

Mapping of Current Studies on a Euro-Atlantic Security Community

List of abbreviations

BMD	ballistic missile defence
CBMs	confidence-building measures
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSBMs	confidence- and security-building measures
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
EASI	Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative
EST	European Security Treaty
EU	European Union
EWI	EastWest Institute
G8	Group of Eight
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
HDC	Human Dimension Committees (OSCE)
HDIM	Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (OSCE)
IDEAS	Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative
OCSE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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1. Executive summary

In 2014, Switzerland will take up the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Chairmanship. Here, the Helsinki + 40 process is of the essence. As a process that examines how the OSCE can achieve the Helsinki Final Act goals in the current era, Helsinki + 40 is part of broader effort to enhance mutual security in the wider European or Euro-Atlantic area. Recent years have seen a number of initiatives launched that aim to identify major security concerns and contribute to improving the efficacy of the security institutions in addressing them. As a result of these initiatives, a number of reports have been published.

While the probability of a major conventional war in Europe is no longer seen as a threat, the reports view conventional arms and protracted conflicts as primary security issues. Transnational security threats and economic security challenges are considered secondary concerns. The focus of the reports is, therefore, on the security of states and the global commons. States and their regional institutions, notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the OSCE in that order of importance, are viewed as the most significant security providers. Russia is overwhelmingly seen as part of the solution to addressing the most urgent military security concerns. As such, addressing Russian threat perceptions is seen as critical.

The OSCE takes on particular importance in the majority of reports that seek to repair or partly restructure the existing security governance system, rather than overhaul it. Proposed initiatives to improve the OSCE's performance that also provide input for the Helsinki + 40 process relate largely to conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the resolution of protracted conflicts, overcoming historical enmity, addressing new aspects of the OSCE's human, economic and environmental issues, as well as cyber security. The engagement of civil society and employing new technologies are also viewed as innovative means of addressing both older and newer security challenges.

Based on a mapping of the reports, a number of recommendations can be made in connection to the upcoming Swiss OSCE Chairmanship:

- Switzerland's promotion of a modernized arms control agreement should take into consideration transparency measures linked to, for example, new weapons and conventional arms deployments in non-state entities. CSBMs based on the modernization of the Vienna Document could include new measures for the provision of advanced information about military exercises, as well as restrictions on military exercises near the NATO-Russian border, limitations on military build ups and manoeuvres, and avoidance of forward deployment of particular weapons with pre-emptive use. Further efforts should also be made to overcome difficulties in the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty.
- In support of the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by the parties to the conflict or a provision on the inspection of conventional forces in non-state entities under a modernized arms control agreement could provide means of overcoming deadlock. Placing the rights of individuals and minorities at the heart of resolving these conflicts could also open promising avenues.
- In the area of transnational security, cybersecurity receives some attention in the Swiss programme. Developing CSBMs in relation to cyberspace, such as promoting greater transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyber activities, the development of early

warning information and information sharing about dangerous cyber events, should be promoted.

- Strengthening the human dimension of the OSCE is a priority for Switzerland, which stresses the need to further the implementation of norms and rights in this area. A useful contribution to this 'basket' of the OSCE could also be made by facilitating dialogue and building confidence between secular states and their Muslim communities, as well as between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
- An area where Switzerland could make a contribution is in the economic and environmental dimension. Switzerland's experience in mediation could contribute to developing the OSCE's capacity to support the peaceful resolution of disputes connected to energy, access to natural resources and migration.

2. Purpose of the study

Over recent years, a growing number of experts and policymakers have published studies and reports, some the result of so-called track II processes (i.e. citizen diplomacy) that call for the creation of a security community within a European or Euro-Atlantic area. The impetus for these endeavours comes from the concern that historical divides, Cold War thinking and postures, protracted conflicts, and a weakening of agreed-upon norms and commitments are impeding mutual security and generating instability. Among the most prominent initiatives and institutions engaged in these efforts are the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), the EastWest Institute, the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) and the track II Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region. These, as well other, institutes and track II dialogues have sought to examine the shortfalls in current approaches and institutions in addressing long-standing, as well as newer, security threats, and to put forward recommendations based on their findings.¹

In parallel to these initiatives, the OSCE as an institution, whose inclusiveness and comprehensive approach to security arguably makes it particularly pertinent to overcoming security threats and challenges within the Euro-Atlantic zone, has been undergoing its own process of self-reflection. The “Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community”, issued by participating states on 3 December 2010, reaffirmed the OSCE’s commitment to comprehensive security and recognized that more should be done to implement the core principles and commitments of the OSCE.² During the Lithuanian Chairmanship in 2011, efforts were made to implement the tasks outlined at the OSCE Astana Summit held in Astana, Kazakhstan in December 2010. The summit was the first to be held in 11 years, as well as the first to be hosted by a Central Asian participating State. It was the result of the Corfu Process – a temporary dialogue on European security that resulted in a meeting between OSCE foreign ministers in Corfu in June 2009. The subsequent Irish Chairmanship launched the Helsinki + 40 process, which seeks to review the progress made in applying the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and to assess how these principles could be better applied to respond to ongoing and current security challenges. Some of the reports on a European or Euro-Atlantic security community are particularly relevant to this effort.

The objective of the current mapping study is to examine the reports resulting from initiatives to build a security community. Specifically, it considers a number of key questions in relation to the reports. These are:

- How is the security environment defined?
- What is the nature of the current security governance system?
- What measures are put forward to improve the functioning of the security governance system, or to restructure it?
- What importance is attributed to the OSCE within the security governance system?
- What initiatives are proposed to enhance the efficacy and relevance of the OSCE?

¹ For further discussion on the background to the studies, see Matthew Rojansky, “A Euro-Atlantic Security Community for the 21st Century,” 6 July, OSCE Talks 2011, <http://m.ceip.org/2011/07/06/euro-atlantic-security-community-for-21st-century/8eyx&lang=en>, accessed 3 August 2013.

² “Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Summit Meeting, Astana, 3 December 2010, <http://www.osce.org/cio/74985?download=true>, accessed 3 August 2013.

- What is the value of these proposed initiatives for the Helsinki +40 Process?

The mapping study is divided into two parts. The first part examines the individual studies separately in order of their publication date. It looks at how each study defines the security environment. In doing so, it asks how each study conceives of the nature of threats and their relative importance, the actors being threatened, the main security providers, and the geographical scope of strategic concern. It then considers how each study defines the security governance system by looking at which regional institutions are identified, the relative importance given to them, the dominant practices and mechanisms associated with them and the hurdles facing them. Initiatives proposed in the studies to overcome obstacles to building a security community are also examined.

The second part of the mapping study takes a comparative approach. It compares the way in which the reports define the security environment. It looks at how their visions of the security governance system differ and compares the various initiatives the reports. It then compares the place attributed to the OCSE within either the existing, a partly restructured or a transformed security architecture and the measures proposed in relation to the OSCE. Finally, it assesses the usefulness of those measures for the Helsinki +40 Process.

3. Approaches adopted by individual studies

3.1 Simon Serfaty, “An Opportune Moment for a Shared Euro-Atlantic Security Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2009, pp. 1-8.

3.1.1 Authors and objectives

Simon Serfaty is the holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geopolitics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. The paper was written as part of a two-year Global Dialogue between the EU and the United States on five issues – stabilization and reconstruction, energy security, climate change, economic governance and concepts for the convergence of approaches to security – undertaken by the Brzezinski Chair. The aim of the Dialogue was to contribute towards a shared Euro-American approach and set of best practices in each of these issue areas that will help them to further their mutual interests (p. 8).

3.1.2 Security environment

3.1.2.1. Nature and hierarchy of threats

The Euro-Atlantic security environment discussed in the paper includes EU member states, the United States (US) and Canada, and does not appear to comprise Russia. Within this Euro-Atlantic zone, military threats are not thought to stem from the use of military force for a territorial invasion but rather primarily from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missiles. In particular, WMD proliferation to Iran is perceived as a particular concern. Among the other transnational threats to security thought to constitute major threats to the Euro-Atlantic zone is international terrorism. The potential for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction is believed to be a particular concern. Russia as the source of strategic instability in relation to the use of non-military means is also mentioned in the paper. Other security concerns that are attributed less importance for EU member states and the US include political issues, for example bad governance, and economic and social concerns, such as access to natural resources, pandemics and poverty, demographic issues and climate change (pp. 4-6).

Table 1: The security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
-transnational threats linked to WMD proliferation, long-range missiles, and international terrorism -economic security challenges -human security challenges -environmental security threats	-Russia to the Persian Gulf	-individuals -states (US and EU member states) -global commons	-states -regional organizations (EU, US/NATO)

3.1.2.2 Actors, agency and geographical scope

These threats and challenges are discussed primarily in relation to states, notably the EU member states and the US. The approach is, thus, mainly state-centric, although implicitly some of the less pressing security concerns also affect individuals and the global commons. However, they are not explicitly discussed in such terms or at any length in the paper. Those actors that are seen as agents or providers of security are principally states and regional organisations, notably the EU and NATO. The geographic zone of instability outlined in the paper runs from Russia to the Persian Gulf.

3.1.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices, hurdles

NATO and the EU are seen as key institutions capable of furthering Euro-Atlantic security, narrowly defined as Euro-American security. However, their engagement with other institutions, including the G8, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank is also considered essential to tackling security concerns facing the US and EU member states. In terms of practices, the paper refers to intervention, stabilization, counterterrorism and collective security and defence. The paper devotes considerable attention to the hurdles to improving Euro-Atlantic security. At present, members of the Euro-Atlantic community and their security institutions are perceived as being unprepared to adequately address the diverse and interconnected set of security threats faced by EU members and the US. Lack of preparedness is believed to exist in terms of capabilities, knowledge, organisation and policies. A factor contributing to this weakness is the nature of the threat matrix, which requires a combination of military and civilian capabilities, as well as a mixture of national and international means. In other words, they require integrated and comprehensive approaches and tools. The paper argues that national and institutional capabilities need to be adapted to reflect the need for hard power, soft power and a combination of both. While the US and NATO are believed to have been responding to this diverse set of needs, they have done so less well in relation to the non-military dimension associated with the deployment of soft power. By contrast, the EU has invested more resources in these types of capabilities. Yet, the EU's soft power appeal is believed to be connected to the specificities of Europe's history and strategic cultures and is, therefore, thought to be limited in terms of its applicability outside Europe. Moreover, the EU's coherence as a security actor is thought to be weakened as a result of divergent priorities and interests on the part of EU member states, as well as budgetary pressures in the context of the economic crisis (pp. 4-5). In relation to terrorism, the EU still has nothing comparable to US homeland security and member states are still reluctant to share intelligence at the EU level. The EU has little capacity to deploy military force abroad in relation to combating terrorism (pp. 5-6). In addition, divergences between Europe and the US as to how to respond to the spread of nuclear weapons, specifically to Iran, as well the priority attributed to the broader Middle East exist (p. 7).

3.1.4 Proposed initiatives

An EU strategy paper that captures the trends and convergence in strategic thinking in the French, German and British white papers in the 30-month period preceding 2009 is proposed as a means of generating increased convergence between NATO and EU in terms of strategic vision. In addition to closing the gap in Euro-Atlantic strategic thinking, it is also argued that the EU needs to further develop its capabilities. 'Smart power' – a combination of hard and soft power – is believed to be

required by both the US and its European allies, rather than a division of labour that reflects the US assumed preference for hard power and Europe’s predilection for soft power. Moreover, consultations between the US and European states, on the one hand, and between the EU and NATO, on the other, is thought to need improving (p. 8).

Table 2: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
-EU and NATO in partnership with G8, UNSC, IMF and World Bank	-intervention -stabilization -collective defence	-US/NATO soft power weaknesses -EU’s lack of hard power capabilities, divergent strategic cultures -lack of consensus between Europeans and US on counterterrorism, WMD proliferation, and importance of the Middle East	-a new EU strategy paper -development of smart power capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic

3.2 EastWest Institute, “Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths,” June 2009, pp. i-12.

3.2.1 Authors and objectives

The report was produced by the EastWest Institute (EWI) in response to requests from US and Russian officials. The EastWest Institute convened a Group of Experts that assembled in Brussels to deliberate and make subsequent recommendations on improving Euro-Atlantic security. The report is the end product of those discussions. Due to divergences of opinion among the participants of the Group of Experts, the report does not reflect a consensus view. Instead, it proposes several possible courses of action set out in three different scenarios, which are meant to generate debate (pp. i; iii).

3.2.2 Security environment

3.2.2.1 Nature and hierarchy of threats

The report focuses on military security threats in the Euro-Atlantic zone, which includes Russia. Geopolitical rivalries and protracted conflicts are seen as contributing to the potential for the use of military force. In addition, the report discusses new transnational threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, such as sea piracy, terrorism, cybercrime, organized crime, and drug and arms trafficking (p. 1). While the report does not focus on identifying threats to security, implicitly each of the report’s scenarios suggests a series of security concerns and the importance attributed to them. In the first scenario, the most urgent security threats are military threats linked to conventional arms and ballistic missile defences (BMDs). Economic (primarily energy) and cyber security threats are recognized as concerns, but not considered a priority. The second scenario is premised on the belief that the situation in the southern Caucasus and Black sea region represents an immediate threat to security, making military threats linked to protracted conflicts a priority (p. 3).

Table 3: Security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
<u>Scenario 1:</u> -military security threats -Economic security threats -cybersecurity threats	-the OSCE zone plus Afghanistan and Pakistan	-states -sub-state communities -global commons	-states (Russia and the US) -Euro-Atlantic and Eastern regional organisations -international organisations
<u>Scenario 2:</u> -military security threats -transnational threats (*terrorism)	-Atlantic through Europe to Russia to Central Asia to the Iran to northeast Asia		
<u>Scenario 3:</u> -military security threat -transnational threats (*WMD proliferation)	-Atlantic through Europe to Russia to Central Asia to the Middle East and Persian Gulf to northeast Asia		

In the final scenario, conventional and nuclear arms are identified as threats to security. Concerns in Russia about missile defence are also taken on board. Threats and challenges from the Middle East and northeast Asia are part of the security environment in this scenario. Looking forward, the report suggests that civil violence as a result of austerity measures, and global warming may be added to the array of security threats faced in the longer term in the Euro-Atlantic area (p. 7).

3.2.2.2 Actors, agency and geographical scope

States, sub-state communities and the global commons are the actors and entities whose security is considered in the report. In terms of agency, states, working together in institutionalized settings, are conceived as the most important actors in furthering security within the Euro-Atlantic zone. The sphere of strategic instability runs from the Atlantic, to Europe to Russia to the Caucasus, to Central Asia, the Middle East and northeast Asia.

3.2.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices and hurdles

While the report does not argue that new institutions are needed, it does recognize a need to be open to this eventuality. In the first scenario that views priority security concerns as lying within the OSCE area, the report sees the OSCE, NATO the EU, as well as the UNSC as having key roles to play in furthering Euro-Atlantic security. The NATO-Russia Council and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council are thought to be particularly important mechanisms for cooperation, with important security governance practices including dialogue, confidence-building measures (CBMs), shared decision making across the region and reciprocal obligations (pp. i; 2-3). The second scenario is based on the belief that the institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area need reform in ways that would create cooperative security and power sharing. Institutional reforms that allow more power sharing between the US, Russia, NATO and the EU in particular are viewed as necessary (p. 4). In the third scenario, a new European security treaty would not only be elaborated by states in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia but also by the OSCE, NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the EU. The new treaty would develop new mechanisms for coordination on the political and operational levels in conflict prevention and resolution (p. 5).

In terms of the hurdles facing these institutions, the report argues that the Euro-Atlantic security arena is characterised by a loss of mutual confidence, and an increase in tensions and divergences with regards not only to practices but also principles (p. i). A renewed East-West division in strategic thinking is believed to be reflected in the tensions surrounding NATO enlargement, the unraveling of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the debate over missile defence deployment in Central Europe, as well as political tensions linked to the war in Georgia in 2008 (p. 1).

3.2.4 Proposed initiatives

Three potential scenarios are presented in the report: (1) “remedial repair”; (2) “partial reconstruction”; and (3) “fundamental transformation”. The first, remedial repair, is based on the institutional architecture that already exists, while reducing mistrust and misperceptions, increasing transparency and confidence, and identifying shared interests in the Euro-Atlantic area (p. i). Measures proposed in relation to military security include refocusing the NATO-Russia Council on European security issues, such as the CFE Treaty and ratifying and implementing the Adapted CFE

Treaty. In connection to protracted conflicts, this Scenario of the report also proposes discussing the security situation in the Black Sea region and Southern Caucasus in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), as well as exploring new ways of addressing competing approaches to recognition of territories that have declared independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Increased transparency of strategic concepts and military doctrines between the US, Russia, NATO and CSTO are also advocated. In relation to BMD, the report recommends joint monitoring of ballistic missile launch, continued talks on missile defence deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic and on the potential for OSCE states to develop cooperative missile defences to combat an eventual nuclear Iran. In association with transnational threats and economic security, the report proposes a number of measures. Linked to terrorism, it calls for expanding the geographic area covered by the Cooperative Airspace Initiative. The report also argues that OSCE participating states should make cyber and energy security the subject of greater attention in multilateral fora. At the institutional level, agreed obligations by OSCE member states and those of the NRC not to block instruments for dialogue are suggested. Cooperative efforts on the part of the EU, OSCE, NATO and CSTO to addressing instability emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan are also proposed (pp. 2-3).

Proposed initiatives in the second scenario, “partial reconstruction”, include the creation of new political, legal and military instruments that address the security concerns of states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region (p. i). In the area of military security, the report argues that legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by parties to the conflicts in the Southern Caucasus should be sought. It also argues that the EU and Russia should provide overlapping security guarantees to countries such as Ukraine and Georgia through, for instance, collaborative operation measures similar to the joint US-Russian-NATO peacekeeping command system employed in Bosnia following the 1995 Dayton Accords. Measures on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe are also called for. In connection to nuclear forces, the extension of the START treaty is advocated. US-Russian cooperation on BMD is proposed, as well as a new mechanism for cooperation in the form of a joint BMD Center. In relation to transnational threats, joint action on preventing terrorist measures against energy transit is proposed. The report also calls for further US-Russian-European cooperation throughout Eurasia on threats and challenges emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and on terrorism. In terms of new mechanisms, the creation of sub-regional cooperative collective security communities, facilitated by new consultative structures, are put forward (p. 4).

The third scenario, “fundamental transformation”, envisages an overhaul of the security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic zone, which would include the implementation of the Russian-proposed European Security Treaty (EST) (p. i). Concrete measures would include: incorporating procedures and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of international disputes as well as commitments not to undermine the security of other parties to the treaty, and development of coordination mechanisms at both the political and operational levels in relation to conflict prevention, dispute resolutions and good inter-state relations. The report stresses that such a treaty should not compromise the CSCE Final Act, the Paris Charter for a New Europe or other OSCE-relevant documents. The Group of Experts that wrote the report, however, differed in their assessments as to whether consensus could be found on how such a legally-binding principle should be defined, i.e. how would mutual security guarantees be defined? The feasibility of a new EST would depend upon how these kinds of questions would be answered. The report suggests that the principle of equal and indivisible security could be achieved through institutional and legal guarantees that included the Adapted CFE Treaty, a

NATO-Russia agreement on peacekeeping cooperation based on the notion of joint peacekeeping developed in the NRC, joint control systems for European airspace as a means of facilitating responses to terrorism and air piracy (p. 5). The development of a joint NATO-Russia counter-terrorism centre is also proposed as well as a more robust Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (p. 6). The report notes that some members of the Group of Experts favoured the idea of a steering committee in the OSCE including representatives of the US, Russia and the EU as a means of discussing high-level security issues. Other members of the group supported the creation of a Euro-Atlantic Security Council in which the US/NATO and the EU could discuss geostrategic and politico-economic issues as well as work towards bettering relations between the EU, the US/NATO and Russia in coordination with the OSCE. The report also called for the assembly of a Group of Eminent Persons to discuss the opportunities presented by the Russian EST proposal and positive signs for improved US-Russian relations for Euro-Atlantic security. It also proposes that the Russian EST proposal should be deliberated in the OSCE, the NRC and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council (p. 6).

With regards to addressing specific security threats, a number of recommendations are made in this scenario. In terms of military security, the report argues for the linkage between offensive and defensive strategic arms, and recommends establishing a treaty on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, a treaty on cooperation on anti-missile defence, and the creation of centres for the joint monitoring and analysis of missile threats. With respect to transnational threats, the report called for the NRC and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council to work on bringing respective positions in Russia and the West on nuclear non-proliferation in preparation for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Given that some security threats and challenges are believed to come from the Near and Middle East, the report also recommends greater collaboration between NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), as well as the creation of an expert dialogue on EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO as a means of furthering the convergence of their respective strategic visions (p. 6).

Table 4: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> -OSCE -NATO (the NATO-Russia Council) -the EU (the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council) -the UNSC</p>	<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> -dialogue -CSBMs -shared decision-making</p>	<p>-loss of mutual confidence -increase in tensions and divergences with regards to practices and principles -renewed East-West division in strategic thinking -the unraveling of the CFE Treaty -tensions related to missile defences</p>	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u> -ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty -increase transparency of strategic concepts and military doctrines of the US, Russia, NATO and CSTO -joint monitoring of ballistic missile launch -talks on cooperative ballistic defence -expansion of Cooperative Airspace Initiative -increase focus on energy and cyber security -obligations of OSCE and Russia-NATO Council not to block dialogue -refocusing the Russia-NATO Council on European security issues -cooperative efforts by the EU, OSCE, NATO and CSTO to address security concerns linked to Afghanistan and Pakistan</p>
<p><u>Scenario 2:</u> -NATO -EU -OSCE -UN -CSTO</p>	<p><u>Scenario 2:</u> -new political, legal and military instruments to address the security concerns of states in Central and eastern Europe, as well as the Black Sea region</p>		<p><u>Scenario 2: "partial reconstruction"</u> -legally binding measures on the non-use of force by parties to the conflict in the southern Caucasus -measures on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe -NATO, EU and Russian overlapping security guarantees to countries in grey zones -US-Russian cooperation on BMD and the establishment of a joint BMD Center -extension of the START Treaty, -joint action on preventing terrorist measures against energy transit -US-Russian-European cooperation on threats emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism -creation of sub-regional cooperative collective security communities</p>
<p><u>Scenario 3:</u> -OSCE -NATO -CSTO -EU</p>	<p><u>Scenario 3:</u> -dialogue -collective cooperative security -arms control -tack II processes -collaboration with partners</p>		<p><u>Scenario 3: "fundamental transformation"</u> -implementation of the Russian-proposed European Security Treaty (EST) -coordination mechanisms for conflict prevention, dispute resolutions and good inter-state relations -a joint NATO-Russia counter-terrorism centre -a more robust Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security -a Euro-Atlantic Security Council -a Group of Eminent Persons to deliberate the EST proposal -EST proposal deliberated in the OSCE, the NRC and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council -a treaty on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe -a treaty on cooperation on anti-missile defence -centres for the joint monitoring and analysis of missile threats -NRC and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council to work on convergence of Russia and the West's position on nuclear non-proliferation -greater collaboration between NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the CSTO and SCO -expert dialogue on EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO to further the convergence of their strategic visions</p>

3.3 EastWest Institute and the Ditchley Foundation, “Consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security,” Ditchley Park, 25-26 September 2010, pp. 1-7.

3.3.1 Authors and objectives

The report reflects the outcome of a meeting on Euro-Atlantic security co-hosted by the EastWest Institute and the Ditchley Foundation between 25 and 26 September 2010. Participants of the consultation were drawn from the OSCE area and included political figures, diplomats, government officials, representatives from international organizations within the Euro-Atlantic zone, and academics. The aim of the report is to lay out the ‘next steps’ in EastWest Institute track II dialogue on Euro-Atlantic security. Policy highlights rather than a consensus view of participants are contained in the report (pp. 1; 6-7).

3.3.2 Security environment

3.3.2.1 Nature and hierarchy of threats

While the report argues that non-conventional threats are becoming more important than conventional military threats in the Euro-Atlantic region, there is recognition that certain military issues are perceived as threats by some actors and require attention. Pressing threats to Euro-Atlantic security are believed to emanate from outside Europe, notably from Afghanistan and broader Central Asia. The nature of these threats is not specified, though. Threats to states from internal challenges, such as political manipulation and communal conflict, are believed to be gaining in significance, as well as perhaps energy dependence, small arms, demographic trends, natural disasters, economic crises and even poverty. Among the transnational threats discussed in the report is cyber warfare (pp. 2-4).

Table 5: Security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
-military threats -transnational threats (*cyber warfare) -internal security threats	-Euro-Atlantic to Russia to Turkey to Central Asia (including Afghanistan)	-Euro-Atlantic states, including Russia and Turkey -individuals -global commons	-states -regional organisations -civil society actors

3.3.2.2 Actors, agency and geographical scope

State security is attributed primary importance in the report. The need to take account of Russian and Turkish security concerns is explicitly mentioned. Russian threat perceptions linked to military security issues are believed to warrant particular attention as well as its need for assistance in connection with softer internal security issues linked to social and economic conditions in the country. This implies a consideration for human security too, although the report does not discuss these issues in those terms. Turkey’s location on the border of an unstable region is thought to heighten its security concerns (p. 2). In relation to cyber warfare, the security of the global commons is also taken into consideration. The geographic focus of Euro-Atlantic security policy, according to

the report, should stretch from the Atlantic to Europe to Russia to Turkey to Central Asia (including Afghanistan). States and their regional organisations, as well as civil society are attributed agency in terms of enhancing or providing security.

3.3.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices and hurdles

NATO, OSCE, and the EU are considered the most important Euro-Atlantic security institutions. However, their cooperation with partner organisations, such as the CSTO and the SCO is perceived as important. Practices include collective defence, confidence-building measures (CBMs), conflict prevention mechanisms, stabilization operations, economic partnership. Among the hurdles to furthering Euro-Atlantic security are considered the relatively weak military capabilities, divergences among EU member states in terms of strategic thinking, and EU indecision on the accession of Turkey. A disconnect between NATO and OSCE practices are also cited as hurdle. Specifically, the NATO principle of collective defence and the OSCE principle of indivisible security need to be reconciled, as too do those of the CSTO and OSCE. Another identified obstacle is the diminishing commitment to cooperative security in the OSCE area. In general terms, greater coherence between NATO, the OSCE and EU approaches to security needs to be furthered. The Euro-Atlantic zone is believed to be ill-prepared to address the increasing importance of internal security threats. As a result, European security institutions and their mechanisms need to be adapted in order to better address non-conventional threats, such as cyber warfare, political manipulation and intra-state conflict (pp. 2-3).

3.3.4 Proposed initiatives

The report proposes that the OSCE take a leading role in developing conflict prevention tools on the OSCE border with Afghanistan. The EU is also viewed as in need of developing a more coherent approach to Central Asia. The report argues that Turkey should be further integrated as part of the solution to security threats on the OSCE border. As a means of assuaging Russia's sense of weakness in terms of conventional hard power, the report proposes that the OSCE find innovative means of adapting to Russia's transformation, for instance increasing cooperation in the areas of economic and social policy. The military postures and planning of NATO and Russia need to be adapted to reflect the unlikelihood of large-scale military confrontation. Discussions on how best to respond to internal security threats, as well as on the use of military force in Europe are also proposed (p. 2).

Specific initiatives for the OSCE include measures related to military security, specifically fostering commitment to a regime aimed at monitoring and reporting on conventional forces in Europe, as well as commitment to regular reporting of force deployments outside Europe that may affect the security of OSCE members, particularly those in West Asia, South Asia and the oceans adjacent to them. The report also suggests convening an expert group to work on interconnected issues that may provide avenues for addressing conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Connected to improving institutions, the report calls for the establishment of a standing track II process inspired by the Asia Pacific CSCAP as a means of improving OSCE functions (pp. 4-5).

Concrete proposals for NATO include a number of mechanisms and practices, such as fostering mutual defence commitments in relation to non-conventional threats, a civil-military approach to preventive diplomacy and convergence of NATO and EU strategies. The report also advocates

refocusing the NRC from 28 +1 to a 29 format to consider global challenges and setting up a high-level mechanism to discuss cooperative missile defence (p. 5).

Measures suggested for regional organisations (OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO) include: engaging in regular consultations with each other; improving conflict prevention capacities, particularly in the OSCE, advancing approaches to the resolution of existing conflicts that integrate economic development; establishing an ad hoc multilateral group comprising Russia, the EU and the US as a way of maintaining the US involved in European security; and engaging the business community from the East and West in discussions on the economic aspect of pan-European security, modeled on the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (p. 5).

While economic and internal security threats and challenges, such as energy dependence, small arms, natural disasters, economic crises and poverty, were cited as increasingly important in the Euro-Atlantic security zone, the report notes that there was little discussion during the consultation on what implications they have for national and regional security planning (p. 2).

Table 6: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
-NATO -EU -OSCE	-partnerships with other regional organisations -collective defence CBMs -conflict prevention mechanisms -stabilization operations -economic partnership	-weak military capabilities and divergences among EU member states in strategic thinking -EU indecision on the accession of Turkey -disconnect between NATO principle of collective defence and the OSCE principle of indivisible security need to be reconciled -declining commitment to cooperative security in the OSCE area -Euro-Atlantic security institutions ill-prepared to address internal security threats and challenges	<u>OCSE:</u> -commitment to a regime aimed at monitoring and reporting on conventional forces in Europe -commitment to regular reporting of force deployments outside Europe -a standing track II process aimed at improving OSCE functions -an expert group to work on interconnected issues in addressing protracted <u>NATO:</u> -mutual defence commitments in relation to non-conventional threats -a civil-military approach to preventative diplomacy -convergence of NATO and EU strategies -refocusing the NRC from 28 +1 to a 29 format to consider global challenges -a high-level mechanism for Russia-NATO discussions on cooperative missile defence <u>Regional organisations (OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO):</u> -regular consultations -improved conflict prevention capacities -advancing approaches to the resolution of existing conflicts through economic development -an ad hoc multilateral group comprising Russia, the EU and the US -engagement of business community from the East and West in discussions on economic security

3.4 Valdai International Discussion Club, “Towards an Alliance of Europe: Analytical Report by the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” St. Petersburg Kizhi Valaam, Moscow, 31 August -7 September 2010, pp. 1-31.

3.4.1 Authors and objectives

The authors of the report include Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP), Dean of the School of World Economy and International Affairs of the State University-Higher School of Economics, Timofei Bordachev, CFDP Director of Research, Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies of the State University-Higher School of Economics, Ivan Ivanov, Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, research professor of the State University-Higher School of Economics, Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of *Russia in Global Affairs*, and Mark Entin, Director of the European Studies Institute of the MGIMO of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation.

The report is the final version of a paper discussed by participants of the annual meeting of the Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club, held between 31 August and 7 September 2010. It is the first in a series of planned papers whose aim is to set out a 10-15-year agenda for relations between Russia and key centers of global power, such as the EU, the US and Asia (p. 2).

3.4.2 Security environment

3.4.2.1 Nature and hierarchy of threats

As a result of the rise of China, the authors of the report argue that Russia perceives the possible formation of a China-US diarchy as a potential threat. Climate change, economic insufficiencies (particularly in Russia), potential competition for natural resources (and subsequently territory), are also seen as issues that could develop into threats for a wider Europe, which includes the EU, Russia and non-EU member states. Indeed, the major threat outlined in the report is the potential marginalization of Russia and the EU in the world. Russian threat perceptions in relation to military security issues are also attributed significant importance. In addition, NATO expansion to Ukraine is explicitly mentioned as a measure that would be perceived in Russia as a threat to its security. Aside from their potential marginalization, common threats to Russia and the EU are believed to include illicit migration, terrorism, organized crime, cybercrime, climate change and a conflict of civilizations. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is also cited as a security challenge and potential threat. New challenges to security, such as international terrorism, piracy and cybercrime, are also given some attention in the report, although their impact is believed to be unclear as yet (pp. 5-6; 13-14; 23).

3.4.2.2 Actors, agency and geographical scope

States, specifically Russia and to a lesser extent EU member states, and even civilizations are key actors and entities whose security is discussed in the report. Threats and challenges to security are believed to emanate from Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China, northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. In addition to states and the EU, civil society actors, such as representatives from business and

expert communities, are attributed a role in overcoming divisions in different sectoral fields and improving the security of a broader Europe (p. 30).

Table 7: Security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - geopolitical concerns - transnational threats and challenges - conflict of civilizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Europe, to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, South Asia, China, northeast Asia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - states, specifically Russia and EU member states - civilizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - states - regional organisations, principally the EU - civil society actors

3.4.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices and hurdles

NATO is viewed as the most significant European security institution (p. 28). However, the EU is seen as constituting the most important institution in terms of being able to address a set of comprehensive concerns, believed to be shared by both Russia and the EU. The OSCE in so far as it addresses military security issues is attributed relevance by the authors. The OSCE’s minimal agenda of addressing protracted conflicts and modernizing the arms control regime is perceived by authors of the report as of little significance, and efforts taken so far to render the organisation more relevant and effective have come to very little, in their view. Since the authors do not see radical reform of the OSCE as feasible, the institution is not given a priority place within the European security architecture. That said, the report does warn that exclusion of hard security issues from the OSCE agenda could lead to a deterioration of regulatory relations between US/NATO and Russia (and perhaps also CSTO) that would reinforce existing divides, suggesting that it does attribute importance to the OSCE (p. 23). In terms of military security, practices deemed important within the security governance system are collective defence, cooperative security practices and economic integration.

Hurdles to improving security relations in a wider Europe, include mistrust generated by the expansion of NATO and the EU into areas perceived as within Russia’s sphere of influence (p. 3). Continuing divides in Europe are also identified as an obstacle to addressing new and potential challenges and threats (p. 6). In particular, significant differences in values and interests are recognized as generating mistrust and preventing improvements in Russian-European relations. Differences in expectations on the part of Russia and Western states too are seen as creating difficulties, and are also seen as being the result of an accumulation of prejudices over the last two decades (pp. 13-14). The Partnership for Modernization between the EU and Russia is not perceived as having been successful in furthering the key interests of both parties. Indeed, this is believed to reflect an overall inertia in the institutions, mechanisms and practices designed to promote EU-Russian cooperation (p. 20).

3.4.4 Proposed initiatives

The report proposes the establishment of an ‘Alliance for Europe’ that would incorporate a ‘Greater Europe’ that goes beyond EU member states and would include, above all, Russia. Such an alliance would be codified in a Treaty on the Alliance of Europe. It would work towards the creation of a single human and economic space, with coordination of foreign and security policies of participating states. Freedom of movement of people, implying a visa-free area, freedom to establish and run

companies, access to the means of production of goods and services, mutual access to natural resources and their means of distribution, and a single energy space would be sought through an Alliance of Europe. It would also require the demilitarization of Europe. Hypothetically, it could also include Russian accession to NATO. This, it is argued, would create the impetus and opportunity to integrate Russia as a genuinely equal partner, which is clearly a concern for Russia. The authors of the report argue that the Russian-proposed EST, or something similar, should be considered as a means of moving beyond Cold War divides. Alternatively, a Treaty on the Alliance of Europe could include security provisions for those member states that fall outside other European security institutions (pp. 28-9).

Specific projects proposed in the report include assembling state officials, representatives from business, as well as members of expert communities drawn from Russia, EU member states and other European countries to engage in dialogue aimed at developing sectoral agreement. In terms of facilitating freedom of movement of people, the gradual abolition of visa regimes and efforts to promote student mobility are called for. The creation of a pan-European communications system, coordination of energy transit between Europe and Asia, as well as the development of neighbouring Russian regions is also suggested. So too is the coordination of power transmission and distribution networks and macroeconomic policies, as well as synchronization in the area of information and communication systems. Joint funding for small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as a harmonized space for investors, are also suggested. To further cooperative efforts in the area of non-economic dimensions of security, the authors of the report propose developing joint measures to combat terrorism, organized crime, illicit migration and piracy, peacekeeping and international development assistance programmes, as well as cooperation in the area of military technologies (pp. 30-1).

Table 8: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
-NATO -EU -OSCE	-collective defence -cooperative security practices (*arms control) -economic integration	-continuing divides in wider Europe -differences in values and mistrust -ineffectiveness of established mechanisms to improve EU-Russian cooperation	-creation of an Alliance for Europe codified in a treaty -potential Russian NATO membership -a European Security Treaty, perhaps modeled on the Russian-proposed EST - sectoral agreements aimed at furthering economic integration -cooperative approaches to security as well as to facilitate economic integration

3.5 Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), “Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community,” Moscow, Brussels, Washington DC, February 2012, pp. 1-32.

3.5.1 Authors and objectives

The EASI was launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow, Brussels and Washington D.C. in December 2009. The initiative is co-chaired by Wolfgang Ischinger, Chair of Munich Security Conference, global head of government relations at Allianz SE, Munich, Igor Ivanov, President of the Russian International Affairs Council and Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, and Sam Nunn, Co-chairman and chief executive for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Its participants include policymakers, diplomats, generals and business leaders from the US, Europe and Russia.

The EASI’s objective is to identify the challenges posed by unresolved issues and new security threats within the Euro-Atlantic area, and to examine the shortcomings of institutions in responding to them. The results of EASI deliberations were published in the report examined here, which contains recommendations for institutional modifications and new approaches that could transform the Euro-Atlantic security region into a genuine Euro-Atlantic security community.³

3.5.2 Security environment

3.5.2.1 Nature and hierarchy of threats

The report prioritizes military threats to security. It identifies the use - or threat of use - of military force to resolve conflicts as the most pressing threat to security within the region. In particular, limited warning and decision time in the face of a military attack are believed to heighten threat perceptions linked to the potential use of both conventional and nuclear force. Cyber threats are cited as a priority area in relation to military security. Historical tensions, particularly between Russia and the Baltic states, as well as protracted conflicts in relation to Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, are believed to heighten the risk of the use of force. However, these issues are discussed in terms of human rather than military security. While the importance of military threats to security is emphasized in the report, new challenges to security are also given some attention (p. 10-14). Economic security, notably energy security, is also mentioned as a security concern by the authors of the report. Within this category of challenges, particular importance is given to tensions related to natural gas and the Arctic. In this sense, the securitization and related tensions are deemed relevant rather than constituting threats per se (pp. 14-15).

3.5.2.2 Actors, agency and geographic scope

In relation to military security, state security takes precedence in the report. By contrast, historical enmity between states and protracted conflicts are discussed primarily in relation to human security, bringing the security of the individual to the fore. Since historical enmities and protracted conflicts have the potential to escalate crises and hinder regional economic cooperation and integration, the security of the broader region is thus also conceived as being compromised by their lack of resolution (pp. 12-13). Economic security, specifically in relation to Russia and European countries, is believed to be compromised by energy disputes between these regional actors. Energy disputes are also

³ Rachel S. Salzman, “The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative,” *OSCE Year Book 2010*, p. 85; EASI, “Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community,” Moscow, Brussels, Washington DC, February 2012, p. 7.

perceived as an economic security question for the EU as a regional actor (p. 16). The Arctic is viewed as a security issue for states because of competing claims over hydrocarbons and the potential for disputes to escalate and become raised to the level of a security concern, in other words to become securitized and even lead to military confrontations. However, potential damage to the Arctic's ecology due to activities related to the extraction and transportation of hydrocarbons is also perceived as a threat to the global commons and to indigenous peoples at the human security level (p. 15).

Table 9: Security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
-military threats -human security -economic security	-the Arctic to the Euro-Atlantic Europe to Russia and the Caucasus	-states -sub-state communities -regional actors -global commons (*the Arctic)	-states -regional and sub-regional organisations/institutions -civil society actors

States – notably Russia and Poland, on the one hand, and the Baltic states and Russia, on the other – are viewed as having the most important role in promoting reconciliation in terms of overcoming longstanding divides. Russia, as the most powerful state, is thought to have the greatest moral responsibility to promote measures to reconciliation. Civil society actors, such as churches and civic forums, are also believed to have a leading role to play in terms of rebuilding and strengthening ties between respective civil societies (pp. 12-13). In relation to energy security, the EU as a regional actor, as well as states (Russia, European states and the US) are seen as actors capable of reducing the likelihood of energy disputes between Russia and the EU, on the one hand, and Russia and the US, on the other (p. 15). In terms of agency, the Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US) and other Arctic Council member states (Finland, Iceland and Sweden) in particular are seen as having an important role in addressing numerous security concerns related to the Arctic. Their collaboration is viewed key to ensuring that military competition does not become a feature of their relations in the Arctic, as well as ensuring their energy needs while protecting the interests of indigenous peoples and the Arctic's ecology (p. 16).

Military threats to security are perceived as affecting Russia, the United States and Europe. When energy security concerns are considered, the geographical scope of the area of focus extends to the Arctic. The geographical scope of threats to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region thus runs from the Arctic to the Atlantic, across Europe (through the Baltic states) and on to Russia and the Caucasus.

3.5.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices and hurdles

Given the report's emphasis on military security, NATO is seen as the key institution capable of providing instruments to transform threat perceptions and security relations between states. The OSCE is also viewed as having a critical, though not exclusive, role in resolving protracted conflicts. It is perceived as being particularly well-suited to fostering conflict resolution measures involving civil society actors, as well as track II processes aimed at complementing traditional diplomacy (p. 14). In terms of economic security, the OSCE is also considered important. While in the specific field of energy security, the EU is viewed as a pertinent institution. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and the

US-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission are believed to be appropriate fora for cooperation to improve energy efficiency (p. 15), though the former is given greater emphasis in terms of its relevance to enhancing energy security between the EU and Russia. The Arctic Council is also identified as an important institution in relation to Arctic-specific security concerns (p. 16).

Practices that characterize the security governance system in the Euro-Atlantic region include dialogue as a means of reducing tension and threat perception, cooperative security instruments, such as CBMS, reconciliation and conflict resolution. Existing obstacles to Euro-Atlantic security include the continuation of Cold War postures and thinking, as well as historical divisions and ongoing post-Cold War security concerns. Historical enmities between Russia and the US, on the one hand, and between Russia and other states in the Euro-Atlantic region, on the other, are specifically mentioned as factors that make cooperation on addressing security challenges difficult. Within the context of the economic and financial crisis, the report cites a renationalization of decision-making and subsequent weakening of the bonds between the peoples of the US and Europe as a hindrance to Euro-Atlantic security (p. 7). The sensitive nature of some issues, such as national cybersecurity measures, is also believed to impede cooperative measures (p. 11).

3.5.4 Proposed initiatives

In relation to the use – or threat of uses – of military force, the authors of the report do not recommend the conclusion of new treaties or the creation of new security institutions. Instead, they argue in favour of a confidence-building process to extend warning and decision time, since this is viewed as a critical factor heightening the risk of military conflict. Resulting CBMs are envisaged as taking place in a variety of fora, both multilateral and bilateral (p. 10). In the field of conventional forces, the report recommends dialogue on issues such as transparency in deployments, restrictions on military exercises near the Russia-NATO border and limitations on military build-ups and manoeuvres in areas of Europe where tensions are highest, and avoiding forward deployment of some offensive weapons systems. With regards to nuclear force, the report proposes a number of CSBMs that could be taken. In the area of tactical nuclear weapons, it suggests separating warheads from delivery systems and storing them apart from each other. In relation to BMD, dialogue focusing on issues that are most likely to lead either NATO or Russia to misinterpret actions as a decision to launch interceptors is advocated. Talks on intelligence sharing and jointly manned operation centres in relation to missile defence, for example, are suggested (p. 10). The authors of the report argue that a cooperative approach to missile defence involving Russia, the US/NATO would be a “game changer” in terms of reducing threat perceptions, transforming state security relations and, thus, building a security community within the Euro-Atlantic region (p. 11). In the area of cybersecurity, dialogue between Russia, the US and Europe on what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate cyber practices, and standardizing and reinforcing where necessary legislation on cybercrime, are proposed. The report also proposes starting discussions on cooperative early warning systems, as well as the sharing of best practices and measures to enhance IT resilience (p. 11).

In the area of human security, the report recommends that states open their archives in order to facilitate dealing with sensitive issues as part of the promotion of reconciliation where historical enmity exists (p. 17). As regards protracted conflicts, revitalization of efforts by Russia, the US and Europe to resolve protracted conflicts are proposed. In particular, new diplomatic tools should be developed and civil society should be involved as means of complementing diplomatic measures. Galvanizing support for peace at both the elite and societal level is seen as essential to advancing

fresh initiatives aimed at conflict resolution. Proposed measures include the implementation of a civil-society framework for conflict resolution. Strengthening inter-societal linkages and cultural dialogue are also viewed as important processes for paving the way for peace. At the elite level, the commitment of leaders to peace is perceived as essential. In terms of processes, track II dialogue under the auspices of the OSCE is seen as an important tool in overcoming impasses. Leaders’ use of social media to promote peace at the societal level is also recommended. The authors of the report also suggest placing the rights of individual and minorities, as well as the right to self-determination without necessarily implying a right to secession, at the heart of renewed efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts (pp. 13-14).

Table 10: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
-NATO -OSCE -EU	-dialogue -confidence-building measures -reconciliation -conflict resolution	-continuation of Cold War postures and thinking -historical divisions and ongoing post-Cold War security concerns -historical enmities -renationalization of decision-making and weakening of the Euro-American bonds -reluctance to share information on national cybersecurity measures	<u>Military security:</u> -CSBMs in relation to conventional forces in Europe. -CSBMs in relation to nuclear force -CSBMs in relation to BMD and the development of cooperative missile defence <u>Securing the global commons:</u> -CSBM in relation to cyber threats and cooperative measures to enhance IT resilience <u>Human security:</u> -a new track II processes, new diplomatic tools, the engagement, the opening of state archives to promote peace and reconciliation -placing the rights of individuals and minorities, as well as the right to self-determination without necessarily implying a right to secession, at the heart of renewed efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts <u>Economic security:</u> -abolition of visa regimes -CSBMs and cooperative mechanisms in relation to energy security between the EU and Russia -promotion of further compatibility of EU and Russian energy markets -a high-level dialogue aimed at promoting CSBMs concerning defence planning in relation to the Arctic

As a means of enhancing economic security and reducing the securitization of migration within the Euro-Atlantic region, the gradual abolition of visa regimes is put forward. In relation to energy security, the report proposes the creation of a mechanism for promoting cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic region on research and development in energy efficiency and innovation. The establishment of a Joint Centre for Energy Innovation and Efficiency is a specific measure that Russia and the EU could undertake, as proposed in the 2010 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. The report, however, argues that such a centre ought to include the participation of states within the entire Euro-Atlantic region and not only EU member states and Russia. Discerning how Russia and the EU could further the compatibility of their energy markets is also advocated. Reinforcing the Russia-EU early warning system developed within the context of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in relation to disruptions to European gas supply as a confidence and security building measure are put forward in the report. At the state level, the leaders of Russia and EU member states should make progress in implementing the measures proposed by EU-Russia Energy Dialogue to improve investment related to energy. In order to prevent the militarization of the Arctic, a high-level dialogue aimed at promoting transparency, and therefore confidence building, concerning defence planning in relation

to the Arctic, as well as discussions about means of reducing threat perceptions linked to the Arctic, is recommended (pp. 15; 17).

3.6 Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS), “Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: From Vision to Reality,” Hamburg, Paris, Warsaw, Moscow, October 2012, pp. 1-28.

3.6.1 Authors and objectives

The Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) is a track II initiative undertaken by the following institutions:

- the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH);
- the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), Paris;
- the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw; and
- the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO).

IDEAS’ stated aim is to conceptualize a “free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, as outlined by the OSCE participating States in the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration.

The four institutes were asked in late 2011 by their country’s respective foreign ministries to organize a number of workshops aimed at facilitating discussions on the future character of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, and to present a report with recommendations to participating OSCE states. As a result, the IDEAS institutes held a series of workshops in Berlin, Warsaw, Paris and Moscow between March and July 2012. Approximately 300 participants from 40 countries and representatives from four international organisations attended the workshops. The report “Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: From Vision to Reality” resulting from these meetings was drafted by a group including the coordinator, Wolfgang Zellner, Yves Boyer, Frank Evers, Isabelle Facon, Camille Grand, Ulrich Kühn, Lukasz Kulesa and Andrei Zagorski.⁴

3.6.2 Security environment

3.6.2.1 Nature and hierarchy of threats

Threat perceptions in relation to conventional forces in Europe in particular are given considerable emphasis in the report. Protracted conflicts are considered the most likely contexts in which force may be employed and, as such, are viewed as representing a significant threat to security (pp. 17-18). Transnational threats are also discussed in the report with the most important being the trafficking of drugs, human beings, light weapons and small arms, organized crime, corruption and money laundering, and the interrelationship between these issues. The connection between these issues and terrorism is identified as a concern. Climate change is also designated as a critical transnational threat to security, due to its role as a crisis multiplier. To a lesser extent, cyber threats are also discussed within this category (p. 21). In terms of economic security, tensions rather than threats as such are highlighted in relation to energy security, water management and migration and access to markets. Again in relation to environmental issues, the securitization of natural resources and cross-border water management are given attention (p. 23). Political Islam is also identified as posing a

⁴ “Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community,” IDEAS website, <http://www.ideas-network.com/>, accessed 25.07.13.

challenge to the norms, regulation and institutional principals of the secular state in some countries. In some cases, this is believed to be linked to poor social conditions and governance, and intolerance and discrimination. In other instances, it may be linked to migration (p. 24).

Table 11: Security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
-military security -transnational threats -economic security threats -environmental security -political Islam	-Euro-Atlantic (including Russia) to Central Asia (including Afghanistan)	-states -political and politico-religious communities, including sub-state communities -global commons	-states and their regional institutions -civil society actors

3.6.2.2. Actors, agency and geographical scope

The security of states, sub-state communities and the global commons are considered in the report. Both states and their regional institutions, as well as civil society actors, are seen as having a capacity to promote reconciliation as a means of contributing to the resolution of protracted conflicts, continuing tensions, territorial, ethnic and inter-religious disputes. The engagement of civil society actors as well as states is also deemed important in addressing transnational threats, particularly in relation to terrorism, organized crime and drug-related crime (pp. 20-2). The geographic area of strategic concern includes the Euro-Atlantic Eurasian zone, which includes Russia, as well as Afghanistan and broader Central Asia.

3.6.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices and hurdles

The institutional density of the OCSE area is recognized, and conceived as an asset. However, overlap and duplication among institutions operating within this zone are perceived as hampering their effectiveness and efficiency in addressing security threats and challenges. New institutions are not deemed necessary, but rather improvements in existing institutions’ capacities to address challenges and better coordination between them is perceived as requisite in order to address long-standing and new security threats and challenges. As the most inclusive security institution in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, with a comprehensive mandate, the OSCE is described as having a key role to play in building a genuine security community in this area. Indeed, developing a security community is believed to depend upon strengthening the *acquis* of the OSCE. The report also recommends that the OSCE reinforce its cooperation with other institutions, such as the UN, the EU, and NATO, as well as international organisations in the eastern part of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, CSTO, the Customs Union and the SCO (p. 26). Significant security governance practices include cooperative security arrangements, such as arms control, CBMs, reconciliation, dialogue and sharing of best practices.

Among the hurdles to mutual security within the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zone are new divergences between states’ agendas in the OSCE area, a reduced willingness to compromise on issues and the subsequent erosion of established areas of cooperative security. In addition, the implementation of agreed upon norms remains uneven, and states within the OSCE area enjoy different levels of security. Moreover, new issues, such as migration, energy and natural resources are being securitized and generating tension (p. 12). Divergent priorities and interests, as well as

different definitions and approaches to tackling terrorism, are recognized as rendering cooperative measures difficult to achieve. That said, the report also notes that joint actions on terrorism undertaken by OSCE participating states have been easier to achieve than those related to some other issues (p. 21).

While the OSCE's geographic, political and topical comprehensiveness and inclusiveness are clearly viewed as strengths, it also means that the challenges the institution faces are multifarious, and tensions and contradictions between various stakeholders are numerous. Indeed, divergent positions among the 56 participating states are recognized as having the potential to hinder advancing its *acquis*, particularly in relation to the human dimension, and, at times, limiting the organisation's role to the maintenance of relations between states rather than a strong security actor. While the OSCE's ability to act decisively is recognized by the report as being weak, it also argues it has room for manoeuvre to explore innovative ideas on a broad basis and that this may be perceived as a strength (p. 27).

3.6.4 Proposed initiatives

In relation to conventional forces, the authors of the report argue that states refrain from undermining existing arms control regimes in Europe, as well as limit the deployment of conventional arms. In the event that the deadlock linked to the CFE Treaty is overcome, the extension of arms control to new weapons and monitoring rather than placing limits on new categories of weapons is believed to be a productive way forward (p. 17). The OSCE is seen as being particularly well-suited to reducing threat perceptions in relation to conventional forces through CSBMs. In particular, the report suggests that the OSCE facilitate efforts to overcome difficulties with the Open Skies Treaty, encourage joint threat assessments and responses, and foster joint training and military exercises. In view of the modernization of the Vienna Document, the report proposes a modification of the baseline agreement, under which participating states would extend the provision of advanced information about military exercises. CSBMs at the bilateral and regional levels are also advocated. More ambitiously, the report also argues that the OSCE should restart negotiations on a modernized arms control agreement (p. 18).

In terms of preventing conflicts, the report makes some recommendations. Despite divergent views about which measures may be effective among OSCE participating states, the report argues that there remain avenues that could be taken to reduce the risk of an escalation of violence in the OSCE zone, such as early warning and early action. The development of a conflict mediation capacity within the OSCE is put forward (p. 19).

Reconciliation could be promoted by the OSCE in a variety of contexts. OSCE efforts to advance reconciliation could be further emphasized by making adjustments in the priorities of OSCE institutions or by developing specific mandates for action. In particular, the report suggests that the OSCE should draw on lessons learnt from previous historical cases, identify 'reconciliation stakeholders' at the state and regional levels, and provide support for relevant parties to find ways of overcoming obstacles to reconciliation. Specifically, the report argues that the OSCE should hold seminars on the relationship between reconciliation and conflict resolution, produce reports focused on past case studies and a handbook on best practices, and creating a pool of reconciliation experts. In addition, the OSCE could examine whether new technologies offer innovative means of reconciliation support and design a programme that encourages the participation of civil society actors in reconciliation efforts (pp. 20-1).

Measures that could be taken by the OSCE in relation to transnational threats mentioned in the report include encouraging transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyberspace, providing a platform for dialogue on cyber risks and security, as well as on national cyber defence systems and international standards, fostering cybersecurity CBMs, further advancing an OSCE framework for addressing terrorism, holding seminars with civil society actors on preventing radicalization, encourage de-radicalization and re-integration, promoting dialogue on preventing the spread of mafia organisations, producing a handbook for businesses on preventing drug-related crime, and engaging in joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (pp. 21-2).

In the area of economic security, the OSCE is encouraged to raise awareness and foster consensus on issues that can lead to tension, such as energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration. Mediation in instances of disputes linked to transboundary issues are also called for in the report. The OSCE could also assist states with the implementation of international environmental regulatory frameworks, such as the 1991 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context and the 1998 UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation on Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (p. 23).

Issues discussed in relation to human security are not specified as threats as such, although provisions in that area are seen as critical to building a security community. As such, recommendations are put forward in the report to strengthen the OSCE *acquis* in this area. Specifically, the report suggests combining the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) and Human Dimension Committees (HDC) activities in an integrated way, assisting with the creation of a common baseline for a state reporting system to facilitate the HDIM and HDC in their work, rethink the scheduling and reduce the duration of the HDIM. It also calls for the OSCE to facilitate dialogue between its participating states and their respective Muslim communities as means of reducing mistrust between secular and moderate Islamist forces (p. 24). The OSCE could facilitate CBMs between secular state representatives and secular and Islamist civil society actors, initiate talks on the relations between secular states and their Muslim communities in OSCE sub-regions, explore lessons learnt in preventing radicalization, and organize a conference on the Arab Spring and its repercussions with the OSCE's Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation (p. 25).

Due to its inclusive nature and comprehensive approach to security, the OSCE is believed to be well-suited to addressing the transnational threats. However, the report stresses that activities in this area should not produce overlaps with other international organizations (p. 21).

In relation to the potential instability caused by the pull-out of International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014, the OSCE is encouraged to consider what this could mean for OSCE engagement in Afghanistan and Central Asia more broadly. In particular, the report suggests that the OSCE participating states, in discussion with Partners for Co-operation, should discuss whether activities defined under the Madrid mandate agreed in 2007 require modification. The report argues that through the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security, OSCE participating states should engage in broader talks with the UN, NATO, the CSTO and relevant Partners for Co-operation (pp. 19-20).

Finally, the report suggests that an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions be established to enhance the role of civil society in achieving the aims of the OSCE. Such a network could advise the OSCE and its participating states, inform the academic debate on issues related to building a security

community, and serve as a platform for discussion on issues, such as those relevant to Helsinki + 40. A network of this kind could build upon initiatives already underway, such as the ‘OSCE Security Days’ (pp. 25-6).

Table 12: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -OSCE -EU -NATO -CSTO -The Customs Union 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -arms control -CBMs -reconciliation -dialogue -sharing of best practices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -new divergences between state agendas -a reduced willingness to compromise on issues -erosion of established areas of cooperative security -uneven implementation of OSCE norms -different levels of state security -securitization of energy and natural resources are being securitized -divergent priorities and approaches to tackling terrorism 	<p><u>Military security:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -if extension of CFE Treaty is overcome, the extension of arms control to new weapons and monitoring rather than limiting new categories of weapons -the OSCE should restart negotiations on a modernized arms control agreement -CSBMs in relation to conventional forces through the Open Skies Treaty and modernized Vienna Document, as well as the inclusion of additional CSBMs at the bilateral and regional levels -early warning and early action in relation conflict prevention -the development of a conflict mediation capacity within the OSCE -OSCE should draw on lessons learnt from previous historical cases and reinvigorate reconciliation efforts -create a pool of reconciliation experts -examine whether new technologies offer innovative means of reconciliation support -engage civil society in reconciliation efforts <p><u>Securing the global commons:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -further develop approaches to address transnational security challenges without creating overlap with other institutions <p><u>Economic security:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -raise awareness and foster consensus on issues that can lead to tension, such as energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration <p><u>Human security:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -combining the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) and Human Dimension Committees (HDC) activities in an integrated way -facilitate dialogue and CBMs between its participating states and their respective Muslim communities and explore lessons learnt in preventing radicalization -assess the implications of the Arab Spring with OSCE’s Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation <p><u>Geographic scope:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - reassess OSCE activities in relation to Afghanistan in cooperation with partners <p><u>Engagement of civil society:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -create an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions

3.7 “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Report Prepared for Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Publics,” 2013, pp. 1-35.

3.7.1 Authors and objectives

“Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Report Prepared for Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Publics” is a report resulting from a track II dialogue co-chaired by Des Browne, Member, House of Lords, Wolfgang Ischinger, former Deputy Foreign Minister, Germany, Igor S. Ivanov, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia, and Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, NTI, and comprising distinguished former senior political leaders, senior military officials, defence officials and security experts drawn from Europe, Russia and the US. The talks aimed at initiating a dialogue on military issues and their linkages to other security concerns as a means of paving the way for transformative change in the Euro-Atlantic region. Discussions began during the Munich conference in February 2012 and were finalized through a series of meetings subsequently held in Washington, Moscow and Paris, in which political, military and civil leaders gathered in 2013.⁵

3.7.2 Security environment

3.7.2.1 Nature and hierarchy of threats

Reflecting the objective of the track II dialogue, military threats are given priority within the report. The use – or potential use – of nuclear capabilities and missile defences are considered the most urgent security threats within the Euro-Atlantic region (p. 7). The threat of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile is considered a possibility, particularly given the proliferation of cyber threats and nuclear missile capabilities. The prompt-launch status of nuclear weapons is viewed as a key dimension to this problem (p. 9). The threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons is seen as being linked to their vulnerability to theft, for instance by terrorists, or to unauthorized use. Part of the problems is perceived to be the absence of verification and transparency regarding US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons (p. 10).

Missile defences are identified as a perceived threat on the part of Russia, given that the US missile defence programme has no clear endpoint and could, therefore, compromise Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. While the New Start Treaty recognizes the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, Russia and the US do not agree on the implications of that interrelationship (p. 15).

Conventional weapons are viewed as representing a security threat in so far as there is an asymmetry between Russian and NATO/US conventional forces. The weaker position of Russia as regards conventional forces in conjunction with its distrust about the intentions behind NATO enlargement and concerns about maintaining territorial integrity, have led it to rely more heavily on nuclear

⁵ “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Report Prepared for Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Publics,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/building-mutual-security-euro-atlantic-region-report-prepared-presidents-prime-ministers-parliamentarians-and-publics/>, accessed 23 July 2013.

weapons. In particular, it has resulted in Russia maintaining a greater number of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil than the US. This, in turn, has led to NATO member states feeling that Russian tactical nuclear weapons are aimed at them. Their concern is thus with reducing Russian tactical nuclear weapons before any alterations are made in NATO’s nuclear posture (p. 11).

Conventional global strike forces are seen in the US as a means of providing the ability to launch attacks within 60 minutes against terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. From the Russian point of view, prompt-strike capabilities risk creating instability in the Euro-Atlantic region, as well as globally, altering the existing balance of strategic offensive weapons (p. 18).

In relation to transnational threats, the potential for attacks on military, civilian and government cyber networks is viewed as a threat that is gaining in relevance, though not as pressing as military threat perceptions. Specifically, cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusive activities are cited as concerns, particularly if they become associated with a conventional military strike. Cybercrime could also trigger a false warning of a missile attack leading to a broader crisis. Lastly, space is identified as an area of activities that could undermine strategic stability (p. 26).

Table 13: Security environment

Nature of threats and hierarchy of threats	Geographical scope	Actors	Agency
-military security -transnational threats (*cyber threats) - space	-the Euro-Atlantic zone (including Russia)	-states -global commons	-states -regional organisations

3.7.2.2. Actors, agency and geographical scope

States – Russia, the US and member states of NATO in Europe – and their regional organisations are those actors identified as perceiving a major threat from strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Similarly, states are conceived as those actors with agency to reduce those threat perceptions. In relation to cyber threats and space, the security of the global commons as well as states is viewed as being affected. Russia and the US, and to a lesser extent France and the UK, as possessors of nuclear weapons are perceived as having the greatest responsibility and potential agency in reducing the gaps in their threat perceptions as well as reducing the threat perceptions of NATO states in Europe. The geographic scope of strategic concern spans from the Atlantic to Europe to Russia.

3.7.3 Security governance system: institutions, practices and hurdles

NATO is clearly a key institution where strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and BMD are concerned. The NATO-Russia Council in particular is seen as an important forum within which to address threat perceptions associated with missile defences. The OSCE is viewed as providing an institutional setting for reinforcing CSBMs in relation to conventional forces (p. 23). Important practices within the security governance system include arms control and CSBMs. Obstacles to achieving mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic area are believed to include policy inertia, continuing divides and lack of trust (p. 4). The inability of the existing institutional architecture to allow a

comprehensive approach to reducing the most pressing threat perceptions is also seen as a major obstacle.

3.7.4 Proposed initiatives

The report proposes the creation of an informal Euro-Atlantic contact group, comprised of leaders from key Euro-Atlantic states, and potentially joined by representatives from the EU, OSCE and NATO. This contact group would lay the groundwork for a new phase of dialogue by defining the principles of talks, the potential participants and the central issues and the priorities to be discussed. Leaders would then initiate various dialogue tracks in both established and new frameworks for dialogue. Already existing tracks referred to in the report include the Russia-NATO Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation of the OSCE. The authors of the report argue that while these institutional fora may be suitable for dialogue on some issues, bilateral discussions may also be appropriate for other issues. Others still may require multilateral talks involving different areas of Europe, or the whole of the region, and some may require the involvement of China (p. 6).

While existing institutional mechanisms are thought important, one of the main recommendations of the report is the creation of a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum that would aim to implement the recommendations advanced in the report and provide a framework for sustaining discussions designed to create a Euro-Atlantic security community. The motivation for establishing a new framework for cooperation and coordination is both to symbolize and facilitate a novel approach to enhancing mutual security across the region. The proposed forum is conceived as a framework for specific measures outlined in the report associated with security threats emanating from nuclear and conventional forces, missile defences, prompt-strike capabilities, cyber threats and activities in space (pp. 7-8).

In relation to military security threats, measures suggested in the report to reduce the likelihood of use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons include a reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed on prompt-launch status, a shift of force postures so that the overall reliance on deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons is reduced, encouraging the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and developing propositions for nuclear threat reduction. Specifically, the report suggests that the US and Russia should agree to reduce a proportion of the strategic nuclear forces from prompt-launch status. Commitments could be made either in relation to existing force levels or to those under the New START ceiling (p. 11). The first step would be to agree to start a process to remove nuclear weapons from prompt-launch status. The second step would be to reduce the number of nuclear weapons deployed with this status to several hundred (p. 12). As a voluntary CBM, France and the UK could make shadow declarations regarding future plans for their nuclear forces. France and the UK could also provide data consistent with that provided by Russia and the US under the New Start Agreement, and Russia and the US could provide the data they exchange under the New Start to both France and the UK. With regards tactical nuclear weapons, the report recommends that the US, NATO and Russia take steps to increase CSBMs, such as providing stockpile data on the number of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (p. 13). Following CSBMs, a US/NATO and Russia dialogue on reciprocal reductions in tactical nuclear is also proposed. A five-year target for consolidating US tactical nuclear weapons, accompanied by reciprocal cuts by Russia, is suggested (p. 14).

As regards missile defences, the report puts forward a number of propositions. Several CSBMs are suggested. The exchange of information on systems capabilities and observation of tests as well as annual disclosures of the state of missile defence capabilities are proposed. Such initiatives would be aimed at demonstrating the limited nature of missile defences stationed in Europe and that they are not intended to enable a preemptive ballistic missile strike targeted at Russian strategic nuclear forces (p. 16). Joint missile defence exercises by Russia, the US and NATO are also put forward as a means of increasing mutual knowledge of equipment, doctrine, tactics and capabilities, with a view to eventually generating compatibility in terms of information systems and interception. The aim of joint exercises is to provide reassurance that missile defence systems do not erode strategic deterrence. They are also thought to provide a basis for future cooperative operations in relation to non-strategic missile threats. The report also envisages the pooling and sharing of data generated from early warning systems in joint NATO/US/Russian Missile Defence Cooperation Centres. The early warning information generated by such centres could then be transmitted to Russian and NATO/US command and control centres (p. 16). Cooperative Missile Defence Centres are also believed to provide a basis for the creation of a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum that would have a remit that goes beyond missile defences, addressing also nuclear and conventional forces, cybersecurity and space. Finally, political commitments from Russia, NATO and the US not to deploy missile defences in ways that would create instability are recommended (p. 17).

A number of possible actions that could be taken to reduce the gap in threat perceptions linked to prompt-strike forces are advocated by the authors of the report. Reciprocal transparency is proposed as a means of reducing the risk that a state may perceive itself the potential target of an attack. This is viewed as including, for instance, transparency in relation to programmes as well as operations and CBMs, such as advance warning about test launches, exercises and imminent use. Missile Defence Cooperation Centres are proposed as forming the institutional setting in which such information is shared (p. 18). Legally binding commitments on quantitative limits related to the development and deployment of prompt-strike forces is also suggested. In addition, the report proposes that states announce where bases would be located and what quantity of prompt-strike forces would be deployed on them, making clear that they would be separated from any activities or deployments connected to nuclear weapons. Inspections by other countries should also be agreed (p. 19).

Also in relation to conventional forces, the report argues in favour of strengthening CSBMs aimed at reducing threat perceptions associated with conventional forces in Europe. In the event of a collapse of the CFE regime, the Vienna Document is believed to be a good basis for increased visits and monitoring activities. Similarly, the Open Skies Treaty could be expanded to include a greater number of Euro-Atlantic states and expanding the collection capabilities under the auspices of the OSCE. The report also argues that agreed provisions to extend decision-making time and agreements for their implementation along with CSBMs should be sought, without undermining the future of the CFE Treaty. Talks on CSBMs and measures to increase decision time are envisaged as taking place either within the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation or a new forum (p. 23).

In relation to cyber threats, the report recommends creating a forum for cooperative early warning information about cyber threats, particularly in the military security domain, as well as information sharing on dangerous cyber events and mutual investigations. Such a forum is conceived as eventually forming a framework for shared approaches to cyber defence. The report also suggests

establishing a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum based on US-Russian discussions on CBMs in cyberspace (pp. 24-5).

Measures recommended in the area of space are limited, due to the lower priority given to this area. The authors of the report argue for the implementation of an information exchange pilot project that would facilitate an agreement on an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities. It is suggested that either the Missile Defence Cooperative Centres or a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum proposed in the report could provide institutional fora for the exchange of information outlined in such a code of conduct, and could eventually provide a venue for the discussion of CBMs or legally binding agreements in relation to activities in space (p. 27).

Table 14: Security governance system and proposed initiatives

Institutions	Practices	Hurdles	Proposed initiatives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -NATO -OSCE -EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -arms control -confidence-building measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -continuing divides and lack of trust -inability of the existing institutional architecture to allow a comprehensive approach to security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -creation of an informal Euro-Atlantic contact group - creation of a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum <p><u>Military security:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed on prompt-launch status -shift force postures to reduce overall reliance on deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons -encourage the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons -develop propositions for nuclear threat reduction -reciprocal transparency measures in relation to missile defence -joint missile defence exercises by Russia, the US and NATO -pooling and sharing of BMD data -legally binding commitments on quantitative limits related to the development and deployment of prompt-strike forces -announcements regarding where bases would be located and what quantity of prompt-strike forces -strengthen confidence- and security-building measures in order to reduce threat perceptions linked to conventional forces in Europe - Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty to provide a basis for CSBMs <p><u>Securing the global commons:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -cooperative early warning information -information sharing on dangerous cyber events and mutual investigations -creation of a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum -information exchange pilot project regarding space-related activities -an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities

4 Comparison of the studies

This section compares the ways in which the reports conceive of the security environment. First, it examines the nature of the security threats outlined in the reports, as well as the relative priority given to them. Second, it considers what is perceived as being threatened or challenged. Third, it compares how the different studies conceive of the principle security providers. And, finally, it compares the geographic scope of strategic concern as set out in each of the reports.

4.1 Security environment

4.1.1 Nature and hierarchy of security threats

Geostrategic shifts – Broad geostrategic issues are considered major security threats by several reports. The marginalization of Russia and Europe, the potential formation of a US-China diarchy and further NATO expansion are considered key threats to Russia’s security in particular by the Valdai International Discussion Club.

Military security – All of the reports, apart from those of Serfaty and the Valdai International Discussion Club, identify military security threats as top priorities within the overall security threat environment. However, whether military threats include both conventional and nuclear forces and the relative importance of each type of military force differs. In addition, whether military forces are seen as posing a threat due to their interrelationship with other security threats or challenges is also treated differently in the respective reports.

All of the reports that view military threats as major security concerns identify conventional forces as a major source of threat. What the key issues are in relation to conventional forces is, however, conceived differently. The EWI prioritizes threats from conventional forces in Europe in general terms in its third scenario. The other reports highlight different issues in relation to conventional forces. The EASI emphasizes the limited warning and decision time associated with the use of force as the major issue. IDEAS views the potential for the use of conventional forces in Europe in relation to protracted conflicts as a critical concern. “Building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region” view the asymmetry between US/NATO and Russian conventional forces as the key issue in relation to conventional forces, which heighten Russia’s threat perception regarding conventional forces and its subsequent reliance on nuclear weapons as a counterweight. This report also adds conventional prompt-strike forces as a critical type of conventional military threat, due to their capacity to generate strategic instability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation also implies that Russia’s relative disadvantage in conventional arms is a major source of instability in the region.

Nuclear weapons are given priority in several of the reports that emphasize military threats as a priority. Again, the issues that are viewed as key differ slightly in the various reports. In its third scenario, the EWI views nuclear threats as emanating in particular from the Middle East. For the EASI, the primary issue of concern is the short warning and decision time. Whereas “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” views the continuation of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) postures in relation to strategic nuclear weapons as the principal concern. The potential for accidental or unauthorized use of ballistic missiles is also perceived as a significant threat, especially in relation to cyber threats and the proliferation of nuclear missile capabilities. The possibility of theft of tactical nuclear weapons and their use by, for instance, terrorists is also perceived as a major

worry. A principal factor in heightening the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons is the lack of registering mechanisms in Russia and the US.

Missile defences are considered a major threat by the EWI, in its third scenario, the EWI/Ditchley Foundation and “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region”. Missile defences as a primary issue in Russia’s threat perceptions are emphasized in the latter report, due to the lack of a clear end point of the US missile defence system and its potential capacity to erode Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent.

Only the EWI and IDEAS prioritizes protracted conflicts. The former specifically mentions those in the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea region. The latter report also mentions ongoing conflicts in Eastern Europe and South Eastern Europe. In both reports, protracted conflicts are discussed as dimensions of military security, rather than human security. Protracted conflicts and historical enmity are discussed as important threats to human security rather than military security by the EASI.

Transnational threats to security –Transnational security issues are considered as major security threats only by the EASI and EWI/Ditchley Foundation. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation views the threat as coming from cyber warfare, whereas the EASI sees threat perceptions linked to a lack of transparency in cyber practices, as well as cybercrime as the key dimensions of cyber threats. Other transnational threats to security qualified as major security threats are set out by Serfaty and the EWI/Ditchley Foundation. They include international terrorism in the former’s report, especially in connection to the proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles, and political manipulation and communal conflict in the latter’s.

Transnational threats to security are, however, considered of secondary importance in the majority of reports. Those transnational threats that are given the most attention in the reports are climate change, organized crime, cyber threats and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. They are described as important, but not priority security issues by Serfaty, the EWI/Ditchley Foundation (with the exception of cyber threats), the Valdai International Discussion Club, IDEAS and “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region”.

Economic security – In almost all the reports under examination, non-military threats are considered as secondary and even tertiary security threats. Within the category of secondary security threats and challenges is economic issues, linked to energy and natural resources, as well as environmental concerns are given attention in a number of the reports. Serfaty focuses on broad economic concerns, such as poverty, as well as access to natural resources. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation identify energy dependence and economic crises as potential threats to security. Energy disputes and competition over natural resources are identified by the EASI as important economic security concerns. The exception is the Valdai International Discussion Club, which views principally Russia’s, although also Europe’s, lack of economic strength as the major security issue. Economic security issues are considered tertiary concerns by the EASI.

4.1.2 Actors and agency

Those actors whose security is considered in the reports are generally thought to be states. However, which states’ security is of major concern partly depends on the definition of the boundaries of the security community (i.e. which states are included within it) and the nature of the threats thought to

Table 15: Comparison of security environments

Study	Nature and hierarchy of security threats	Actors	Agency	Geographical scope
Simon Serfaty, "An Opportune Moment for a Shared Euro-Atlantic Security Strategy"	-transnational threats linked to WMD proliferation, long-range missiles, and international terrorism -economic security challenges -human security challenges -environmental security threats	-individuals -states (US and EU member states) -global commons	-states -regional organizations (EU, US/NATO)	-Russia to the Persian Gulf
EWI, "Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths"	<u>Scenario 1:</u> -military security threats -Economic security threats -Cyber security threats <u>Scenario 2:</u> -military security threats -transnational threats (terrorism) <u>Scenario 3:</u> -military security threat -transnational threats (WMD proliferation)	-states -sub-state communities -global commons	-states (Russia and the US) -Euro-Atlantic and Eastern regional organizations -international organisations	<u>Scenario 1:</u> -OSCE zone plus Afghanistan and Pakistan <u>Scenario 2:</u> -Atlantic through Europe to Russia to Central Asia to the Iran to northeast Asia <u>Scenario 3:</u> -Atlantic through Europe to Russia to Central Asia to the Middle East and Persian Gulf to northeast Asia
EWI and the Ditchley Foundation, "Consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security"	-military threats -transnational threats (cyber warfare) -internal security threats	-Euro-Atlantic states, including Russia and Turkey -individuals	-states -regional organisations -civil society actors	-Euro-Atlantic to Russia to Turkey to Central Asia (including Afghanistan)
The Valdai International Discussion Club, "Towards an Alliance of Europe"	- geopolitical concerns -transnational threats and challenges -conflict of civilizations	-states, specifically Russia and EU member states	-states -regional organisations, principally the EU -civil society actors	-Europe, to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, South Asia, China, northeast Asia
EASI, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Security Community"	-military threats -human security -economic security	-states -sub-state communities -regional actors	-states -regional and sub-regional organisations/institutions -civil society actors	-the Arctic to the Euro-Atlantic Europe to Russia and the Caucasus
IDEAS, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Eurasian Security Community"	-military security -transnational threats -economic security threats -environmental security -political Islam	-states -political and politico-religious communities, including sub-state communities -global commons	-states and their regional institutions -civil society actors	-Euro-Atlantic (including Russia) to Central Asia (including Afghanistan)
"Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region"	-military security -transnational threats (cyber threats) - space	-states -global commons	-states -regional organisations	-the Euro-Atlantic zone (including Russia)

affect the security community. The US and EU member states are the focus of Serfaty's paper. Euro-Atlantic states more broadly, including Russia and Turkey, are specifically mentioned by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation. For the Valdai International Discussion Club, Russia and EU member states take on particular importance. Sub-state communities are also considered in several of the reports as

the objects of security, notably those that give attention to protracted conflicts, namely that of the EWI and the EASI, respectively. The latter also takes into account the security of sub-state communities in relation to the impact of exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic on indigenous and local communities. In relation to Muslim communities in secular states, sub-state communities' security is also considered by IDEAS. Human beings, in relation to poverty for example, are also mentioned as security actors by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation. The global commons forms the object of security in a number of the reports. This is largely linked to reports that discuss environmental security, such as that of Serfaty and the EASI. "Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region" also considers the security of the global commons, due to its identification of the militarization of space as a potential security threat.

States and their regional organisations are believed to be the main providers of security in all of the reports. Some states are conceived as particularly important in this regard, depending on the nature of the security environment described in the reports. For example, the role of Russia and the US are emphasized by the EWI and in the Valdai International Discussion Club's report, Russia and the EU states take on particular significance. Regional organisations and, in some cases, international organisations are also considered important security providers. The relative importance attributed to them is discussed in the section comparing the security governance systems (section 4.2). In some of the reports, civil society actors are also deemed as having the potential to contribute to security. Civil society is attributed agency for the most part in those reports that consider protracted and communal conflicts, as well as economic issues as forming part of the threat environment. This is the case in those by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation, the EASI and IDEAS. By the EASI in relation to the former and by the Valdai International Discussion Club in connection to the latter.

4.1.3 Geographical scope

The geographical area of strategic concern described in the reports is subject to variation. The most limited area of concern is outlined by Serfaty, who sees threats to security emanating from Russia to the Persian Gulf. The zone of strategic concern described by "Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region" is also fairly limited, running from the Atlantic to Russia. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation see threats stemming from the Atlantic to Europe to Russia to Turkey and Central Asia (including Afghanistan). The EASI views the area of instability as ranging from the Arctic to the Atlantic to Europe to Russia and the Caucasus. The OSCE zone plus Afghanistan and Pakistan is the area of concern set out by the EWI. Similarly, IDEAS describes an area of strategic concern as running from the Atlantic to Europe to Russia and Central Asia (including Afghanistan). The largest zone from which threats are believed to originate, spanning Europe, the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf), South Asia, China, northeast Asia is outlined by the Valdai International Discussion Club.

4.2 The security governance system

This section compares the security architecture and associated practices as conceived in the respective reports, as well as the way in which the reports view hurdles to ensuring mutual security.

4.2.1 Institutions, security practices and hurdles

Serfaty considers only NATO and the EU as the principle relevant regional institutions within a fairly narrowly defined Euro-Atlantic zone. This security architecture is slightly expanded to include not just NATO and the EU but also the OSCE in a number of the reports, notably those by the EWI/Ditchley

Foundation, the Valdai International Discussion Club, the EASI and “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region”. In EWI’s report, this security architecture is extended to include not only NATO, the EU and the OSCE but also a number of other institutions. In its first scenario, the UNSC is also mentioned as a relevant institution. In its second scenario, the CSTO is also included, and in the report’s third scenario the CSTO and SCO are also believed to be important institutions.

The main security governance practices outlined in the majority of reports are cooperative security arrangements, such as dialogue, arms control, CSMBs, conflict prevention mechanisms, reconciliation, sharing of best practices and collaboration with partners. Serfaty alone identifies collective defence in relation to military threats and military intervention as dominant practices. Stabilization is, however, discussed by Serfaty and the EWI/Ditchley Foundation. Economic partnership and economic integration are identified only by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation and the Valdai International Discussion Club.

A number of hurdles to achieving mutual security within the security community are defined in the reports. The principle obstacles identified in the reports that focus on a fairly narrow Euro-Atlantic security, namely those by Serfaty, EWI/Ditchley Foundation, which tend to view weaknesses in EU military capabilities and divergences in EU members’ strategic cultures as a key obstacles. NATO and the US’s relative weakness in soft or non-military or coercive forms of power are also highlighted as a hurdle by Serfaty. Inadequacies in terms of institutional mechanisms and capacities are also discussed in relation to internal security challenges by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation. The ineffectiveness of existing institutional frameworks designed to improve Russian-EU cooperation are also cited as a hurdle by the Valdai International Discussion Club. The EU’s lack of inclusion of Turkey is also explicitly mentioned as a hurdle to furthering security in the Euro-Atlantic region by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation.

For those reports that also see the OSCE as part of the security architecture, the disconnect between NATO’s principle of collective defence and the OSCE’s principle of cooperative security are viewed as creating fissures in the security governance system. This is the case in the reports by Serfaty and the EWI/Ditchley Foundation, respectively. Erosion of the commitment to cooperative security is also outlined in the latter report, as well as in that of the IDEAS, which also cites the uneven implementation of agreed-upon norms as a hurdle. Divergences in values are highlighted by the Valdai International Discussion Club.

The continuation of Cold War thinking and postures is also identified as a major hurdle to mutual security by EASI, as well as historical enmities and distrust by the Valdai International Discussion Club. In addition, divergent priorities and approaches to new post-Cold War security concerns are also highlighted in several reports as hurdles, particularly in relation to international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD in that by Serfaty and IDEA, respectively. The reluctance to share information is identified as a hurdle in relation to tackling cyber threats by EASI.

Table 16: Comparison of security governance systems

Study	Institutions	Practices	Hurdles
Simon Serfaty, "An Opportune Moment for a Shared Euro-Atlantic Security Strategy"	-EU and NATO	-intervention -stabilization, -collective defence -collaboration with partners	-US/NATO weakness in terms of soft power -EU's lack of military capabilities, divergent strategic cultures -lack of consensus between Europeans and US regarding counterterrorism, WMD proliferation and priority given to the Middle East
EWI, "Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths"	<u>Scenario 1:</u> -OSCE, NATO, EU, UNSC	<u>Scenario 1:</u> -dialogue -CSBMs	-loss of mutual confidence -increase in tensions and divergences with regards to practices and principles -renewed East-West division in strategic thinking -unraveling of the CFE Treaty -tensions linked to BMD
	<u>Scenario 2:</u> -OCSE, NATO, EU, CSTO	<u>Scenario 2:</u> -legal, political and military instruments	
	<u>Scenario 3:</u> -OCSE, NATO, EU, CSTO, SCO	<u>Scenario 3:</u> -dialogue -arms control -collaboration with partners	
EWI and Ditchley Foundation, "Consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security"	-NATO, EU, OSCE	-collective defence CBMs -conflict prevention mechanisms -stabilization operations -economic partnership -partnerships with regional organisations	-weak military capabilities and divergences among EU member states in strategic thinking -EU indecision on the accession of Turkey -disconnect between NATO principle of collective defence and the OSCE principle of indivisible security need to be reconciled -declining commitment to cooperative security in the OSCE area -Euro-Atlantic security institutions ill-prepared to address internal security threats and challenges
The Valdai International Discussion Club, "Towards an Alliance of Europe"	-NATO, EU, OSCE	-mechanisms to further cooperative approaches -economic integration	-differences in values and mistrust -ineffectiveness of established mechanisms to improve EU-Russian cooperation
EASI, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Security Community"	-NATO, OSCE, EU	-dialogue -CBMs -reconciliation -conflict resolution	-continuation of Cold War postures and thinking -historical divisions and ongoing post-Cold War security concerns -historical enmities -renationalization of decision-making and weakening of the Euro-American bonds -reluctance to share information on national cybersecurity measures
IDEAS, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Eurasian Security Community"	-OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO, Customs Union	-arms control -CBMs -reconciliation -dialogue -sharing of best practices	-new divergences between state agendas -a reduced willingness to compromise on issues -erosion of established areas of cooperative security -uneven implementation of OSCE norms -different levels of state security -securitization of energy and natural resources are being securitized -divergent priorities and approaches to tackling terrorism
"Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region"	-NATO, OSCE, EU	-arms control -CBMs	-continuing divides and lack of trust -inability of the existing institutional architecture to allow a comprehensive approach to security

4.2.2. Proposed initiatives

4.2.2.1 Military security

Conventional forces - The narrow view of the Euro-Atlantic security community taken by Serfaty leads to the recommendation that the EU should develop its military capabilities further. The Valdai International Discussion Club similarly focuses on enhancing capabilities, but within a wider Europe

that includes principally Russia. It argues for joint cooperation in the development of military technologies and joint peacekeeping operations. Other reports generally take a broader view of the security community and, therefore, put forward a wider set of recommendations mostly linked to conventional arms control and CSBMS connected to conventional forces. In relation to arms control, in its Scenario 1, the EWI calls for the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Its Scenario 2 seeks measures on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. Similarly, IDEAS argues for the extension of arms control to new weapons and also calls for the OSCE to restart negotiations on a modernized arms control agreement. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation, the Valdai International Discussion Club, the EASI and “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” do not propose arms control initiatives associated with conventional forces.

The majority of the reports make recommendations for enhanced CSBMs in relation to conventional forces. The EWI in its Scenario 1 argues for increased transparency of strategic conceptions and military doctrines between the US, Russia, NATO and the CSTO. Its Scenario 3 calls for a more robust code of conduct on the politico-military aspects of security. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation argue that the OSCE should promote commitment to a regime aimed at monitoring and reporting on conventional forces in *and* outside Europe. The EASI recommends transparency in deployments, restrictions in military exercises near the NATO-Russia border, limitations on military build-ups and manoeuvres and avoidance of forward deployment of offensive weapons systems. IDEAS proposes limits on the deployments of conventional arms, without specifying further what this might imply. It also calls for increased efforts to overcome difficulties associated with the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, joint threat assessments and responses, and joint training and exercises. In relation to the modernization of the Vienna Document, it calls for the provision of advanced information about military exercises. It also proposes the development of additional CSBMs at bilateral and regional levels. “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” also views the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document as providing a good basis for CSBMs in relation to conventional forces.

Only “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” makes recommendations in connection to conventional prompt-strike forces, which include legally-binding commitments on quantitative limits on both the development and deployment of prompt-strike forces, and transparency in relation to where bases are situated and the number of prompt-strike forces located on them.

Nuclear forces - With regards to nuclear arms control, EWI in its Scenario 2 calls for an extension of the START Treaty. Its Scenario 3 proposes the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” also proposes working towards the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

CSBMs associated with nuclear weapons are suggested in several of reports. The EASI argues in favour of separating tactical nuclear warheads from their delivery systems. “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” proposes reducing the number of strategic and nuclear weapons deployed on prompt-launch status, promoting a general shift in military postures so that they rely less on both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and developing proposals for nuclear threat reduction.

Ballistic missile defences – a number of the reports make recommendations in relation to BMD. In its Scenario 1, the EWI encourages talks on cooperative missile defence. Its Scenario 2 goes further and suggests establishing US-Russian cooperation on BMD and the creation of a joint BMD centre. Its Scenario 3 calls for a treaty on anti-missile defences and the creation of joint centres for the analysis and monitoring of missile threats. EASI calls for a dialogue on CSBMs in relation to BMD. “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” also suggests CSBMs, such as reciprocal transparency, joint missile defence exercises between Russia and the US/NATO, and the pooling and sharing of data.

Space – the militarization of space is only discussed by “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region”, which suggests setting up a pilot project for the exchange of information and the creation of a Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities.

Protracted Conflicts – In its Scenario 2, the EWI suggests establishing legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by the parties to the conflict in the Southern Caucasus. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation propose establishing an expert group to examine interconnected aspects of the conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The EASI suggests establishing a track II dialogue under the auspices of the OSCE on protracted conflicts. It also calls for leaders’ use of social media to promote peace, as well as placing the rights of individuals and minorities, as well as the right to self-determination without necessarily implying a right to secession, at the heart of renewed efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts.

Conflict prevention – In its Scenario 3, the EWI argues in favour of the establishment of a coordination mechanism for conflict prevention, dispute resolution and friendly inter-state relations. It also argues for the development of a more robust Code of Conduct on the Politico-military Dimensions of Security. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation call for a civil-military approach to preventative diplomacy. It also suggests that the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the CSTO and the SCO improve their conflict prevention capacities. IDEAS suggests that the OSCE in particular improve its early warning and early response capacities, and develop a conflict mediation capacity.

Historical reconciliation – The EASI proposes opening state archives, the development of new diplomatic tools, engaging civil society actors in reconciliation efforts, strengthening inter-societal linkages and cultural dialogue, and establishing a track II dialogue under the auspices of the OSCE in relation to historical reconciliation. IDEAS devotes considerable attention to overcoming historical enmity and, therefore, makes a number of recommendations for the OSCE in relation to this issue. These include: drawing on lessons learnt from previous historical cases; identifying ‘reconciliation stakeholders’ at the state and regional levels; providing support for relevant parties to find ways of overcoming obstacles to reconciliation; holding seminars on the relationship between reconciliation and conflict resolution; producing reports focused on past case studies and a handbook on best practices; creating a pool of reconciliation experts; examining whether new technologies offer innovative means of reconciliation support; and designing a programme that encourages the participation of civil society actors in reconciliation efforts.

4.2.2.2 Economic security

The EWI/Ditchley Foundation advise that the OSCE engage the business community from both the East and West in deliberations on economic security. The Valdai International Discussion Club, which is focused on economic issues, also makes a number of proposals. They include measures aimed at the integration of a wider Europe (including Russia): development of a pan-European communications system; coordination of transit between Europe and Asia and development of neighbouring Russian regions; a common framework for research and innovation; joint creation of 'science towns'; joint funding for the improvement of higher education institutions and efforts to improve student mobility; joint funding for small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as a harmonized space for investors; coordination of power transmission and distribution networks, as well as synchronization in the area of information and communication systems; coordination of macro-economic policies; joint measures to combat illicit migration; gradual abolition of visa regimes and the creation of a European company status; and joint international development assistance programmes. EASI also makes a number of recommendations connected to economic security, mostly linked to energy security. They include: abolishing visa regimes within the Euro-Atlantic zone; creating a mechanism for promoting cooperation on research and development in energy efficiency and innovation; creating a Joint Centre for Energy Innovation and Efficiency as proposed in the 2010 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue; furthering the compatibility of energy markets; reinforcing the Russia-EU early warning system on disruptions to European gas supply; and implementing measures proposed by EU-Russia Energy Dialogue to improve investment related to energy. IDEAS suggests raising awareness and generating consensus on issues that may lead to tension, including energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration.

4.2.2.3 Human security

Recommendations linked to human security are made by the EASI. One recommendation is institutional, namely the combining the OSCE's Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) and the Human Dimension Committees (HDC) in a more integrated manner. In terms of practices, it argues that dialogue and CBMs between participating states and their Muslim communities should be encouraged and facilitated by the OSCE. It also views the exploration of lessons learned from radicalization as an important exercise. Finally, the report argues that the implications of the Arab Spring ought to be further examined by OSCE participating states and their Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation. Protection of indigenous and local communities in the Arctic is also proposed by the EASI.

4.2.2.4 Securing the Global Commons

Cybersecurity – Most of the reports concerned with cybersecurity recommend CSBMs. The EASI calls for a dialogue between Russia, the US, and Europe on licit and illicit cyber practices, the standardization of legislation on cybercrime, as well as talks on possible early warning systems, sharing of best practices and measures to reinforce IT resilience. IDEAS recommends greater transparency in relation to cyber defence systems, engaging in a dialogue on cyber risks and security, and international standards. "Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region" proposes the development of early warning information, as well as information sharing on dangerous cyber events and mutual investigations, and also puts forward the idea of a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum.

Environmental security – IDEAS argues that the OSCE should mediate in cases of disputes connected to transboundary issues, as well as assist states with the implementation of environmental regulatory frameworks. Protection of the Arctic ecosystem is advocated by the EASI.

4.2.2.5 Transnational security

Terrorism – the EWI in its Scenario 1 proposes the expansion of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative. In its Scenario 2, joint action on preventing terrorist actions against energy transit is proposed. The Valdai International Discussion Club proposes very generally joint action on combating terrorism within a wider Europe. IDEAS proposes that the OSCE further develop a framework for tackling terrorism, as well as OSCE seminars aimed at engaging civil society actors on discussions of how to prevent radicalization and promote de-radicalization and reintegration. It also suggests that the OSCE cooperate with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

Organized crime – Joint measures within a wider Europe to combat organized crime are proposed by the Valdai International Discussion Club. Promoting talks on the prevention of the spread of mafia organizations and the production of a handbook for the private sector on preventing drug-related crime.

Piracy – Only the Valdai International Discussion Club argues in favour of joint measures between states in a wider Europe to combat piracy.

4.2.2.6 Widening the strategic area of concern

Afghanistan and Pakistan - Several reports recommend widening of the geographic zone of strategic concern beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. The EASI views Afghanistan as a strategic priority. As such, it proposes that the OSCE reassess its activities under the Madrid mandate, as well as use the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security to engage in dialogue with the UN, NATO, the CSTO and other Partners for Co-operation. In its Scenario 1, the EWI recommends cooperative efforts by the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the CSTO to address security concerns stemming from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran – The EWI in its Scenario 2 extends the geographic zone to North Korea and Iran, and recommends US-Russian and European cooperation on threats emanating from this expanded zone of concern.

The Arctic – The EASI gives special attention to the Arctic. It recommends the establishment of a high-level dialogue aimed at promoting transparency and confidence building associated with defence planning linked to the Arctic, as well as dialogue on threat perceptions connected to the Arctic.

Table 17: Comparison of proposed initiatives

Study	Military security	Economic Security	Human security	Securing the global commons	Transnational security	Geographic area of Strategic concern	New institutions and practices	Cooperation with partners
Simon Serfaty, "An Opportune Moment for a Shared Euro-Atlantic Security Strategy"	-improve EU military capabilities							-EU and NATO to converge strategic approaches
EWI, "Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths"	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - dialogue and CSBMs on BMD -further conventional arms control and CSBMs <p><u>Scenario 2: "partial reconstruction"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -further progress on resolving protracted conflicts in Southern Caucasus -re-invigorate conventional and nuclear arms control -US-Russian cooperation on BMD <p><u>Scenario 3: "fundamental transformation"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -improve conflict prevention capacities -promote a more robust Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security -reduction and eventual reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe -cooperative BMD 	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -increase focus on energy security <p><u>Scenario 2: "partial reconstruction"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -prevent terrorist measures against energy transit 		<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -increase focus on cyber security 	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -expand Cooperative Airspace Initiative <p><u>Scenario 3: "fundamental transformation"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -joint action on terrorism and measures to prevent terrorist attacks on energy transit on terrorism - NRC and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council to work on convergence on nuclear non-proliferation thinking 	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -cooperative efforts by the EU, OSCE, NATO and CSTO to address security concerns linked to Afghanistan and Pakistan <p><u>Scenario 3: "fundamental transformation"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - US-Russian-European cooperation on threats emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism 	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -refocus the Russia-NATO Council on European security issues <p><u>Scenario 3: "fundamental transformation"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -a joint BMD Center -creation of sub-regional cooperative collective security communities -NATO, EU and Russian overlapping security guarantees to countries in grey zones -implementation of EST -joint NATO-Russia counter-terrorism centre -a Euro-Atlantic Security Council -a Group of Eminent Persons to deliberate the EST proposal -a treaty on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe -a treaty on cooperation on anti-missile defence -centres for the joint monitoring and analysis of missile threats 	<p><u>Scenario 1: "remedial repair"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -greater collaboration between NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the CSTO and SCO -expert dialogue on EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO to further the convergence of their strategic visions <p><u>Scenario 3: "fundamental transformation"</u></p>

Table 17 continued

Study	Military security	Economic Security	Human security	Securing the global commons	Transnational security	Geographic area of Strategic concern	New institutions and practices	Cooperation with partners
EWI and the Ditchley Foundation, "Consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security"	<p><u>OSCE:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -revive conventional arms control -create an expert group on interconnected issues in conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus <p><u>NATO:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -mutual defence commitments in relation to non-conventional threats -convergence between NATO and EU strategies -civil-military approach to preventative diplomacy <p><u>Regional organizations (OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO):</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -advance conflict resolution through economic development -improve conflict prevention capacities 	<p><u>OSCE:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -engage the business community from the East and West in discussions on economic security 					<p><u>OSCE:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -a standing track II process aimed at improving OSCE functions -an ad hoc multilateral group comprising Russia, the EU and the US <p><u>NATO:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -a high-level mechanism for Russia-NATO discussions on cooperative missile defence-refocusing the NRC from 28 +1 to a 29 format to consider global challenges 	
The Valdai International Discussion Club, "Towards an Alliance of Europe"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -potential Russian NATO membership -broader Europe cooperation in the area of military technologies and joint peacekeeping operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -social and economic integration between Russia and the EU 					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -an Alliance for Europe codified in a treaty -a European Security Treaty, perhaps modeled on the Russian-proposed EST 	
EASI, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Security Community"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -expand transparency and other CSBMS in relation to conventional arms -promote dialogue and CSBMS in relation to nuclear weapons -dialogue on missile defence -strengthen reconciliation measures -place the individual and minority rights at the heart of conflict resolution in protracted conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -abolish of visa regimes -cooperation and CSBMS on energy security -further the compatibility of energy markets -implement measures proposed by EU-Russia Energy Dialogue to improve investment related to energy 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -dialogue between Russia, the US and Europe on licit/illicit cyber practices -standardizing and reinforcing legislation on cybercrime -discussions on cooperative early warning systems, sharing of best practices and measures to enhance IT resilience 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -OSCE to reassess Madrid mandate in Afghanistan -employ OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security to engage in broader talks with the UN, NATO, the CSTO and relevant Partners for Co-operation -dialogue and CSBMS in defence planning in related to the Arctic -dialogue on reducing threat perceptions linked to the Arctic 		

Table 17 continued

Study	Military security	Economic Security	Human security	Securing the global commons	Transnational security	Geographic area of Strategic concern	New institutions and practices	Cooperation with partners
IDEAS, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Eurasian Security Community"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -revive conventional arms control and strengthen CSBMS -early warning and early action in support of conflict prevention -the development of a conflict mediation capacity within the OSCE -OSCE to strengthen its reconciliation capacities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -raise awareness and foster consensus on issues that can lead to tension, such as energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -CSBMs between its participating states and their respective Muslim communities -explore lessons learnt in preventing radicalization -organize a conference on the Arab Spring and its repercussions with the OSCE's Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyberspace -dialogue on cyber risks and security, as well as on national cyber defence systems and international standards -mediation in instances of disputes linked to transboundary issues -OSCE to assist states with the implementation of international environmental regulatory frameworks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -further advancing an OSCE framework for addressing terrorism -promoting dialogue on the preventing the spread of mafia organizations -producing a handbook for businesses on preventing drug-related crime -engaging in joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -combining the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) and Human Dimension Committees (HDC) activities in an integrated way 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -the OSCE should restart negotiations on a modernized arms control agreement -create an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions 	
"Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -strengthen CSBMS in relation to conventional forces -further nuclear arms control and develop CSBMs reduction of strategic and tactical -CSBMs on BMD -limitations on conventional and CSBMs 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -cooperative early warning information -information sharing on dangerous cyber events and mutual investigations -creation of a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum Space: -information exchange pilot project on activities in space -develop an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -creation of an informal Euro-Atlantic contact group -creation of a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum 	

4.3. Evaluation of proposed initiatives

Some of the reports examined propose measures to improve the functioning of existing institutions, mechanisms or practices. Others are more ambitious and suggest measures that could be taken that seek to repair and partly restructure the existing security governance system. Others still, put forward propositions aimed at transforming the security governance system.

4.3.1 Improving the existing institutions, mechanisms and practices

Serfaty argues that a new EU strategy paper is required, partly as a means of generating more coherence with NATO. He also calls for the improved smart power capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic, implying improved military capabilities on the side of Europeans, on the one hand, and improved soft power capabilities on the American side, on the other. These initiatives would improve the capacity of US/NATO and the EU to respond effectively to security challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic area. They do not constitute measures that would restructure the existing security governance system, or even assist in addressing a myriad of older and newer issues.

Measures proposed by the EWI in its Scenario 1 – “remedial repair” – also fall within this category of recommendations. The suggested measures are modest and mostly aim at preventing a further deterioration of the current cooperative security arrangements through CBMs, such as joint monitoring of ballistic missile launches and overcoming blockages, such as ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty. How the difficulties in relation to the latter should be overcome is not specified. Improving relations with Russia and talks on cooperative missile defence are also suggested. The latter would be useful in as a confidence building measure in terms of recognizing a key Russian security concern. Improving regional institutional capacities in relation to energy and cybersecurity, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan, are also proposed and would help to address a number of non-military security threats that are often attributed significance.

IDEAS also sets out measures that seek to repair the existing security governance system. With regards to conventional forces, propositions outlined in the report aim to prevent the arms control regime from further crumbling through encouraging efforts to overcome difficulties connected to the Open Skies Treaty, for instance, and extending CSBMs through, for example, advanced information on military exercises under a modernized Vienna Document. Again, how difficulties that prevent the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty are to be overcome is not outlined. The report also calls for discussions on a modernized arms control agreement to be reanimated. Human security is also given attention in this report. The authors argue simply for improving the implementation of OSCE’s *acquis*, partly through improving institutional mechanisms and partly through CSBMs in relation to Muslim communities in secular states. The latter would constitute a useful contribution to human security as well as countering extremism that the OSCE could make. In relation to transnational security challenges, a general call for dialogue, further developing capacities to tackle these concerns is made. CSBMs are also suggested in relation to cybersecurity, such as transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyberspace. Efforts to assist in developing regulatory frameworks are also suggested in relation to environmental security. Specifically, the report argues that the OSCE should assist states with the implementation of international environmental regulatory frameworks, which would help to further the institution’s efficacy in this area. Engaging civil society, particularly in relation to preventing radicalization under the auspices of the OSCE, as suggested by IDEAS, would be

a helpful contribution to addressing an issue linked to newer threats facing the OSCE participating States. This could be a useful way of generating innovative approaches to older and newer security concerns. Again in relation to the OSCE, the report suggests involving civil society through the creation of an OSCE academic network. The report also calls for giving greater focus to Afghanistan within the OSCE, in cooperation with partners, which may be important in terms of achieving OSCE objectives.

4.3.2 Improving and partly restructuring existing institutions, mechanisms and practices

The EWI puts forward a set of measures that would partly restructure the existing governance system in its Scenario 2 - "partial reconstruction". Some of the suggested measures would alter the conditions generating a number of current threat perceptions, such as legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by parties to the conflict in the Southern Caucasus, reductions in conventional forces in Europe and US-Russian cooperation on BMD, for example. These may be thought of as "game changers" in terms of threat perceptions, particularly in relation to Russia and Central European states, as well as the protracted conflict in the Southern Caucasus. Its report also proposes overlapping security guarantees to states in security 'grey zones'. This proposition would also significantly improve mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic area, broadly defined. Moreover, collaboration with Russia on security threats emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism, could also contribute to improved relations with Russia, although different approaches to the latter in particular would prove challenging. The report's proposed creation of sub-regional cooperative collective security communities would also partially restructure the security governance system within the Euro-Atlantic area by leading to the creation of potentially new sub-regional institutions, mechanisms and perhaps practices. This could significantly improve the security situation in some sub-regions of the Euro-Atlantic zone.

The EWI/Ditchley Foundation partly seek to improve the existing security governance system through, for instance, exploration of measures to improve the OSCE's functioning and encouraging regular consultations between OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO. Others measures put forward in their report attempt to alter security relations between the West and Russia. These include the establishment of a high-level mechanism for Russia-NATO discussions on cooperative missile defence and refocusing the NATO - Russia Council from 28 +1 to a 29 format to consider global challenges. This may go some way to responding to Russia's grievance that it has never been considered by the West as a genuine partner. Some initiatives proposed in the report go further and seek to transform some practices and create new frameworks for cooperation. These include, for example, commitment to regular reporting of force deployments outside Europe that may affect the security of OSCE members, mutual defence commitments in relation to non-conventional threats, advancing approaches to the resolution of existing conflicts through economic development, the creation of an ad hoc multilateral group comprising Russia, the EU and the US.

The EASI proposes a number of CSBMs in relation to conventional military threats, such as transparency in deployments and restrictions on military exercises near the Russia-NATO border. This is also the case in relation to nuclear forces and related issues, where separating tactical nuclear warheads from delivery systems and a dialogue on missile defence CBMs are suggested. The EASI's proposed initiatives in the area of military security are, therefore, aimed at reducing tensions rather than overcoming significant impasses. Proposed initiatives aimed at reducing historical enmity and

protracted conflicts are aimed, however, at transforming societal relations through new approaches that engage civil society as well as explore how new technologies could be used to promote peace. Yet, intractable issues in relation to protracted conflicts are not addressed. It is in the area of economic security that the report is more ambitious and suggests new frameworks and practices. In connection to energy, a mechanism for promoting cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic region on research and development in energy efficiency and innovation and the creation of a Joint Centre for Energy Innovation and Efficiency is a specific measure that Russia and the EU could undertake, although it was already proposed in the 2010 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and is not a new proposition. However, in relation to tensions around access to natural resources in Arctic, proposed the exploration of a number of CSBMs that would be a useful contribution to reducing tensions, such as a high-level dialogue aimed at promoting transparency and confidence building related to defence planning connected to the Arctic. In relation to transnational security threats, the report focuses on CSBMs and capacity building in terms of cybersecurity that could be useful, and the creation of a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum could constitute an important mechanism with which to facilitate cooperation in this area.

The recommendations put forward by “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” would also partly restructure the existing security governance system. Measures suggested in connection with conventional forces aim at preventing the further unraveling of the arms control regime and constitute CSBMs based on, for instance, the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty. The proposition of measures in relation to conventional prompt-strike forces, such as the legally-binding commitments on quantitative limits related to the development and deployment of these types of forces, as well as announcements regarding where bases would be located, are potentially important measures in terms of reducing concerns that prompt-strike forces could create strategic instability. Other measures are intended as CSBMs in non-military security threats outlined in the report, namely cyber threats and the potential militarization of space. A new framework – a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum – is also suggested and could be a useful mechanism for facilitating cooperation in relation to cybersecurity. Other new and broader frameworks include an informal Euro-Atlantic contact group and a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum, which could be frameworks through which a comprehensive approach to all military and non-military issues might be discussed among all relevant states. In relation to nuclear weapons and related security concerns, it proposes measures that are both CSBMs and more ambitious measures, in particular between the West and Russia. The proposed reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons deployed on prompt-launch status and shifts force postures to reduce overall reliance on nuclear weapons would constitute significant measures contributing moving beyond Cold War military postures, but would need to be accompanied by initiatives to reduce Russia’s perceived weakness in conventional forces *vis-à-vis* NATO/US and its subsequent reliance on nuclear weapons. In relation to missile defence, joint missile defence exercises by Russia, the US and NATO and pooling and sharing of data are suggested. They would help to build confidence in relation to missile defences, but fall short of being “game changers”.

4.3.3 Transforming the security governance system

In the EWI’s Scenario 3 - “fundamental transformation” – recommendations that would significantly transform the security governance system are proposed. It envisages the implementation of the Russian-proposed EST. A treaty on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear

weapons in Europe, as well as one on cooperation on anti-missile defence, is proposed. A number of new frameworks for cooperative approaches are also suggested in the report, including a Euro-Atlantic Security Council, a joint NATO-Russia counter-terrorism centre, and centres for the joint monitoring and analysis of missile threats. Greater collaboration and convergence of strategic visions of NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the CSTO and SCO are also recommended, as well as between the US/NATO. In relation to nuclear non-proliferation, already existing frameworks, namely the NATO-Russia Council and the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council, are advised to work towards a convergence of Russian and Western approaches.

The Valdai International Discussion Club also sets out a range of measures that would bring about a fundamental transformation in EU-Russian relations in particular and even those between Russia and non-EU European states that fall within security 'grey zones'. It argues in favour of the creation of an Alliance for Europe, which would be codified in a treaty. It even conceives of potential Russian membership of NATO, a European Security Treaty that could be modeled on the Russian-proposed EST. In relation to economic security, the report proposes measures that would further economic integration between Russia and the EU, such as the creation of pan-European communications system, common research and innovation and the establishment of 'science towns', coordination of macroeconomic policies and the gradual abolition of visa regimes within a broader Europe. In the sphere of energy security, coordination of transit between Europe and Asia and development of neighbouring Russian regions would help to prevent energy disputes. An Alliance for Europe would include greater cooperation in foreign and security policy, as well as defence and security.

4.4 The role of the OSCE

This section examines the importance attributed to the OSCE in the reports, as well as the measures proposed to enhance its functioning and relevance. It also assesses the value of the propositions put forward in relation to the OSCE for the Helsinki + 40 process. This section is, thus, structured around the OSCE dimensions or 'baskets'. In addition, it considers suggestions related to expanding the geographic focus of OSCE activities, collaboration with partners and the engagement of civil society.

4.4.1 Relevance attributed to the OSCE

The importance given to the OSCE varies in the different reports. Serfaty does not allocate importance to the OSCE, due to the narrow definition of the Euro-Atlantic area within his paper. In all three scenarios outlined by the EWI, the OSCE is conceived as a relevant security actor. In all other reports, with the exception of the Valdai International Discussion Club's report, the OSCE is seen as an institution with an important role to play in Euro-Atlantic security. The Valdai International Discussion Club's report does, however, contain some degree of ambiguity, which seems to reflect Russia's interests and involvement in protracted conflicts and the OSCE's flagging success in the area of conventional arms control.

4.4.2 Proposed OSCE initiatives

4.4.2.1 Military security dimension

Conventional forces - In relation to conventional threats to security, the EWI's suggested initiatives under its Scenario 1 – “remedial repair” – are largely aimed at salvaging the existing arms control regime through, for instance, ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation recommend commitments to a regime aimed at monitoring and reporting on conventional forces in Europe and, in this sense, their proposals are also fairly modest. However, it does envisage extending the current regime through commitments to regular reporting of force deployments outside Europe that could affect OSCE participating states. The EASI sets out proposals that are essentially CSBMs, including restrictions on military exercises near the Russia-NATO border, limitations on military build-ups and manoeuvres, and avoidance of forward deployment of offensive weapons systems. “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” outlines measures that seek to reinforce CSBMs in order to reduce threat perceptions linked to conventional forces in Europe. The Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document are believed to provide good bases for CSBMs. In relation to conventional forces, IDEAS stresses the importance of not further undermining the existing arms control regimes in Europe. In the event that the difficulties of extending the CFE Treaty are surmounted, the report recommends extending arms control to new weapons and monitoring rather than limiting new categories of weapons. In terms of CSBMs, further efforts to overcome difficulties with the Open Skies Treaty, joint threat assessments and responses, and joint training and military exercises are proposed. The IDEAS report also makes a specific suggestion in relation to the modernization of the Vienna Document - the development of a new baseline agreement, under which participating states would extend the provision of advance information about military exercises. It also advocates developing additional CSBMs at bilateral and regional levels. In addition to these measures, the report also calls for the OSCE to restart negotiations on a modernized arms control agreement. Measures proposed in the EWI's Scenario 2 – “partial reconstruction” - also aim at the reduction of conventional forces in Europe in general terms.

Protracted conflicts – In its Scenario 2 – “partial reconstruction” – the EWI proposes legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by parties to the conflict in the Southern Caucasus. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation suggest the OSCE create of an expert group to work on interconnected issues in approaches to addressing conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus and better coordinate with other Euro-Atlantic and eastern regional organization to advancing approaches to the resolution of existing conflicts through economic development. The EASI suggests track II dialogue under the auspices of the OSCE on protracted conflicts. It also calls for leaders' use of social media to promote peace, as well as placing the rights of individuals and minorities, as well as the right to self-determination without necessarily implying a right to secession, at the heart of renewed efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. A more extensive list of measures focused on reconciliation as a means of conflict resolution are set out in the IDEAS report. They include: drawing lessons learned from past cases; holding seminars on the relationship between reconciliation and conflict resolution; identifying ‘reconciliation stakeholders’ at the state and regional levels; providing support for relevant parties to find ways of overcoming obstacles to reconciliation; creating a pool of reconciliation experts; examining whether new technologies offer new avenues for reconciliation; and designing a programme that encourages the participation of civil society actors in reconciliation efforts.

Conflict prevention – The EWI/Ditchley Foundation make a general proposition of improving OSCE conflict prevention capacities. More specific recommendations are made by IDEAS, which recommends improving the OSCE’s capacity for early warning and early action, as well as its developing a conflict mediation capacity.

Historical enmity – The EASI proposes opening of state archives, creating new diplomatic tools, engaging civil society, and strengthening of inter-societal linkages and cultural dialogue. The reconciliation measures set out by IDEAS are also viewed by as being relevant for rapprochement and overcoming historical enmity.

4.4.2.2 Human dimension

IDEAS proposes institutional measures that could improve the OSCE’s efficacy in implementing its *acquis* in the Human Dimension, notably combining the HDIM and HDC activities in an integrated way. The report also argues that the OSCE should facilitate dialogue and CBMs between its participating States and their respective Muslim communities, exploring lessons learnt in preventing radicalization, and organizing a conference on the Arab Spring and its repercussions with the OSCE’s Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation.

4.4.2.3 Economic and environmental security dimension

Economic security – In its Scenario 2 – “partial reconstruction” - the EWI recommends joint action on preventing terrorist measures against energy transit. The EASI argues for the abolition of visa regimes under OSCE auspices. IDEAS proposes measures aimed at raising awareness and fostering consensus on issues that can lead to tension, such as energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration.

Environmental security – IDEAS recommends that the OSCE mediate in instances of disputes linked to transboundary issues and that it assist participating States with the implementation of international environmental regulatory frameworks.

4.4.2.4 Transnational security challenges

Cybersecurity – IDEAS calls for transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyberspace, as well as dialogue on cyber risks and security, and national cyber defence systems and international standards.

Counter-terrorism – IDEAS argues for further advancing an OSCE framework for addressing terrorism, holding seminars with civil society actors on preventing radicalization, facilitating de-radicalization and reintegration, and engaging in joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

Combating organized crime – IDEAS recommends promoting dialogue on the preventing the spread of mafia organisations and producing a handbook for businesses on preventing drug-related crime.

Table 18: Proposed Initiatives for the OSCE

Study	Human dimension	Military security dimension	Economic and environmental dimension	Transnational threats dimension	OSCE neighbourhood and beyond	Cooperation with partners	Engagement of civil society
EWI, "Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths"		<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> -ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty</p> <p><u>Scenario 2:</u> -promote a new arms control agreement -secure legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by parties to the conflict in the Southern Caucasus</p>	<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> -increase focus on energy -joint action on preventing terrorist measures against energy transit</p>	<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> - expand of Cooperative Airspace Initiative -increase focus cyber security</p>	-extend strategic focus to Pakistan and Afghanistan	<p><u>Scenario 1:</u> -cooperative efforts with EU, OSCE, NATO and CSTO to in relation to Afghanistan and Pakistan</p> <p><u>Scenario 3:</u> -greater collaboration with NATO, the EU, the CSTO and SCO</p>	
EWI and the Ditchley Foundation "Consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security"		<p>-reinvigorate conventional arms control -improve conflict prevention capacities -advance approaches to conflict resolution through economic development -create an expert group on interconnected issues related to conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus</p>				<p>-a standing track II process on OSCE functions -regular consultations with the EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO</p>	
EASI, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Security Community"		<p>-transparency in deployments -restrictions on military exercises near the Russia-NATO border -limitations on military build-ups and manoeuvres -avoidance of forward deployment of offensive weapons systems -opening of state archives -new diplomatic tools -engagement of civil society - strengthening inter-societal linkages and cultural dialogue -commitment of leaders to peace is perceived as essential. -track II dialogue on protracted conflicts -leaders' use of social media to promote peace -place the rights of individual and minorities, to resolve protracted conflicts</p>	<p>-abolish of visa regimes -promote cooperation on research and development in energy efficiency and innovation</p>				

Table 18 continued

Study	Human dimension	Military security dimension	Economic and environmental Dimension	Transnational threats dimension	OSCE neighbourhood and beyond	Cooperation with partners	Engagement of civil society
<p>IDEAS, "Towards a Euro-Atlantic Eurasian Security Community"</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -combine the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) and Human Dimension Committees (HDC) activities in an integrated way -facilitate dialogue and confidence-building measures between its participating states and their respective Muslim communities -explore lessons learnt in preventing radicalization -organize a conference on the Arab Spring and its repercussions with the OSCE's Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - states to limit the deployment of conventional arms -extension of the CFE Treaty to new weapons and monitoring - restart negotiations on a modernized arms control agreement - overcome difficulties with the Open Skies Treaty -encourage joint threat assessments and responses, and foster joint training and military exercises - Under the Vienna Document extend provision of advance information about military exercises - CSBMs at the bilateral and regional levels - early warning and early action -the development of a conflict mediation capacity -improve reconciliation repertoire -create a pool of reconciliation experts -use new technologies as means of reconciliation support -design a programme that encourages that engages civil society in reconciliation efforts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -raise awareness and foster consensus on issues that can lead to tension, such as energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration -mediation in instances of disputes linked to transboundary issues -the OSCE could also assist states with the implementation of international environmental regulatory frameworks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyberspace -dialogue on cyber risks and security, as well as on national cyber defence systems and international standards -further advancing an OSCE framework for addressing terrorism -holding seminars with civil society actors on preventing radicalization, de-radicalization and reintegration -promoting dialogue on the preventing the spread of mafia organizations -producing a handbook for businesses on preventing drug-related crime -engaging in joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) 			
<p>"Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region"</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty to provide a basis for CSBMs 					

4.4.2.5 OSCE neighbourhood and beyond

Afghanistan and Pakistan – IDEAS proposes that the OSCE reassess activities under the Madrid mandate, employing the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security to engage in broader talks with the UN, NATO, the CSTO and relevant Partners for Co-operation on Afghanistan. In its Scenario 1 - “remedial repair” – the EWI recommends cooperative efforts by the EU, OSCE, NATO and CSTO to address security concerns linked to Afghanistan *and* Pakistan.

4.4.2.6 Cooperation with partners

The EWI argues for greater collaboration between the OSCE and other partners in general, notably NATO, the EU and the CSTO. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation also argue for regular consultations and collaboration with partners, which NATO, the EU, the CSTO *and* the SCO.

4.4.2.7 Engagement with civil society

The EASI suggests that the OSCE engage civil society actors in its efforts to assist in resolving protracted conflicts. IDEAS also proposes that the OSCE engage civil society in approaches to reconciliation as a means both of resolving protracted conflicts *and* overcoming historical enmity. The report also makes a more generally proposes creating an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions.

4.5 Value of proposed initiatives for the Helsinki + 40 process

The fundamental objectives of the Helsinki Final Act include: (1) refraining from the use – or threat of use – of force; (2) sovereign equality; (3) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (4) territorial integrity of participating States; and (5) the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Helsinki + 40 process aims to contribute to the OSCE’s success in meeting these aims, both in relation to older and newer security threats and challenges. This sub-section assesses the extent to which the reports’ proposed initiatives for the OSCE constitute valuable input for the Helsinki +40 Process.

4.5.1 Military security dimension

Conventional forces – measures suggested in the reports should contribute to the Helsinki Final Act’s objective of diminishing the use – or threat of use – of force. Arms control and CSBMs in connection to conventional forces in Europe have traditionally been a central part of the OSCE’s military security dimension. However, in recent years, the OSCE *acquis* in relation to arms control has been eroded. In particular, the CFE Treaty is not implemented and efforts to move beyond the impasse have not brought about the desired results. The 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty modified the CFE Treaty by placing limits on individual states rather than alliances. The CFE Final Act associated with it also included commitments to address the stationing of Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova. The resulting Adapted CFE was ratified by Russia in 2004. However, NATO member states refused to ratify the treaty until Russian commitments to remove its forces from Moldova and Georgia were fulfilled. As a

result of this linkage, Russia stopped implementing provisions of the Treaty in 2007.⁶ An attempt at overcoming the deadlock was made in 2011, involving talks between all CFE states parties and six NATO member states not yet party to the treaty, but failed. Subsequent to this failure, the US and other NATO states also suspended their obligations in relation to Russia. The Adapted CFE Treaty, thus, remains at an impasse.⁷

Other cooperative security arrangement including key mechanisms for CSBMs - the OSCE's Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty – are also under strain. The Vienna Document includes a series of CSBMs designed to prevent intimidation, crises and their escalation, and surprise attack. However, commitments to such measures are not legally binding. They include observation visits, observation of military exercises and short-notice on-site inspections. Efforts to modernizing the Vienna Document have met with limited success.⁸ Moreover, Russia refused evaluation visits in 2012, the first time that it has done so in 22 years.⁹ The Open Skies Treaty, by contrast, is legally binding. It enables countries to obtain aerial imagery aimed at addressing their concerns about the military capabilities and intentions of other states. For countries lacking the technical capacity to obtain this kind of information otherwise, the Open Skies Treaty is an important means of verification.¹⁰ Yet, the treaty has come under pressure due to the controversy between Turkey and Greece related to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the treaty, and as a result of Georgia's refusal to accept Russian observation flight over its territory.¹¹

In general the measures put forward in the reports in relation to arms control are aimed at repairing the existing arms control regime and salvaging the OSCE *acquis* in this area. The EWI argues in its Scenario 1 that the Adapted CFE Treaty should be ratified. Yet, how impasses in discussions should be overcome is not specified. Should difficulties in expanding the CFE Treaty be overcome, The EASI recommends extending arms control to new weapons and monitoring rather than limiting new categories of weapons. This would constitute a significant modification of the arms control regime. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation also argues in favour of a regime aimed at monitoring and reporting. However, it also envisages extending the current regime through commitment to regular reporting of force deployments outside Europe, which may contribute to the use – or threat of use – of force by those OSCE participating states that may feel threatened by such forces. Measures proposed in the EWI's Scenario 2 – “partial reconstruction” - the further reduction of conventional forces in Europe is advocated, which would imply a new arms control agreement. Indeed, IDEAS calls for the OSCE to begin negotiations again on a modernized arms control agreement, which would represent a significant advance in meeting the above-mentioned goal of the Helsinki Final Act. However, the report does not elaborate on what a modernized arms control agreement would contain.

A modernized conventional arms control approach contained in a new agreement would need to increase reassurance and address threat perceptions within the current security environment. Quantitative disparities in conventional forces between Russia and NATO are an important factor in

⁶ See “Key Existing Cooperative Initiatives in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” pp. 2-3, available on the NTI Website: <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/key-existing-cooperative-initiatives-euro-atlantic-region/>.

⁷ Ulrich Kühn, “Conventional Arms Control 2.0,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 191.

⁸ “Key Existing Cooperative Initiatives in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” p. 3.

⁹ Kühn, “Conventional Arms Control 2.0,” p. 192.

¹⁰ “Key Existing Cooperative Initiatives in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Kühn, “Conventional Arms Control 2.0,” p. 192.

Russian threat perceptions linked to conventional forces. It would also need to contain cooperative mechanisms to prevent rapid build ups of conventional forces, which would help to reassure the Baltic states and states in Central Europe. It should also increase transparency, particularly in relation to Russian and NATO conventional forces. New transparency measures involving, for example, military-to-military exchanges in personnel and transparency in relation to new weapons. A modernized arms control agreement could also contribute to preventing the escalation of crises in connection to protracted conflicts. Russian forces in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not in compliance with the provisions of the Adapted CFE Treaty, as explained. A solution to decoupling this issue from the linkage being made by the US in particular to their CFE commitments in a way that still upholds the principle of host-nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces would need to be found. A related issue is how to include the conventional forces in non-state entities, such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, within the arms control regime.¹²

In relation to CSBMs linked to conventional forces, the EWI suggests in its first scenario that CSBMs could be expanded through the Cooperative Airspace Initiative. This constitutes an effort to address the inter-linkages between older and newer security challenges, since the initiative is aimed at preventing terrorist attacks through the use of civilian aircrafts via the exchange of information on air traffic in Russian and NATO airspace.¹³ The Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty are cited as sound bases for CSBMs by “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region”. How difficulties encountered in the modernization of the Vienna document and the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty should be overcome are not addressed, though. IDEAS argues for further efforts to overcome difficulties with the Open Skies Treaty, but do not elaborate on how this might be done. Its authors do, however, suggest a number of further CSBMs, such as joint threat assessments and responses, joint training and military exercises, which would constitute significant additional measures. In relation to the modernization of the Vienna Document, it suggests that a new baseline agreement should be sought under which participating states extend the provision of advance information about military exercises, as well as the inclusion of additional CSBMs at the bilateral and regional levels. These measures would also enhance the repertoire of CSBMs. Proposals for CSBMs put forward in the EASI’s report, including restrictions on military exercises near the Russia-NATO border, limitations on military build ups and manoeuvres, and avoidance of forward deployment of offensive weapons systems. The latter seem particularly pertinent to reducing Russian threat perceptions in relation to its weakness *vis-à-vis* the West in the area of conventional arms, as well as states neighbouring Russia that may feel threatened by the build up of Russian forces near their borders.

Protracted conflicts – the Helsinki Final Act goals of the non-use of force, territorial integrity, equal rights of peoples and the peaceful settlement of disputes all imply that the OSCE must improve its capacity to assist in the resolution of protracted conflicts. Legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by parties to the conflict in the Southern Caucasus suggested in the EWI’s Scenario 2 – “partial reconstruction” – would reduce tensions and enhance security. Yet, lesser measures that could be provided for in a modernized approach to arms control, aimed at enhancing transparency and predictability through inspections of conventional forces stationed in non-state entities, could also be a more realistic measure that could be taken and combined with the need for a renewed

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 193; 195; 197-9.

¹³ “Key Existing Cooperative Initiatives in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” p. 4.

commitment to conventional arms control within the OSCE zone.¹⁴ However, it does not address other dimensions of the conflicts. The exploration of interconnected issues related conflicts in the Caucasus as well as Central Asia proposed by the EWI/Ditchley Foundation seem to open avenues for discussions. The EASI proposes track II dialogue under the auspices of the OSCE on protracted conflicts could explore these interconnections. The EWI/Ditchley Foundation call for better coordination with other Euro-Atlantic and eastern regional organization in advancing approaches to the resolution of existing conflicts through economic development may help to address some aspects of the conflicts. The EASI calls for leaders' use of social media to promote peace suggests how new technologies may be used to help apply the principles of the Helsinki Final Act in today's world, although they seem unlikely to break the deadlock in protracted conflicts. Placing the rights of individual and minorities, as well as the right to self-determination without necessarily implying a right to secession, at the heart of renewed efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts also seems interesting.

Conflict prevention – Also in relation to the non-use of force, the equal rights of peoples and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the OCSE needs to ensure effective responses to crises. While the EWI/Ditchley Foundation propose improved OSCE conflict prevention capacities, it does not specify what these could be IDEAS is more specific and recommend improving the OSCE's capacity for early warning and early action, as well as its development of a conflict mediation capacity. The former might help to ensure an OSCE presence on the ground when needed. The latter capacity could also help to improve the institution's conflict prevention efforts.

Historical enmity – The non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes can be undermined by ongoing historical enmity and as such the latter still needs to be dealt with in support of other OSCE aims. The opening of state archives, as suggested by the EASI, would be a useful initiative that the OSCE could promote. The same report also proposes creating new diplomatic tools, but does not elaborate on what those might be. The engagement of civil society, and strengthening of inter-societal linkages and cultural dialogue, is also essential components to overcoming mistrust and enmity.

4.5.2 Human dimension

The reports devote very little attention to this OSCE dimension, partly because of the way in which they conceive of the threat environment and partly due to divergences of opinion as to what this area should relate to, notably between Russia and the West. Only one report provides recommendations for this dimension and those are measures linked to improving the OSCE's institutional functioning and how to address a new aspect of the human dimension rather than proposals as to how to overcome difficulties in reaching consensus in this field. IDEAS proposes combining the Human Dimension HDIM and HDC activities in an integrated way. With regards to enhancing the OSCE's capacity to address new security aspects of the human dimension, the report does put forward several useful measures, namely facilitating dialogue and CBMs between its participating states and their respective Muslim communities, and exploring lessons learnt in avoiding radicalization and promoting de-radicalization and reintegration. The idea of organizing a conference that looks at the repercussions of the Arab Spring with the OSCE's Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation would also be useful, particularly given the uncertain trajectory of

¹⁴ Kühn, "Conventional Arms Control 2.0," p. 199.

transitions and the potential for radicalization that could spill-over into the OSCE zone, as well as considering the potential long-term implications of failure to make further progress on the implementation of the *acquis* within this dimension in relation to the rights and the rule of law, for instance.

4.5.3 Economic and environmental security dimension

Compared to the period in which the Helsinki Final Act was concluded, greater economic integration and the finite nature of natural resources upon which national economies have come to depend are more pronounced. The OSCE needs to consider how to reduce tensions that can arise in relation to economic issues and how to support the peaceful resolution of disputes linked to, for instance, energy and access to natural resources. Inter-linkages with other issues also need to be taken into account, as well as sustainability. The OSCE would be well placed to foster joint action on preventing terrorist measures against energy transit as proposed by the EWI. In support of reducing the securitization of migration between some states, the gradual abolition of visa regimes put forward in EASI would be fruitful as would the creation of a mechanism for promoting cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic region on research and development in energy efficiency and innovation in relation to reducing competition over natural resources. In general, measures proposed by IDEAS, such as raising awareness and fostering consensus on issues that can lead to tension, such as energy security, water management, access to natural resources and markets, and migration would support the application of Helsinki Final Act fundamental principles. So too would mediation in instances of disputes linked to transboundary issues and assistance to states with the implementation of international environmental regulatory frameworks, as proposed by IDEAS.

4.5.4. Transnational security challenges

Cybersecurity – Cybersecurity constitutes a new area in which cooperative security mechanisms could be further developed under the OSCE auspices in support of the peaceful settlement of disputes and a new aspect of the use of ‘force’. What constitutes cyber threats are, nevertheless, variably conceived in the reports, generating proposals with different objectives. IDEAS is more concerned with offensive national cyber capabilities and related threat perceptions. It calls for transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyberspace, as well as dialogue on cyber risks and security, and national cyber defence systems and international standards. “Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region” is concerned with both cybercrime and intrusive cyber activities carried out by states. It also puts forwards the development of cooperative early warning information, information sharing on dangerous cyber events and mutual investigations, as well as the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Cybersecurity Forum.

Counter-terrorism – IDEAS argues for further advancing an OSCE framework for addressing terrorism, holding seminars with civil society actors on preventing radicalization, de-radicalization and reintegration, and engaging in joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Addressing radicalization linked to terrorism is a way in which the OSCE could usefully contribute to counter-terrorism efforts in ways that leverage its comparative advantage in terms of inclusiveness and comprehensive security, and compliment the activities of partner organisations.

Combating organized crime – IDEAS recommends promoting dialogue on preventing the spread of mafia organisations, as well as publishing a handbook for businesses on preventing drug-related crime. These measures may be a useful means of initiating further cooperation in this area. However, other measures could also be taken that aim at exploring the inter-relationship between organized crime and other transnational threats, such the trafficking in human beings and terrorism.

4.5.5. OSCE neighbourhood and beyond

Transnational challenges to security and their interrelationship to other types of threats today suggest a larger strategic area of concern than when the Helsinki Final Act was concluded. In relation to international terrorism, a greater focus on Afghanistan and perhaps Pakistan, as suggested in the EWI's Scenario 1, would help to improve the OSCE's efficacy in addressing this challenge. IDEAS calls for reassessing the OSCE's Madrid mandate in relation to Afghanistan would also be helpful in taking account of the implications of the end of the ISAF mission in 2014.

4.5.6 Cooperation with partner institutions

In terms of suggestions as to how the OSCE can better cooperate with partners, greater collaboration and regular consultations are called for the EWI and the EWI/Ditchley Foundation, particularly in relation to NATO, the EU, the CSTO and, in the latter, also SCO. IDEAS proposes that the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security be employed to engage in broader talks with the UN, NATO, the CSTO and relevant Partners for Co-operation specifically on Afghanistan, which would be helpful in reducing overlap in terms of the OSCE's activities in Afghanistan. Improved cooperation with partners is necessary in terms of attempting to overcome difficulties implementing established cooperative security arrangements, which are often associated with connected issues, attempting to address security grey zones and in further developing responses to non-military and transnational security challenges.

4.5.6 Engagement of civil society

The creation of an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions, put forward by IDEAS, would be useful in terms of exploring innovative approaches that the OSCE could achieve its objectives. The involvement of civil society in overcoming historical divides is essential in reducing mistrust as well as promoting peace. As such, the notion of engaging civil society in support of the OSCE's military security dimension suggested by the EASI is important. In terms of preventing radicalization and improving relations between secular states and their Muslim communities, the involvement of civil society actors is vital. The report by IDEAS alone addresses this new aspect of the Human Dimension of the OSCE's activities. However, it proposes the facilitation of dialogue only between representatives of secular states and Muslim communities, when dialogue between representatives of Muslim and non-Muslim civil society actors is also an important dimension of preventing radicalization as well as in promoting the equal rights of peoples. In general, the role of civil society in addressing older and newer security challenges could be explored further.

5. Conclusions

During Switzerland's Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2014, one of its major tasks will be to further advance the Helsinki + 40 process. The latter should be seen within the broader context of efforts to identify the most urgent security issues in the Euro-Atlantic security area and to examine how they can be more adequately met. As such, the reports provide useful insights. While the imminent threat of a major conventional war in Europe is considered unlikely, the reinvigoration of conventional arms control and related CSBMs are believed to be of the essence in most of the reports. Due to their potential to result in the use of force, protracted conflicts are qualified as primary security concerns in many of the reports. Transnational threats to security, especially cyber threats, and economic security issues receive considerable attention, but are generally considered secondary security concerns. The reports are largely focused on the security of states and the global commons. The most important security providers are believed to be states and their regional organisations. In a minority of reports, civil society actors are also thought to play a role in enhancing security. In terms of the geographic scope of strategic concern, most reports view it as spanning the Euro-Atlantic zone, including Russia and Central Asia. Some expand that geographic scope to include the Middle East. In a minority of cases, Afghanistan, Pakistan and even northeast Asia are included within the area of concern.

The security governance system is mostly viewed as including the NATO, the EU and the OSCE, in that order of importance. However, in a number of reports that consider an expanded geographic zone of strategic concern, the CSTO and the SCO are also considered important regional institutions that may contribute to Euro-Atlantic security through collaboration mostly with the OSCE. The principle hurdles facing these institutions are viewed as mutual distrust, the continuation of Cold War postures and thinking, the disconnect between the collective defence principle of NATO and the comprehensive security approach of the OSCE, a weakening of established cooperative security arrangements, and new divergences in states' priorities and agendas. The propositions put forward to help overcome these hurdles are in most cases aimed at repairing and salvaging the cooperative security *acquis*. Some propositions seek to repair and partially restructure the security governance system. Only in a minority of cases is fundamental transformation sought.

The reports attribute varying degrees of importance to the OSCE, depending partly on their conceptions of the security environment, particularly in relation to the nature and hierarchy of the threats with which they are concerned. Recommendations for the OSCE set out in the reports largely relate to the military security dimension of the OSCE, in particular to arms control. Significant attention is also given to measures proposed to improve the OSCE's capacity to resolve protracted conflicts. In association with the economic and environmental dimension of the OSCE, measures to address energy security issues are put forward by a number of reports. Among the transnational security challenges, cyber security receives the most attention in the reports. Space is put forward only in one report as a new area to which a cooperative approach to security could be applied.

Measures that have particular value in relation to the Helsinki + 40 process are in the area of military security, notably in relation to conventional arms control and CSBMs linked to conventional military forces. In the field of conventional arms control, calls for a modernized arms control agreement are the most useful. The extension of arms control to new weapons, mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on conventional forces in non-state entities are particularly relevant suggestions with

regards to addressing current concerns and overcoming the current impasse, as well as potential contributing to the resolution of protracted conflicts. In relation to new CSBMs, exchanges in military personnel, for example, constitutes a valuable proposition for furthering the achievement of Helsinki Final Act goals. In relation to protracted conflicts, monitoring and reporting on conventional forces in non-state entities is also a useful proposition as well as the more ambitious, but perhaps less realistic, proposition of legally-binding commitments from parties to the conflict not to use force. Placing the rights of minorities and self-determination, without implying secession, at the heart of resolving protracted conflicts may also help to overcome the stalemate. In relation to conflict prevention, the suggestion of establishing an OSCE mediation capacity is particularly interesting, as is the use of new technologies in promoting reconciliation and overcoming historical enmity. Extending the human dimension to issues of radicalization and improving relations between secular states and their Muslim communities are also interesting ways of achieving the Helsinki Final Act goals in ways that address current concerns.

In relation to the OSCE's economic and environmental dimension, proposed initiatives that aim at reducing tensions and mediating disputes linked to energy and access to natural resources are particularly pertinent to current security concerns within this OSCE 'basket'. OSCE mediation in relation to transboundary issues, as well as provision of assistance to states in relation to implementing regulatory frameworks connected to the environment, is valuable in relation to the Helsinki + 40 process.

Proposed measures to extend the OSCE's activities in relation to other transnational security challenges are mostly valuable in relation to cyber threats. Proposed CSBMs and capacity building in terms of IT resilience are particularly relevant. Propositions related to the engagement with civil society actors are particularly pertinent to new ways of addressing old issues connected to historical enmity as well as new issues such as radicalization.

With regards to the upcoming Swiss Chairmanship of the OSCE and its priorities for 2014, as set out by Federal Councillor Didier Burkhalter in Vienna on 28 June 2013, the reports are suggestive of measures that could be taken to further Swiss priorities as well as in areas that are considered important in the reports but are not taken up by Switzerland. There are a number of overlaps between the stated Swiss priorities and the proposals made in many of the reports.¹⁵ The overwhelming focus of the reports that propose OSCE-relevant measures that could be taken by the OSCE is arms control and CSBMs in connection to conventional forces, both of which will be important areas during the Swiss Chairmanship. The resolution of protracted conflicts also receives considerable attention in the reports. However, largely in relation to the Southern Caucasus, whereas Switzerland's stated priorities in relation to protracted conflicts suggest a focus on the Southern Caucasus and the Western Balkans. In the related area of reconciliation, some of the reports propose initiatives linked to mediation and the engagement of civil society. Switzerland too has highlighted these two aspects as a means of strengthening the OSCE. Equally, transnational security, in particular cybersecurity, is also discussed in a number of reports in relation to the OSCE. Cybersecurity, as well

¹⁵ "Creating a security community for the benefit of everyone – Priorities of the Swiss OSCE chairmanship in 2014," speech by Federal Councillor Didier Burkhalter at the Permanent Council of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna on 2 July 2013, <http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/dfa/head/speech/single.html?id=49544>, accessed 11 August 2013.

as terrorism and drug-trafficking, are also given some attention by Switzerland. Proposals aimed at advancing the OSCE's activities in relation to its economic and environmental dimension, which do not seem to feature prominently in the Swiss agenda, even though it could make a contribution here, are also made in several of the reports. Switzerland does, however, give greater attention to the human dimension, but could further contribute to further addressing newer aspects of this area. One topic that receives scarce attention in the reports, but is prioritized by Switzerland is security sector governance – an area in which Switzerland has particular expertise and also has the capacity to have an impact in the relation to some aspects of military security. Based on the overlaps between the proposed initiatives in the reports and the Swiss agenda, and the gaps between the reports' proposals and Swiss priorities set out thus far, several recommendations can be made:

- A modernized arms control agreement should take into consideration transparency measures in relation to new weapons, deployments outside of Europe that may affect OSCE participating states, and conventional arms deployments in non-state entities.
- CSBMs based on the modernization of the Vienna Document could include a new baseline on the provision of advanced information about military exercises, and restrictions on military exercises near the NATO-Russian border, limitations on military build ups and manoeuvres and avoidance of the forward deployment of particular weapons with pre-emptive use. Further efforts should also be made to overcome difficulties with the Open Skies Treaty.
- Legally-binding measures on the non-use of force by the parties to the conflict or a provision on the inspection of conventional forces in non-state entities in a modernized approach to arms control as means of overcoming deadlock to protracted conflicts in the Southern Caucasus should be explored. So too, should placing individuals and minorities rights at the heart of conflict resolution.
- Further efforts to promote the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security should be made.
- Efforts to develop CSBMs in relation to cyberspace, such as greater transparency in relation to military doctrines and cyber activities, and the development of early warning information and information exchanges on dangerous cyber events should be undertaken.
- Facilitating dialogue and encouraging CBMs between secular states and their Muslim communities, as well as between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, within OSCE participating states, could help to strengthen the human dimension of the OSCE's activities within the current context.
- Efforts to support the peaceful resolution of disputes linked to energy, access to natural resources and migration should be furthered through awareness raising and mediation in instances of disputes.