDC/HA Preparation of field visit schedule
13.07.10	Morning	Dhaka, office Intercooperation	Meeting with representatives Intercooperation
	Afternoon	Dhaka, office UNDP	Meeting with representatives UNDP
14.07.10	Morning	Dhaka – Jessore – Khulna	Travel by airplane and by car
	Afternoon	Khulna	Meeting With Former Staff of SDC's Cash for livelihood Project CfL
15.07.10	Morning	Sharonkhola Upazila, Kadamtala, Rayenda and Khontakata Unions	Meetings with beneficiary groups of ASHROY's Emergency Relief and Early Recovery Projects
	Afternoon	Rayenda Union, Parisad village	Meeting with local authorities (Ward Chairman)
16.07.10	Morning	Sharonkhola Upazila, Khoulia and Nisanbaria Unions, Villages: Baroikhali, Vashandol, Parisad, Pasurbunia, Babuan	Meetings with beneficiary groups of RUPAN-TAR's Emergency Relief and Early Recovery Projects
	Afternoon		
17.07.10	Morning	Sharonkhola Upazila, Rayenda and Khontakata Unions, Villages: Jilbunia, Rajoir and Badal	Meetings with beneficiary groups of FAO's Emergency Relief and Early Recovery Projects
	Afternoon		
18.07.10	Morning	Khulna – Jessore – Dhaka	Travel by car and by airplane
	Afternoon	Dhaka, SDC/Coof	Meeting with representatives of FAO
19.07.10	Morning	Dhaka – Sylhet – Sunamganj	Travel by airplane and by car
	Afternoon	Sunamganj office Intercooperation	Meeting with IC staff, briefing on PFRP
20.07.10	Morning	Jamalganj Upazila, Fenarbank Union, Soyhara village	Meeting beneficiary groups of IC's Post Flood Rehabilitation Project (LEAF), household visits
	Afternoon	Bishwamvarpur Upazila, Dakkhin Badaghat Union, Purangaon village Bishwamvarpur Upazila, Polash Union, Polash Bazar village	Meeting with representatives of Cluster platform of IC's Post Flood Rehabilitation Project (LEAF) Meeting with representatives of Nursery Associations at Upazila and District level (AFIP)
21.07.10	Morning	Sunamganj office Intercooperation Sunamganj – Sylhet – Dhaka	Wrap up and Debriefing with IC staff Travel by car and by airplane
	Afternoon	Dhaka, SDC/Coof	Meeting with head of SDC/RC. Analysis of field visits, drafting of debriefing notes
22.07.10	Morning	Dhaka, SDC/Coof	Debriefing with heads of SDC/RC and SDC/HA
	Afternoon	Dhaka, SDC/Coof	Wrap up, development of review report structure
23.07.10		Dhaka	Drafting of review report
24.07.10		Dhaka	Drafting of review report
25.07.10		Dhaka – Dubai – Zürich – Basel	Travel Bangladesh – Switzerland (Herrmann)

D. Emergency relief and early recovery activities

7F-Referenz	Action / Name of project and objectives (of emergency relief & early recovery activities)	Implementer
Recovery of nurseries associated with AFIP		
7F-03804	<p>Objectives: Most affected nursery owners resume their business (rehabilitation of seed beds, support to seed collection, support to new plantations), and thus, secure their assets. Self-help capacity of nursery associations at district and upazilla level to manage such disasters in the future are strengthened.</p> <p>Project area: AFIP's work areas in 169 upazillas in 30 districts</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 1'542 Nursery Owners</p> <p>Main results: To face the devastating flood occurred in 2007; AFIP operated a post flood rehabilitation program (PFRP) for its affected nursery owners over the year. Under this programme, a total of BDT 8'673'500 was disbursed to 1'542 nursery owners as interest free loan for a 2 years maximum. After the payback to the nursery associations, 50% of the money will be used by the DNMS and UNMA as an emergency fund for future disaster relief, and 50% as revolving/recurring fund for productive purposes of the associations.</p>	IC
Recovery of livelihoods of extreme poor flood-affected families associated with LEAF/SAAKTI		
7F-03402	<p>Objectives: Livelihood of most affected population in work areas of LEAF and SAAKTI are recovered, their productive activities are resumed and thus, their assets are secured.</p> <p>Project area: working area of LEAF/SAAKTI</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 31'100 flood-affected extreme poor households/families</p> <p>Main results: The rehabilitation inputs were divided into six packages, including (1) house and latrine repair /reconstruction, (2) poultry and small live-stock, (3) utensils, (4) tree saplings and vegetable seeds, (5) tube well repair / re-sinking, and (6) tools for government safety net programmes (Money for Work, Food for Work). All six packages covered a total of 31'100 households in 59 unions under 18 upazilas of 5 districts. IC's project contributed BDT 25'003'000, the beneficiaries, CBOs and communities themselves contributed an other BDT 4'217'900.</p>	IC
Rehabilitation assistance to flood victims of Tangail district		
7F-03331	<p>Objectives: Relevant social, economic and living conditions of the flood affected people in worst hit areas of Tangail district are re-established; measures for risk reduction and prevention against natural disasters are to improve livelihoods.</p> <p>Project area: 6 unions of 4 upazilas in Tangail district</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 2'950 flood-affected households/families</p> <p>Main results: 900 households were selected for low cost housing repair and reconstruction assistance. 1'450 families received sanitation and fresh drinking water facilities. The project provided agricultural rehabilitation assistance to 600 families.</p>	BURO Bangladesh

Recovery of installations at schools		
7F-03333	<p>Objectives: Providing emergency relief for flood affected people, most of them poor and lacking of resources to cope with the emergency. Livelihood and infrastructure in the worst flood hit project areas of CMES are restored and rehabilitated.</p> <p>Project area: 11 unions in 5 upazilas of Sirajganj and Tangail districts</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 14'493 families/households for emergency relief 22 basic and 6 advanced schools, 2 rural technology centres</p> <p>Main results: <i>no operational final report provided to evaluators</i></p>	CMES
Emergency response and early recovery for flood- and cyclone-affected farmers		
7F-05979 (actions 1&2)	<p>Objectives: Agriculture and livestock based livelihoods of poor farmers are restored. An immediate resumption of farming and livestock activities is secured.</p> <p>Project area: 84 flood- and cyclone-affected districts</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 568'283 most vulnerable farming/fishing households/families</p> <p>Main results: Total 140'334 beneficiaries received field crop cultivation inputs and 175'695 received vegetable seeds. 251'754 livestock farmer and 1'500 fish farmers were benefited from the project. Rice seeds along with urea was distributed to 63'000 farmers in cyclone areas. Maize along with urea was distributed among 8'800 beneficiaries in both floods and cyclone districts. Mung bean, Khesari, Black gram and Mustard seeds were distributed in 5 cyclone districts among 68'534 beneficiaries in 5 cyclone districts. Vegetable seeds were distributed in 29 floods and cyclone districts among 175'695 beneficiaries. 2'000 local female goats along with 50 MT of animal feeds and 1'000 sheds (2 animal/shed) was given to 1'000 beneficiaries of 2 cyclone affected districts. Moreover, 325'000 cattle, belonging to 250'754 households, were benefited by vaccination against FMD. 1'500 beneficiaries were benefited from 3 separate aquaculture packages of carp, galda (shrimp), and bagda (shrimp). All the packages were supported with feeds, and lime.</p>	FAO with DAE, DLS and DoF
Rehabilitation of flood and cyclone affected poor / recovery of livelihoods and productive structures		
7F-05979 (actions 3&4)	<p>Objectives: Livelihood of poorest affected by cyclone SIDR are secured. An immediate resumption of farming and livestock activities is enabled.</p> <p>Project area: 10 ten cyclone-affected districts</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 26'401 beneficiaries in cash for work, 12'000 households in housrepair</p> <p>Main results: Through provision of materials, labour and assistance, partially damaged houses of 12'000 families were repaired. Three pre-qualified partner NGOs implemented the community restoration project. Using a cash for work approach in ten cyclone-affected districts, the project recruited at least 26'401 people from the localities. It generated 402'025 work days (50% of them of women). In total, 629 km of roads were repaired, along with eight embankments and dams, 88 educational institutions, 126 religious centres, 1'656 ponds, canals and gardens, and 45 plinths were raised.</p>	UNDP with DAM, Prodipon, and BEES

Emergency relief for cyclone SIDR victims		
7F-05955	<p>Objectives: Immediate and subsequently short term recovery support for most affected population is provided.</p> <p>Project area: Districts of Bagerhat, Potuakhali, Pirojpur, Jhalakhathi and Madaripur</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 10'683 households/families (53'415 individual beneficiaries)</p> <p>Main results: Distribution of emergency relief packages (food and non food) to 10'683 families (kitchen set, water purification tablets, clothes, plastic sheets, blankets and other utils, and food).</p>	SRC/BDRC
Emergency relief for the cyclone SIDR affected victims in Khulna and Bagerhat districts		
7F-05978	<p>Objectives: Immediate and subsequently short term recovery support to most severely cyclone-affected population is provided.</p> <p>Project area: Districts of Bagerhat and Khulna</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 4'131 households/families</p> <p>Main results: Distribution of 4'131 sets of relief good provided per family included a food package with a 15-day food ration, clothes and household utensils. All relief goods were procured by the NGO partner from local suppliers mainly in Khulna.</p>	Rupantar & Ashroy
Livelihood support for cyclone SIDR affected people in Khulna and Bagerhat districts		
7F-06011	<p>Objectives: Enhanced capacity of the cyclone Sidr victims, whose livelihoods were affected, to overcome the loss of income and to re-start their economic activities.</p> <p>Project area: Districts of Bagerhat and Khulna</p> <p>Beneficiaries: 10'000 families winter vegetable seeds</p> <p>Main results: Cash for Work activities were implemented over the entire month of January. By the end of the months, 26'250 daily wages had been paid by Ashroy and 14'995 by Rupantar. One third of the persons contracted for the work were women. Seed for 10 types of winter vegetables was provided to 20'000 farmers in January, followed by a second distribution, this time of seed for 10 types of spring vegetables, in March/April. For the rehabilitation of rural productive infrastructure, 205 toolkits for craftsmen and 230 rickshaw vans were distributed. Additionally, 20 power tillers and 150 country boats were repaired. For the rehabilitation of drinking water supplies, altogether 35 new pond sand filters were constructed and handed over, benefiting more than 2'500 families from safe drinking water.</p>	Rupantar & Ashroy
Secondment of monitoring specialist to UNDP Dhaka		
7F-06029	<p>Objectives: UNDP is supported with assistance in the monitoring and reporting on the implementation of their emergency assistance programme to the targeted beneficiaries.</p> <p>Project area: Area of UNDP SIDR emergency & early recovery operations</p> <p>Beneficiaries: UNDP Monitoring Unit, UNDP Headquarters</p> <p>Main results: The SDC secondee was heading a monitoring team of eight people, including six field monitors. He provided tools, methodology and good practice to local staff in a 'capacity building' approach, especially in the knowledge management and coordination fields, what was very much appreciated.</p>	SDC/UNDP

Cash for Livelihood project in SIDR affected communities in Khulna and Bagerhat districts


7F- 06087	<p><u>Objectives:</u> Increased capacity of cyclone-affected farmers, fisherfolk and small enterprises owners, to overcome the loss of income in order to re-start their economic activities through a cash grant.</p> <p><u>Project area:</u> Saronkhola upazila of Bagherhat district</p> <p><u>Beneficiaries:</u> 2'962 most affected and vulnerable families/households</p> <p><u>Main results:</u> SDC successfully disbursed cash grants of BDT 15'000 to 2'962 beneficiary households. This increased the capacity of the cyclone SIDR affected families to overcome the loss of income to restart their economic activities through a one fold cash grant. The majority of the beneficiaries were fisherman (36%), farmers (22%) and small enterprise owners/traders (20%). Most of them restarted their previous business immediately after receiving the money, 96% beneficiaries invested their money within 3-5 days. 61% of the beneficiaries invested in one single business, 25% invested partially in a business and 13% invested in multiple lines of business. 4% did use the money nor start their business immediately. Beneficiaries invested the money in the sector of agriculture (35%), livestock (22%), fisheries (25%), small enterprises and other trades (16%), only 2% invested in transport business (rickshaw vans).</p>	SDC/HA
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Strengthening SDC COOF Dhaka with a specialized HA expert

7F-06030	<p><u>Objectives:</u> Cooperation office is strengthened with an assistant country director in charge of humanitarian affairs, to have a dedicated person responsible for all humanitarian activities related to cyclone SIDR as well as new HA activities.</p> <p><u>Project area:</u> Area of SDC's 2007 post flood and post SIDR emergency relief and early recovery operations</p> <p><u>Beneficiaries:</u> SDC Coordination office (Coof) in Dhaka</p> <p><u>Main results:</u> The SHA member to become Assistant Country Director had already organized the post-cyclone relief activities in November-December 2007 and participated in assessment missions. During the three months of his tenure, he worked about half of his time in the field and started setting up a field office in Khulna. When in Dhaka he participated in coordination meetings of the agencies involved in the relief effort. He installed an office at the ground floor of the Coof Dhaka. The administration (including accounting) of the HA projects became a fully integrated part of the Coof administration.</p>	SDC/HA
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E. Facts & figures; Post monsoon floods 2007


Flood affected districts



Districts affected	46
Households affected	3 million
Total estimated damages (loss and damages)	BDT 72'534,74 million
Major infrastructures damages and losses	32'000 Sq Km including the char areas of 6'000 sq km
Damaged shelters (totally and partially)	Eighty five thousand (85'000) houses were completely damaged, while almost one million suffered partial damages.
Human casualties	649
Food and agriculture sector damage	1,12 million ha of cropland
Other	About 70-75% of the total damages and losses where in the crop, livestock, fisheries and forestry sectors.

F. Facts & figures; Cyclone SIDR 2007

Areas hit by SIDR



Districts affected	30 districts
Households affected	2,3 million
Total estimated damages (loss and damages)	BDT 115'569 million
Major infrastructures damages and losses	BDT 75'000 million
Damaged shelters (totally and partially)	565'000 houses were completely damaged, while 950'000 houses suffered partial damages.
Human casualties	3'406 (1'001 missing)
Food and agriculture sector damage	1,5 million ha of cropland
Other	It is estimated that about 2 million people have lost income and employment in the more affected districts. These districts also have some of the highest poverty rates in the country (according to data from the 2005 Household Survey, poverty levels range between 35% to more than 50% of the population).

G. Terms of Reference



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
South Asia Division

SDC Copy

Annex

Terms of references

Contract no. 81011884 (Mandate type B)

SDC's Humanitarian Response Programme, Bangladesh

Review of the Post Flood and Post Cyclone 2007 Actions

Background

Bangladesh was struck by devastating floods in two spells, during 2007 Monsoon; about 60% of Bangladesh's area was affected, taking lives, damaging crops, houses and other productive assets of people as well as roads and other public infrastructure.

Cyclone SIDR hit Bangladesh in the evening of 15 November 2007. The cyclone made landfall across the Southern Coast; it had a radius of 500 kilometres with wind speeds of up to 240 kilometres per hour. The storm caused large-scale damage to 33 out of 64 districts; about 4'000 people lost their life; severe damages were caused to livelihoods, housing and crops, further pauperising an already significantly higher-than-average poor population.

SDC has been conducting a development programme in Bangladesh since 1971. The Humanitarian Aid Department has been intervening regularly, to save lives and alleviate suffering in case of natural disasters. Humanitarian Aid (HA) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) are notably included as special themes in SDC's Cooperation Strategy (CS) 2008-2012 for Bangladesh. Bangladesh is also one of the 8 countries, where SDC's DRR mainstreaming concept is presently piloted; a specific review on that aspect will take place in early 2010. A specific DRR programme 2010-2012 is to be launched by February 2010. SDC provided emergency assistance to the victims of the 2007 floods and of Cyclone SIDR, followed by early recovery actions. The main actions, financed by SDC's Regional Cooperation (RC) and HA departments, were:

Assistance to post flood rehabilitation

Action	7F-Reference	Funding	CHF
Recovery of nurseries with AFIP (Intercooperation)	7F-03804	RC	172'000
Recovery of livelihoods with LEAF (Intercooperation)	7F-03402	RC	534'000
Recovery of houses and livelihoods (Buro Tangail)	7F-03331	RC	352'000
Recovery of installations at schools (CMES)	7F-03333	RC	67'000
Recovery of livelihoods and productive structures (FAO)	7F-05979	RC	2'180'000
Total disbursements			3'305'000

Assistance to Cyclone SIDR affected population

Action	7F-Reference	Funding	CHF
Early recovery actions with UNDP	7F-05978	RC	2'000'000
Cash for Livelihoods in SIDR affected communities	7F-06366	RC	1'000'000
Relief actions with Swiss Red Cross / Bangladesh Red Crescent	7F-05955	HA	220'000
Emergency with Rupantar and Ashroy Foundation (NGOs)	7F-05978	HA	348'000
Early recovery with Rupantar and Ashroy Foundation (NGOs)	7F-06011	HA	560'000
Secondment to UNDP	7F-06029	HA	60'000
Strengthening HA in SCO-B with a specialised expert	7F-06030	HA	70'000
Total disbursements			4'258'000

1/5

The still ongoing 'Community Based DRR (CB-DRR, 7F-06215.01) programme in Cyclone SIDR affected Areas' (CHF 3,525 million) is the next step in bridging relief and early recovery activities to medium-term recovery and restoration, aiming at reducing the vulnerability of the population in the affected areas to future natural disasters, and thus, to initiate crucial steps towards longer-term preparedness and development. In 2009, Cyclone AILA hit again regions in the South-Western part of Bangladesh; respective early recovery actions have been (are still) implanted, partially with the same partner organisations.

SDC decided to conduct a review on the effectiveness and the efficiency of the whole relief and early recovery package, looking as well on the first achievements of the CB-DRR programme.

Objectives of the review

The main objective is establish an overview on the relevance¹, effectiveness² and efficiency³, of SDC's post flood / post SIDR 2007 relief and early recovery actions; this in the view of discussing necessary changes in the present strategic focus for such humanitarian projects, also reflecting on bridging these actions towards longer term recovery and development endeavours (including DRR mainstreaming).

Main expected outcomes of the review are:

- The achievements of the post flood / post SIDR package are critically assessed, having a close look into well selected specific (representative) actions.
- Elements for a well informed decision making on the design and the implementation approach of future relief / early recovery actions of SDC are provided.
- Good practices of successful relief / early recovery actions are documented. This information will contribute to a results' oriented reporting and capitalisation of experiences on HA and related development actions (planned to be emphasised still in 2010 by SDC Bangladesh).
- Potentials and limitations for bridging relief / early recovery actions towards longer term projects are critically analysed; also in the frame of the newly launched DRR programme 2010-2012. The potential for strengthening the interface between SDC's HA and RC departments in the case of its programme in Bangladesh is specifically considered in this assessment.
- The mix of selected partners for the implementation of the post flood / post SIDR actions is critically analysed.
- Recommendations on the future orientation of SDC's humanitarian support programme in Bangladesh (type of actions, cooperation between relevant SDC units, interface short term actions to longer term projects, mix of implementing partners, cooperation with relevant networks and with coordination units of the government, etc.) are presented.

Key questions for the review

The following key questions will be prioritised within major fields of observations between SDC staff and the consultants during the preparatory steps before and at the beginning of the field mission.

¹ The relevance of a programme (and its projects) exemplifies to what extent its objectives and themes respond to essential needs of the defined beneficiary groups.

² The effectiveness appraises to what extent planning and implementation of the actions (according to agreed plans with implementing partners) correspond to tangible results (outcomes) within the working context.

³ The efficiency appraises to what extent provided means (mainly finances) are economically and timely implemented (converted into adequate results / outputs)

Related to the relevance of the post flood / post SIDR 2007 package

- 1) To what extent did the realised actions respond to essential needs of the supported population ? Could this relevance of the realised actions be improved in future similar situations of emergency / and how ?
- 2) To what extent did the realised actions benefit the most affected people in the disaster hit areas ? What is the scope to respond specifically to most vulnerable groups in such disaster situations / and how ?
- 3) To what extent are SDC's strategic objectives relevant in such disaster situations, mainly looking at its HA and DRR policies ? What is the scope to make SDC's strategies still more relevant in future similar situations of emergency / and how ?
- 4) To what extent did the realised actions contribute (bridge) to options for future development endeavours of the supported population ? What is the scope to improve this bridging aspect in future similar situations ?
- 5) What is the scope of coherence between the realised actions and the ongoing CB-DRR as well as the post Cyclone AILA 2009 projects (implemented or still under implementation) ? To what extent were lessons learnt applied ? How and where could stronger synergies be mobilised ?
- 6) To what extent did the realised actions fit to the national post flood / post SIDR 2007 programmes ? What is the scope for more coordination and synergies with these actions ?
- 7) To what extent did the realised actions fit to the post flood / post SIDR 2007 actions of other international agencies ? What is the scope for more coordination and synergies with these actions ?

Related to the effectiveness of the post flood / post SIDR 2007 package

- 8) What are the most significant achievements of the realised actions ? Which are the "striking examples" that should be specially documented ? Which remaining problems should still be addressed or avoided in next similar actions ?
- 9) How adequate can the balance between planning and outcomes/outputs of the projects be assessed ?
- 10) What are the most significant achievements of mainstreaming gender equity within the realised actions ? Which remaining problems have to be clearly addressed and solved in order to make SDC's contribution in this (cross-cutting) area still stronger ?
- 11) How effective were the projects' contribution to capacity building of local stakeholders and implementing partners for guiding future similar actions and for strengthening the awareness on disaster preparedness ?
- 12) What are SDC's "specialities" (specific, successful and innovative activities or approaches) that can be recommended to other actors or that are clearly complementary (synergetic) to projects of national and international agencies ? Where further opportunities for SDC to play a role as real innovator in HA actions in Bangladesh ?

Related to the efficiency of the post flood / post SIDR 2007 package

- 13) How efficient were the financial means implemented in the realised actions ? Where and how could the performance in this field be improved in future similar actions ?
- 14) How can the efficiency of SDC and its partners be assessed related to an adequate division of labour with local structures (communities, UPs, etc.), with NGOs and civil society groups, as well as with other cooperation agencies, active in HA in Bangladesh ? What is the scope to improve this efficiency in future similar situations ?

Cooperation processes (modalities) and management performance

- 15) What are SDC's and its implementing partners' performances in relevant national and local networks for coordinating HA (and DRR) ? Where and how can SDC improve its active participation in such networks ?

- 16) To what extent were SDC's flood and SIDR 2007 projects really coordinated with respective national and local systems (emergency programmes) ? Where and how can SDC improve its cooperation within these frameworks ?
- 17) To what extent were SDC's flood and SIDR 2007 projects really coordinated with respective emergency programmes of the international community ? Where and how can SDC harmonise its cooperation within these frameworks ?
- 18) Were the management capacities of SDC's implementing partners adequate to properly plan, implement and monitor the realised actions (in accordance with the set rules as per mandates) ? Where and how can the implementing partners improve their respective performance ?
- 19) Did the implementing partners apply adequate management schemes and tools ? In which aspects should SDC insist in respective improvements or set clearer standards for future similar actions ?

Related to the further development of SDC's HA and DRR programme in Bangladesh

- 20) What are important lessons learnt in regard to the management of SDC's standby capacity for HA and disaster response ?
- 21) What are the main lessons learnt for the further implementation and development of SDC's DRR activities ?

Methodology for the review

Consultants

The review is to be realised by two professionals, whereas **the contractor** will be the team leader. The consultants are knowledgeable in:

- Methodologies and tools for the evaluation of cooperation programmes and project packages for HA and longer term development endeavours (including DRR aspects and the bridging approach from HA to longer term development).
- The specific context of HA and development cooperation in Bangladesh (at least one of the evaluators must have relevant experiences in this field).
- SDC's policies and programmes, with a specific focus on its actions in the field of HA and DRR.
- Organisational performance and organisational development of implementing partners working with HA and DRR actions.

Timing and Tentative activities for the contractor:

The review is to be scheduled for May-July 2010 (27 working days including preparation, realisation and follow up of the mission). The field mission is scheduled for 11.-25. July 2010.

The detailed programme will be finalised in close cooperation with the consultants and in accordance with the selected actions to be visited.

Main activities are to be planned as follows:

Before field mission

- Revision of programme/projects' related documents and other reference documents as per specific list / chapter 6. (estimated time: **3 days**)
- Elaboration of review scheme (final, prioritised key questions or other indicators, selection of projects to be visited, final mission programme) in close cooperation with SDC Dhaka. (estimated time: **1 day**).
- Briefing at SDC Berne / HA department and S-ASIA division of Regional Coop. domain (estimated time: **1 day**).

During field mission (estimated time: **15 days / plus 2 days** for journey of Swiss consultant)

- Briefing at SDC Dhaka with SDC staff and representatives of involved implementing partners.

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- Revision of documents.
- Interviews with staff of SDC Dhaka and of implementing partners, in charge of the realised actions.
- Field visits to selected concluded projects as well as to CB-DRR and ongoing comparative actions (mainly post AILA).
- Systematisation of findings and recommendations.
- Presentation, verification and discussion of findings/recommendations in a specific debriefing workshop at SDC Dhaka with SDC staff and representatives of involved implementing partners.
- Elaboration of first draft report.

After field mission

- Elaboration and submission of final report. (estimated time: **4 days**).
- Debriefing at SDC Berne HA department and S-ASIA division of Regional Coop. domain (estimated time: **1 day**).

Deliverables

A report (both electronic and hard copy) of maximum 15 pages plus annexes, and an executive summary of 2 pages shall be submitted to SDC's Dhaka Office on or before August 15, 2010. The structure of the report will be established between the consultants and SDC Dhaka during the field visit.

The consultants report to SDC Dhaka for all operational and logistic aspects of the assignment.

Reference documents

To be submitted to the Contractor in May 2010:

- Cooperation Strategy Bangladesh 2008-2012, SDC 2007.
- SCO-B's approach for mainstreaming gender equity, SCO-B 2008.
- DRR Programme Bangladesh 2010-2012, SDC 2010 (present draft version of December 2009).
- Planning documents and reports of SDC supported post flood / post SIDR 2007 projects.
- Documents of Bangladesh's disaster response system (to be further detailed by AHMFA).
- Guidelines and manuals followed by other cooperation agencies involved in HA and DRR in Bangladesh (to be further detailed by AHMFA).
- Specific concepts and reports on HA and DRR of implementing partners (to be further detailed by AHMFA).
- Report on the effectiveness assessment about DRR mainstreaming in the Bangladesh programme, (April 2010).

Date: 16.5.2010

Signature: 