



Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo

Final evaluation

Dieuwke Klaver

CONFIDENTIAL



WAGENINGEN
UNIVERSITY & RESEARCH

Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo

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This report is the final evaluation of the Gold Program implemented by PAX and its partners in Haut Uele province and Ituri province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most important components that the evaluation looked at related to the extent to which the program fostered human rights and security in conflict zones where gold is being mined, as well as the extent to which a peaceful co-existence between artisanal and industrial miners was created. A theory-based evaluation methodology was used to check the theory of change of the program and to increase the likelihood with which outcomes, changes in behaviour, could be attributed to PAX and its partners.

Keywords: Human Security, Human Rights, Governance, Natural Resources, Conflicts



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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ACIAR	Appui à la Communication Interculturelle et à l'Autopromotion Rurale
AEMAPRI	Association des Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux pour la Pacification et Reconstruction de l'Ituri
AGA	Anglo Gold Ashanti
AGK	Ashanti Goldfields Kilo SARL
ANR	Agence Nationale de Renseignement/ National Intelligence Service
APRu	Actions pour la Promotion Rurale
CDC/RN	Cadre de Concertation de la Société Civile de l'Ituri sur les Ressources Naturelles
CDI	Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
CDJP	Commission Diocésaine Justice et Paix
CEGEMI	Expertise Centre on Mining Governance
CERN	Commission Episcopale des Ressources naturelles (CERN)
CLE	Comité Local d'Eveil
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FRPI	Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri
I4S	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ILP	Initiatives Locales de Paix
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
L&A	Lobby and Advocacy
MGM	Mungbwalo Gold Mines SA
MONUSCO	Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo
OKIMO	Office des mines d'or de Kilo Moto
PAC	Partnership Africa Canada
PNC	Police Nationale Congolaise
RFO	Reserve de Faune à Okapi
RHA	Réseau Haki na Amani
SAESSCAM	Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining
SOKIMO	Société des Mines d'Or de Kilo Moto
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
ToC	Theory of Change
VP	Initiative of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre
ZEA	Zone d'Exploitation Minière – Artisanal Mining Zone

Executive Summary

Introduction

This report assesses the relevance, the effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness of the 'Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo', which has been implemented by PAX and its partners in Ituri, Haut-Uele and Tshopo province between November 2013 and September 2017. The program has been financed by the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by PAX under the strategic Partnership Program of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The program's specific objective is to improve the human security situation in and around gold mining sites and has 3 components: Fostering human rights and security in conflict zones, in concessions of mining companies where artisanal miners are also digging for gold, and in Eastern DRC.

This evaluation aims to contribute to the learning process of both PAX and its partners, as well as provide the donors of the program with an independent view of the results of the program. The following evaluation questions were formulated by PAX:

1. To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?
2. To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
3. To what extent have program objectives been achieved?
4. To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?
5. To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?
6. To what extent has the program been cost-effective?

Evaluation methodology and data collection

The evaluation uses a Theory Based methodology that aims to test the Theory of Change and that assesses the likelihood that the program has contributed to outcomes or changes in behaviour in its environment.

Data were gathered through documents made available by the program and through external documents; as well as through interviews with PAX staff and those of the partners it works with; beneficiaries or right holders; organisations whose behaviour need to change and external resource persons.

Fieldwork did only take place in Haut-Uele province and in Ituri province and therefore the contribution of the program towards changes in Tshopo province, at the national level and the international level (VP) have been only slightly taken into account.

Understanding the context of the program, its ToC and its logical framework

The intervention zone of the gold program is huge, given the generally bad conditions of the road which considerably increases traveling time; with a number of mining sites only being accessible by feet after a few days hiking and; because traveling between the Kivu provinces and Ituri, Tshopo and Haut-Uele province is not possible given the insecurity that reigns in the north part of North Kivu and the southern parts of Tshopo and Ituri.

The population density in some parts is very low to insignificant in Bafwasende territory (Tshopo province), Mambasa territory (Ituri province) and Haut-Uele province, which also affects the presence or absence of public services, order forces and (inter)national NGOs.

PAX's justification of the program relates to the mineral context which presents different conflicting situations. In the first place artisanal mining is the most important livelihoods strategy of some

150000 persons and their families, of which some 10000 persons previously were members of armed groups: Denying these people their main livelihood strategy might endanger the very fragile security situation. In the second place, mining sites are heavily affected by the presence of FARDC, PNC and armed groups inside and outside the mines, who obtain revenues out of mining activities for their personnel benefit and for the reinforcement of their entity. In the third place, the presence of artisanal miners within the concessions of international mining companies causes conflicts and in the fourth place conflicts exist between artisanal miners and the wardens of national parks and reserves, and where gold mines are discovered in these parks and reserves, armed groups and the FARDC and PNC are also present.

In these contexts, the following integrated ToC and logical framework have been formulated, where the consultant has added the outcomes (changes in behaviour) at the level of the specific objective because these were missing in the program document. These have been validated by PAX.

With regards to conflict zones, the behavioural change sought consists of the local authorities, the administration at groupement, chefferie and territorial level, protect human rights and foster human security. Two results will be delivered in order to make this change happen in parts of Mambasa and Irumu (Ituri province):

- Result A: Systematic and frequent monitoring of human security and gold mining in conflict zones;
- Result B: Early warning system in conflict zones in place.

Although Bafwasende is part of the conflict zone component, no activities have been deployed towards obtaining result A and B: As written in the project document, interventions would be limited to annual studies, followed by workshops in situ to validate these findings.

With regards to the co-existence between artisanal miners and companies, the behavioural change sought consists of: 1) Local authorities, the administration at groupement, chefferie and territorial level, protecting human rights and security in cases where artisanal mining takes place in concessions of companies, and : 2) when their security committees, public administration, local authorities and mining companies react positively upon Lobby and Advocacy (L&A) efforts. Three results will be delivered in order to make these behavioural changes happen in Ituri province:

- Result C: Artisanal miner associations/cooperatives created and operational;
- Result D: Local government, populations and civil society informed and capacitated;
- Result E: Constructive dialogue between all stakeholders.

Although Haut-Uele province is part of the co-existence component, no activities were deployed to organise artisanal miners, result C. As written in the program document, PAX decided to organise artisanal miners as a pilot in only included Ituri province.

With regards to Eastern DRC, policies and attitudes of local, regional and national authorities and policy makers will change and foster the respect of human rights and human security. Two results will be delivered;

- Result F: Capacity development of civil society in Eastern DRC ensured;
- Result G: Regular and effective lobbying and advocacy of authorities ensured.

As an assumption the program expects that other NGOs will address working conditions of artisanal miners, health effects, effects on agriculture, alternative employment opportunities. PAX will look for other NGOs to intervene on those issues with other funding mechanisms.

Answering the evaluation questions

1. To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?

The ToC for the conflict zone component and the component for the co-existence between artisanal miners are relevant with regards to the contexts in which these were to be implemented;

The relevance of the ToC for the conflict zones could however have increased if the program had formulated the ambition to address the presence of armed groups, the FARDC, PNC and others who are committing human rights violations and cause insecurity and included a L&A strategy and activities

beyond the territorial level would have increased its relevance. PAX had already concluded this in 2014, but unfortunately was not able to implement it (PAX, 2017).

The relevance of the component on co-existence of artisanal and industrial miners in industrial concessions was limited to 1 (KibaliGold) out of 6 companies known at the start of the program, probably due to declining gold prices at the global market. It became however more relevant when AGK sold its concession rights in Djugu territory to MGM in 2015, which wanted to start operations soon. A clearer vision on what co-existence means might possibly have enlarged the range of results to be delivered to foster this co-existence that respects human rights and security. Apart from the 3 results in the ToC, other results could have been formulated that support for example; the creation of ZEA (be it by PAX or other partners); L&A actions to ensure that part of the royalties and taxes paid by companies return to affected chefferies and their communities (as is being mentioned in the ToR of this evaluation); or L&A actions to decrease the maximum surfaces of concessions that are currently occupying entire chefferies and territories. Or these possibilities could have been elaborated in the justification of the program, after which it was decided that they were not appropriate.

The relevance of the third component is doubtful: Policy changes at provincial and national level require more than studies and 1 or 2 conferences. The component would have become more relevant if more meetings would have taken place to identify appropriate L&A strategies and divide responsibilities between civil society.

A general observation is that the ToCs miss at the level of specific objective a clear definition of what behavioural change will be observed from the FARDC, PNC, armed groups, the companies, the policy makers and public sector at provincial and national level.

2. To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?

During its implementation the ToC has not been revised. However important changes occurred within and outside the program that influenced the extent to which activities were implemented or not, and in which territories.

Most important changes *within* the program relate to the presence and performance of partners on the ground, as well as to the many staff changes from PAX's side. An important change *outside* the program consisted of companies closing their doors, hence decreasing the opportunity to implement the co-existence component on more than two locations. Another *external* change observed when mining companies prepare the production phase is that civil society becomes fragmented, as was the case in Watsa territory where KibaliGold started mining as of 2013. Similar processes have taken place in Mwenga in South Kivu, when Banro started operations and in Mungbwalo, when MGM started to prepare for gold mining. Consequences of these changes are:

With regards to the conflict zone component

In Bafwasende, local partners were absent or weak and therefore not able to give a sound follow-up in the territory of the studies conducted and the conferences where these were validated. Between April 2015 and April 2017, apart from a conference to validate a study, PAX has not been in the territory; Activities in Mambasa and Irumu were hampered by the problematic partnership between RHA and PAX, and seriously delayed between 2014 and October 2015; in particular the work to be done by agents to monitor the situation in the mines was not carried out between October 2015 and January 2017, due to a misinterpretation of the program interventions by the then program lead of PAX; Only in 2017, program activities could not be implemented because of increased insecurity in Mambasa.

With regards to the co-existence component

Activities in Djugu territory in Ituri, were also hampered by the problems between RHA and PAX (between 2014 and October 2015). However in this territory the whole package of results have been delivered (awareness raising and training of artisanal mining (pre-)cooperatives, studies and capacity development activities and constructive dialogue between all stakeholders); With regards to Haut-Uele (Watsa), PAX missed strong partners on the ground since the beginning of the program and had no partners between March 2016 and May 2017. PAX conducted studies to be

validated through conferences and continued to engage stakeholders in a constructive dialogue. Only as of May 2017 a new partner has been identified that already has become effective; Apart from studies and validation workshops no further activities were undertaken in Mambasa where Kilogold and Loncor have concessions, because both companies stopped their mining activities; No activities were undertaken in Mahagi since the start of the program, because there were not that many mining sites and the only company included in the program, Mwan Africa, closed its doors.

With regards to the Eastern DRC component

Program activities have been implemented but suffered from PAX's program leads setting other priorities and because its partner Life and Peace Institute closed its doors early 2016.

3. To what extent have program objectives been achieved?

Based upon the program document and progress reports, as well upon interviews with program staff, an overview has been made to assess the extent to which indicators in the program document have been realised. With regards to reporting against indicators, the consultant observes that no monitoring plan has been in place to monitor progress being made against indicators set in the program document and their targets. The progress documents had the tendency to report on activities rather than at the level of results.

The specific objective in the logical framework contains indicators which reflect the level of results to be delivered by the program, but not changes in behaviour to be observed at the level of those stakeholders that had to be reached in the program. The progress reports have not systematically documented changes in behaviour, which possibly are related with the program.

Another observation is that, although the program document clearly develops for each component a separate set of results to be delivered, it formulates exceptions at the same time. This is the case for Bafwasende, part of the conflict zone component, where result A (systematic monitoring by peace committees) and result B (early warning systems in place) were not delivered, but alternative activities deployed. This is also the case for Haut-Uele, part of the co-existence zone, where result C (organisation of artisanal miners) was not delivered, because this result was included in the logical framework as a pilot activity. On the other hand, peace committees were still operational and supported during the program in Djugu, although this territory was part of the logical framework component related to the fostering of the co-existence between artisanal miners and companies.

4. To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?

Changes in behaviour have been clustered in 8 outcomes, 5 for Haut-Uele province and 3 for Ituri. The number of the outcomes here is not indicative for the effectiveness of the program, it is the significance of these outcomes in the ToC that could be taken as a measure of effectiveness.

In Haut-Uele province

The FARDC and the Territorial Administrators of Watsa and Faradje use less violence in their attempts to maintain order around KibaliGold's concession after PAX presented its report on the company in October 2015 in Kisangani and in Kinshasa. In this report PAX highlighted human rights violations committed by the FARDC when relocating populations and evicting artisanal miners. It also highlighted that transport was facilitated by Kibali's vehicles. Another outcome related to the report is that a Captain of the FARDC, involved in these relocations and evictions, was sentenced to 10 years of prison;

Civil society and artisanal miners have gained more space to denounce the excessive use of violence during workshops. The population of Watsa and Faradje are better informed on their human rights through radio broadcasts organised by the 'Commission Justice et Paix' of the diocese, through some courses organised by PAX in 2016 and those offered by MONUSCO;

Civil Society has obtained more possibilities to get in touch with KibaliGold facilitated by the (sporadic) presence of PAX as of the presentation of the 2015 report;

In the period May-October 2017, KibaliGold has become more sensitive and open to the requests of civil society, APRu and PAX to have a constructive dialogue with independent civil (and not those

previously co-opted), on the use of excessive violence, on the position of artisanal miners within the concession, and on the follow-up of the recommendations in PAX's report on Kibali; As of December 2017, the recommendations of civil society of Faradje and Watsa territories on the revision of the 2002 mining law have been presented in the National Parliament in Kinshasa.

In Ituri

In March 2017, MGM in Mungbwalo signed an agreement with 4 artisanal mining cooperatives, who can continue mining within the concession, this time backed up by a legal framework. They can dig gold until a maximum depth of 30 meters, after which MGM will start industrial mining. In October 2017, the identification and formalisation of artisanal mining zones had not yet happened. More cooperatives want to sign an MoU with MGM;

Peace committees engage with traditional authorities and their security committees, as well as with MONUSCO since the beginning of this year. In Irumu, the coordinating structure of the peace committees became an advisor to the security committee and this is also seems the case in NiaNia chefferie in Mambasa. Also RHA became an advisor of the security committees of Mambasa territory and a member of the same committee in Irumu territory as of June 2017. In Mambasa and Irumu an early warning system has been put in place with MONUSCO;

Mixed results have been obtained with regards to stopping the presence of armed groups, FARDC and PNC in and around mines. Although the peace committees in Irumu have been able to move the militia from the centre of Nyankunde and two other village centres, RHA admits that with local peace committees, the program has not been able to move armed groups away from the mining sites (FARDC, PNC, ANR and militia).

5. To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?

The consultant looked at 3 outcomes in depth to assess PAX's and its partner's contributions to the outcomes obtained in the previous section.

In Haut-Uele, PAX and its partners possibly have contributed to the outcomes in the following way.

The reduction of violence by the FARDC and the Territorial Administrator has most likely been triggered by PAX's publication, the workshops and the publicity by amongst others radio Okapi; For the other outcomes PAX and APRu have most likely contributed to; 1) the creation of a space to denounce human rights violations; 2) have supported civil society to get in touch with Kibali; 3) made the company more sensitive and open to the requests of civil society, including the creation of a platform for dialogue of independent civil society and Kibali and; 4) managed to present their recommendations for the revision of the 2002 mining law in the national parliament in Kinshasa The significant of this change in the light of the ToC is that the revised mining law takes into account some of the realities faced by artisanal miners on a daily basis.

In Ituri, PAX and its partners possibly have contributed to the outcomes in the following ways

The role of RHA and PAX in the signature of MoUs between MGM and 4 mining cooperatives consists most likely of the empowerment of artisanal miners that enabled them to engage in a dialogue on equal footing with MGM. However the triggering factor has been the increased insecurity in Mungbwalo town when MGM, with the support of the PNC, evicted artisanal miners from the concession, urging the government to start discussions with MGM and the artisanal miners for a sustainable solution; The most likely actors that has contributed to peace committees engaging with traditional and territorial authorities and their security committees, as well as with MONUSCO since the beginning of this year are RHA and PAX. No other actor is known in the area to have started working with peace committees since the Hema – Lendu conflicts between 2003 and 2007;

Limited outcomes were yielded with regards to the presence of FARDC, PNC, armed groups on mining sites. An explanation for this is amongst others that RHA and PAX did not develop an L&A strategy and implemented this at the provincial and national level, although the idea was already discussed in 2014.

6. To what extent were the intervention strategies identified in the program proposal efficient in reaching the goals (cost effectiveness)

The cost effectiveness of the program could have been improved for the conflict zone component if:

In Ituri province, the focus of the data collection by the peace committees would have been oriented towards preparing L&A messages at chefferie, territorial, provincial and national level, from the start of the program, with RHA and PAX taking responsibility for the provincial and national level;

In Ituri province, the monitoring agents in the mining sites had been in place during the entire program, without interruptions between April 2015 and December 2016;

In Ituri province, the early warning systems had been in place as of 2014;

In Tshopo, Bafwasende, if PAX had decided to deliver the entire package for conflict zones. An alternative would have been to not include this territory in the program document, because of its remoteness and the absence of qualified partners on the ground.

The cost effectiveness of the program could have been improved for the co-existence between artisanal miners and mining companies component if:

In Ituri, Mambasa territory, after having concluded that KiloGold and Loncor were not active anymore, the program had limited its interventions in Mambasa towards reducing the presence of the FARDC, PNC and armed groups on the mining sites through effective L&A activities at provincial and national level as already concluded in 2014. The studies conducted on both companies (after these had already stopped their activities) did not result in follow-up activities after their validation in workshops;

In Ituri, Djugu, the thematic group on Natural Resources had played an active role in L&A activities as of 2015, with regards to the MoU signed between MGM and the miner cooperatives. The role of the peace committees in this program component on co-existence has not become clear during the evaluation;

In Haut-Uele, Watsa and Faradje, PAX had had a local partner on the ground to ensure that recommendations formulated in reaction to the study on KibaliGold, had been followed up at the local level. With a local partner on the ground possibilities to train different stakeholder categories on the mining law, would possibly have empowered these stakeholders to start a dialogue with Kibali before 2017.

The cost effectiveness of the Eastern DRC component if more efforts had been deployed to create a common understanding amongst civil society actors of issues to be addressed, if a sound L&A plan had been prepared and responsibilities divided amongst different stakeholders. The program could have decided during the conception of the program to either deliver a full package, or not include this component in the program.

Recommendations

The evaluation of this program has generated the following recommendations.

When designing the ToC of the program, be very explicit on what type of behavioural changes will be realised through the results delivered by the program. These behavioural changes are in the first place those to be reflected in the specific objective of the program. Then think through how the program will realise these behavioural changes. The consultant has the impression that such a reflection has been limited with the design of the co-existence component.

With regards to these strategies that introduce behavioural changes, two recommendations are worthwhile to consider.

Develop a clear L&A strategy to introduce changes in behaviour: Organising conferences to validate studies and formulate recommendations are not enough. Different strategies may be needed to conduct effective L&A;

Before conducting studies, assess their relevance in the light of the behavioural changes to be achieved. Behavioural changes may require community based security approaches, capacity development interventions, platforms for dialogue, L&A activities. If the relations between a study and the strategies on how to change behaviour are not clear, do not start the study. This might have been one of the considerations to conduct the studies on KiloGold and Loncor in Mambasa, as well as those conducted in the light of the I4S studies.

In line with the ToC and the logical framework, develop a monitoring and evaluation plan that measures the indicators set in the program document. A program is expected to at least monitor progress made in indicators at the level of results delivered.

Ensure that you have partners on the ground who have the capacities to implement deliver on results, not on activities. These partners could have started to work on community based security and the enhancement of the confidence between the state and society as key development processes identified in both PAX's strategic framework of 2011 – 2015 and that of 2016 – 2020. If you do not have these partners on the ground, don't start the program in these locations.

Limit staff changes at the PAX level to ensure the continuity of the program and orient the program towards outcomes to be realised.

1 Introduction

1.1 Terms of Reference

PAX has requested the services of Wageningen CDI to conduct the final evaluation of its 'Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo. This program is being financed by the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PAX under the Strategic Partnership Program of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The main purpose of the program is to improve the human security situation in the selected regions. More specifically it has 3 components.

1. Improving the human security situation in conflict areas through the monitoring of the security situation inside and outside the mining sites (in Ituri), and through the creation of early warning systems. In these areas goldmining still has the potential to be a source to finance conflicts because armed groups (including the FARDC and police) and powerful elites have control over mining sites. The conflict zones concerned by the project are Mambasa and Irumu territory in Ituri province and in Bafwasende in Tshopo province;
2. Fostering the co-existence between industrial and artisanal mining through a dialogue between industrial mining companies, authorities, communities and the artisanal miners in order to reduce tensions and human rights violations. But also by informing and strengthening the capacity of local authorities regarding mining and security issues. Furthermore, the creation of formal structures (cooperatives) of artisanal miners will be supported. Most artisanal mining sites are located within concessions of industrial companies and hence increase the risks of open conflicts. Part of the artisanal miners do not have other livelihood alternatives and became artisanal miner only after their demobilisation of armed groups. The main territories where this is to be achieved are Djugu, Mambasa and Mahagi territory in Ituri province and the Watsa (and later de Faradje) territory in Haut-Uele;
3. Changing policies and attitudes of local, regional and national authorities and policy makers. This is done through the strengthening of capacities of local civil society organisations, to enable them to lobby at provincial and national level and to organize regular and effective lobby activities. A number of studies are foreseen and 2 conferences will be organised with Civil Society Organisations from Eastern DRC to develop effective Lobby and Advocacy strategies. South Kivu has experience with the creation of a first Artisanal Mining Zone (ZEA).

This end of program evaluation intends to contribute to the learning process of both PAX and its local partner organisations. The outcomes and lessons learned will strengthen future interventions and allow PAX to make informed decisions regarding future interventions in Congo. The evaluation also intends to provide donor organisations with an independent view of the results of the program and will allow the donors to assess the effects of these results on their strategic goals and policies.

Its specific objective is to assess the effectiveness and relevance of program interventions. The ToR formulate the following evaluation questions to be answered:

- To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?
- To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
- To what extent have program objectives been achieved?
- To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?
- To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?

In a meeting with PAX on September 2013, the following clarifications were made with regards to the ToR.

The provision of an independent view to the donor organisations involved to allow them to assess the effects of the program on their strategic goals and policies does not require a comparison of their policies with regards to human security issues in gold mining;

Apart from looking at effectiveness and relevance, the evaluation will also address efficiency, whilst trying to assess if the program would have yielded more results whilst using other intervention strategies. The consultant will address issues of cost effectiveness rather than cost efficiency.

1.2 Field work and other data collection

Data collection took place in the period of 10 to 20 October in the Faradje and Watsa territories in Haut-Uele province and in Bambasa and Djugu territory in Ituri province. For time reasons, data collection in south Irumu did not take place. Whereas PAX and its partners organised the meetings, the consultant interviewed its respondents without the presence of the implementers of the gold program, as a means to provide a space for interviewees to give their opinions about the program. Most of the meetings planned have taken place and provided the consultant with sufficient information to triangulate information from different stakeholders.

In Haut-Uele the consultant met with KibaliGoldmining, Action Pour la Promotion Rurale (APRu), artisanal miners, victims of KibaliGold, a security committee of the territorial administration, traditional chiefs, different sections of civil society and attended a meeting organised by civil society in Faradje with KibaliGold.

In Ituri province, the consultant met with Réseau Haki na Amani (RHA), ACIAR, thematic group of civil society organisations on natural resources, artisanal miner cooperatives and monitoring agents on mining sites, civil society local peace and security committees, civil society, traditional chiefs, 2 security committees of the territorial administration, the provincial minister in charge of mining and different mining services and MONUSCO.

Discussions with PAX staff during the field visit, as well as interviews with PAX staff who were involved in the project in different moments or in different places also added to get a better understanding about the relevance and the effectiveness of the program.

Generally speaking the information obtained through the interviews was very informative and helped the consultant to: 1) better understand the context in which the program is being implemented; 2) to clarify timelines of activities implemented by the program, and; 3) to obtain information about changes in behaviour obtained that at least can be associated with the program and that have not been documented. The guidelines of the interviews have been partially followed, because the consultant in the first place tried to get people at ease by opening questions and where possible probed for further more detailed information considered to be relevant for the evaluation and as a means to crosscheck information obtained from others. It was unfortunate that KibaliGold was the first to be interviewed, reason for which the information obtained remained rather general. It was also unfortunate that there was no opportunity to meet with the territorial administrator and the security committee of Watsa territory to check information already obtained. The 2 interviews with RHA were very informative and contributed considerably to the creation of timelines of activities implemented and outcomes obtained. The list of resource persons can be found in Appendix 3.

Apart from conducting interviews, the consultant has consulted project related documents, ranging from project documents, budgets progress reports, to reports produced by RHA and publications. Another category of documents consulted consists of reports produced by others, websites, laws etc.

The consultant observes that progress reports did not document progress against set indicators described in the project document. For this reason the consultant also had to fall back to the memories of PAX staff and its local partners to get clarity on the timing and relations between activities. The many changes in staff within PAX as well as changes in its partners on the ground may affect the accuracy with which facts are presented. However, where possible, information from different sources has made it possible to obtain clarity on the chain of events and activities.

1.3 Reading this report

After this introduction to the evaluation assignment, the next chapter explains the main features of the gold program and the context in which it had to operate. Chapter 3 describes the evaluation methodology used, with a further elaboration of this methodology presented in Appendix 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are presented in the fourth chapter, followed by the last chapter that presents the conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation.

2 Understanding the program

2.1 Context and Rationale

Geographic context

The intervention zone of the gold program is the former 'Province de l'Orientale' with its capital Kisangani, which as of 2015 is divided into smaller provinces: the program intervenes in 1 territory in the new Tshopo province (Bafwasende), in 2 territories of Haut-Uele province (Watsa and Faradje) and in 4 territories of the new Ituri province (Mambasa, Irumu, Djugu and Mahagi). The program also seeks collaboration with civil society organisations in North (Walikale territory) and South Kivu province (Mwenga territory).

This intervention zone is huge when considering traveling time between territories and provinces. In the first place some mining areas, for example in Bafwasende territory and Mambasa, are only accessible by feet after a few days hiking. In the second place road conditions are bad and it takes for example 3 hours to travel from Watsa to Faradje territory (95 km); 4 hours from Bunia to Mungbwalo in Djugu territory when it has rained (70 km) and; 12 hours on a dry day to travel from Watsa to Bunia (360 km). In the third place North and South Kivu province are not accessible by road from Ituri, Tshopo and Haut-Uele province because most armed groups and the FARDC operate in the border zones of North Kivu (northern part), Bafwasende (southern part), Irumu (southern part) and Mambasa (southern part).




Figure 1 Map of project intervention zone

Besides the bad road conditions, the very difficult accessibility of some mining sites and the insecurity between North Kivu province and those of Ituri and Tshopo, population density is considerably low, as is the case with the presence of capable and well equipped public sector services. The average population density in Haut-Uele province is estimated at 21 persons per km², that of Mambasa and Bafwasende territories is respectively between 6 and 8 persons per km² (Bakker, Jogien; Puijebroek, Joost van, 2014) (IKV Pax Christi & Réseau Haki na Amani (RHA), 2012) (Puijebroek, 2014). It is in those remote and nearly unpopulated areas that armed groups and FARDC operate and obtain revenues from mainly mining and poaching.

Except for Ituri, where other international and national NGOs are implementing projects on the mineral sector and other natural resources, hardly any organisations are present in Tshopo province and Haut-Uele province.

Mineral context

Minerals, like other natural resources in DRC play an important role in both the economy, the human security and rights context, as well as in pertaining conflicts in Eastern DRC.

In the first place they are one of the most important livelihood strategies of local populations and have the potential to contribute to the local economy and to peace. PAX estimates that some 150.000 artisanal miners search for gold in Eastern DRC, and represent the main livelihood strategy of some 700.000 people. Amongst these artisanal miners are some 10.000 persons who turned down their weapons after a war that started in the early 90th in the Kivu provinces and in the early 2000th in Ituri district (Bakker, Puijebroek, Uiterwaal, & Wesselink, 2014). Artisanal mining takes place on both concessions owned by industrial companies, in national parks and reserves such as the 'Reserve de la Faune et de l'Okapi' (RFO) and other locations outside parks and mining concessions such as in south Irumu. Artisanal miners have put in place informal but well performing structures which continue however to export their produce in an informal economy without any international due diligence requirements (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013).

In the second place, mining sites under the control of the Congolese army (FARDC), the National Police (PNC), sometimes the Agence Nationale de Renseignement (ANR), armed groups (international or national) or powerful elites generate revenues to finance conflicts. The program document defines control in terms of *the 'exploitation (qui) a lieu dans un contexte gravement militarisé et (dont) le revenu est utilisé pour le profit personnel des commandants et le renforcement d'un milice'* (conflict minerals) (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013)¹. As of 2010, these actors lost (part of their) control over the value chains of tin, tantalum and tungsten in North and South Kivu, due to the enforcement of international and national due diligence measures to pull these chains into the formal economy. As a consequence armed groups, including the FARDC, PNC and powerful elites turned to the gold sector as of 2011, which is almost entirely functioning in the informal economy, apart from some minor initiatives taken in South Kivu to formalise the sector. In 2012, the most insecure areas, both mining sites and neighbouring communities, consisted of

1. The Babila Babombi chefferie in the territory of Mambasa (Ituri province), bordering Nord Kivu province. The southern part of this chefferie was under the control of both the Simba militia, and different brigades of the FARDC. In general terms 2/3 of Mambasa territory was highly militarised and every 'groupement' where gold mining activities take place were under the influence of an armed group or an entity of the FARDC;
2. The Walendu Bindi secteur in the territory of south Irumu (Ituri province), where both the FRPI and the FARDC are affecting the human security and rights situation;
3. The Bafwasende territory in Tshopo province, which degraded in 2011-2013. Both the Mai Mai of major Luc and FARDC elements control mining sites and cooperates with the 10th integrated brigade of the FARDC (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013) (UNSC, 2012).

In the third place they may create new conflicts between artisanal miners and mining industries, who have concession rights for the exploitation of minerals. The mining code of 2002 opened the sector for international investors and companies in the intention to start industrial mining. Before 2002, industrial mining by the national agency OKIMO failed to take off because it did not have the financial means to invest in industrial mining. OKIMO introduced a subcontracting system with artisanal miners

¹ Page 5 of the program document, version modifiée le 25 juin, 2013

to start production, which continued when it became the private enterprise SOKIMO. After 2002, SOKIMO concluded joint ventures with international companies in Haut-Uele and Ituri where subcontracting practices continued. BANRO was the first to start production as of 2011 – 2012 in South Kivu. The following international companies were present in the intervention zone of PAX's Gold Program in 2011-2012:

- Ashanti Goldfields Kilo SARL (AGK), a joint venture of Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA), registered in South Africa, and SOKIMO in the territory of Djugu in Ituri province, more specifically in Mungbwalo. This under the name of Ashanti Goldfields Kilo SARL);
- Mwan Africa in Mahagi territory in Ituri province;
- Loncor, registered in Belgium, in Mambasa territory in Ituri province;
- Kilo Gold in Mambasa territory in Ituri province;
- Auris company registered in Switzerland. This company did never start its operations in Bakaiku groupement in the Babila Babombi chefferie in Mambasa territory;
- KibaliGold in Watsa (and later Faradje) territory in Haut-Uele province. This is a joint venture between Anglo Gold Ashanti, Rand Gold and SOKIMO.

Of these joint ventures, KibaliGold in Haut-Uele and AGK in Mungbwalo were most advanced in their exploration and research stage and seemingly about to start production in 2012. KibaliGold had already started to resettle populations living in its concession in Watsa territory.

All these companies were confronted with the production of gold by artisanal miners on their concessions, most of them not having alternative income generating strategies (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013).

In the fourth place, the exploitation of natural resources takes place in national parks and reserves, where the presence of people is prohibited. The park wardens unfortunately are not capable to evacuate armed groups, criminal elements of the FARDC and artisanal miners, such as is the case in the RFO (Mambasa and Bafwasende), Maiko National Park (North Kivu, Maniema provinces and Bafwasende territory in Ituri province) and Garamba National Park (Haut-Uele province).

Opportunities for PAX to intervene

It is against this background that PAX started its Gold Program, based upon the following opportunities and trends:

South Kivu province experimented with pilots to create artisanal mining zones (ZEA) for miners to be organised in formal associations and started the implementation of traceability systems to commercialise conflict free gold on the global market before 2013. These could provide valuable examples for the gold sector in the former 'Province Orientale';

PAX had a strong partnership relation with the Réseau Haki na Amani in Ituri province and both had gained the credibility of public sector, private sector and civil society to improve the human rights and security situation in the gold sector, based upon their past track record. They started their partnership in the early 2000th by creating a network of peace initiatives in the territories of Djugu, Irumu and Mahagi as a response to the war between the Hema and Lendu populations;

Both PAX and the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs are member of the Initiative of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VP), as are a number of the above mentioned international companies. The VP setting provides a legitimate background to PAX to address human rights and security atrocities committed as a result of the activities of those companies;

A major trend observed in the period 2010-2012 is that armed groups, including the FARDC and the PNC turned to the exploitation of gold which is more difficult to pull into the formal economy as the 3Ts which had their initially attention. Given the fact that a considerable amount of gold is found in the former 'Province Orientale' and PAX's presence in this province, this provided another opportunity to start the program (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013).

PAX's policies

The gold program is part of PAX's strategic framework 2011 – 2015 and that of 2016-2020. In the first framework the program is part of interventions in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Situations (FCAS) whereas other interventions are planned in Repressive States. Important elements in the Theory of Change in FCAS are to enhance the confidence between the state and society; to acknowledge the sometime ambiguous role of religion and identity; to act from an increased

understanding of the political economy around natural resources and conflicts; to acknowledge that security, human rights and development are mutually linked to each other and; to start all interventions by addressing community based security (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2009) (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013).

In PAX's 2016 – 2020 strategic framework, the program is most aligned with the central themes Citizens' Security & Citizens' Rights, with community based security being a key development process next to peace activism, and; Natural Resources and Conflict (PAX, undated).

2.2 Theory of Change

PAX's goal of the gold program is to contribute to sustainable, harmonious gold mining to the benefit of all stakeholders in Eastern DRC, including those mining in conflict zones and those mining in concessions of industries. Its specific objective is to improve human rights and security in gold mining, based upon increased knowledge.

In order to improve human rights and security in gold mining, the following behavioural changes need to be in place.

Local authorities, the administration at groupement, chefferie and territorial level, protect human rights and security in *conflict zones* (1). This will be reached when the security committees of the administration at groupement, chefferie and territorial level (which regroup the FARDC, the PNC, and the ANR) as well as the population organised in local peace committees and their coordinating structures (representing civil society and populations) engage in a constructive dialogue (4). For this to happen, local peace committees (CLES/ILPs) and their coordinating structures frequently monitor the human rights and security situation in gold mines and their surroundings to inform the security committees. Consolidated reports are being disseminated to whom is concerned, where appropriate at provincial level (A). Simultaneously an early warning system is being put in place, based upon the monitoring by the peace committees(B). This behavioural change is sought in Ituri province, in particular in the Babila Babombi chefferie in Mambasa territory; in the Walendu Bindi secteur in Irumu territory. Although Bafwasende in Tshopo province is part of the conflict zone component, no peace committees and early warning systems will be put in place there.

Local authorities, the administration at groupement, chefferie and territorial level, protect human rights and security in cases where artisanal mining takes place in concessions of companies (2), when their security committees, public administration, local authorities and mining companies react positively upon Lobby and Advocacy (L&A) efforts (5). For this to happen the program will organise miners as a pilot in Ituri only (C), train stakeholders on the mining law and its challenges (D) and organise constructive dialogues in a conference setting or in specific platforms of companies, civil society and traditional chiefs (E), based upon studies conducted by PAX and its partners. This behavioural change is in particular sought in Haut-Uele province in Watsa and Faradje territory, and in Ituri province in Mambasa, Djugu and Mahagi territory.

Co-existence between artisanal miners and industries on the same concession (3) will be a fact when local authorities, public administration and mining companies react positively upon L&A efforts by traditional chiefs and civil society (5). This will happen when miners are organised (C), when stakeholders are trained in the mining law and its challenges (D) and a constructive dialogue is in place, either in a conference setting or a specific platform that directly engages with the mining company (E). This behavioural change is in particular sought in zones where artisanal mining takes place within the concessions of international companies, which is the case in Haut-Uele province in Watsa and Faradje territory, and in Ituri province in Mambasa, Djugu and Mahagi territory.

Policies and attitudes of local, regional and national authorities and policy makers will change (4), when civil society and partners of PAX in Eastern DRC are effective in L&A. This will happen when they have gained enough insights in the mining code and other rules and regulations, as well as in the different contexts in which artisanal mining is taking place based upon studies conducted by PAX and its partners (F). This behavioural change in terms of new policies and laws is to be observed at national and provincial level.

The following diagram visualises the ToC based upon the program document.




Figure 2 Theory of change

Observations

Observation 1: The Theory of Change (ToC) in this section is based upon information presented in the program document which describes the context in which the program is to take place, rather than the aspired behavioural changes to be obtained with different stakeholder categories (see section 4.1). The ToC described above presents these behavioural changes as conditions to contribute to the goal and the specific objective of the program.

Observation 2: The strategies in the ToC (see section 4.2) mention amongst others awareness raising of artisanal miners about the importance to organise oneself into an association or a cooperative as well as about participating in consultations with civil society, authorities and private sector. However in the logical framework a stronger output is being formulated; artisanal miners are organised and operational.

Observation 3: The ToC described in the ToR of this assignment is slightly different and conceived in 2017. In the first place does the new ToC put a stronger attention to community based security as a starting point for the entire program instead of only in the conflict zones. In the second place does it emphasize the important role that international companies have to play in assuming their corporate responsibility and in complying with the VP. Only then revenues from royalties and taxes paid by these companies will be shared in a more fair way in favour of local livelihoods, and prevent conflicts and social tensions amongst the many artisanal miners. In the third place it assumes that organised artisanal ‘miners will allow them to move away from informal parties that might have connections to the war economy’ (ToR by PAX). These assumptions were not that specifically formulated in the program document.

2.3 Logical framework and components

Logical framework

The overall objective of the program is to contribute to sustainable, harmonious gold mining to the benefit of all stakeholders in Eastern Congo.

Its specific objective is to improve human rights and security in gold mining in Eastern Congo and to enhance the knowledge about human rights and security in gold mining: these are being presented in the ToC in figure 1. It has 3 components, one consisting of interventions in conflict zones, the second consisting of interventions related to the co-existence of artisanal miners in industrial concessions, and the third consisting of interventions in Eastern DRC. The results are being presented in the ToC in figure 1.

1. In the conflict zones (Mambasa towards the border to North Kivu province, south Irumu in Ituri province and Bafwasende in Tshopo province) it will ensure the following results:

Result A: Systematic and frequent monitoring of human security and gold mining in conflict zones

Result B: Early warning system in conflict zones in place.

Although Bafwasende is part of the conflict zone component, no activities have been deployed towards obtaining result A and B: As written in the project document, interventions would be limited to annual studies, followed by workshops in situ to validate these findings.

2. In order to prevent conflicts between companies and artisanal miners who are mining within industrial concessions in Ituri and Haut-Uele province, it will realise the following results:

Result C: Artisanal miner associations/cooperatives created and operational;

Result D: Local government, populations and civil society informed and capacitated;

Result E: Constructive dialogue between all stakeholders.

Although Haut-Uele province is part of the co-existence component, no activities were deployed to organise artisanal miners, result C. As written in the program document, PAX decided to organise artisanal miners as a pilot in only included Ituri province.

3. In order to change policies and attitudes of local, provincial and national authorities and policy makers, the program will achieve the following results in Eastern DRC, which comprise North and South Kivu province, Haut-Uele province, Tshopo province and Ituri province.

Result F: Capacity development of civil society in Eastern DRC ensured;

Result G: Regular and effective lobbying and advocacy of authorities ensured.

As an assumption the program expects that other NGOs will address working conditions of artisanal miners, health effects, effects on agriculture, alternative employment opportunities. PAX will look for other NGOs to intervene on those issues with other funding mechanisms.

Appendix 5 presents the logical frameworks including indicators and their target values.

Observations about the logical framework and indicators

The specific objective has a number of indicators that are comparable to those set at the results level and that are not that ambitious. For example it measures the achievement of the specific objective in terms of reactions given to L&A messages, without specifying what concrete behavioural changes are needed to decrease human rights atrocities and improve human security. One would expect to have indicators that measure the extent to which the program increases the respect of human rights and security in the conflict zones and in the concessions where artisanal miners are operating, as well as in terms of revisions of law, rules and regulations that are subject to L&A actions. The ToC in figure 1 sets some higher ambitions and in consequence also looks beyond the indicators set in the program document towards perceivable changes in behaviour.

3 Evaluation methodology

3.1 Theory-Based Evaluation

A Theory-Based Evaluation methodology has been developed to answer the evaluation questions in the ToR. The complete evaluation methodology can be found in appendix 4.

The methodology is based upon contribution analysis and realist evaluation (Befani and Mayne, 2014; Westhorp, 2014). The methodology aims at testing the ToC presented in chapter 2. The main evaluation steps to measure the effectiveness are:

1. Set out the problem to be addressed

The first step in the contribution analysis is to review the cause-effect issues to be addressed in the gold program. During this step the evaluator gains understanding of the program, what outcomes this programs is most likely to generate, what context factors have to be taken into account by the program to reach outcomes etc.

2. Develop or clarify the theory of change and risks to it

The next step is to develop or clarify (refine) the ToC of the program, in terms of clarifying the nature of outcomes to be achieved and the pathways foreseen in the program to contribute to these outcomes. In this evaluation an outcome describe observable changes in the policies, practices, behaviours, relationships, actions, or mind-sets of an individual, group, community, organisation or institution.

3. Gather (existing) evidence on the theory of change

Based upon the ToC and the evaluation questions, the consultant will identify its information needs to test the ToC. As a means to collect as many positive, negative, intended and unintended outcome (areas), data gathering will 1) start with the identification of outcomes realised and collecting evidence of these outcomes being achieved, 2) follow with the identification of actors and factors that explain these outcomes. This method is based upon the Outcome Harvesting Method (Wilson-Grau & Britt, 2012).

4. Assemble and assess the contribution story and challenges to it

When all information has been collected, the evidence (information gathered) to test the ToC of the program will be synthesised, and the extent to which the program contributed towards achieving outcomes identified.

Apart from this organisation of the information collected, process tracing tests will be used to assess the extent to which the information gathered is really capable to confirm one pathway instead of another pathway.

5. Seek out additional evidence

If possible, additional information will be collected to strengthen the evidence necessary to confirm or refute a contribution story. It is unlikely that resources persons contacted during the field visit will be again contacted by telephone to provide additional information. However additional written documents can possibly be mobilised to obtain additional evidence.

6. Revise and strengthen the contribution story

After additional information has been analysed the contribution story can be further strengthened (or refuted). This will then help to assess the strengths and weaknesses in the ToC as written in the initial program document and possible adjustments over time. If in-depth information has been obtained about the underlying drivers of change and their relations to different contexts, this will further enhance the reflection of PAX with regards to future interventions in Human Rights, Security and Gold extraction programs.

3.2 Sources of information used

The following data sources were consulted

- Internal documents and public documents made available by PAX and its partners;
- External documents found on the internet, for example those of the UN expert group on DRC;
- PAX staff and partners that started the program in 2013;
- PAX staff and partners that implemented the program in subsequent years;
- Beneficiaries or right holders/citizens, those categories in society whose human rights, security and living conditions are to be improved;
- (Relative) External resources persons, who are knowledgeable about the project and are capable to look at it from an outside perspective.

3.3 Practical limitations and limitations to the methodology

A general constraint with using contribution analysis and realist evaluation is that a thorough and exhaustive impact evaluation of all outcomes requires a lot of time and resources. It would probably require a next round of inquiries after the field visit which is not possible within the framework of this assignment.

For this reason in this evaluation the number of outcomes that will be selected for an exhaustive impact evaluation will be limited to a maximum of 2 outcome areas. Criteria for the selection of these outcome areas will be amongst others the importance of these outcome areas is the ToC of the program.

Fieldwork will take place in Ituri and Haut-Uele province. Therefore the assessment of the contribution of the gold program towards changes in Tshopo province, at the national level (policy changes and attitudes) and at the international level (VP) will only be taken into account when field data show the relevance of a further assessment.

4 Presentation of the findings

This chapter presents the findings to the evaluation questions presented in the ToR of this evaluation. These questions are:

- To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?
- To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
- To what extent have program objectives been achieved?
- To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?
- To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?
- To what extent has the program been cost-effective?

Each of the following sections answers one evaluation question.

4.1 To what extent did the context analysis and ToC inform program objectives and interventions?

This section assesses the extent to which the context analysis and the ToC inform the program objectives and the interventions. For this 3 sub questions were formulated:

- What conclusions does the context analysis draw on the relation between human rights, human security and artisanal gold mining in 2012-2013?
- What are the changes in the context that the program aims to realise in 2013? What does the ToC tell and the logical framework?
- How relevant are these changes to be realised given the actual context in 2013?

Information was collected through interviews with PAX's staff who wrote the project document, the project documents and external document that provide information about the external context in which the program is situated.

4.1.1 Conflict zones: Context in relation to ToC and logical framework

The aim of this component is to reduce human rights atrocities and increase human security and ultimately the finance of war through conflict minerals. This component is very relevant because:

- Armed groups, criminal networks within the FARDC and miners easily shift to gold mines where due diligence requirements have not affected trade (UNSC, 2012). And where the commercialisation is entirely into the hands of the informal sector. When these areas become heavily militarised and when militia or the FARDC use revenues related to gold mining (taxation, looting, kidnapping, exploitation itself) for their own benefit and/or strengthen their control over the mining sites, this situation is considered to finance conflicts (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2013);
- M23 in North Kivu was trying to get in touch with armed groups in Ituri province in 2012, in particular with the FRPI that is mining gold in Walendu Bindi secteur in Irumu;
- M23 was defeated in North Kivu in 2013, major parts of the North Kivu province came under the control of the FARDC, which motivated loose rebel factions to move to Mambasa territory, such as is the case with the Maï Maï Morgan who based itself in the 'Reserve de Faune d'Okapi'. This group became more active in violent attacks of several gold mines, pillage, rape and kidnapping in 2013 (UNSC, 2012) (Weijs & Jacobs, 2015). This groups has close relations with the ninth military region of the FARDC in Kisangani (UNSC, 2014);
- Part of the 150.000 artisanal miners and the 700.000 household members they support are former members of militia who were demobilised in consecutive years. Not supporting them in creating a

decent livelihood through artisanal mining consists a future risk of conflicts and human rights atrocities.

The part of the ToC for this component misses an outcome in terms of changing the behaviour of authorities, including the FARDC, PNC and ANR to respect human rights and fostering human security. A strong element in this ToC is the fostering of dialogue between security committees of the government and peace committees created with support of RHA: Dialogues create more trust worthy relations between local authorities and populations and hence foster community based security. This support to community based security is one of the main and most important pillars in PAX's strategic framework of 2011-2015 (IKV PAX CHRISTI, 2009) and they are one of the pillars for the actual I4S strategy in place for Eastern DRC (ISSSS for the Democratic Republic of Congo, undated).

In relation to the logical framework, the consultant would have expected that apart from the peace committees and the early warning systems to be put in place (Result A and B in the logical framework), this part of the program might have benefited from another result regarding L&A actions beyond the territorial level and related to the behavioural changes needed to improve human rights and security: PAX itself concluded in 2014 that dialogue between local authorities and populations is not enough to improve human rights and security issues, because the involvement of the FARDC and the PNC in these issues require L&A actions beyond the territorial administration. These L&A actions would have made the ToC more complete (PAX, 2017).

4.1.2 Co-existence between artisanal and industrial miners: Context in relation to ToC and logical framework

Ituri and Haut-Uele province already hosted many international companies already far advanced in their research process, and about to start the mining phase in a concession where artisanal miners were already digging for gold. This component was partially relevant at the start of the program, because:

The global market price for gold reached a peak by the end of 2011 and 2012, creating expectations that the industries would start their mining activities (BullionByPost, 2017)². However gold prices dropped considerably by March 2013 (8 month before the program officially started), and a some companies initially targeted by the gold program had closed when the program started in November 2013: Hence considerably reducing possibilities to work on the co-existence of artisanal and industrial miners in concessions. At the start of the program, the co-existence component was relevant for KibaliGold in Haut-Uele province, who had started mining operations in 2013 (Interview 10). The situation of Ashanti Goldfields Kilo SARL (AGK) in Djugu territory was unclear, because production initially was expected to have started in 2011, which had not happened (BYEMBA, 2017): By the end of 2013 AGK suddenly stopped their operations although equipment had already been purchased to start production. Gold prices regained their prior values only as of mid-2016 (BullionByPost, 2017). Both AGK and KibaliGold are a joint venture in which Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA) is a shareholder. AGA is a member of the Voluntary Principles Initiatives on Security and Human Rights (VP), as well as PAX is. This membership created hence opportunities for PAX to engage with both joint ventures to enhance the respect of human rights and security in the Eastern DRC, although RanGold, the second shareholder in KibaliGold is not a VP member;

The South Kivu province faced considerable conflicts between the BANRO company and artisanal miners on its concession, which served as a forecast for future conflicts in Haut-Uele and Ituri province at the level of concessions.

What seems to be missing in the context analysis and strategy development is in the first place a definition of what co-existence between artisanal and industrial miners means as well as the assessment of the feasibility of different strategies to foster this co-existence. PAX's staff interviewed came with different interpretations and 1) expected that mining industries would prevent the use of excessive violence during relocation of people and evictions of miners; 2) that the creation of a ZEA within the concession was a possibility, and; 3) a necessity for the reduction of conflicts, because there was not enough space in the Ituri and Haut-Uele province to create valid and productive ZEAs outside existing industrial concessions (Interviews 1, 10, 15).

² Orientation obtained from interview 10

The 2002 mining law does not open doors to foster the co-existence of artisanal miners within an industrial concession. However, before 2002, artisanal mining was common practice within industrial concessions. When international companies bought their shares in these concessions, they were confronted with this practice and acted in different ways. Whereas KibaliGold in Haut-Uele province considers artisanal mining illegal in its concession, AGK in Djugu territory (Ituri province) opened the doors for the co-existence of artisanal mining in its concession (Bakker, Puijenbroek, Uiterwaal, & Wesselink, 2014). A new opportunity was presenting itself when the Government published a new decree in 2013, that allows mining industries to subcontract small and medium mining enterprises by mining industries as a means to reduce poverty (Ministère des Mines, 2013).

From a more political economy perspective, concession rights are being obtained in Kinshasa and they cover enormous surfaces, including the land of entire chefferies who have to face entire resettlements without prior notice. This situation could have oriented the program towards more L&A actions to modify the mining law foreseen since 2012, ensure that royalties and taxes paid by mining companies benefit local populations and, based upon a study about the enormous surfaces already registered under as a concession start a discussion on land and resources needed for populations to have a decent livelihood, based upon artisanal mining or other economic activities.

Like for the first component, the ToC misses clear outcomes in terms of changing behaviours to be expected from mining companies, authorities, policy makers, order forces. Based upon the program document, the consultant added the respect and protection of human rights and security by authorities and the co-existence between artisanal and industrial miners. However, the respect of the Ruggie principles and the Voluntary Principles by these international companies, as well as their engagement to actively lobby the central government to transfer considerable amounts of taxes and royalties to the provincial and chefferie level for economic development beyond the sphere of influence of this program.

The interpretation of result E about a constructive dialogue between authorities, industries, civil society and artisanal miners is somewhat vague: Most of the activities under this result consist of conferences where studies are being presented to a general audience. However a dialogue would possible have gained in effectiveness if multi-stakeholder platforms had been created around mining companies, as has been the case with KibaliGold in Haut-Uele.

In relation to the logical framework, the consultant would have expected:

A clarification of the expected behaviour of industries, authorities, order forces, and policy makers; Apart from result C the organisation of artisanal miners, another result would be integrated that addresses the creation of ZEAs outside the concessions. If PAX had considered this to be beyond its mandate, it would preferably have attracted other actors to intervene.

4.1.3 Interventions in Eastern DRC: Context in relation to ToC and logical framework

The third component is about civil society in North and South Kivu, Ituri, Haut-Uele and Tshopo provinces. The intention is that these actors, when they have gained the necessary capacities, will start L&A actions that change policies and attitudes of local, regional and national authorities and policy makers. Its relation with human rights, security and gold mining presents some doubt. On the one side the project document states that South Kivu province has experiences in the creation of ZEA and is introducing due diligence measures, from which the program can learn for Ituri and Haut-Uele province. And as already mentioned the conflicts on the BANRO concession also predict the nature of conflicts to be foreseen in Ituri and Haut-Uele. On the other side, the program document.

States that more gold is mined in these last 2 provinces in comparison to South Kivu;
Does not introduce the creation of ZEA as a project intervention to prevent conflicts between artisanal and industrial miners, although this was a buzzword when the program was drafted (Interview 10);
Does not explain why gold mining in North Kivu is included in the program.

In relation to its ambition to change policies and attitudes, the number of activities foreseen under this component are rather limited, i.e. conducting studies and 1 conference to develop capacities (Result F), based upon which effective L&A is to be conducted.

In relation to the logical framework, the consultant would have expected, that apart from sharing the experiences from South Kivu with stakeholders in Ituri, Haut-Uele and Tshopo Province during 1 or 2 conferences, one might have expected that more L&A efforts would have been undertaken for follow-up of these conferences. Joint L&A could for example have targeted the national government with regards to 1) the return of part of the royalties and taxes to the communities affected by industrial mining, 2) the right to a decent livelihood with sufficient land and natural resources for artisanal mining or other livelihood activities and 3) the review of the mining code in terms of the procedures in place to obtain a concession right based upon prior consultations and consent of local populations. This would however have had budget implications, given the high transportation costs needed to undertake joint activities.

4.1.4 How relevant are these changes to be realised given the actual context in 2013?

The relevance of the interventions to reduce human rights violations and improve human security in conflict zones was very high at the start of the program in November 2013. However exact descriptions of which changes in behaviour were to be realised missed. The success rate for achieving these behavioural changes would probably have increased if an extra result was included in the logical framework for L&A actions *beyond* the territorial level for the *conflict zones* (Irumu, Mambasa and Bafwasende). These actions would in particular target particular entities of the FARDC, the PNC and armed groups, relevant for these conflict zones, rather than L&A actions addressing issues relevant for the entire Eastern DRC.

The relevance of the component on co-existence of artisanal and industrial miners in industrial concessions was high before the program started in November 2013, with many companies still exploring their concessions but about to start the production phase. But at the start of the program in November 2013, only KibaliGold in Watsa territory prepared for the production phase as of 2013. The success rate for achieving behavioural changes would probably have increased if PAX had further explored its own vision and strategies that foster the respects of human rights and security: Interviews with staff working in the program show different ideas.

The relevance of the third component addressing the Eastern DRC seems doubtful, because the relations between this component and the two others is not well established. The success rate of achieving policy changes at the provincial and national level, would have considerably increased if more efforts³ had been deployed to foster the exchange of experiences and provide strategic guidance on L&A efforts.

³ More than 1 or 2 conferences, as mentioned on the program document

4.2 To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?

This section assesses the extent to which the program implementation has been adjusted and changed, according to updates and theories of change. For this 4 sub questions were formulated:

- What changes or adjustments have been made in the implementation of the program? Why did those changes occur?
- What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program implementation?
- How did the program respond to those site specific changes?
- How relevant were these responses from the program given the changes in the context?

Appendix 6 gives a comprehensive overview of changes that occurred in the context of each territory in which the program operated, as well as changes in the staffing of PAX and its partners throughout the project. The reconstruction of these changes in a time line was considerably hampered by missing information in program documents, hence increasing the need to rely upon the memories of the many people involved in the program.

4.2.1 Changes in the context and their influence upon the ToC and intervention strategies

When considering the three components – conflict zones, co-existence zones and Eastern DRC – there have been no considerable changes in the context in which these components were implemented.

Changes with regards to security in the conflict zones

Throughout the program, Mambasa and Irumu in Ituri province and Bafwasende in Tshopo province remained conflict zones. No additional conflict zones were reported, except for the occupation of North Kivu by the M23, where no program activities took place. The intensity of conflicts, as well as the involvement of armed groups, the FARDC and PNC in mining activities in these zones changed however throughout the program.

In Mambasa territory, the Mai Mai Morgan group appeared in part of the RFO and clashed with the FARDC in urban centres in 2012. In 2013 it turned from poaching activities to attacking goldmines for gold, foods and other goods; raping women and kidnapping. The group also engaged with the 9th FARDC region (UNSC, 2014). When its leader was killed in April 2014, whilst being arrested, the armed group split into different factions and continued to commit human rights atrocities in mining sites. In 2015, these groups were still continuing their activities in and around mining sites on 3 axes from Mambasa. In 2016 it became clear that the PNC owned mining pits in the area. And in 2017 it became clear that the 31th brigade of the FARDC had its own mining pits in the RFO, as well as that the presence of Chinese gold miners was tolerated in the RFO. Most human rights violations were committed by the 31th brigade.

Consequences for the program: As far as we know, insecurity has only influenced program activities in May 2017, when monitoring of the situation in goldmines was stopped on one axe from Mambasa.

Security in Irumu decreased considerably when M23 occupied major parts of North Kivu province in 2012 and engaged with the FRPI already present in the territory. FRPI in consequence increased its control over at least 4 mining sites and an oil exploration block in Lake Albert and mobilised child soldiers (UNSC, 2014). When the FARDC attacked FRPI in vain in 2013, 150.000 persons moved to more secure areas (UNSC, 2014). Also in 2013 another armed group, the ADF/NALU, increased its level of activities. In 2014, the FRPI leader was arrested, but its group, though not active anymore in mining sites, continued looting and imposing taxes. In that same year the unstable situation in North Kivu province caused an influx of people into Irumu, hence increasing land conflicts that only can be dealt with at higher administrative levels, such as chefferie and province. Both the FARDC and the PNC increased their illegal taxations and roadblocks. FRPI continued looting and imposing regular taxes in

three mining sites but was not anymore directly involved in gold mining. In 2016, the FRPI chief in vain discussed possibilities for demobilisation with the FARDC, which explains that the FARDC did not undertake any activities: In consequence the security situation got worse, as well as conflicts about land between cattle keepers and agricultural producers. In 2017 both the FRPI, FARDC, PNC, ANR and other public services were present in two mining sites, the public actors imposing taxes, and the FRPI continuing its looting 2 or 3 times a month. In August 2017, another attempt by the FARDC failed to defeat FRPI.

Consequences for the program: As far as we know, monitoring agents were not able to do their work in the mines in 2014, because the FRPI was present in the mines. PAX suggested to reorient the program to address land issues but this did not take off within the framework of the gold program (PAX, 2017).

In the Bafwasende territory in Tshopo province, Mai Mai Luc was operational as of 2004. In 2012 his group collaborated with the 10th brigade of the FARDC under the commandment of General Kifwa, which is being characterised as a criminal network by the UN Group of Experts. The brigade collaborates in poaching activities and mineral extraction with Mai Mai Luch. In an attempt to eliminate the armed group, the FARDC increased their presence in 2014: These fights resulted in 20.000 persons moved to more secure places (Puijtenbroek, 2014). Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba, FARDC commander of the first defence zone of DRC is involved in the gold sector according to the investigations of the United Nations Expert Group on the DRC in 2017 (UNSC, 2017).

Consequences for the program. Not related to the security situation.

The security situation has not influenced interventions in Mahagi territory in Ituri province and Watsa and Faradje territory in Haut-Uele. Nor has it influenced interventions foreseen for Eastern DRC.

Changes with regards to co-existence of artisanal and industrial mining

World market prices: As already mentioned in 4.1.2, changes in the world market price seem to be amongst the most important elements that impacted the implementation of the co-existence program. The following diagram shows these fluctuations between January 2013 and July 2017. It also showed that prices went up as of mid-2016. KibaliGold started its production phase in Watsa territory and is preparing production in Faradje territory in 2017. AGK closed their operations in Mungbwalo (Djugu territory in Ituri province) and became Mungbwalo Gold Mines SA (MGM) in April 2015: Until today MGM has not started operations (October 2017).

Consequences for the program: Although studies were conducted on KiloGold, Loncor, AGK and KibaliGold, and validated in workshops, only follow-up was possible with AGK, when MGM took over in April 2015 and KibaliGold as of 2013.



Figure 2 Gold prices on the global market between 2013 and 2017

Source: (BullionByPost, 2017)

Other changes that affected the program

When mining companies started their production, civil society became more fragmented, due to diverging interests and positions vis-à-vis the mining company. CS in Watsa is actually divided into 4 different groups (Interviews 2, 7, 12). Already in 2015, KibaliGold created a 'FORUM de Délégués Communautaires', with the territorial administrator being appointed as the chairman. This group, which according to PAX and APRU only represents a selection of civil society and the private sector, decides on the allocation of the company's social fund. Most stakeholders explained to PAX that the FORUM does not represent the populations affected by the mining company, and that in consequence those populations do not benefit from the social fund (PAX and CERN, 2015). In June 2017, PAX and APRU attempted to create another 'cadre de concertation' between KibaliGold and civil society, and this time excluding the territorial administrator and his security committee. However KibaliGold did not accept this invitation. Apart from the FORUM, the coordination of Civil Society in Watsa territory has been co-opted by Kibali and the Governor of Haut-Uele province (Interview 2, 7, 12). In reaction to this a new civil society coordination was formed in June 2017, after the workshop organised by APRU and PAX. This new civil society structure has not been accepted by the governor of the province. A third group of CSOs in Watsa presents itself as independent and focusses on Human Rights. Similar processes were about to take place in Faradje territory in October 2017 (Interview 2, 10) and in Djugu territory around AGK/MGM until 2013, when AGK was about to start its gold mining activities (Bakker, Puijtenbroek, Uiterwaal, & Wesselink, 2014).

4.2.2 Changes in staffing and partners in the project and their influence upon the ToC and intervention strategies

The program has been seriously affected by staffing problems and the capacities of partners on the ground.

With regards to the partner organisations, the following issues influenced the program:

RHA in Ituri province, in collaboration with the diocese of Wamba for Mambasa territory: Despite a partnership relation that had worked since 2002 and had made RHA and PAX creditworthy organisations in Ituri province, this relation was seriously affected by declining trust from both parties; irregular progress reporting and justification of expenditures, irregular transfer of funds, different perspectives about activities to be carried out, including L&A beyond the territorial level (Vlassenroot & Thiers, 2016). In consequence program activities were delayed in 2014, and entirely stopped when the coordinator of RHA resigned in the beginning of 2015. Activities were gradually restarted in 2016, but mainly limited to Result A (Monitoring of human security and rights by the peace committees) - without including the agents in charge of monitoring the situation in the mines and; activities related to Result C (organisation of artisanal miners). The activities of the monitoring agents only restarted in the beginning of 2017⁴;

Archdiocese of Kisangani, that intervenes in the southern part of Bafwasende territory, and the diocese of Wamba that intervenes in the northern part of Bafwasende in Tshopo province on the conflict zone component: At the start of the program, PAX did not have a partner organisation on the ground and assumed that the Archdiocese and diocese of Wamba would be able to implement the program activities. Already in 2014 PAX concluded that its partners were too far from the intervention zone to run the program as foreseen as well as did not have the necessary experience to run the program. Bafwasende territory is a very remote place and difficult to reach, and in particular the mining zones are hardly accessible. The only interventions that were planned as of 2015 consisted of the annual update of a study co-financed by I4S about the conflicts in the RFO (Result D), followed by validation workshops in Bafwasende and in Kisangani (Result E). The partner organisations participated in the I4S study (Puijtenbroek, 2014).;

Isiro diocese and Durba parish and Voix des Opprimés in Haut-Uele province. PAX stopped working with its partners in Haut-Uele in 2014 because they lacked the managerial capacities to support the co-existence component. More important but unfortunate reasons for PAX were that contacts with the partners had to start anew when one of them passed away and the other left Isiro diocese early 2016. Both partners participated in the study on KibaliGold, which was published mid-2015. Like for Bafwasende, PAX concentrated on follow-up studies, followed by conferences (Result D and E). Two

⁴ See contract between PAX and RHA for 2017.

groups of civil society and one group of artisanal miners state that the report on KibaliGold did not generate important impacts, because relations between PAX and its partners on the grounds and civil society were interrupted after a last workshop on the VP was organised in Watsa or Durba, in which civil society, local authorities and security forces participated in January 2016: The follow-up of recommendations of the study did not happen (Interview 6, 7, 11);

In May 2017 PAX started to work with a new partner, Action Pour la Promotion Rurale (APRu) on the relations between KibaliGold, the communities and artisanal miners (Result D and E), as well as on L&A (Result G);

Life and Peace Institute in Bukavu: With regards to the third component on capacity building of civil society in Eastern DRC and L&A at provincial and national level, PAX identified Life and Peace Institute in Bukavu as its partner. Its partner conducted the necessary studies related to the capacity development and participated in a conference in Kisangani early 2016 (Result F)⁵. However, after this conference, Life and Peace closed its office in 2016. A new partner was found in June 2016, the Expertise Centre on Mining Governance (CEGEMI) who carried out a study on the formalisation of the artisanal sector in the MGM concession in Ituri province.

With regards to PAX's staff, the following changes occurred with consequences for the program:

For Ituri province, a first staff change as of April 2015. The new program lead was in function until April 2017 and in charge of the program for Ituri province; however, Mambasa is not being taken care of, whereas Irumu and Djugu are. Between April 2015 and January 2017, no monitoring agents were in place on the mining sites of the 3 territories in Ituri province. After April 2017, the new program lead is in charge of all three provinces. A local PAX office is opened in Bunia in 2014, with one staff member responsible for studies and oversight, but having other obligations which were difficult to combine with PAX's work;

For Tshopo province, the first staff change is in April 2016. There is no supervision until April 2017 when the new program lead arrives;

For Haut-Uele province, the first staff change is in April 2016. Another person is in charge of the studies and updates around KibaliGold as of August 2015. There is no supervision until April 2017, when the new program lead arrives;

For the Kivus: The program lead of Ituri province was in charge until April 2015. The new program lead remained in function until April 2017 but did not engage with partners in the Kivu province. As of April 2017, the new program lead is in charge of all three provinces and the Kivus.

4.2.3 Effect of context factors upon program results and ToC: Conclusions

Although there have been no changes in the ToC according to interviewees, important changes occurred throughout the implementation of the program:

With regards to the conflict zones, in Bafwasende, annual studies were planned to update the 2014 I4S study, which has been done once. The absences and/or weak capacities of local partners on the ground and PAX's program lead not taking care of Bafwasende territory, partially explain these consequences, as well as the difficulties encountered to organise civil society in this territory. Two conferences were organised in situ to present and validate the research reports. Activities in Mambasa and Irumu were hampered by the problematic partnership between RHA and PAX, and seriously delayed, in particular the work to be done by agents to monitor the situation in the mines for the peace committees and the creation of early warning systems.

With regards to the co-existence between artisanal miners and companies, most effects on the program were caused by the gold price on the global market that urged a number of mining companies to either stop activities, or sell their concession. Only in Djugu territory with AGK/MGM, the full package of the ToC has been implemented; organising artisanal miners (C), studies and capacity building (D) and constructive dialogue through conferences, rather than multi-stakeholder platforms (E). In Haut-Uele, PAX missed strong partners on the ground but was capable to implement its activities as foreseen: This included studies to be used for capacity development (E) and the creation of a constructive dialogue with KibaliGold through not only conferences but also through attempts to put in place multi-stakeholder platforms, though civil society was seriously divided (F).

⁵ One other conference was organised in Kisangani by the Swiss Embassy, and another was organised in Kisangani by I4S.

With regards to the Eastern DRC component, L&A activities may have been identified during a conference organised by the program in Kisangani in early 2016, regrouping many representatives of civil society, artisanal miners, companies, and provincial and national authorities (G), but were not implemented. This is most likely due to PAX staff setting other priorities, although PAX already intended to start these activities as of 2014 (PAX, 2017). This component benefitted however from a conference organised by the Swiss Embassy on the VP, as well as a conference organised by I4S on amongst others the studies conducted by the program on Irumu, Bafwasende and Mambasa.

4.3 To what extent have program objectives been achieved?

This section assesses the extent to which results/outputs have been delivered by the program as well as assesses achievements at the level of the specific objective. The following sub questions were formulated:

- What have been the outputs and outcomes realised in comparison to the plan?
- What challenges did PAX and its partners encounter with the implementation of the program?
- To what extent do the outcomes achieved provide evidence for the realisation of the program objectives?

The progress reports do not present achievements with regards to the indicators formulated in the project document. The level of reporting presented activities implemented rather than results obtained. The following information is based upon the progress documents, documents made available by RHA and the reconstruction of time lines and activities through interviews. Section 4.3.2 gives an overview of results that have been addressed in each of the territories. Appendix 7 presents an overview of program outputs per territory.

After considering all information obtained, the third sub question in this section will be answered in depth in section 4.4.

4.3.1 What have been the outputs and outcomes realised in comparison to the plan?

This section presents planned vs realised objectives and output in line with the indicators set in the logical framework. For a number of critical indicators, such as L&A messages and reactions to these messages, no data were collected by PAX and its partners.

Specific objective: Human rights and security in gold mining known and improved in Eastern DRC

As already mentioned in 2.3, a number of indicators mentioned under the specific objective do not measure changes in behaviour of the stakeholders who are being addressed by the program. The following presents however an overview in line with the logical framework, for as much as information has been made available through documents and interviews. Section 4.4 will give an overview of changes in behaviour observed by interviewees.

Table 1

Specific Objective: Realisations compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
5 credible dialogues between the industry and artisanal gold miners	2 credible dialogues started, one with Kibali in Haut-Uele and one with MGM in Mungbwalo, Ituri	
# and quality of reactions by local authorities upon L&A messages in conflict zones: 1 / 2 messages receives a reaction	No information found	
# and quality of local peace committees in conflict zones that are active and operational: in	No information found	

every 1/2 groupements 1 / 2 messages receives a reaction		
Every chefferie reacts at least 1 time upon L&A messages on the governance of the artisanal mining sector: at least	No information found	
# of artisanal miner associations operational in Ituri	Many (pre) cooperatives exist already in Mungbwalo before PAX gives its first course on the formalisation of the artisanal sector in June 2016 (Réseau Haki na Amani, 2016).	Contribution of the gold program limited to awareness raising and courses
Global vision on gold mining	No information found	Possibly the report on the March 2016 conference in Kisangani can serve as a stepping stone for formulating this vision

Result A: Systematic and frequent monitoring of human security and gold mining

Table 2

Result A - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
# of human rights and security reports for each territory: 1 per year for Mambasa, Bafwasende, Irumu = 9 reports	2/3 reports produced in Mambasa and Irumu, Djugu and Mahagi.	Reports Djugu and Mahagi not foreseen Monitoring of situation in mining sites not organised for 2 years.
Study of artisanal mining: 1 in Bafwasende, 1 for the RFO	1 study published: 'Exploiter dans le désordre'.	
3 L&A messages per year about the military zones	Indicator not monitored at the level of peace committees RHA and civil society lobby the Parliamentary Caucus in January 2016.	
1 module about monitoring techniques produced	1 module found for the redynamisation of 3 ILPs in December 2015:	Module is very long and not concrete enough ⁶ (Réseau Haki na Amani, 2015)
# of people trained on the mining law, monitoring and reporting: 25 existing peace committees, all traditional chiefs and 2 CS representatives per chefferie	20 peace committees and 20 monitoring agents for the mines trained on monitoring 3 trainings organised, 1 for Mambasa, 1 for Djugu&Irumu and 1 in Bafwasende	No records of typology of participants

Result B: Early warning system in place

Table 3

Result B - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
# of committees put in place and trained on community security: Minimum 20 in Mambasa and 5 in Irumu	20 peace committees conduct regular monitoring and barzas in Mambasa (13), Djugu (3) and Irumu (4) and 20	Peace committees not foreseen in Djugu in the program document, because this is not a conflict zone.

⁶ The annex 2 of this report is the training module and counts 17 pages. It describes the creation, role and actions of a peace committee, as a means to create one. However with regards to the monitoring of incidents, clarity is missing of what type of incidents are to be monitored. For example, what incidents do we consider to be human rights atrocities and human insecurity. Since 1948 many conventions have been adopted by the UN to describe human rights, and consultant is missing the definition used by PAX and RHA on these. The section on the creation of a peace committee, assesses conflicts in the first place rather than describing the creation of a peace committee. Although the document has a section on strategies to transform conflicts, nowhere it highlights the possibility for L&A actions that address local authorities, or higher levels of public administration. The peace committees seem to have been set up to transform conflicts within their own sphere of influence but not human rights atrocities and human insecurity caused by outside actors like the FARDC and armed groups.

	monitoring agents (13 in Mambasa and 7 in Djugu&Irumu) 3 early warning systems in place of which 2 in Mambasa and 1 in Irumu. In 2017 2 systems successfully connected to MONUSCO	Peace committees are not capable to function independently from RHA after 10 months of absence Early warning systems do not function at first sight because people lose telephones and airtime.
at least 5 members per peace committee	Between 5-10 persons per committee	
% of women in peace committees: at least 2 per committee	20 % are women	
% of peace committees that have regular meetings: 100 %	No information found	

Result C: Artisanal miner associations/cooperatives created and operational

Table 4

Result C - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
5 delegates trained in pilot zones	No information found 4 courses in Djugu for 18 (pre-) cooperatives, 246 persons, including members of cooperatives and traders. 16 % are women. Courses organised in Mambasa for 200 miners and traders. 15 members of peace committees and 20 public servants trained	No specification if this is outside or inside industrial concessions
15 meetings on 15 mining sites with 50% of the artisanal miners being present	25 mining sites identified in Djugu territory (Mungbwalo concession)	Courses in Djugu based upon a TNA conducted by CEGEMI
5 artisanal miner associations active in 15 pilot zones	RHA supported 18 cooperatives of which 4 have not been completely legalised in 2017 in Mungbwalo, Djugu territory. In 2016 there were 7 cooperatives in this territory. In Mambasa 9 cooperatives were initiated. In Haut-Uele contacts exist with 47 (pre-) cooperatives	Many (pre-) cooperatives created. The program's role is limited to awareness raising and training.
1 artisanal miner association active in 10 other zones	No information found	

Result D: Local government, populations and civil society informed and capacitated

Table 5

Result D - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
1 report that makes an inventory of Human Rights and Security Risks	No information found, or these could be 2 I4S studies co-funded by I4S, covering Mambasa, Bafwasende, Irumu territory	
4 reports on the context analysis in 4 concessions	2 I4S studies co-funded by I4S/STAREC 1 study on KibaliGold 1 on KiloGold and Loncor	Report on KiloGold and Loncor produced when they had already stopped activities
Refresher course on the mining law and training on challenges related to gold: All chiefs and existing committees in Ituri in the Gold mining areas	Refresher courses organised in Mambasa, Irumu, Djugu and Bafwasende	

Training on mining law and challenges related to gold: all traditional chiefs, most important representatives of SC in mining zones in Haut-Uele	1 training in Kisangani for civil society on the VP in relation to Kibali 1 workshop organised in 2016 to better organise civil society in Watsa and Faradje. 40 persons
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Result E: Constructive dialogue between all stakeholders

Table 6

Result E - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
1 conference about the inventory of human rights and security risks	If this is about the I4S studies than 2 conferences took place, 1 in Mambasa and 1 in Bafwasende (40 persons attending)	
2 conferences, each about two concessions, with the participation of all stakeholders	2 Conferences in Bunia and Mungbwalo on AGK/MGM in 2014. 100 p attending 2 Conferences in Durba and Kinshasa in 2015 on KibaliGold. 3 workshops with Kibali, local chiefs, civil society as of May 2017	AGK activities stopped in April 2015, so no follow-up in 2015

Result F: Capacity development of civil society in East Congo ensured

Table 7

Result F - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
2 Research reports on the governance and political economy of gold mining, 1 in each of the Kivus	2 studies realised	
2 studies and 1 report on the dynamics of artisanal gold mining	2 I4S studies co-funding from I4S/STAREC (Bafwasende-Mambasa and Ituri) 1 study: 'Exploiter dans le désordre' (Bafwasende-Mambasa) 1 study on Bondo in Bas-Uele, financed by PAX	
1 exchange meeting between SCOs in East Congo	1 exchange meeting in March 2016	The text in the program document mentions 2 exchanges
1 presentation each year of the reports on security and gold mining in conflict zones	1 presentation of the 2 I4S studies and a similar study in Bondo (Bas-Uele province) during exchange meeting in March 2016 and during a conference organised in January 2016 by the UN in Kisangani	
1 presentation of lessons learned about the artisanal miner associations	Report of CEGEMI about (pre-) cooperatives in Djuju	Not presented during the March 2016 exchange, because not available
1 presentation of the context analysis in the industrial concessions	1 presentation of BANRO study and KibaliGold in Kisangani meeting March 2016	
1 presentation of the baseline reports on the OKAPI national park and that of Bafwasende	These are the 2 I4S studies already counted under Result E	

Result G: Regular and effective lobbying and advocacy of authorities ensured

Table 8

Result G - Results compared to target indicators.

Target indicator	Realised	Observations
At least 1 L&A message about the governance and political economy of gold mining report	See the Kivu studies under Result F: Resolutions/recommendations formulated during conference in Kisangani, March 2016	
At least 1 message about the research findings on the dynamics of artisanal mining	No information found	
At least 1 message of civil society based upon the exchange meetings in East Congo	See also Result A: RHA and civil society Ituri lobby Parliamentary Caucus in January 2016	
1 Conference that involves all stakeholders of East Congo	Already registered under Result F May 2017, Conference in Paris in the margin of the OECD forum 1 conference organised by Swiss Embassy on VP on the Kibali Gold case	In total 3 conferences were organised in Kisangani, 1 financed by the UN on the I4S studies, 1 by the Swiss Embassy and 1 by the Gold program
At least 2 resolutions formulated at the end of the conference	17 recommendations formulated for follow-up by the Government, mining companies and Civil Society. APRu starts L&A as of May 2017 for Haut-Uele, in relation to Kibali	

4.3.2 Results being addressed or not for each territory

The following table gives an overview of results in the logical framework being addressed or not for each territory. It highlights activities for particular results not implemented in a particular territory (orange) and it also shows that activities for particular results were implemented although this was not foreseen in the program document (orange). For example, Mambasa is part of the conflict zone component and conform the logical framework, activities were implemented to deliver result A and B (green), but also activities were conducted to deliver results on the co-existence component (orange).

Table 9

Overview of results for which activities were implemented or not, in line with the component in which the territory is classified in the program document.

Green = Result addressed conform program document;

Orange = Modifications to the logical framework, though sometimes already mentioned in program document;

White = No activities foreseen in program document and not implemented either, so conform program document.

Result	Mambasa, Conflict zone component	Irumu, Conflict zone component	Djugu, Co-existence component	Watsa and Faradje, Co-existence component	Bafwasende, Conflict zone component	Eastern DRC, Eastern DRC component
A: Monitoring by peace committees	Green	Green	Orange	White	Orange	White
B: Early warning systems	Green	Green	White	White	Orange	White

C: Organisation of miners	Awareness raising and training on cooperatives			Not addressed conform program document though part of co-existence component		
D: Capacity development stakeholders	Study on KiloGold and Loncor and training of local authorities and civil society					
E: Constructive dialogue	Conference based upon study KiloGold and Loncor		Conferences based upon studies AGK/MGM	Conferences and some multi-stakeholder platforms		
F: Capacity development Eastern DRC						3 conferences in Kisangani: 1 by the Swiss Embassy, 1 by I4S and 1 by the program together with ICGLR of which 2 by the program ⁷
G: L&A at high levels				L&A starts in 2017 with the new partner APRu		L&A took place during conferences but follow-up was limited.
Observation: Hardly any activities undertaken in Mahagi right from the start.						

4.4 To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?

This section identifies the most significant changes in behaviour that have been associated with the gold program at first site. However section 4.5 will assess the program's contribution to a limited number of outcomes in more detail. The sub questions answered in this section are:

- What were the most significant changes/outcomes observed since 2013 that contributed to the sustainable mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
- What are the changes in behaviour observed, and whose behaviour changed, when? SMART formulation.
- What evidence is available that testifies this behavioural change?
- Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?

Information is obtained through the interviews with PAX and its partners, external resources persons and documents. A number of outcomes have been clustered into one outcome, for example the changes that the peace committees were able to introduce in Mambasa, Irumu and Djugu have been documented together. This means that the number of outcomes described here does not tell anything about the effectiveness of the program. In this section, only behavioural changes have been documented, the contribution of PAX and its partners on the ground will follow in the next section.

⁷ The program document mentions 2 conferences, but the target indicators mention 1 conference. Two of the three conferences have been organised by other actors and not with the program budget.

4.4.1 Behavioural changes observed in Haut-Uele

Around the concession of KibaliGold in Watsa and Faradje territory, the following changes in behaviour have occurred and are at first sight related to the program according to persons and groups interviewed.

1. The FARDC and the Territorial Administrators of Watsa and Faradje use less violence in their attempts to maintain order around KibaliGold's concession after PAX presented its report on the company in October 2015 in Kisangani and in Kinshasa (Interview 2, 11, 16, 24). This is the case when they evict artisanal miners from the concession, when the population is organising manifestations or sit-ins. Also less arbitrary arrests are taking place. PAX's report showed the involvement of KibaliGold in several of these incidents. After its publication, Captain 'Coup par Coup' of the FARDC and some of his soldiers were arrested and sentenced to 10 years of prison by military justice (Interviews 2, 3, 6, 11, 24) (ACP, 2016). PAX documented human rights violations committed by these military in March 2014, whilst using vehicles from Kibali (PAX and CERN, 2015).

In the light of the gold program, the significance of this change is that violence has decreased around the KibaliGold concession; KibaliGold's continued involvement in these incidents became less visible, but the PNC continues to harass the local population (LONEMA, 2016).

2. There is now a space to denounce the excessive use of violence during conferences about co-existence with KibaliGold. The population of Watsa and Faradje are better informed on their human rights through radio broadcasts organised by the 'Commission Justice et Paix' of the diocese, through trainings organised by PAX in 2016 and those offered by MONUSCO. PAX's report on KibaliGold was a first step for the population to better understand their position. More recently also artisanal miners attend meetings and workshops on these themes (Interview 2, 3, 11). The L&A activities conducted by APRu, based upon the results of these meetings generate reactions from Kibali, an indication that they are not indifferent vis-à-vis the activities carried out by APRu since May 2017. In the light of the gold program, the significance of this change is that people increase their sense of being able to decrease violence through dialogue.
3. Civil Society has obtained more access to KibaliGold (Interview 24). Whereas the company did not open the door for CS on beforehand, increasingly they manage to get in touch with the company. One of the reasons advanced is that PAX opened these doors, because they are in touch with Kibali. However communication between both actors stopped entirely after the publication of PAX's report, because the company did not agree with the conclusions of the report and recommendations formulated during the conferences as of January-March 2016 (Interview 2). APRu organised 3 conferences as of May 2017, in which Kibali participated 2 times. On the first occasion Kibali and PAX were both present, on the second occasion in October PAX was an observer.
The significance of this change is that it contributes to a dialogue based upon equal footing between CS and Kibali.

4. In the period May-October 2017, KibaliGold becomes more sensitive and open to the requests of civil society, APRu and PAX to⁸:

- Create a platform of independent CSOs (and not those previously co-opted) and to have monthly meetings with CS of Faradje;
- Decrease the excessive violence used by the PNC, resulting in the appointment of a new police commander;
- Address the situation of the artisanal miners and accept their presence in the concession, as is the case in the concession of Banro in South Kivu and MGM in Djugu territory (see below);
- Respect the right of information and consultation, as presented by civil society in a letter to Kibali;
- Ensure the follow-up of the recommendations published in the study of Kibali in 2015 (PAX and CERN, 2015);
- Attend the conference in October 2017, after civil society wrote a letter to Kibali, complaining that they had not come to a conference in August 2017;
- Publish the social and environmental impact studies and mitigation plans.

⁸ Consultant has not been able to cross check this information provided by PAX on the ground.

The position of artisanal miners within the concession seems to have become stronger in this same period: Although miners were ordered to stop their activities before 20 October, or they would be evicted, a new provincial order on 2 November postponed these evictions.

The significance of this outcome in the light of the program is that the terms of the dialogue between Kibali and civil society have changed and that these dialogues will possibly result in more sustainable outcomes for co-existence.

5. According to the latest information obtained on December 8, 2017, recommendations formulated by artisanal miners in Faradje territory on the revision of the 2002 mining law have been presented in the national parliament in Kinshasa by the Member of Parliament mister Banio. These recommendations were formulated during a workshop in August 2017, organised by APRu, PAX's partner in Haut-Uele province since May 2017. Workshop participants were the territorial administrator of Faradje, Civil Society of Watsa and Faradje territories, local chiefs and leaders of these territories, mining cooperatives, SAESSCAM and pit managers (APRu, 2017). The significance of this change in the light of the ToC is that the revised mining law takes into account some of the realities faced by artisanal miners on a daily basis.

4.4.2 Behavioural changes observed in Ituri

1. In March 2017, MGM in Mungbwalo signed an agreement with 4 artisanal mining cooperatives, who can continue mining within the concession, this time backed by a legal framework. They can dig gold until a maximum depth of 30 meters, after which MGM will start industrial mining (MGM & COOPEMI COOP-CA, 2017). In October 2017, the identification and formalisation of artisanal mining zones had not yet happened and more cooperatives want to sign an MoU with MGM (Interview 4, 8, 22, 25, 29). MGM realised that it was losing part of its gold because the artisanal miners found a lot of gold at a depth of 25 meters.

The significance of this outcome is that it creates a precedent for artisanal miners to co-produce with companies within their concession, as was the case before the 2002 mining law came into force. Its significance is also that creating formal opportunities for some 40000 – 50000 artisanal miners of which 10000 are former demobilised armed men, prevents the deterioration of the actual security situation in Djugu territory and in Bunia.

2. Peace committees engage with local authorities and their security committees, as well as with MONUSCO since the beginning of this year. This is the case in Djugu, but also in Mambasa and in Irumu. These committees are the only local structures in place that are trying to resolve local conflicts. For example in Djugu these committees solve conflicts related to land and mining. Traditional chiefs of chefferies who used to sell land 2 to 3 times, now consult the peace committees to check the property rights over land plots before selling. Conflicts within mines are often about the boundaries of the pit and about sharing the revenues from gold between pit owners and miners. Also in the other 2 territories (Mambasa and Irumu), peace committees have been able to decrease tensions and insecurity at the local level by means of increased engagement with local authorities and the administration, which has helped to decrease amongst others the number of roadblocks where taxes have to be paid. In Irumu, the coordinating structure of the peace committees became an advisor to the security committee and this is also seems the case in NiaNia chefferie in Mambasa. Also RHA became an advisor of the security committees of Mambasa territory and a member of the same committee in Irumu territory as of June 2017. In Mambasa and Irumu an early warning system has been put in place with MONUSCO. Members of the peace committees and its coordination can easily contact MONUSCO when insecurity is increasing, who in its turn is contacting the FARDC to take joint action (Interviews 9, 14, 17, 18, 27). Monusco is surprised about the trustworthy structures in place in Irumu. They are very active in mobilising accurate and complete information about incidents. Their members are leaders who are popular in their community (Interview 9).

The significance of these outcomes in the light of the gold program is that they foster a dialogue with security committees of local authorities and territorial level, as well as provide these authorities with viable information needed to protect and respect human rights and security at a local level. The connection with MONUSCO increases the chances to protect these rights at a more strategic level.

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3. Mitigated changes in behaviour with regards to the presence of armed groups, FARDC and PNC in and around mines. Although the peace committees in Irumu have been able to move the militia from the centre of Nyankunde and two other village centres, RHA admits that with local peace committees, the program has not been able to move armed groups away from the mining sites (FARDC, PNC, ANR and militia): This because the chain of command of the FARDC, PNC and ANR is at the provincial or national level (Interview 21). This observation is confirmed with regards to the presence of the FARDC and PNC in the mines of Mungbwalo; Their removal was based upon instructions from the provincial and national level (Interview 13). The training module for the creation of the peace committees does not highlight any L&A actions that address local authorities, or higher levels of public administration. The peace committees seem to have been set up to transform conflicts within their own sphere of influence but not human rights atrocities and human insecurity caused by outside actors like the FARDC and armed groups (Réseau Haki na Amani, 2015). Also none of the monitoring reports consulted make an inventory of what actions to take with regards to the types of incidents that occurred in a particular period in a particular area. The significance of this outcome in the light of the gold program is that they show limitations in the validity of the ToC.

4.5 To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?

Whereas the former section described major outcomes (behavioural changes) associated with the program in Ituri and Haut-Uele, in this section we explore the actual contribution made by PAX and its partners, by comparing alternative explanations for a limited number of outcomes. The following sub questions will be answered.

- According to you, what actors, factors explain some of the outcomes associated with the gold program in the previous section?
- What is the story of change - the sequence of incidents/actors and factors that explains each outcome?
- Why do you think this is the proper story of change? (Is this always the way people behave, react, act? what are the drivers of change?)
- What evidence can you provide that this is the most likely story of change?
- In this story of change - what has been the role of PAX and its partners?

Although much information has been gathered through interviews and through documentation, the consultant was not able to obtain much in-depth information on the deeper drivers of change for time reasons.

The behavioural changes that are being further assessed in this session, have been selected based upon how relevant they are in the ToC of the program.

4.5.1 FARDC and the Territorial Administrators of Watsa and Faradje use less violence in their attempts to maintain order around KibaliGold's concession

The FARDC and the Territorial Administrators of Watsa and Faradje use less violence in their attempts to maintain order around Kibali's concession. The inventory of actors and factors that possibly explain this outcome are the following:

1. PAX presented its report on the company in October 2015 in Kisangani and in Kinshasa (PAX and CERN, 2015). It highlights amongst others the close relations between KibaliGold, the PNC and FARDC as well as the transport of these order groups in the vehicles of the company. The presentation in Kinshasa urged the director general of the company to publicly reject the accusations by the Commission Episcopale des Ressources Naturelles (CERN) and PAX that the company was involved in human rights violations (Radio OKAPI, 2015); AngloGold Ashanti, one of the shareholders of KibaliGold is a member of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, like PAX and the Swiss Government. These principles include amongst others that companies 'engage appropriately with public and private security service providers and surrounding communities in complex environments' (VP, undated). The VP provided

possibly another platform were the allegations against Kibali were discussed (no information available);

After the publication of the report, PAX also organised a workshop in 2016 on the VP for Kibali, the PNC and the FARDC during which the close relations between the company and the security forces were addressed;

According to some actors the report did not generate important impacts on the ground, because relations between PAX and its partners and civil society were interrupted after the workshop: The follow-up of recommendations did not happen. A meeting was organised with the Ambassador of Switzerland, CERN and PAX to put in place a platform that could collaborate with PAX. CERN however was not able to represent PAX in Haut-Uele; it is only in May 2017 that PAX found a new partner on the ground (Interview 7, 11).

2. After the publication of the report, Captain "Coup par Coup" of the FARDC and some of his soldiers were arrested and sentenced to 10 years of prison by military justice for having committed human rights violations, whilst using Kibali's vehicles (ACP, 2016). No information is available with regards to actors that potentially influenced the decision of the military to arrest Captain Coup par Coup. The new Captain may have received clear orders with regards to the use of violence.
3. The government sent its instructions to the territorial administrator and urged the local government to start with dialogues before using arms. The administrator is in charge of security issues in his territory and in that role is the chairman of the security committee (interview 16).
4. PAX has been an inspiring actor in Haut-Uele as of 2014, because they encouraged local radio stations, with support from human right organisations, to inform people about their human rights and to inform local populations also about violent incidents in and around KibaliGold (interview 11).

To conclude: PAX's publication, the workshops and the publicity by amongst others radio Okapi are most likely the triggering factors that explain a decrease in violence used by security forces are the nomination of a new Captain and instructions given to the territorial administrator.

4.5.2 MGM in Djugu territory signs an agreement with 4 mining cooperatives in March 2017

MGM signed an agreement with 4 mining cooperatives in March 2017. Those cooperatives will be assigned an artisanal mining site within the concession of MGM in Mungbwalo in the Djugu territory of Ituri. The following actors and factors may have played a role:

1. The thematic group on Natural Resources in Bunia which was created in 2006 has been the key factor for this change through its connections with both artisanal miners and authorities. Members of this thematic group are amongst others the 'Association des Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux pour la Pacification et Reconstruction de l'Ituri (AEMAPRI)', 'Cadre de Concertation de la Société Civile de l'Ituri sur les Ressources Naturelles '(CdC/RN)' and RHA. by means of organising several meetings with MGM.
 - In 2012 RHA and PAX published their report on the 'future of gold' first its report followed by the 2014 'potentiel en or' report on the Mungbwalo concession, AGK at the time (IKV Pax Christi & Réseau Haki na Amani (RHA), 2012), (Bakker, Puijenbroek, Uiterwaal, & Wesselink, 2014). Both reports emphasised existing tensions between the artisanal miners and AGK (Interview 1). These findings were shared with the thematic group and with the 'Association des Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux pour la Pacification et Reconstruction de l'Ituri (AEMAPRI);
 - Another member of the thematic group, the 'Cadre de Concertation de la Société Civile de l'Ituri sur les Ressources Naturelles conducted another study on the human rights situation in Mungbwalo, with support of the Carter Center and SIDA (CdC/RN, 2015);
 - After the publication of these reports the thematic group multiplied its activities. After a training of artisanal miners in Goma in 2015, RHA started to train artisanal miners on a formalised artisanal mining sector for 18 (pre-) cooperatives in the Djugu territory in 2016 and 2017. According to RHA their awareness raising activities and courses were also used as an instrument to become involved in the mining services and local authorities. The thematic group prepared L&A activities and stated that MGM engaged with them in 2015 (no information available) (Interview 8, 22);

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- The consultant observes that RHA was hardly operational in 2014 and not operational in 2015, after activities resumed in November 2015. When activities were resumed, the program waited until January 2017 to start working again with the monitoring agents in the mines.
2. Human security in Mungbwalo town has been a key factor in explaining the outcome.
 - AGK and later MGM wanted to make an end to the insecure situation, threatening its equipment's, and its buildings which were already attacked in 2013, 2014, 2015 during manifestations of artisanal miners when one of their mining sites was closed. In 2016 an influx of artisanal miners was observed when a new mining site was discovered within the concession of MGM. When MGM wanted to evict the artisanal miners from this site with the PNC this resulted again in violence in 2017. In consequence there were manifestations in Mungbwalo for 3 days and all economic activities were stopped. The authorities of Mungbwalo town were ordered to come to Bunia, where the Governor and the provincial Minister of Mining contacted the CEO of MGM who was in Kinshasa. By coincidence, there was a meeting of national members of Parliament in Bunia and these started to get involved. At the same time leaders of the local communities of Bunia, the FEC, MGM in Mungbwalo, the chairmen of the 'coordination de la société civile', and churches raised the awareness to commit non-violent actions;
 - In consequence the Governor of Ituri started a dialogue between the 2 parties that resulted in the end in the contracts between 4 mining cooperatives and MGM. In February 2017 MGM understood the necessity to accept artisanal miners in its concession because this had been common practice before the 2002 mining law came into force (Interview 13).
 3. An important other factor is that Mungbwalo town counts between 20.000-25.000 artisanal miners that are moving from one mining site to the other. 'They are behaving like nomads'. For example gold was discovered on the Kpangba site in MGM's concession in 2016. On this place there is no gold left anymore and the miners moved to other places (Interview 13). Another important factor is that some 10.000 artisanal miners previously were members of armed groups;
 4. MGM and AGK have never had the financial means to start the production in the mining site. The concession is in the middle of an artisanal mining site where SOKIMO worked with subcontracts with the miners. This means that MGM and AGK found the miners in their concession and those miners depend upon mining for their livelihood. AGK, SOKIMO and MGM have the concession already for 25 years without starting production and without starting community development projects. After the manifestations in 2016 and 2017, the government of RDC got involved and asked MGM to give mining sites to the artisanal miners (Interview 29).

To conclude: The most likely triggering factor for this outcome has been the increased insecurity in Mungbwalo when MGM with the PNC evicted artisanal miners from their mining site by early 2017, urging the government to take action by starting discussions with MGM and the artisanal miners. The following factors played a role:

- SOKIMO, AGK and now MGM have a long history with artisanal miners on their concession and have until so far not been able to start industrialised mining nor to support community development activities;
- Ensuring a livelihood to artisanal miners who otherwise cause insecurity and of which some have a back ground in armed groups is an important reason to foster human security in and around the mining site.

The role of RHA and PAX in this outcome consist of the studies conducted that were then discussed with a larger community, and the courses organised, in combination of those organised by other actors. With these courses RHA has possibly been able to contribute to the empowerment of the artisanal miners. RHA's membership to the thematic group on natural resources, may have had some influence upon the L&A activities carried out by the thematic group, however the consultant lacks information with regards to the exact activities carried out by this group.

4.5.3 Peace committees engage with traditional and territorial authorities and their security committees

Peace committees engage with traditional authorities and territorial and their security committees, and this engagement provides security committees with information needed to protect and respect human rights and security. In Irumu and in Mambasa two early warning systems are now in place that directly connect these peace committees with security forces at the provincial level.

The most important factor that explains this outcome is RHA and PAX. However many peace committees in Irumu and Djugu have been created before the gold program, to address the ethnic conflict between the Hema and the Lendu in the 2000th decade. For Mambasa these committees were started after the conflict but still before the program. The peace committees however need sustained support in order to continue functioning: After all project activities stopped in 2015 for ten months, RHA had to revitalise again these structures in 2016.

To conclude: The most likely actor that has contributed to this outcome are RHA and PAX. In Ituri province they have been at the heart of the creation of these peace committees during the conflict and they have been given the credits for this approach by other actors.

4.6 To what extent were the intervention strategies efficient in reaching the goals (cost effectiveness)

In this section we examine the relations between activities, results, outcomes and specific objective as presented in the ToC in 2.2. This assessment looks in particular at the cost effectiveness – instead of cost efficiency of the program. The sub questions to be answered are:

- Could more outcomes have been realised with the same funding?
- Could the same outcomes have been realised with less funding?

The section below first positions the outcomes to which PAX and its partners contributed, followed by 3 other sections, one for each component in the ToC.

4.6.1 ToC and outcomes achieved




Figure 3 ToC and behavioural changes realised

The diagram above again visualises the ToC, but this time with the changes in behaviour to which PAX and its partners contributed to some extent, as is indicated with a star, green for a positive outcome and red for an outcome which was not so successful.

4.6.2 Conflict zones

Ituri, Mambasa and Irumu and Djugu

The following elements justify the conclusion that for the conflict component more outcomes could have been realised with the same amount of funding, in particular with regards to the peace committees, their efforts to lobby the authorities to protect and respect human rights and foster human security and the monthly monitoring activities by RHA:

1. The peace committees have collected a lot of information at the local level, helping members of the peace committees with a good understanding of the local context (Weijts & Jacobs, 2015). RHA has invested considerable efforts and many missions to validate these data through barzas and through the organisation of meetings with the authorities. However, the annual reports only describe the human rights and security situation in and outside the mines, and do not identify follow-up actions such as L&A to be conducted at chefferie and territorial level, and if necessary at provincial and national level. Data collected became a routine and their ultimate purpose may have been overlooked. Based upon a training module assessed it seems like the peace committees received a training that was relevant to reduce conflicts at local level during the conflict between

the Hema and the Lendu in the first decade of this century. But when addressing conflicts related to gold mining as described in the context of this program, these peace committees should also build the capacity to address human rights violations caused by external actors, like the FARDC and armed groups through L&A actions at higher administrative levels. RHA admitted that the peace committees are not in the position to reduce the presence of armed groups, FARDC, PNC and ANR in mines, because the chain of command of the FARDC, PNC and ANR is at the provincial or national level (Interview 21);

2. The monitoring agents, associated to the peace committees to obtain information from the mining sites have not been active between April 2015 and December 2016, due to 1) the problematic partnership between RHA and PAX, and 2) a different interpretation of the program by the PAX program lead for that moment. Their information could have contributed to the identification of more strategic (L&A) activities towards improving human security and rights in the mining sites;
3. The findings of the peace committees did not urge the program to address some of the issues that need actions at the provincial level or national level. Already in 2014, PAX and RHA felt the need to start L&A activities at provincial and national levels, including other CSOs (PAX, 2017). However, in Ituri province a first L&A plan was only formulated in 2017 (Réseau Haki na Amani, 2017) and not implemented: The thematic group on natural resources stated that it needed funding in order to conduct L&A during the evaluation;
4. It took the project 2.5 years to start with the implementation of the early warning systems, which is rather late. However the peace committees now have the possibility to contact MONUSCO when needed. If the system had been in place earlier, than this might have helped to evacuate armed groups, FARDC and PNC from the mining sites;
5. Another factor is that the implementation of activities was considerably delayed in 2014 and entirely stopped until November 2015, due to the problematic partnership between PAX and RHA;
6. The program would probably have yielded more outcomes with the same budget, in terms of authorities protecting and respecting human rights and security, if it had oriented the data collected by the peace committees and in particular the mining agents towards L&A activities at territorial, provincial and national level.

Tshopo, Bafwasende

Based upon the information consulted, the activities carried out in Bafwasende have hardly generated outcomes.

The main results obtained in this territory are the delivery of 2 reports, followed by workshops in Bafwasende and a conference in Kisangani. As already mentioned in 4.2.2, the program did not have a partner organisation on the ground that was capable of organising the appropriate follow-up of these studies on the ground.

In terms of cost effectiveness, PAX should have decided during the conception of the program about the feasibility of realising outcomes in this territory: either not start any activities or deliver the full package with a qualified partner on the ground.

4.6.3 Co-existence between artisanal miners and companies

Ituri, Djugu (Mungbwalo) and Mambasa

The program has conducted several studies in Ituri on the co-existence between artisanal miners and companies with different results.

Hardly any information was found regarding the follow-up of the study conducted in Mambasa on KiloGold and Loncor. This is partially due to the fact that both companies were not active anymore at the beginning of the program nor at the start of the studies: Enough reasons though existed to take actions with regards to the presence of FARDC, PNC and armed groups in the territory, all having an influence on mining activities and their revenues. As has been mentioned in the previous section, RHA was not much active in the 2014-2015 period, but also did not use the information gathered by the peace committees, nor the information obtained through the studies to start L&A activities at provincial and national level together with PAX. RHA's membership of the thematic group on Natural Resources with members as the CdC/RN and the AEMAPRI offered enough opportunities to start these activities. In terms of cost-effectiveness more outcomes could have been realised with L&A activities at the provincial and national level.

In Djugu, the combination of studies, those by RHA and by the CdC/RN on the Mungbwalo mine; the monitoring of the situation in the mines by monitoring agents, and courses on the mining law for different stakeholder categories as well as on artisanal mining cooperatives, possibly have contributed to the signing of an MoU between Mungbwalo and 4 mining cooperatives. The consultant did not find information about the role of the thematic group on Natural Resources with regards to the realisation of this outcome, possibly a missed opportunity; nor that of the peace committees. Apart from these two observations, the combination of interventions (raising the awareness and training artisanal miner cooperatives, conducting studies followed by capacity building of local chiefs and civil society and fostering a multi stakeholder dialogue) in a context where former members of armed groups turn to artisanal mining and actually are a threat in terms of picking up their arms again as an alternative livelihoods strategy to mining, has been quite cost-effective in reaching an agreement between MGM and the artisanal miner cooperatives.

Haut-Uele: Watsa and Faradje

Although the report about KibaliGold triggered a chain of actions that reduced the use of violence by the FARDC in Watsa and Faradje, none of the other recommendations formulated during the conferences in Durba, Kisangani and Kinshasa (March 2016), where the study on the company was validated, have been followed up. Until May 2017, PAX did not have local partners on the ground and only a few activities have been organised to train all stakeholders on the mining law. The findings about the co-existence between MGM and artisanal miners in Djugu, however suggest that these courses helped to empower the communities and artisanal miners to engage with the authorities and with the mining company. As of May 2017, APRu has become a key partner on the ground, and already seemingly managed to change Kibali's perception with regards to a constructive dialogue with independent civil society (not the co-opted organisations), as well as started to influence the revision of the mining law. It is unfortunate that this partner was identified rather late in the program.

4.6.4 Eastern DRC

The implementation of the Eastern DRC component has not been effective. The rationale behind this component consisted of organising 2 conferences (the indicator only states 1 conference) to inform and train civil society stakeholders, who then were supposed to start an L&A activity, only based upon recommendations formulated during the conference. Conducting effective L&A activities in the first place requires a CS that is well organised and has a common understanding of issues to be addressed. Based upon this common understanding an L&A plan could have been prepared and responsibilities divided amongst different stakeholders. Like for Bafwasende, the program could have decided during the conception of the program to either deliver a full package, or not include this component in the program.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

5.1.1 To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?

The ToC for the conflict zone component and the component on the co-existence between artisanal miners are relevant with regards to the contexts in which these were to be implemented.

The relevance of the ToC for the conflict zones could however have increased if the program had formulated the ambition to address the presence of armed groups, the FARDC, PNC and others who are committing human rights violations and cause insecurity and included a L&A strategy and activities beyond the territorial level would have increased its relevance. PAX had already concluded this in 2014, but unfortunately was not able to implement it (PAX, 2017).

The relevance of the component on co-existence of artisanal and industrial miners in industrial concessions was limited to 1 (KibaliGold) out of 6 companies known at the start of the program, probably due to declining gold prices at the global market. It became however more relevant when AGK sold its concession rights in Djugu territory to MGM in 2015, which wanted to start operations soon. A clearer vision on what co-existence means might possibly have enlarged the range of results to be delivered to foster this co-existence that respects human rights and security. Apart from the 3 results in the ToC, other results could have been formulated that support for example; the creation of ZEA (be it by PAX or other partners); L&A actions to ensure that part of the royalties and taxes paid by companies return to affected chefferies and their communities (as is being mentioned in the ToR of this evaluation); or L&A actions to decrease the maximum surfaces of concessions that are currently occupying entire chefferies and territories. Or these possibilities could have been elaborated in the justification of the program, after which it was decided that they were not appropriate.

The relevance of the third component is doubtful: Policy changes at provincial and national level require more than studies and 1 or 2 conferences. The component would have become more relevant if more meetings would have taken place to identify appropriate L&A strategies and divide responsibilities between civil society.

A general observation is that the ToCs miss at the level of specific objective a clear definition of what behavioural change will be observed from the FARDC, PNC, armed groups, the companies, the policy makers and public sector at provincial and national level.

5.1.2 To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?

During its implementation the ToC has not been revised. However important changes occurred within and outside the program that influenced the extent to which activities were implemented or not, and in which territories.

Most important changes *within* the program relate to the presence and performance of partners on the ground, as well as to the many staff changes from PAX's side. An important change *outside* the program consisted of companies closing their doors, hence decreasing the opportunity to implement the co-existence component on more than two locations. Another *external* change observed when mining companies prepare the production phase is that civil society becomes fragmented, as was the case in Watsa territory where KibaliGold started mining as of 2013. Similar processes have taken place in Mwenga in South Kivu, when Banro started operations and in Mungbwalo, when MGM started to prepare for gold mining. Consequences of these changes are:

With regards to the conflict zone component

In Bafwasende, local partners were absent or weak and therefore not able to give a sound follow-up in the territory of the studies conducted and the conferences where these were validated. Between April 2015 and April 2017, apart from a conference to validate a study, PAX has not been in the territory; Activities in Mambasa and Irumu were hampered by the problematic partnership between RHA and PAX, and seriously delayed between 2014 and October 2015; in particular the work to be done by agents to monitor the situation in the mines was not carried out between October 2015 and January 2017, due to a misinterpretation of the program interventions by the then program lead of PAX. Only in 2017, program activities could not be implemented because of increased insecurity in Mambasa.

With regards to the co-existence component

Activities in Djugu territory in Ituri, were also hampered by the problems between RHA and PAX (between 2014 and October 2015). However in this territory the whole package of results have been delivered (awareness raising and training of artisanal mining (pre-)cooperatives, studies and capacity development activities and constructive dialogue between all stakeholders);

With regards to Haut-Uele (Watsa), PAX missed strong partners on the ground since the beginning of the program and had no partners between March 2016 and May 2017. PAX conducted studies to be validated through conferences and continued to engage stakeholders in a constructive dialogue. Only as of May 2017 a new partner has been identified that already has become effective;

Apart from studies and validation workshops no further activities were undertaken in Mambasa where Kilogold and Loncor have concessions, because both companies stopped their mining activities; No activities were undertaken in Mahagi since the start of the program, because there were not that many mining sites and the only company included in the program, Mwan Africa, closed its doors.

With regards to the Eastern DRC component

Program activities have been implemented but suffered from PAX's program leads setting other priorities and because its partner Life and Peace Institute closed its doors early 2016.

5.1.3 To what extent have program objectives been achieved?

Based upon the program document and progress reports, as well upon interviews with program staff, an overview has been made to assess the extent to which indicators in the program document have been realised. With regards to reporting against indicators, the consultant observes that no monitoring plan has been in place to monitor progress being made against indicators set in the program document and their targets. The progress documents had the tendency to report on activities rather than at the level of results.

The specific objective in the logical framework contains indicators which reflect the level of results to be delivered by the program, but not changes in behaviour to be observed at the level of those stakeholders that had to be reached in the program. The progress reports have not systematically documented changes in behaviour, which possibly are related with the program.

Another observation is that, although the program document clearly develops for each component a separate set of results to be delivered, it formulates exceptions at the same time. This is the case for Bafwasende, part of the conflict zone component, where result A (systematic monitoring by peace committees) and result B (early warning systems in place) were not delivered, but alternative activities deployed. This is also the case for Haut-Uele, part of the co-existence zone, where result C (organisation of artisanal miners) was not delivered, because this result was included in the logical framework as a pilot activity. On the other hand, peace committees were still operational and supported during the program in Djugu, although this territory was part of the logical framework component related to the fostering of the co-existence between artisanal miners and companies.

5.1.4 To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?

Changes in behaviour have been clustered in 8 outcomes, 5 for Haut-Uele province and 3 for Ituri. The number of the outcomes here is not indicative for the effectiveness of the program, it is the significance of these outcomes in the ToC that could be taken as a measure of effectiveness.

Haut-Uele province

The FARDC and the Territorial Administrators of Watsa and Faradje use less violence in their attempts to maintain order around KibaliGold's concession after PAX presented its report on the company in October 2015 in Kisangani and in Kinshasa. In this report PAX highlighted human rights violations committed by the FARDC when relocating populations and evicting artisanal miners. It also highlighted that transport was facilitated by Kibali's vehicles. Another outcome related to the report is that a Captain of the FARDC, involved in these relocations and evictions, was sentenced to 10 years of prison;

Civil society and artisanal miners have gained more space to denounce the excessive use of violence during workshops. The population of Watsa and Faradje are better informed on their human rights through radio broadcasts organised by the 'Commission Justice et Paix' of the diocese, through some courses organised by PAX in 2016 and those offered by MONUSCO;

Civil Society has obtained more possibilities to get in touch with KibaliGold facilitated by the (sporadic) presence of PAX as of the presentation of the 2015 report;

In the period May-October 2017, KibaliGold has become more sensitive and open to the requests of civil society, APRu and PAX to have a constructive dialogue with independent civil (and not those previously co-opted), on the use of excessive violence, on the position of artisanal miners within the concession, and on the follow-up of the recommendations in PAX's report on Kibali;

As of December 2017, the recommendations of civil society of Faradje and Watsa territories on the revision of the 2002 mining law have been presented in the National Parliament in Kinshasa.

Ituri

In March 2017, MGM in Mungbwalo signed an agreement with 4 artisanal mining cooperatives, who can continue mining within the concession, this time backed up by a legal framework. They can dig gold until a maximum depth of 30 meters, after which MGM will start industrial mining. In October 2017, the identification and formalisation of artisanal mining zones had not yet happened. More cooperatives want to sign an MoU with MGM;

Peace committees engage with traditional authorities and their security committees, as well as with MONUSCO since the beginning of this year. In Irumu, the coordinating structure of the peace committees became an advisor to the security committee and this is also seems the case in NiaNia chefferie in Mambasa. Also RHA became an advisor of the security committees of Mambasa territory and a member of the same committee in Irumu territory as of June 2017. In Mambasa and Irumu an early warning system has been put in place with MONUSCO;

Mixed results have been obtained with regards to stopping the presence of armed groups, FARDC and PNC in and around mines. Although the peace committees in Irumu have been able to move the militia from the centre of Nyankunde and two other village centres, RHA admits that with local peace committees, the program has not been able to move armed groups away from the mining sites (FARDC, PNC, ANR and militia).

5.1.5 To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?

The consultant looked at 3 outcomes in depth to assess PAX's and its partner's contributions to the outcomes obtained in the previous section.

In Haut-Uele, PAX and its partners possibly have contributed to the outcomes in the following way.

The reduction of violence by the FARDC and the Territorial Administrator has most likely been triggered by PAX's publication, the workshops and the publicity by amongst others radio Okapi;

For the other outcomes PAX and APRu have most likely contributed to; 1) the creation of a space to denounce human rights violations; 2) have supported civil society to get in touch with Kibali; 3) made the company more sensitive and open to the requests of civil society, including the creation of a

platform for dialogue of independent civil society and Kibali and; 4) managed to present their recommendations for the revision of the 2002 mining law in the national parliament in Kinshasa. The significance of this change in the light of the ToC is that the revised mining law takes into account some of the realities faced by artisanal miners on a daily basis.

In Ituri, PAX and its partners possibly have contributed to the outcomes in the following ways:

The role of RHA and PAX in the signature of MoUs between MGM and 4 mining cooperatives consists most likely of the empowerment of artisanal miners that enabled them to engage in a dialogue on equal footing with MGM. However the triggering factor has been the increased insecurity in Mungbwalo town when MGM, with the support of the PNC, evicted artisanal miners from the concession, urging the government to start discussions with MGM and the artisanal miners for a sustainable solution; The most likely actors that has contributed to peace committees engaging with traditional and territorial authorities and their security committees, as well as with MONUSCO since the beginning of this year are RHA and PAX. No other actor is known in the area to have started working with peace committees since the Hema – Lendu conflicts between 2003 and 2007;

Limited outcomes were yielded with regards to the presence of FARDC, PNC, armed groups on mining sites. An explanation for this is amongst others that RHA and PAX did not develop an L&A strategy and implemented this at the provincial and national level, although the idea was already discussed in 2014.

5.1.6 To what extent were the intervention strategies identified in the program proposal efficient in reaching the goals (cost effectiveness)

The cost effectiveness of the program could have been improved for the conflict zone component if:

- In Ituri province, the focus of the data collection by the peace committees would have been oriented towards preparing L&A messages at chefferie, territorial, provincial and national level, from the start of the program, with RHA and PAX taking responsibility for the provincial and national level;
- In Ituri province, the monitoring agents in the mining sites had been in place during the entire program, without interruptions between April 2015 and December 2016;
- In Ituri province, the early warning systems had been in place as of 2014;
- In Tshopo, Bafwasende, if PAX had decided to deliver the entire package for conflict zones. An alternative would have been to not include this territory in the program document, because of its remoteness and the absence of qualified partners on the ground.

The cost effectiveness of the program could have been improved for the co-existence between artisanal miners and mining companies component if:

- In Ituri, Mambasa territory, after having concluded that KiloGold and Loncor were not active anymore, the program had limited its interventions in Mambasa towards reducing the presence of the FARDC, PNC and armed groups on the mining sites through effective L&A activities at provincial and national level as already concluded in 2014. The studies conducted on both companies (after these had already stopped their activities) did not result in follow-up activities after their validation in workshops;
- In Ituri, Djugu, the thematic group on Natural Resources had played an active role in L&A activities as of 2015, with regards to the MoU signed between MGM and the miner cooperatives. The role of the peace committees in this program component on co-existence has not become clear during the evaluation;
- In Haut-Uele, Watsa and Faradje, PAX had had a local partner on the ground to ensure that recommendations formulated in reaction to the study on KibaliGold, had been followed up at the local level. With a local partner on the ground possibilities to train different stakeholder categories on the mining law, would possibly have empowered these stakeholders to start a dialogue with Kibali before 2017.

The cost effectiveness of the Eastern DRC component if more efforts had been deployed to create a common understanding amongst civil society actors of issues to be addressed, if a sound L&A plan had been prepared and responsibilities divided amongst different stakeholders. The program could have

decided during the conception of the program to either deliver a full package, or not include this component in the program.

5.2 Recommendations

The evaluation of this program has generated the following recommendations.

When designing the ToC of the program, be very explicit on what type of behavioural changes will be realised through the results delivered by the program. These behavioural changes are in the first place those to be reflected in the specific objective of the program. Then think through how the program will realise these behavioural changes. The consultant has the impression that such a reflection has been limited with the design of the co-existence component.

With regards to these strategies that introduce behavioural changes, two recommendations are worthwhile to consider.

Develop a clear L&A strategy to introduce changes in behaviour: Organising conferences to validate studies and formulate recommendations are not enough. Different strategies may be needed to conduct effective L&A;

Before conducting studies, assess their relevance in the light of the behavioural changes to be achieved. Behavioural changes may require community based security approaches, capacity development interventions, platforms for dialogue, L&A activities. If the relations between a study and the strategies on how to change behaviour are not clear, do not start the study. This might have been one of the considerations to conduct the studies on KiloGold and Loncor in Mambasa, as well as those conducted in the light of the I4S studies.

In line with the ToC and the logical framework, develop a monitoring and evaluation plan that measures the indicators set in the program document. A program is expected to at least monitor progress made in indicators at the level of results delivered.

Ensure that you have partners on the ground who have the capacities to implement deliver on results, not on activities. These partners could have started to work on community based security and the enhancement of the confidence between the state and society as key development processes identified in both PAX's strategic framework of 2011 – 2015 and that of 2016 – 2020. If you do not have these partners on the ground, don't start the program in these locations.

Limit staff changes at the PAX level to ensure the continuity of the program and orient the program towards outcomes to be realised.

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Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

Termes of Reference End Terme Evaluation 'Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo'. August 2017

Introduction

PAX is an international peace movement, based in the Netherlands, which starts up and supports local peace initiatives in conflict areas around the world. PAX mobilizes moral, political and financial support for these local peace initiatives and conducts local interventions to improve human security of citizens in war zones. PAX operates in 15 countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South-eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

PAX operates in the eastern part of DRC since 2002, dealing with reconciliation, community based security, access to land, land conflicts and gold mining. PAX mainly works with local civil society organisations and churches. The Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prioritized two themes within the framework of its foreign policy that match the working fields of the PAX program: human security and gold mining. With regards to the latter, Switzerland became a participant of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights⁹, in which PAX has participated since 2003.

In 2013, the Swiss Ministry decided to finance the PAX´ project proposal that seeks to improve the human rights and human security situation in the mining areas. In addition, this program focusses on national, international and corporate policy development in this domain. PAX supplemented the funding for this program from the Swiss government with funding of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Strategic Partnership Funds). This program is entitled '*Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo*'. The program originally had a duration of three years. However, during its implementation phase it was extended for six more months (until September 2017) so that it could further complete its objectives. PAX is commissioning an independent evaluation of this project, for the period September- November 2017.

Purpose of the evaluation

The program which is to be evaluated, includes several exploratory components focussing on both new mining regions and new mining issues in the eastern province. While this specific program will end in September 2017, the overall program of PAX in eastern Congo will continue and will probably include elements of the current program. PAX will therefore take the main outcomes of the evaluation into account in the decision making processes regarding current and future areas of intervention in Congo.

This evaluation has two main purposes:

First of all, it is intended to contribute to the learning process of both PAX and its local partner organisations. The outcomes and lessons learned of the evaluation will strengthen future interventions and allow PAX to make informed decisions regarding future interventions in Congo; The evaluation will provide donor organizations with an independent view of the results of the program and will allow the donors to assess the effects of these results on their strategic goals and policies.

Program information and context

Program period

Starting date program:	1 November 2013
End date program:	30 September 2017

Total budget of program

The total budget for the program is:	€1.059.415
Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs:	€ 760.000, --

⁹ <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/>

The contribution of PAX (Strategic Partnership of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was foreseen as €359.415. Given the budget neutral extension, this will be significantly higher. This will be updated at a later stage.

Theory of Change

Community based security is the starting point of the improvement of the human security in eastern Congo. The existing local structures for peace and security, such as peace committees, already form an important and sustainable basis for improving human security and are accepted by the population. The strengthening of the capacity of the people involved in such structures will allow them to have a better understanding and oversight of the security situation. This allows them to respond more quickly to security incidents, and to have a pertinent dialogue with all authorities and parties involved.

According to the theory of change of the program, the access to natural resources such as gold is a crucial element in the conflict dynamics, as is the fragility of the Congolese state structures and the continuity of the power base of the political elite. If the industrial gold mining companies assume their corporate responsibility and comply with the international guidelines and standards, revenues will be shared in a more just way. This allows all sectors of Congolese society to benefit from the exploitation, and avoids provoking conflict and social tensions.


The artisanal mining sector is part of an informal economy in an insecure and conflict-ridden environment. Artisanal mining is even excluded from the formal mining sector and causes an unequal development in the regions. In addition, artisanal miners are prone to be subjected to human rights violations, such as extortion. The artisanal mining sector needs to be restructured and formalized so it can be part of the official economy. This will allow the miners to move away from informal parties that might have connections to the war economy.

Geographic focus of the interventions

The interventions of this program had the following geographical focus:

- Ituri (especially Sud-Irumbu and Mabassa); (conflict zones);
- Haut- (Watsa and Faradje) (cohabitation artisanal and industrial);
- Tshopo (Kisangani and Bafwasende) (conflict zones, especially Bafwasende);
- The provinces of North and South Kivu:
- Walikale and the Banro-concessions near Bukavu (conflict zones).

The work in Kivu was limited to research, which was carried out in two focus areas (Walikale and Bukavu). The work in Tshopo (Bafwasende) was partially combined with the Mambasa region in Ituri.



Outline of the program

The 'Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo' focuses on the improvement of the human security situation in gold mining areas in the Eastern part of Congo. The security situation of the local communities in these areas varies a lot, ranging from armed conflicts to more incidental security incidents. The gold mining sector, both artisanal and industrial, is one of the local factors impacting the human security situation. Research was conducted (some prior to this program) in all four of the above-mentioned regions to analyse the interaction between goldmining and violence. Seven reports have been written; the main findings and conclusions were synthesized in a last overall report.

The intervention mechanisms are in tune with the specific characteristics of the security situation in each region. In the areas where armed violence by different non-state and state parties undermines the security of the population, the program focuses on community based security mechanisms and early warning systems. In the zones where artisanal mining and industrial mining overlap, the different interests of the parties can lead to social tensions, violent protests and human rights violations by (state) security forces. Therefore, the intervention mechanisms here focus on dialogue between communities, artisanal miners, industrial mining companies and authorities. Also, lobby activities were carried out within the framework of international standards and guidelines such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. In areas with a strong presence of artisanal miners, interventions are focused on the strengthening of the capacity of the small-scale miners to formalize their status, to lobby for legal changes at a national level, and to conduct dialogue with relevant local authorities.

Purpose and planned results of the program

The main purpose¹⁰ of the program is to improve the human security situation in the selected regions. More specifically it focusses on three main issues:

Improving the human security situation in conflict areas through monitoring the security situation (in Ituri), and through implementing Early Warning Systems and community based mechanisms such as; Fostering the co-existence between industrial and artisanal mining through a dialogue between industrial mining companies, authorities, communities and the 'creusseurs' in order to reduce tensions and human rights violations. But also by informing and strengthening the capacity of local authorities regarding mining and security issues. Furthermore, the creation of formal structures (cooperatives) of artisanal miners will be supported;

Changing policies and attitudes of local, regional and national authorities and policy makers. This is done through the strengthening of capacities of local civil society organisations, to enable them to lobby at a local level and to organize regular and effective lobby activities.

Part of the reason for the program was to explore new areas for intervention. PAX has been working on the issue of human security and community based security during the last 15 years in eastern Congo, but the focus on artisanal and industrial gold mining with its specific problems was new. This also included the exploration of new areas (Mambasa, Bafwasende, Bonro, Watsa and Faradje) with new partner organisations.

Context in Congo

As mentioned above the program geographical focus is:

Ituri (especially Sud-Irumu and Mambasa); (conflict zones);

Haut- (Watsa and Faradje) (cohabitation artisanal and industrial);

Tshopo (Kisangani and Bafwasende) (conflict zones, especially Bafwasende);

The provinces of North and South Kivu:

Walikale and the Banro-concessions near Bukavu (conflict zones).

A part of the gold mining takes place in conflict areas with a fragile security situation, where both militias and the Congolese security forces commit human right violations. The (informal) gold economy has become one of the drivers of conflict. It concerns Mambasa, Irumu and Bafwasende. These are more isolated (forested) areas where authorities and civil society lack capacities on all levels.

¹⁰ See also text original programme document, Project Multi Annual Plan and subsequent programme idea 2016

Another part of the gold exploitation takes place in a context of tensions between the (formal) industrial mining companies and the (informal) artisanal miners, who work in or near the concessions areas of the industrial mining companies. The conflicting interests between the two groups, and the weak legal, political and economic position of the artisanal miners might lead to increased tensions. The local communities are often divided over the mining issue, but those who do not benefit from the presence of the industrial mine but suffer the negative impacts, tend to feel excluded. This division in the community increases the risks of the social tensions.

At least 150.000 artisanal miners (*creusseurs*) are active within the geographical boundaries of this program, which means that these economic activities form the livelihood of at least 700.000 persons in those regions. These *creusseurs* are not officially recognized and poorly organized. They are part of an informal economy that has links with the war economy. Local authorities, legal and illegal armed parties are often stakeholders and profit from this illegal sector, which further weakens the credibility of the state and the law enforcement agencies.

Context of PAX Netherlands

The set up and objectives of this program were ambitious both in the geographical and programmatic sense. During the implementation of the program there were staff changes within the Congo team, and so different PAX staff members managed the program. Implementing partner organizations had internal difficulties, which affected the implementation of the program as well.

Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation will focus on the effectiveness and relevance of the 'Program sur les Droits de l'Homme et la Sécurité Humaine dans l'exploitation de l'or dans l'Est de la RD Congo' (in relevant areas)¹¹.

Objective of the evaluation

Assessment of effectiveness and relevance of program interventions.

Evaluation questions

- To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?
- To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
- To what extent have program objectives been achieved?
- To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele
- To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?

Methodology

The evaluator will design a detailed work plan and evaluation matrix in consultation with the focus team for the evaluation. This will cover inter alia:

- Interviews with relevant PAX staff in the Netherlands and DRC;
- Desk study of PAX documentation and analysis and partner reports;
- Interviews in DRC with staff of partner organisations, ILPs(?), community leaders and traditional authorities, territorial authority, artisanal miners local police and army commanders, lobby network of NGOs, resource persons. Because of logistic reasons, PAX proposes a field visit to Haut-Uele and Ituri.

Products/ deliverables

- Concise inception report consisting of detailed work plan, revised purpose and evaluation questions, budget and evaluation matrix (max 5 pages);
- Draft report including presentation in English to the focus team;
- Final report in accordance with the attached outline.

¹¹ Areas will be selected together with the consultant and DRC team early September.

Draft evaluation program

Phase	Activities	Estimated # of days
Inception: September	Discussions/ interviews PAX NL (current and former staff DRC program)	4
	Desk study PAX/ project documents	
	Discuss/ fine tune main purpose/ evaluation questions by consultant in consultation with PAX	
	Submission detailed work plan, budget, evaluation matrix	
Implementation: October	Additional desk study PAX/ project documents	2
	Field visit (including transportation), to Entebbe-Arua; Watsa; Faradje-Bunia- Djugu-Sud Irumu-Mambasa (final selection by evaluator)	14
	Additional interviews/ discussions internal and external stakeholders	2
Report: November	Presentation of findings in learning session, and draft report	5
Report: November	Final report	1
Total number of days		28

Qualification of the consultant/ evaluation team

- Extensive experience in conducting evaluations in conflict sensitive contexts;
- Extensive field experience in Congo;
- Knowledge of and experience with peace work and advocacy;
- Knowledge of the artisanal and industrial gold mining sectors in DRC;
- Experience with Context Analysis and Theory of Change approach;
- Fluency in written and spoken French and English;
- Willingness to travel and stay in Congo in fairly basic conditions.

The evaluation will be carried out by an external individual consultant or a team of consultants. If the assignment is done by more than one consultant, one of them should take the lead. The lead consultant will be responsible for the final report.

Implementation Arrangements

- The contract (including the final TOR of the evaluation) will be signed by the Program Lead DRC;
- The external evaluator is ultimately responsible for the evaluation report and its contents;
- The external evaluator will report to the current Program Lead Congo, who carries the overall responsibility for the evaluation;
- During the implementation of the evaluation in Congo, the consultant(s) will be in permanent contact with the local representative of PAX in Congo;
- PAX will establish a focus team for the evaluation, which will consist of five staff members of PAX. This focus team will provide advice, data, information and other support during the evaluation process.

The Focus Team of the Evaluation

Name	Function/ role
Jurrie de Hart	PAX PME advisor. Responsible for advising on quality of evaluation process and report and management response.
Marianne Moor	Current Program Lead Congo (since April 1, 2017). Overall responsibility for the evaluation.
Egbert Wesselink	Program Lead natural resources. Responsible for the link between the evaluation process and outcomes and the Natural Resources Program.
Joost van Puijenbroek	Former Program Lead Congo. Advisor regarding the context and development of the original project proposal and the first years of its implementation.

Budget

A maximum € 37,500- including fees, accommodation, transportation and VAT.

ANNEX TOR : OUTLINE EVALUATION REPORT

1. cover page clearly identifying the report as an evaluation and stating:
 - Evaluation title;
 - Program/project title;
 - Geographical coverage: global; region; country(ies);
 - Date that the evaluation report was finalized;
 - Evaluator(s) name(s) and logo (if available);
 - Clear statement in case this report can NOT be used externally.
2. Table of contents;
3. Glossary;
4. List of abbreviations;
5. Executive summary that can be used as a stand-alone document;
6. Introduction, definition/ scope, and justification, including possible limitations of research object, organizational/ policy contexts of the evaluation, stating objectives of the evaluation, evaluation criteria, and questions;
7. The program, theory of change and context;
8. Methodology, its justification, and process, and perceived limitations of the evaluation;
9. Presentation of the findings and their analysis;
10. Conclusions;
11. Learning and Recommendations;
12. Appendices:
 - Terms of reference;
 - Evaluation program (main features of data and activities carried out);
 - A list of interviewees (name, function and working environment) and places visited;
 - List of documents and bibliography used;
 - Details on composition of evaluation team (names, nationality, expertise, working environment);
 - Link to Methodological appendices;
 - The evaluation proposal;
 - Evaluation instruments such as questionnaires and interview guides;
 - Data collected.

PAX will assess the quality of the evaluation report, using the IOB (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) quality criteria for external evaluations¹².

¹² <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/.../evaluatiebeleid...evaluaties/evaluatiebeleidbuza.pdf>

Appendix 2 Day to day program of field visit

Le 8 octobre (dimanche)

Vol Amsterdam – Entebbe (KLM)

Le 9 octobre (lundi) **Entebbe-Durba**

Vol Entebbe – Arua;

Voyage Arua – Durba (3,5 heures);

L'arrivée de l'évaluateur et Marianne a Durba;

17.00 heures: Rendez-vous avec Kibali (Kibali offices);

Hotel Durba.

Le 10 octobre (mardi) **Faradje**

Voyage Durba – Faradje;

Faire la connaissance avec l'équipe d'Apru;

Creuseurs et familles délocalisées;

L'Administrateur du Territoire et comité de sécurité;

Chefs de Chefferie et de Groupement;

Société Civile de Faradje;

Hôtel Faradje.

Le 11 octobre (mercredi) – **Faradje et Watsa**

Réunion entre Société Civile de Faradje et Kibali;

Voyage de Faradje à Watsa;

Entretien avec le coordonnateur d'APRU;

Administrateur du Territoire de Watsa (N'a pas eu lieu);

Hôtel a Watsa 19.00.

Le 12 octobre (jeudi) - **Watsa**

Les Creuseurs;

Société Civile, les organisations de Droits Humains;

Société Civile, la nouvelle dynamique;

Autorités de Chefferie et de Groupement (annulé);

Les représentantes des communautés locaux et chefs coutumiers (annulés);

Hôtel a Watsa.

Le 13 octobre 2017 (vendredi) - **voyage**

Voyage Watsa – Bunia;

Arrivé à Bunia dans l'après-midi.

Le 14 octobre 2017 (samedi) - **Bunia**

08.30 heures ; Groupe thématique mine de la société civile (future réseau de plaidoyer) – (Salle de réunion de la société civile);

11.00 heures; rencontre avec l'équipe RHA (bureau RHA);

14.00 : chef de division e mine à Bunia – (Hotel évaluateur);

16.00 : Président RHA Mons. Katembo – (Hotel évaluateur) (annulé);

Le 15 octobre 2017 (dimanche) - **Djugu**

06.30 heures : Départ pour Mungbwalu (Djugu) 4 heures de voyage;

13.30 heures : Membres des cooperatives;

15.00 heures: Visites de chantier, (site MAKALA);

16.30 heures: Retour hotel.

Le 16 octobre 2017 (lundi) **Djugu et Bunia**

08.00 heures: les membres des ILPs/ NPMs (lieu à l'hôtel);

09.00 heures: les chefs coutumiers (lieu à l'hôtel);

10.00 heures: les membres de sécurités et la police – On a vu le Bourgmestre et non le comité de sécurité;

12.00 heures: l'administration minière (Mine & Saesscam);
13.00 heures : repos;
14.00 heures : Retour à Bunia;
20.00 heures : Entretien avec Leo van der Zwan.

Le 17 octobre 2017 (mardi) - Mambassa

06.00 heures : Départ pour Mambassa;
14.00 heures : les membres des CLEs/CPMP (à l'hôtel);
16.00 heures : les orpailleurs (à l'hôtel);
18 :00 heures : la Société Civile (à l'hôtel);
Séjour à Mambassa.

Le 18 octobre 2017 (mercredi) - Mambassa

08.00 heures : chefs coutumiers (pas venu);
09.00 heures: quelques membres du comité de sécurité du Territoire);
11.00 heures: administration minière (Mine & SAEMAPE);
12.30 heures ; déjeuner;
14.30 heures : Voyage à Bunia.

Le 19 octobre 2017 (jeudi) - Bunia

08.30 heures: Ministre des Mines (lieu Bureau du Ministre de Mine);
10.00 heures : Equipe RHA;
14.00 heures : Joel Abe Monusco base du territoire de Sud Irumu;
18.00 heures: l'Ex-Conseiller Technique PAX Jean Paul Lonema (à l'hôtel);
Coordonnateur PAX-Bunia, Daniel Nsekuye (pas présent).

13. Le 20 octobre (vendredi)

Vol Bunia – Entebbe;
Vol Entebbe – Amsterdam.

Appendix 3 Resource persons

Stakeholder category	Name	Fonction	Place	Telephone
PAX	Joost van Puijenbroek	Former program lead of the gold program	Utrecht	
PAX	Jogien Bakker	Former program lead of the gold program	Utrecht	
PAX	Margot Leegwater	Former program lead of the gold program	Utrecht	
PAX	Michel Uiterwaal	Former Researcher in Haut-Uele	Utrecht	
PAX	Marianne Moor	Program lead of the gold program	Utrecht	
	Leo van der Zwam	Independent consultant based in Bunia	Bunia	
KibaliGold mining	Charles Wells	General Manager KibaliGold Mine	Durba	0812538090/0817516783 Charles.Wells@rangold.com
Durba	Bimbiti Nzana	Social Manager	Durba	0811756258; bombiti.nzanza@kibaligold.com
APRu Faradje	Jean Claude Malitano	Coordonnateur national APRU	Faradje	0810079176 Apruong2015@gmail.com
Artisanal miners and victims of mining industries, Faradje	Kandana Atakiri Caroline	Représentante comité	NDolomo	
	Makidhu Kashale Adolphe	Orpailleur	Rambi	08285623185
	Mana Fulbert Trmino	Représentant victimes	NDolomo	0812729256
	Jonas Muanda Thadi	Creuseur	Durba	
	Tamilo Mawr	Orpailleur	Makoro	
	Itoke Arimwi	Orpailleur	Makoro	
	Tamise Tritsi	Orpailleur	Makoro	
	Mogo Combi Jerome	Président Boki	Makoro	
	Liandema MK	Orpailleur	Makoro	
	Wuz Manidhaba	Orpailleur	Rambi	
	Akwa Denis Maradona	Orpailleur	Rambi	
	Kanika Medard	Orpailleur	Rambi	
	Babowa Deo Léonard	Victime	Rambi	
	Babowa Oio Paul	Orpailleur	Rambi	
	Bichar Lokosa Wedho	Orpailleur	Rambi	
	Regeri Tadri Shati	Orpailleur	Makoro	
	Alanzo Brisharayo Marie Jeanne	Coordinatrice DFCB	Faradje	

	Anciali Aladro	Orpailleur	Rambi	
	Jean Faustin Androciako Vomi	Vice PRGSISOCI	Makoro	
	Réginald Arakayo Lhombo	Exploitant artisanal	Rambi	
Security committee at territorial level, Faradje	Lokakao Lupanshia	Administrateur Territoire	Faradje	0814308833
	Ancha Ombati Alphonse	ATA/Police	Faradje	0811170514
	Tembele Lifenya Papy	Capitaine ANR	Faradje	0816855463
	Landu Kakese J.P.	Comm FARDC	Faradje	0828689021
	Mukunda Banlikoko Muba	Commandant xx Police	Faradje	0816100118
	Suruaki Madranbele Cyprien	CB	Faradje	0819641846
	Traditional chiefs, Faradje	Mawa Yabe Agumani	Chef de Chefferie Doka	Doka
Akudhi Matafa Jean Faustin		Chef du groupement de Makoro	Makoro	
Kizabha Ndolomo		Groupement Ndolomo	Ndolomo	
Artisanal miners, Watsa	Bayo Bahati	Président de P.A.P	Kokiza	0818408554
	Mawanzo Aleko	P.A.P	Kokiza	0822449003
	Papy Bosanga	Président C.M.D.C.H	Durba	0813232670
	Sombe Tabu	Conseiller COMILIJIDEWA	Durba	0817273066
	Saida Issa	C.M.D.C.H	Durba	0816992814
	Kaloma Richard	Secrétaire P.A.P	Kokiza	0828003082
	Jean-Noel Bolongo	Orpailleur	Moku	0811819564
	Jean – Robert Atsidri	Orpailleur	Moku	0811073375
	Azarias Kisala	Orpailleur	Moku	0817771412
New civil society, Watsa	Djona Muumin Antoine	Groupement d'Intervention pour le Développement	Durba	0812001660
	Edhobho Androa Lambert	Conseiller Société Civile	Durba	0821010023
Human Rights organisations Civil society, Watsa	Antoloba Raphael	CA Voix des Opprimés	Watsa	0813568163
	Longo Ibra	Secrétaire Voix des Opprimés	Watsa	0811797716
	Ombeni Kavunka	Coordonnateur CPDH	Moku	0812133259
	Dane Richard	Observateur indépendant	Watsa	0812174015

Réseau Haki na Amani team, Bunia	Augustin Kangamina Feruzi	Coordonnateur	Bunia	0828168081/0812100215 Rha.coordi@gmail.com	
	Schadrac Bandoni Bavi	Superviseur axe Djugu – Irumu	Bunia		
	Charline Mumpasa	Caissière	Bunia		
	Bénézet Muhindo	Animateur Axe Djugu- Irumu	Bunia		
	Emile Ndele	Administration et finances	Bunia		
	Pascal Takaibone	Chargé de programme	Bunia	0823345700 Pascaltakis.rdc@gmail.com	
	ACIAR NGO Bunia	Eric Mongo Malolo	Coordonnateur ACIAR	Bunia	aciaongd@gamil.com
Groupe thématique RN, Bunia	Jimmy Munguriek Ufoy	Coordonnateur de la société civile	Bunia	Jimmyjudi@gmail.com CDCituri@gmail.com	
	Pasteur Ignace Bingi	Coordonnateur LASI et conseiller groupe thématique	Bunia	0810087447, 0994299842 pasteurbingi@gmail.com	
	Louis Bedidjo Fuarwinyo	Coordonnateur AEMAPRI	Bunia	0812411445 lbedidjo@gmail.com	
	Pascal Takaibone	Chargé de programme RHA	Bunia		
	Marie-Noël Nyaloka	Vice coordonnatrice de la SC	Bunia	0815895814 nyolokamarienoel@gmail.com	
Artisanal mining cooperatives and monitoring agent Mungbwalo	Luc Likambo	COOPERAMEM, Vice président CA	Mungbwalo	0824614218	
	Kabala Kibundila	COPEMI, DARH	Mungbwalo	0825628002	
	Omba Abedi Jules	COPEMI, Développement Communautaire	Mungbwalo	0811672818	
	Bamandu Djanny	COOMIMA, Vice président	Mungbwalo	0815050815	
	Toshiba Jean Claude	COMIMAV, Président CA COMIMAV	Mungbwalo	0816600018	
	Justin Ngona	COPEMI, Logisticien	Mungbwalo	0817519360	
	Adhule Adriko	COPEMI, Conseiller	Mungbwalo	0818868073	
	Gaston Okito	COOPERAME, Membre	Mungbwalo	0815839071	
	Maki Bonnerge	RHA, Agent de monitoring	Mungbwalo	0812930061	
	Mawrice M Baliga	COOPERAME, Chargé des relations	Mungbwalo	0821141410	
	Isaac Mabili Bunjoko	COPEMI, Membre	Mungbwalo	0825714231	
	Barnabas Owinyaci	COMIMAV, Directeur Général	Mungbwalo	0813750509	
	Sulo Sumbuje	COOMIDOR, secrétaire administratif	Mungbwalo	0825544709	
	ILP and coordination	Doka Ngoy	Président ILP Mungwalo	Mungwalo	0811886785

of ILPs, Mungbwalo	Bangfa Jeannette	Présidente ILP Niam	Niam	0813478563
	Antamukosi Jeanne	Trésorière Wazabo		0823503827
	Pascal Biaseamase	Coordonnateur des ILPs		0813432112
	Ngabusi Pascaline	NPM		0816372876
	Isaac Nasili	ILP Mungwalo	Mungwalo	0825714231
Civil Society, Mungbwalo	Masiko Animalise Denis	Coordonnateur de la SC Mungwalo et ses environs	Mungwalo	0819546482
	Bahati Muhito Moise	Secrétaire administratif de la coordination de la SC		0815266300 3Muhito@gmail.com
Traditional chief, Mungbwalo	Emile Mbele- Bandetena	Chef de groupement TCHIBI-TCHIBI	TCHIBI- TCHIBI	
Antenne des mines Mungbwalo	Ganiade Matalis	Inspection des Mines	Mungbwalo	0816030722
	Jianidjo Madege	Inspection des mines		0818872339
	Butchinda	SEAMAPE Chargé de Développement Intégré		0816754150
	Komvu Musan	SAEMAPE – CB		0820128150
	Nduku Oilanga	Police des mines		0820282562
Antenne RHA Mambasa	Amina Aliswa	Logisticienne et caissière	Mambasa	0991880701 0826063792
	Masiak Goretti	Animatrice	Mambasa	0999911062 0829022940
CLES and coordination of CLES Mambasa	Moza Salumu Amina	Vice présidente CLE Mambasa I	Mambasa	0825930003
	Kitambala Dieudonné	Conseiller CLE Mambasa III	Mambasa	0810724010
	Mbweki Romaine	Vice présidente CLE Mambasa III	Mambasa	0993438973
	Mungu Djakisa	Président des orpailleurs PK51	51 km de Mambasa	0979283284 0821397703
Artisanal miners, Mambasa	Daniel Apome	Représentant des orpailleurs de PK 25	25 km de Mambasa	0818544754
	Société Civile Mambasa	Assani Ngumba	Coordonnateur de la Société Civile de Mambasa	Mambasa
Mungeni Yuma		Président du Conseil Territorial de la Jeunesse de Mambassa	Mambasa	0814538595 0993737511
Comité de sécurité Territoire de Mambasa		Musoy Michel	Chef de bureau Territoire	Mambasa
	Yakoni Opede	Admin Ter adjoint	Mambasa	0811412350 0975399095
	Mudagiri Ruthi Ozia	Commissaire Supérieur principal	Mambasa	0991741527

PNC				
	Gabriel Ali	Commissaire principale commandant Police des Mines	Mambasa	0823876116
SAESSCAM – SAEMAPE, Mambasa	Jerry Itekenya Mayuke	Chef de bureau SAEMAPE	Mambasa	0823344334 0993033143
Division des Mines, Mambasa	Edgard Ngbenev Aliso	Chef de bureau minier isolé	Mambasa	0817595777 0971803755
Ministre provincial des Mines, Bunia	Deogracias Ombalia Alombo	Ministre Provincial	Bunia	0824003699 0990342914
MONUSCO	Joel Abe Oridiabho	Civil affairs base Monusco en territoire de Irumu	Bunia	
	WOMEN			

Appendix 4 Methodology and operationalisation

Theory-Based Evaluation

1. Methodology

The evaluation methodology chosen for this impact assessment is qualitative in nature and is inspired by Contribution Analysis and Realist Evaluation. The methodology aims at testing the Theory of Change of the Human Rights, Security and gold extraction program. These evaluation methodologies are more appropriate to assess the often complex relations between a cause and its effect, such as is the case with programs that operate in complex and changing contexts as well as are complex in themselves. The Gold Program is operating in such a context and aims to foster human security, which in itself is a complex process, requiring the synergies between different actors. Alternative evaluation methodologies, such as those that assess the association (not the causation), between a single cause and a single effect are not appropriate for this program.

Contribution Analysis examines and tests the Theory of Change (ToC) of a program against logic and the evidence available from results observed and the various assumptions behind the ToC and other influencing factors. This analysis either confirms – verifies – the postulated ToC or suggests revisions in the theory where the reality appears otherwise. Its overall aim is to reduce uncertainty about the contribution an intervention is making to observed outcomes through an increased understanding of why results did or did not occur and the roles played by the intervention and other influencing factors. In Contribution Analysis, a contribution claim (an outcome a program claims to have contributed to) is defined as: Contribution Claim = a verified ToC + other key influencing factors accounted for (Mayne, 2012). The outcome of an evaluation that uses contribution analysis consists of the description of the necessary and sufficient ingredients of a causal mechanisms that explain an outcome (Befani and Mayne, 2014).

Realist Evaluation, apart from assessing the certainty of contribution claims, further assesses how and why a program works or not in different contexts. Apart from the description of the necessary and sufficient ingredients of a causal mechanism it probes further, aiming to understand the underlying drivers of change that trigger change or not in a given context. A key question to answer with a Realist Evaluation Methodology is ‘what works for whom, in what contexts, and how?’ (Westhorp, 2014). In Realist Evaluation, a contribution claim is defined as: A Context + (Causal) Mechanism = Outcome.

In comparison with Contribution Analysis with a first focus on testing a Theory of Change, Realist Evaluation further expands the evaluation towards identifying new pathways of change that may enhance the effectiveness of future interventions.

Whereas the Contribution Analysis provides guidance in the sequence of steps to be followed during this evaluation, the Realist Evaluation will help to take into account the fact that the program was implemented in different contexts (conflict zones compared to less severe conflict zones; as of 2015, the creation of 4 new provinces replacing the former Oriental province, amongst which Ituri and Haut-provinces; etc). The Realist Evaluation also opens the door for the assessment of changing contexts and changing interventions when required.

2. Terminology used

In this evaluation we will use outcome as the term to describe observable changes in the policies, practices, behaviours, relationships, actions, or mind-sets of an individual, group, community, organisation or institution.

3. Evaluation steps

In line with Contribution Analysis and Realist Evaluation, this evaluation consists of the following steps:

1. Set out the problem to be addressed

The first step in the contribution analysis is to review the cause-effect issues to be addressed for the Human Rights, Security and Gold Extraction program. During this step the evaluator gains understanding of the program, what outcomes this programs is most likely to generate, what context factors have to be taken into account by the program to reach outcomes etc.

During this step the consultant will analyse the program documentation made available and gain understanding of the rationale behind the program (Contribution Analysis) and possible drivers of change (Realist Evaluation).

2. Develop or clarify the theory of change and risks to it.

The next step is to develop or clarify (refine) the ToC of the program. This includes the identification of risks and possible influencing factors. The consultant will:

- In the first place seek further clarification of the ToC as defined in the original project document. This will be done through document analysis and interviews with PAX staff involved during the beginning of the program, as well as through interviews with its partners involved in the program from its start;
- In the second place, seek clarification of changes in the ToC throughout the project, as well as understanding the reasons for these changes, which may partly be due to changing contexts, but also due to staff changes within PAX and its partner organisations, each actor having its own ideas about how Human Rights and Security can be fostered in the gold sector;
- Where possible, Realist Evaluation oriented questions will help to understand underlying drivers of change anticipated by these interviewees;

The clarification of the ToC will possibly also help to identify other than the anticipated pathways of change which might be worthwhile to test during the data gathering phase.

3. Gather (existing) evidence on the theory of change.

Based upon the ToC and the evaluation questions, the consultant will identify its information needs. As a mean to collect as many positive, negative, intended and unintended outcome (areas), data gathering will 1) start with the identification of outcomes realised and collecting evidence of these outcomes being achieved, 2) follow with the identification of actors and factors that explain these outcomes. This method is based upon the Outcome Harvesting Method (Wilson-Grau & Britt, 2012).

Information will be gathered through:

- The analysis of documents provided by PAX.
- The analysis of documents publically available and websites;
- Interviews with different stakeholders involved in the implementation of the program, its 'beneficiaries' - citizens and external resource persons.

The quality of all information collected will be assessed for evaluate their quality based on rigour, traceability and credibility. One method which is often used consists of the triangulation of information obtained from different sources, be they resource persons or documents.

4. Assemble and assess the contribution story and challenges to it.

When all information has been collected, the evidence (information gathered) to test the ToC of the program will be synthesised. For this a table will be drafted that lists all possible pathways and their connections to the outcomes achieved, followed by an overview of all information that confirms or refutes the pathway.

Apart from this organisation of the information collected, process tracing tests will be used to assess the extent to which the information gathered is really capable to confirm one pathway instead of another pathway.

Table 10
Organisation of information collected per causal pathway

Pathways (project and alternatives)	Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway	Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway
Pathway 1	Information 1 Source of information	Information 1 Source of information
Pathway 2	Information 1 Source of information	Information 1 Source of information
Pathway 3	Information 1 Source of information	Information 1 Source of information

Based upon this list the consultant can set out a first contribution story that describes the configuration of ingredients that explain an outcome (contribution analysis). Where possible the consultant can identify the drivers of change (mechanism) that explain the outcome in a given context (Realist Evaluation).

This first assessment of the contribution claims and mechanism might help to find missing information that is needed to further substantiate the evidence of pathways explaining the outcomes achieved.

1. Seek out additional evidence

If possible, additional information will be collected to strengthen the evidence necessary to confirm or refute a contribution story. It is unlikely that resources persons contacted during the field visit will be again contacted by telephone to provide additional information. However additional written documents can possibly be mobilised to obtain additional evidence.

2. Revise and strengthen the contribution story

After additional information has been analysed the contribution story can be further strengthened (or refuted). This will then help to assess the strengths and weaknesses in the ToC as written in the initial program document and possible adjustments over time. If in-depth information has been obtained about the underlying drivers of change and their relations to different contexts, this will further enhance the reflection of PAX with regards to future interventions in Human Rights, Security and Gold extraction programs.

4. Practical limitations to the methodology

A general constraint with using contribution analysis and realist evaluation is that a thorough and exhaustive impact evaluation of all outcomes requires a lot of time and resources. It would probably require a next round of inquiries after the field visit which is not possible within the framework of this assignment.

For this reason in this evaluation the number of outcomes that will be selected for an exhaustive impact evaluation will be limited to a maximum of 2 outcome areas. Criteria for the selection of these outcome areas will be amongst others the importance of these outcome areas is the ToC of the program.

5. Answering the evaluation questions

In the following section the method to find answers to each of the evaluation questions is being presented.

To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?

Sub questions

- What conclusions does the context analysis draw on the relation between human rights, human security and artisanal gold mining in 2012-2013?
- What are the changes in the context that the program aims to realise in 2013 as a contribution to the sustainable and peaceful mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
- How relevant are these changes to be realised given the actual context in 2013?

Data gathering method and information sources

To answer the above mentioned sub questions, the consultant will analyse the project documents and context analysis documents prepared by PAX. Interviews will be organised with staff from PAX and its partner organisations that started the program in 2013

To answer the third question, also external documents that are site specific will be analysed when made available by external resource persons, and interviews with external resource persons are expected to provide valuable information.

Data analysis

The data gathered under this question will help to clarify the ToC at the beginning of the program, as well as its assumptions about factors in the context that might affect interventions and intervention strategies that might lead to changes in the context.

To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?

Sub questions

- What changes or adjustments have been made in the implementation of the program? Why did those changes occur?
- What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program implementation?
- How did the program respond to those site specific changes?
- How relevant were these responses from the program given the changes in the context?

Data gathering method and information sources

Question 1 will be answered by means of the analysis of project documents made available by PAX and its partners, as well as interviews with staff of PAX and its partners who were involved in the implementation of the program in subsequent years.

Question 2 will be answered by means of the construction of a time line that highlights changes in the context of each intervention site (Watsa, Faradjé, Djugu, Mambassa). These time lines will be constructed based upon program documentation made available, interviews with current and previous staff of PAX and its partners, external resource persons and beneficiaries – right holders/citizens.

Question 3 will be answered by means of the analysis of project documents, and interviews with current and previous staff of PAX and its partners and beneficiaries – right holders/citizens.

Question 4 will be answered through interviews with current and previous staff of PAX and its partners, external resource persons (where appropriate) and its beneficiaries – right holders/citizens.

Data analysis

The analysis of these data may result in a table that highlights for each change in the adjustment of the program, the reason of the change which may be due to internal reasons or to external (context) factors.

To what extent have program objectives been achieved?

Sub questions

- What have been the outputs and outcomes realised in comparison to the plan?
- What challenges did PAX and its partners encounter with the implementation of the program?
- To what extent do the outcomes achieved provide evidence for the realisation of the program objectives?

Data gathering method and information sources

The first sub questions will be answered by means of a comparison of planned and realised outputs and objectives, including an inventory of challenges documented with regards to implementation. This will be done by the consultant based upon the planning and process documents made available by PAX.

Question 2 will be answered by presenting the overview obtained under question 1 to staff of PAX and its partners to seek for further clarifications.

The third question will be answered under paragraph 4.5.

Data analysis

The analysis will result in a table that highlights outputs and outcomes realised according to plan and those not in line with plans. Reasons for clarification will also be described in the table. It is most likely that the progress reports and other documents will not provide detailed information about the achievement of the objectives of the program. These will however be collected by answering the following evaluation question in paragraph 4.5.

To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?

Sub questions

- What were the most significant changes/outcomes observed since 2013 that contributed to the sustainable mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
- What are the changes in behaviour observed, and whose behaviour changed, when? SMART formulation.
- What evidence is available that testifies this behavioural change?
- Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?

Data gathering method and information sources

These questions are inspired by the Outcome Harvesting method described by Wilson-Grau & Britt (2012). Information regarding the 4 sub questions will be gathered through interviews with staff of PAX and partners, external resource persons and beneficiaries- right holders/citizens.

Data analysis

The data gathered under this paragraph help to make an inventory of positive and negative, anticipated and unanticipated outcomes achieved during the implementation of PAX program. These outcomes might be partially in line with the expected outcomes as described in PAX' ToC in 2013, but they may also describe other outcomes that might not fit into PAX' ToC. However the data will not assess the contribution of PAX to achieving those outcomes.

To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?

Sub questions

- According to you, what actors, factors explain each of these outcomes (identified under question 4.a) (more than 1 explanation is possible)?
- What is the story of change - the sequence of incidents/actors and factors that explains each outcome?
- Why do you think this is the proper story of change? (Is this always the way people behave, react, act? what are the drivers of change?)
- What evidence can you provide that this is the most likely story of change?
- in this story of change - what has been the role of PAX and its partners?

Data gathering method and information sources

Like under paragraph 4.5, these questions will be asked during interviews with staff of PAX and its partners, external resource persons and beneficiaries – right holders/citizens. The questions aim to collect for each outcome identified under paragraph 4.5, a range of possible stories of change. They also aim to obtain some more information about drivers of change that may explain relations between interventions, factors and outcomes. With this perspective in mind, they aim to analyse some of the mechanisms behind changes in behaviour, as intended with Realist Evaluation.

Data Analysis

The data gathered under this paragraph are meant to test the pathways outlined in the ToC of the program and respective changes. This would provide information about what interventions, given the specific contexts in which they take place are most likely to lead to change and which not.

To what extent were the intervention strategies identified in the program proposal efficient in reaching the goals (cost effectiveness)

Sub questions

- What program interventions could have gained more results (outcomes) under the specific contexts on each site?
- What program interventions did not yield any results and what are possible explanations?

Data gathering method and information sources

After the analysis of all data obtained, the consultant will compare the ToC as described in program documents and subsequent changes with the stories of change gathered in the field.

- Analysis by consultant.
- Debriefing/presentation of evaluation findings with PAX.

Data analysis

The data gathered will help to further identify the most effective strategies to introduce change in a given context for the future program.

6. Sources available

Until so far, the following data sources have been identified for this evaluation

- Internal documents and public documents made available by PAX and its partners
- External documents found on the internet, for example those of the UN expert group on DR Congo;
- PAX staff and partners that started the program in 2013: Joost van Puijenbroek;
- PAX staff and partners that implemented the program in subsequent years: Jogien Bakker, Margo Leegwater, Marianne Moor, Leo van der Zwan, l'ONG Voix des Opprimés, Civil Society of Watsa, RHA, APRU, Groupe thématique mine de la société-civile, Réseau Provincial du Plaidoyer (Bunia);
- Beneficiaries or right holders/citizens, those categories in society whose security and living conditions are to be improved: Autorités coutumières et représentants des communautés locaux/Société Civile (Faradje, Watsa, Djugu, Mambasa), Creuseurs (et familles délocalisés) (Faradjé, Watsa, Djugu, Mambassa, Délégués des ILPs et communautés et / CLEs/CPMP (Djugu, Mambasa);
- (Relative) External resources persons, who are knowledgeable about the project and are capable to look at it from an outside perspective: Ex-Conseiller PAX (Mr Lonema), Cégémi¹³, Administrateurs du Territoire (Faradje, Watsa), ONG Voix des Opprimés (Haut-)¹⁴, KibaliGoldmines (Watsa, Mambasa/Djugu), Société Civile KibaliGoldmines (Watsa), Réseau des religieux (Watsa), Division des Mines/Saesscam (Bunia, Djugu, Mambasa, Watsa ???), ACIAR papa Eric et son équipe (Mambasa), police and security forces.

At this moment in time, some of the resource persons may not be well located in one of the stakeholder categories, but this will be adapted when a more in-depth understanding of the program has been gained.

For each of the stakeholder groups, a particular check list for discussion will be drafted in line with the evaluation questions that the particular group can give an answer to.

7. Checklists for interviews: Current and previous PAX staff and partners

1. To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
 - What changes occurred in the implementation of the program?
 - What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program implementation? CONSTRUCT A TIMELINE
 - How did the program respond to those site specific changes?

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¹⁴ Or partner that started the program in 2013

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- How relevant were these responses from the program given the changes in the context
2. To what extent have program objectives been achieved?
 - What have been the outputs and outcomes realised in comparison to the plan?
 - What challenges did PAX and its partners encounter with the implementation of the program?
 - To what extent do the outcomes achieved provide evidence for the realisation of the program objectives?
 3. To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?
 - What were the most significant changes/outcomes observed since 2013 that contributed to the sustainable mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
 - What are the changes in behaviour observed, and whose behaviour changed, when? SMART formulation.
 - What evidence is available that testifies this behavioural change?
 - Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?
 - Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?
 4. According to you, what actors, factors explain each of these outcomes (identified under question 4.a) (more than 1 explanation is possible)?
 - What is the story of change - the sequence of incidents/actors and factors that explains each outcome?
 - Why do you think this is the proper story of change? (Is this always the way people behave, react, act? what are the drivers of change?)
 - What evidence can you provide that this is the most likely story of change?
 - in this story of change - what has been the role of PAX and its partners?

8. Checklists for interviews: Beneficiaries' - right holders

1. To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
 - What changes occurred in the implementation of the program?
 - What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program implementation? CONSTRUCT A TIMELINE
 - How did the program respond to those site specific changes?
 - How relevant were these responses from the program given the changes in the context
2. To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?
 - What were the most significant changes/outcomes observed since 2013 that contributed to the sustainable mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
 - What are the changes in behaviour observed, and whose behaviour changed, when? SMART formulation.
 - What evidence is available that testifies this behavioural change?
 - Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?
 - Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?
3. According to you, what actors, factors explain each of these outcomes (identified under question 4.a) (more than 1 explanation is possible)?
 - What is the story of change - the sequence of incidents/actors and factors that explains each outcome?
 - Why do you think this is the proper story of change? (Is this always the way people behave, react, act? what are the drivers of change?)
 - What evidence can you provide that this is the most likely story of change?
 - in this story of change - what has been the role of PAX and its partners?

9. Checklists for interviews: External Resource persons

1. To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
 - What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program since 2013? CONSTRUCT A TIMELINE?

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- What were consequences of these changes in the context for human security and rights in goldmining?
 - And what would have been the best strategies to foster human security and rights in goldmining?
2. To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?
 - What were the most significant changes/outcomes observed since 2013 that contributed to the sustainable mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
 - What are the changes in behaviour observed, and whose behaviour changed, when? SMART formulation.
 - What evidence is available that testifies this behavioural change?
 - Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?
 - Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?
 3. According to you, what actors, factors explain each of these outcomes (identified under question 4.a) (more than 1 explanation is possible)?
 - What is the story of change - the sequence of incidents/actors and factors that explains each outcome?
 - Why do you think this is the proper story of change? (Is this always the way people behave, react, act? what are the drivers of change?)
 - What evidence can you provide that this is the most likely story of change?
 - in this story of change - what has been the role of PAX and its partners?

10. Checklists for interviews: PAX staff and partners 2013

1. To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?
 - What conclusions does the context analysis draw on the relation between human rights, human security and artisanal gold mining in 2012-2013?
 - What are the changes in the context that the program aims to realise in 2013 as a contribution to the sustainable and peaceful mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?
 - How relevant are these changes to be realised given the actual context in 2013?
2. To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?
 - What changes occurred in the implementation of the program? CONSTRUCT A TIMELINE
 - What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program implementation?
 - How did the program respond to those site specific changes?
 - How relevant were these responses from the program given the changes in the context
3. To what extent have program objectives been achieved?
 - What have been the outputs and outcomes realised in comparison to the plan?
 - What challenges did PAX and its partners encounter with the implementation of the program?
 - To what extent do the outcomes achieved provide evidence for the realisation of the program objectives?

	Evaluation Question	Questions to be answered	Data gathering method	Information Sources	Data Analysis
1a	To what extent did the context analysis and theory of change inform program objectives and interventions, as outlined in the program proposal?	What conclusions does the context analysis draw on the relation between human rights, human security and artisanal gold mining in 2012-2013?	Review of docs PAX; interviews	Program docs ; PAX staff and its partners in 2013	ToC clarified
1b		What are the changes in the context that the program aims to realise in 2013 as a contribution to the sustainable and peaceful mining of gold and to the benefit of each stakeholder group?		Program docs ; PAX staff and its partners in 2013	
1c		How relevant are these changes to be realised given the actual context in 2013?	Review of external documents that are site specific if available; interviews	External resource persons and external documents	
2a	To what extent, and why has the program implementation been adjusted and changed, according to updates in context analyses and theories of change?	What changes occurred in the implementation of the program? Why did those changes occur?	Review of docs PAX; interviews	Program docs ; current and prev PAX staff and its partners	Table that highlights changes, and reasons for change
2b		What site specific changes occurred in the context that were critical for the program implementation?	Construct timeline about critical changes in context for each site	Program docs ; current and prev PAX staff and its partners; external resource persons and citizens	
2c		How did the program respond to those site specific changes?	Review of docs PAX; interviews	Program docs ; current and prev PAX staff and its partners; citizens	
2.d		How relevant were these responses from the program given the changes in the context?	Interviews	Current and prev PAX staff and its partners; external resource persons and citizens	
3a	To what extent have program objectives been achieved?	What have been the outputs and outcomes realised in comparison to the plan?	Inventory of outputs, objectives planned in comparison to outputs and objectives realised, as well as inventory of challenges documented with regards to implementation	Compare project docs with annual progress reports	Inventory of outputs (and objectives) realised or not, and reasons
3b		What challenges did PAX and its partners encounter with the implementation of the program?	Interviews	PAX and its partners	
3c		To what extent do the outcomes achieved provide evidence for the realisation of the program objectives?	See question 4 and 5	See question 4 and 5	

4a	To what extent did the program contribute to changes in the local situation in the intervention areas in Ituri and Haut-Uele?	What were the most significant changes/outcomes observed since 2013 that contributed to enhanced human rights respect and security in in gold mining in Eastern Congo? What are the changes in behaviour observed, and whose behaviour changed, when? SMART formulation. What evidence is available that testifies this behavioural change? Why is this change important for sustainable mining of gold and equal sharing of benefits for all?	Interviews	Staff PAX and partners; external resource persons and citizens	Inventory of positive and negative, anticipated and unanticipated outcomes achieved in line or not with ToC PAX
5	To what extent have PAX and partners contributed to the results?	According to you, what actors, factors explain each of these outcomes (identified under question 4. a) (more than 1 explanation is possible)?What is the story of change - the sequence of incidents/actors and factors that explains each outcome?Why do you think this is the proper story of change? (Is this always the way people behave, react, act? what are the drivers of change?)What evidence can you provide that this is the most likely story of change? in this story of change - what has been the role of PAX and its partners?	Interviews	external resource persons and citizens	Pathways outlined in PAX' ToC are tested. Clarification of what interventions might/might not work in a given context
6	To what extent were the intervention strategies identified in the program proposal efficient in reaching the goals (cost effectiveness)	What program interventions could have gained more results (outcomes) under the specific contexts on each site? What program interventions did not yield any results and what are possible explanations?	Compare the ToC in program doc and subsequent changes with the stories of change gathered in the field	Analysis by consultant Debriefing/presentation of evaluation findings with PAX	Cost effectiveness. Most likely interventions that may work in future programs, under specific conditions

Appendix 5 Intervention logic, indicators and targets

	Narrative	Indicators and targets
Goal	Sustainable, harmonious gold mining to the benefit of all stakeholders	
Specific Objective	Human rights and security in gold mining known and improved in Eastern DRC	<p>5 credible dialogues between the industry and artisanal gold miners</p> <p># and quality of reactions by local authorities upon L&A messages in conflict zones: 1 / 2 messages receives a reaction</p> <p># and quality of local security committees in conflict zones that are active and operational: in every 1/2 groupements 1 / 2 messages receives a reaction</p> <p>Every chefferie reacts at least 1 time upon L&A messages on the governance of the artisanal mining sector: at least # of artisanal miner associations operational in Ituri - target not specified</p> <p>Global vision on gold mining drafted</p>
Conflict zones: Bafwasende, Mambasa to the North Kivu border, Irumu		
Result A	Systematic and frequent monitoring of human security and gold mining	<p># of human rights and security reports for each territory: 1 per year for Mambasa, Bafwasende, Irumu</p> <p>Study of artisanal mining: 1 in Bafwasende, 1 for the RFO</p> <p>3 L&A messages per year about the military zones</p> <p>1 module about monitoring techniques produced</p> <p># of people trained on the mining law, monitoring and reporting: 25 existing committees, all traditional chiefs and 2 CS representatives per chefferie</p>
Result B	Early warning system in place	<p># of committees put in place and trained on community security: Minimum 20 in Mambasa and 5 in Irumu</p> <p>at least 5 members per security committee</p> <p>% of women in security committees: at least 2 per committee</p> <p>% of security committees that have regular meetings: 100 %</p>
Conflict zones due to co-existence artisanal mining and industrial mining		
Result C	Artisanal miner associations/cooperatives created and operational	<p>5 delegates trained in pilot zones</p> <p>15 meetings on 15 mining sites with 50% of the artisanal miners being present</p> <p>5 artisanal miner associations active in 15 pilot zones</p> <p>1 artisanal miner association active in 10 other zones</p>
Result D	Local government, populations and civil society informed and capacitated	<p>1 report that makes an inventory of Human Rights and Security Risks</p> <p>4 reports on the context analysis in 4 concessions</p> <p>Refresher course on the mining law and training on challenges related to gold: All chiefs and existing committees in Ituri in the Gold mining areas (Mambasa and Walendu Bindi in Irumu NOT included)</p> <p>Training on mining law and challenges related to gold: all the chiefs of chefferies and groupements, most important representatives of SC in mining zones in Haut-</p>

Result E	Constructive dialogue between all stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 conference about the inventory of human rights and security risks 2 conferences, each about two concessions, with the participation of all stakeholders
Eastern DRC		
Result F	Capacity development of civil society in East Congo ensured	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 Research reports on the governance and political economy of gold mining, 1 in each of the Kivus 2 studies and 1 report on the dynamics of artisanal gold mining 1 exchange meeting between SCOs in East Congo 1 presentation each year of the reports on security and gold mining in conflict zones 1 presentation of lessons learned about the artisanal miner associations 1 presentation of the context analysis in the industrial concessions 1 presentation of the baseline reports on the OKAPI national park and that of Bafwasende
Result G	Regular and effective lobbying and advocacy of authorities ensured	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least 1 L&A message about the governance and political economy of gold mining report At least 1 message about the research findings on the dynamics of artisanal mining At least 1 message of civil society based upon the exchange meetings in East Congo 1 Conference that involves all stakeholders of East Congo¹⁵ At least 2 resolutions formulated at the end of the conference
Assumption	Other NGOs will address working conditions of artisanal miners, health effects, effects on agriculture, alternative employment opportunities. PAX will look for other NGOs to intervene on those issues with other funding mechanisms.	

¹⁵ In the text of the program document 2 conferences are being mentioned

Appendix 6 Overview of changes in the context and within the project per territory

Period	Changes in context				Changes in staffing and partners	Changes in ToC - Interventions
	Mambasa	Irumu	Djugu – Mungbwalo concession	Mahagi		
2011		Land conflicts on the rise	Tensions between artisanal and industrial mining, because production is expected to start in 2013. SOKIMO stops activities and support for artisanal mining and government stops support to organise artisanal miners			Program in conception
2012	Mai Mai Morgan in RFO also gets active in urban centres and clashes with FARDC	M23 engages with FRPI to head to Mungbwalo in Djugu. FRPI expands its control				Program in conception
2013	Considerable drop of gold prices on the global market until mid-2016. Kilo Gold and Loncor in Mambasa and AGK in Djugu stop industrial mining preparations. Mwan Africa in Mahagi also stops because there is not much gold					Program starts in November 2013 in the Netherlands

2013	Mai Mai Morgan in RFO turns from poaching to attacking gold mines and has close relations with 9 th FARDC region	FARDC attack FRPI, in vain. Displacement of 150.000 persons. FRPI controls gold mines at Bavi, Soke, Singo, and Songolo and an oil concession. It uses child soldiers. ADF/NALU activities on the rise. Land conflicts on the rise			
2014	Mai Mai Morgan killed while arrested. His group still commits human rights atrocities in Muchacha and Penge.	FRPI leader arrested but no effect on FRPI. Land conflicts on the rise above groupement level, because of influx from people from North Kivu	New rebel groups on the rise, probably reflect conflicts between traditional leaders	RHA is the partner on the ground RHA does not report conform financial agreement, so transfer of funds delayed PAX opens an Office in Bunia	Program starts in April 2014 Monitoring agents in Irumu cannot do their work because FRPI is present in mines PAX decides to start L&A at provincial and national level on land and mining
2014	Expulsion of the head of the Human Rights section of MONUSCO				
2015	Remainders of the Mai Mai Morgan are active around 3 roads: Mambasa-Biakato, Mambasa-Nia Nia and Nia Nia-Isiro	Fragmented FRPI causes insecurity also outside.. FRPI are looting and imposing taxes on a regular basis but not directly involved in gold mining (Walendu Bindi, Songolo, Nyankunde. Increasing of Influence of ADF/Nalu. Extortion by police and FARD. FARDC collaborates with armed groups	Access of peace groups to local security authorities decreases and civil society in gold mining areas becomes corrupted by companies and government	RHA: Institutional funding of by Cordaid stops. Coordinator RHA resigns. RHA Mahagi members withdraw. RHA not operational for 10 months until November PAX: Replacement of project manager Ituri by a new manager in charge of Ituri, Bafwasende and Kivus. Pax opens office in Bunia	No activities undertaken by RHA for 10 months until November After decreased funding of RHA, PAX decides to concentrate on research and L&A at provincial and national level on land an mining. Activities with RHA start with the peace committees, but without monitoring agents in the gold mines
2015	Ituri become a province				

2016	PNC owns mining pits in Don de Dieu and Libre Ville.	FARDC not attacking armed groups because their chief is asking for a dialogue. Wide spread insecurity by armed groups and kidnapping. Conflicts between cattle keepers and agricultural producers	RHA has an interim manager, followed by a new coordinator in August	
2017	Mambasa - M'sa: 31 th brigade of the FARDC present in RFO and has own mining pits. Presence of Chinese in RFO tolerated. Most HR violations by 31 th brigade. Kidnapping is a new phenomenon	FRPI and FARDC operational on mining sites (Bavi and Andisoma). Tax collection by FARDC, police, ANR and other public services. Systematic looting by FRPI (Walendi Bindi) and others. August: attempts to fight armed groups by FARDC and PNC fail	RHA resumes work in line with program doc PAX: In May 2017, a new program manager starts, in charge of the entire program	In January, monitoring agents in goldmines start their work again For security reasons, monitoring stopped on the Mambasa, Biakito, Bela axe as of May 2017.

Changes in context			Changes in staffing and partners		Changes in ToC - Interventions
Period	Haut Uele – Watsa and Faradje	Tshopo - Bafwasende	Kivus		
2011	LRA is very active and high level of atrocities. GoDRC denies existence of LRA in DRC Relocation of 16.277 persons from the KibaliGold concession and 7.500 artisanal miners				Program in conception
2012	LRA continues as a low intensity conflict but committing serious atrocities Mai Mai Morgan is also active in the RFO in Haut Uele	Mai Mai Luc is operating	BANRO starts gold mining M23 occupies major parts of North Kivu	peace talks start in December	Program in conception
2013	Considerable drop of gold prices on the global market until mid-2016				Program starts in the Netherlands in November
2013	Mai Mai Morgan in RFO turns from poaching to attacking gold mines and has close relations with 9 th FARDC region LRA has a decreasing strength		M23 defeated in November		Partners : Haut Uele: Isoro diocese, Durba doyenne, Voix des Opprimés Tshopo : Archdiocese of Kisangani and parish of Wamba Kivus : Life and Peace Institute
2014	Tensions increase in Watsa and Faradje around KibaliGold. LRA context is improving	Bafwasende highly militarised		PAX Stops working in Haut Uele because partner organisation lacks managerial capacities. Tshopo: partner organisation far from the field and not knowledgeable	PAX continues in Haut Uele with the religious leader network on LRA
2015	LRA activity has substantially decreased Tensions around KibaliGold rising with manifestations resulting in casualties. Close relations between government and Kibali AGK becomes MGM in April 2015			PAX does not carry out regular activities and follow-up in Tshopo and Haut Uele.	LRA work stopped

2015 In November 2015, the provinces of Tshopo and Haut Uele are created

2016 Life and Peace Institute closed
CEGEMI identified as new partner for 1 study

2017 Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba, FARDC commander of the first defence zone of DRC, involved in the gold sector
PAX: In May 2017, a new program manager starts, in charge of the entire program

Appendix 7 Overview of outputs per territory

Red = Conflict zone component

Yellow = Co-existence component

Green = Eastern DRC component

	Mambasa	Irumu	Djugu	Mahagi	Watsa and Faradje	Bafwasende	Kivus
Goal				Activities stop in 2014			
Specific Objective Human rights and security in gold mining known and improved in Eastern DRC Indicators 5 credible dialogues between the industry and artisanal gold miners # and quality of reactions by local authorities upon L&A messages in conflict zones: 1 / 2 messages receives a reaction # and quality of local security committees in conflict zones that are active and operational: in every 1/2 groupements 1 / 2 messages receives a reaction Every chefferie reacts at least 1 time upon L&A messages on the governance of the artisanal mining sector: at least					Radio emissions about study Kibali At times constructive dialogue between Kibali, CS (3 x?) Decrease of human security incidents Social contract of 100.000 USD for projects.	Conference about I4S study generates littl eimpact in 2016, because of erratic cooperation with CSOs	

# of artisanal miner associations operational in Ituri - target not specified Global vision on gold mining drafted							
Result A Systematic and frequent monitoring of human security and gold mining Indicators # of human rights and security reports for each territory: 1 per year for Mambasa, Bafwasende, Irumu Study of artisanal mining: 1 in Bafwasende, 1 for the RFO 3 L&A messages per year about the military zones 1 module about monitoring techniques produced # of people trained on the mining law, monitoring and reporting: 25 existing peace committees, all traditional chiefs and 2 CS representatives per chefferie	2/3 HR reports based on monitoring 1 I4S study on artisanal mining 12/20 CLEs conduct regular monitoring except for 10 months in 2015 6 monitoring agents in place until December 2014, restart in 2017 and 13 trained 1 coordinating body for 6 CLEs created for L&A (# of L&A messages not documented) Training for 5 CLEs, 25 persons, 6 women Forms for monitoring are available for Monitoring Agents and peace committees	2/3 HR reports based on monitoring 0 studies on artisanal mining 1 coordinating body for 6 CLEs created for L&A (# of L&A messages not documented) 3/5 ILPs conduct regular monitoring except for 10 months in 2015 7 monitoring agents in place as of 2017 in Djugu and Irumu 2016 Training for 3 ILP on mining law: 15 p of which 3 women 2015 training of 25 persons Irumu & Djugu	2/3 HR reports based on monitoring 0 studies 1 coordinating body for 6 CLEs created for L&A (# of L&A messages not documented) 6 ILPs conduct regular monitoring except for 10 months in 2015 operational revamped as of December 2016 In 2017 7 monitoring agents in place; first training in 2014 for Irumu&Djugu Training of 25 persons in Irumu&Djugu	1/3 HR reports produced 2 monitoring agents foreseen in 2014	End 2014 early 2015 training of customary chiefs, CS on incident reporting	1 I4S study on artisanal mining training on mining code in 2016	
Result B Early warning system in place Indicators # of committees put in place and trained on community	20 committees in place but not trained (June 2015-May 2016),	1 early warning system in place in 2016 in Nyankunde 10 persons in security committees of which 2 are women					

<p>security: Minimum 20 in Mambasa and 5 in Irumu at least 5 members per peace committee % of women in peace committees: at least 2 per committee % of peace committees that have regular meetings: 100 %</p>	<p>only some representatives 2 early warning systems in place Mambasa and NiaNia (2016) Composition of peace committees and % of women not monitored # of peace committee meetings not measured</p>						
<p>Result C Artisanal miner associations/cooperatives created and operational Indicators 5 delegates trained in pilot zones 15 meetings on 15 mining sites with 50% of the artisanal miners being present 5 artisanal miner associations actif in 15 pilot zones 1 artisanal miner association actif in 10 other zones</p>	<p>16 mining sites identified in 2014 (including Babili Bakwanza and Babili Babombi training on artisanal coops organised in 2017</p>	<p>2 mining sites identified in 2014 Training on artisanal coops organised in 2017</p>	<p>Mining sites identified in 2013, 2014 and 2016 Baseline study artisanal mining in 2016 (CEGEMI) 1 Training needs assessment conducted for artisanal mining (pre) cooperatives in 2017 (CEGEMI) Meetings of miners, traders, civil society? of the 3 territories. 200 persons reached Courses organised in Mambasa for 200 persons from 2 mining sites – dates unknown 4 courses organised in Djuju in June 2016 and June 2017 for 246 persons, including members</p>	<p>2 mining sites identified in 2014</p>			

			of cooperatives and traders. 16 % are women, based upon figures for the first 2 courses.				
<p>Result D Local government, populations and civil society informed and capacitated</p> <p>Indicators 1 report that makes an inventory of Human Rights and Security Risks 4 reports on the context analysis in 4 concessions Refresher course on the mining law and training on challenges related to gold: All chiefs and existing committees in Ituri in the Gold mining areas (Mambasa and Walendu Bindi in Irumu NOT included) Training on mining law and challenges related to gold: all traditional chiefs, most important representatives of SC in mining zones in Haut-Uele</p>	1 context report on Kilogold and Loncor concession in October 2015		1 context report on AGK/MGM in November 2014	Context study for Mwan Africa not done.	1 context report on KibaliGold (2015)		
<p>Result E Constructive dialogue between all stakeholders</p> <p>Indicators 1 conference about the inventory of human rights and security risks 2 conferences, each about two concessions, with the participation of all stakeholders</p>	1 conference 2015-2016 on the context report of KiloGold and Loncor: lively debate between KiloGold, RFO and CS and artisanal mining sector		2 conference in Bunia and Mungbwalo on the context report of AGK/MGM in 2014?. 100 p attending, but AGK activities frozen and sold in April 2015 to MGM --> no follow-up in 2015		2 Conferences in Durba (August) and Kinshasa (October) in 2015 on KibaliGold. follow-up with a workshop on	1 Conference in 2016 for the I4S study	

					local implications of VP, January 2016 3 workshops with Kibali in 2017		
Result F Capacity development of civil society in East Congo ensured Indicators 2 Research reports on the governance and political economy of gold mining, 1 in each of the Kivus 2 studies and 1 report on the dynamics of artisanal gold mining 1 exchange meeting between SCOs in East Congo 1 presentation each year of the reports on security and gold mining in conflict zones 1 presentation of lessons learned about the artisanal miner associations 1 presentation of the context analysis in the industrial concessions 1 presentation of the baseline reports on the OKAPI national park and that of Bafwasende							2 studies conducted in South and North Kivu. Presented in the Kisangani meeting
Result G Regular and effective lobbying and advocacy of authorities ensured Indicators At least 1 L&A message about the governance and political economy of gold mining report	1 planning report on L&A for Ituri province but no initiatives taken RHA senses the urgency to lobby for ZEA in early 2016, but does not act.						
	March 2016 3 day conference in Kisangani with the Congolese National Coordination Mechanism of the ICGLR and Civil Society of Eastern DRC etc. One of the participants read a final declaration in the presence of the representative of the Commissaire Spécial who had come to open and close the conference.						

<p>At least 1 message about the research findings on the dynamics of artisanal mining</p> <p>At least 1 message of civil society based upon the exchange meetings in East Congo</p> <p>1 Conference that involves all stakeholders of East Congo¹⁶</p> <p>At least 2 resolutions formulated at the end of the conference</p>	<p>17 recommendations formulated for follow-up by the Government, mining companies and Civil Society.</p>	
<p>Assumption</p> <p>Other NGOs will address working conditions of artisanal miners, health effects, effects on agriculture, alternative employment opportunities. PAX will look for other NGOs to intervene on those issues with other funding mechanisms.</p>		

¹⁶ In the text of the program document 2 conferences are being mentioned

To explore
the potential
of nature to
improve the
quality of life



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