



Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

Regional Programme Southern Africa: Food Security Strategy & Programme, 2009-13

Mid-Term Review: Final Report

Simon Milligan, Jeff Luhanga & Shawn McGuire

27 September 2011

Contacts:

simonmilligan@compuserve.com, mrsimonmilligan@gmail.com

xluhanga@yahoo.com

S.Mcguire@uea.co.uk

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations	4
Glossary	7
Executive Summary	9
1 Part I: Introduction	12
1.1 Purpose of this review	12
1.2 SDC context	12
1.3 Review process	13
1.4 Caveats	13
1.5 Report structure.....	14
2 Part II: Scene-setting	15
2.1 Food insecurity, hunger and nutrition in the SADC region: issues and trends	15
2.2 Seed insecurity: issues and trends	17
3 Part III: The RPSA Food Security Strategy and Programme, 2009-13.....	20
3.1 Main features of the SDC Strategy	20
3.2 The regional approach	21
3.3 Programme portfolio and budgetary allocation	21
4 Part IV: Relevance of the SDC Food Security Strategy and Programme for Southern Africa.....	23
4.1 The purpose of a Strategy.....	23
4.2 Evaluation context.....	23
4.3 Relevance to the SDC policy and priorities.....	24
4.4 Relevance to the SADC policy environment.....	25
4.4.1 <i>RISDP, RAP, CAADP and the role of a Regional Economic Community.....</i>	<i>25</i>
4.4.2 <i>Regional markets, cross-border trade and the regional political-economy.....</i>	<i>27</i>
4.4.3 <i>Food and seed security linkages.....</i>	<i>29</i>
4.5 Changes within the Tripartite environment	33
4.6 Concluding comments.....	33
5 Part V: Programme results to date.....	35
5.1 The evaluation context	35
5.2 Findings	35
6 Part VI: Project and programme management: process, efficiency and coordination.....	41
6.1 Evaluation context	41
6.2 The nature and purpose of regional programming.....	41
6.3 Issues of alignment and sub-optimal spend.....	41
6.4 Relationships, coordination and leverage	42
6.4.1 <i>SDC-IP and SDC-SDC/HA.....</i>	<i>42</i>
6.4.2 <i>IP-IP.....</i>	<i>43</i>
7 Part VII: Summary findings and lessons.....	45
8 Part VIII: Recommendations	49
8.1 For SDC HQ	49
8.2 For SDC COOF	50
8.2.1 <i>Focus.....</i>	<i>50</i>

8.2.2	<i>Programme logframe.....</i>	<i>50</i>
8.2.3	<i>Coordination, lesson capture and sharing, and advocacy.....</i>	<i>51</i>
8.2.4	<i>Geographical focus.....</i>	<i>52</i>
8.2.5	<i>Future funding opportunities.....</i>	<i>53</i>
Annex A:	Terms of Reference.....	55
Annex B:	Evaluation Framework.....	61
Annex C:	Indicative Field Questions.....	66
Annex D:	List of People Consulted.....	78
Annex E:	List of SDC Documents Consulted.....	80
Annex F:	Cereal Balance Sheet for 2010/11 Marketing Year, SADC.....	82
Annex G:	Completed Self-Reflection Sheets (SDC Implementing Partners).....	84
Annex H:	SDC Project Appraisals.....	88
Annex I:	Current and Upcoming Donor Programmes (DFID, USAID, AusAID).....	119
Annex J:	Regional, multi-country and singular-country programming.....	124
Annex K:	Proposed formal-informal seed sector linkages in East Timor (AusAID Seeds of Life) ...	126
Annex L:	Indicative matrix to plot seed interventions.....	127
	Documents cited.....	129



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACTESA	Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa
AEZ	Agro-ecological zone
AGRITEX	Agricultural, Technical, and Extension Services (Zimbabwe)
ASARECA	Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa
AU	Africa Union
CA	Conservation agriculture
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CBA	Cost-benefit Analysis
CBI	Crop Breeding Institute
CCARDESA	Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research & Development for Southern Africa
CF	Challenge Fund
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CHF	Swiss Franc
CIAT	International Center for Tropical Agriculture
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMMYT	International Center for Maize and Wheat
COMESA	Common Market of East and Southern Africa
COOF	SDC Regional Cooperation Office
DFID	Department for International Development
DR&SS	Department of Research and Specialist Services
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo (or Congo, DR)
DSD	Direct Seed Distribution
DUS	Distinctiveness, Uniformity and Stability
EC	European Commission
ENDA	Environment and Development Activities (an NGO)
EU	European Union
FANR	Food, agriculture and Natural Resources Directorate (SADC)
FANRPAN	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FSS	Food Security Strategy (SDC)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board

GNU	Government of National Unity
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HaSSP	Harmonised Seed Security Project
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IARC	International Agricultural Research Center
ICP	International Cooperating Partner
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IP	Implementing Partner
ISTA	International Seed Testing Association
IWMI	International Water Management Institute
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KIU	Knowledge into use
KM	Knowledge Management
Logframe	Logical framework
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi Donor trust Fund
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
M.P	Member of Parliament
MS	Member State
NARS	National Agricultural Research System
NARES	National Agricultural Research and Extension Service
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-State Actor
NSIMA	New Seed Initiative for Maize in Southern Africa
NTB	Non Trade Barriers
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPV	Open Pollinated Variety
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
QDS	Quality Declared Seed

R&D	Research and Development
RAP	Regional Agricultural Policy
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
ReSAKSS-SA	ReSAKSS-Southern Africa
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (SADC)
RPSA	Regional Programme for Southern Africa (SDC)
SACAU	Southern African Confederation of Agricultural Unions
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SAMP	Seeds and Markets Project
SAT	Sustainable Agriculture Trust
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Services
SSC	SADC Seed Committee
SSSA	Seed System Security Assessment
SSSN	SADC Seed Security Network Project
SVRC	SADC Variety Release Committee
SVF	Seed Vouchers and Fairs
TBT	Technical Barriers to Trade
TF	Trust Fund
ToR	Terms of Reference
UPOV	International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
VCU	Value for Cultivation and Use
VFM	Value for Money
WFP	World Food Programme
WB	World Bank



Glossary

Access	People have adequate cash or other resources (for example, financial credit or friends and relatives willing to help out) to buy appropriate seed or barter for it. An expanded view of access may also include the relevant information about a seed type and its best use.
Acute food insecurity	Exists when the lack of access to adequate food is short-term in nature, and usually caused by shocks, e.g. drought, war.
Availability	Sufficient quantities of seed can be obtained within reasonable proximity (spatial availability) and in time for critical sowing periods (temporal availability).
Basic/foundation seed	The seed produced from breeder's seed.
Breeder's seed	Seed or vegetative propagating material used as the source for the production of foundation seed. Produced under the supervision of the breeder or institution that developed the variety in conjunction with the seed certification authority
Certified seed	Seed of a known variety produced under strict, formally regulated seed standards to maintain varietal purity and high degrees of seed health. Seed lots must also be free of inert matter and weed seeds. All certified seed must pass field inspection, be conditioned by an approved seed conditioning plant, and then be sampled and pass laboratory testing before it can be sold as certified seed.
Chronic food insecurity	When people are unable to access sufficient, safe and nutritious food over long periods, such that it becomes their normal condition.
Farmer variety	Any variety produced within the farmer system, i.e. NOT a uniform Modern Variety. The distinction from the latter is more about the production approach than the genetic material itself: while Farmer Varieties include local varieties, or landraces, they can also include genetic material originally from formal research.
Formal seed system	Production and supply of seed of modern varieties and certified seed through an organised chain, including specialized plant breeders, regulated seed producers, and specialized commercial outlets or government extension agencies.
Informal seed system	Seed channels that include farmers' own stocks, local exchange networks, and local seed/grain markets. Also known as local seed systems or traditional seed systems.
Macro-level environment	The policy, legal and regulatory framework, and which therefore includes regional and national-level considerations. It includes laws, standards and regulations.
Meso-level environment	Constitutes the infrastructure, and financial and non-financial support services provided by a variety of state and non-state actors. Such services may be utilized by a variety of actors within the seeds chain (e.g. smallholders, retailers and even government) to help them operate efficiently and to respond to emerging opportunities and constraints. Services within the meso-level environment include extension and/or advisory services, research and development (including certification and seed stocks registration), finance and infrastructure (e.g. storage). As this would imply, providers of such services might range from small entrepreneurs to private for-profit firms to industry associations and parastatals.
Micro-level	Synonymous with a household's ownership and control of, and access to, capital

environment	assets.
Modern variety	A variety developed and released by formal research system, which is distinct, uniform, and stable (sometimes also called 'Improved Varieties')
Phyto-sanitary quality	Describes a range of health and physical attributes of seed: presence of disease or pests, level of shrunken seeds, presence of inert matter, and germination ability.
Quality	For seed, refers either variety quality or phyto-sanitary quality.
Quality declared seed	Seed produced by a farmer which conforms to specified standards and quality control measures provided for under the SADC protocol.
Variety Quality	Plant genetic attributes, such as yield potential, growth cycle length, stress tolerance, or seed colour.

Executive Summary

Introduction

In line with SDC's 2008 Evaluation Policy, this mid-term review or 'formative evaluation' of SDC Southern Africa's Regional Food Security Programme is intended to improve programme (and project) performance and, as such, it seeks to place considerable focus on institutional learning. Timed to coincide with the mid-point of the programme the review focuses on, inter alia: assessing the ongoing relevance of the programme, coupled with consideration of its effectiveness and efficiency; identifying what results (outcomes) have been attained from mid-2009 to date, and; providing findings, conclusions and recommendations with respect to the future direction of the regional food security programme. In doing so, this review seeks to answer key questions: is the programme doing the right things? And is it doing things the right way? As such, it is necessary to assess the strategy that underpins the programme, which necessarily includes consideration of its clarity, realism, priority setting and any associated theories of change.

Southern Africa

About 86 million people in Southern Africa live in extreme poverty. Food security in the region remains only an aspiration, with the region off-track in meeting the Millennium Development Goal target of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Food insecurity continues to affect between three and twelve million people in any one year, resulting in unacceptably high levels of under-nutrition. For the poor, the worst of all worlds occur when they are forced to contend with a production shortfall without sufficient means to access the market or, for the chronically poor, an absence of suitable social protection measures.

At the regional scale, there is typically enough maize seed to meet the region's requirements but optimal benefit requires stock movements from countries of surplus to those of deficit. Those countries with a deficit of certified/quality declared maize seed are typically small or fragile states. There is very little organized seed production of crops other than maize and as such there are very few seed outlets stocking such seeds. Most farmers therefore depend on recycled farm seed or off-farm seed from networks of neighbours, relatives and open grain markets. Whilst a lack of genetic material is sometimes an issue the major constraint within most seed systems is not availability but rather access or variety quality, i.e. varieties that are adapted to fit farmers' needs and preferences

Main findings

- The answer to the question, '**Are we doing the right things?**', is open to question and may be captured as a 'yes, but to an extent and with caveats'. Without exception, the projects are evidently highly relevant to regional frameworks and SDC's overall goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development. The increased attention on output markets is both critical and timely. However, the apparent skew of the current programme to increased supply (or availability) of improved, certified maize seed arguably devalues SDC's supposed niche because of other donors investing in measures to support input and output markets for the same crop. SDC, like other donors, must better respond to the challenge and *pro-poor opportunity* of better engaging with farmer varieties and informal seed systems.
- There is little evident support to the notion that SDC has a particular technical comparative advantage in the seed sub-sector or necessarily occupies or has captured a genuine niche, suggesting a disconnection between SDC outlook and local perceptions, limited regional benefit being derived from earlier and ongoing research and action programmes at a global level within SDC (which might better convey SDC's added value and comparative advantage), and, potentially, requiring SDC to further sharpen and articulate its niche.

- The existing Strategy is framed in a very broad manner. The definition, distinction and linkages between micro, meso and macro are largely unstated, assumptions and theories of change are often hidden, and there is a lack of specificity concerning target groups, crops and preferred traits. The principles regarding project selection within a regional perspective are clear and sound. However, it is less certain that this clarity extends to the current articulation of the programme composition nor guides the action or understanding of Implementing Partners. The Strategy does not define the target group and is silent on how far the programme should focus on specific vulnerability contexts (e.g. chronically-stressed populations) and vulnerable groups (e.g. women-headed households, HIV/AIDS-affected households).
- The answer to the question, '**Are we doing things right?**' is broadly positive. SDC's pragmatic, proactive and mature approach to project funding and donor-Implementing Partner relations is highly appreciated by the Implementing Partners, and has enabled the programme budget to be committed with an apparent degree of efficiency. Should SDC enjoy a comparative advantage it is likely to be here, i.e. the agency is perceived by partners as being better able to respond and engage in a more timely and efficient manner than many other donors and as such SDC is often perceived to be a 'partner of choice'. Furthermore, SDC's choice of Implementing Partners is sound, with an appropriate mix of support to or through different delivery bodies. Technical and political legitimacy are key for project success, and in all cases the Implementing Partner and/or its staff have the necessary personal and professional connections, technical understanding, and institutional support to offer an optimistic outlook for effective and efficient project delivery.
- Whilst there is no suggestion that SDC lacks technical competency, an increasing budget and the existence of multiple IP contracts inevitable places strains on the time availability of SDC personnel. As such, there is a significant risk that projects may operate in organizational vacuums, with limited formal fora for them to meet on a periodic basis, and little apparent sharing of logframes, workplans and periodic reports. Any degree of projectisation typically undermines the extent to which a donor and its Implementing Partners are able to secure maximum leverage at a regional level from pilot, lesson-sharing and advocacy initiatives. SDC support to the emergence of the Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern Africa (CCARDESA) represents a pragmatic, strategic investment but the return will only be realised if SDC maximises the platform it offers, both with CCARDESA but also with the Southern Africa Development Community Secretariat itself.
- To answer the question, '**How do we know we are doing the right things?**', is more difficult to articulate. The programme contains five funded initiatives but two are only at inception stage, whilst support to CCARDESA is not expected to contribute directly to the attainment of the programme results outlined in the SDC Food Security Strategy. The projects – Harmonised Seed Security Project (HaSSP) and Seed and Markets Project (SAMP) have been operating for 18 and 12 months respectively. Both projects have recorded achievements but they are largely or exclusively at activity-level.
- Office-level reporting, accountability, effectiveness and advocacy are and will continue to be compromised so long as there is: an apparent absence (or incompleteness?) of programme baseline data; scope for improvement in the phraseology of several programme-level indicators; a disconnection between project logframe indicators and programme logframe indicators, and; a likelihood that the totality of SDC's projects may not deliver the expected programme results. Consequently, SDC may struggle to articulate robust answers to questions such as, What does it all add up to? Does it offer value for money? Are tax-payers receiving the best development return possible from their investment?

Key recommendations

The report makes 16 recommendations, including:

- A redesign of SDC's standard logframe template to improve the quality of design and implementation. The separation of baseline, indicator, milestone and target information, for example, would help in this regard and would greatly assist partners and SDC to undertake monitoring, periodic reviews, outcome and impact assessments, and value-for money analysis.
- A call for greater thematic focus, which could stem from a more narrowly-defined goal, e.g. improving farmers' ability to adapt to stress and change in their cropping systems, an emphasis on building demand for seed through informal supply channels and strengthening capacity in that regard, or a greater focus on the notion of resilience or nutrition.
- A review of programme-level indicators, development of a small cluster of standard indicators, and collection of baseline data for all revised programme-level indicators.
- Initiation of coordinated, joint working across projects by providing learning moments (e.g. field visits), events (e.g. workshops, annual planning meetings) and outputs (e.g. programme-wide papers). As such, it is also recommended that SDC establish a Learning and Communications Component to the Programme, with direct links to CCARDESA.
- Identification of a cluster of focal countries, with there being a strong case for deepening engagement in/with several current countries: Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, and engaging more directly with SDC's national office in Mozambique. Future investment in Botswana, DRC and Lesotho is not recommended.
- Scoping SDC funding to:
 - A Seed Services Support Initiative, which would provide capacity building and equipment support to Seed Services in focal countries *but* following an aid for results agenda, i.e. embracing a competitive approach so focal countries compete for funding, with turnkey funding on an annual basis and on the condition that government fulfils mutually agreed steps.
 - A Seeds Window within upcoming DFID or AusAID Challenge Funds, and so as to better enable small or emerging seed companies to secure financial capital to enable improved participation in national and international seed markets.
 - Support informal seed supply channels, using market principles and where these enhance the access and resilience elements of seed security.

1 Part I: Introduction

1.1 Purpose of this review

1. In line with SDC's 2008 Evaluation Policy, this review or 'formative evaluation' is intended to improve programme (and project) performance and, as such, it seeks to place considerable focus on institutional learning. Timed to coincide with the mid-point of Food Security Programme (2009-13)¹, the review focuses on:
 - Assessing the ongoing relevance of the programme, coupled with consideration of its the effectiveness and efficiency.
 - Identifying what results (outcomes) have been attained from mid-2009 to date.
 - Identifying and documenting areas for improvement in the delivery of the programme.
 - Identifying key lessons and challenges for regional and cross-border engagement.
 - Assessing the appropriateness of the actors, partnerships and modalities deployed by SDC.
 - Identifying any necessary reorientation in strategic areas of focus, to include understanding of other donor programming.
 - Providing findings, conclusions and recommendations with respect to the future direction of the regional food security programme.
2. In doing so, this review seeks to answer key questions: is the programme doing the right things? And is it doing things the right way? As such, it is necessary to assess the strategy that underpins the programme, which necessarily includes consideration of its clarity, realism, priority setting and any associated theories of change (see Annex A for the ToR).

1.2 SDC context

3. SDC seeks to achieve the best results and returns with the available resources. Its programmes must also collate, analyse, and distil evidence into coherent, succinct, timely and targeted information to:
 - Steer and drive the programme (internal decision-making).
 - Inform the Swiss parliament and tax-payers, and a broader constituency of stakeholders, of programme impact (accountability).
 - Inform and influence the policy, strategy and programming of donors, government and other key stakeholders (effectiveness through advocacy).
4. Against this backdrop the review team were asked to consider:
 - The balance of the current portfolio, and whether the programme focuses on the right bottlenecks within seed systems, e.g. downstream (e.g. marketing) matters vs. those upstream (e.g. research and germplasm development).
 - The appropriateness of the current approach and means of engagement.
 - Results to date and likely results by programme end in 2013.
 - The extent of focus with the current programme and the degree to which greater critical mass is required.
 - Programming options for the next four years

¹ The ToR refer to 2009-12; the Seed Security Strategy refers to 2009-13

5. Given the trend towards greater integration of SDC and Foreign Affairs, and SDC and SDC/HA, coupled with ongoing debates about the geographical focus of the programme, the review team was also asked to consider the 'geography' of the programme, and the merits (or otherwise) of singular country, multi-country, sub-regional and regional foci, and the criteria for the same. SDC also requested consideration of opportunities to better mainstream governance and private sector involvement.

1.3 Review process

6. The evaluation team comprised three consultants: a team leader based in South Africa with expertise in livelihoods and evaluations, a regional seeds expert based in Malawi, and an international seeds expert based in the UK. The team worked intermittently over a six-week period from 01 August 2011 to 12 September 2011. The experts based in South Africa and Malawi met in person on 04 August (i.e. during the inception period), and the team leader engaged with team members by email and telephone on a regular basis.
7. With a need to be systematic and objective, emphasis was placed on robustness, evidence and 'traceability'. The key evaluation questions presented in Annexes B and C, informed by the ToR and distilled during a literature review of SDC evaluation guidelines and SDC's Food Security Strategy (FSS), formed the basis of the high-level evaluation matrix and field questions framework. Both were provided to SDC in hard and electronic copy on 05 and 11 August 2011 respectively.
8. SDC arranged a briefing meeting with the Programme Manager and Head of Mission on 16 August 2011 and a further meeting with the Programme Manager on 19 August 2011. SDC provided a selection of project documents on 22 August 2011, following requests on 09 August 2011. (A further request was made on 04 September 2011). This included a request for baseline data. The team leader commenced meetings with SDC Implementing Partners (IPs) and programme stakeholders on 23 August 2011.
9. A number of semi-structured interviews were held with representatives of government, the private sector and representative organisations; SADC and ACTESA (COMESA); development partners (USAID) and donor-financed programmes (EU-COMESA Regional Agricultural Inputs Programme), and SDC's five IPs. (A full list of the individuals consulted is provided in Annex D). An attempt was made to meet with NEPAD. The team also conducted a document review of project documents provided by SDC and IPs, independent secondary sources on food and seed security dynamics in Southern Africa, and strategy, programme and internal materials of various donors, the SADC Secretariat and ACTESA/COMESA.
10. As part of the evaluation process IPs were requested to complete a questionnaire concerning programme management arrangements (shared with SDC prior to circulation), a 'self-reflection' template that sought to capture the skew of project focus across certain lines (see Annex G), and a project mapping template to capture like-minded projects that impinge on SDC interventions). In line with SDC's 2008 Evaluation Policy draft project appraisals (see Annex H) were shared with all IPs to foster transparency, partnership, lesson learning and to guard against any factual inaccuracies being presented in this report.²

1.4 Caveats

11. No primary research (e.g. meetings with smallholder farmers) was undertaken. However, the comprehensive collation of quantitative and qualitative data from written and interview sources enabled relatively robust conclusions to be made.

² The appraisal for CCARDESA was not shared with Centre staff because it may contain confidential information only known to SDC.

12. The data and information from this breadth of sources, respondent interviews, discussions and the document review provided for triangulation to assure, wherever possible, the validity of findings. However, it should be noted that the views expressed by certain stakeholders in specific countries should not be seen as being representative of their peers in other countries or necessarily reflecting the pertinent issues in those countries. The region is highly diverse and time and resource limitations did not permit a full consultation with all stakeholders nor all relevant data and information.
13. Delays in SDC providing programme documentation squeezed time to review the same, and priority was therefore given to examining literature concerning current projects and not projects under development. Documents concerning SDC Tanzania programming were unavailable.
14. A meeting was requested with DFID Southern Africa (DFIDSA) but could not be scheduled before submission of the report. However, DFIDSA and the design team consulted by email, and internal DFID programming documents were received and appraised. CIDA's Regional Representative left the Canadian mission during this review. Of the priority donors identified by SDC only the European Commission was not consulted given the number of relevant offices.
15. Following discussions with SDC personnel on 16 and 19 August 2011 the review team understands that SDC has not issued any new policies, strategies or guidance material since mid-2009 that might affect the strategic direction of this programme.
16. The reviewers only considered those initiatives directly supported by SDC COOF-Pretoria. As such, explicit analysis of existing or upcoming support to address post-harvest losses and promote micro-insurance is outside the parameters of this evaluation.

1.5 Report structure

17. The following sections of this report present the findings and recommendations of the mid-term review. Part II sets the food security context in Southern Africa, after which headline issues and trends concerning seed security are presented. Against that backdrop, Part III provides an overview of both SDC's 2009 Food Security Strategy (FSS) for Southern Africa and the programme portfolio that has flowed from it. Part IV examines issues of strategy and programme relevance in relation to SADC and SDC policy and frameworks, whilst Part V presents an assessment of development results to date based on the programme logframe and the project's contribution to expected programme-level output and outcome targets in the FSS. Part VI evaluates processes, exploring aspects of management, efficiency and coordination in the development and delivery of the programme. Part VII brings together the headline findings and lessons of the mid-term review, whilst the final section, Part VIII, presents recommendations.
18. The evaluation framework, lists of people and documents consulted, project-level appraisals, and other background documents and working notes are annexed to this report.

2 Part II: Scene-setting

2.1 Food insecurity, hunger and nutrition in the SADC region: issues and trends

19. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), whose Secretariat is based in Gaborone, Botswana, is composed of 15 member countries: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Namibia, Madagascar (currently suspended), Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
20. Cereals occupy an estimated 50% of farmland in the region, with maize cultivated on about 40% of total farmland (USAID 2011). The SADC Secretariat reports that there was a “good” cereal harvest in 2010, which occasioned a “generally satisfactory” regional food security situation for the 2010/11 marketing year ending March 2011 (SADC 2011). Total cereal availability for the year was estimated at 39.38 million tonnes. This was comprised of 34.64 million tonnes of production, with the balance of 4.73 million tonnes being carryover stocks. Total demand was estimated to be 38.64 million tonnes, creating an overall regional cereal surplus of 732,000 tonnes (see Annex F). Inevitably, these regional figures camouflage significant inter-state differences. By way of example, in the 2010/11 marketing season South Africa (pop: 48.7m) produced 43.7% of the total gross harvest of cereals across the region. This equated to 15.1 million tonnes – approximately 2.5 million tonnes more than the combined total of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe (pop: 87.5m, see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Key statistics by SADC Member State (selected countries)

Country	Pop. (m)	GDP USD bil	Per. Cap. Income (USD)	% pop. Below USD 1.25/day	Gini Coef	Hunger Index	HDI Score	Urban Pop (%)	Stunting (%)	Ag % GDP
Angola	18.0	75.5	1,196	54	58.6	25	0.403	58.5	45	10
Botswana	1.9	11.8	4,442	-	61.0	12	0.633	61.0	23	3
Lesotho	2.0	1.6	500	59	52.5	12	0.427	26.9	46	8
Malawi	14.8	5.0	149	74	39.0	19	0.385	19.8	48	36
Moz.	22.4	9.8	342	75	47.1	25	0.284	38.4	41	31
Namibia	2.1	9.3	1,749	39	74.3	14	0.606	38.0	24	9
DRC	64.3	10.6	94	59	44.4	39	0.239	35.2	38	43
South Africa	48.7	285.4	3,442	26	57.8	7	0.597	64.1	25	3
Swaziland	1.2	3.0	1,140	63	50.7	11	0.498	21.4	30	7
Tanzania	42.5	21.6	358	89	34.6	21	0.398	36.0	38	45
Zambia	12.6	12.8	374	64	50.7	26	0.395	35.7	49	21
Zimbabwe	12.5	-	450	68	50.1	21	0.141	38.8	27	19

Source: USAID 2011 (citing evidence from UNDP Human Development Report, 2010; World Development Indicators Base, World Bank, December 2010; Global Hunger Index. IFPRI, 2010; UN World Population Prospects, 2008 revision; and, The State of the World's Children, UNICEF. November 2009)³.

³ The Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a multidimensional statistical tool used to describe the state of countries' hunger situation. It combines three equally weighted indicators: 1) the proportion of the undernourished as a percentage of the population; 2) the

21. About 86 million people in the SADC region live in extreme poverty (Chilonda et al. 2007). Food security in Southern Africa remains only an aspiration (see Table 2.2), with the region off-track in meeting the MDG target of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Southern Africa now has the highest proportion of food insecure people in the world (ECA 2007). Food insecurity continues to affect between three and twelve million people in any one year, resulting in unacceptably high levels of under-nutrition. The 2008 food price crisis highlighted the prevalent structural weaknesses in the region and directly contributed to increased poverty; rising by 2% and 4.4% in Malawi and Zambia respectively (Ivanic & Martin 2008 cf Chilonda et al 2008). In June 2011 SADC, COMESA and FAO convened another high-level meeting to discuss the return of high food prices. A number of items were discussed, including the need for effective policy coherence and harmonisation and evidence-based policy dialogue and negotiations.

Table 2.2: Population of Food Insecure Households in SADC (selected countries)

Country	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11
Lesotho	270,000	948,300	541,000	245,700	553,000	353,000	450,000	200,000
Malawi	400,000	1,340,000	5,055,000	833,000	63,200	673,498	147,492	508,089
Mozambique	659,000	659,000	801,655	240,000	520,000	302,700	281,300	350,000
Namibia	-	-	-	-	-	-	224,795	106,297
Swaziland	217,000	600,400	634,400	465,900	345,000	238,600	262,000	160,989
Tanzania	844,333	686,356	848,019	995,433	581,974	780,416	717,684	432,530
Zambia	60,000	39,300	1,232,700	380,537	440,866	444,624	110,000	53,629
Zimbabwe	5,422,600	2,300,000	2,884,800	1,392,500	4,100,000	5,100,000	1,400,000	1,287,937
TOTAL	7,872,933	6,573,356	11,997,574	4,553,070	6,604,040	7,892,838	3,593,271	3,099,471

Source: SADC 2011

22. Countries in the SADC region are highly affected by HIV and AIDS; the Member States account for an estimated 37% of all HIV cases in the world. FAO estimates that between 13% and 26% of the agricultural labour force in the region will be lost in the period 1985-2020 due to HIV and AIDS. Women and young girls are disproportionately affected by HIV and AIDS, both in terms of increased physiological vulnerability to the virus and due to the increased burden of care due to adult morbidity in the household. There are an estimated 16.8 million orphans in the region, many of which are attributable to HIV and AIDS. The burden of HIV affects wealth creation and productivity in the region, in particular in the agricultural sector where labour is a crucial household resource.
23. Achieving food security requires adequate food availability, access and use. Sub-Saharan African agriculture is 96% rain-fed and highly vulnerable to weather shocks. Southern Africa is little different. It is estimated that 70% of SADC's population depends on agriculture for food, income and employment (SADC 2011), with much of the production coming from smallholder farmers who are least able to anticipate and deal with the effects of climate change, shocks and stresses. Whilst SADC reports a gradual increase in region-wide cereal production from 2001-10 (SADC 2011), there are also reports

prevalence of underweight children under the age of five; and, 3) the mortality rate of children under the age of five. The Index ranks countries on a 100 point scale, with 0 being the best score ("no hunger") and 100 being the worst, though neither of these extremes is achieved in practice. The higher the score, the worse the food situation of a country. Values less than 4.9 reflect "low hunger", values between 5 and 9.9 reflect "moderate hunger", values between 10 and 19.9 indicate a "serious", values between 20 and 29.9 are "alarming", and values exceeding 30 are "extremely alarming" hunger problem.

that the region has seen a gradual transition from grain surplus to a structural grain shortfall since 1980 (ECA 2007). There also remain concerns that maize production is expected to decrease under increased El Niño/La Niña-Southern Oscillation conditions (Stige et al. 2006). Furthermore, production levels of other cereals (e.g. wheat, rice, sorghum, millet) have remained largely unchanged in the last decade.

24. Bad agricultural seasons are followed by increases in emergency food aid (ECA 2007). Malawi is the only country in the region that is reported to have met the CAADP goal of investing at least 10% of its national budget in agriculture (USAID 2011), though budget allocation in and of itself need not necessarily translate to positive outcomes (Nyagah pers. comm).
25. Post-harvest losses of staple foods are significant. Losses in maize in Southern Africa amount to approximately 1.5 million tonnes per annum. Of this, about a third stems from poor storage. Losses of cassava – a drought-tolerant and low-input ‘substitution staple’ – are estimated to be 4.8 million tonnes or 40-50% of yield. The estimated total annual value of storage losses for maize across just eight SADC countries exceeds USD 111m, while cassava losses are estimated to be approximately USD 66m (Davis 2010).
26. For the poor, the worst of all worlds occur when they are forced to contend with a production shortfall without sufficient means to access the market or, for the chronically poor, an absence of suitable social protection measures. Private cross-border maize trade and consumer substitution of alternate food staples can moderate food consumption volatility. However, current market failures in Southern Africa reduce food security, amplify price volatility, raise transaction costs, discourage investment in staple food production and trade, and stifle innovation and risk-taking (Haggeblade 2009). Low levels of investment, particularly in regional infrastructure, and inappropriate political intervention (e.g. export bans) mean that it is difficult to move food from areas of surplus to areas experiencing a deficit.
27. Nutritional indicators are poor. In almost all countries, at least 35% of all children aged 6-60 months are stunted, though some countries have rates significantly higher: Malawi (49%), Zambia (47%), Lesotho (46%), Angola (45%) and Mozambique (44%) (ECA 2007; also see Table 2.1, above).
28. Women and girls bear a disproportionately large share of the household burden, and make up 70% of the rural agricultural producers in the region. Women are disadvantaged due to historical and current patterns of migratory labour prevalent in a number of the Member States, leading to high levels of female-headed households. In addition, women have unequal access to resources for education, resulting in high levels of female illiteracy across the region, and a myriad of socio-cultural reasons limit a woman’s options in terms of reproduction and control over livelihoods. Finally, data shows that women are unequally and adversely affected by HIV and AIDS epidemic leading to lower social and economic resilience.

2.2 Seed insecurity: issues and trends

29. The evidence-base upon which to make assessments of SADC-wide seed security has been undermined since the conclusion of the SADC Seed Security Network Project (2006-2008) (Mpofu pers. comm). The last SADC Seed Update was produced by SADC FANR/SSSN in February 2008, i.e. the year the project was completed. SADC’s aforementioned headline assessment of seed security for 2010/11 derived from production and demand statistics, enabling assessment of surplus/deficit for major crops. However, such projections tend to assume adoption rates of modern varieties, particular renewal rates, and certified seed as the sole source for renewing seed. However, most seed is sourced from informal channels. CIAT et. al. (2008) correctly note that any determination of seed security must go far beyond determining the ‘seed need’ deficit because micro-level realities are often different to the picture painted by macro-level data (Magunda pers. comm. and see Box 2.1).

Box 2.1: 2009 Seed System Security Assessment, Zimbabwe

"The SSSA found that the overriding problem around the issue of seed security, and the functioning of seed systems more broadly, had little to do directly with seed at all. Immediate and key constraints revolve around money and purchasing power: [following the currency collapse in 2008] the terms of trade for farmers have escalated enormously; farmers were just starting to market produce and were concerned about low remunerations; there is little actual cash (and particularly \$US currency notes) in rural economies" (CIAT et al. 2009).

30. Despite these shortcomings in data and information provision and analysis, it is apparent that several macro-level trends have been evident in the last five years:

- South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia typically register surplus maize seed.
- At the regional scale, there is typically enough maize seed to meet the region's requirements but optimal benefit requires stock movements from countries of surplus to those of deficit. Those countries projecting deficit of certified/quality declared maize seed have typically been small or fragile states (e.g. DRC, Zimbabwe).
- Input subsidy programmes, such as that in Malawi which uses a voucher scheme, have improved access to seeds and other inputs but the financial sustainability of such initiatives is uncertain.
- Local capacity for seed production in Swaziland and Lesotho is weak, resulting in low levels of seed production and a dependence on seed imports from South Africa, e.g. of maize, sorghum and beans in the case of Swaziland, and imported seed of beans, peas, maize and wheat in the case of Lesotho. Remittances likely play a critical role in enabling access to such seed.
- There are often national deficits of improved, certified seed for minor cereals (e.g. sorghum, millet) and legumes (e.g. soyabeans, cowpea), and where there are seed surpluses in these crops (often South Africa, Zambia), the quantities are not enough to supply the whole region.
- There is very little organized seed production of crops other than maize and as such there are very few seed outlets stocking such seeds. Most farmers therefore depend on recycled farm seed or off-farm seed from networks of neighbours, relatives and open grain markets.

31. At a meso and micro-level, scoping and baseline studies for two current SDC projects⁴ have identified:

- A high incidence of retained seed, e.g. over 70% of the seed that is used in Malawi⁵.
- A reliance by seed companies on public breeding institutions, most notably CGIAR Centres (e.g. CIMMYT and ICRISAT), for breeding materials (Zimbabwe), with related concerns that research centres have insufficient foundation seed and planting materials for the improved crop varieties for smallholder multiplication (Malawi).
- An availability of high quality certified hybrid maize seed of the preferred varieties in Swaziland but widespread concerns amongst smallholders that fertiliser prices and high transport costs are driving down returns on maize investment.

⁴ Seeds and Markets Project (SAMP and the Harmonised Seed Security Project (HaSSP). The findings presented here derive from Mujaju (2010, Zimbabwe), Woodburne (2011, Swaziland), Miti (2010, Zambia) and Mloza-Banda et al. (2010, Malawi).

⁵ Which should not be interpreted as a problem not that the retained seed is necessarily poor.



- A perception amongst consumers that poor packaging and seed treatment (colour) of locally produced seed implies lesser quality than imported OPV seed, which is often treated with colored chemicals and sold in attractive packages (Malawi).
- There is minimal private seed industry involvement in crops other than maize (Malawi), and a perceived gap in the seed supply for crops such as OPV maize, beans, groundnuts, soybeans and pigeon pea (Malawi, Swaziland).
- A disincentive for commercial companies to produce seeds of OPV and leguminous crops because the practice of seed recycling is perceived to limit year-on-year sales (Zimbabwe but likely broadly applicable). Furthermore, poor liquidity, stemming from long payback periods and lack of credit, creates inefficiencies in and impediments to agricultural seed marketing (Malawi).
- Inadequate storage and processing facilities for smallholder farmers to store their seed under conditions that will ensure the maintenance of seed viability (Malawi, Swaziland)⁶.
- An absence of output markets for specific crops, e.g. for potatoes and beans (Lesotho).
- Concerns about the ability of retail staff at outlets to provide reliable information concerning suitability of seed varieties to consumers, coupled with minimal choice, e.g. of preferred varieties of OPVs (Swaziland).

⁶ Poor storage may be a greater threat to crops such as beans and groundnuts than cereals.

3 Part III: The RPSA Food Security Strategy and Programme, 2009-13

3.1 Main features of the SDC Strategy

32. The stated purpose of the Strategy, which is described as an “internal document”, is to provide SDC personnel in Bern (Head Quarters) and in Pretoria (COOF) with “a strategic framework for its Regional Food Security Programme in Southern Africa. It will help to ensure the coherence of the programme, facilitate the selection of partners, the development and implementation of relevant projects. It will become a good monitoring tool to measure progress and results”. Its vision is “an enabling legislative environment, improved agricultural techniques and decentralised availability of quality seeds varieties allow farmers to increase food production and income. It therefore supports them to avoid recurrent food crisis and enhances their resilience to the consequences of poor state governance, economic fluctuation, climate change and HIV/AIDS”.
33. Against that backdrop, its objective tiers are as follows:

Development Objective:	Food insecurity caused by external shocks or structural reasons is reduced.
Overall Objective:	Targeted poor rural populations improve their food situation.
Specific Objectives	
	1. Enabling policies at regional and national levels aimed at reducing seed insecurity are implemented.
	2. Availability of and accessibility to seeds and food is improved for targeted populations.
	3. Food production and quality seeds use are enhanced to increase resilience of farmers

34. The RPSA programme seeks to contribute to food security by adopting “a systemic approach (availability, accessibility, quality) using “seeds” as a guiding red thread”. It also seeks to speak to SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the complementary 2004 Action Plan for “Enhancing Agriculture and Food Security for Poverty Reduction in the SADC Region” (the “Dar-es-Salaam Declaration”) and the AU Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), which promotes regional integration and support to smallholders to ensure sufficient food production.
35. A self-described “small donor”, SDC opts to “focus its policy intervention on a niche in order to gain visibility but also to successfully exert an influence on the systems”. In part, it opts to focus on food and seed security because of a perceived “comparative advantage through its extensive knowledge and experience regionally and globally (relations with CGIAR centres, strong back-up on rural development from SDC network, existing local projects on the matter)”. The potential to create ‘multiplier effects’⁷ at national and sub-national level by working at a regional level is also noted.
36. The Strategy foresees partnerships with a wide range of stakeholders: governments, private sector, policy networks, NGOs, research institutions, and farmers and their organisations. It also anticipates supporting local empowerment (e.g. support to farmers’ unions) and international and continental organisations (e.g. FAO, CAADP, SADC) to facilitate more speedy policy implementation and action at national level. As this might imply, SDC outlines an intention to “be guided by a “seed security” focus at

⁷ Reviewers’ term.

policy level" (with specific focus on the SADC Secretariat), alongside "interventions related to building resilient sustainable livelihoods in a context of food security will be supported", including crop micro-insurance, "local-level" seed multiplication, and the promotion of district-level seed fairs.

3.2 The regional approach

37. The Strategy states that project selection will be based on one or several of the following principles:

- "Regional nature: where inter-country cooperation/collaboration is vital, given the nature of the problem (e.g. cross-border movements of seeds);
- Regional capacities: utilising the capacities of a regional or national organisation to influence the regional and global policy dialogue, create knowledge locally to be shared regionally or foster peer learning;
- Exemplarity: where an example or a practice at ground level (e.g. production or use of new seeds) can be shared in the region for the benefit of farmers or other stakeholders ("Think globally, act locally")".

38. Regional programming is expected to, inter alia, strengthen seed value chains through, for example, policy harmonisation and the breeding of improved varieties. Similarly it is expected that the translation of regional policies and the exchange of knowledge can support improved country-level responses to food security challenges. At a national level SDC states that it is "most likely to provide support to those countries who have been experiencing the most serious food security challenges (e.g. Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland) and where agriculture is the main national resource for the largest part of the population". The Strategy states that micro- and meso-level field projects in Tanzania and Mozambique are not foreseen given the presence of national SDC offices.

3.3 Programme portfolio and budgetary allocation

39. The initial Food Security Strategy budget for 2009-13 was CHF 16 million, to which an amount of CHF 2.5 million from the SDC GPFS budget would be added. As of 05 September 2011, CHF 11.4m (USD 14.2m) was committed to five initiatives, with a further CHF 9.6 (or USD 12m) earmarked for two upcoming initiatives (see Table 3.1, below). For project details of each committed item, see Annex H.

Table 3.1 SDC portfolio - summary table by resource envelope

Project	Implementing Partner	Modality	Timeframe	Budget	Status	Focal countries	Focus
Harmonised Seed Security Project (HaSSP)	FANRPAN (not-for-profit)	Project	Jan 2010 – Dec 2013	CHF 4,385,000 (= USD 5,471,690)	Implementation	Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Domestication of SADC Protocol (macro)
Seed and Markets Project (SAMP)	GRM International (private sector)	Project	Oct 2010 – June 2013	USD 3,248,116 (=CHF 2,603,032)	Implementation	Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe	Input, output markets (micro)
New Seed Initiative for Maize in Southern Africa (NSIMA) III	CIMMYT (CG Centre)	Project	Jul 2011 – Dec 2014	USD 2,500,000 (=CHF 2,003,494)	Inception	Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland,	Production and marketing of improved maize (macro, meso, micro)
Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research & Development for Southern Africa (CCARDESA)	SADC institution	Contribution (initially through FARA, then MDTF)	Oct 2010 – Oct 2011 (Phase 1)	CHF 850'000 (Phase 1 & 2) (= USD, 1,060,646)	Implementation (Phase 1)	SADC-wide	Coordination of regional R&D (macro)
Irrigation Rehab.	IWMI (not-for-profit funded by CGIAR)	Project	Jun 2011 – Jun 2013	USD 1,950,846 (=CHF 1,563,404)	Inception	Zimbabwe	Irrigated crop production (micro)
Weather-indexed insurance	TBD (private sector)	Project	Est. Dec 2011 – Dec 2014	USD 6,500,000 (=CHF 5,209,085)	Entry proposal approved by SDC CC Credit proposal end of 2011	Malawi or Zambia	Micro-insurance (micro, meso)
Post-harvest storage	CIMMYT	Project	Est. Dec 2011 – Dec 2015	USD 1,000,000, with further 4,500,000 for a Phase 2 (=CHF 4,407,687)	Development	Several countries, including Malawi	Post-harvest storage technologies (micro)

Note: further details on each project are provided in Annex H.

4 Part IV: Relevance of the SDC Food Security Strategy and Programme for Southern Africa

4.1 The purpose of a Strategy

40. A strategy is a plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. It typically deals with the 'how' rather than the 'what' but there is often merit in a strategy document addressing both. It conveys what issues are deemed to be important and why. Consequently, it makes choices and explicit trade-offs about what is included and what is not, coupled with the underlying assumptions. Those matters that are included should give rise to an array of interlocking activities, providing an obvious pattern with recurrent themes. Weak strategies result in internal and external stakeholders having different perceptions of what an organisation is interested in pursuing, why and how.
41. A number of considerations may shape strategy development, including resource availability, the actions of other actors, and limits to internal coordination and control within the organisation. The advantages of a clear strategy are many fold. For internal stakeholders, it offers an opportunity for staff to make operational decisions within a clear framework (e.g. whether a project concept is of interest or not) and a means to ensure that the organisation occupies a suitable niche area, i.e. one in which activities are performed differently from other organisation or in which different activities or subject matters are supported. For partners and prospective grantees it provides high-level guidance as to eligibility and priorities, thereby reducing transaction costs and furthering coherence within an organisation's project portfolio.

4.2 Evaluation context


42. The SDC projects are based on a number of tacit assumptions (see Annex H for more detail):
- There is a lack of certified seed of improved, adapted and appropriate varieties available in the marketplace (HaSSP, NSIMA).
 - SADC Member States typically have weak input distribution systems and smallholders usually have limited access to improved seed (e.g. HaSSP, NSIMA, SAMP).
 - Poor quality seed results in wastage of financial capital (i.e. the money spent purchasing seed), limits yield and therefore compromises food security (e.g. HaSSP, NSIMA, SAMP).
 - Output markets for farm surplus are an essential stimuli for increased production and productivity but are often lacking (e.g. SAMP).
 - Output markets enable farmers to secure increased income, which in turn can be used to access inputs, including seed (e.g. SAMP).
 - Insufficient attention is often placed on the role and drivers of output markets, and therefore of the role, motives and potential value addition of the private sector (e.g. IWMI, SAMP).
 - That, being pilots, there is something new and/or innovative about the initiatives being trialled that can be scaled-up and/or -out (e.g. IWMI, SAMP).
 - That there is demand for the lessons emanating from projects and therefore there is scope for replication, adaptation and scaling-up at field level, and for modifications of relevant legal, regulatory and programming (e.g. HaSSP, IWMI, SAMP).
 - A more diverse, geographically dispersed and competent formal seed sector is vital for enabling increased farmer adoption of improved seed in the region (e.g. HaSSP, NSIMA) and therefore formal cross-border trade of improved seed is vital for productivity gains (e.g. HaSSP).

- Domestication of the regional seed protocol will stimulate the availability of more varieties, encourage more companies to invest in the seed business and increase the choices of varieties available to farmers (e.g. HaSSP).
 - Doing so will lead to better seed quality as a result of improved facilities and skills, and save time and resources because importing countries will no longer need to re-test imported seed (e.g. HaSSP; explicit assumption).
 - Doing so will allow more efficient movement of seed in the region through the use of a common seed certification scheme, terminology, standards, procedures, seals and labels. Harmonization will also facilitate better targeting of relief seed (e.g. HaSSP; explicit assumption).
 - Should Member States domestic the SADC Protocol seed matters will necessarily be handled in accordance with law, i.e. the technical, trade, food security and poverty reduction merits of adhering to the SADC Protocol will not be overshadowed by 'politics', issues of sovereignty or similar (e.g. HaSSP).
 - Strategic investments will provide SDC with an advocacy platform and help achieve SDC's FSS strategy objectives at a regional and national policy level (e.g. CCARDESA).
 - By supporting regional learning platforms, improving technical capacity and supporting the provision of evidence regional and national decision-makers appropriate will adopt appropriate, evidence-based policy processes and programmes (e.g. CCARDESA).
43. In this section, the report will examine the relevance of the Strategy and programme portfolio when set against the regional policy framework. Key lines of enquiry have therefore included:
- Are programme and project objectives in line with priorities and policies of SDC?
 - Are programme and project objectives in line with needs, priorities and policies of SADC (as SDC's key interlocutor and principle stakeholder)?
 - Is the Strategy and programme in line with the livelihoods strategies and needs of the beneficiaries?
 - Are the tacit assumptions that underpin project design sound?

4.3 Relevance to the SDC policy and priorities

44. The Strategy and programme are aligned with SDC's policy and strategy cascade (see Figure 4.1, below). However, one point of variation may be the choice of partner countries by the IPs (subsequently endorsed by COOF and Head Office). The 2003 Partnerships for the Future guidelines stipulate that partner country selection should be informed by, inter alia, need, e.g. "mass poverty, precarious subsistence living, crisis-prone". On that basis, the inclusion of Botswana, a middle-income country with a small population and comparatively good Hunger Index score, within NSIMA III is questionable (even if the basis for decision was informed by complementarity with the programmes, see Annex H). Similarly, the inclusion of the DRC, albeit just one province, runs contrary to the position taken within the FSS that the DRC should be excluded. It is also noteworthy that IPs seldom actively sought to mainstream transversal themes per se, albeit some projects, most notably SAMP, may create positive gender- and HIV-sensitive outcomes through crop choice, even if the basis for their selection was market driven (which may indicate a possible tension at times between market drivers and therefore economic sustainability vis-à-vis broader development outcomes).

Figure 4.1: SDC's policy and strategy cascade



4.4 Relevance to the SADC policy environment

4.4.1 RISDP, RAP, CAADP and the role of a Regional Economic Community

45. Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as SADC, have a critical role to play with regards to both their regional CAADP compact, and the series of national compacts to be developed and implemented in/by the Member States. This dual role is often overlooked, with emphasis placed on the latter. The RECs have considerable scope to exert positive political influence, to demonstrate catalytic leadership and to guide the building of an effective regional partnership for food and nutrition security. Through SADC's emerging Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP), the REC and the Member States are placing greater attention on constraints and impediments to agricultural development. The RAP process has created a catalytic environment that deepens regional dialogue concerning food security.
46. The scoping phase of the RAP was concluded in April 2010 with a regional workshop of SADC Senior Government Officials and SADC Farmer Organisation representatives who recommended that the RAP should constitute a formal policy arrangement (in contrast to existing loose strategic frameworks, such as the RISDP and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration). As such it become a legally binding instrument. It will be implemented on the principle of subsidiarity, and have budgetary provisions linked to Member States' own planning and budget frameworks.
47. The RAP framework, together with the Policy Statement, will form the RAP 'Policy Document' which is expected to be completed by late 2012. As of late August 2011, SADC FANR was producing a

Statement of Intent, which will provide direction and outline priorities for Member State consideration. That will be shared with Permanent Secretaries, representatives of Chambers of Trade and Commerce, and representatives of farmers' associations in October or November 2011. It is probable that the RAP will place significant focus on genetic material, including farmer or "indigenous" varieties. It is equally likely that legumes, roots and tubers will receive greater attention that may have been the case to date (Muchero pers. comm).

48. The SDC programme rightly conceives SADC FANR as a policy and strategy body; a body that is not expected to implement or coordinate implementation of programmes - doing so is outside of its mandate and neither does SADC FANR have the staff numbers or skill-sets for such. The programme portfolio recognises that, and only HaSSP (rightly) engages directly with SADC FANR. SDC's support to CCARDESA fills an important gap: SADC has lacked a dedicated Sub-regional Organisation (SRO) following the phasing out of Southern Africa Committee for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) in 1997-2002. With CCARDESA focusing on technical coordination and related harmonization functions of facilitation of the regional research and development (R&D) agenda, SADC FANR is expected to provide overall strategic policy guidance and leadership to CCARDESA in order to ensure that the regional R&D agenda and priorities are consistent with the SADC mandate on agriculture and food security. Both HaSSP and SDC support to CCARDESA are therefore highly relevant to the regional political-institutional and policy frameworks in the SADC region.
49. Whilst CCARDESA does not have a seed focus per se, its regional mandate, institutional connections with the SADC Secretariat, focus on lesson capture, sharing and scale-up, and its direct relevance to RISDP, CAADP and RAP frameworks make it highly relevant within the regional food security agenda. SDC's support is a justifiably strategic and political investment decision (even if the Centre's financial sustainability is uncertain, see Annex H).
50. All five SDC initiatives are aligned with the working objectives of the RAP outlined by SADC in December 2010, i.e.:
 - Objective 1: "to promote and support production, productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector" (within which the stated highest priority issue is crop production) (e.g. HaSSP, IWMI, SAMP).
 - Objective 3. "to promote and support growth in incomes for agricultural communities in particular small-scale farmers, fishers and foresters" (e.g. IWMI, SAMP)
 - Objective 4: "to promote the development of trade and markets" (e.g. SAMP and, indirectly, HaSSP).
 - Objective 6: "to promote sustainable utilisation and management of natural resources and the environment" (e.g. IWMI).
51. Specifically, the SDC initiatives are also aligned with policy directions within the emerging RAP that puts focus on measures to:
 - Support regional integration and regional trade integration, with the latter specifically seeking to "remove most, if not all, intra-regional trade barriers between countries while possibly enhancing extra-regional protection" (e.g. HaSSP).
 - Increase the availability, access and affordability of seeds and genetic material of improved characteristics, coupled with emphasis on 'market-led breeding' and harmonising standards, regulations, certification and use of seeds and genetic materials (e.g. HaSSP, NSIMA).
 - Address the "diversity of national regulatory systems on seeds in SADC countries", with a view to reaching the currently "segregated, small and difficult to access" markets (e.g. HaSSP).
 - Increase irrigation-based farming from the regional average of 4.5% of agricultural land under irrigation to 7% (e.g. IWMI).



- “Improve on past efforts to promote irrigation”, with greater emphasis on social, management and organisational matters, coupled with market considerations (e.g. IWMI).
- Promote contract farming, out-grower schemes and value-chain promotion (e.g. HaSSP, SAMP) (see SADC 2010).

52. The projects are also variously aligned with SADC’s RISDP, which seeks to ensure food availability (Intervention 1), and Pillars II and IV of CAADP, i.e. increasing food supply, reducing hunger and improving responses to food emerging crises, and improving agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption (respectively).

4.4.2 Regional markets, cross-border trade and the regional political-economy

53. Trade offers a way to improve access to and availability of food by managing volatility, encouraging productivity growth, by keeping prices competitive and increasing diversity of supply. For the poor, the worst of all worlds occur when they are forced to contend with a production shortfall without sufficient means to access the market. A recent meta-analysis of 49 household economy studies across 12 countries in Southern Africa provides valuable insights into the livelihood-level issues that cause food insecurity. It found that:

- Failure to access food was nearly twice as significant as the failure to *produce* food.
- Climate and environmental stressors, poverty, increases in food prices, and poor market access were amongst the most frequently cited direct drivers of food insecurity.
- Poverty, climate and environmental stressors, prevalence of HIV/AIDS, government policy and low regional cereal availability were amongst the most frequently cited indirect drivers (Misselhorn 2005, 2008).

54. Given the heavy dependence on rain-fed maize production, countries in Southern Africa must routinely cope with pronounced production and consumption volatility in their primary staple food. Private cross-border maize trade and consumer substitution of alternate food staples can moderate food consumption volatility. Recent evidence from Zambia concerning regional trade, government policy and food security finds that a favourable policy environment, private imports and increased cassava consumption could together meet roughly two-thirds of the maize consumption shortfall facing vulnerable households during drought years (Dorash et al. 2009).

55. Regional trade in Southern Africa is, however, typified by significant blockages, which have the effect of reducing food security, amplifying price variations, and reducing incentives for increased production. Staple food markets in Southern Africa are weak, politicised, fragmented and characterised by seasonal price hikes. Maize, in particular, is subject to regular export bans. National borders in Southern Africa often separate typical food surplus zones (e.g. northern Mozambique, northern Zambia) from areas that regularly suffer deficits (Hagglblade et al. 2008).

56. Sources of market failure are diverse but include:

- Barriers to market entry for a range of value-chain actors, including a lack of access liquidity for small and emerging seed houses (MacRobert, Henderson pers. comm).
- The existence of a number of small, landlocked and low population density countries that fail to offer economies of scale and which typically have higher transport costs than coastal countries (World Bank 2008).
- Heavy controls over private regional trade in food staples (MSU 2008) and seed.
- The prevalence of unpredictable and unstable policy interventions, such as the imposition of non-tariff barriers, which continue to introduce uncertainty into the production and value chain (MSU 2008).

- Inaction on free trade arrangements by regional organisations and sovereign governments, and little harmonisation of sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) requirements.
 - Severe deficits in essential elements of the 'hard' enabling environment, including inadequate physical infrastructure such as roads – deficiencies that drive up transport costs, meaning that even if markets were competitive the final costs to consumers can be high (Tschirley & Jayne 2009).
57. The 2003 Maputo Declaration states that governments must create the right enabling environment for private investment, including foreign direct investment (FDI). However, inappropriate government intervention through commodity price fixing, the imposition of export bans in times of perceived high prices and/or shortages (particularly if these coincide with an election), or the implementation of import bans for one reason or another all serve to distort markets and market signals, continue to result in inappropriate supply responses. The consequences are significant. Market failures reduce food security, amplify price volatility, raise transaction costs, discourage investment in staple food production and trade, and stifle innovation and risk-taking (Haggeblade 2009). Low levels of investment and inappropriate political intervention mean that it is difficult to move food from areas of surplus production to areas experiencing a deficit. Instead, in Zambia, for example, and due to variability in rainfall and government maize policy, both maize production and prices vary substantially, with domestic wholesale prices ranging from USD100 to USD350/tonne (Dorosh et al 2009).
58. SDC's promotion of measures to understand and support output markets is praised, with SAMP being a case in point (Carr, De Santis, Ngwenya pers. comm). Similarly, the HaSSP project is highly relevant in that domestication of the SADC Protocol should allow for the efficient movement of seed in the region through the use of a common seed certification scheme, terminology, standards, procedures, seals and labels. Harmonization should also facilitate better targeting of relief seed. Nevertheless, it is uncertain that should Member States domestic the SADC Protocol seed matters will necessarily be handled in accordance with law, i.e. the technical, trade, food security and poverty reduction merits of adhering to the SADC Protocol will not be overshadowed by 'politics', issues of sovereignty or similar. Moreover, the status of the MoU is uncertain. Two thirds of Member States must sign the MoU for the legislation to be legally binding. As of 1Q 2011, USAID estimates that only six or seven had signed, including Zambia and Malawi (Khupe pers. comm). This apparent reticence or ambivalence by SADC FANR may limit Member States' willingness to start domestication.
59. A recent assessment by ECA argued that: "translating regional economic community goals into national plans and budgets is an important interface between individual countries and the regional economic communities. But member countries have deficient national mechanisms for doing so.... In most Africa countries regional cooperation does not go beyond signing treaties and protocols" (ECA 2007). Typically, governments mistrust the private sector. Policy makers fear a loss of government control over maize supplies (in particular) and the politically sensitive maize price. Political capital is critical. Governments fear that collusion by traders could result in market manipulation and profiteering that could generate food shortages and price spikes that are politically damaging, not least in election years (Dorosh et al. 2009; Tschirley & Jayne 2009). On another level, there is concern that opening up national markets to other Member States could result in those relatively weaker economies becoming dominated by private sector actors from the stronger economies. As such, suspicions remain that the benefits of regional integration could be unevenly distributed, with South Africa often cited in this regard (though the 'GMO issue' offers a further dimension to the debate).
60. As this would suggest, the challenges must not be seen from a purely technocratic perspective; the constraints are often inherently political in nature. This is certainly not lost on HaSSP's IP, FANRPAN.

4.4.3 Food and seed security linkages

61. The links between seed system interventions and food security, the ultimate goal, are unclear within the FSS. On one level, Specific Objectives 2 and 3 mention food and seed together, i.e. they are placed at the same level in a results chain. There is also insufficient separation of hierarchy between Specific Objectives and the Development Objective. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, to assess causal pathways between seed interventions and food outcomes. On another level, though the Strategy recognises that seed security includes availability, access, and quality, there is no acknowledgement that one element may affect food security more than another (depending on the situation and stakeholder in question). Rather, the tacit assumption within the Specific Objectives is that availability per se is a – the? – major limiting factor for seed security and therefore that the missing link to production was that seed of a particular variety was unavailable in time for planting. In reality, the link between seed and food security may not be as direct as is often assumed (Ngwenya pers. comm; McGuire & Sperling 2011), and variety release need not necessarily mean uptake by smallholders (De Santis pers. comm).
62. Internationally or otherwise, the current portfolio is skewed towards increasing the availability of cereals and particularly maize, despite anecdotal evidence of smallholders in marginal, dry and drought-prone areas placing renewed focus on small grains, such as sorghum and pear millet (Sibanda, Macrobert pers. comm), whilst perhaps having lost some of the expertise required. Moreover, significant emphasis is placed on modern varieties and formal seed systems (see Table 4.1, below).

Table 4.1: Distribution of project focus (excluding CCARDESA)

Crop type	Cereal 32.7%	Veg., melons 6.8%	Fruits, nuts 6.8%	Oilseed 8.8%	Roots, tubers 4.6%	Beverage, spices 9.5%	Legumes 12.3%	Sugar crops 6.1%	Other 12.3%
Cereal type (as % of total cereal)	Maize 74.7%	Rice 4.6%	Wheat 12.5%	Millet 2.4%	Sorghum 3.4%	Other 2.4%			
Cereal type (as % of prog total)	Maize 24.5%	Rice 1.5%	Wheat 4.1%	Millet 0.8%	Sorghum 1.1%	Other 0.8%			
Variety type	Modern 78.9%	Farmer 21.1%							
Seed system type	Formal 57.6%	Informal 42.4%							
Seed security parameter	Availability 45.0%	Access 23.9%	Quality 31.0%						
Food security frame	Chronic 48.3%	Acute 51.7%							
Market dimension focus	Supply 61.6%	Demand 38.4%							
Scale level	Macro 37.5%	Meso 36.1%	Micro 26.5%						
Primary stakeholder type	Regional 28,5%	National 48.5%	Local 23%						

Data derives from project-level data, see Annex G. CCARDESA is excluded because it does not have a seeds focus and the rationale for SDC investment is strategic (see commentary above and Annex H). The content of the table above is somewhat crude but is valuable in terms of understanding programme emphasis and for identifying any skews in focus. The reviewers suspect that the informal and acute estimates may actually be over-stated.

63. There is an implication in the Strategy, seemingly in SDC's programme (see Table 4.1, above) and within in the broader discourse of food security in Southern Africa, that food security is secured through F1 hybrid maize. Whilst maize is clearly important in many areas, it is not the sole crop delivering food security. Moreover, the extent to which hybrid maize varieties (the variety type most associated with formal seed production systems and quality-control regimes) always out-perform open-pollinated varieties under farmers' conditions, especially when input costs are factored in, remains contested, and signals the importance of skills, experience and external inputs in the delivery of improved productivity⁸.
64. If food security goals move away from production alone, then other crops may become more important, not least if improved nutrition and resilience come more to the fore. Indeed, several interviewees promoted the notion of a more rounded basket of crops for increased resilience and nutritional benefit, with mention made of legumes and pulses. In such an approach nutrition is conceived as much as an input as an outcome (De Santis pers. comm.). Similarly, any increased emphasis on access for specific groups (e.g. women-headed households, AIDS-affected households) may lead to different selection of crops and supply channels to ensure these groups have access to the varieties they desire⁹. At present, however, priority crops or even expected skew of focus are not specified within the Strategy, and there is no requirement for stakeholders to consider the traits of the varieties promoted nor their importance for specific groups. This may reflect a somewhat loose programme linking of food security to production.
65. A lack of genetic material is sometimes an issue (e.g. when a new crop or variety is being promoted) and there is clearly value in promoting new varieties for development. However, the major constraint within most seed systems is not availability but rather access or variety (genetic) quality, i.e. varieties that are adapted to fit farmers' needs and preferences (MacRobert, Carr, De Santis pers. comms.). Even in Zimbabwe, after the currency crisis of 2008 when agro-dealers were closed, farmers still obtained significant amounts of hybrid maize through the parallel market (also see Boxes 4.1 and 4.2, below).

Box 4.1: Questioning the centrality of availability

"We've noted over the years, especially when one looks at secondary crops, that where people don't buy the seed, for example groundnuts, the market is informal. They buy from each other; they rely on exchanges. That defeated out thinking, our thesis, that food insecurity is equal to seed security. Because despite seemingly high levels of food insecurity, people we're still growing crops meaning that that seed was there show how, despite the hunger and food insecurity" (Magunda pers. comm.).

"There is a consensus that availability is there even in the bad years and that's why seed fairs came about because it was felt that seed was around and that dumping seed disrupted markets" (Carr pers. comm.).

⁸ MacRobert (CIMMYT) estimates that hybrids produce a 20% better yield than OPVs but suspects that farmers may regard the higher return as marginal, once all costs and yield variability are factored in.

⁹ It may also promote critical reflection of the most suitable partners for programme delivery.

Box 4.2: 2009 Seed Security Assessment, Zimbabwe

"The formal seed sector in Zimbabwe has been very badly affected by the massive inflation that existed over the last 10 years, and by a very difficult economic and policy environment that prevailed during the same time period, and which has been particularly unfavorable in the last three years. However, in the first half of 2009 things have greatly improved (legalization of use of the US dollar for trade in-country and removal of restrictions on input and output markets). Most of the major seed companies are also still functioning in Zimbabwe, albeit at much reduced levels compared with 10 years ago. So there is now an important opportunity to re-establish the formal seed sector and related retail market networks in the country....The right kind of relief programs at this time – ones that promote rather than compete with the formal seed sector and retail networks – could be extremely valuable in jump-starting the recovery.

"Sorghum, pearl millet, groundnuts, cowpeas, Bambara nuts, sugar beans and sweet potato constitute the bulk of crops that are important in the informal seed sector in Zimbabwe. Others include open pollinated maize varieties, soybeans, sunflower, white beans and finger millet. Except for maize, the informal sector supplies over 95% of the seed Zimbabwe farmers sow. Informal sector crops are also key for production stability and nutrition, and many are loosely identified as 'women's crops'. Due to the collapse of the economy and the resultant shortage of maize seed in formal markets, hybrid maize has also made inroads into the informal markets. Hybrid maize bought in 10kg, 20kg, 25kg or 50kg packs is repackaged into smaller packets of 2kg and 5 kg and sold in the informal venue – from trucks or open market stalls, or from others who have obtained it, e.g. employees of some seed companies who were paid in seed bags, rather than currency.

"Overall, the assessment team found the informal sector function well: being both resilient and dynamic. There was an impressive amount of processing within communities, to add value to basic agricultural products and especially to generate income. All major crops could potentially undergo transformation into saleable products. Also a number of processes have served to keep the informal sector dynamic and supplied with an injection of new varieties" (CIAT et al. 2009).

66. For most crops, availability is not usually the limiting factor; given effective demand, seed can be obtained. Availability is mainly a limiting factor when a variety is totally new (so there are no alternate channels for provision through the local system) or is exclusively produced by the formal system, with limitations to supply (as can be the case with F1 hybrid maize – as following generations of F1 seed suffer significant yield declines).
67. The Strategy implicitly assumes that improved availability of 'quality seeds' will result in greater production and income¹⁰. Whilst new crop varieties can make important contributions to productivity, productivity depends on many other factors as well. First, ownership of assets, entitlements to

¹⁰ The notion of 'quality seed' is mentioned repeatedly but it has questionable analytical value because it may refer to modern varieties developed through breeding, or to seed (of any type) that is formally certified or quality-checked to some formally-recognised standard, such as Quality Declared Seed. Thus 'quality seed' could mean the 'genetic quality' (attributes such as potential yield, plant type, or other traits), 'seed quality' per se (whether the seed is healthy, will germinate, and is free of inert material), or both. Moreover, there are dangers in implying that anything else is 'not quality' or 'not seed'. This is not supported by empirical evidence. Within the informal seed system, quality control practices exist - from on-farm seed storage practices to 'social certification' of seed vendors in local markets. Whilst there are invariably opportunities for improvement in practice and technology, it may be unhelpful to under-acknowledge their effectiveness at maintaining the phyto-sanitary quality of seed, especially cereals in drier areas. Furthermore, the notion of 'indigenous' seeds (see p8 of the FSS) is imprecise. Does it mean native crop species, or locally-developed varieties (i.e. landraces)? Moreover, the notion of 'indigenous' does not always hold up genetically, as local seed systems may combine material from research centres and from other farmers. Better terminology may be 'modern varieties' to denote material from formal research which has been produced as a uniform variety, and 'farmer varieties' to denote everything else. It is also noteworthy that any assumption – explicit or otherwise – that local varieties (or crops?) are being abandoned may not be true in many cases, as farmer and improved varieties often coexist when they serve different goals.

resources, and individual capabilities all matter, as do the policy context and economic conditions. Whilst this is recognised in the Strategy, the results chains are not always evident¹¹. Secondly, the impacts of a crop technology on poverty and food security depend on factors beyond yield: the level of labour demanded, nature of output and labour markets, crop input requirements, and a crop's role in the diets of the poor. Whilst it is impossible in a short strategy document to list all possible factors, the recognition that seed technologies' contribution to food security depends on the context, and target groups, is under-stated at present.

4.5 Changes within the Tripartite environment

68. SADC, COMESA and the EAC are each based on premises of regional cooperation and integrated markets. Efforts to harmonise important productivity-increasing measures, such as the provision of improved seeds for staple crops, are also continuing. At a political level, the benefits of the Tripartite Agreement, and a Tripartite Free Trade Area, are increasingly cited. Of particular importance, the 28th Meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers in August 2010 decided to form a Zambia-Malawi-Mozambique triangle cluster (or marketshed) to improve the functioning of regional markets. (The marketshed also extends to Zimbabwe, Swaziland and DRC). Regional progress is often slow and patchy but there does appear to be a gradual sea-change: a sea-change to which this SDC programme could actively support (given the right resources to do so and with a careful marshalling of evidence emanating from the programme's IPs).
69. In late 2010 the Tripartite Committee agreed that a Tripartite Compact should be developed, with COMESA, EAC and SADC Compacts to be subsumed by the same. Consequently the near-final COMESA Compact has apparently been placed on hold. The implications for the SADC RAP are not clear but it is difficult to imagine SADC FANR, in part given the time, political and financial investment in the RAP to date, foregoing its Policy. At least one major donor sees space for the RAP, even should the notion of Tripartite Compact be approved (with any subsequent emergence likely taking a minimum of 2-3 years). In fact, the biggest threat to the RAP in so far as (some?) donors are concerned is the perceived inaction of SADC FANR, which may alienate donors and potentially erode funding lines.

4.6 Concluding comments

70. There is a tangible growing commitment to operationalise the Tripartite framework, particularly in COMESA's senior executive and within the donor community. There is an increasing focus on the constraints to and opportunities for trans-border trade of seed and staple foods and an expectation for regional institutions to provide leadership, to facilitate learning and to undertake action that exploits economies of scale. The apparent commitment of African leaders, the RECs, Member States and the donors to NEPAD's CAADP framework and evidence-based policy processes provides SDC with, perhaps, a unique opportunity to support seed, food and nutrition security from a regional perspective; an approach that could make a significant difference in Southern Africa. The opportunity to inform and even influence the strategic direction and content of the SADC RAP must not be lost on SDC.
71. From conceptual and field perspectives, there is an important acknowledgement that seed security extends beyond seed availability to issues of quality and access. Similarly, there is recognition of the importance of informal and formal seed systems in the FSS. The FSS rightly connects food security to a range of cross-cutting objectives concerning gender, HIV/AIDS, resilience and, to a lesser extent, governance reform. The emphasis on longer-term developmental interventions over emergency aid and

¹¹ By way of example, a results chain concerning seed production and food security might look like: seed crop production → increased income → increased financial access to foodstuffs → increased households food security.

the distinguishing of chronic from acute stresses is important, and the focus on seed security provides opportunities to link other programmes and policy initiatives in agriculture, particularly in crop development, seed supply, and local enterprise development. The Strategy clearly aspires for regional impact, and consequently seeks to engage at this level. This builds on earlier support at policy level (e.g. SSSN), providing an important 'legitimacy bridge' for further policy work.

5 Part V: Programme results to date

5.1 The evaluation context

72. The programme contains five funded initiatives but two are only at inception stage (IWMI, NSIMA III), whilst support to CCARDESA is not expected to contribute directly to the attainment of the programme results outlined in the FSS. HaSSP and SAMP have been operating for 18 and 12 months respectively. Both projects have recorded achievements but they are largely or exclusively at activity-level (See Box 5.1, below). As such, it is premature to assess the totality of the effects of programme interventions, be they positive or negative, intended or unintended. Moreover, in the case of HaSSP, it is quite possible that impacts, and even outcomes, will be released after December 2013.

Box 5.1: Key project deliverables to date

FANRPAN HaSSP (Jan 2010 – Dec 2013)

- Phyto-sanitary capacity evaluation studies of the national phyto-sanitary institutions in the project countries, which included examination of phyto-sanitary measures for seed at different border posts.
- Forty-six research, extension, seed company personnel and members of the seed variety release committees in Swaziland and Zimbabwe trained in evaluation of new varieties according to 'value for cultivation and use' (VCU) and 'distinctness, uniformity and stability' (DUS) to ensure standardisation.
- 142 smallholder farmers from the project countries trained in seed production and entrepreneurship skills.
- Vehicles purchased to strengthen seed certification facilities in the project countries, which should better facilitate seed crop inspections.
- Seed processing and seed storage equipment purchased to support seed production by small-scale seed producers.
- Project logframe revised, baseline studies conducted, and M&E Manual developed.

GRM SAMP (Oct 2010 – June 2013)

- SAMP introduced to, and relevant protocols completed with, governments in all three countries.
- Contracts and MoUs signed with private sector Implementing Partners and CGIAR Centres (CYMMIT, CIAT).
- Project logframe revised and M&E Manual developed (using the OECD DCED framework).
- Knowledge-into-Use strategy developed.

73. In due course it is advisable that IPs consider any mistakes in targeting, not least given the broad silence in the FSS on the identity of target groups. It will be necessary to examine, for example, whether interventions supported by IWMI, NSIMA and SAMP resulted in benefits going to unintended beneficiaries, and the extent to which women, for example, have been excluded. Similarly, IPs may wish to monitor the extent to which project support is creating any recoil effects, for example if a recipient organisation or its systems are overburdened by SDC's intervention (e.g. Seed Services within the HaSSP context or the Agritex service within SAMP).

5.2 Findings

74. Given the early nature of programme activities to date it is also difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine the extent to which programme objectives will be achieved. Programme outputs are not yet

producing the desired outcomes. Nevertheless, it is probable that SDC's ability to monitor and report results to 2013 will be constrained by four factors:

- There is an apparent absence of baseline data across the majority of programme indicators.
- There is scope for improvement in the phraseology of several programme-level indicators.
- The project logframe indicators are often unaligned with programme logframe indicators.
- In totality the projects may not deliver the expected programme results (see Table 5.1, below).

75. As this may suggest, without a firm picture of the starting point it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine possible results should the programme be extended or expanded. The 2010 SDC Report on the Effectiveness of Swiss Development Cooperation in the Agricultural Sector also identified an absence of a result-oriented methodology that would enable overarching conclusions about the effectiveness of sector support.

**Table 5.1: Headline programme achievements**

Development Objective: Food insecurity caused by external shocks or structural reasons is reduced				
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Status	Comments
Increased global food production	<i>Presumed to be zero</i>	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>No attributable change or change to which SDC can claim programme contribution</i>	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HaSSP Goal: % change in production of major staples in tonnes <p>SADC data is presumably available from which SDC could produce a baseline</p>
# and % of people having enough food	<i>Various. SDC has figs for population in need of food 2006-10 (SADC data)</i>	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>No attributable change or change to which SDC can claim programme contribution</i>	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IWMI Goal: Households achieving 12 month food security • IWMI Purpose: Reduction of proportion of beneficiary households failing to meet food requirements from own production, disaggregated by sex <p>No baseline data for % of people having enough/insufficient food.</p>
Adoption rate of new seeds	<i>Presumed to be zero</i>	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>No attributable change or change to which SDC can claim programme contribution</i>	<p>Partially aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SAMP Outcome: Increased number of farmers buying or growing quality seed in target areas and lessons learned documented <p>A questionable indicator: adoption of new seeds may be an enabler rather than a performance measurement of the overall programme objective statement</p>
Increased global income	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>Extent of increase unstated.</i>	<i>No attributable change or change to which SDC can claim programme contribution</i>	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IWMI Goal: Average net farm income increased by 50% of 2016, disaggregated (but % increase does not capture actual monetary increase) • IWMI Purpose: Economic status of targeted population improved by 20% in 10 years' time analysed according to sex • IWMI Output: Percentage increase in men and women's incomes • SAMP Output: Increased income for farmers engaged in pilot schemes <p>Notion of "global" creates confusion. SADC-wide? SDC's countries of engagement? SADC data is presumably available from which SDC could produce a baseline</p>
Specific Objective 1: Enabling policies at regional and national levels aimed at reducing seed insecurity are implemented				
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Status	Comments
# of countries having developed	<i>Unstated but presumed</i>	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>No attributable change</i>	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HaSSP Purpose: Policies that align national procedures and guidelines for seed variety re-lease and registration; phytosanitary and quarantine measures for seed; and seed certification and quality control with

"seeds" policies	to be zero			<p>SADC protocols, adopted by the governments of Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe by December 2012.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SAMP Goal: SADC Member States and relevant donors and multilateral organisations adopt improved seed security strategies and policies <p>Current programme indicator is silent on quality and extent of alignment with SADC Protocol – a very poor policy would currently register as a result</p>
# of countries having implemented "seeds" policies	Unstated but presumed to be zero	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None. Neither HaSSP or SAMP indicators speak directly to policy implementation, though two HaSSP indicators will track performance measurement in relation to variety testing and release, and quarantine pest lists (which presumably are elements of 'policy implementation') <p>It is probable that there will be varying degree of implementation, so the programme indicator requires greater specificity.</p>
# of policies with a "gender sensitive" approach	Unstated but presumed to be zero	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None <p>Are there agreed minimum standards? Wording is ambiguous, suggesting the indicator is not measurable. Indicator does not speak to Specific Objective, though what the policy is supposed to 'enable' is unclear.</p>
# of policies with a "HIV/AIDS" approach	Unstated but presumed to be zero	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None <p>Are there agreed minimum standards? Wording is ambiguous, suggesting the indicator is not measurable. Indicator does not speak to Specific Objective, though what the policy is supposed to 'enable' is unclear.</p>
Specific Objective 2: Availability of and accessibility to seeds and food is improved for targeted populations				
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Status	Comments
# of quality seed varieties available to people	Various. SDC has figs for number of staple food crop varieties per country (2007)	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SAMP Outcome: Increased quantity of quality seed available for sale in target areas and lessons learned documented. SAMP Output: Increased quantity of inputs available on time. HaSSP Goal: % change in volumes of seed traded in project countries [NB: # vs. %, and application to prog. indicator assumes increased local availability] HaSSP Goal: % change in variety of seeds traded in project countries [NB: # vs. %, and application to prog. indicator assumes increased local availability] NSIMA Outcome: Over three years, CIMMYT to develop and provide to NARS and Seed Companies in BW, CD, SZ, LS and ZA with at least five new OPVs and 10 hybrids with improved performance and acceptance under the stress-prone conditions of resource-poor farmers. NSIMA Outcome: Over three years, CIMMYT to develop and release to the NARS and private seed sector 20 elite inbred lines that have improved general combining ability. NSIMA Outcome: At least 3 OPVs and 6 new hybrids registered by NARS or private sector and taken up by the private seed sector for marketing, particularly in BW, CD, LS, SW and ZA.



				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NSIMA Outcome: Initial “start-up” basic seed of newly released improved maize varieties produced by CIMMYT, NARS and seed companies and used for certified seed production. <p>Unclear if the “targeted populations” are SADC wide or a sub-region with that.</p>
Increase in yields (quantity and quality)	Unstated	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Changes in income at household levels (quantity and type)	Unstated	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IWMI Goal: Average net farm income increased by 50% of 2016, disaggregated (but % increase does not capture actual monetary increase) SAMP Output: Increased income for farmers engaged in pilot schemes
Improved situation of women (working conditions, health, empowerment)	Unstated	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> IWMI Purpose: Economic status of targeted population improved by 20% in 10 years' time analysed according to sex IWMI Purpose: Nutrition status and health benefits attributable to the programme (level under 5 malnutrition)
Specific Objective 3: Food production and quality seeds use are enhanced to increase resilience of farmers				
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Status	Comments
# of seeds developed, tested and certified	Unstated	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HaSSP Purpose: A new variety that has been tested and released in two SADC Member States, and listed in the SADC Common Catalogue, is marketed in at least three of the four focal countries within six months of registration without further testing locally (by February 2013). NSIMA Outcome: Over three years, CIMMYT to develop and provide to NARS and Seed Companies in BW, CD, SZ, LS and ZA with at least five new OPVs and 10 hybrids with improved performance and acceptance under the stress-prone conditions of resource-poor farmers. NSIMA Outcome: Over three years, CIMMYT to develop and release to the NARS and private seed sector 20 elite inbred lines that have improved general combining ability. NSIMA Outcome: At least 3 OPVs and 6 new hybrids registered by NARS or private sector and taken up by the private seed sector for marketing, particularly in BW, CD, LS, SW and ZA.
# of new quality seeds developed and adopted	Unstated	Unstated	No attributable change	<p>Aligned SDC project indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> HaSSP Purpose: A new variety that has been tested and released in two SADC Member States, and listed in the SADC Common Catalogue, is marketed in at least three of the four focal countries within six months of registration without further testing locally (by February 2013). NSIMA Outcome: Over three years, CIMMYT to develop and provide to NARS and Seed Companies in BW, CD, SZ, LS and ZA with at least five new OPVs and 10 hybrids with improved performance and acceptance under the stress-prone conditions of resource-poor farmers. NSIMA Outcome: Over three years, CIMMYT to develop and release to the NARS and private seed sector 20



				<p><i>elite inbred lines that have improved general combining ability.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>NSIMA Outcome: At least 3 OPVs and 6 new hybrids registered by NARS or private sector and taken up by the private seed sector for marketing, particularly in BW, CD, LS, SW and ZA.</i> • <i>NSIMA Outcome: Initial “start-up” basic seed of newly released improved maize varieties produced by CIMMYT, NARS and seed companies and used for certified seed production</i>
Changes in food production techniques (% of farmers using new technologies)	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>No attributable change</i>	<p><i>Aligned SDC project indicators:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>None</i>
Improved know-how of local seed producers	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>Unstated</i>	<i>No attributable change</i>	<p><i>Aligned SDC project indicators:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>None, only activity-related indicators concerning, for example, number of training sessions held.</i>

6 Part VI: Project and programme management: process, efficiency and coordination

6.1 Evaluation context

76. In this section, the report will examine issues that affect how well resources/inputs (e.g. funds, expertise, time) are converted into outputs; the efficiency of programme management. In the context of this mid-term review, lines of enquiry have included:

- Does the regional approach add value? Is it understood and what bearing might that have on delivery?
- Are management arrangements adequate?
- Have unnecessary transaction costs been identified and minimised?
- What could be done to make programme interventions more effective?
- Might interventions be done better, more cheaply or more quickly?

77. The findings presented in this section draw from the three responses to the IP questionnaire, coupled with semi-structured interviews with all five IPs, SDC and SDC/HA staff members in Pretoria and Harare respectively, and email and face-to-face with other development partners.

6.2 The nature and purpose of regional programming

78. The portfolio contains an eclectic mix of multi-country and singular-country projects. At least one is described by the IP as a vehicle to test innovative pilots but there is a lack of clarity about what was new or truly innovative, who was demanding information (or lessons) from the pilot, who may benefit from a more supply-driven approach to lesson dissemination, and specific mechanisms for best ensuring that any successful pilot may be scaled-up or –out. A further project claims that its institutional linkages with the SADC Secretariat increases the prospects for project lessons to be disseminated and recommendations actioned but this will require concerted identification and tracking of suitable windows to inform and influence.

79. The IPs understanding of CCARDESA's mandate and existence is patchy, and there is no evidence known to the reviewers that the programme is seeking to maximise return on its investment to the Centre by ensuring that approaches, lessons and recommendations can be infused into CCARDESA's R&D agenda.

6.3 Issues of alignment and sub-optimal spend

80. IPs have little understanding of both SDC's FSS and the programme logframe (see Table 6.1, below). As such, there is a possibility that project logframes and indicator selection have been developed within a vacuum, with raises uncertainty about COOF's ability to meaningfully participate in the SDC annual reporting process and therefore report (and hopefully demonstrate) effectiveness, accountability and VFM. It may also explain the poor indicator alignment identified in Part VII of this report. The IPs limited familiarity with SDC strategies and guidelines concerning cross-cutting issues will likely limit the programme's fulfilment of obligations and directions laid out in the Swiss Bill and other high-level framing instruments, and IPs even more limited understanding of SDC's agricultural policy will require that COOF plays a strong oversight role to ensure objectives, priorities and values are implemented.

81. From a SADC perspective, IPs have a very variable and often limited understanding of key regional frameworks, most notably the emerging RAP. At least one project working in several countries had no

knowledge of the status of the national CAADP Compact, likely undermining its value as a pilot project that seeks to inform and influence programming and policy debates in those SADC Member States. The presence of FANRPAN and IWMI as SDC IPs offers significant (and untapped?) opportunity for other IPs to better understand policy direction and emerging debate within the region, and therefore where there are opportunities to add value.

Table 6.1: IP familiarity with key framing documents


How familiar are you with....	Not at all	A little familiar	Familiar	Very familiar
SDC's Food Security Strategy (FSS) for Southern Africa (2009)	0	2	1	0
The overarching programme logframe for SDC's FSS for Southern Africa	2	0	1	0
The ToR and focal areas of other SDC food security projects in Southern Africa	0	3	0	0
Relevant SDC policy, e.g. Swiss development bill, agricultural sectoral policy	2	1	0	0
SDC's strategies and guidelines for cross-cutting themes, e.g. gender, governance, HIV/AIDS	0	3	0	0
SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan	1	0	2	0
SADC's emerging Regional Agricultural Policy	2	1	0	0
COMESA's Regional CAADP Compact	1	1	1	0
Answered question: 3				
Skipped question: 0				

6.4 Relationships, coordination and leverage

6.4.1 SDC-IP and SDC-SDC/HA

82. All IPs praised SDC for the quality of its relationship management, the style of which was typically described as being mature, trusting, and interested (but not one of micro-management). Asked to describe the three things it most liked about SDC's current engagement on food security matters in the region, one IP listed "open engagement with partners" as its first response; the third response was, "Long-term commitment and support". Another IP listed, "It is very flexible and pragmatic", as its third response. Besides the IPs, donors and SDC/HA praised SDC COOF's collaborative culture, proactivity and willingness to engage.
83. Notwithstanding these highly positive cultural and operational traits, several IPs stressed the need for COOF to play a much stronger coordination role: "there is a massive, massive need for coordination in the programme"; "I am not aware of coordination"; "it's a priority issue". Asked about the three things an IP most dislikes about SDC's current engagement, one IP responded: "the information flow is poor" (#2). Concern was also expressed about the timeliness of SDC feedback to IP submissions (see Figure 6.1, below). Another IP listed the following items as the top two concerns: "Lack of information on other projects they are funding"; "lack of coordination between projects".
84. In interviews IPs feared that SDC may collapse into a project identification and contractor administrator function, and called for measures and arenas to "get everyone around one logframe", to share project logframes and workplans, to get "better mileage from its projects", to encourage and facilitate learning between projects, and to actively identify and promote synergies. Whilst there was a view in some quarters that some coordination functions could be outsourced (e.g. M&E quality assurance, and only should there be internal resource constraints), the majority of those interviewed, including SDC/HA, felt that SDC, as an organisation, had to retain strategic oversight and portfolio coordination.

Figure 6.1: Quality of SDC contract administration and management



85. Several IPs expressed interest in a more strategic and coordinated approach to lesson capture and sharing: “there is a danger we can push paper without direction”, said one, then proposing need for a “knowledge manager”. Whilst there was a loose consensus that such a role could be outsourced, it was felt that that body must not become a gatekeeper nor act as a micro-manager. It was equally felt that whilst there should be a more strategic and centrally managed lesson capture and sharing function, this must not stifle the need for, and merits in, IPs engaging directly with national and sub-national institutions on matters of project importance where there are context-specific lessons and recommendations, and where relationships of trust, legitimacy and such like are important for traction.

6.4.2 IP-IP

86. Calls by COOF for IPs to cooperate and liaise with each other have been met with a positive response, with IPs offering evidence of informal collaboration, e.g. regular email, telephone and face-to-face meetings, sending beneficiaries of one SDC project to workshops organised by another SDC project (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3, below). This driver for this was often the existence of personal relationships between IP staff members. Such relationships often pre-dated the SDC programme but perhaps suggesting wise partner selection by COOF.

Table 6.2: Frequenting of IP meetings with key stakeholders

How often do you MEET with...	Never	1+ every six months	1+ a quarter	1+ a month	1+ a week
Staff from SDC's regional office in Pretoria	0	1	2	0	0
Staff from SDC/HA's office in Harare	0	1	1	1	0
Staff from SDC HQ in Bern	2	1	0	0	0
Staff of other SDC Implementing Partners in Southern Africa	0	0	2	1	0
Staff of a regional body, e.g. SADC Secretariat, COMESA Secretariat	1	1	1	0	0
An elected representative of a national government	2	0	0	1	0
A civil servant, e.g. of the Ministry of Agriculture, a public sector extension officer	0	1	0	2	0
Staff of relief and development agencies, including other donors and NGOs	0	0	1	1	1
A member of the formal private sector involved in marketing and distribution, e.g. wholesalers, stockists	0	0	1	0	2
Staff of organisations involved in plant breeding and seed production	0	0	0	1	2
Staff of a representative body, e.g. national/regional farmers' union	0	0	2	1	0
Small-scale farmers, households, local-level farmers' associations and similar	0	0	2	1	0
Answered question: 3					
Skipped question: 0					

Table 6.3: Frequenting of other interactions with key stakeholders

How often do you engage by email and/or telephone with...	Never	1+ every six months	1+ a quarter	1+ a month	1+ a week
Staff from SDC's regional office in Pretoria	0	0	2	1	0
Staff from SDC/HA's office in Harare	1	0	1	1	0
Staff from SDC HQ in Bern	3	0	0	0	0
Staff of other SDC Implementing Partners in Southern Africa	1	0	0	2	0
Staff of a regional body, e.g. SADC Secretariat, COMESA Secretariat	1	1	1	0	0
An elected representative of a national government	3	0	0	0	0
A civil servant, e.g. of the Ministry of Agriculture, a public sector extension officer	0	0	1	2	0
Staff of relief and development agencies, including other donors and NGOs	0	0	1	1	1
A member of the formal private sector involved in marketing and distribution, e.g. wholesalers, stockists	0	0	1	0	2
Staff of organisations involved in plant breeding and seed production	0	0	0	0	3
Staff of a representative body, e.g. national/regional farmers' union	1	1	0	1	0
Small-scale farmers, households, local-level farmers' associations and similar	0	1	0	2	0
Answered question: 3					
Skipped question: 0					

7 Part VII: Summary findings and lessons

87. The answer to the question, '**Are we doing the right things?**', is open to question and may be captured as a 'yes, but to an extent and with caveats'. There is consensus amongst the SDC IPs that seeds does offer a niche, though this endorsement is tempered by the fact that there is widespread unfamiliarity with global SDC policy, strategy and programming, and even the regional FSS and programme results-framework.
88. Section 4.4 of the current Strategy, "Approach and areas of intervention", is clear in expressing the regional imperative but the four key perspectives are very broad and may lead to 'mission creep'. The principles regarding project selection within a regional perspective (see Section 3.2 of this report) are clear and sound. However, it is less certain that this clarity extends to the current articulation of the programme composition nor guides IP action or IPs understanding of where and how they fit within the broader programme. From an operational perspective, SDC and its IPs must ensure that are real, meaningful and budgeted coordination mechanisms to ensure that practice is linked, that cross-country and regional 'institutional' connections are made, and that synergies and leverage are achieved. From a more detached perspective, there is broad consensus that leverage and legitimacy are born from critical mass and programming depth, and, as such, IPs largely recommend that SDC identify a defined cluster of focal countries. The reviewers agree. This follows practice within other regional donor programmes (see Annex I), and even the practice of some donors (e.g. DFID, WB) in large, populous countries such as Nigeria.
89. A strategy should make choices, and therefore both include and exclude specific themes, regions, stakeholders and/or modalities. However, the existing Strategy is framed in a very broad manner. The definition, distinction and linkages between micro, meso and macro are largely unstated, assumptions and theories of change are often hidden, and there is a lack of specificity concerning target groups, crops and preferred traits. The funding of the irrigation rehabilitation scheme in Zimbabwe, which does not have an explicit seeds focus but is rather an income generation initiative that may lead to improved food security, may be evidence of these weaknesses.
90. The Strategy's development objective is to reduce food insecurity, particularly that caused by shocks. The overall objective of an "improved food situation" for "targeted poor rural populations" implies benefits will accrue to the poor beyond just farmers, though pathways for broader impact (e.g. lower food prices, rural employment generation) are not mentioned. Moreover, the Strategy does not define the target group; rather reference is made to "poor farmers", "poor people who are living in conditions of food insecurity" (seemingly inter-changeably)¹². With targets only broadly defined the Strategy is silent on how far the programme should focus on specific vulnerability contexts (e.g. chronically-stressed populations) and vulnerable groups (e.g. women-headed households, HIV/AIDS-affected households).
91. Not dissimilarly, the section on partners could also be re-worked to more expressly signal intent. SDC's intention is to include a range of actors is understood, but by not signalling priorities it provides little guidance and makes assessment on the appropriateness of current partnerships difficult. For instance, there is intent to include the private sector but also a recognition that the work involved in doing so

¹² In August 2011 the Head of Mission confirmed that SDC is targetting the productive or active poor, including the largely self-sufficient and the transient poor, who have the potential to contribute to the regional food trade value chain. It does not seek to directly target the chronically poor, including those 'able households' with very few assets but with able bodied adults, and those 'unable households' which are destitute, bereft of assets (including human capital) and unable to sustain themselves. Such households typically include the disabled, orphans, the elderly and chronically ill. SDC IPs were largely unaware that this was SDC's vision, though the projects are aligned with this framework.

directly would be beyond the resource capacity of RPSA. The section might usefully explore how partners should seek to work with a range of actors and processes to achieve that reach.

92. Since the 2008 food crisis and the apparent traction of the CAADP and Tripartite agendas, large donors, such as the EU, DFID and USAID have seemingly given seed, and seed supply in particular, increasing attention, albeit with a focus largely on regional trade, formal markets and maize (see Annex I, and noting exceptions). Whilst SDC's support to the SSSN is acknowledged and valued in the region, there is little evident support to the notion that SDC has a particular comparative advantage in the seed sub-sector or necessarily occupies or has captured a genuine niche, suggesting a disconnection between SDC outlook and local perceptions, limited regional benefit being derived from earlier and ongoing research and action programmes at a global level within SDC (which might better convey SDC's added value and comparative advantage), and, potentially, requiring greater SDC to further sharpen and articulate its niche.
93. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, without exception, the projects are evidently highly relevant to regional frameworks (e.g. RISDP, RAP), and SDC's overall goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development. The increased attention on output markets is both critical and timely. Moreover, HaSSP is an appropriate and pragmatic response to the success of the SDC-financed SSSN, and is a wise investment of SDC finance. However, the apparent skew of the current programme to increased supply (or availability) of improved, certified maize seed arguably devalues SDC's supposed niche because of other donors investing in measures to support input and output markets for the same crop.
94. SDC, like other donors, must better respond to the challenge and *pro-poor opportunity* of better engaging with farmer varieties and informal seed systems. The benefits of the former, in particular, are contested. However, the reality is that the majority of farmers depend on both farmer varieties and informal systems for seed security, particularly for seeds of crops other than maize. A genuine pilot with clear, budgeted and well-conceived mechanisms for sharing lessons (and recommendations) for scale-up and –out if applicable) would add value to the SDC portfolio. Furthermore, support to a more rounded basket of crops and varieties, including legumes, may be more consistent with SDC's stated desire to improve resilience, and offer particular benefits in terms of climate change adaption, gender-sensitive outcomes and labour-constrained households living with AIDS. CCARDESA and the SADC RAP Coordinator are both currently identifying regional priorities, and this follows recent IFPRI and USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub analysis and identification of staple crops from a market perspective. As such, there may be considerable scope for SDC to use the same for the identification of future investment opportunities and even use lessons (i.e. evidence) from its current portfolio to shape SADC policy and programming.
95. The answer to the question, '**Are we doing things right?**' is broadly positive. SDC's choice of Implementing Partners is sound¹³, with an appropriate mix of support to or through a SADC institution, CG centres, not-for-profit bodies and private sector contractors. In itself, this blend potentially offers SDC a lesson-learning opportunity about value-for-money of different delivery bodies. That aside, technical and political legitimacy are likely key for project success, and in all cases the implementing partner and/or its staff have the necessary personal and professional connections, technical understanding, and institutional support to offer an optimistic outlook for effective and efficient project delivery.
96. The ability of IPs to influence government policy and practice is typically informed by an organisation's regional or national record, and therefore the trust, confidence, credibility and understanding that that

¹³ Though greater focus within the strategy (e.g. towards legumes, nutrition) may require greater critical reflection.

typically creates. CCARDESA aside, all the IPs have shown a strong desire to engage with and work through government officials at a local, national and cross-border level, with a similarly strong commitment to adopt a market perspective and therefore to work in partnership with the private sector.

97. A common feature of the projects is a desire and commitment to work directly with end users and through local institutions, including traditional authorities and government ministries. In the cases of NSIMA, SAMP and particularly HaSSP, there are accompanying measures to support institutional strengthening, thereby likely improving sustainability but also better ensuring interest, commitment and goodwill.
98. Projects that seek to inform and influence policy, legal and regulatory frameworks usually have increased political and technical credibility and legitimacy where they have complementary activities at field-level. As such, HaSSP, has shown a positive strategic outlook by financing community-based seed production initiatives. However, from a programme perspective this looks like a questionable investment given the scope for HaSSP to have utilised SAMP learnings for the same objective (even if SAMP only works in two of the four countries).
99. SDC's pragmatic, proactive and mature approach to project funding and donor-IP relations is been highly appreciated by the IPs, and has enabled the programme budget to be committed with an apparent degree of efficiency. However, from an overarching programme portfolio perspective, there is a significant risk that projects may operate in organizational vacuums, with limited formal fora for them to meet on a periodic basis, and little apparent sharing of logframes, workplans and period reports. Despite reportedly minimal formal coordination by SDC, IPs have sought to identify synergies with other projects, with SDC promoting the same.
100. Any degree of projectisation typically undermines the extent to which a donor and its IPs are able to secure maximum leverage at a regional level from pilot, lesson-sharing and advocacy initiatives. A joined-up approach – which is explicitly requested by the IPs – better enables field experiences to be marshalled and presented to target stakeholders and in line with clarified and agreed goals. SDC support to the emergence of CCARDESA represents a pragmatic, strategic investment but the return will only be realised if SDC maximises the platform it offers, both with CCARDESA itself but also with FANR.
101. Formal, supply-side governance matters are at the front and centre of HaSSP; elsewhere governance typically comes to the fore in relation to community-level matters, e.g. IWMI, SAMP. There is a variable commitment to mainstream gender, environment and HIV/AIDS matters, despite the presence of a SDC Gender Consultant in the region. Related logframe content is similarly variable, with IWMI offering specific sex-aggregated indicators and targets on the one hand, and whilst SAMP omits from on the other. There is only patchy evidence that projects have conducted detailed assessment of the challenges, obstacles and opportunities faced by women and HIV-affected people during design periods.
102. To answer the question, '**How do we know we are doing the right things?**', is more difficult. Office-level reporting, accountability, effectiveness and advocacy are and will continue to be compromised so long as there is:
 - An apparent absence (or incompleteness?) of programme baseline data.
 - Scope for improvement in the phraseology of several programme-level indicators.
 - A disconnection between project logframe indicators and programme logframe indicators.
 - A likelihood that the totality of SDC's projects may not deliver the expected programme results.



103. Consequently, SDC COOF may struggle to articulate robust answers to questions such as, What does it all add up to? Does it offer value for money? Are tax-payers receiving the best development return possible from their investment?

8 Part VIII: Recommendations

8.1 For SDC HQ

Recommendation 1: SDC HQ and COOF must ensure that when a regional approach is adopted the rationale for and nature of a regional programme is carefully articulated, that areas of engagement (i.e. choices, priorities) are clearly defined with appropriate targets; there is a robust baseline and monitoring framework related to the plan; and resources, especially the SDC staffing contingent, reflect the aspirations of the approach and enable programme coordination and advocacy.

Recommendation 2: SDC should be more systematic with regards to lesson-sharing and even awareness-raising between its global and regional food security programme portfolios. It is probable that IPs, and possibly SDC COOF itself, would benefit from fora to share lessons, learn about alternative approaches, and explore the options for, and merits of, scaling-up or –out approaches supported by SDC in other environments. Such fora would also provide opportunity for SDC to advise IPs on any new policies, strategies and guidelines that might improve IP compliance and performance.

Recommendation 3: SDC should redesign its standard logframe template to improve the quality of project design and implementation. The separation of baseline, indicator milestone and target information, for example, would help in this regard and would greatly assist IPs and SDC to undertake monitoring, periodic reviews, outcome and impact assessments, and value-for money (VFM) analysis. New SDC guidelines and examples would better ensure consistency and quality, and might include requirement for at least two (standard?) VFM indicators to be included within each logframe.

Recommendation 4: SDC should promote a modified analytical framework (see Figure 7.1, below) that recognises that seed access, availability, and quality can affect food security in distinct ways, that the notion of ‘quality’ is more nuanced than often perceived, and that information (e.g. about traits) is important to allow farmers to make informed choices among crops and varieties, and therefore improve resilience. This framework mainstreams choice, empowerment and resilience, and therefore places smallholders in the frame of marketplace consumers with rights and preferences, who must adapt in the face of shocks, trends and opportunities.

Figure 7.1: Seed security parameters

Parameter	Description
Availability	Sufficient quantity of seed within reasonable proximity to people (spatial availability) and on offer in time for critical sowing periods (temporal availability)
Access	People produced own seed or have adequate resources to otherwise obtain seeds
Quality	Seed is of acceptable seed quality (seed health, physiological quality); it is of acceptable variety quality (is adapted and aligned with farmers' preferences); and it produces food of comparatively higher quality per se (e.g. better inherent nutrition; or high income value)
Human capital	People have the skills to maintain a balanced portfolio of appropriate seed, and the necessary knowledge about the best varieties for them given, inter alia, agro-ecological conditions, capital assets and marketing outlets.

8.2 For SDC COOF

8.2.1 Focus

Recommendation 5: SDC should reconsider its focus if it wishes to continue occupying a defined niche. Should it wish to do so, the focus could stem from a more narrowly-defined goal, such as improving farmers' ability to adapt to stress and change in their cropping systems, an emphasis on building demand for seed through informal supply channels and strengthening capacity in that regard, or a greater focus on the notion of resilience or nutrition. More refined seed security, and by extension, food security goals may mean that greater emphasis is placed on particular activities, partners and crops. For example, resilience as a goal could be served by supporting access to legumes and drought-tolerant varieties, through both formal and informal supply channels, with benefits in terms of crops favoured by female farmers and nutritional benefits and labour savings for households living with HIV.

8.2.2 Programme logframe

Recommendation 6: The COOF should review its programme logframe statements. Two working options are suggested. The first responds to the need for greater separation of objective areas, allows for an easier migration from the current formulation and allows for easier placement of current SDC projects. The second option is in line with Recommendation 5, above, concerning the need for greater focus.

Option 1:

Development Objective: Food security of productive poor smallholder households in Southern Africa improved [i.e. "Productive" or active poor in line with the earlier footnote to this report. Terminology would need to be aligned with SADC norms]

Overall Programme Objective: Seed availability, access and quality improved for the productive or active poor in SDC's focal countries

Specific Objective 1: Evidence-based enabling policies at regional and national levels aimed at reducing seed insecurity developed and implemented [i.e. which speaks to macro-level interventions such as HaSSP and governance]

Specific Objective 2: Client-driven market infrastructure and seed support services supported by state and non-state service providers [i.e. which speaks to meso-level interventions, and opening up possibility of a Challenge Fund for the private sector and, separately, further support to seed services (see below)]

Specific Objective 3: Approaches that enable greater access to seed piloted, validated and disseminated [i.e. which speaks to appropriate micro-level interventions, including piloting of measures to support farmer varieties and informal systems, see below]

Option 2:

Development Objective: The proportion of people living under chronic stress who suffer from hunger and under-nutrition in Southern Africa decreased.

Overall Programme Objective: "Productive male and female smallholder households in chronically-stressed areas of SDC's focal countries adopt crop varieties that improve their food and nutritional security."

Specific Objective 1: "Availability of desired varieties in chronic stress areas improved."

Specific Objective 2: "Farmers in chronic stress areas are better able to access seed"

Specific Objective 3: “Quality of seed – genetic and phytosanitary – used by farmers improved.”

Specific Objective 4: “Policies which support seed security are implemented at national and regional levels.”

Recommendation 7: Programme-level indicators should be reviewed, a small cluster of standard indicators to be used across the programme (i.e. SDC and IPs) should be developed¹⁴, and baseline data be collected for all revised programme-level indicators.

Recommendation 8: Any ‘access’ initiatives must have an explicit, robust results chain that justifies funding within the Overall Programme Objective. ‘Access’ within micro-level initiatives should only be supported where it is essential for validation and offers very significant learning opportunities within the region, e.g. concerning diversity within seed supply channels. If access is collapsed into general IGAs, and so long as seed remains a ‘guiding thread’, the portfolio will likely become too broad and convoluted.

8.2.3 *Coordination, lesson capture and sharing, and advocacy*

Recommendation 9: Without clear strategic oversight there is a risk that the SDC portfolio concentrates on project-level activities, and thus misses potential programme-level opportunities and outcomes. SDC should be more systematic with regards to lesson-sharing and even awareness raising within its programme portfolio. It is probable that IPs, and SDC itself, would benefit from formal, coordination fora to share lessons, learn about alternative approaches, and explore the options for, and merits in, scaling-up or -out approaches supported by SDC in other environments. Such fora would also provide opportunity for SDC to advise IPs on any new policies, strategies and guidelines, not least on cross-cutting issues, that might improve IP compliance and performance.

Recommendation 10: SDC should initiate joint working across projects by providing learning moments (e.g. field visits), events (e.g. workshops, annual planning meetings) and outputs (e.g. programme-wide papers). As such, it is recommended that COOF establish a Learning and Communications Component to the Programme, with direct links to CCARDESA¹⁵. There are merits of SDC itself implementing this workstream, perhaps seconding a staff member with the right skills, experience and technical understanding from HQ. However, should there be internal resource constraints, an external service provider should be recruited. Technical and political legitimacy are key, and it is imperative that the service provider does not act as buffer or intermediary between IPs and SDC. It is understood that the University of Pretoria has or is establishing a Food Security Unit, and it is recommended that SDC understand their skills, experience, standing and therefore suitability as a possible service provider. The presence of a Component rooted at a local institution would provide:

- A SADC-based institutional home for the lessons stemming from the Programme, thereby providing scope for the institution to further cement its role as a recognised broker of seeds-related knowledge within the SADC region and to provide maximum sustainability.
- SDC with greater opportunity to ensure that the project portfolio develops and sustains common messages, particularly when concerned with policy advocacy and macro-level matters.

¹⁴ Utilisation of standard indicators does not mean that projects should not have a number of project-specific indicators.

¹⁵ Links would also be encouraged with the upcoming SADC Seed Centre. As an aside, there is also need for the appropriate organisation in the region – the Seed Centre? – to resume region-wide communication of seed issues, with timely release of information having declined with the end of the SSSN in 2008.

- The SDC Programme with a strong regional flavour, binding together the various projects, many of which are country-specific in their orientation, e.g. IWMI and, to an extent, SAMP.
- A bridge between approaches and lessons generated by this Programme and the broader pool of seeds-related knowledge within and beyond the SADC region, thereby providing opportunity for the Programme to be enriched by, and contribute to, this broader pool of knowledge.
- An (SDC-branded?) space for learning and the communication of knowledge stemming from the Programme, thereby increasing the probability of successes stories to be replicated/adapted elsewhere.
- An opportunity for IPs to strengthen their capacity in the field of knowledge management and learning¹⁶.

8.2.4 Geographical focus

Recommendation 11: SDC identify a cluster of focal countries. There is a strong case for deepening engagement in/with several current countries: Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, and engaging more directly with SDC's national office in Mozambique, i.e. five 'lead countries' in total. The Global Hunger Index (see Table 2.1 in this report) rates Malawi and Swaziland as having a "serious" hunger problem, whilst Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia are ranked as "alarming".

All countries are SADC member states. With COMESA having lead responsibility within the Tripartite for trade and food security matters, there is a strategic opportunity for SDC to engage with both SADC and COMESA Secretariats about common issues within a distinct sub-region, and an institutional opportunity for strategic engagement between SDC regional and national offices in the region. Moreover, these countries overlay the 'Cluster A marketshed' of the upcoming ACTESA-AusAID programme *SMART-FS* (see Annex I), which will support maize, sorghum, rice, cassava and beans in the DRC, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Such a cluster is formally recognised by COMESA. All five are strategically located in terms of donor support to transport and investment corridors, and enable leverage and synergy with other upcoming donor programmes, e.g. those supported by DFID, AusAID and USAID (see boxes in Annex I)¹⁷.

Future investment in Botswana is not recommended, as it runs contrary to the line promoted in SDC's Partnerships for the Future (2003). Return on investment in the DRC is uncertain, not least given the fragile governance environment and consequences for measures to improve the enabling environment at meso and micro-level. Current support to Lesotho (NSIMA, SAMP) should continue given the newness of the SDC projects but any future investment would be questionable.

Recommendation 12: The FSS, and the COOF more broadly, should better articulate the differences and points of interface between regional, multi-country and singular country initiatives (see Annex J for a working suggestion).

¹⁶ With the current programme budget largely committed and two further projects in the pipeline it is assumed that COOF will spend less time identifying project opportunities. It is also assumed that the presence of a Learning and Communications Component/Service Provider would free up time of COOF staff to play a stronger coordination role. These assumptions need to be tested by COOF.

¹⁷ As a caveat, SDC are advised to understand the basis for these agreed marketsheds for several reasons: 1) marketsheds naturally differ for different crops, e.g. appropriate trade links for germplasm may be very different for beans, sorghum, and maize, for example; 2) the 'read'across' between formal and informal marketsheds needs to be mapped, e.g. evidence in Southern Sudan, for example, showed that long-distance exchanges of seed, even across borders, may be very important – much to the surprise of local experts; 3) any excessive emphasis on formal trade, especially for F1 maize, may drive focus entirely on formal sector integration, which may hide opportunities for SDC to define interesting niches with other crops and delivery channels.

8.2.5 Future funding opportunities

Recommendation 13: HaSSP's success may be limited to development of national legislation that is aligned with SADC Protocol. However, its implementation will likely depend on issues concerning the appropriateness and timeliness of capital and recurrent budget releases, skills, governance arrangements and incentives structures, accountability mechanisms, and equipment availability. In sum, there must be a willingness and capacity to implement policy. HaSSP has insufficient budget to address these issues, and whilst the EU COMESA Regional Agricultural Inputs Programme (COMRAP) will provide seeds services departments with equipment up to a value of EUR 70,000 in each of HaSSP's focal counties by the end of October there is a significant risk that operation and maintenance procedures for capital assets may be lacking, that recurrent budgeting processes are weak, that further skills development will be required, and that EUR 70,000 will be insufficient to enable the department's to fulfil their mandates. As such, implementation of the SADC Protocol may be jeopardised, and there may be continued concerns within the private sector and smallholder community that seed testing and field monitoring are flawed, affecting variety release, germination and such like. It is therefore recommended that SDC and FANRPAN-HaSSP monitor COMRAP delivery and any subsequent problems in the next 3-5 months. Should there be gaps or areas for investment, it is recommended that SDC open a Seed Services Support Initiative, providing capacity building and equipment support to seed services in focal countries BUT following an aid for results agenda, i.e. embracing a competitive approach so focal countries compete for funding, with turnkey funding on an annual basis and on the condition that government fulfils mutually agreed steps, e.g. improved, more timely release of recurrent budgets; introduction of cost-recovery models. It has been estimated that such an Initiative could absorb up to USD2m over four years. (To better infuse demand-side governance reform into the programme, SDC may wish to investigate associated accountability measures in which non-state actors monitor Seed Services performance using scorecard systems or such like)¹⁸.

Recommendation 14: There is anecdotal evidence from the private sector in Zimbabwe and CG representatives that financial capital represents a major constraint for entrants to the formal seed sector or those looking to scale-up their operations. This is supported by evidence from AGRA. It is assumed that, with increased access to finance to enable expansion of operations, there would be greater competition between seed companies, creating greater diversity in the market place, improved quality, improved availability of preferred varieties, increased accountability through market-based choice, greater access because of downward pressure on prices and therefore a favourable impact on the productive or active smallholder households in the region. Should that be the case – something to be tested by SDC – it is recommended that SDC liaise with DFID and AusAID about establishing a Seeds Window with their upcoming Challenge Funds, i.e. Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Food Markets Programme and SMART-FS respectively, and both of which

¹⁸ It is noteworthy that seed certification is important for maintaining yield potential of F1 hybrid maize (which dominates seed production in Southern Africa). However, certification is not always a guarantee of a seed's phyto-sanitary quality, due to technical lapses, rent-seeking and weak enforcement, i.e. weak governance frameworks, poor incentive structures, and poor or untimely capital and recurrent budgeting processes may undermine implementation of policy and institutional mandates. Moreover, certification is expensive, and the availability of certified seed can be restricted by the complexity of its production, as certified seed requires several generations of multiplication from the original Breeder Seed, with each generation having defined standards of purity and production conditions.

should start in 2012 and both of which would largely focus on the marketshed identified above. Such support to the private sector may – may – also have read-across to HaSSP objectives¹⁹.

Recommendation 15: To better address the needs and realities of the poor, SDC should also support informal seed supply channels (see Annex K for an example of formal-informal linkages). For example, this could be done by: facilitating links with sources of new germplasm (which may be farmer varieties for crops or regions where modern varieties are not preferred/suitable); helping ensure user input in choice of varieties on offer; promoting practices (and quality-control mechanisms) that maintain phyto-sanitary quality to farmer-acceptable standards; and enhance smallholder access to seed through marketing approaches, packet size, etc. This informal support should be market-oriented where possible, and particularly enhance the access and resilience elements of seed security. Such activities could be done on a pilot basis, but with good data gathering to enable analysis of impacts and VFM. Given that impacts may be geographically-dispersed (e.g. new varieties disseminated widely through informal channels) or involve a range of indicators (income, nutrition, for example), careful evaluation will be important.

Recommendation 16: It is noted that USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub (SATH) has undertaken an analysis of 15 potential priority agricultural value chains, using the following criteria: growth potential; benefit to smallholders, small enterprises and the poor; and, regional utility. The results of this analysis indicate that the five top value chains with the highest potential, in order of ranking on a 100-point basis, are: cereals (96.7), legumes (92.7), oilseeds (83.3), cotton (76.1) and processed foods (73.3). SATH intends to focus on facilitating regional strengthening of one or more of these five value chains in five countries, including Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. Malawi, for example, has selected legumes and dairy products; Mozambique has selected oilseeds, cashews and fruit; and Zambia has selected legumes, oilseeds, maize research and horticulture. It is therefore recommended that SDC engage with USAID SATH, and draws on the aforementioned IFPRI-CCARDESA analysis, to identify seeds-related bottlenecks and related opportunities for SDC investment.

¹⁹ It is noted that this initiative would further emphasise the current focus on supply and availability, which may be cause for concern should SDC be looking for a more balance and perhaps more relevant portfolio. The extent to which this is an issue would be identified during a scoping mission.

Annex A: Terms of Reference

Review of RPSA Rural Development Programme

Terms of Reference

Background

Overall context

The current cooperation strategy for the Regional Programme Southern Africa (RPSA) 2005-2010 has been extended until December 2012. A new strategy has to be designed to cover the foreseen new actual Dispatch 2013 – 2017. The strategy will serve to define the objectives of Swiss development and humanitarian cooperation in Southern Africa as well as its cooperation with government offices, civil society, private business, other donors, and multilateral or private organisations in the SADC region. SDC strategy has two domains of intervention in the region: Food security and HIV/AIDS.

The objective of these Terms of reference is to undertake an analysis of the context and experiences accumulated in the region by SDC and others in the food security domain. Based on this analysis, the needs and the gaps identified will be presented in parallel to what the Swiss contribution can achieve taking into account its comparative advantage. Options for results to be achieved within the next 5 years should be part of the work. These options will be discussed in a strategic workshop and presented for approval to SDC Headquarters by the end of 2011.

RPSA Food Security Strategy 2009- 2012

Actual RPSA strategy aims to respond to the challenges of making regional integration in Southern Africa work better for poor. Specifically, the RPSA programme supports the SADC regional priorities as defined in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) that spells out SADC development path to 2015. SADC therefore provides the overall institutional framework for policy dialogue and coordination for SDC's regional programme in the region. Food Security is one of the two domains of the RPSA, alongside health.

As part of a multi donor response to food insecurity in Southern Africa and in line with the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), SDC's regional Cooperation Office (COOF) in Pretoria has developed a Food Security Strategy (FSS) to address the chronic food insecurity facing the SADC region. This strategy identified seed security as a particular problem area which is to be addressed through a series of macro-, meso- and micro-level interventions. At the macro-level, SDC supports the Food and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) and the SADC Seed Security

Network (SSSN) in particular for policy dialogue and harmonization of seed policies to encourage the free movement of quality seeds throughout the region. At the meso-level, SDC has been supporting agricultural research organizations such as CIMMYT to produce new varieties of seeds which are higher yielding and adapted to the areas where food security persists. Complementary to these interventions, SDC recognizes a need to find ways of improving access to quality seed at the household level by linking the different components of the seed economy together. The Seeds and Markets project (SAMP) has been designed to contribute towards this shortcoming.

This programme framework takes into account the multiple factors that create poverty and food insecurity. A Regional Public Goods approach has been utilised in the identification, consolidation and expansion of programmes and projects.

The programme was approved in November 2009, and the first contract signed in December, 2009. The following are the current contracts in place towards achieving this strategy.

- SADC Seed Policy Implementation (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland)
- Strengthening Seed and Output Markets (Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland)
- Support for Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research in East and Southern Africa (CCARDESA)
- NSIMA III: Diversified Seeds Multiplication Project approx CHF 5m (CIMMYT Harare) – Zimbabwe, Swaziland, South , Malawi, Zambia
- Rehabilitation of Small scale Irrigation field for Seed Value Chain – Zimbabwe

One more entry proposal has been approved towards establishing a Micro-insurance for Food Security and Climate Adaptation in Southern Africa project. Two additional project proposals are under development: Diversification of seed to address nutrition aspects considering the widespread of HIV/AIDS affected people and their need to have better quality of food and a project to address loss of crops. In the region losses can often represent about 30 – 40% of a crop.

This review covering the last three years (2009 - 2011), provide an opportunity to further sharpen and consolidate this domain taking into account the contextual changes that are shaping the region, and the new Development Bill of Switzerland covering 2013-2016.

Purpose of the programme review

Regional programme Southern Africa is proposing an review of the Food security domain in order to fulfil the following three objectives:

- (a) To review the achievements in the domain and the relevance of its niche focus, seed security systems for the period 2009 to date;
- (b) To assess the landscape within SDC and within SADC and validate whether this focus is still a high value niche especially with other donors having re-aligned their programmatic focus and funding for food security in the region
- (c) To propose any necessary amendments and options than can strengthen the programme and realign it to changing regional needs towards a new regional strategy 2013-2017.

Methodology and Processes of Evaluation

The methodology and process of the evaluation and future concept drafting are outlined as follows:

Briefing SCO Pretoria, desk study and preparation (Desk review, Donor documents, RECs Review documents etc (TL) 9 days)

The briefing for the whole team will take place in SCO Southern Africa, and the team will afterwards elaborate framework and instruments for the review. A brief desk study shall be carried out prior to the evaluation mission, to review the most relevant documentation concerning the project as well as the relevant documents produced by SDC Food Security Global Programme and relevant documents related to this field from SDC Tanzania and Mozambique offices (see list of documents in Annexe 1).

On the basis of the briefing and the desk-study, the consultants will prepare a sector review framework. The consultants will identify and elaborate appropriate methods, tools and instruments for the data-collection and analysis during the field mission. They will develop a detailed list of questions to respond to the areas outlined in section 3. They will share and discuss this with SDC (SCO Pretoria) prior to the field visits. The

SCO Pretoria will closely exchange views on the evaluation framework prior to the field visits of the consultants.

Evaluation and drafting report (15 days (TL) and ATL 12 days)

Field Visits, data collection and initial analysis (travel to key countries and SADC FANR for agricultural priorities in the region). An extra day for each is required to review what SDC Tanzania and SDC Mozambique are doing in Food Security that may be relevant to our review going forward.

The mission will involve interviews and consultations with partners of RPSA on the rural development domain (5 project/5 organisations) and interviews of donors and other actors involved in food security work. All the project partners are based in different countries in Southern Africa. This will include representatives of the private sector of the seed industry.

The consultants shall indicate the logistical support they need to receive during the mission from SCO Southern Africa. This can relate to time (for interviews, field visits), organisational support (of field visits, of visits to donor institutions in RSA, etc), logistics (transport, booking accommodation, etc.). SCO Southern Africa and the evaluators will discuss how these needs can be met.

Draft reporting incl. preliminary findings, recommendations and workshop preparation. It is expected that the evaluators will first list the opinions of the various stakeholders before drawing conclusions. Towards the end of the mission the evaluators shall have prepared a draft report, which includes preliminary findings and recommendations and prepare two-days of workshop.

Workshops in Pretoria South Africa and Zimbabwe (4 days (TL) and 4 days (ATL))

A one-day workshop will be hosted by SCO Southern Africa around 15th of September and a 2 day workshop on 22nd to 23rd of September in Zimbabwe. The evaluators will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation, and brainstorm on the strategic orientation of the domain from 2013-2017. OSA management and SCO staff as well as Zimbabwe Staff will attend the respective meetings. SDC will organise the moderation of the workshops.

Final Report (2 days - TL)

A Final Report, which incorporates the feedback from the workshop, should be submitted. OSA and SCO will check whether requirements are in line with the ToR and quality standards have been met before giving final approval. The length of the evaluation report should be a maximum of 25 pages single-spaced document before inclusion of appendices and should be typed in Arial using a font size of 11.

Total number of days: Team Leader 30 and Consultant 16.

Management and Composition of the evaluation Team

The review process will be led by a Team Leader, while the process will be managed by the Regional Programme Manager for the domain. The Team Leader will be assisted by Assistant to Team Leader, who will be assigned strategic roles by the Team leader. The assignment will be conducted by the two consultants who provide a qualified programmatic and strategic team leader and a seed specialist with several years experience in seed policy and programming in Southern Africa.

Timeframe and Road Map

The evaluation is expected to be carried out in August to September 2011.

The following steps are foreseen:

What	Who	When	Comments
Desk Study by Consultants	Consultants	August	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field visit, data collection and initial analysis 	Consultants	01-26 August	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft reporting 	Consultants	06 September	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshop preparation 	Consultants	07-14 September	
Debrief in South Africa <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluation Feedback 	Consultants, DRF, DIE, KARSA, consultants, partners, stakeholders	15 th September	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Zimbabwe Strategic Orientation 	Consultants, DDS, DSA; Ambassador Wittwer; DRF, DIE, KARSA, consultants, partners, donors stakeholders in Zimbabwe	19-22 th September	
Finalise and submit report	Consultants	15 th October 2011	

Scope and approach of the evaluation

The actual rural development program includes projects in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia and dialogue with partners in these countries.

Specific Objectives of the Review

(a) To evaluate the achievements in the domain and the relevance of its niche focus, seed security systems for the period 2009 to date;

Three key programme review approaches are recommended in this assignment: programme strategy, programme implementation, and process evaluation:

- Regional approach:
 - o What added value does the regional dimension bring to the approach?
 - o Are there any added risk and added opportunity by a regional approach?
 - o How can these risks be mitigated, or opportunities scaled to maximise regional benefits?
- Programme Strategy
 - o To what extent is the current strategy relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food security in SADC? To what extent is the programme designed in alignment with the SADC regional priorities and documents? What needs to change, and what needs to remain the same towards 2013-17 strategy?
 - o What are the governance issues related to seed sector and food security?
 - o How is the gender perspective incorporated in the programme taking into account the importance of women in this sector and in general in terms of food security?
 - o How coherent is the programme and how the respective elements reinforce each others; to critically investigate the viability/appropriateness of integrated programming as implemented in

the project (examine synergies, complementarities and appropriateness of the sub components of gender, nutrition, climate change and governance);

- Programme Implementation: What challenges do partners have in any of the following areas, and how can SDC assist?
 - o Did the project design proposals have a clear description of the problem(s) and an appropriate strategy?
 - o Monitoring system – How relevant are the base lines? How timely and reliable are program reports? What is the quality of the monitoring tool? What could be more appropriate?

Process Evaluation: How aligned are the project reports to the implementation plans?

- o Are the management aspects of the programme adequate? This should include staffing; resource, allocation and use of resources; policies; coordination and collaboration arrangements; administration; monitoring, reporting and documentation, among others.
- o To provide lessons, best practices and specific recommendations for improvement and replication of the programme in similar contexts.
- b) To assess the landscape within SDC and within SADC and validate whether this focus is still a high value niche especially with other donors having re-aligned their programmatic focus and funding for food security in the region
 - o What are other donors supporting food security (governmental and nongovernmental) focussing on in the region, and how can SDC programme be complimentary and yet visible?
 - o Is the programme in line with global SDC activities?
 - o What are the best practices of SDC in the food security sector in particular related to seed sector if any in the region and in the rest of the world?
 - o Is the programme in line and complimenting with the government national strategies in the region and in line with CAAPD overall recommendations?
- c) To propose any necessary corrective measures, amendments and options than can strengthen the programme and realign it to changing regional needs towards a new regional strategy 2013-2016. This will include the question of regionality:

The evaluation will help to design the new result based strategy for 2013 - 2016

- o Is the focus well appropriate considering evolution of context and priorities of the main actors and donors
- o Is the Swiss niche credible and useful (comparative advantage)?
- o Has SDC the correct and well balanced partnership?
- o Is the project portfolio adequate or should it be changed?
- o Are the means to measure the results appropriate?
- o What could be the results SDC could achieve in 5 years time in this field?

Next steps

The consultant will submit a technical offer which describes the understanding of the TOR as well as the methodology proposed for the evaluation. The offer should also include the foreseen division of labour within the evaluation team. A financial offer according to SDC standard has to be included (number of days, daily rates, CV).

Annex 1: List of documents

1. Original and revised RPSA and Food Security domain strategies
2. Relevant document of SDC HQ (Swiss Bill, Food security and governance, HIV and gender, climate change)
3. Relevant documents of SDC in Tanzania and Mozambique
4. Mid-Term Review Report 2007
5. Annual Plans from 2009 to 2014

6. The Proposals, Logframes, Bi-annual reports and Evaluations of all contracted projects
To identify
7. Relevant SADC, CAADP, COMESA strategies and major Donors strategies (DFID, USAID, FDA, , AusAid, EU)
8. CGIARS relevant documents

Annex 2: List (non exhaustive) of persons to be interviewed

1. SADC FANR directorate
2. FANRPAN CEO
3. COMESA Secretariat
4. GRM Regional Manager
5. IWMI Director
6. CIMMYT Director Zimbabwe
7. Donor representatives

Annex 3: Template SDC financial offer



Annex B: Evaluation Framework

	Research method	Focal stakeholder	Purpose	Primary source (indicative and to be discussed with SDC COOF)	Person responsible
1	Intellectual critique of analytical framework within current SDC Strategy	-	1.1 To assess quality, appropriateness and clarity of the existing analytical framework, and to propose any necessary amendments and options.	University of East Anglia	McGuire
2	Review of policy, strategy and legal documentation (SDC)	SDC	2.1 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme are in line with global SDC frameworks. 2.2 To identify any recent (2009-) policies, strategies and guidelines that require a modification to the existing Strategy. 2.3 To identify whether the means to measure the programme results are appropriate.	SDC Food Security in Southern Africa 2009-13; Dispatches and other SDC HQ documents (to be provided by COOF)	Milligan
3	Review of policy, strategy, legal documentation and political statements (SADC Secretariat and region)	SADC, key Member States	3.1 To capture any key changes within SADC's political-economic landscape and the potential implications (positive, negative) for the SDC strategy. 3.2 To assess the extent to which the current strategy is relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food security in SADC. 3.3 To assess the extent to which the strategy is aligned with SADC regional priorities and documents, and relevant to REC integration/coordination (e.g. Tripartite Agreement). 3.4 To assess the extent to which the strategy is in line with and	SDC Food Security in Southern Africa 2009-13 document; post-2009 REC council decisions, protocols, minutes, speeches, press releases; SADC RISDP and RAP documentation; key Member State actions post-2009; ACTESA and NEPAD-CAADP newsletters and reports; key regional programme designs and periodic reports (e.g. EU COMRAP, AusAID)	Luhanga



			complimentary to the CAADP framework and the MS national strategies.	SMART-FS); review of SDC COOF material from Mozambique and Tanzania	
			3.5 To assess the extent to which the focus remains appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.		
				<i>NB: 3.2 stems from the output of 1.1</i>	
4	Review of SDC project documentation	Implementing Partners	<p>4.1 To assess the extent to which project proposals have a clear description of the problem(s) and an appropriate strategy to address them.</p> <p>4.2 To identify the existence, quality and alignment of project baselines (and alignment with the results framework at programme level).</p> <p>4.3 To assess the extent to which cross-cutting issues, e.g. gender, governance, HIV/AIDS, are incorporated, mainstreamed and monitored.</p> <p>4.4 To identify whether the means to measure results are appropriate.</p>	SDC credit proposals, IP proposals, Credit Committee minutes, inception reports, periodic reports	Milligan
				<i>NB: Ask COOF about relative importance of 4.1</i>	
5	Analysis of existing reviews and evaluations of SDC activities in Southern Africa (2009-date)		5.1 To capture findings and recommendations made in any external assessments of project and/or programme achievements to date.	To be provided by SDC COOF	Milligan
6	Key informant interviews	SDC	<p>6.1.1 To identify SDC's current position in relation to governance as a transversal theme, to identify relevant guidelines and frameworks, and to consider potential application to this Strategy and programme.</p> <p>6.1.2 To understand the 'fit' between SDC and SDC-HA objectives and priorities, and the operationalism of the continuum and contiguuum model.</p> <p>6.1.3 To identify relevant global action and research programmes (e.g. SDC funding to the Nuuchâtel Initiative) and potential lesson sharing between those and the COOF programme in Southern Africa.</p> <p>6.1.4 To capture SDC's understanding of its niche, of multi-country vs regional programming, and the expected value addition of regional initiatives.</p> <p>6.1.5 To understand the perceived linkages between food and seed</p>	<p>Christoph Fuchs (SDC-Bern)</p> <p>Marc Desantis (SDC-HA Zim)</p> <p>Ian Christopolos (freelance consultant)</p> <p>Sam Kareithi (SDC COOF)</p> <p>Francois Droz (SDC COOF)</p>	Milligan



	security, and any related theories of change.		
	6.1.6. To identify any pressure on current programme management arrangements.		
	6.1.7 To understand major events in SDC programming history from 2009 to date, including any changes to the programme budget.		
RECs	6.2.1 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche and whether readjustments or further tightening are merited.	Margaret Nyirenda, Martin Muchero (SADC FANR)	Milligan
	6.2.2 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line and compliments the CAADP framework and other current and emerging frameworks, e.g. SADC's RAP.	TBD (COMESA) Cris Muyunda, Bridget Chilala, Julius Mathende (ACTESA)	
	6.2.3 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.	<i>NB: Lines of questioning with evolve from the output of 3, above.</i>	
	6.2.4 To assess the extent to which the current strategy and programme are relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food and seed security in SADC.		
	6.2.5 To identify any minimum standards and/or guidelines on infusion of cross-cutting issues, e.g. gender, HIV/AIDS.		
Member States	6.3.1 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche and whether readjustments or further tightening are merited.	Julius Shawa (Min Agric, Zambia) TBD (Min Agric, Malawi)	Malawi: Luhanga Zam & Zim: Milligan
	6.3.2 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line with and compliments the MS national strategies.	TBD (Agritex service, Zimbabwe)	
	6.3.3 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.		
Implementing Partners	6.4.1 To explore specific matters identified within Item 4, above.	Alex Carr (GRM)	Milligan
	6.4.2 To establish the extent to which the management aspects of the programme are adequate (see ToR for dimensions therein).	John MacRobert (CIMMYT) Lindiwe Sibanda, David Kamchacha,	
	6.4.3 To identify extent of project and programme results from 2009 to	Project Mgr (FANRPAN)	



	date (headline only)	Pius Chilonda (IWMI)	
	6.4.4 To identify lessons, best practices and specific recommendations for improvement and replication of the programme in similar contexts (headline only).	TBD (CCARDESA)	
	6.4.5 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche and whether readjustments or further tightening are merited.		
	6.4.6 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line and compliments the MS national strategies.		
	6.4.7 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.		
	6.4.8 To capture headline challenges faced by IPs.		
Development Partners	6.5.1 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche, to assess whether readjustments or further tightening are merited, to capture what other donors are or will be supporting in the area of food/seed security, and to identify areas of complementarity.	Helena McLeod (DFID-SA) Cecilia Khupe (USAID-SA) Ellen Hagerman (CIDA-SA) Stephanie Aubin (AFD-SA, SACAU) Sonja Palm (GTZ-SA) TBD (WFP-P4P) Peter Ewell (USAID-EA) Rebecca Worner (AusAID-EA)	Milligan
Non-state actors, e.g. private sector	6.6.1 To capture any key changes within SADC's political-economic landscape and the potential implications (positive, negative) for the SDC programme.	Charity Mutonodzo-Davies (University of Pretoria) TBD (NEPAD-CAADP)	Milligan
	6.6.2 To assess the extent to which the current strategy is relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food security in SADC.	Ishmael Sungaa (SACAU) Juancho Hagnauer (Swisscontact)	
	6.6.3 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line with and complementary to the CAADP framework and the MS national strategies.	Ndambo Ndambo (ZNFU)	

				TBD (private sector rep) Lesley Nyagah (IDASA)	
				<i>NB: To verify and explore items raised in 3, above</i>	
7	Portfolio analysis	mapping	7.1 To map existing and projected projects onto SDC's current programme framework to identify degree of coverage. 7.2 To identify the extent to which there is internal coherence within the programme.	Sources as above. Desk-based activity. <i>NB: To stem from output to 1, above.</i>	Milligan
8	Questionnaire survey	Implementing Partners	8.1 To capture headline challenges faced by IPs. 8.2 To assess the quality and regularity of IPs engagement with SDC COOF (and other SDC offices, if appropriate). 8.3 To assess the extent of awareness of SDC policies, strategies and guidelines (including mainstreaming issues). 8.3 To assess the extent of awareness of other SDC-financed activities in the region and globally.	Alex Carr (GRM) John MacRobert (CIMMYT) Lindiwe Sibanda, David Kamchacha (FANRPAN) Pius Chilonda (IWMI) TBD (CCARDESA) <i>NB: Results to be used in lines of enquiry within 6.4, above</i> <i>SDC COOF to advise whether SDC-HA and SDC HQ should be included within 8.2</i>	Milligan
9	Common and visioning and feedback workshop (Harare)	Various [TBD]	9.1 To present and test the validity of draft findings and recommendations.	-	Milligan, Luhanga



Annex C: Indicative Field Questions

	Research method	Key stakeholder	Purpose	Framing questions	Indicative field questions
1	Intellectual critique of analytical framework within current SDC Strategy	-	1.1 To assess quality, appropriateness and clarity of the existing analytical framework, and to propose any necessary amendments and options.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is the underlying approach behind the strategy and programme appropriate to the problems to be solved? Who are the target beneficiaries or partners? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is SDC's current perspective on seed systems and seed insecurity defensible and complete? What are its strengths? Where is it weak? Is the theory of change sound? Are the underlying hypotheses clear? Does international evidence support SDC's strategy and hypotheses? Is the strategy disconnected with emerging best/good practice and thinking? What 'do no harm' principles should the programme adhere to? What lines of enquiry should be considered during the evaluation field research?
2	Review of SDC policy, strategy and legal documentation (SDC)	SDC	2.1 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme are in line with global SDC frameworks. 2.2 To identify any recent (2009-) policies, strategies and guidelines that require a modification to the existing Strategy. 2.3 To identify whether the means to measure the programme results are appropriate.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the strategy and programme support SDC development and cooperation policies and strategies? Are they aligned with global frameworks, e.g. PD, AAA? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What framing documents (e.g. dispatches, strategies, guidelines) have been introduced by SDC HQ since 2009? With what implications? Have the implications been recognised and addressed? What is SDC's latest position on governance becoming a transversal theme? Are there guidelines? Are there examples of how it has been applied within a food security context? What are the ToR of the SDC Gender Advisor in Southern Africa? Are there programme-level baselines, milestones and targets? Are they appropriate, usable and measurable?
3	Review of SADC, key Member States policy, strategy, legal documentation and political	SADC, key Member States	3.1 To capture any key changes within SADC's political-economic landscape and the potential implications (positive, negative) for the SDC strategy.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is the strategy/programme purpose and overall goal consistent with, and in support of, SADC policy (e.g. RISDP, RAP)? And the CAADP framework? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How do the RECs frame the relationship between seed security and food security? Are there differences between the outlooks of the RECs? Do they marshal evidence to support their hypothesis or thesis? Are there substantive differences between the outlook of RECs and the outlook of the various MSs? If so, what are the



statements (SADC Secretariat and region)	<p>3.2 To assess the extent to which the current strategy is relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food security in SADC.</p> <p>3.3 To assess the extent to which the strategy is aligned with SADC regional priorities and documents, and relevant to REC integration/coordination (e.g. Tripartite Agreement).</p> <p>3.4 To assess the extent to which the strategy is in line with and complimentary to the CAADP framework and the MS national strategies.</p> <p>3.5 To assess the extent to which the focus remains appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the strategy/programme consistent with the needs and priorities of the SADC (and the other RECs, as appropriate)? • Where do/might other RECs and agencies (e.g. ACTESA) fit? What role do/might they play now and in the next 2-3 years? • Are there any external factors that are likely to jeopardise programme results? • Where are the emerging opportunities for the SDC programme? • What must SDC be cognisant of in the next 2-3 years? 	<p>consequences?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent do RECs and MS place emphasis on formal markets over informal markets in policy, programming etc., and why? • In what ways and why has the political, policy and legislative environment changed since 2009 and as it relates to food and seed security? Please cite and provide specific documents, paragraphs, clauses etc. as appropriate. • Have other debates and issues (e.g. on climate change, COP17) come to the fore or even waned, and with what bearing on food and seed security perspectives? • What is the political-economy of the SADC RAP, how does this affect seed security and seed security debates, and what are the possible implications for SDC's strategy and programme? • What is the current political-economy of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Agreement and how does this affect seed security and seed security debates? What is the nature of the relationship between the different players? Who are the likely sponsors or champions of increasing integration, why, and with what possible implications for seed security and SDC's strategy and programme? • Are CAADP and SADC RAP seen as politically legitimate at REC and MS level? What are their respective support bases? What are the forces, processes and politics at play? Where are the alliances or coalitions (within and beyond state bodies)? What are the implications for regional and national food and seed security? Where are the opportunities and constraints in so far as SDC's strategy and programme are concerned? • Who are the key players responding to seed security challenges or opportunities? Are there efforts effective? Why, and how do you know? • Where is there political-economic momentum and opportunity? Why? • Where are there opportunities to increase the meaningful role of non-state actors (e.g. SADC PF, FARNPAN, SACAU) in seed security debates and action? What needs to change?
---	--	---	---



				<ul style="list-style-type: none">What opportunities and challenges exist in the national and regional environments that could affect achievement of programme-level results?	
4	Review of SDC project documentation	Implementing Partners	<p>4.1 To assess the extent to which project proposals have a clear description of the problem(s) and an appropriate strategy to address them.</p> <p>4.2 To identify the existence, quality and alignment of project baselines (and alignment with the results framework at programme level).</p> <p>4.3 To assess the extent to which cross-cutting issues, e.g. gender, governance, HIV/AIDS, are incorporated, mainstreamed and monitored.</p> <p>4.4 To identify whether the means to measure results are appropriate.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Do results frameworks at project-level speak to the same at programme-level? Are they aligned/nested?Is the programme on track to meet its objectives? How will we know?Have methodologies been developed by SDC and/or IPS to address gender equality issues?According to the OECD Gender Policy Marker, how does the programme perform?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">To what extent to the actual project results match the targeted results?What are the impacts in terms of cross-sector themes?Is there evidence that lessons from different approaches and locations are being captured, recorded, reported and shared for informed decision-making and at various levels?Is there evidence that cross-cutting themes are properly integrated into project design, implementation and reporting? What improvements might be made?Are the results frameworks properly disaggregated (e.g. by sex, gender, location)?Are the current programme targets realistic? Is it evident that projects will contribute to them?To what extent are there systems in place for effective monitoring and reporting on internal and external risks that could hinder achievement of results? Are these appropriate to collect sufficient reliable data for a timely response to management risks and identify opportunities?
5	Analysis of existing reviews and evaluations of SDC activities in Southern Africa (2009-date)		<p>5.1 To capture findings and recommendations made in any external assessments of project and/or programme achievements to date.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Is there evidence that benefits, particularly in institutions and systems, will be sustained?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">To what extent do the actual programme impacts match the targeted impacts?Is there evidence of sustainability?What lessons have been identified in earlier reviews? Is there evidence that those lessons were considered and, where relevant, applied in decision-making and management?
6	Key informant	SDC	<p>6.1.1 To identify SDC's current position in relation to governance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Are appropriate systems in place and operational for	<ul style="list-style-type: none">What is SDC's definition of regional programming? Does this differ to multi-country programme and, if so, in what ways?



interviews	<p>as a transversal theme, to identify relevant guidelines and frameworks, and to consider potential application to this Strategy and programme.</p> <p>6.1.2 To understand the 'fit' between SDC and SDC-HA objectives and priorities, and the operationalism of the continuum and contiguum model.</p> <p>6.1.3 To identify relevant global action and research programmes (e.g. SDC funding to the Nuuchâtel Initiative) and potential lesson sharing between those and the COOF programme in Southern Africa.</p> <p>6.1.4 To capture SDC's understanding of its niche, of multi-country vs regional programming, and the expected value addition of regional initiatives.</p> <p>6.1.5 To understand the perceived linkages between food and seed security, and any related theories of change.</p> <p>6.1.6. To identify any pressure on current programme management arrangements.</p> <p>6.1.7 To understand major events in SDC programming history from 2009 to date, including any changes to the programme budget.</p>	<p>follow-up on audits, evaluations or other review recommendations?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do any inter-institutional structures (e.g. steering commitments, monitoring systems) allow for efficient implementation? Are the structures pre-existing or SDC specific? • Is the communication between responsible actors in the partner country, SDC, SADC and project management satisfactory? • Are the most suitable partners cooperating? • Are the strategies reasonable and practical? • What are the opportunities to better programme impact? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are your expectations of the programme? • What is your organisation's definition or understanding of seed security? • What is the relationship between seed security and food security? • Where are the opportunities for infusing governance? To what extent is governance explicit in the current strategy and programme? • To what extent does SDC place emphasis on formal markets over informal markets in policy, programming etc., and why? • What is the history of the programme and what major changes or events have had impact on the programme since 2009, e.g. budget increases? • What is the current programme budget and how much is committed? • What have been the major successes to date? Why? • How does SDC capture programme results? How do results frameworks and reporting at project level feed into the same at SDC COOF level? • Does SDC stipulate that any programme results frameworks must inform results frameworks at project level? • What have been the major shortcomings and constraints to date? Why? • Which institutions been involved in setting the aims and activities of the regional strategy/programme? • How often do you meet SADC and other key institutions to discuss the programme and in what forum do you meet? • What are the three most important challenges facing seed security in Southern Africa? • Who are the key players responding to these challenges? Are there efforts effective? Why, and how do you know? • What does SDC do well? • What is SDC's comparative advantage? Why? • What criteria should inform decision on which issues to tackle through a regional programme?
------------	--	--	---



			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What criteria should determine how those issues are approached? • What do you like about SDC's current engagement in the region? • What do you not like about SDC's current engagement in the region? • What could SDC do differently? Why? What might the results be of any such change? • Does SDC focus on the right priorities in the region? Why? • Do you see any significant gaps in their current approach? Why? How would you describe their current approach? • What opportunities is SDC missing? Why do you believe they are opportunities? • Is SDC working with the most appropriate partners to address the priority challenges in the region? • Is SDC using the right modalities for working with others? (e.g. project, budget support) • Are there other ways of partnering which would add more value at the regional level? • What evaluations have been conducted and what results did they report? • What research and action programmes does SDC support at a global or continental level, and which have relevance to this programme? Are measures taken to ensure that the COOF programme engages with those global/continental programmes? With what results? • Were any of the recommendations made by Milligan and Bertram in 2009 actioned? Why? Why not?
RECs	<p>6.2.1 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche and whether readjustments or further tightening are merited.</p> <p>6.2.2 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line and compliments the CAADP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do any inter-institutional structures (e.g. steering commitments, monitoring systems) allow for efficient implementation? Are the structures pre-existing or SDC specific? • Is the communication between 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is your organisation's definition or understanding of seed security? • What is the relationship between seed security and food security? • To what extent does your organisation place emphasis on formal markets over informal markets in policy, programming etc., and why? • Tell me what you know about the SDC regional food security



framework and other current and emerging frameworks, e.g. SADC's RAP.

6.2.3 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.

6.2.4 To assess the extent to which the current strategy and programme are relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food and seed security in SADC.

6.2.5 To identify any minimum standards and/or guidelines on infusion of cross-cutting issues, e.g. gender, HIV/AIDS.

responsible actors in the partner country, SDC, SADC and project management satisfactory?

- What are the opportunities to better programme impact?
- Should the objectives of the regional strategy be changed?
- Have or will changes in regional and national policies and priorities affect the programme? Is the programme adapting in terms of long-term needs for support?
- What is SDC's perceived (and actual) comparative advantage? Why?
- To what extent is there local ownership of programme results and what commitment is there to achieve them?
- What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project, programme and policy level?
- Is the programme setting conducive to furthering the dynamics already set in motion? Do people and agencies actively relate to the context and content of the programme?
- What measures of an institutional, financial, technical or political nature

programme? Do you believe it has a target area or thematic niche? If so, what is it? Is it a logical choice? Why/Why not?

- What are your expectations of the programme?
- How often do you meet SDC to discuss the programme and in what forum do you meet?
- What do you know about the various projects SDC is financing? Do you receive their reports or any other publications? Do they meet you to discuss status and lessons? Would you want them to?
- Was your institution involved in setting the aims and activities of the regional strategy/programme? And monitoring and reviewing during implementation?
- What are the three most important challenges facing seed security in Southern Africa?
- Who are the key players responding to these challenges? Are there efforts effective? Why, and how do you know?
- In what ways and why has the political, policy and legislative environment changed since 2009 and as it relates to food and seed security? Please cite specific documents, paragraphs, clauses etc. as appropriate.
- Have other debates and issues (e.g. on climate change, COP17) come to the fore or even waned, and with what bearing on food and seed security perspectives?
- What does SDC do well?
- What is SDC's comparative advantage? Why?
- What criteria should inform decision on which issues to tackle through a regional programme?
- What criteria should determine how those issues are approached?
- What do you like about SDC's current engagement in the region?
- What do you not like about SDC's current engagement in the region?
- What could SDC do differently? Why? What might the results be of any such change?
- Does SDC focus on the right priorities in the region? Why?



		<p>could be supported/implemented to increase the chances of the programme's sustainable impact?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does the current programme make sense within this specific context? How far as the context changed since 2009? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you see any significant gaps in their current approach? Why? How would you describe their current approach? What opportunities is SDC missing? Why do you believe they are opportunities? Is SDC working with the most appropriate partners to address the priority challenges in the region? Is SDC using the right modalities for working with others? (e.g. project, budget support) What have been the major successes to date? Why? Are there other ways of partnership which would add more value at the regional level? How can SDC best support the RECs to fulfil their potential? Should the objectives of the regional strategy be changed? Why? Is there evidence for that recommendation?
Member States	<p>6.3.1 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche and whether readjustments or further tightening are merited.</p> <p>6.3.2 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line with and compliments the MS national strategies.</p> <p>6.3.3 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Should the objectives of the regional strategy be changed? Have or will changes in regional and national policies and priorities affect the programme? Is the programme adapting in terms of long-term needs for support? To what extent is there local ownership of programme results and what commitment is there to achieve them? What is the level of policy support provided and the degree of interaction between project, programme and policy level? Does the current programme make sense within this specific context? How far as the context changed since 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What is your organisation's definition or understanding of seed security? What is the relationship between seed security and food security? Tell me what you know about the SDC regional food security programme? Do you believe it has a target area or thematic niche? If so, what is it? Is it a logical choice? Why/Why not? What do you know about the various projects SDC is financing? Do you receive their reports or any other publications? Do they meet you to discuss status and lessons? Would you want them to? What are the three most important challenges facing seed security in Southern Africa? Who are the key players responding to these challenges? Are there efforts effective? Why, and how do you know?



2009?

- Where does SDC enjoy good will? Does that generate any results? Examples? What drives good will?

Implementing
Partners

6.4.1 To explore specific matters identified within Item 4, above.

6.4.2 To establish the extent to which the management aspects of the programme are adequate (see ToR for dimensions therein).

6.4.3 To identify extent of project and programme results from 2009 to date (headline only)

6.4.4 To identify lessons, best practices and specific recommendations for improvement and replication of the programme in similar contexts (headline only).

6.4.5 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche and whether readjustments or further tightening are merited.

6.4.6 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line and complements the MS national strategies.

6.4.7 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and

- Do results frameworks at project-level speak to the same at programme-level? Are they aligned/nested?
- Is the programme on track to meet its objectives? How will we know?
- Have methodologies been developed by SDC and/or IPS to address gender equality issues?
- Who are the target beneficiaries or partners at programme level? Is their identity clearly and commonly understood across the IPs?
- Are the programme-level results explicit and clearly understood by all? Do IPs know where and how they contribute to the same?
- What are the headline risks at programme and project level? Have they been identified (realised), assessed and strategies developed to mitigate?
- To what extent are new approaches being piloted for achieving results? What lessons are emerging?

- What is the history of the project?
- What problem is the project seeking to address? What change is expected? What is the project's contribution to seed security?
- What are the expected project results? How were these set and by whom? How often are they reviewed? Is the project on target for achieving these?
- What have the major achievements been to date? For each of the project's results areas, what have been the main achievements since the start of the project? And in the last year?
- What outcomes and impact appear likely?
- Is the project creating any undesirable impacts or changes? Why?
- Is the project generating any unexpected but positive changes?
- Have there been any major unforeseen events that have affected project delivery?
- Do you have a risk management matrix? How often is it updated and how is it used? Does SDC review it on a periodic basis? Is the matrix useful?
- Does the project have any 'no go areas' or 'do no harm' principles?
- Has the project been planned on the basis of a gender-differentiated beneficiary analysis?
- Who are the expected primary beneficiaries of your project?
- What evidence is there that changed in needed?
- To what extent are governance improvements anticipated as a consequence of your project? What types of improvement are expected and within which institutions? Are these being monitored and reported? How and when?



development partners.

6.4.8 To capture headline challenges faced by IPs.

- According to the OECD Gender Policy Marker, how does the programme perform?

- How are lessons from different approaches and locations being captured, recorded, reporting and shared for informed decision-making and at various levels?
- At what geographical level does the project operate? For example, locally (e.g. district, province), nationally, regionally? How and why?
- In what ways does the project engage with state, non-state and regional bodies? In what forums? Why? With what results?
- What lessons are emerging from project implementation? Are there any examples of emerging good practice that might influence future policy and practice in the region and globally? What are you doing to ensure those lessons and recommendations are reaching potentially interested parties? What could SDC do to assist? What does it do now? What might it do better?
- Are you aware of any regional or international research-type programmes supported by SDC, e.g. from Bern?
- Are cross-cutting themes properly integrated into project design, implementation and reporting? What improvements might be made?
- Are the results frameworks properly disaggregated (e.g. by sex, gender, location)?
- Are the current programme targets realistic?
- Are you aware of the SDC programme results framework and where and how your project is expected to contribute to those?
- How often do you revert to the SDC Food Security Strategy and other SDC policies, strategies and guidelines? Why? Are they useful?

Development Partners

6.5.1 To test whether SDC's current focus is (still) a high value niche, to assess whether readjustments or further tightening are merited, to capture what other donors are or will be supporting in the area of

- Is programme design appropriate and consistent with the approaches of other donors addressing the same/similar needs and problems?
- Is SDC support harmonised

- What is your agency's definition of regional programming? Does this differ to multi-country programme and, if so, in what ways?
- Tell me what you know about the SDC regional food security programme? Do you believe it has a target area or thematic niche? If so, what is it? Is it a logical choice? Why/Why not?
- What are the three most important challenges facing seed



	<p>food/seed security, and to identify areas of complementarity.</p> <p>6.5.2 To assess the extent to which the strategy and programme focus remain appropriate considering any contextual changes and the priorities of the main actors and development partners.</p>	<p>with other donors? Are appropriate steps being taken for a more harmonised delivery in the future, if appropriate?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the drivers and constraints to greater harmonisation? • Where does SDC enjoy good will? Where is its comparative advantage seen as being? 	<p>security in Southern Africa?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who are the key players responding to these challenges? Are there efforts effective? Why, and how do you know? • What is the appropriate balance between measures to support formal markets and those to support informal markets? • Where do you see the governance entry points in relation to food and seed security, and particularly in relation to a regional programme? • What does SDC do well? • What is SDC's comparative advantage? Why? • What do you like about SDC's current engagement in the region? • What do you not like about SDC's current engagement in the region? • What could SDC do differently? Why? What might the results be of any such change? • Does SDC focus on the right priorities in the region? Why? • Do you see any significant gaps in their current approach? Why? How would you describe their current approach? • What opportunities is SDC missing? Why do you believe they are opportunities? • Is SDC working with the most appropriate partners to address the priority challenges in the region? • Is SDC using the right modalities for working with others? (e.g. project, budget support) • Are there other ways of partnering which would add more value at the regional level? • What programmes do you have now or will you have in the next two years that will focus on similar issues and stakeholder to those SDC currently works with? • Is there interest in joint programming? • What are the drivers and constraints to greater donor harmonisation?
Non-state	6.6.1 To capture any key changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Should the objectives of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is your organisation's definition or understanding of seed



	<p>actors, e.g. private sector</p> <p>within SADC's political-economic landscape and the potential implications (positive, negative) for the SDC programme.</p> <p>6.6.2 To assess the extent to which the current strategy is relevant to the macro, meso and micro issues of food security in SADC.</p> <p>6.6.3 To assess the extent to which the programme is in line with and complementary to the CAADP framework and the MS national strategies.</p>	<p>regional strategy be changed?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have or will changes in regional and national policies and priorities affect the programme? Is the programme adapting in terms of long-term needs for support? • Does the current programme make sense within this specific context? How far as the context changed since 2009? 	<p>security?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the relationship between seed security and food security? • Tell me what you know about the SDC regional food security programme? Do you believe it has a target area or thematic niche? If so, what is it? Is it a logical choice? Why/Why not? • What do you know about the various projects SDC is financing? Do you receive their reports or any other publications? Do they meet you to discuss status and lessons? Would you want them to? • What are the three most important challenges facing seed security in Southern Africa? • Who are the key players responding to these challenges? Are there efforts effective? Why, and how do you know? • Where do you see the governance entry points in relation to food and seed security, and particularly in relation to a regional programme? • Are CAADP and SADC RAP seen as politically legitimate at REC and MS level? What are their respective support bases? What are the forces, processes and politics at play? Where are the alliances or coalitions (within and beyond state bodies)? What are the implications for regional and national food and seed security? Where are the opportunities and constraints in so far as SDC's strategy and programme are concerned? • Where is there political-economic momentum and opportunity? Why? • Where are there opportunities to increase the meaningful role of non-state actors (e.g. SADC PF, FARNPAN, SACAU) in seed security debates and action? What needs to change?
7	<p>Portfolio mapping analysis</p>	<p>7.1 To map existing and projected projects onto SDC's current programme framework to identify degree of coverage.</p> <p>7.2 To identify the extent to which there is internal coherence within</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where are the strategically important gaps in the output areas? Why? • To what extent does the current portfolio map on the result areas identified in the SDC Strategy?



the programme.					
8	Questionnaire survey	Implementing Partners	<p>8.1 To capture headline challenges faced by IPs.</p> <p>8.2 To assess the quality and regularity of IPs engagement with SDC COOF (and other SDC offices, if appropriate).</p> <p>8.3 To assess the extent of awareness of SDC policies, strategies and guidelines (including mainstreaming issues).</p> <p>8.3 To assess the extent of awareness of other SDC-financed activities in the region and globally.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How can SDC (better?) influence strategic policy debates and regional action? • How can SDC better engage with IPs? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ratings scale (e.g. very weak – outstanding) and qualitative commentary section for various matters – see draft survey provided to SDC COOF on 11 Aug 2011.
9	Common visioning and feedback workshop	Various [TBD]	<p>9.1 To present and test the validity of draft findings and recommendations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is SDC doing the right things? • Is SDC doing the right things 'right'? • Are the findings and recommendations sound? What are the priorities? • What improvements/changes should be made? 	

Annex D: List of People Consulted

Dr. Samuel Kareithi	Regional Programme Manager, Food Security, SDC COOF, Pretoria, South Africa
Mr Francois Droz	Director, SDC COOF, Pretoria, South Africa
Mr Marc De Santis	Country Director, SDC/HA, Harare, Zimbabwe
Mr Mkhululi Ngwenya	Food Security Advisor, SDC/HA, Harare, Zimbabwe
Ms. Helena MacLeod	Head Resilient Livelihoods Theme, DFID, Pretoria, South Africa
Ms. Celia Khupe	Senior Regional Agriculture Program Manager, USAID Southern Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
Mr Martin Muchero	Regional Coordinator, Regional Agricultural Policy Project, SADC FANR Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana
Dr. Angel Daka	Production and Food Security Markets Advisor, ACTESA, Lusaka, Zambia
Dr. John MacRobert	Team Leader, SDC NSIMA III Project, Harare, Zimbabwe
Mr Lesley Nyagah	Agricultural Research, Economic Governance Programme, IDASA, Pretoria, South Africa
Mr Douglas Magunda	M&E Officer, Emergency Coordination Unit, FAO, Harare, Zimbabwe
Ms Ellah Chembe	Deputy CEO, Zambia National Farmers Union, Lusaka, Zambia
Mr Claid Mujaju	Head, Seed Services, Government of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe
Mr Nyasha Pambirei	Acting Director, Field Services, Department of AGRITEX, Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development, Harare, Zimbabwe
Mr Ishmael Sunga	CEO, SACAU, Centurion, South Africa
Ms Stephanie Aubin	Technical Assistant, Policy Development, SACAU, Centurion, South Africa (Embassy of France)
Mr Alex Carr	Team Leader, SDC Seeds and Markets Project
Mr Beke Dube	Regional Capacity Building Specialist, SDC Seeds and Markets Project
Mr Terry Quinlan	Former Technical Director, SDC Seeds and Markets Project
Dr. John Makuka	Seeds Expert, EU COMRAP/ACTESA, Lusaka, Zambia
Dr. Lindiwe Sibanda	CEO, FANRPAN, Pretoria, South Africa
Dr. Bellah Mpofu	Project Coordinator, SDC HaSSP Project, FANRPAN, Pretoria, South Africa
Dr. Pius Chilonda	Head, IWMI Southern Africa, Pretoria, South Africa
Dr. Emmanuel Mwendera	Senior Researcher, SDC Irrigation Rehabilitation Project, IWMI, Pretoria, South Africa
Dr. Patrick Tawonezwi	Technical Adviser/Coordinator, CCARDESA Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana
Dr. Alfred Mapiki	Former Technical Adviser/Regional Research and Training Officer, SADC Land and Water Management Applied Research Programme, now CCARDESA, Gaborone, Botswana



Mr Andrew Henderson	Managing Director, Progene Seeds, Harare, Zimbabwe
Mr Brian Saunders	Sustainable Agriculture Trust, Harare, Zimbabwe
Dr. Michele Leone	Climate Change and Water Programme, IDRC, Ottawa, Canada

Annex E: List of SDC Documents Consulted

Foreign Policy Report (2007)

Federal Council Dispatch, 2009-12 (2008)

SDC Strategy 2010 (2000)

Agricultural Sectoral Policy (1999)

Securing Enough Food for All (2007)

Medium-term Strategy for Development Cooperation in East and Southern Africa, 2000-10 (2000)

Regional Programme Southern Africa – Updated Cooperation Strategy (2008)

Regional Food Security Strategy, Southern Africa (2009)

The Logical Framework (n.d., SECO, Version 1.2)

Governance as a Transversal Theme: An Implementation Guide (2007)

Guidelines North-South (1994)

The Basic Principles of Swiss Development Cooperation (1988)

Creating the Prospects of Living a Life in Dignity (2004)

Gender Equality (2003)

Evaluation policy of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2008)

Report on Effectiveness: Swiss development cooperation in the agricultural sector (2010)

Partnerships for the Future (2003)

External Evaluation: Are we Doing the Right Things? Are We Doing Things Right (2000)

Food Security Strategy, RPSA (2009)

FANRPAN HaSSP

SDC-FANRPAN Contract

HaSSP Operational Report to SDC for the period, 01 April – 30 September 2010

HaSSP Operational Report to SDC for the period, 01 October 2010 – 31 March 2011

Monitoring and Evaluation Manual (May 2011)

GRM SAMP

SDC-GRM Contract

GRM Proposal to SDC

SAMP Credit Proposal to SDC

SAMP Inception Report

SAMP M&E System Report (May 2011)

SAMP Workplans and Monitoring Plan Key Questions, Draft 1, Year 2011 to 2012 (July 2012)

SAMP Seed Security Report in the Kingdom of Swaziland (March 2011). Authored by Stephen Woodburne

Diagnostic Study for Seed Security Project in Seminking (February 2011). Authored by Mpho Liphoto

CIMMYT NSIMA III

CIMMYT Proposal to SDC (October 2010)

IWMI Irrigation Rehabilitation

SDC-IWMI Contract

ANNEX 2: SDC Logframe Small irrigation schemes Masvingo province Phase 1 2011 – 2013 (15 May 2011)

Survey on Scheme Utilisation, Cropping Activities and Cropping Potential in Smallholder Irrigation Schemes in Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces, Final Main Report to SDC. Authored by Lawareco Zimbabwe (November 2010)

CCARDESA

Credit Proposal to SDC

Protokoll Opkom 22.4.2010

Annex F: Cereal Balance Sheet for 2010/11 Marketing Year, SADC

Thousands of metric tonnes		Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Namibia	South Africa	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe	SADC
A	Domestic availability	1256	139	207	3761	3047	181	1832 5	84	7396	3433	1538	3937 5
A.1.	Opening stocks	78	85	70	189	406	25	3203	9	301	356	4	4732
	Formal/SGR	71	65	63	131	278	25	3203	9	90	353	4	4297
	On-farm	7	19	7	31	128	-	-	-	211	3	-	406
	Other	-	1	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
A.2.	Gross harvest	1178	55	137	3572	2641	155	1512 2	75	7095	3078	1534	3464 3
B	Gross domestic requirements	2202	334	357	2608	3522	319	1493 6	150	7041	2063	2269	3610 9
C	Desired SGR carryover stocks	24	85	12	30	150	49	1756	8	150	200	60	2534
D	Domestic shortfall/surplus	-970	-280	-163	1123	-625	-187	1633	-73	205	1170	-790	732
E	Commodity cross substitution	-	-	-	-	6	7	-	-	9	8	6	1053
F	Imports	-	312	230	-	830	173	2136	78	73	-	-	3832
F.1.	Received	-	173	13	-	-	19	2136	-	73	-	-	2414
	Commercial	-	173	13	-	-	19	2136	-	61	-	-	2402
	Food aid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	1
F.2.	Expected	-	139	217	-	830	154	-	78	-	-	-	1418
	Commercial	-	139	217	-	830	154	-	74	-	-	-	1414
	Food aid	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
G	Exports	-	4	-	-	160	-	2374	-	-	80	-	2619
	Commitments shipped	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	7	4	-	2375
	Commitments not yet shipped	-	4	-	-	160	-	-	-	-	80	-	244
H	Import gap	-970	-	-	-	-	-14	-	-	-	-	-791	-
I	Forecasted closing stock	-	113	79	1154	262	35	3150	12	1414 1	1290	-	5532
J	Current stock	-	162	57	-	-	-	4601	1	90	-	-	4910

K	Self-sufficiency ratio	57	42	58	144	87	57	123	56	105	166	68	109
L	Inversed import gap	970	-	-	-	1	11	4	-	-	-	7	9
M	Import needs	970	280	163	-	558	187	-	73	-	-	790	-
N	Current stocks (mon)	-	5.8	1.9	-	-	-	3.7	0.1	0.2	-	-	1.6

Source: SADC 2011

Annex G: Completed Self-Reflection Sheets (SDC Implementing Partners)²⁰

Project name	New Seed Initiative for Maize in Southern Africa	
Implementing partner	CIMMYT	
Project value (USD)	2 500 000 USD	
Project start date	01 July 2011	
Expected completion date	31 December 2014	
Geographical focus	Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland	
Current distribution of project focus		
Crop type	Cereal: vegetables & melons: fruits & nuts: oilseed crops: root/tuber crops: beverage & spice crops: leguminous crops: sugar crops: other crops	100: 0: 0: 0: 0: 0: 0: 0: 0 <i>e.g. 30: 5: 0: 15: 30: 0: 10: 10: 0</i>
Cereal type	Maize: rice: wheat: millet: sorghum: other	100: 0: 0: 0: 0: 0
Variety type	Modern: farmer	100: 0
Seed system type	Formal seed system: informal seed system	75:25
Seed security parameter	Availability: access: quality	60: 20: 20
Food security frame	Chronic: acute	20: 80
Market dimension focus	Supply: demand	40: 60
Scale level	Macro: meso: micro	10: 40: 50
Primary stakeholder type	Regional: national: local*	30: 50: 20

* Regional bodies include RECs (e.g. SADC, COMESA), related agencies (e.g. ACETSA), multinational companies, and regional representative bodies (e.g. SACAU); national bodies include government ministries and agencies (e.g. extension service) and national companies; local groups include farmers associations, households, independent rural stockists, and individual farmers.

²⁰ Note: (a) the glossary provided used the same definitions as those in this report; (b) CCARDESA did not complete the template as it was agreed that it was inappropriate given their mandate and the rationale for their funding, (c) the templates were populated by the Project Team Leaders and sought to capture the distribution of project effort or focus; (d) each line must add up to 100, e.g. 30:25:30:15; (e) for details of the classification, see

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/world_census_of_agriculture/appendix3_r7.pdf (accessed 10 August 2011)

Project name	Harmonized Seed Security Project (HaSSP)		
Implementing partner	FANRPAN		
Project value (USD)	CHF 4 385 Million		
Project start date	01 January 2010		
Expected completion date	31 December 2013		
Geographical focus	Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe		
Current distribution of project focus			
Crop type	Cereal: vegetables & melons: fruits & nuts: oilseed crops: root/tuber crops: beverage & spice crops: leguminous crops: sugar crops: other crops	11.11: 11.11: 11.11: 11.11: 11.11: 11.11: 11.11	
Cereal type	Maize: rice: wheat: millet: sorghum: other	16.67: 16.67: 16.67: 16.67: 16.67: 16.67	
Variety type	Modern: farmer	80: 20	
Seed system type	Formal seed system: informal seed system	70: 30	
Seed security parameter	Availability: access: quality	40: 20: 40	
Food security frame	Chronic: acute	50: 50	
Market dimension focus	Supply: demand	80: 20	
Scale level	Macro: meso: micro	50: 40: 10	
Primary stakeholder type	Regional: national: local	30: 50: 20	

Project name	Seeds and Markets Project (SAMP)	
Implementing partner	GRM International	
Project value (USD)	3.2m USD	
Project start date	01/10/2010	
Expected completion date	30/6/2013	
Geographical focus	Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho	
Current distribution of project focus		
Crop type	Cereal: vegetables & melons: fruits & nuts: oilseed crops: root/tuber crops: beverage & spice crops: leguminous crops: sugar crops: other crops	10: 0: 0: 17: 0: 20: 25: 0: 28 (Other: cotton. Other crops: Maize, Paprika, Groundnut, Rice, Sugar Beans, Sesame, Cowpea
Cereal type	Maize: rice: wheat: millet: sorghum: other	56: 30: 00 :00: 14: 00
Variety type	Modern: farmer	60: 40
Seed system type	Formal seed system: informal seed system	10: 90
Seed security parameter	Availability: access: quality	45 :30:25
Food security frame	Chronic: acute	60: 40
Market dimension focus	Supply: demand	60: 40
Scale level	Macro: meso: micro	30:30 : 40
Primary stakeholder type	Regional: national: local	30: 50: 20

Project name	Rehabilitation of Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes in Masvingo Province – Zimbabwe	
Implementing partner	IWMI, with University of Zimbabwe, EU funded Projects in Masvingo Province, Lawareco Ltd, Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources (SAFFIRE), GRM International, International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), SDC funded projects, and SDC Experts	
Project value (USD)	1,950,846 USD	
Project start date	15 June 2011	
Expected completion date	31 July 2013	
Geographical focus	Zimbabwe	
Current distribution of project focus		
Crop type	Cereal: vegetables & melons: fruits & nuts: oilseed crops: root/tuber crops: beverage & spice crops: leguminous crops: sugar crops: other crops	45: 15: 15: 0: 0: 0: 10: 10: 5
Cereal type	Maize: rice: wheat: millet: sorghum: other	50: 0: 50: 0: 0: 0
Variety type	Modern: farmer	80: 20
Seed system type	Formal seed system: informal seed system	80: 20
Seed security parameter	Availability: access: quality	40: 30: 30
Food security frame	Chronic: acute	60: 40
Market dimension focus	Supply: demand	40: 60
Scale level	Macro: meso: micro	50: 30: 20
Primary stakeholder type	Regional: national: local	20: 40: 40



Annex H: SDC Project Appraisals

CIMMYT NSIMA III: Quality standards and progress assessment

1. Relevance of the project and quality of the design	
Focal issue: the appropriateness of the project's objectives to the real problems, needs and priorities of its target groups/beneficiaries and the quality of the design through which these objectives were to be reached	
Framing questions	Commentary
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the project relevant to addressing the pre-existing problems? 2. Did the project proposal have a clear description of the problem and an appropriate strategy for addressing it? 3. Is the theory of change explicit? 4. Are the project objectives consistent with country / regional policies and the CAADP framework? 5. Are the project objectives consistent with SDC policies and guidelines? 6. Were the target groups clearly identified? Did the project respond to their needs? Was there a targeting strategy? 7. Were the stakeholders actively involved in the design process? Did they support the design (so far as I can be ascertained)? 8. Have coordination, management and financing arrangements clearly been identified and do they support institutional strengthening and local ownership? 	<p>The project assumes that there is a lack of certified maize seed of improved, adapted and appropriate varieties available in the marketplace. It similarly assumes that a more diverse, geographically dispersed and competent formal seed sector is critical to enabling increased farmer adoption of improved seed in the region.</p> <p>The project draws on lessons learned from SDC-financed NSIMA I and II, which highlighted, for example, a recognition that breeding measures were not benefitting smallholders, that there was a need for more market-based value chain thinking and, as such, that there was a requirement to work with a broader set of actors, including farmers themselves, to respond to opportunities and address identified constraints. The design also draws on recommendations made during consultative regional workshops in 2010. As such, whilst three of the five Areas of NSIMA III focus on variety development, testing and registration, over 60% of the project budget is seemingly allocated to seed production, processing and quality assurance (Area 4) and seed marketing and distribution (Area 5). The theory of change is explicit but there are currently weaknesses in the project logframe (see below).</p> <p>NSIMA III seeks to have a modest, yet focused and results-oriented approach for this final phase, with an expectation that 2-3 CIMMYT varieties will be actively released into the market in each country. The 'Seed Road-maps' (see below) have been conceived as important enablers in this process. The project plays to CIMMYT's comparative strengths and recognises, inter alia, the private sector drivers and opportunities in relation to maize, i.e. comparatively high gross margins (45-50% vs. 5-10% for some legumes) and therefore less risk. There is similarly an appreciation on market dynamics and drivers in relation to registration processes, variety competition, marketing and product displacement but also the potential role of small seed companies as more dynamic and agile variety adopters.</p> <p>The project focus is aligned with the working objectives of the Regional Agricultural Policy outlined by SADC in</p>



	<p>December 2010, i.e.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective 1: “to promote and support production, productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector” (within which the stated highest priority issue is crop production). • Objective 3. “to promote and support growth in incomes for agricultural communities in particular small-scale farmers, fishers and foresters” • Objective 4: “to promote the development of trade and markets. “ <p>Specifically, it is also aligned with policy directions within the emerging RAP that put focus on measures to increase the availability, access and affordability of seeds and genetic material of improved characteristics, coupled with emphasis on ‘market-led breeding’ and harmonising standards, regulations, certification and use of seeds and genetic materials (see SADC 2010). It is therefore aligned with SADC’s RISDP, which seeks to ensure food availability (Intervention 1), and Pillars II and IV of CAADP, i.e. increasing food supply, reducing hunger and improving responses to food emerging crises, and improving agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption (respectively).</p> <p>The project has adopted a multi-country approach, working in one border province of the DRC (Lubumbashi), Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and, likely to a lesser extent, South Africa (especially amongst the small-holder sector). The selection of the project’s focal countries is sound insofar as CIMMYT has sought to complement other projects (e.g. DTMA in Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) but, in working in the Katanga Province of DRC (which borders Zambia), SDC has financed a project that partly operates in a so-called ‘SDC no go area’. Moreover, Botswana is an ‘outlier’ in the sense that no other SDC-financed project currently directly targets Botswana, potentially undermining the benefits of critical mass.</p> <p>NSIMA’s multi-country activities will be supported by a regional lesson-sharing workstream, which will also bring to together lessons and approaches from the more geographically defined CIMMYT projects financed by the B&M Gates Foundation, the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, and HavrestPlus. As such, and with the right support, there is <i>potential</i> for NSIMA to enable efficiency gains across SADC member states by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking practice at country-level, together with cross-country and regional institutional connections, to ensure synergies and economies of scale from lesson learning and knowledge sharing are achieved. • Improving and quickening the transfer of appropriate technologies between countries and therefore accelerating productivity gains. • Building regional-national linkages to promote efficient uptake of evidence and avoidance of flawed or inefficient approaches. <p>This workstream might also enable improved effectiveness at regional and national level by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving the translation of REC goals, treaties and protocols into national plans, budgets and action (though in a SADC environment national ownership is critical as a regional driver). • Facilitating technical cooperation and regional learning platforms with the objective of improving technical
--	---



			<p>capacity, the provision of evidence and support to national decision-makers and therefore the appropriate policy processes and programmes for optimal impact.</p> <p>As this would imply, the RSC and NCU approach appears consistent with the RAP's guiding principle of "permanently involving" stakeholders in the agricultural sector, and in the spirit of the their expected "identification of solutions to constraints, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the regional agricultural policy". NSIMA intends to work in collaboration with the private sector (e.g. seed companies) and public bodies (e.g. NARES). Engagement with NGOs, which are seen as more transient, will be on a case-by-case basis. NSIMA has little direct, long-term engagement with target smallholders and instead works through intermediaries. The linkages and need for coordination between SAMP, HASSP and NSIMA in Swaziland and Lesotho (and more broadly) are noted and encouraged by CIMMYT, and there is anecdotal evidence of collaboration between NSIMA and HASSP, and a desire to work with SAMP, particularly once it gets greater field traction and therefore is better able to share approaches and lessons.</p>					
Performance conclusion	Highly relevant	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Largely relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Partly relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The M&E framework								
Focal issue: the quality and appropriateness of the M&E framework								
Framing questions			Commentary					
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Was the baseline data collected as part of the project design? Was the baseline relevant?2. Does the project logframe have clear outcome and output statements with SMART targets and measurable indicators? Does it represent a clear results chain?3. Are the indicators appropriate?4. Does the design articulate the importance of mutual accountability (where appropriate) by making provision for mutual assessment of progress by partners?5. Have adequate budgetary resources (e.g. 5-7%) been made available for the design and oversight of the M&E system? Is there adequate provision of timely and quality M&E expertise?6. Is there a complete schedule of M&E activities that shows when all key M&E activities will be carried out and by whom?			<p>NSIMA has opted to use Outcome Mapping¹ with encouragement from SDC. The project commenced in July 2011 and the logframe will be subject to further review during the inception period. As a consequence of the project's brief lifespan to date, an inception report, communications plan and workplan have not yet been produced. Baseline data was seemingly not collected as part of the project design. The following therefore draws on CIMMYT's proposal to SDC dated October 2010.</p> <p>It is assumed that the vision statement equates to the project goal, though the current statement constitutes an IF-THEN statement. It, and the four components of the Project Mission, also lack specific, measurable targets for December 2014, i.e. the end of contract. The project seeks to deliver four "achievements" (which are presumably regarded as high-level results):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provision of improved germplasm, technical backstopping, training and coordination to the activities of partners through NCU's.• National Coordinating Units (NCUs) shall identify bottlenecks and opportunities in the seed value chain of their respective countries, and together with relevant partners, establish and facilitate activities to overcome constraints and enhance development of the seed sector based on Outcome Challenges.• NCU's shall facilitate capacity building of partners and farmers relevant to the seed value chain.• NCU's shall advocate for appropriate policies, partnerships and promotion activities that will enhance the development of the seed value chain.					



<p>7. Are M&E reports available upon request?</p> <p>8. Do the reports show progress against planned M&E activities, e.g. summarising information collected, analysed and interpreted during the reporting period, and for all major survey and study-type activities?</p> <p>9. Do the progress reports meet stakeholder needs, report against the logframe and any milestones and targets set, have a credible basis for claims, and recommend actions to improve performance?</p> <p>10. Does the project M&E plan link to any communications plan?</p> <p>11. Is the logframe and baseline aligned with the programme-level logframe/results framework?</p> <p>12. Is there evidence that reports are timely and reliable?</p>	<p>The “logframe” (Table 5 of the CIMMYT proposal) has some positive features. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It seeks to identify “progress markers”. • It details “support activities”, i.e. tasks expected of each project partner. • The framework is seemingly participatory, with emphasis on mutual accountability (see p21 of the CIMMYT proposal) • It allows for identification to key contextual changes and resultant implications for project direction and results. <p>Nevertheless, when the Project Mission statement and the logframe are considered together, there appears to be an uncertain results chain. For example, the logframe is silent on the means by which appropriate policies are promoted, the associated targets and the indicators used to track progress. The IF-THEN logic at Project Mission and Project Vision is defensible, though the targets, milestones and indicators at Vision level are currently absent. There is some degree of alignment between the NSIMA logframe and the SDC’s programme logframe, i.e. that contained within its FSS of 25 June 2009. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSIMA contributes to directly to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ No. of quality seed varieties available to people (KPI within Strategic Objective 2) ○ No. of seeds developed, tested and certified, No. of new quality seeds developed and adopted, and Improved know-how of local seeds producers” (KPIs within Strategic Objective 3). <p>NSIMA will contribute to overall programme targets of, for example, increase adoption rates and increased food production. However, for SDC and NSIMA stakeholders to be able to track the project’s contribution it is necessary for certain NSIMA indicators to mimic those at programme level (with the latter reviewed for ambiguity, and any blurring between indicator and target).</p> <p>As the partners review the current project logframe, it is advised that CIMMYT:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examines the logframe to ensure there is sufficient separation of “outcomes” from outputs, i.e. those “products and services produced or competences and capacities established directly as a result of project activities” (SDC). Table 5, currently pitched as the project logframe”, details five “outcome challenges”, within which there are 18 “outcomes”. Some, such as “SADC Seed System implemented”, seem to be higher-order than others, e.g. “Seed Companies and NARS register new varieties, that are then available for marketing”. It is also noteworthy that there may also be a furthering blurring with activities, which in places are pitched as outcomes, e.g. “Private seed companies register and market new and improved varieties derived from CIMMYT and NARS breeding programs”. Similarly dot point 2 within the Project Mission should be critically reviewed in relation to the extent to which it actually presents an activity and not a high-level result area (as currently pitched). • Removes ambiguous statements or words from the logframe. Outcomes statements currently use words such as “dynamic”, “productive”, “more capable” (Area 1), “better informed”, “better able” (2), “more proactive”, and “enabled” (4). All, in monitoring terms, are ambiguous and will likely hinder a clear line of sight on what constitutes acceptable performance. Where possible, it is equally advisable that baseline information be
--	---



			<p>explicit within the next iteration of the project logframe. Without a clear statement of the reality at commencement (and avoidance of terms such as “enabled”), it will be difficult for CIMMYT and partners to distil the extent of ‘travel’ during the project lifetime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Examines the extent to which progress markers live up to their presumed billing and potential use as time-bound milestones. Currently Table 5 rarely offers time-bound progress markers, devaluing their potential use as ways to track the direction of travel and to hold various stakeholders to account.• Considers including sex-disaggregated and relevant voice, accountability and empowerment indicators (where relevant, e.g. in relation to measures to increase the accessibility of seeds within Area 5). DFID, for example, has standard indicators, some of which may be applicable and should SDC not have suitable, standard governance-related indicators for this project. <p>Finally, it is noteworthy that project outcome statements (or the Mission in this case?) convey what will change and for whom. It is therefore advised that indicator, baseline and target data be disaggregated, e.g. by sex.</p>					
Performance conclusion	Excellent	<div><div></div></div>	Very good	<div><div></div></div>	Good	<div><div></div></div>	Weak or to early to assess	<div><div></div></div>

3. Cross-cutting issues

Key question: have cross-cutting issues and interests been adequately considered in the project design and implementation?

Sub-areas	Commentary
<p>1. If so, how and to what effect? If not, why not? If n/a, explain. Please consider the following aspects of gender mainstreaming:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Has the project been planned on the basis of gender analysis? To what extent does any a focus on female headed households led to an improved impact of the project? What is the likeliness of increased female participation beyond project end? <p>2. Were environmental constraints and opportunities considered adequately in the project design?</p> <p>3. Are good good environmental practices followed in project implementation (in relation to use of water and energy and materials, production of wastes, etc)? Did the project respect traditional, successful environmental practices?</p> <p>4. Has environmental damage been caused or likely to be caused by the project? What kind of environmental impact</p>	<p>In focusing on the development and marketing of more drought-tolerant maize varieties NSIMA III offers a <i>partial</i> response to calls for more resilient agriculture and climate change adaptation, whilst recognising that maize is not a panacea but, where agro-ecological conditions permit, is instead one of a basket of crops that could be used by resource-poor farmers. Any intended measures to promote good, environmentally sustainable agronomic and land management practices are not explicit within the project proposal and focus on them is not foreseen.</p> <p>The project is founded on the basis that farmers should be conceived as consumers and therefore inputs should be acceptable to the market. NSIMA will develop advisory information of varieties for farmers.</p> <p>The utilisation of the Seed Road-map offers opportunity to identify likely governance and other bottlenecks at each stage of variety release, production, certification and marketing, and therefore open up NSIMA to identify and address governance issues through NCU and other channels. With NCUs including seed companies, farmers groups and farmers, there appears to be opportunity for ‘voice and accountability’ considerations to be mainstreamed in NCU operations (so long as the views provided are representative of those of the targeted beneficiaries, i.e. “resource-poor smallholder-farmers in southern Africa”.</p> <p>This framing of the targeted beneficiaries is useful and offers more specificity than that provided by SDC in its Regional Food Security Strategy. However, for monitoring and reporting purposes there may be need for further definition, coupled with due disaggregation of data by sex. With no explicit gender planning nor baseline, milestone</p>



mitigation measures were taken?			or target setting in terms of female participation the extent of gender mainstreaming is unclear. Similarly, the extent to which maize (vis-à-vis) other crops offers particular benefit to labour-constrained HIV-affected households is unclear.							
5.	Has governance been mainstream in accordance with SDC guidelines?		NB: CIMMYT's October 2010 proposal includes mention of legumes, legume-maize linkages, vegetative seeds, nutritional benefits for populations living with HIV/AIDS, gender-related benefits and the use of specialised partners such as GART. However, the project vision and mission statements are maize-oriented and CIMMYT's "self-reflection" confirmed a 100% focus on maize, and the legume coverage is not now anticipated.							
6.	Have governance-related opportunities been identified?									
7.	Has HIV/AIDS been mainstreamed in accordance with SDC guidelines?									
8.	Has there been consideration of HIV/AIDS-sensitive crops and seeds?									
Performance conclusion			Excellent	<input type="checkbox"/>	Very good	<input type="checkbox"/>	Good	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Weak	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. Headline achievements

Focal question: what headline results have been achieved to date?

Performance target

Outcome statement: *Absent in explicit terms*

Indicator	Baseline		Target		Comments			
Absent	Absent		Absent					
Absent	Absent		Absent					
Absent	Absent		Absent					
Absent	Absent		Absent					
Performance conclusion	Wholly achieved	<div><div></div></div>	Largely achieved	<div><div></div></div>	Partly achieved	<div><div></div></div>	Unachieved, unknown, too early	<div><div></div></div>
Qualitative assessment of performance								
Framing questions			Commentary					



<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What headline results have been achieved to date? Are they in line with milestones? 2. What evidence is there that achieving the project outcome is contributing to the realisation of the goal? 3. Are the OVIs/targets for the Project goal appropriate and are they reported against 4. Are there any external factors that jeopardised the project's direct impact? 5. Insofar as is possible given the constraints of tis assignment, to what extent did the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)? Have there been any unplanned positive impacts on the planned target groups or other non-targeted communities arising from the project? How has this affected the impact? 	<p>To early to expected headline results; NSIMA III still at inception phase.</p>
---	---



FANRPAN HaSSP: Quality standards and progress assessment

1. Relevance of the project and quality of the design	
Focal issue: the appropriateness of the project's objectives to the real problems, needs and priorities of its target groups/beneficiaries and the quality of the design through which these objectives were to be reached	
Framing questions	Commentary
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the project relevant to addressing the pre-existing problems? 2. Did the project proposal have a clear description of the problem and an appropriate strategy for addressing it? 3. Is the theory of change explicit? 4. Are the project objectives consistent with country / regional policies and the CAADP framework? 5. Are the project objectives consistent with SDC policies and guidelines? 6. Were the target groups clearly identified? Did the project respond to their needs? Was there a targeting strategy? 7. Were the stakeholders actively involved in the design process? Did they support the design (so far as I can be ascertained)? 8. Have coordination, management and financing arrangements clearly been identified and do they support institutional strengthening and local ownership? 	<p>The Harmonized Seed Security Project (HaSSP) seeks to contribute to improved food security of smallholders in the SADC region through increased availability of and access to seeds. It intends to do so by “piloting the domestication and implementation of the SADC Harmonised Seed Regulatory System in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with important data, information and knowledge utilized in the wider SADC region for evidence-based decision-making on seed systems”. It is expected that this outcome will be achieved by the delivery of five outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alignment of seed variety release policies in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe with SADC protocols. • Alignment of phytosanitary policies in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe with SADC protocols. • Alignment of seed certification policies in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe with SADC protocols. • Strengthened measures to operationalise policies introduced and related capacity of government, civil service and other key stakeholders. • Strengthened seed certification facilities successfully functioning in the four focal countries. <p>The project is a successor initiative to SDC's earlier support to the SADC Seed Security Network. It explicitly responds to an MoU signed in February 2010 by the SADC Ministers responsible for agriculture and food security to adopt a SADC harmonized seed regulatory system.</p> <p>The project provides ‘enabling support’ to lead SADC member states, which also have COMESA membership, to domesticate the regional seed protocol, harmonise their seed policies and legislation, and effectively implement the provisions of the protocol with enhanced national capacities.</p> <p>The project assumes that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SADC Member States typically have weak input distribution systems and smallholders usually have limited access to improved seed. • Poor quality seed results in wastage of financial capital (i.e. the money spent on purchasing seed) and poor yield, therefore compromising food security. • The gains made in the establishment of the SADC Seed Regulatory System – which emergence was



	<p>informed by the SDC-financed SSSN – will be lost if necessary reforms are not made at Member State level. Such changes include changes to national Seeds Regulations to provide for SADC certification, standardisation of seed testing for variety release, labelling, SADC field standards etc.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a lack of certified seed of improved, adapted and appropriate varieties available in the marketplace. • A more diverse, geographically dispersed and competent formal seed sector is vital for enabling increased farmer adoption of improved seed in the region. • Domestication of the regional seed protocol will stimulate the availability of more varieties, encourage more companies to invest in the seed business and increase the choices of varieties available to farmers. • Doing so will lead to better seed quality as a result of improved facilities and skills, and save time and resources because importing countries will no longer need to re-test imported seed. • Doing so will allow more efficient movement of seed in the region through the use of a common seed certification scheme, terminology, standards, procedures, seals and labels. Harmonization will also facilitate better targeting of relief seed. • Should Member States domestic the SADC Protocol seed matters will necessarily be handled in accordance with law, i.e. the technical, trade, food security and poverty reduction merits of adhering to the SADC Protocol will not be overshadowed by 'politics', issues of sovereignty or similar. <p>From an operational level, the project also assumes that the SADC Seed Centre will be functional by 2011 and the SADC Common Seed Variety Catalogue is in place.</p> <p>The project focus is aligned with the working objectives of the Regional Agricultural Policy outlined by SADC in December 2010, i.e.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective 1: "to promote and support production, productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector" (within which the stated highest priority issue is crop production). • Objective 3. "to promote and support growth in incomes for agricultural communities in particular small-scale farmers, fishers and foresters" • Objective 4: "to promote the development of trade and markets. " <p>Specifically, it is also aligned with policy directions within the emerging RAP that put focus on measures to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support regional integration and regional trade integration, with the latter specifically seeking to "remove most, if not all, intra-regional trade barriers between countries while possibly enhancing extra-regional protection". • Increase the availability, access and affordability of seeds and genetic material of improved characteristics, coupled with emphasis on 'market-led breeding' and harmonising standards, regulations, certification and use of seeds and genetic materials. • Address the "diversity of national regulatory systems on seeds in SADC countries", with a view to addressing the currently "segregated, small and difficult to access" markets. • Address the "lack of harmonised standards, regulations, certification and use of seeds and genetic
--	--



	<p>materials" (see SADC 2010).</p> <p>The project is also aligned with SADC's RISDP, which seeks to ensure food availability (Intervention 1), and Pillars II and IV of CAADP, i.e. increasing food supply, reducing hunger and improving responses to food emerging crises, and improving agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption (respectively).</p> <p>The project has adopted a multi-country approach, working in Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, all of which have dual COMESA and SADC membership status. Selection of countries was seemingly based on their perceived 'readiness' to align domestic legislation with the SADC Protocol. The project is taking active measures to raise the profile of, and generate interest in, the project by presenting the project to regional meetings of the SADC Ministers responsible for Agriculture and Food Security, and presenting HaSSP to regional meetings of FANRPAN's nodes, many of which are non-state actors, such as farmers' unions. This practice offers an excellent example of how a project that focuses on a small number of 'lead Member States' can seek to engage with a broader group of countries, with a view to generating understanding, interest and possible out-scaling.</p> <p>As such, and given the inter-country activities within the project itself, there is <i>potential</i> for HaSSP to enable efficiency gains across SADC member states by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking practice at country-level, together with cross-country and regional institutional connections, to ensure synergies and economies of scale from lesson learning and knowledge sharing are achieved. • Building regional-national linkages to promote efficient uptake of evidence and avoidance of flawed or inefficient approaches. <p>The project may also enable improved effectiveness at regional and national level by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving the translation of REC goals, treaties and protocols into national plans, budgets and action (though in a SADC environment national ownership is critical as a regional driver). • Building peer support linkages across Member States so as to encourage and maintain momentum, particularly if/when faced with political-institutional hurdles. • Facilitating technical cooperation and regional learning platforms with the objective of improving technical capacity, the provision of evidence and support to national decision-makers and therefore the appropriate policy processes and programmes for optimal impact. <p>Positive design, planning and programmatic features of note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SDC FANR regards FANRPAN as a regional "centre of excellence", and therefore it is likely that the IP has the political and technical legitimacy to support the necessary reforms. The use of Seed Elders is a shrewd addition to the project team. • There is evidence of excellent collaboration with CIMMYT-NSIMA (II and III) and, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, GRM-SAMP. However, coordination to date has been informal and based on personal relationships. • FANRPAN submits periodic reports directly to SADC FANR, though in time it will do so to the SADC Seed Centre. This is sound insofar as it is in line with the policy and strategy mandate of SADC FANR, however
--	--



	<p>SDC should ensure prior quality assurance and 'acceptance' of content.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FANRPAN-HaSSP reports are of a very high standard: they are well written, have a logical flow, speak to the logframe (though omit progress against outcome-level milestones and targets), offer critical reflection and provide non-specialists with sufficient explanatory comment on technical matters. <p>Weak design, planning and programmatic features of note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FANRPAN's modus operandi is founded on national nodes. Their role vis-à-vis that of the FANRPAN project team and the beneficiary partners is unclear, and FANRPAN may need to consider transaction costs and demonstrate the tangible added value of working with and through national steering committees and nodes. FANRPAN supports community-based small-scale seed production enterprises in each of the four countries. There is no obvious 'home' for them in the project logframe, though it is understood that their purpose is to test legislation and provide technocrats (e.g. seed services) and political decision-makers with access to field-level realities and an understanding of the consequences of poor legislation. However, from an overarching programming perspective, the rationale for these schemes is unclear when lessons from SAMP and possibly NSIMA could offer the necessary advocacy platform. Whilst the commencement of HaSSP may have pre-dated SAMP by 6-9 months that, in itself, is an insufficiently strong reason to fund community-based seed projects within HaSSP. HaSSP reports and national audits draw attention to the variable quality of systems, procedures, equipment and skills capacity within the public sector seeds departments. For example, the project report for Oct 2010-March 11 reported that seed testing laboratories in all four pilot countries "are not yet ready for the implementation of the SADC Protocol on seed certification quality assurance.... Issues such as limited availability of basic equipment and consumables for seed testing, varying minimum qualifications for seed analysis, lack of clear understanding of what is contained in the SADC Protocols and Procedure manual, need critical consideration". (FANRPAN 2011). Poor equipment can compromise the accuracy of test results, results that should ascertain whether seed is of an acceptable genetic purity and specified physical quality in terms of germination percentage, seed moisture and seed physical purity. Consequently even a small variation could permit release of seed that is actually sub-standard, bar release of seed that should be acceptable, and, by consequence, reduce trans-border trade in acceptable seed. The quality of equipment and apparent constraints occasioned by limitations to recurrent budgets pose a significant risk to the project, and suggest a questioning of at least one output-level assumption in the logframe. (NB: EU COMRAP may provide funding to seed laboratories but the programme is coming to an end and the HaSSP project team is unaware of their intentions in relation to this project's focal countries). Approximately one year after project commencement it became evident that HaSSP and an Iowa State University project entitled Seed Policies in African Regions (SPEAR) were both pursuing similar objectives in Malawi and Zambia. Both are working with the same institutions to strengthen variety release systems. This has since been resolved, and budget savings within HaSSP are expected to be reinvested in other focal countries. Support to Mozambique is also possible (based on a request for assistance). Given the equipment constraints identified above, it could be asked why the project didn't seek to reinvest the saved
--	--



			money in the remaining focal countries rather than seeking to expand to a new country.					
Performance conclusion	Highly relevant	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Largely relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Partly relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The M&E framework								
Focal issue: the quality and appropriateness of the M&E framework								
Framing questions			Commentary					
<div>1. Was the baseline data collected as part of the project design? Was the baseline relevant?</div> <div>2. Does the project logframe have clear outcome and output statements with SMART targets and measurable indicators? Does it represent a clear results chain?</div> <div>3. Are the indicators appropriate?</div> <div>4. Does the design articulate the importance of mutual accountability (where appropriate) by making provision for mutual assessment of progress by partners?</div> <div>5. Have adequate budgetary resources (e.g. 5-7%) been made available for the design and oversight of the M&E system? Is there adequate provision of timely and quality M&E expertise?</div> <div>6. Is there a complete schedule of M&E activities that shows when all key M&E activities will be carried out and by whom?</div> <div>7. Are M&E reports available upon request?</div> <div>8. Do the reports show progress against planned M&E activities, e.g. summarising information collected, analysed and interpreted during the reporting period, and for all major survey and study-type activities?</div> <div>9. Do the progress reports meet stakeholder needs, report against the logframe and any milestones and targets set, have a credible basis for claims, and recommend actions to improve performance?</div>			<div>There is a very good degree of alignment between the HaSSP logframe and the SDC’s programme logframe, i.e. that contained within its FSS of 25 June 2009. For example, HaSSP contributes directly to:</div> <div><div><div>No. of countries having developed “seeds” policies (KPI within Strategic Objective 1).</div><div>No. of countries having implemented “seeds” policies (KPI within Strategic Objective 1).</div></div><div>In so doing, it is assumed that it will indirectly contribute to other programme results, e.g.:</div><div><div>No. of quality seed varieties available to people (KPI within Strategic Objective 2)</div><div>No. of seeds developed, tested and certified, and No. of new quality seeds developed and adopted” (KPIs within Strategic Objective 3).</div></div><div>The original project logframe was rightly updated in January 2011, following national workshops in December 2010 and January 2011. Whilst the new logframe has necessarily reduced the number of indicators contained within the original version, the logframe would benefit from targets: for example, what percentage of seed certification laboratories should be using service charters by the end of 2012? How much less time should multinational seed companies take to process documentation and move seeds across borders by July 2013?</div><div>An M&E Manual was also developed in Q1 of 2011. Baseline surveys and institutional audits have been conducted in all four focal countries, though the extent to which the baseline surveys speak directly to the new indicators is unclear.</div><div>The involvement of steering committees, direct reporting to SADC FANR and utilisation of ‘common visioning workshops’ all help to build understanding and ownership, and the regular meetings of peers in the four countries might create relationships of mutual accountability between Member States.</div></div>					



10. Does the project M&E plan link to any communications plan? 11. Is the logframe and baseline aligned with the programme-level logframe/results framework? 12. Is there evidence that reports are timely and reliable?								
Performance conclusion	Excellent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Very good	<input type="checkbox"/>	Good	<input type="checkbox"/>	Weak or to early to assess	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Cross-cutting issues								
Key question: have cross-cutting issues and interests been adequately considered in the project design and implementation?								
Sub-areas			Commentary					
1. If so, how and to what effect? If not, why not? If n/a, explain. Please consider the following aspects of gender mainstreaming: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Has the project been planned on the basis of gender analysis? b. To what extent does any a focus on female headed households led to an improved impact of the project? c. What is the likeliness of increased female participation beyond project end? 2. Were environmental constraints and opportunities considered adequately in the project design? 3. Are good good environmental practices followed in project implementation (in relation to use of water and energy and materials, production of wastes, etc)? Did the project respect traditional, successful environmental practices? 4. Has environmental damage been caused or likely to be caused by the project? What kind of environmental impact mitigation measures were taken? 5. Has governance been mainstream in accordance with SDC guidelines? 6. Have governance-related opportunities been identified? 7. Has HIV/AIDS been mainstreamed in accordance with SDC guidelines? 8. Has there been consideration of HIV/AIDS-sensitive crops and seeds?			Issues of gender, environment and HIV/AIDS are not central to activities within HaSSP, though the IP monitors and records the number of males and females who participate at different training events. However, supply-led governance reform is central to the project, and the inclusion of Service Charters enables demand-side accountability measures to be included.					
Performance conclusion	Excellent	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Very good	<input type="checkbox"/>	Good	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Weak	<input type="checkbox"/>



4. Headline achievements

Focal question: what headline results have been achieved to date?

Performance target

Outcome statement: SADC Harmonized Seed Regulatory System domesticated and implemented in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe with important data, information and knowledge utilized in the wider SADC region for evidence-based decision-making on seed systems by February 2013.

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Comments
Policies that align national procedures and guidelines for seed variety release and registration; phytosanitary and quarantine measures for seed; and seed certification and quality control with SADC protocols, adopted by the governments of Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe by December 2012.	0	<i>Embedded within the indicator statement, see left: an 'aligned' policy in Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe</i>	<i>In accordance with SDC norms, indicators include target statements. SDC should consider revising its current logframe format to separate out indicators, milestones and targets</i>
A new variety that has been tested and released in two SADC Member States, and listed in the SADC Common Catalogue, is marketed in at least three of the four focal countries within six months of registration without further testing locally (by February 2013).	0	<i>Embedded within the indicator statement, see left.</i>	
Harmonized quarantine pest lists adopted in the 4 project countries by July 2013.	0	<i>Embedded within the indicator statement, see left.</i>	
Change in the time taken by multinational seed companies to process documentation, and move seed across borders by July 2013 through the use of the regional seed certification system.	<i>Absent</i>	<i>Absent</i>	
Percentage of seed certification laboratories using service charters by end of 2012.	<i>Absent</i>	<i>Absent</i>	
Performance conclusion	Wholly achieved	<div> <div><input type="checkbox"/></div> <div>Largely achieved</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/></div> </div>	<div> <div>Partly achieved</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/></div> <div>Unachieved, unknown, too early</div> <div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></div> </div>
Qualitative assessment of performance			
Framing questions		Commentary	



<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What headline results have been achieved to date? Are they in line with milestones? 2. What evidence is there that achieving the project outcome is contributing to the realisation of the goal? 3. Are the OVIs/targets for the Project goal appropriate and are they reported against 4. Are there any external factors that jeopardised the project's direct impact? 5. Insofar as is possible given the constraints of this assignment, to what extent did the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)? Have there been any unplanned positive impacts on the planned target groups or other non-targeted communities arising from the project? How has this affected the impact? 	<p>Headline results at activity level include conduct of the baseline surveys (not least as a means to generate momentum and interest in the SADC Protocol), the near completion of seed testing and seed inspection audits in each of the four focal countries, and all the community-base seed production micro-projects being underway.</p> <p>Progress towards headline output and outcome results as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phytosanitary capacity evaluation (PCE) studies of the national phytosanitary institutions in the project countries which also examined phytosanitary measures for seed at different border posts were conducted. • Forty six research, extension, seed company personnel and members of the seed variety release committees in Swaziland and Zimbabwe were trained in evaluation of new varieties according to 'value for cultivation and use' (VCU) and 'distinctness, uniformity and stability' (DUS) to ensure standardisation. • 142 small holder farmers from the 4 project countries were trained in seed production and entrepreneurship skills. • Vehicles were purchased (to facilitate seed crop inspections) to strengthen seed certification facilities in the project countries under Output 5. • Seed processing and seed storage equipment was purchased to support seed production by small scale seed producers.
--	---



IWMI Irrigation Rehabilitation: Quality standards and progress assessment²¹

1. Relevance of the project and quality of the design	
Focal issue: the appropriateness of the project's objectives to the real problems, needs and priorities of its target groups/beneficiaries and the quality of the design through which these objectives were to be reached	
Framing questions	Commentary
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the project relevant to addressing the pre-existing problems? 2. Did the project proposal have a clear description of the problem and an appropriate strategy for addressing it? 3. Is the theory of change explicit? 4. Are the project objectives consistent with country / regional policies and the CAADP framework? 5. Are the project objectives consistent with SDC policies and guidelines? 6. Were the target groups clearly identified? Did the project respond to their needs? Was there a targeting strategy? 7. Were the stakeholders actively involved in the design process? Did they support the design (so far as I can be ascertained)? 8. Have coordination, management and financing arrangements clearly been identified and do they support institutional strengthening and local ownership? 	<p>The goal of the project is to alleviate poverty and food insecurity in the rural communities of the drier areas of Zimbabwe. The expected outcome is 'rural communities in dry areas from Masvingo Province are food, nutritional and income secure by 2020, ensuring equal benefit to men and women'. The project has two phases:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phase 1, for the period 2011 to 2013 and during which time two small irrigation schemes will be rehabilitated, and lessons shared with the SADC Secretariat regarding, for example, the role of the private sector and optimal operation and maintenance measures. • Phase 2, for the period yyyy to yyyy and during which time a further eight schemes will be rehabilitated based on the lessons from Phase 1. <p>Phase 1 has been awarded to IWMI. The project commenced in mid-June 2011 and, as a consequence, limited documentation exists, i.e. there is a project logframe (15 May 2011), a contract between SDC and IWMI, and a November 2010 survey on scheme utilisation, cropping activities and cropping potential in smallholder irrigation schemes in Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces of Zimbabwe. The latter served as a scoping assessment for this project.</p> <p>The project is premised on several assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing or earlier schemes fail to operate at capacity for a number of reasons, including low productivity, insufficient markets, poor management, and poor group cohesion. • Output markets for farm surplus are essential for increased production and productivity. • Output markets enable farmers to secure increased income. • Insufficient attention is often placed on the role and drivers of output markets. • That, being 'pilots', there is something new and/or innovative about the initiatives trialled within SAMP. • That there is demand for the lessons emanating from the project and therefore there is scope for

²¹ IWMI was invited to respond to a draft appraisal but no feedback was received. Approximately one week was given to IWMI. The draft appraisal is presented here as the final version.



	<p>replication, adaptation and scaling-up at field level, and for modifications of relevant legal, regulatory and programming frameworks to better enable the same.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That there is a clear results chains between rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, income generation, seed security benefits and food security gains. <p>Phase 1 has a two-pronged approach: (a) to rehabilitate pilot irrigation schemes in Masvingo Province based on analysis of water viability, socio-economic surveys, a market survey (of which seeds will be a part) and irrigation systems analysis; (b) sharing lessons with the Water Directorate in the SADC Secretariat. Being a singular country project it is justified by SDC on the basis that it reinforces delivery of and seeks to add value to national and sub-national programming by supporting regional-level institutions, processes and mechanisms that can improve development strategies, enhance development processes and facilitate development results. In turn, and with the active engagement and support of the SADC Secretariat, it could be argued that the project will generate downstream efficiency and effectiveness gains across SADC member states by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking practice at country-level, together with cross-country and regional 'institutional connections, to ensure synergies and economies of scale from lesson learning and knowledge sharing are achieved. • Improving and quickening the transfer of appropriate technologies between countries and therefore accelerating productivity and post-harvest gains. • Building regional-national linkages to promote efficient uptake of evidence and avoidance of flawed or inefficient approaches. • Facilitating technical cooperation and regional learning platforms with the objective of improving technical capacity, the provision of evidence and support to national decision-makers and therefore the appropriate policy processes and programmes for optimal impact. <p>The project focus is aligned with the working objectives of the Regional Agricultural Policy outlined by SADC in December 2010, i.e.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective 1: "to promote and support production, productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector" (within which the a priority issue is water for irrigation, and assuming that the irrigation scheme focuses on food over cash crops). • Objective 3. "to promote and support growth in incomes for agricultural communities in particular small-scale farmers, fishers and foresters". • Objective 4: "to promote the development of trade and markets". • Objective 6: "to promote sustainable utilisation and management of natural resources and the environment". <p>Specifically, and depending on the findings and recommendations of the aforementioned surveys to be conducted in the next quarter, it is also aligned with policy directions within the emerging RAP that put focus on measures to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase irrigation-based farming from the regional average of 4.5% of agricultural land under irrigation to
--	--



			<p>7%. (Zimbabwe currently sits at about 4%)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• “Improve on past efforts to promote irrigation”, with greater emphasis on social, management and organisational matters, coupled with market considerations.• Promote contract farming, out-grower schemes and value-chain promotion (see SADC 2010). <p>The project is also aligned with Pillar I of CAADP, i.e. extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems.</p> <p>Critically, however, in so far as the relevance to SDC’s FSS is concerned there are hidden assumptions and a questionable results chain, testified by the fact that seeds is not mentioned in the project logframe. The project assumes, quite defensibly, that rehabilitation of smallholder irrigation schemes will lead to increased food generation and income generation, from which food security and nutritional benefits will accrue. It does not explicitly assume that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The project will increase seed availability (e.g. from irrigation-based seed production/multiplication).• The increased income through which people can make procurement choices <i>will necessarily include</i> certified seed.• That the market surveys to be conducted in the next quarter will recommend commercial seed production over cash or food crop production for the marketplace. Should the survey propose better market conditions for cash and food crops, seed becomes a process or an input in the same vain as fertiliser or capital. <p>As such, whilst the project is relevant within a broad food security agenda, and is highly relevant to SADC’s RISDP and RAP frameworks, it does not necessarily support the objectives laid out in SDC’s FSS, with has seeds as its niche. Moreover, being a singular country project, its funding within a regional programme is only justifiable with a strong lesson-sharing and advocacy workstream with the SADC Secretariat. It is premature to assess its direction but the selection of IWMI as the Implementing Partner provides suitable entry points to the Secretariat, e.g. through the ReSAKKS and with IWMI being a member of the SADC RAP Working Group.</p>					
Performance conclusion	Highly relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Largely relevant	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Partly relevant	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Not relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>



2. The M&E framework

Focal issue: the quality and appropriateness of the M&E framework

Framing questions	Commentary
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Was the baseline data collected as part of the project design? Was the baseline relevant? 2. Does the project logframe have clear outcome and output statements with SMART targets and measurable indicators? Does it represent a clear results chain? 3. Are the indicators appropriate? 4. Does the design articulate the importance of mutual accountability (where appropriate) by making provision for mutual assessment of progress by partners? 5. Have adequate budgetary resources (e.g. 5-7%) been made available for the design and oversight of the M&E system? Is there adequate provision of timely and quality M&E expertise? 6. Is there a complete schedule of M&E activities that shows when all key M&E activities will be carried out and by whom? 7. Are M&E reports available upon request? 8. Do the reports show progress against planned M&E activities, e.g. summarising information collected, analysed and interpreted during the reporting period, and for all major survey and study-type activities? 9. Do the progress reports meet stakeholder needs, report against the logframe and any milestones and targets set, have a credible basis for claims, and recommend actions to improve performance? 10. Does the project M&E plan link to any communications plan? 	<p>There is a little degree of alignment between purpose and goal-level indicators in the project logframe and those at the overall programme objective level. Specifically, the project contributes to directly to “increased global income”. It also contributes to indicators within the programme’s second objective: an increase in yields, changes in income at household levels, and an “improved situation” of women. However, it may not necessary contribute to any of the seed-specific indicators in the programme logframe.</p> <p>As the partners review the current project logframe, it is advised that IWMI:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviews the logic of the first KPI at project purpose level. It currently assumes a ‘reduction of proportion of beneficiary households failing to meet food requirements from own production’ is a positive change. This is not necessarily so for with increased incomes and a move towards more livelihood strategies with a greater return on capital investment, households may choose to procure foodstuffs and move away from household self-sufficiency from production. • Examines the logframe to ensure there is sufficient separation of the different tiers of the logframe, particularly at output and activity level. Some outputs seem to be activities, i.e. “specific tasks performed using resources and methods in order to achieve the intended output” (SDC). By contrast, outputs are “products and services produced or competences and capacities established directly as a result of project activities” (SDC). • Looks to include time-bound milestones as ways to track the direction of travel and to hold various stakeholders to account. <p>It is advised that the project undertakes cost-benefit analysis of its various interventions during the course of implementation, not least given the pilot nature of this project. It is also advised that the project tracks utilisation of income stemming from project intervention and so as to test any assumptions about its use for seed and food security gains.</p> <p>The current logframe shows a good understanding of the need to disaggregate data. A baseline has not yet been conducted.</p>



6. Have governance-related opportunities been identified?								
7. Has HIV/AIDS been mainstreamed in accordance with SDC guidelines?								
8. Has there been consideration of HIV/AIDS-sensitive crops and seeds?								
Performance conclusion	Excellent	<input type="checkbox"/>	Very good	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Good	<input type="checkbox"/>	Weak	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. Headline achievements

Focal question: what headline results have been achieved to date?

Performance target

Outcome statement: Rural communities in dry areas from Masvingo Province are food, nutritional and income secure by 2010, ensuring equal benefit to men and women

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Comments					
Increased quantity of quality seed available for sale in target areas and lessons learned documented	Unknown	25% increased over 2010 baseline by project end						
Increased number of farmers buying or growing quality seed in target areas and lessons learned documented	Unknown	25% increase over 2010 baseline by project end						
Performance conclusion	Wholly achieved	<input type="checkbox"/>	Largely achieved	<input type="checkbox"/>	Partly achieved	<input type="checkbox"/>	Unachieved, unknown, too early	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Qualitative assessment of performance

Framing questions	Commentary
-------------------	------------



<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What headline results have been achieved to date? Are they in line with milestones? 2. What evidence is there that achieving the project outcome is contributing to the realisation of the goal? 3. Are the OVIs/targets for the Project goal appropriate and are they reported against 4. Are there any external factors that jeopardised the project's direct impact? 5. Insofar as is possible given the constraints of tis assignment, to what extent did the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic)? Have there been any unplanned positive impacts on the planned target groups or other non-targeted communities arising from the project? How has this affected the impact? 	<p>To early to expect headline results.</p>
---	---



GRM SAMP: Quality standards and progress assessment

1. Relevance of the project and quality of the design	
Focal issue: the appropriateness of the project's objectives to the real problems, needs and priorities of its target groups/beneficiaries and the quality of the design through which these objectives were to be reached	
Framing questions	Commentary
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is the project relevant to addressing the pre-existing problems? 2. Did the project proposal have a clear description of the problem and an appropriate strategy for addressing it? 3. Is the theory of change explicit? 4. Are the project objectives consistent with country / regional policies and the CAADP framework? 5. Are the project objectives consistent with SDC policies and guidelines? 6. Were the target groups clearly identified? Did the project respond to their needs? Was there a targeting strategy? 7. Were the stakeholders actively involved in the design process? Did they support the design (so far as I can be ascertained)? 8. Have coordination, management and financing arrangements clearly been identified and do they support institutional strengthening and local ownership? 	<p>The goal of SAMP is to improve seed security strategies and policies within Southern Africa. The expected outcome is 'improved availability and access to quality seed by target households in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho'. The project seeks to do so by stimulating or facilitating improved input and output markets by piloting a "suite of innovative approaches adopted to the local situations which can 'link' the different components of the seed economy (regulatory, research, production and markets) together at the local level" (Inception Report).</p> <p>The project is premised on several assumptions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Output markets for farm surplus are an essential stimuli for increased production and productivity • Output markets enable farmers to secure increased income, which in turn can be used to access inputs, including seed. • Insufficient attention is often placed on the role and drivers of output markets, and therefore of the role, motives and potential value addition of the private sector. • That, being 'pilots', there is something new and/or innovative about the initiatives trialled within SAMP. • That there is demand for the lessons emanating from the project and therefore there is scope for replication, adaptation and scaling-up at field level, and for modifications of relevant legal, regulatory and programming frameworks to better enable the same. <p>SAMP focuses on three pilot areas within three countries, namely Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho. Activities in Zimbabwe are concentrated on Zaka District, Mashvingo province, in large part to test the notion of 'continuum and contigium' developed by SDC and SDC/HA. SDC/HA supported seed inputs and conservation agriculture activities until 2010/11 and now seeking to stimulate a market economy as the agenda moves away from humanitarian support to more mainstream development approaches.</p> <p>A 'Knowledge into Use' workstream has been developed to "record and package" the results of the SAMP pilots and so as to "enable SDC to inform and ultimately 'influence' policy directions and strategic decisions of key stakeholders such as governments, donors, multilateral organisations, private sector companies and farmers" (Inception Report). As such, there is <i>potential</i> for SAMP to enable efficiency gains across SADC</p>



	<p>member states by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Linking practice at country-level, together with cross-country and regional institutional connections, to ensure synergies and economies of scale from lesson learning and knowledge sharing are achieved. • Improving and quickening the transfer of appropriate technologies between countries and therefore accelerating productivity gains. • Building regional-national linkages to promote efficient uptake of evidence and avoidance of flawed or inefficient approaches. <p>This workstream might also enable improved effectiveness at regional and national level by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitating technical cooperation and regional learning platforms with the objective of improving technical capacity, the provision of evidence and support to national decision-makers and therefore the appropriate policy processes and programmes for optimal impact. <p>Following scoping, consultations with communities, extension officers and the private sector, and an 'investors tour' to Zaka, SAMP has opted to pilot four initiatives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Community-based production of certified seed (Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho), the purpose of which is to two-fold: to increase seed availability within formal channels by facilitating output sales to agro-dealers (see below), and by increasing the amount of high quality (i.e. certified) seed available to farmers through informal channels, e.g. by way of seed fairs and/or general seed sales. It is expected that 400 farmers will produce certified seed. The initiative will with focus on maize and those legumes said to be in short supply, i.e. cowpea, sugar bean and groundnuts. High quality germplasm will be sourced from CGIAR centres (e.g. CYMMIT, CIAT), CIMMYT will provide seed business training (therefore linking SAMP to NSIMA), the Department of Seed Services will be engaged to provide quality assurance, certification and regulatory compliance, and links to HASSP are foreseen. 2. Contract farming of food, cash and seed crops for contracted companies (Zimbabwe only), the purpose of which is utilise commercial contracting arrangements and increased availability of quality seed to smallholders to increase farmers' income levels. The project has six collaborating partners, including FANRPAN HASSP (see related Annex for observations). Of note, 4,500 farmers are producing cowpeas for export, whilst a further 300 farmers have been contracted by Capsicum to produce beans over 75ha and paprika and sesame over 75ha. Non-food crops are also foreseen, e.g. cotton. 3. Development of agro-dealer networks (Zimbabwe only), the purpose of which is two-fold: to better enable the timely provision of improved seed (and other inputs) to smallholders, and to provide an output market by 'capaciting' agro-dealers to purchase commodities, 'bulking-up' the same and onward selling to commodity marketing companies. Efforts to support the latter are rare, and therefore there are claims to a genuine pilot here. It appears that SAMP will focus on wholesalers and large commodity buyers as it seeks to 'kick-start' output markets. However, in some respects the specifics of SAMP support are unclear, in part because a USAID-financed partner programme implemented by CNFA has been identified to provide training, at no cost to SAMP. CNFA will utilise pre-existing curricula. Thirty agro-dealers are targeted within Zaka district; the dangers of monopoly creation are unknown to the reviewer. The Inception Report makes reference to possible measures to support a credit guarantees
--	---



	<p>(credit schemes) and insurance costs (consignment schemes) and, again, CNFA is planning these interventions.</p> <p>4. Facilitate the organisation and management of local seed fairs (Zimbabwe only), with a view to improving availability of locally produced seed by way of trade or exchange. The notion of choice is central.</p> <p>The project focus is aligned with the working objectives of the Regional Agricultural Policy outlined by SADC in December 2010, i.e.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective 1: “to promote and support production, productivity and competitiveness of the agricultural sector” (within which the stated highest priority issue is crop production); • Objective 3. “to promote and support growth in incomes for agricultural communities in particular small-scale farmers, fishers and foresters”; • Objective 4: “to promote the development of trade and markets”, and, to a lesser extent; • Objective 6: “to promote sustainable utilisation and management of natural resources and the environment”. <p>Specifically, it is also aligned with policy directions within the emerging RAP that put focus on measures to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase the availability, access and affordability of seeds and genetic material of improved characteristics (see contract farming and community-based seed production in relation to availability) • Facilitate adequate, reliable access to inputs at affordable prices (see agro-dealer support) • Address the “loss of indigenous seed and genetic materials that are generally more resilient to environmental and climate shocks such as droughts” (see promotion of conservation agriculture) • Promote contracting farming, out-grower schemes and value-chain promotion • Provide incentives for high value landraces and private sector investment and smallholder involvement in seed multiplication schemes, improved and decentralised distribution systems (see SADC 2010). <p>By extension, the project is aligned with SADC’s RISDP, which seeks to ensure food availability (Intervention 1), and Pillars I and II of CAADP, i.e. extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems, and increasing food supply, reducing hunger and improving responses to food emerging crises (respectively).</p> <p>Whilst the primary focus of SAMP is arguably increased availability of quality, suitable and appropriate seed (attested by the Implementing Partner’s Self Reflection exercise, see Annex xx), there may, in actuality, be a blend of high-level motives, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased seed availability (e.g. community-based seed production/multiplication, seed fairs). • Increased income through which people can make procurement choices, which <i>may</i> include certified seed from formal channels (e.g. contract farming). • Increased food security where food crops are grown for domestic consumption (e.g. as an element of cash crop production farming systems).
--	---







	<p>As such, it is important that the project articulates and is confident about any underpinning assumptions to its interventions. For example, it is currently assumed that with greater seed availability, competition will reduce seed price and therefore enable better access (but it is unclear whether this be monitored against a baseline). It is similarly assumed that people will use a certain, unspecified percentage of their increased income to purchase improved seed. However, it is entirely possible that income derived from output sales may be used for a variety of things, some of which could be food security oriented but none seed security related. Significantly, seed may not constitute the output of CBSP schemes but may instead be food and cash crop commodities. There is nothing inherently wrong with this and it is in line with the project's (correct) view that farmers should not necessarily produce sufficient quantities of their own seed nor even their own food to meet their domestic requirements, however it does suggest a possible disconnection between intervention selection and expected project outcome.</p> <p>Other areas for project consideration include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilots assume that there is innovation, a demand for lessons and scope for replication and/or scale-up. Projects and donors must always guard against calling something a pilot when, in actuality, what is being funded is small-scale because there is insufficient finance to do it on a larger scale. The project may wish to consider how it can better articulate the nature of what is being trialled besides (the legitimate) desire to focus on output markets and upstream-downstream linkages (e.g. linking germplasm to production to markets). • The status of the national CAADP and other policy and government programming frameworks in the three focal countries is insufficiently understood by the project. These, and the means to influence the SADC RAP (through SDC?), should be carefully considered, not least given the project purpose and impact statements, and should policy recommendations stem from project implementation. • Given the aforementioned rationale for a pilot, it can be safely assumed that SAMP should also seek to be a recipient of lessons stemming from other pilots. Whilst similar initiatives are known in the three focal countries, there is value in SDC facilitating improved information flows from its global action and research programmes to its regional portfolio in southern Africa. SDC support to the Neuchâtel Initiative could be a case in point given SAMP's close involvement with extension services. <p>Notwithstanding the above, the project is demonstrating a number of positive traits, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The project is targeting are those households who have a market orientation ("C", in Zimbabwe's national classification), albeit some may have some asset constraints (B2), and as such is fully aligned with SDC's expectations of the Food Security Programme and its desire not to directly target the poorest of the poor (A) and the labour stressed (B1). • SAMP has seemingly excellent local networks in all three focal countries, which in part has facilitated private sector interest. It should also enable regular engagement with government structures (particularly in Zimbabwe?) and with relevant non-state structures, such as the Market Linkage Working Group in Zimbabwe.
--	---



			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project recognises that the private sector must be incentivised to participate in certain activities, particularly in marginal areas such as Zaka. The cost-sharing approach, which enables risk-sharing, will likely remove a major impediment to private sector engagement in a communal area with low and variable rainfall. There is a strong commitment to identify and utilise partnerships, not least with CGIAR centres, the government extensions service and other donor-financed programmes. This should enable exploitation of comparative advantages, facilitate increased local ownership, and enable increased return from SDC investment (so long as partnerships are seen as a means to an end and that SAMP maintains a strong quality assurance role). The adoption of a KIU strategy that moves focus away from 'knowledge management' as an end in itself, and teases out the potentials for informing vs influencing specific actors. 					
Performance conclusion	Highly relevant	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Largely relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Partly relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	Not relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. The M&E framework								
Focal issue: the quality and appropriateness of the M&E framework								
Framing questions			Commentary					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Was the baseline data collected as part of the project design? Was the baseline relevant? Does the project logframe have clear outcome and output statements with SMART targets and measurable indicators? Does it represent a clear results chain? Are the indicators appropriate? Does the design articulate the importance of mutual accountability (where appropriate) by making provision for mutual assessment of progress by partners? Have adequate budgetary resources (e.g. 5-7%) been made available for the design and oversight of the M&E system? Is there adequate provision of timely and quality M&E expertise? Is there a complete schedule of M&E activities that shows when all key M&E activities will be carried out and by whom? Are M&E reports available upon request? 			<p>SAMP's M&E systems contains several components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A project logframe, which is expected to be subject to further review in the coming quarter and now that activities in Swaziland and Lesotho have been firmed up. Intervention-level results chains that enable tracking of expected and actual implementation, including mutual obligations. Training on M&E systems and processes. Guidelines for the same. M&E reporting. <p>SAMP has committed to utilising the DCED standards on measuring results within a market-based programming environment and, as such, the project has aligned itself with SDC's broader interest in and support to the DCED framework. Whilst this may have merit, the project needs to be cognisant of any resultant tensions between the programme's objectives (seed and food security) and with those stemming from a DCED approach; for example, the draft M&E Manual puts primacy on increased competitiveness and poverty reduction. Similarly, the DCED framework for SAMP seemingly requires significant deployment of resources for monitoring purposes, and it is advised that the team tracks the benefits of doing so, and vis-à-vis other demands on their time.</p> <p>A draft M&E manual was prepared in May 2011 and is regarded as a living tool. Workplans were produced in July 2011. SAMP is considering the re-deployment or refocusing of one long-term project staff member onto</p>					



<div>8. Do the reports show progress against planned M&E activities, e.g. summarising information collected, analysed and interpreted during the reporting period, and for all major survey and study-type activities?</div> <div>9. Do the progress reports meet stakeholder needs, report against the logframe and any milestones and targets set, have a credible basis for claims, and recommend actions to improve performance?</div> <div>10. Does the project M&E plan link to any communications plan?</div> <div>11. Is the logframe and baseline aligned with the programme-level logframe/results framework?</div> <div>12. Is there evidence that reports are timely and reliable?</div>			<div>M&E, with oversight and support from an international STTA with DCED credentials. Each long-term project staff member has been assigned responsibility to oversee one or two results chains, and therefore the planning of related activities and monitoring the same.</div> <div>The contract for delivering a baseline study for Zimbabwe has been tendered and a preferred bidder selected. The baseline should start in September 2011, and the contracts for those in Swaziland and Lesotho may be fused with the Zimbabwe contract. The project baseline will be completed just over a year after project commencement, which is later than good practice suggests (i.e. by month six) but may be acceptable given the merits of timing baseline production in relation to agricultural cycles.</div> <div>There is a sound degree of alignment of programmatic thrust and indicator phraseology between the SAMP logframe and the SDC's programme logframe, i.e. that contained within its FSS of 25 June 2009. For example, SAMP contributes to directly to:</div> <div><ul style="list-style-type: none">No. of quality seed varieties available to people (KPI within Strategic Objective 2)No. of seeds developed, tested and certified, No. of new quality seeds developed and adopted, and Improved know-how of local seeds producers" (KPIs within Strategic Objective 3).</div> <div>SAMP will contribute to overall programme targets of, for example, increased adoption rates of new seeds, increased income levels and increased food production. However, for SDC and SAMP stakeholders to be able to track the project's contribution it is necessary for certain SAMP indicators to mimic those at programme level (with the latter reviewed for ambiguity, and any blurring between indicator and target).</div> <div>As the partners review the current project logframe, it is advised that SAMP:</div> <div><ul style="list-style-type: none">Includes sex-disaggregated indicators, e.g. in relation to measures to increase the accessibility of seeds, changes in income levels).Ensures data and information stemming from intervention-level results chain monitoring feeds up into project-level indicator monitoring at output and outcome level.</div> <div>It is advised that the project undertakes cost-benefit analysis of its various interventions during the course of implementation, not least given the pilot nature of this project. It is also advised that the project tracks utilisation of income stemming from project intervention and so as to test any assumptions about its use for seed and food security gains.</div>					
Performance conclusion	Excellent		Very good		Good		Weak or to early to assess	



3. Cross-cutting issues

Key question: have cross-cutting issues and interests been adequately considered in the project design and implementation?

Sub-areas			Commentary					
<div>1. If so, how and to what effect? If not, why not? If n/a, explain. Please consider the following aspects of gender mainstreaming:<div><div>a. Has the project been planned on the basis of gender analysis?</div><div>b. To what extent does any a focus on female headed households led to an improved impact of the project?</div><div>c. What is the likeliness of increased female participation beyond project end?</div></div></div> <div>2. Were environmental constraints and opportunities considered adequately in the project design?</div> <div>3. Are good good environmental practices followed in project implementation (in relation to use of water and energy and materials, production of wastes, etc)? Did the project respect traditional, successful environmental practices?</div> <div>4. Has environmental damage been caused or likely to be caused by the project? What kind of environmental impact mitigation measures were taken?</div> <div>5. Has governance been mainstream in accordance with SDC guidelines?</div> <div>6. Have governance-related opportunities been identified?</div> <div>7. Has HIV/AIDS been mainstreamed in accordance with SDC guidelines?</div> <div>8. Has there been consideration of HIV/AIDS-sensitive crops and seeds?</div>			<div>In focusing on a basket of crops, legumes and drought-tolerant maize varieties stemming from NSIMA, and the promotion of conservation agriculture, SAMP represents a good response to calls for more resilient agriculture and climate change adaptation.</div> <div>Being a field-level project there is minimal mainstreaming of governance per se but the KIU workstream offers opportunity to inform and influence policy, programming and practice. Similarly, the engagement of public extension services alongside the private sector offers opportunity to respect and reinforce mandates, whilst providing opportunity for capacity building and skills development. Furthermore, in working with community seed production considerable attention will be placed on good governance issues, group dynamics etc. at a micro-level.</div> <div>The framing of the targeted beneficiaries (see above) is useful and offers more specificity than that provided by SDC in its Regional Food Security Strategy. However, for monitoring and reporting purposes there is need for greater definition and inclusion within the project's M&E Manual and systems, coupled with due disaggregation of data by sex (and as such a score of Very Good rather than Excellent). Whilst there was minimal explicit gender planning, the choice of crops, the promotion of CA, and the partial focus on legumes does offer benefit to women farmers, nutritional intake and labour-constrained HIV-affected households.</div>					
Performance conclusion	Excellent	<div></div>	Very good	<div></div>	Good	<div></div>	Weak	<div></div>

4. Headline achievements								
Focal question: what headline results have been achieved to date?								
Performance target								
Outcome statement: Improved availability and access to quality seed by target households in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho								
Indicator	Baseline	Target	Comments					
Increased quantity of quality seed available for sale in target areas and lessons learned documented	Unknown	25% increased over 2010 baseline by project end						
Increased number of farmers buying or growing quality seed in target areas and lessons learned documented	Unknown	25% increase over 2010 baseline by project end						
Performance conclusion	Wholly achieved	<input type="checkbox"/>	Largely achieved	<input type="checkbox"/>	Partly achieved	<input type="checkbox"/>	Unachieved, unknown, too early	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Qualitative assessment of performance								
Framing questions			Commentary					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> What headline results have been achieved to date? Are they in line with milestones? What evidence is there that achieving the project outcome is contributing to the realisation of the goal? Are the OVIs/targets for the Project goal appropriate and are they reported against Are there any external factors that jeopardised the project's direct impact? Insofar as is possible given the constraints of this assignment, to what extent did the project have any indirect positive and/or negative impacts? (i.e. environmental, social, cultural, 			<p>To early to expect headline results. However, at activity and process level there are interesting interim results. For example, SAMP has facilitated introductions and relationship-building between SAT (a previous SDC/HA IP), a beneficiary farmer group and InterGrain for 4,500 farmers to grow cowpea as a commodity for export. Contract farming is anticipated in year two, with the company looking to invest because of the cost and therefore risk-sharing proposition of SAMP, enabling all parties to respond to an Asian market demand. An unknown number of the farmers will be women. FAO, with EU financing, will provide some input support, e.g. fertiliser.</p> <p>Achievements to date have largely been activity based. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inception report completed in February 2011 and accepted by SDC 					



gender and economic)? Have there been any unplanned positive impacts on the planned target groups or other non-targeted communities arising from the project? How has this affected the impact?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SAMP introduced to, and relevant protocols completed with, governments in all countries• Contracts and MoUs signed with private sector Implementing Partners and CGIAR Centers (CYMMIT and CIAT)• M&E framework designed and installed• Knowledge into Use strategy developed.
---	---

Annex I: Current and Upcoming Donor Programmes (DFID, USAID, AusAID)

Box 1: Future DFID programmes in Southern Africa

Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Food Markets Programme (2012-): The programme will seek to contribute will be “more stable prices for staple foods” (goal) by “improved functioning of regional staple food markets” (attributable outcome). In turn, this is expected to increase resilience for poor consumers who spend a large proportion of their income on staple foods. By extension, it will also benefit producers (e.g. farmers and food processors) through increased and more stable incomes from agricultural production. Specific interventions will aim to improve agricultural markets and cross border trade in staple foods (e.g. maize) in East and Southern Africa, focusing initially on countries where DFID has offices (e.g. South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and Kenya). As such, there is a close correlation with the North-South Corridor and related infrastructure and one-border post initiatives. Whilst there is no reference to certain crops being prioritised, specific reference is made to cereals and specifically maize.

The programme will be designed in 4Q 2011. Options include:

- Support to regional agricultural policy and planning processes, e.g. through RECs and ACTESA
- Support to technology and service innovations, e.g. post-harvest storage technologies, warehouse schemes, regional market information services, regional insurance services (i.e. there is read-across to future SDC investments. It should also be noted that DFID is currently implementing a pilot weather-indexed insurance scheme in Africa, which is in its inception phase);
- Support to the alleviation of market failures in relevant market systems or value chains related to regional staple food markets – indicatively support to measures that take a “holistic” approach to alleviating failures in regional food market systems or value chains.

The scoping to date is based on evidence that regional trade with an open borders policy facilitates grain price stabilization. The programme assumes that national governments will implement policies which lead to greater private investment in storage, processing and cross-border trading of staple foods. Whilst no mention is made of seeds in the current design documentation, reference is made to the need for promotion of grain storage by the private sector to reduce seasonal variability in grain prices and the need for supportive action by national governments. Indeed, the second of the three cited options (see above) adopts a “supply” side focus to increase stability in regional food prices and promote regional food trade by encouraging private investment in food storage and marketing. The theory of change behind this option sees the need for public-private sector partnerships to develop innovative technologies, ameliorate potential risks and leverage private investment in inputs and services to help regional food staple markets work more efficiently.

DFID has tentative interest in the establishment of a challenge fund to stimulate a competitive market place for private sector innovation in technology and services, especially at the regional level, which will facilitate storage, processing and trading in food staples (see related recommendation in this MTR report).

Seed is not specifically mentioned in the DFID design documentation but tentative initiatives focus on improving the enabling environment, e.g. through strategic support to RECs and by improving agricultural commodity (i.e. output) markets. Moreover, DFID-supported TradeMark Southern Africa and TradeMark East Africa, both trade facilitation programmes, should, in principle, help with enabling trade in drought resistant seeds. Moreover, the DFID recognises that the affordability of food through interventions in agricultural commodity markets alone will not be sufficient to improve food and nutritional security in the longer term. Therefore, a twin programme will seek to increase production in a sustainable manner.

Box 2: Future DFID programmes in Southern Africa

Climate Resilient Agriculture in Southern and Eastern Africa (2012-16): The programme will seek to contribute will be “improve food and agricultural security of poor in East and Southern Africa” (goal), by “improving climate resilient policies and practices for food and agricultural security for East and Southern Africa” (attributable outcome). DFID recognises that the affordability of food through interventions in agricultural commodity markets alone will not be sufficient to improve food and nutritional security in the longer term. Therefore, a twin programme will seek to increase production in a sustainable manner.

The programme will be designed in 4Q 2011 or early 2012. Options include:

- Scaling-up conservation agriculture practices as one means of promoting climate-resilient agriculture, which may be with or without a complementary evidence-based policy component
- Infusing support to regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis of broader climate resilience in addition to the above, as it relates to food security and presumably as a follow-on to earlier DFID support.

The programme is expected to see farmers adopt improved, locally relevant climate resilient agriculture practices in order to increase their climate resilience. Focal countries will likely include Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and may extend to one or more countries in East and Southern Africa.

Box 3: Upcoming AusAID programming

SMART-FS (2011/12-): The Strengthening Markets and Regional Trade for Food Security (SMART-FS) is an Australian AID funded Programme under design through a starter up fund and implemented by the Alliance for Commodity Trade in Eastern and Southern Africa (ACTESA), a specialized agency of COMESA. The AUD 20m, four-year programme will support ACTESA's core objectives for trade and food security: improved policy environment, strengthened regional markets for staple foods, and, increased capacity. It will contain two funding mechanisms:

A Policy and Advocacy Facility, that will seek to support stakeholder-led initiatives, coalitions, campaigns and platforms for policy advocacy and change. It will also provide stakeholders with access to ACTESA's high level platforms. The Facility will operate a proposal based system open to all stakeholders.

A Regional Trade and Markets Facility, that will support private sector-led initiatives for the expansion of regional trade and increasing smallholder access to markets. It will provide matching grants for innovative projects and provide loan guarantees for other projects. Emphasis on inclusive business models, with possibility of co-financing existing facilities.

Emergence of SMART-FS is dependent on ACTESA's strategic plan being finalised.

Box 4: USAID Feed for the Future Strategy for Southern Africa (2011-15)

The draft strategy for April 2011 notes two key opportunities to achieve economic growth and food security:

- Increased trade and better policies, including: “successful implementation by SADC of its trade protocols”, “policies and practices which streamline and standardize regulations governing cross-border trade”, “uninform application of standards” and the removal of NTBs and therefore improved trade integration, reduced transport costs, and economic growth. Specific mention is made of key transport corridors and a desire to see the “unhindered flow of food staples from surplus to food deficit areas within the region” (which echoes DFIDSA perspectives). The regional consequences of NTBs on countries producing maize surplus, such as South Africa and Zambia in 2010/11, are noted.
- Raising agricultural productivity, with priority given to raising the yields of cereals crops and “accelerating the more widespread adoption of new farming technologies that use improved seeds and fertilizer, as well as the latest conservation farming techniques.... Achieving higher yields will also require increasing the amount of land under irrigation; providing the private sector financing needed to stimulate an increase of food supplies and agricultural inputs; increasing market access for smallholders; and, improving the effectiveness of agricultural research networks in the region”. Measures to promote conservation agriculture, post-harvest storage technologies, warehouse receipting, and regional market information network are mentioned (note the similarities to DFID programming).

Comparatively little focus on demand-side governance reform or accountability mechanisms, which is broad tendency across the regional programmes of the ‘large’ donors.

The Southern Africa Trade Hub (SATH) project (-2014), which works with the SADC Secretariat to promote the FTA, is charged with taking the lead role in implementing activities designed to achieve increased trade in the region. It will facilitate regional strengthening of one or more of five value chains of staple foods in Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia, which will include focus on agricultural inputs. (Malawi has selected legumes and dairy products; Zambia has selected legumes, oilseeds, maize research and horticulture). SATH will also work to increase the “availability of regional private sector financing of, and investment in, activities that give priority to supporting agribusinesses along key transport corridors” (see recommendation concerning the focal countries in this mid-term review). As a preparatory step, SATH is expected to develop an inventory of agriculture and agribusiness financing mechanism available in the region.

Note that USAID’s regional office in Pretoria covers SADC and therefore the RAP, whilst its Nairobi hub covers COMESA. With a number of SADC Member States (e.g. Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe), enjoying COMESA membership too, programming environment and the mechanics of donor coordination become more difficult.

Box 5: Africa's future and the World Bank's support to it

The World Bank's plan for 2011-2021 opts against sectoral strategies in favour of support to three themes:

- Competitiveness and employment, e.g. diversification of economies, infrastructure works, skills development, coupled with regional solutions (e.g. growth corridors).
- Vulnerability and resilience (e.g. in response to shocks and climate change), e.g. "*developing better seeds*", building household assets, safety net measures, irrigation and water management, storage, insurance.
- Governance and public sector capacity, e.g. improving quality of service delivery, accountability (citizen report cards, public expenditure tracking surveys, and NGO monitoring of projects).

Agriculture is viewed as key to generating jobs, enhancing value adding and expanding agribusiness. The strategy envisages building on successful insurance-like mechanisms including weather insurance which the Bank has already piloted in countries like Malawi (note SDC's interest in the same in Malawi and Zambia). The plan promotes trade and competition but acknowledges that small markets, constrained by national borders, constrain. Similarly, it notes that small and medium enterprises often have problems accessing finance; "all firms have problems getting long-term finance to fund productive investments" (see read-across to recommendations in this report concerning a Seeds Window to a Challenge Fund). It calls for a move "beyond political protocols to execution", and the need to "build the capacity of different actors so they can more effectively hold decision-makers accountable". It also states a comment to "try to scale up the experience with, for example, results-based financing in Rwanda, output-based assistance in Mauritius" (see links to the recommendation in this report concerning aid for results).

Note the strong similarities between upcoming DFID programming and the messages in the World Bank plan.

Annex J: Regional, multi-country and singular-country programming

The role of a regional programme

Regional engagement does not substitute national programming; rather it reinforces delivery of and seeks to add value to national and sub-national programming by supporting regional-level institutions, processes and mechanisms which can improve development strategies, enhance development processes and facilitating development results in several ways:

- Supporting processes and actions that can only be pursued, or which are best pursued, at a regional level, such as:
 - The harmonisation of standards and policies that will lead to the development of regional markets, and therefore create economies of scale, support trade, lower costs and permit greater risk-taking by the private sector.
 - The effective provision of appropriate and sustainable regional public goods, such as physical infrastructure and sub-regional market information systems which support market-sheds that transcend national borders.
 - Supporting collective action across international boundaries which can secure new partnerships, new financing and therefore new regional solutions to regional challenges, such as climate change.
- Enabling efficiency gains at a regional level by:
 - Improving coordination and collective action across RECs.
 - Supporting the appropriate allocation of lead tasks and responsibilities, reducing unhealthy competition for donors funds, and supporting the design of common or joint programmes.
 - Supporting capacity and improved performance.
- Enabling efficiency gains across SADC member states by:
 - Supporting regional mechanisms which access finance and mobilise resources (e.g. climate change funds) for regional or multi-country programmes, thereby maximising economies of scale and reducing transaction costs associated with the deployment of funds in the region.
 - Supporting the facilitatory or conduit function of regional institutions (e.g. running policy networks, publishing regional statistics), and building regional-national linkages to promote efficient uptake of evidence and avoidance of flawed or inefficient approaches.
- Enabling improved effectiveness at regional and national level by:
 - Facilitating technical cooperation and regional learning platforms with the objective of improving technical capacity, the provision of evidence and support to national decision-makers and therefore the appropriate policy processes and programmes for optimal impact.
- Supporting the catalytic capabilities of regional institutions and approaches which, inter alia, enable benchmarking, the strengthening of regional leadership, the exertion of peer pressure on key

stakeholders to raise standards and to 'think regionally', and encourage the spread and adaptation of best practice Solutions.

The regional approach is predicated on the principle of subsidiarity. The utilisation of synergies and complementarities with relevant national frameworks is critical.

The role of singular or multi-country projects within a regional programme

Multi-country projects should be funded only where there is evidence that efficiency and effectiveness gains can be secured by:

- Improving the translation of REC goals, treaties and protocols into national plans, budgets and action.
- Linking practice at country-level, together with cross-country and regional 'institutional connections, to ensure synergies and economies of scale from lesson learning and knowledge sharing are achieved.
- Improving and quickening the transfer of appropriate technologies between countries and therefore accelerating productivity and post-harvest gains.


In the second and third scenarios, initiatives must have clear, budgeted mechanisms to enable linkages and transfers to occur.

In the case of singular country projects, financing should be predicated on the intervention being a pilot, i.e. where an innovative initiative is essential for testing or validation, and where it offers very significant learning opportunities, e.g. on a technical matter or a concept, on a modality (e.g. aid for results) or a combination of the two (e.g. SDC and SDC/HA collaborating on market-based approaches within a continuum and contiguum framework). Critically, therefore, pilots assume that there is innovation, a demand for lessons and scope for replication and/or scale-up. Vertical and horizontal lesson-capture and –sharing is critical. Projects and donors must always guard against calling something a pilot when, in actuality, what is being funded is small-scale because there is insufficient finance to do it on a larger scale.



Annex K: Proposed formal-informal seed sector linkages in East Timor (AusAID Seeds of Life)

Seeds of Life Phase III: Draft Program Design Document





Annex L: Indicative matrix to plot seed interventions

		Macro activities	Meso activities	Micro activities
		The policy, legal and regulatory framework, and which therefore includes regional and national-level considerations. It includes laws, standards and regulations.	Constitutes the infrastructure, and financial and non-financial support services provided by a variety of state and non-state actors. Such services may be utilized by a variety of actors within the seeds chain (e.g. smallholders, retailers and even government) to help them operate efficiently and to respond to emerging opportunities and constraints.	Synonymous with a household's ownership and control of, and access to, capital assets.
Availability	Sufficient quantity of seed within reasonable proximity to people (spatial availability) and on offer in time for critical sowing periods (temporal availability)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy facilitating movement of seed across borders. • Policy supporting development of diverse private seed producers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures to overcome barriers to foundation seed, and maintenance of breeder seed • Agro-enterprise support to small (informal) seed producers. • Provision of seed, including new varieties, to informal traders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to seed storage at household level • Support to ensure that access interventions (below) link to providers with a diversity of seed types on offer
	People produced own seed or have adequate resources to otherwise obtain seeds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy and protocol efforts to increase farmers' access to seeds. • Policy work to develop marketing infrastructure and better output markets and market information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash or vouchers to vulnerable groups • Provision of information to informal traders, outlets, farmers • Social protection and poverty reduction measures • Efforts to promote information about variety performance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support small packet sales from agro-dealers • Promote commercial activities, and value-addition to generate local capital • Work with CSO and NGO partners to increase scope of decentralised supply



Quality	Seed is of acceptable seed quality (seed health, physiological quality); it is of acceptable variety quality (is adapted and aligned with farmers' preferences); and it produces food of comparatively higher quality per se (e.g. better inherent nutrition; or high income value)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Share experience on QDS and other standards that assure minimum standards while maintaining access. • Modify regulations for variety release to support more locally-adapted varieties. • Policy mandating more farmer & user input to variety release 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participatory variety selection. • Participatory breeding in target environments. • Develop mechanisms to share information about seed health quality from informal vendors and seed enterprises. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality controls to seed fairs • Support to seed storage at household level. • Ensure that farmers get sufficient time and information in order to make informed selections
Resilience	People have the skills to maintain a balanced portfolio of appropriate seed, and the necessary knowledge about the best varieties for them given, inter alia, agro-ecological conditions, capital assets and marketing outlets.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy that recognises and promotes multiple seed supply channels – formal & informal • Policy promoting micro-nutrient rich varieties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop index-linked insurance, and links to Input Trade Fairs • Research on adaptation of crop varieties to chronic stress 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide options allowing farmers to strategise, and timely inputs

NB: Content is not necessarily proposed for this programme but rather should be seen as an analytical and explanatory aide. Moreover, the utility of this framework, and content of the same, is still under development and critique.

Documents cited

- Chilonda, P., Machethe, C., Minde, I. 2007. 'Poverty, food security and agricultural trends in Southern Africa', ReSAKSS-SA Working Paper No. 1, May 2007. ICRISAT/IFPRI/IWMI.
- Chilonda, P., Olubode-Awosola, O.O., Minde, I. 2008. 'Recent trends and future prospects for agricultural growth, poverty reduction and investment in Southern Africa', ReSAKSS-SA Annual Trends Report 2008. ICRISAT/IFPRI/IWMI.
- CIAT, CRS, USAID. 2008. 'When Disaster Strikes: A Guide to Assessing Seed Systems Security. CIAT.
- CIAT, CRS, World Vision, Care, AGRITEX, CIMMYT. 2009. 'Seed system security assessment, Zimbabwe: A study funded by the USAID, Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. CIAT.
- Dabrowski, J.M., Masekoameng, E., Ashton, P.J. 2009. 'Analysis of virtual water flows associated with the trade of maize in the SADC region: importance of scale', Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 13, 1967-77.
- Davis, D. 2010. 'Post harvest policy environment and donor activities in Southern Africa: Mitigating post harvest storage losses. A desk study'. Report for SDC, Pretoria.
- DFID. 2009. Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future. DFID.
- Diao, X., Hazell, P., Resnick, D., Thurlow, J. 2007. The role of agriculture in development. IFPRI Research Report, 153.
- Diao, X., Fan, S., Headey, D., Johnson, M., Nin-Pratt, A., Yu, B. 2008. 'Accelerating Africa's Food Production in Response to Rising Food Prices: Impacts and Requisite Actions', IFPRI Discussion Paper 00825.
- Dorosh, P.A., Dradri, S., Haggblade, S. 2009. 'Regional trade, government policy and food security: recent evidence from Zambia', Food Policy: 34, 350-366.
- ECA. 2007. Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalising Regional Economic Communities. Economic Commission for Africa.
- Fan, S. 2010. Halving Hunger: Meeting the First Millennium Development Goal through Business Unusual. IFPRI. Washington.
- Haggblade, S. 2009. 'Regional trade in food staples: stimulating agricultural growth and improving food security in Eastern and Southern Africa'. Presented to USAID Washington, January 13 2009.
- Haggblade, S., Yane, T., Tschirley, D., Longabaugh, S. 2008. 'Potential for intra-regional maize trade in Southern Africa: an analysis for Zambia at the sub-national level', ReSAKSS Working Paper No. 14. ICRISAT/IFPRI/IWMI.
- McGuire, S., Sperling, L. 2011. 'The links between food security and seed security: facts and fiction that guide response', Development in practice, 21: 4-5, 493-508.
- Mendelsohn, R., A. Dinar and A. Dalfelt (2000) Climate change impacts on African agriculture. Preliminary analysis prepared for the World Bank, Washington, District of Columbia, 25 pp
- Misselhorn, A.A. 2005. 'What drives food insecurity in Southern Africa? A meta-analysis of household economy studies', Global Environmental Change: 15, 33-43.
- Misselhorn, A.A. 2009. 'Food insecurity in Southern Africa: integrating some of the evidence', A presentation prepared for the Workshop on Dealing with Drivers of Rapid Change in Africa:

- Integration of Lessons from Long-term Research on INRM, ILRI, Nairobi, June 12-13, 2008. Nairobi (Kenya): ILRI.
- Miti, F. A Report on the Current Status on the Seed Industry in Zambia. Report for the African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA).
- Mloza-Banda, H.R., Kaudzu, G., Benesi, I. 2010. 'Evaluation of the Malawi Seed Sector for the Common market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Harmonised Seed Regulations and Policies. Final Report'. Report for the African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA).
- MSU. 2008. 'Identification of Key Analytical Agenda Related to CAADP Pillars 2 and 3: Prepared by Food Security Group, Michigan State University, August 2008.
- Mujaju, C. 2010. 'Zimbabwe Seed Sector: A Baseline Study/Survey'. Report for the African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA).
- Nin-Pratt, A., Diao, X., Bahta, Y. 2008. 'Assessing potential welfare impacts on agriculture of a regional free trade agreement in Southern Africa', ReSAKSS Working Paper No. 15. ICRISAT/IFPRI/IWMI.
- OneWorld. 2010. 'Integrated Climate Change and Food Security Analysis for Southern Africa', Regional Climate Change Programme. Report for DFID-SA.
- Pope, A. 2010. 'ACTESA: Inception Report – Strategic Planning Process'.
- SADC. 2009. Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis Strategic Plan and Funding Document October 2010-September 2015. SADC FANR.
- SADC. 2009. SADC Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP). 1st Draft Synthesis Report on Emerging Issues. Gaborone. Botswana. SADR FANR.
- SADC. 2009. Annual Report. April 2008-March 2009. SADC FANR.
- SADC. 2010. Regional Agricultural Policy. Synthesis Report of Key Agricultural Policy Issues and Policy Directions. SADC.
- SADC 2011. 2011 SADC Summit. SADC.
- Sperling, L., McGuire, S. 2010a. 'Understanding and strengthening informal seed markets', *Experimental Agriculture*. 46(2): 119-136.
- Sperling, L., McGuire, S. 2010b. 'Persistent myths about Seed Aid', *Food Policy*, 35: 195-201.
- Stige, L.C., J. Stave, K.S. Chan, L. Ciannelli, N. Pretorelli, M. Glantz, H.R. Herren and N.C. Stenseth (2006) The effect of climate variation on agro-pastoral production in Africa. *P. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA*, 103, 3049-3053.
- Tschirley, D.L., Jayne, T.S. 'Exploring the logic behind Southern Africa's food crisis', *World Development*: 38: 1, 76-87.
- USAID. 2011. Feed the Future, Southern Africa: Multi-Year Strategy, 2011-15. (April 7, 2011 version). USAID. Pretoria.
- World Bank. 2008. World Development Report: Agriculture for Development. World Bank.
- World Bank. 2011. Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to it. World Bank.
- Zunckel, H.E. 2009. 'Agriculture: future scenarios for Southern Africa – ensuring food security through trade policy', Trade Knowledge Network. IISD.