



Final Report

Evaluation of Justice Rapid Response (JRR)

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Introduction

In August 2014, Stockholm Policy Group (SPG) was contracted to carry out an evaluation of the organisational development of Justice Rapid Response (JRR). The assignment aimed to ensure the organisational readiness of JRR to adequately address current and future demands in an effective and efficient way, and to meet the needs of its clients even with increased demand for its services.

The Human Security Division (HSD) of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) is the commissioning entity. In the Terms of Reference (ToR), HSD requested that the evaluation should focus on the formative dimension, namely looking at the organisation's structure, its systems, and its processes in light of the increasing demand for JRR's services. This evaluation thus aims at assessing what the future needs of the organisation might be and how Switzerland can continue supporting JRR in a meaningful and sustainable way. The assessment seeks to identify critical areas for improvement. Furthermore, the evaluation should serve as a basis from which to define Switzerland's support to JRR after the current funding phase runs out in June 2015. The evaluation aims to provide a basis for the dialogue between HSD and JRR in order to define Switzerland's future support to JRR.

SPG has applied an approach and methodology to this evaluation that is guided by a thorough understanding of JRR's theory of change, its ambition to provide relevant, effective, and efficient services, and its need for a sustainable funding platform. Our understanding is based on a large number of interviews with JRR management and staff, board members, trainers, deployed experts and cooperation partners. We have also reviewed documentation on issues that are related to the assessment of the current organisational structure of JRR and its processes and systems, and how these enable JRR to deliver on its mandate.

Our methodology and tools for analysis of available information is framed and influenced by the COSO¹ framework to improve organisational performance and governance. Each area of analysis: (i) organisational structure; (ii) processes; and (iii) systems, is seen and addressed through the lens of governance and management of a successful organisation. Although the COSO framework predominantly focuses on understanding systems and processes of managing and mitigating risks for achieving operational objectives it highlights areas that are critical to an organisational readiness to address current and future demands. We have therefore deliberately applied the COSO-framework to JRR's organisational structure, processes and systems. This has helped us analyse the key elements of JRR's governance and strategy. The analysis has focused on the management cycle for delivering on the strategy: planning, implementation, monitoring, and adapting to changing circumstances and identified challenges.

Our analysis of JRR's management cycle focuses on understanding (i) how the management system contributes to achieving the overall strategic objectives, and provides an enabling process for deploying and executing the strategy; (ii) links between processes of strategic planning, risk mitigation, budgeting, forecasting, and resource allocation; (iii) how the processes contribute to making the operations work and deliver expected performance in accordance with the mandate of the organisation; (iv) mechanisms to review and oversee the implementation of JRR against the overall strategic plan, including the level of acceptable external and internal risk; and (v) mechanisms to improve processes to narrow performance gaps related to stakeholders expectations, as well as corrections in response to changes in the external and internal environment that alter assumptions underlying the strategy.

¹ COSO - Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the Treadway Commission. It provides thought leadership through the development of comprehensive frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal control, and fraud deterrence designed to improve organisational performance and governance and to reduce the extent of fraud in organisations. COSO is considered a relevant tool for our approach to evaluating JRR's organisational structure, processes and systems of internal control - and thereby the capacity of JRR to achieve its objectives relating to operations, reporting and compliance, and its ability to adapt to changes in the business and operating environments.

While these issues and questions have shaped the research process and analysis, the questions that were listed in the terms of reference have been the primary point of departure for the presentation of the team's findings, and have shaped the structure of this evaluation report. In the pursuit of understanding the key drivers for concern or potential for organisational development we sought feedback from the management of JRR on what is considered realistic potential for change to adapt to challenges and build on existing and functioning structures, processes and system.

The working process with JRR has been highly collaborative and management and staff have been very forthcoming about strengths and weaknesses of the organisation, as well as threats and opportunities. It is important to point out that this evaluation is not a validation and verification of results reported by JRR, as a results analysis lies outside the scope of this assignment. The general impression of all consulted stakeholders was that JRR and deployed experts were highly effective and added important value to existing resources. This evaluation has not verified, assessed or reviewed any specific activities or interventions. However, this assessment has considered efficiency in its analysis of the organisational structure, processes and systems in relation to JRR's mandate, operations, and expected results.

SPG believes that the close collaboration and the broad range of stakeholders with whom the team has engaged has contributed to making this report a solid basis for dialogue to define Switzerland's support to JRR after the current funding phase runs out.

2. Organisational Structure

The evaluation team's findings relating to the relevance and sufficiency of the functions and positions of the current JRR secretariat in relation to its mandate are based on the anecdotal evidence of the successful operations of JRR to date, the statements of JRR management, staff and external stakeholders, observations during the teams visits to JRR's offices in Geneva, as well as on quantitative information on the number trainings and deployments managed by the Secretariat.

The overall impression is that the current composition of the JRR Secretariat has managed to fulfil its mandate within the constraints of limited resources. A recurring theme in interviews with stakeholders is a recognition that the JRR Secretariat is understaffed, i.e. that staff seemed to work long hours and that individual staff members often had very broad areas of responsibility. At the same time, all consulted stakeholders hold that the constructive engagement, responsiveness, and commitment of the Secretariat's team members ensure that these perceived limitations in human resources did not affect operations. It is evident from conversations with staff members, senior management, and stakeholders close to the operations of the JRR secretariat, that the staff is often over-worked and that the current set-up is not seen as sustainable in the long run. In the past two years, the volume of JRR's operations has increased, subsequently putting additional pressure on JRR's human resources, which are more frequently stretched to deliver swiftly and professionally.

Despite the small number of staff at the JRR Secretariat, it is clear that the team has managed to deliver impressive results in terms of providing a rapid reaction facility for deployment of criminal justice professionals, available to international as well as national actors. Consulted stakeholders are in unanimous agreement that the JRR secretariat is highly responsive to their needs and that responses from the JRR team are always very timely. JRR's responsiveness to requests and the quality of its delivery builds on several pillars - organisational structure, processes and systems. The need to grow and expand as an organisation by creating and filling new positions to address recurring operational needs without over-stretching the workforce is apparent to the management of JRR. In the planning and deployment of internal resources both human resources and technology (IT) need to be carefully assessed to utilize the full capacity of the organisation. Thus, functions, roles, and responsibilities need to be adapted to existing and potential technical solutions to managing operations. The Roster Management Handbook of the Center for International Peace Operations and www.civcap.info points out that one of the most important tools of a roster is a database.² . The operational structure and administrative resources, processes and systems must be designed to be aligned with the size and scope of operations.

Currently, in November 2014, the team consisted of the following functions/positions:

1. *Executive Director (Seconded, 100%)*: The executive director has been incredibly important for the development of JRR – to the point where it is currently almost difficult to describe the position independently from the person. The executive director is the overall strategic leader, an important part of the institutional memory, and the quality assurer of all the Secretariat's work. The executive director is involved in all important processes of the JRR Secretariat. The executive director is seconded by Canada.
2. *Director of Operations (Seconded, 80%)* – The director of operations serves, in effect, as the deputy executive director. She oversees the work of the office manager and is responsible for the overall operational management of the JRR. The director of operations is seconded by Switzerland.

² zif, Center for International Peace Operations, Roster Management Handbook, civcap.info, 2011.

3. *Office Manager (Regular staff, 80%)*: The office manager serves a number of functions at the JRR Secretariat – from general office administration (including IT), being the executive assistant, and organising the Executive Board meetings, to supporting the financial manager and serving as the HR officer of the Secretariat.
4. *Roster & Deployment Manager (Regular staff 100%)*: The roster and deployment manager is one of the most central positions in the JRR Secretariat, keeping track of the roster, selecting candidates for deployment (together with the SGBV Coordinator when relevant) and managing deployments when JRR itself is the deploying agency. The position is currently non-seconded and funded through the regular budget.
5. *Financial Controller (Regular staff 50%)*: The financial controller is now a position funded through the regular budget of JRR. The current controller is responsible for all financial matters, including budgeting and reporting, and liaising with auditors. The controller is supported by the office manager who also serves as financial assistant. While the controller is formally employed on a 50% contract, in reality the schedule has been quite flexible and she has been working closer to 80% to match the current needs of JRR. She has been duly compensated for the overtime.
6. *Development Officer (Consultant, 100%)*: The position of development officer was created to develop and implement resource mobilisation strategies, build and maintain donor relationships, coordinate reporting to donors, and work with outreach activities. The position is currently held by a consultant on a short-term contract, who was previously deployed as an SGBV expert through the JRR roster. The consultant contract focuses on outreach to potential private sources of funding.
7. *New York Liaison & SGBV Coordinator (Consultant, 100%)*: The position of New York liaison is combined with the role as SGBV coordinator. The position is held by a consultant on a long-term contract. The consultant is stationed in New York in order to be able to liaise with the key partner UN Women, as well as the UN Secretariat, Agencies and Programs, as well as other New York based stakeholders. The function of SGBV coordinator supports the roster and deployment manager in cases where requests focus on SGBV expertise. The position is currently supported by an additional part-time consultant.
8. *Complementarity Coordinator (Consultant, 100%)*: The JRR Secretariat currently employs a consultant on a long-term contract as complementarity program coordinator. The consultant was previously deployed as an expert on the complementarity pilot project in Mali.
9. *Intern (seconded by Switzerland, 100%)* – Every year, the JRR Secretariat has a paid intern, seconded by Switzerland, mainly supporting the roster and deployment manager.
10. *Intern (University students, 100%)*: The JRR Secretariat also regularly takes on interns who are in the process of completing their master's studies. There have been discussions about seeking ways to keep the intern on as a paid junior associate after the internship, and it has now been decided that the current intern shall be offered such a position on a part-time basis.

Between September 2013 and August 2014, JRR also had a liaison officer in The Hague, liaising with the diplomatic community, the International Criminal Court, and other stakeholders there. The Hague liaison also travelled regularly to Brussels to reach out to the European Union. The position was seconded by the Dutch Government for one year. When the secondment ended in August, there were no available funds to hire a replacement to fill the position. The person who held the position is now back at her regular job with the Dutch Government, but has offered to continue working for the JRR on a pro-bono basis one day per week, in order to maintain the contacts that have been established. The offer was accepted, but there is currently no formal contract regulating this relationship. This is clearly not a sustainable way to maintain a presence in the Hague. As there are other needs within the Secretariat that are seen as more pressing, it is not likely that the position in The Hague will be filled in the near future.

A major challenge for the JRR Secretariat, particularly in terms of predictability, strategic planning, and establishing institutional memory has been the reliance on staff seconded from partner countries. Secondments have often been limited to one year and in some cases they have been withdrawn on short notice. There are several examples of seconded staff that have left the organisation without any plan for replacements, forcing the Secretariat to either move on without filling the position of the secondee, or resort to short-term or consultant contracts with any funds that might be available. As noted elsewhere in this report, the lack of predictability in funding and availability of human resources is a major obstacle for the development of the JRR facility. It affects the ability for strategic planning, organisational learning, and institutional memory, as well as recruitment, as JRR is not able to offer long-term, or even medium-term job security.

The JRR Secretariat regularly depends on consultants to fill staffing needs. Sometimes consultants work at the Secretariat and sometimes they work from a distance. There are examples of short-term contracts as well as longer-term consultancies (see current examples in the list above). Working with consultants may be a good way to solve temporary staffing needs in specific projects or processes. It is clear from the list above, however, that JRR currently uses consultant contracts to staff more long-term positions. This is an issue from an efficiency perspective as well as an employer ethics perspective, considering issues such as insurance, pensions and employment security. It may also be more difficult to ensure institutional memory with short-term consultants filling core positions in the organisation.

The Secretariat has, in its first multi-year budget, presented an estimate that would allow hiring four additional full time positions out of the core budget. The four positions will enable JRR to separate the roster management and deployment functions into two positions. Another additional position will be a *training coordinator*, to handle the approximately four training sessions per year that are projected for coming years. The Secretariat would also like to hire a finance assistant with financial training to support the financial controller and take some burden off the current office manager. The fourth position will be devoted to the development officer (up until now seconded or hired on short-term consultant contracts), to handle outreach and strategic communications, advocacy (while maintaining a discrete approach), and resource mobilisation. *The process of establishing the four additional positions, through redefining roles and recruiting new staff, is under way at the time of drafting this report.* This needs assessment is based on a thorough analysis by JRR's management of the current staffing, functions and needs, as well as on the staff's perception of their own capacity to deliver within a regular full time position.

Although neither JRR nor the evaluation team has conducted a time-study of each position, function or task, the management of JRR has estimated the time that is needed to deliver on specific tasks. In our interviews with JRR staff, they were each asked to reflect on how much time they spend on various tasks and how much time they expect to spend in the future, given the planned direction. It is clear that JRR so far has been able to deliver on its mandate. In addition to being a testament to the commitment of JRR's management and staff, this speaks to the effectiveness of its current organisation. The evaluation team believes, however, that the projected additional staffing needs are reasonable. First, the team has not found anything that contradicts or puts into question the allocation of additional resources that has been proposed by JRR management after assessing the organisation's needs. In fact, the proposal allocates human resources to areas where the consulted stakeholders have confirmed additional needs, for example dividing the responsibility of the roster management and deployments into two full-time positions.

One full-time position is considered sufficient to manage the maintenance of the roster at its current size. Introduction of a more advanced and sophisticated software to manage the maintenance could potentially allow the roster manager to work more strategically with recruitment and deployment through outreach activities, and less with administrative maintenance of the roster. Also, a software could also provide JRR with sophisticated statistics about who is relevant and for what, etc. and thereby be able to populate the database with the most relevant people and perhaps reduce the total number.

The demand for JRR's services has increased since the facility's inception. Continuous successful outreach activities combined with increasing recognition and legitimacy will likely contribute to an even greater number of requests by institutions or States. As the operations have increased, so has also the financial and administrative burden. Budgeting, accounting and internal financial control, as well as external financial reporting must meet the requirements and standards of stakeholders. It therefore seems reasonable, from a practical as well as principled perspective, to recruit a finance assistant to support the part-time finance controller and allow more time to ensure continued sound financial management and control.

JRR strives for, and has managed to maintain a flexible and agile organisation. Nevertheless, key functions need to be in place in order to deliver services in accordance with JRR's mandate and the *Organizational Structure and Principles for Participation*. Seconded staff constitute a significant share of the work force, and hold central management positions, but it has also been deemed necessary to establish supplementary professional positions for operations to run efficiently and smoothly. As most contributions have either been in kind (seconded staff) or earmarked for and restricted to specific program activities, JRR has experienced challenges in terms of funding its core professional positions.

The role of seconded staff at JRR is very important and also provides an important strategic link between the donors and JRR. Seconded staff can in many ways add significant value to the organisation through its experience and extended networks. A potential concern in relation to seconded staff, however, is the length of their secondment with the organisation. Secondments of three four years may not cause any problems or challenges to the organisation at all. Issues occur in practice when staff are suddenly needed by their governments somewhere else or when governments shift priorities. Secondments also tend to limit the flexibility of JRR management to allocate resources to the positions that are deemed most important. All JRR secondees are earmarked for a specific position and in some cases JRR itself has had little opportunity to influence these decisions. This makes it challenging for JRR to plan its work, and to effectively and independently prioritise its resources.

It has been articulated by JRR management that while secondments are and will continue to be an important part of staffing at JRR, certain strategic positions are important to hire on regular contracts. Examples of such functions are programming, roster management and deployment, as well as financial controlling. The central argument for this is that regular contracts allow for longer term employments, ensuring institutional memory and sustainability, as well as greater control by JRR management.

In order to hire more regular staff and achieve greater control over staffing, the key issue for JRR remains finding ways to obtain more predictable and sustainable funding for the core functions of the Secretariat. JRR has gradually moved in this direction since 2013, when the office manager was the only staff member employed directly by the Secretariat (on a 50% basis). Today, the office manager is employed on a full-time regular contract and the finance manager, as well as the roster and deployment manager, are on contracts with JRR funded through the regular budget. There is a strong ambition to continue this development.

As noted above, all consulted stakeholders praise the current JRR team. At the same time, however, there have been significant agreement among internal as well as external stakeholders that there is a need to hire more senior and experienced staff members to the team. Externally, stakeholders note that there is a gap between junior staff members with large areas of responsibility and the top management. Internally, it is widely agreed that the reliance on the executive director and director of operations for senior level engagement and decision-making, networks and fundraising, as well as checking and signing off on any written material leaving the office, is not sustainable. These two positions are also both seconded by partner governments. Hiring more senior staff is likely to be easier if JRR can offer longer-term prospects and job security, as well as competitive working conditions (i.e. appropriate salaries, benefits, etc.).

2.2 Funding of JRR

In 2013, JRR received funding from eight donors.³ Canada, The Netherlands and UN Women constituted approximately 76 percent of the total donor funding of JRR in 2013. Financial contributions are provided either as un-earmarked (core) funding, or as earmarked funding to cover things such as office space, specific training activities, or other specified costs. In addition to the financial contributions, the following in-kind contributions were provided in 2013 and 2014⁴:

- Canada - two seconded staff to the JRR Secretariat in Geneva
- The Netherlands - one seconded staff at liaison office in The Hague (*September 2013-August 2014*)
- Switzerland - two seconded staff to JRR Secretariat in Geneva

A more detailed presentation of donor funding - un-earmarked support, earmarked funding, as well as in-kind contributions - is provided in Annex 1: Country Specific Donor Funding Summary (including UN Women) 2012-2015.

The financial contributions are largely earmarked for specific programming components and are often restricted to only finance direct costs associated with a specific activity. The funding modality of activities/projects/programs funds ear-marked contributions such as expenses of:

Programming	2014 (budget in €)	2014 (% of total programming expenses)
Deployment Facilitation	142 130	9 %
Roster Management	107 764	7 %
Alliances & Resource Mobilization	366 578	23 %
Complementarity Program	451 764	29 %
Training	495 453	32 %
Total Programming Components	1 563 689	100 %

The total budget for 2014 is €2 053 238, of which 40 percent is covered through financial contributions, and 27 percent is covered through in-kind contributions. The funding shortfall in May 2014 was 33 percent of the total budget for 2014. At the December Executive Board meeting, the 2014 budget was revised to a total of €2 219 841. The funding shortfall at the end of the year was -€135 555, or 6 percent, that is covered through the reserve fund. For the budget years 2015 and 2016, the funding shortfall of the total budget (as of November 2014) was 90 and 100 percent respectively. By the end of March 2015, JRR had only received some €200 000 to cover core costs. This clearly illustrates the lack of a long-term multi-year funding of JRR's total budget. The financial uncertainty is one of the primary focus areas for JRR's management.

³ In 2013 the funders were Canada, Finland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and UN Women. In 2014, the funders are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, The Greenbaum Foundation, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Organization Internationale de la Francophonie, Sweden, Switzerland, UN Women and US Department of State.

⁴ Colombia provided interpretation, transport, hospitality for SGBV course in Bogota.

The shortfalls have a number of potential negative consequences for governance, strategy, operations, and administration. Although JRR, in a very short time, has managed to establish an essential management system, processes, and functions with roles and responsibilities, a disproportionate and extensive amount of time has to be devoted to securing funding for JRR's programming activities. The balance between securing funding and ensuring governance, strategic planning, and implementation of operations does not currently seem sustainable. The organisation needs secure long-term, multi-year, and unrestricted funding to continue to establish and strengthen existing organisational structures and deliver professional services in accordance with the mandate. The consequences of shorter and limited funding seem to impede the full realisation of JRR's potential.

However, this evaluation recognises it is not unusual for civil society (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to experience great challenges in securing predictable long-term funding to cover administration and other operating costs. A discussion about these challenges for JRR must reflect JRR's organisational mandate and the drivers of its existence. In contrast to CSOs and NGOs with long-term capacity building, or humanitarian programmes, JRR is a facility with a different type of results chain in which the speed and quality of the deployment of experts are the major outputs. The quality of the investigation is of course dependent on the individuals and experts who are part of the investigation team, to which JRR has contributed, but JRR has no real influence on the actual implementation and the outcome of the investigation in the field. In other words, JRR has limited opportunities to follow up and influence the likelihood of positive outcome of investigations to which it was assigned and mandated to contribute. This is important to bear in mind because organisations operate under different rationales and purposes.

This evaluation reckons it is a major difference between more traditional CSOs and NGOs, and JRR. The volume or the size of long-term capacity building or humanitarian programmes are usually much larger, allowing CSOs and NGOs to cover administration costs by including overhead costs (administration costs) in operating budgets. For smaller organisations with short-term interventions, the lack of un-earmarked predictable long-term funding can prove very limiting until they have reached sufficient organisational size and programme volume. Funding for deployments is rarely channeled through JRR. It is therefore not evident what is to be considered the operational budget that would serve as a basis for charging overhead costs. In the larger scheme of things, the entire JRR budget can be seen as overhead costs for the deployment of experts to various missions. This contention would support the argument that partners receiving experts for their missions should share the cost of recruiting and rostering through some sort of cost-sharing or pay for service arrangement. This will be further discussed below.

2.3 Value proposition versus costs

It is inherently difficult to assess and measure efficiency of organisations. It must be considered in a context of the organisation's value proposition. It represents the attributes that JRR provides, through its roster management and deployment, to meet the needs and expectations in the requested organisations and States, as well as donors. The value proposition is the key concept for understanding the drivers of the core measurements of satisfaction. In the business management literature, Robert Kaplan and David Norton (1996) identified three common sets of attributes that organise the value propositions in industries that they researched. Allowing us to apply these sets to non-profit operations we could translate the attributes to (i) service attributes; (ii) partnership relations; and (iii) reputation. Service attributes encompass the functionality of the service, its price and its quality. The partnership relations dimension includes the delivery of the service to the partners, including the response and delivery time dimension, and how the partners feel about using JRR's services. The reputation dimension reflects the intangible factors that attract stakeholders to JRR.

On many accounts JRR does very well when it comes to roster management and deployment. The roster management constitutes a critical attribute of JRR's value proposition. The quality of the candidates is high, and the partner organisations (e.g. UN Women, OHCHR, ICC, and the UN) generally note that they are satisfied with


the performance of the deployed people. The delivery of JRR's services are rapid and smooth. It is stated by the requesting organisations that they feel very good about using JRR's services. JRR has in recent years become a respected actor in the field of justice support. It is important to recognise that JRR has carved out a niche in the "rostering business". Together with the Institute for International Criminal Investigations (IICI) as a training partner JRR has built a name for itself. It has potential to play an important role in the future in supporting States and international institutions with experts from the JRR roster to carry out investigations, inquires, fact-finding and other activities where the identification, analysis, collection, preservation and reporting of information pertaining to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or serious human rights violations is needed. There is however an inherent challenge for JRR to report on results beyond providing end users/receiving organisations (partners) with highly qualified experts. Although JRR has started to provide technical investigatory assistance and mentoring directly to States wishing to undertake their own investigations into international crimes that may have been committed under their jurisdiction (in the so called complementarity programme), JRR primarily provides experts to multinational organisations (e.g. UN Women, OHCHR, ICC, and the UN). The main role of JRR is to be a supplier to the end users whom can more tangibly report on outcomes of specific commissions of inquires and assessment missions.

There is a dilemma in the value proposition in this regard. On one hand it is possible to identify and measure the value propositions (*inter alia* effective and timely responses) JRR delivers to receiving organisations (partners). On the other hand the distance to the actual result risks being considered insufficiently tangible for donors, since it only indirectly contributes to results of the commissions of inquiry and assessment missions, or national capacity development.

The value proposition therefore needs to be assessed against the financing structure and costs of roster management and deployment. It is recognised by donors that both the rostering and deployment to commissions of inquiry carry costs. The Roster Management Handbook⁵ states "*maintenance of a roster is time and cost consuming*". Thus, as we try to understand the cost of JRR's value proposition, it is important to distinguish between the rostering itself and the deployment of experts. Currently, the financial support from donors to the 'sending authority'/roster agency (e.g. JRR, FBA or NRC) for rostering means largely subsidising administrative costs of roster maintenance, data maintenance, data protection, mobilisation and recruitment of civilian experts, assessment of applicants, linking training and rostering, and preparation before departure to place of deployment. Different roster agencies are funded differently. For instance, both the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have rosters. The Swedish Government funds FBA through an annual appropriation directive. FBA reports annually back to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (SMFA).⁶ The Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP) is a standby roster and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and operated by the NRC. For both FBA and NRC the costs of rostering are covered by the funding from the SMFA and NMFA.

⁵ Roster Management Handbook, civcap.info

⁶ Both financial and results reporting.



The results reporting by FBA on the funding of rostering and deployment focus primarily on the number of secondees in missions and their contributions during the missions. Similarly, NORCAP reports on the number of deployed experts across different sectors and geographical areas, and the contributions of the experts in their missions or roles. FBA's financial reporting constitutes of the total costs of rostering and deployment. The financial reporting is categorised by receiving organisation and interventions/mission, for which it is not possible separate the administrative costs for rostering or the overhead costs for each deployment.

It is difficult to compare rostering costs between different roster organisations. Having reviewed annual reports of the FBA and NRC and interviewed FBA's recruitment manager it becomes apparent how difficult it is to present comparable unit costs. The data sometimes differs both between different years and between receiving organisations. The content of the unit cost changes at times from one year to another. It indicates a need for both donors and 'end users' to better understand the cost structure of deploying an expert, and what a donor funds (and what a receiving organisation is paying for, if they do). We recognise the potential burden and risks of setting price tags on deployment, but it would clearly bring some benefits in terms of transparency and accountability. It would also enable organisations to prioritise the allocations of resources on what is considered most cost-efficient.

The financing structure for roster management on the one hand and deployment on the other is often not easily understood and assessed. Some donors fund both activity lines, while others only fund either or. Roster agencies often fund both the roster management and deployment of their respective experts since their donors are structured to pay for deployments. For instance, FBA pays for both the rostering and the deployment of experts to the EU, the UN, OSCE or Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). The deployment cost (seconding) covers monthly salary, travels, pension, while the receiving organisation pays for per diem, boarding, and lodging allowance. In FBA's Annual Report for 2013 the total operating costs for rostering and deployment to international missions was approximately €13 million⁷ for 80 annual manpower to select 194 nominees⁸ and 57 new secondees.⁹ This operating cost would approximately account for €14'000 per month per deployed expert. It also includes staff costs at FBA whom are responsible and tasked to nominate and deploy nominees to international organisations. It is very difficult to know whether this cost is a reasonable comparator with other organisations. Some other examples of roster agencies and estimated average costs of deployment is listed below in the table:

⁷ 123 576 tsek at an exchange rate 9,5 between sek/€ equals €13 million.

⁸ A nominated candidate does not mean a unique individual. One person can be nominated several times to different assignments/positions for international missions. Thus, the number of 194 nominees does not imply 194 individual persons, but 194 nominations to assignments for international missions. In 2013, FBA announced and posted 160 assignments/positions for international missions on its website, and the total number of applicants were 1,060. FBA decided to nominate candidates to 108 of 160 assignments for international missions. There were 898 applicants for the 108 missions. The final number of nominees for these 108 missions were 194 candidates, i.e. a candidate can be nominated to several assignments and therefore the number is higher than the posted assignments /positions for international missions.

⁹ Secondees by FBA are employed by FBA and therefore entitled to Swedish Social Security system and pay Swedish taxes. FBA enters into contract with seconded staff, and are therefore not directly contracted by the receiving organization. The contract with the seconded staff falls within a Swedish central agreement for guiding principles on international and foreign service.

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC /Swiss Development Cooperation)
Average cost and average length of deployments	€11,573/month	€6,596/month	€13,541/month (based on 6 month deployment)	€10,937/month	€4,108 + accomodation + per diem/ month	€10,451/month

Note: Norad, Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP, Report 4/2013

All of these roster agencies pay for the salaries of the deployed experts while on mission. It is important to note that these experts are sent to UN and other agencies on existing missions with functioning infrastructure and logistical arrangements. JRR's direct deployment has so far been on missions that have been set-up and led by the organisation itself - rendering comparisons very difficult. The team has not been able to get estimates of the costs for recruiting, training, and rostering experts from any of the agencies above.

Seconding staff is very different from deploying experts to be contracted directly by the receiving organisation and mission. The contracts of the experts in the latter category are stipulated by the receiving organisation, and the roster agency is largely limited in the contractual arrangement between the expert and the receiving organisation. Most of JRR's experts are deployed on this type of contract, while FBA's secondees are employed by FBA throughout the mission. Considering this in a larger context, we recognise that one and the same donor at times funds two different organisations to secure effective rostering and deployment of an expert. While each stakeholder has its own interests and priorities, it is important to strike a balance between what is feasible and sustainable in achieving long-term goals. Donors want to contribute to making a positive impact with real results on the ground, and ensuring that financial assistance to the organisations is used efficiently. Roster agencies care for recruiting, training, and deploying highly qualified experts, and the receiving organisations have an interest in accessing rapidly available and highly qualified experts in an effective manner to successfully carry out inquiries and missions. Thus, we return to the basic questions: how much does it cost, and what do you get for your funding? In order to analyse this we need unit costs and comparators with other roster arrangements.

Understanding the unit cost for roster management and deployments is important for transparency and accountability of publicly financed organisations. It may be complex for organisations to agree on a good-enough measure to define unit costs and it requires more detailed accounting and administration. Nevertheless, the team sees the process of further clarifying the benefits and the necessary costs of the JRR's existence and core activities as a central aspect of 'renegotiating' its relationship between JRR and its 'owners' - the States in the Board. Maintaining the Secretariat, performing activities and producing outputs may use resources and activities from many different functions within and outside the organisation. An activity-based process-oriented costing system will therefore likely be required for accurate measurement of the unit cost of producing output. JRR's SOP's¹⁰ and its accounting system are not set up to support activity-based costing. However, presently a practical way in which to organise costs is along the two major types of deployments: (i) direct deployments; and (ii) indirect deployments.

JRR receives funding from donors for deployments (direct deployments) directly to States requesting assistance. A useful unit cost could be the average cost of a deployed expert per month. It would be useful to simplify as much as possible and agree on a formula for aggregated costs for a deployed expert that reflects both rostering and deployment costs. For direct expert deployment, JRR has estimated an average monthly cost of €30'000 per deployed expert to finance all the immediate costs of a direct deployment. This average cost includes selection, contracting fees, mission costs, OF fees, DSA¹¹, travel, evaluation, direct project coordination.

¹⁰ SOP - Standard Operating Procedure

¹¹ DSA - Daily Assistance Allowance

However, costs of training and certifying a person onto JRR's roster are not included. Similarly, 12% overhead is not included to cover JRR's indirect costs (back office personnel, infrastructure, office costs, etc).

For budgeting purposes, as well as for transparency and accountability, it would be useful to aggregate these costs to an average total cost for deployed expert per month to establish a cost comparator with other rostering and deployment organisations. We recognise, as JRR puts it, the costs of training and certifying a person onto JRR's roster are not included because JRR organises a variety of certification courses and there are so many variables and people/partners involved in the process. JRR states that it becomes virtually impossible to cost it on a per head basis. JRR also states that the €30'000 figure also does not reflect such things as the work done as a result of the request, i.e. the processing of the request, the selection of the expert(s), the facilitation of the expert's release for the deployment or the cost of maintaining and managing the roster itself. However, it is suggested that for direct deployment there is a clear understanding of how much it does cost per deployed expert per month.

Similarly, for indirect deployments there is a need for accounting purposes, as well as for transparency and accountability, to understand how much roster management costs. Although JRR responds to requests for experts, where funding is not provided by JRR donors, it would be equally useful to have a specific unit cost estimate. Again, we recognise that the number of requests and workload for selection of experts can vary wildly, depending on factors such as the availability of the expert, the ease of release, the contracting modalities of the requesting entity, etc. In addition, JRR states that it is also difficult to budget for the fact that work will be done for deployments that never come to fruition. Despite all these reasonable reservations for not using an average unit cost, we still think it is a way forward to establish a unit cost in order to bring further clarity about the actual costs for rostering and deployment. Since indirect deployment implies that JRR does not pay for the actual deployment of the an expert, the unit cost would be lower than direct deployment. A unit cost could still be calculated based on costs of training and certifying experts onto JRR's roster and preparing them for deployment, but without the e.g. mission costs, DSA¹², travel, and direct coordination of deployed experts. Many candidates on a roster will most likely not be deployed but the roster management and maintenance still devote time to these candidates. Spent time of course has to be accounted for, together with many other activities included in roster management and maintenance. Regardless of the types of deployments there are also other factors that are not financed through the funding for the deployments themselves - i.e. costs for outreach, raising the funds for deployments, budgeting, reporting, etc. JRR states that this has made some of this year's deployments much more complex and time-consuming, whether direct deployments or indirect ones.

The issue of unit cost is a broader and larger issue that does not only pertain to JRR. As noted above, there does not seem to be a universal standard for reporting unit costs for rostering and deployment. While there are deploying agencies that have calculated the average cost per deployment, it is more of a common practice among organisations to report on the total cost of operations rather than by unit.

In sum, in the absence of a comparable unit cost for demonstrating an organisation's value-for-money, JRR should take the initiative to establish its own unit cost for accounting purposes for both direct and indirect deployment. Thus, with a clear understanding of operational cost structure for different types of deployment it can be easier to raise funds to cover an organisation's expenditures. It leads, inevitably to the question of which funding modalities are most effective for an organisation like JRR.

2.4 An appropriate funding modality

Rostering costs are controversial and discussed within the JRR and among stakeholders. In the JRR Annual Report 2013, one of JRR's priorities for 2014 was to strengthen the long-term financial sustainability of the organisation. JRR states that the limited predictability and continuity of funding due to the annual and

¹² DSA - Daily Assistance Allowance

earmarked funding is a serious challenge to the organisation and its operations. At the Executive Board meeting in May 2014, JRR presented an analysis of JRR's business model and steps that had been taken to address funding constraints and challenges to increase financial sustainability. Three options were presented:

1. Fee for service
2. Institutional partnership
3. Donor meeting

JRR assessed pros and cons for each option and was able to draw some preliminary conclusions about which option that seemed to have most potential to secure long-term funding.

Fee for service and cost-recovery

Fee for service is noted to have limited potential and insufficient positive impact on the budget. This option is not considered possible for the types of States that would normally come into question for the complementarity programme. It was also assessed that the ability and readiness of international institutional partners, such as the UN agencies and the ICC, was limited. A fee for service option would require JRR and the agreement partner to integrate this payment structure into the MoU. Furthermore, additional resources are considered necessary by JRR to manage this since it is reckoned to be difficult to implement in a fair and transparent manner.

A NORAD¹³ evaluation of five humanitarian programmes of the NRC and of the Standby Roster NORCAP (2013) concludes that "*the cost-sharing debate is not simply about the UN taking advantage of a free service but rather inherently against the original purpose of the standby partnership agreements. In order to ensure that abuse of the in-kind system is minimised and cost-sharing is applied when appropriate, clear criteria should be developed by NORCAP in collaboration with the MFA as to when cost-sharing should be requested. The issue is not merely related to cost but also to organisational impact on UN agencies of having access to a resource such as NORCAP.*"¹⁴

The report states that "*increased cost-sharing is not an option for most host organisations. There is some concern amongst donors that misuse of the standby partner arrangements by the UN agencies may be encouraged by the fact that secondees are generally a free resource. NORCAP secondees are as a rule paid 100% up to 18 months of deployment with the UN agency possibly paying.*"

Thus, fee for service seems a contentious option to pursue and one that can affect the willingness of partner organisations to continue to use JRR's services. However, JRR's value proposition is fairly unique and would be competitive if it were to be challenged by other rosters. Nevertheless, at the end of the day it is largely a matter of the purchasing ability amongst the 'end users'/receiving organisations. If they cannot pay, then the quality of JRR's services does not matter. However, even if fee for service would be considered as an option JRR still needs to define and clarify what it is they will charge for. Given the two types of deployments for which JRR wants its costs to be recovered it needs to specify costs and set a price tag for each of the deployment models. It can be too big of a shift to ask the receiving organisations to absorb more of the rostering costs by enhancing their own budgets to cover and pay for expenses accrued by the roster agency.

The current 12 percent overhead costs of the average cost for direct deployment to cover back office personnel, infrastructure, office costs need also be covered for indirect deployment when there is a contract between the expert and the receiving organisation. We also know that costs of training and certifying a person onto JRR's roster have to be covered. Thus, it needs to be further elaborated whether these costs can boil down to a unit cost for which it is reasonable to use a cost-sharing model to allow JRR to fully or partly recover

¹³ NORAD - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

¹⁴ Norad, Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Standby Roster NORCAP, Report 4/2013.

its costs. In the short term, this does not seem likely as an option for JRR. However, cost-sharing should continuously be part of the discussion in the partner agreements with organisations requesting JRR services.

Many of the roster agencies seem to have 'standby partnership agreements', and the cost-sharing arrangements seem to vary between roster agencies and their partners. Below is a brief summary of arrangements:

	NRC/NORCAP	Danish Refugee Council	MSB (Sweden)	RedR (Australia)	Irish Aid	SDC /Swiss Development Cooperation
Standby partnership agreements	Serve 15 UN Agencies + IOM. Primarily UNICEF, UNHCR, WWFP, FAO, OCHA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNDP.	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, OCHA, UNRWA, UNDP, UNFPA, IOM (not active), FAO (since 1 Jan 2012). Have been approached by OHCHR and World Bank.	UNICEF, OCHA, ICRC, UNOPS, UNHCR, WFP, UNDP, CADRI	UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, WHO, FAO, IOM and UNOPS	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UNHRD	WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, OCHA, WHO, Separate agreement with ICRC.
Cost-share	NRC does encourage cost-sharing with its partners but it is not common.	In 2011 more than 50% of deployments were paid by the UN. DANIDA funded 55 deployments, UN agencies funded 60.	In principle some cost sharing is assumed for all interventions. There are no set cost-sharing models for individual secondments.	RedR tries to negotiate cost-share with UN agencies, especially for extensions where the partners have the money but not the expertise.	No if not paid up-front by UN agency.	None.

Note: Norad, Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP, Report 4/2013

The above table illustrates the existence of standby partnership agreements of which some have a cost-sharing arrangement for deployments. The extent to which there is a cost-sharing arrangement as part of the standby partnership agreement is probably partly driven by the nature of the partnership. It probably has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on the organisation, which context, the leadership of the organisation, budgetary constraints and flexibility, etc. The time length of the partnership is also a factor to consider in drawing a conclusion. Several roster agencies have existed for many years and successively grown and established themselves as trusted partners to the UN organisations. It should be noted that the cost-sharing arrangements outlined in the table above often (or exclusively) relate to the cost of the deployment itself rather than the recruiting, training and rostering of experts. JRR normally does not pay for deployments, but merely places experts at the disposal of partner agencies. This can be seen as a cost-sharing arrangement inherent in the mode of operation of JRR. In relation to gender professionals, JRR also has an arrangement with UN Women whereby the two agencies share certain costs in the recruitment and training of experts.

Although JRR operates within the development cooperation and humanitarian assistance field, JRR stands out from most traditional actors within the development and humanitarian fields through its close partnership and collaboration with African Union (AU), International Criminal Court (ICC), other international institutions, national governments, and a large number of UN institutions such as UN Women, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR), and UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)

on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Operations in this field require trust and confidence among the actors. JRR has clearly gained legitimacy and is clearly considered a trusted partner in the supply chain of delivery of services to the aforementioned partners.

Throughout its existence, JRR has been increasingly used by partners. Interviews with UN Women, UN OHCHR, and the ICC all confirm the value of the facility in rapidly providing qualified experts for international investigative missions. The way this added value is described is slightly different between partners. This is to be expected, as JRR has different roles in relation to different partners.

The partnership with UN Women is based on a joint interest in strengthening the participation of gender advisers and SGBV experts in the missions of other UN agencies, as well as in investigative efforts by national governments. UN Women actively participates in the selection of candidates and training of the experts on the roster. JRR is solely responsible, however, for the keeping and operation of the roster itself. UN Women sees a growing demand from its constituencies and believes that this development will continue in coming years. This, naturally leads to increasing numbers of requests for experts from the JRR roster. UN Women clearly sees the added value of the roster in that it both provides unique expertise and easy access to experts.

The ICC highlights the role of JRR in providing a readily available pool of experts for short temporary positions - as gap fillers until regular staff is in place. The main added value of JRR, from an ICC perspective, is thus not the provision of expertise that would not otherwise be available. The ICC holds that both organisations recruit from the same global pool of experts. As the ICC is working to improve its own roster capacity of investigative experts, there will likely be a decrease in the number of requests to JRR. In certain situations, however, there will always be a need for surge capacity and filling gaps, particularly in the start up of missions. The ICC acknowledges a particular strength in the JRR roster on SGBV expertise.

Also the OHCHR sees the primary added value of the JRR as capacity support in situations where it is not possible to recruit quickly through internal mechanisms. JRR's support in securing the release of individuals from their regular employer is particularly appreciated. Similar to ICC, the OHCHR notes that they also recruit from the same global pool of expertise and that the quality of expertise is not necessarily different in the JRR roster.

While there are different views on whether JRR's primary added value is in the provision of uniquely qualified experts or in its ability to provide surge capacity on short notice, or both, all partners agree that the facility is a much needed supplement to their own recruiting channels. Some partners expect a slight drop in demand as they are in the process of developing their own capacities for rapid recruitment of experts. The overall impression, however, is that demand for JRR's services will continue to grow in coming years.

Institutional partnership

A second option is to establish institutional partnership with the potential for utilising economies of scale and achieving broader impact. It was considered that this option could risk having a negative impact on fundraising because too much focus could be placed on the economies of the partnership rather than the content. JRR has identified potential partners with which it could elaborate on modalities for closer cooperation to strengthen its institutional foundations. However, this option had been tabled at the time of the evaluation team's visit.

Donor meeting

A third option was to arrange a donor meeting with the purpose of launching a high-level call for support to JRR, which would be manifested in a joint declaration. The idea was to present a proposal for multi-year, multi-donor holistic support. This option could also potentially imply outreach to potential new funders. An ambassadorial-level meeting was scheduled for last November 2014 at which an informal brainstorming regarding potential next steps for this option would take place. This option should not be considered a one-time event but requires continuous dialogue with key individuals at ministries of foreign affairs and development agencies. As JRR becomes more known within broader circles and communities with interest in criminal justice and more specifically international criminal investigation, the more JRR will gain traction in these communities.

JRR's image and reputation will certainly pay off in the future given it continues to deliver highly qualified experts in an effective manner to its partners. It is an assumption, but it will be worth continuously testing whether the good reputation will enable JRR to access new funders, let it be private or public organisations.

It is obvious that a new and young organisation goes through a period of testing the validity of the original concept and idea, and whether the organisation is apt to fulfill its mandate and strategy. Furthermore, it is natural that donors or financiers are more inclined and ready to fund specific activities and interventions, rather than building organisational structures and systems that will make a partner sustainable in the long-term. However, this evaluation considers JRR to have proved its relevance and the added value of its mandate, and therefore would gain from a period of consolidation of its initial strategic and operational achievements. JRR's organisational set-up with different modalities of participation allows JRR to have direct access to both States and Organisations through the Intergovernmental Forum for Justice Rapid Response (IFJRR).¹⁵ Members of IFJRR constitute an important source for funding opportunities. Similarly, the members of the JRR Executive Board together constitute an important potential source of funding. Although, the *Organizational Structure and Principles for Participation* states that "*while financial contribution is not a prerequisite for participation in the Executive Board, its members undertake efforts towards ensuring that JRR resource requirements are met*", thus far, the endeavours of the Executive Board, with the support of the Secretariat, has not materialised to "*secure contributions and pledges to meet the requirements of the draft plan of work and budget approved at the April/May meeting*".¹⁶ The Executive Board currently consists of nine States¹⁷, with the aim of participation of at least one State from each region of the world, but with three countries constituting the bulk of both financial and in-kind contributions. It is reasonable to assume that sitting OECD-DAC-members of the Executive Board would actively contribute to the development of JRR through long-term, multi-year, and unrestricted funding.

It is not uncommon that the various entities that make up an organisation have different perspectives on, and perceptions of, ownership, participation and accountability. Oftentimes, the entity that runs and manages the day-to-day operations tends to feel a stronger sense of ownership, while the governance and oversight body, i.e. the members of the board, is more distant to the daily operations and participates more passively to monitor certain aspects of particular interests. The relationship between passive and active engagement affects the dynamic and functions of an organisation. It seems important for JRR to instil and inject a greater sense of ownership in the members of the Executive Board and thereby a sense of accountability to secure funding for JRR's operations. Today, it appears to be the responsibility of the Secretariat rather than the broader JRR-membership. The ownership and accountability of Participating States does not appear to be fully congruent with the intention of the *Organizational Structure and Principles for Participation*. A conversation between the Secretariat and the Executive Board about creating a stronger sense of mutual ownership, responsibility and accountability to secure funding is therefore critical. As noted above, it seems reasonable to expect OECD-DAC-members of the Executive Board to step forward at this stage in JRR's organisational transitional development to contribute to strengthening the consolidation of JRR's internal and external achievements. There is a need for JRR to secure the participation of high-level diplomats with the authority to advocate and influence the strategic and financial commitment between their countries and JRR. If the Executive Board and the participating States and Organisations do not back up the mandate and the tasks of the organisation through a stronger financial commitment, JRR will have to find resources elsewhere.

¹⁵ JRR is "a facility created by an intergovernmental forum in order to provide the international community with a stand-by facility of rapidly deployable criminal justice and related professionals to help investigate situations where serious human rights and/or international criminal law violations may have occurred."¹⁵ This is the mandate of JRR, see Justice Rapid Response, *Organizational Structure and Principles of Participation*, 2014.

¹⁶ Justice Rapid Response, *Organizational Structure and Principles of Participation*, 2014.

¹⁷ The *Organizational Structure and Principles of Participation* states that the Executive Board shall consist of up to eleven States. The current member states are Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Finland, the Netherlands, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uganda.

There is a real need to bring on more high-level diplomats who can make a political and financial commitment to JRR on behalf of their governments. There also needs to be continuity of focal points of the States to ensure a well-informed and active Executive Board. The fact that 86 percent of funding is earmarked for specific projects/activities (2014 budget) is a problem, and in-kind contributions constitute a significant portion of JRR resources (44 percent in 2012, 49 percent in 2013). There are substantial issues to address and they require a nuanced and insightful understanding of the implications of the current funding structure to the fulfilment of the mandate and the sustainability of the high level of internal and external achievements. It is in this context there needs to be more of a collective effort to commit to a sustainable path forward. Furthermore, JRR also has the opportunity to expand the Executive Board since there are still two seats available and Asia is not represented. Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand are all countries from this region and also DAC-members. It will be equally important to establish JRR at the right level at any new members from the beginning of their participation to benefit from their advocacy and influence to secure long-term funding.

It is important to recognise that options are not necessarily mutually exclusive but that they can rather mutually reinforce each other's strengths and compensate for weaknesses.

Other possible options

JRR is full of ideas in terms of exploring different funding avenues. Besides the three options that were introduced and discussed at the Executive Board meeting in May 2014, JRR has already taken concrete steps towards broadening its funding base. For example, JRR explored philanthropy and charity in the United States. It implies that JRR has to register as a tax-exempt nonprofit organisation under category 501(c)(3) in the United States. 501(c) organisations can receive unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, and unions. Charitable individual and institutional donations are much more widely ingrained in the American society than in many European societies, and constitute an important source of revenue for many American non-profit organisations. Given that JRR is already present in New York it seems to be a timely opportunity to continue to explore. This stream or opportunity for revenue should of course be weighed against the administrative and organisational investment it would likely require, and what is realistic to expect in terms of revenues. Revenues from these types of donations will likely have to be assigned to the cause for which donations are raised, but can provide opportunity for collecting un-earmarked contributions. However, donations are likely to vary depending on JRR's outreach and communication strategy. Members of JRR seem to be positive about exploring the potential of this revenue stream although it is rather unclear what it would entail for the JRR-organisation and resources to make it sustained and predictable for long-term financing.

In many ways the discussion about an appropriate funding model for JRR depends on what type of organisation its members want it to be. There does not seem to be any ambiguities among Executive Board members about the meaning of *Organizational Structure and Principles for Participation*, and it should therefore be a reasonably consensual understanding of the organisational strictures, processes and systems for JRR to work effectively and efficiently. It does however seem to exist a tacit and indirect expectation by Executive Board members that the JRR's Secretariat should be independently able to elaborate and secure predictable long-term financing.

2.5 A shift towards development and capacity building?

A funding model that has been applied by DCAF's International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) is certainly worthwhile considering. ISSAT was established in 2008 in recognition of the need to increase the capacity of the international community to support SSR processes, to enhance the effectiveness and quality of SSR programming and to increase the coordination and coherence of the international community's support for SSR. ISSAT brings together 14 bilateral donors and a range of multilateral and regional actors active in supporting SSR processes, including the United Nations, the African Union, European Union, and the African Development Bank. Since its inception ISSAT has conducted over 300 missions in support of its Members' activities. ISSAT has provided support to its Members' training programmes, and support to SSR country programmes from assessment assistance, to strategic programming guidance and in field coaching, through to

end-of-programme evaluations. ISSAT provides one of the only forums where bilateral donors, multilateral and regional organisations can meet to discuss and coordinate operational activities related to SSR. ISSAT's role of coaching both headquarters and field staff on specific technical and political challenges of SSR has been regarded as an increasingly important role for its Members, particularly those just beginning to develop their SSR capacity. The key services which ISSAT provides to its Members include:¹⁸

- Advisory Field Support
- Training Support
- Knowledge Services
- Advocacy and Outreach

Membership of ISSAT provides countries and multilateral organisations with access to a host of SSR expertise. Through joining ISSAT and contributing to the pooled fund, members get to call down support for their programmes and benefit from reduced transaction costs. In addition, all funding given to ISSAT is ODA eligible given the fact that DCAF is named an ODA eligible organisation under Annex 2 of the ODA Directives.¹⁹

Supporting ISSAT is also an indirect means to support the UN, the AU and the EU's SSR efforts. ISSAT has become a solid partner of the UN, providing SSR advisors on a cost-sharing basis to their Missions, Programmes and mediation activities. ISSAT, due to its standing capacity and flexible funding mechanism, has been able to react quickly to requests for support from the UN.²⁰

ISSAT is funded through two mechanisms. Some Members use both mechanisms to fund ISSAT's work.²¹

- Pool funding
- Project funding

Under the pool funding mechanism, ISSAT covers the human resource costs of its advisors out of its core funds (whether core or roster staff members), and the multilateral mandator covers per diems, flights and associated travel costs (e.g. visas). This arrangement has meant that ISSAT has been able to support many more missions than it otherwise would have the capacity to do. Due to its standing capacity and flexible funding mechanism, ISSAT has been able to react quickly to requests for support from the UN, AU and the EU.²²

ISSAT's model presents JRR with something to continue to explore. The two organisations are fairly similar in nature but however operating under different usage models. ISSAT's members seem to be more actively involved in drawing on ISSAT's services, whereas JRR's members seem not to have explored the full potential of JRR's services. The partnership between ISSAT and its members, and similarly between JRR and its members, is different from the traditional partnership between donors and CSOs and NGOs. It is important to recognise that ISSAT and JRR are important instruments for bilateral donors and multilateral members to complement their own resources to achieve strategic objectives.

A model for one organisation might very well work another organisation, but it needs to be carefully assessed and understood in order to apply elements of one organisational set-up to another organisation. JRR was created to be an agile and flexible organisation to respond swiftly to urgent and complex request. It is therefore important that JRR can utilise its time and resources effectively and efficiently. JRR's resources need to be

¹⁸ DCAF-ISSAT Benefits of ISSAT Membership

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

carefully prioritised to remain a small organisation and avoid to be tied up in resource intensive funding processes.

ISSAT's funding is for example provided by development agencies. Reaching out to these donors does require a more traditional development organisational set-up, with functions for fundraising and grant management as well as more advanced working processes and procedures for planning, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting (PMER). Some funding is already provided to JRR by development agencies and regardless of size and scope of an organisation, it needs to have established system and procedures, and adequate capacity for PMER. However, reliance on traditional development donors would require resources to build processes and organisational structure to manage multiple sets of PMER-requirements. JRR can of course develop in a direction to accommodate these traditional funding requirements. It can seem perfectly suitable to shift towards development agencies since it is where most of the funding sources exist within the field of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The Ministries for Foreign Affairs and their thematic desks rarely have the same budget lines for long-term unrestricted funding. As mentioned earlier, that JRR is prioritised by high-level diplomats or politicians is required to ensure that the long-term funding is secured. It is not entirely uncontroversial for JRR to broaden its funding base towards the development agencies. Doing so would entail adjustments for JRR, investing in the administrative systems and procedures to align with donors' planning and reporting requirements, as well as to provide assurances of ODA eligibility of funded activities. The OECD/DAC provides guidance on what is considered official development assistance (ODA), stating that "*contributions (both core and earmarked) to INGOs, networks and PPPs are reportable under bilateral ODA, provided the main objective of the organisation is the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries.*"²³ JRR has recently embarked on a process to prepare itself for approaching development agencies, and is considered by some members to be suited to establish a long-term partnership with development agencies.

Pooled funding (ISSAT)

Pooled funding is divided equally between:

Bilateral drawdown

Up to one third of the pooled funding contribution can be used by the bilateral donors for use on services which they request of ISSAT from any of ISSAT's services lines, subject to mandate and capacity constraints. Once, this one third has been drawn down, members will be asked to top-up pooled funding, should they wish to receive additional support.

Multilateral use

One third of pooled funding is used to fund the request from ISSAT's multilateral members on a cost-sharing basis. Under cost-sharing, ISSAT pooled funding covers ISSAT advisors costs, while the multilateral actors, such as the UN, AU or EU, cover costs associated to the deployment of ISSAT advisors (flights, accommodation and daily substance allowance/per diem).

Core support

The remainder of pooled funding pays for activities such as the High Level Panels, the community of practice, guidance development, and some ISSAT support staff.

Project funding (ISSAT)

The Governing Board has agreed that only in rare circumstances should ISSAT accept project funding, as it increases the administrative burden to manage such funds. In exceptional cases where bilateral members are unable to provide pooled funding due to legal reasons, or where it is used in tandem with pooled funding, it can be accepted. In these cases funding can be provided directly towards a specific project. Under such circumstances, all costs need to be taken into account, including project staff costs (support and deployment) and costs associated with any reporting requirements additional to ISSAT's standard procedures.

This mechanism also allows for non-members to draw on ISSAT expertise, providing capacity is available. ISSAT's primary focus always remains with its members.

Examples of the project types which have been conducted to date include:

For members:

- Canada – Support to UN SSR Capacity
- Switzerland – Support to SSR programme in South Sudan
- Switzerland – Integrating SSR into Peacekeeping Training

For non-Members

- Denmark – Level 1 SSR Training

²³ OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>

The JRR Strategic and Action Plan 2014-2016 and the JRR's Logic Model & Results Management Framework at a global level are important tools for framing and drafting specific proposals to donor agencies. The drafting of results frameworks for the organisation as a whole or specific program components will require coherent and reflective elaboration in order to link different levels of results and change, similarly to JRR's Logic Model. There will be a need for clear indicators and means of verification for each context in which JRR operates.

Some argue that JRR does not engage in activities that are considered development cooperation, as it does not primarily or directly contribute to long-term local or national capacity with national ownership or even participation (apart from the complementarity program), since it partners with international organisations or institutions. For some members this is a critical consideration. JRR's Proposal to the Government of Finland includes an activity "*to establish a model for the provision of technical investigative and prosecutorial assistance to States wishing to undertake or advance their own investigations into and prosecution of international crimes that may have been committed under their jurisdiction but lacking sufficient capacity.*"²⁴ This is a good example of how JRR can engage directly with local partners, while sticking to its mandate. It can also be argued that JRR contributes to strengthening local capacity by training individuals from the South and having them on the roster for deployment. Results frameworks for development funding can be elaborated on for these types of specific contributions.

²⁴ JRR, Proposal to the Government of Finland

3. Processes and systems

3.1 Effectiveness and governance

JRR's operations are implemented through a number of processes. Although JRR is a small organisation and the organisational culture is informal and flexible, JRR has deliberately strived to systematise processes for operations, compliance and reporting. These processes are organised along with tools and methods to strengthen the procedures and routines for decision-making and follow-up of operations, compliance and reporting. The overarching steering document is the *Organizational Structure and Principles for Participation*. It outlines the division of roles and responsibilities between JRR's different functional entities. For instance, it states that the "Secretariat ensures the delivery of JRR activities including *inter alia*: training, roster management, deployments, outreach, relationship building, and governance under the strategic guidance and oversight of the Executive Board. The Secretariat also supports the Executive Board in resource mobilisation, as well as advising and assisting the work of the Chair and Vice-Chair carried out on behalf of JRR. The Secretariat carries out day-to-day operational and governance support activities and liaison with Eminent Advisors. The Executive Director is responsible for the work of the Secretariat."²⁵ There are Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the JRR Secretariat's roles and responsibilities to assist the Executive Board and General Assembly. There are important considerations to be carefully analysed and incorporated into future protocols such as JRR's duty of care obligations.

Many of the key processes for operations, compliance and reporting are undocumented and elaborated in mutual understanding among the management and staff. These processes are to some degree tacit but they do work efficiently due to the close collaboration between staff members. There is an ongoing process of developing and documenting SOPs for operational, compliance, and reporting processes. These SOPs will increasingly be developed along with the formulation and adoption of policies. Current procedures for compliance and reporting are congruent with JRR's obligations towards agreements and contracts which should be in line with stated contractual requirements, as well as JRR's mandate. The procedures that have been set-up are rigorous and often include a minimum of four people to secure that JRR's and donors' requirements and priorities are reflected. It is recognised by JRR that these procedures should be further documented and institutionalised. As mentioned earlier, the financial management takes more time as the operations grow. JRR uses the financial management software 'Cresus', which is deemed suitable and sufficient for the needs of the organisation. While there has been some backlog from the period before her arrival, the financial management of JRR has worked very well following the hiring of a financial controller. JRR is audited by certified Swiss auditors on an annual basis and by now has two consecutive audited annual reports. There are currently SOPs for financial administration and reporting to donors, which are managed by the financial controller and development officer. An SOP for human resources will be developed in the future when a policy has been adopted (see below).

Human resource management, including recruitment procedures, contracting, competence development, salaries and benefit scales, needs improvement. This is an area that needs to be addressed for both internal as well as external purposes. Internally, there are needs to make the processes easier for staffing contracts, payroll support, pensions (social security), holidays, and talent management. JRR is currently elaborating on an HR policy. Externally, the systematisation of the recruitment process for, and management of, the roster needs to be improved. The human resource processes and systems also relate to the roster of experts. As mentioned in this report, the current roster management system is based on an Excel-data base. JRR has outgrown the capacity of Excel and it is an urgent priority to establish a more sophisticated information management system for human resource management to make the recruitment process in relation to the roster of experts more efficient.

²⁵ Justice Rapid Response, *Organizational Structure and Principles of Participation*, 2014.

For any small organisation it is easy to be overwhelmed by the day-to-day business, and by not being able to catch up with the issues that need to be addressed in building a strategic and sustainable organisation. It is common to worry about all the urgent matters that have to be dealt with to secure effective daily operations and funding. Despite these challenges, JRR has in recent years established itself as a sophisticated international actor, with a functioning office and highly committed staff. Systems and processes are slowly falling into place to underpin and support the daily operations, consequently making the organisation more efficient and transparent. It is however vital for the management of the organisation to prioritise and stay focused on issues that matter for JRR's long-term sustainability. The organisation will benefit from carefully assessing its own allocation of time and resources to avoid duplication of roles and responsibilities. Sometimes during the start-up of organisations or in smaller organisations it is easy to multiply efforts to ensure desired results - the backside is the risk of exhausting available resources. JRR is currently at a stage when its management can with confidence allow different roles and responsibilities to complement each other, and hence create effective synergies. In practical terms, this means that the Executive Director will strengthen his strategic role to further the organisational effectiveness and sustainability. Meanwhile, the Director of Operations remains focused on the day-to-day operations to assure that roster management, training and deployment functions and to meet expectations and requirements.

3.2 Institutionalisation and knowledge management

Institutionalisation of knowledge is critical. Today, JRR's capacity rests largely on the experience and competence of individuals. There is a clear need, which is fully recognised by JRR, for continuous institutionalisation of knowledge and capacity. Documented processes are essential to mitigate the vulnerability of unpredictability in funding and staff resources, and the reliance on seconded staff. Institutional memory has so far been ensured by a core group of staff members who have been with the Secretariat in its various forms since the start, particularly the executive director. A process of documenting roles and responsibilities and institutionalising handovers is underway. The current global set-up of staff and consultants in different places such as in the Hague, Dublin, and New York make the need for documented processes and institutionalisation even greater.

There are some key positions at JRR that are of particular importance for the process of institutionalising knowledge and processes, such as the executive director, financial controller, roster and deployment manager, and development officer. The institutionalisation process would benefit from having these functions filled by permanent staff rather than secondments. Such a process is ongoing and one of the primary goals of the push for more stable financial contributions.

Continuing efforts to create structures conducive to securing institutional memory will be critical for the sustainability of JRR. It is important to note that this is not merely an issue of retaining staff members. Any organisation will experience rotation of staff at more or less regular intervals, particularly organisations staffed with international professionals. Some staff members at JRR have been with the organisation for a very long time, and some have left and then come back again. This should not be taken for granted in the long-run, however. Ensuring institutional memory is an organisational and structural challenge requiring measures and systems relating to attraction and retention of staff, documentation and gathering of lessons learned, systematic information sharing and strategic human resource management. These are all areas that could be developed to reduce and mitigate vulnerabilities stemming from unreliable funding and staffing.

JRR recognises the importance of systems and processes to consolidate and optimise its resources, and ensure efficiency and sustainability, as well as transparency and accountability of its delivery of services and performance. There is a transparent atmosphere and open non-hierarchical working relationships at the JRR office. Whereas this contributes to a flexibility and agility of the organisation, it also naturally weakens internal accountability structures. Transparency also becomes difficult to measure in a highly flexible and informal environment, as there are no structures to govern or even define transparency. There is a careful balance to be

struck here, as the flexibility and adaptability is one of the central and most often stated added values of JRR. The assessment of the evaluation team is that JRR works hard to ensure accountability and transparency in its formal relationships with donors and partners. There are no complaints to be heard from any of JRR's stakeholders, including auditors and donor representatives. The team is convinced, however, that there are ways of further carefully formalising and institutionalising processes, roles and responsibilities without losing the responsiveness and soul of JRR.

3.3 Roster management

The *Organizational Structure and Principles for Participation* outlines reporting obligations and processes for decision-making and funding. More specifically, the Deployment Procedures for Justice Rapid Response outlines the procedures for deployment from requests to deployment. To be eligible for JRR engagement, requests may come from the State concerned, i.e. States with jurisdiction over the territory in which the requested work is to take place, or from an international or regional institution that has the jurisdiction to undertake such work. A memorandum of understanding (MoUs) between Institute for International Criminal Investigations (IICI) and JRR describes the modalities for a mutually supportive cooperation in the development and delivery of training programs including those to certify experts for inclusion on the JRR Roster. The MoU outlines in detail the different roles and responsibilities of each organisation for the delivery of professional training. However, the different internal operational components of JRR's work, such as deploying experts, roster management, and training development are not explicitly documented. While these processes and routines are clear to the staff members involved, and have been outlined to the evaluation team in detail, JRR has not yet been able to establish documented written internal procedures, guidance notes or manuals. Some processes are documented while others take the form of more of established praxis. As the number of staff is limited and most processes are highly integrated, a more flexible nature of certain processes seems to have worked well. As the organisation develops and potentially grows, however, there is a need to formalise and document at least the key processes of JRR.

Currently there are established operational processes for general roster management (including entry and exit of experts to and from the roster), nominations and selection of experts, training of roster members, processing incoming requests for experts, selection of candidates, facilitation of the release of candidates and the deployment of experts through UN- and other international bodies, and a limited follow-up of lessons from deployments upon the return of experts. JRR is also developing processes for deploying experts in JRR missions under the complementarity program.

An overall objective of the roster management system is to contribute to successful missions and investigations by effectively managing the process from requests throughout the operational chain to deployment of experts. The operational chain comprises a number of steps that are important to keep close track of:



The recruitment to the roster is done mainly through outreach to states and international organisations calling for nominations of suitable candidates. The profiles for recruitment are decided based on an analysis of incoming requests and gaps in existing profiles and skill sets in the roster. The first step after selecting suitable candidates is mandatory participation in a training course in the technical field for which they have been recruited. The selection of candidates for participation in the training is rigorous. The training itself is increasingly competitive as all participants are not taken into the roster. Only experts who fulfil a set of criteria tailored to each training will

be certified and taken into the roster. Experts need to be re-nominated every two years and their information is ideally updated every six months.

The requesting entity defines the criteria for selecting candidates from the roster on a case-by-case basis, and formulates the desired skill set for the expert(s) needed. JRR usually provides a short-list with candidates from the roster within a few hours of the request. When the requesting entity has selected suitable candidate(s) JRR facilitates the negotiations between the requesting entity and the employer for release of the candidate, as well as discussions on the terms of contract, i.e. salary levels, insurance coverage, security, etc..

The current process from nomination to deployment and debriefing is generally seen as strong and functions well. The current system for roster management, however, is hugely time consuming and significant manual work is required to keep the roster up to date. The role and responsibility that is assigned to the roster management function entails continuous review and update of expertise, language and regional experience of experts to properly and rapidly meet the needs and requests of institutions or States. The roster and deployment manager currently spends an unsustainable amount of time on this function, while she is also responsible for deployment (see above outline of job description). One factor that drives the need for time to be spent on roster management is naturally the size of the expert pool, but also the technical functionality of the roster management system. JRR states that it is very important to ensure that experts in the pool are actually available and deployable. JRR applies its annual review policy and roster certification process to ensure the continued relevance of the roster and to limit the number of experts to keep the roster manageable. In November 2014, there were 462 specifically trained, active duty, deployable experts from all regions of the world, half of them female (52,6%), and 40% from developing countries. The number of requests for JRR's services as well as the number of experts deployed have increased since 2013. The current number experts is considered a minimum in order to meet the number of requests from institutions or States in the coming four years.

There is no formula for how large a roster is supposed to be in relation to the number of requests and deployments. For instance, The Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy's (FBA) has in recent years changed its roster management system and hence reduced its resource pool prior to 2014 from 350 people down to 120 people to improve the maintenance and administration of contact details and individual expert profiles. Approximately half of the candidates were previously passively interested in seeking deployments. FBA recognised that fewer and fewer of the people on the roster actually applied for jobs that were advertised. One of the reasons behind changing the roster was that the roster was too broad and general in nature. Today, FBA advertises all positions openly. However, an optimal size of the resource pool to draw from for FBA would probably be 250 people to match the posting of 100 deployments. FBA annually manages approximately 75-95 deployments.

One roster model is not easily replicated by another organisation since the roster types can vary across institutional entity, financial concept, outreach, areas of expertise, and rapidness.²⁶ JRR is for instance different from FBA. FBA is governmental and not inter-governmental. It is a national roster as opposed to regional or international roster. Furthermore, FBA's area of expertise is defined as 'catch-all roster' as opposed 'specific roster'. FBA offers 'standing roster' while JRR offers 'stand-by roster'. Regardless of the differences, there are lessons to be learned from rostering. The Roster Management Handbook offers a rich source of information. Similarly, different roster organisations provide insight into the techniques/technicalities of rostering. There is a general understanding that the different steps in the recruitment process are time consuming and resource intensive. FBA stressed that the identification and matching of available candidates with the requests takes time and skills, as well as the continuous maintenance and management of the data base system. The maintenance of a database can with support from appropriate software be managed to some degree by candidates themselves. Different programmes allow candidates to update their contact details and profiles.

²⁶ See Roster Management Handbook, civcap.info

A key driver for a new IT-platform for roster management would therefore be to better manage time. An updated program to manage the roster could, according to preliminary consultations with IT experts and JRR's own estimates, free up up to 30 percent of the roster manager's time. This time could instead be used for quality control, monitoring and evaluation, and communication with experts. JRR sees the outdated roster management system as a vulnerability, and therefore see an urgent need for an up-to-date database, particularly in light of increasing requests and the need to include additional categories of experts in the roster.

A new system should be geared towards making updates of the roster easier, for example through automatic reminders to update information and functions that allow experts to make updates directly through online tools. It should also have tailored search tools to match and optimise experts with requests, and to match them with appropriate training needs. A new IT-system needs to build on and be integrated with existing processes and structures, and ensure a simple and functioning Customer Relations Management (CRM) system to keep track of correspondence and communication with people on the roster, and of meeting notes with these individuals or other associated stakeholders, references, etc..

Increased JRR-deployments under the complementarity program, for example, will require stronger systems and processes for remotely managing staff in complex work environments, for security assessments and arrangements, logistical arrangements and managing increasingly complex contracts. JRR acknowledges that it does not currently have all necessary systems and processes in place, but is aware of the need to develop them, and to ensure the highest possible standards of duty of care.

There are companies that offer IT-based solutions for recruitment, talent management and staff assessments. They can provide different options and opportunities such as updates on statistics for recruitment and deployments. There are human resources tools that allow modules to link with each other to combine both internal human resource needs such as staff administration for contracting and talent management, with external roster management needs such as recruitment and deployment processes.

A key tool for JRR's operational system is the roster management system of experts for deployment. Today, the system is managed by a deployment and roster manager with support from an intern. The roster is Excel-based and it is generally considered that the system is outdated and needs to be replaced. Excel offers many useful functions, and JRR staff members have impressively managed to utilise Excel to its technical limits. Given the amount of information that is stored in the roster, the current system has also reached its limits in terms of scope. There are today 462 experts on the roster. The roster is becoming more and more competitive - in a recent call for nominations, there were 262 nominations for 25 positions. JRR has limited the number of trainings to 4 per year (some 100 participants). The drop-out rate from the roster is about 50 experts per year. At the current rate, this means the roster grows with some 50 experts each year. The growth is mainly due to the addition of new categories of experts and an attempt to broaden the language proficiency of the roster. JRR is cautious, however, not to make the roster to large to be manageable.

The information in the roster management system is confidential. The system saves information about the individual, including CV, as well as her or his compatibility with the requests. Today, the Excel database is stored on a server at JRR. However, there is also an off-site and encrypted back-up system in England. The external storage system can easily replace the internal server in case the internal server would crash. JRR never loses access to its stored information, and there is no migration of information and data required. Since the information is largely confidential JRR does not use drop-box in order to protect individuals. The current IT-platform supports both blackberry and phone services.

3.4 Complementarity program

JRR has impressively managed to respond to a growing demand for its services without a matching increase in resources. There has not yet been a case where JRR has had to decline support to an actor that has requested its services. As requests from States started to come in, JRR established the complementarity program to be able to respond to this need. The program is designed to enable delegations to be deployed directly by JRR to support national efforts to investigate international crimes. Support can be provided at various stages of the investigation depending on the needs.

After the pilot project in Mali, JRR is currently in the process of gathering experiences and lessons learned in order to further develop the complementarity project and strengthen its capacity to engage in support of States. JRR regularly engages in lessons learned activities, such as post-deployment surveys and debriefings of experts. Admittedly, however, they often do not have the time and resources to systematically follow-up and institutionalise these lessons. This is an area with great potential for development. Dividing the roster management and deployment functions into two positions would go a long way towards ensuring capacity and resources to properly follow-up activities and lessons.

All consulted stakeholders also highlight the truly rapid response received from JRR – with a shortlist of candidates within hours or a day. As demand is projected to grow also in coming years, JRR is planning for an increase in staff capacity. At the same time, it is not clear where funding for this increase will come from. The central challenge for JRR, also in this regard, is to secure resources for its core activities in order to enable deployments. As outlined elsewhere in this report, because of the relatively limited number of deployments managed fully by the JRR, it is not likely or sustainable that overhead funds from deployments could cover the costs of running the secretariat and keeping the roster. Most of the JRR experts are still eventually deployed by partner organisations - and the overhead that the back-donor pays for the deployment is payed to the deploying agency. While it is a common practice among CSOs, NGOs, as well as international organisations (IOs), to request overhead contributions for their services, it is therefore not sufficient for JRR to apply a similar financial strategy. This does however, not exclude an alternative for JRR to request overhead contributions for a service such as deployments of experts. JRR has a short but proven record it can manage with a small and slim organisation with low overhead, and continuous flexibility to identify new opportunities for funding and adapting to available resources. The growth of JRR should continue to be framed by this attitude of efficiency and nimbleness, while being actively supported by its members.

It will be important for JRR to further develop its internal procedures in relation to deployment of staff. As the complementarity program grows and JRR can be expected to deploy more staff under its own programs, there will be a need for a more sophisticated infrastructure and capacity in terms of security assessments and arrangements, other logistical issues, emergency response and contingency planning, human resource management, post-deployment debriefing including psycho-social support, etc. There is currently a process where lessons are drawn from the pilot project within the complementarity program.

On the administrative side the team have identified established processes for budget and planning, proposal writing, follow-up on donor requirements and commitments of partnership agreements, as well as organisation of Executive Board meetings.

Furthermore, there are nascent developments towards models and templates for MoUs with requesting states. The MoU with Mali is considered to be a good model.

4. Conclusions

This assignment is based on a number of assumptions about present and future challenges to JRR that need to be handled in order to strengthen the organisation. One of the key challenges is achieving financial sustainability of JRR. A second concern is about knowledge management of JRR's operations and underlying processes and procedures. The third concern is about JRR's organisational structure. The issue of effective systems, aligned with the organisation's mandate and tasks, and optimised to ensure efficient and effective operations, underpins all three of these challenges and concerns.

The issue of financial sustainability is complex due to five reasons. Firstly, JRR's mandate and set-up was initially well recognised by the founding members whom were largely States, and were represented by their ministries of foreign affairs. Very few of these members had any long-term capacity to financially support JRR. Instead it was constrained by a political or diplomatic interest in the *raison d'être* of JRR. This interest has not been translated into real financial support to the extent it has been needed to build a sufficiently sound organisational basis and financial stability. However, some members, such as Switzerland, Canada and the Netherlands, have continuously supported JRR with in-kind contributions through secondments of staffing and office space in Geneva, as well as financial support to cover overhead costs. During the first years, it was a clear challenge for JRR to fully establish itself as one of the global roster agencies. It is important to say that it is not uncommon that the political and diplomatic commitment is often stronger than the financial commitment since MFAs rarely take the role of financially midwifing organisations. It is up to the organisations themselves to capitalise on the diplomatic grace that comes along with the engagement of MFAs. In some OECD-countries, there is very limited interaction between MFAs and their development- or other funding agencies. MFAs can often only suggest a contact or be a reference for the organisation, but not be an active advocate or decision-maker in relation to whom the development agency should support. The diplomatic commitment may provide the organisation credibility, but often that is it. In some OECD countries where MFAs and development agencies are integrated, decision-making is more of a collaborative exercise, which allows diplomats to materialise the political commitment with financial support. It is important to recognise that MFAs are automatically bound to financially support organisations that they support politically or morally. This realisation may require organisations to strategically identify key partners for funding while utilising the political capital wisely.

JRR has elaborated on several options to secure sustainable, and preferably un-earmarked, funding. One option focused on high-level individuals within relevant organisations. This is undoubtedly a good strategy to raise the credibility and legitimacy of JRR's work, but probably not sufficient to secure long-term funding. Funding rests largely with the development or other specialised agencies and follows very strict regulations for grants. Tapping into this type of funding may require meeting ODA-eligibility, as well as the procedures and requirements that donors request in terms of results and financial reporting. This brings us to the second reason for why the issue of financial sustainability is complex for JRR. JRR was set up to support international institutions and organisations, as well as States, with experts on international criminal justice. At times and for some donors it was not always fully clear if, and if so how, JRR would fit into more traditional development and/or humanitarian programming. Some donors considered JRR's scope of work to be too limited to be defined as long-term capacity development. Other donors and organisations do not seem to make the same interpretation, but the scepticism underlines the challenge of fitting-in with the donors' definition of development and humanitarian support.

We argue that JRR makes important contributions to both the development and humanitarian agenda. JRR's mission statement and operations give significant guidance for and proof of a reasonable and congruent theory of change.²⁷ We reckon JRR's theory of change to be articulated and paraphrased in the following way '*by providing highly qualified experts in an effective and flexible manner to organisations which are assigned to carry out commission of inquiry or assessment missions of investigations, JRR contributes to address impunity for acts that constitute atrocities, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or serious human rights violations,*

²⁷ JRR Logic Model & Results Management Framework outlines a coherent chain of attribution and causality.

to hold perpetrators of international crimes accountable, to ensuring access to justice for victims, and to the achievement of sustainable peace, security and stability.' Whether JRR deploys experts directly or indirectly its contribution to peace and security, as well as to maintaining human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are affected by armed conflicts, is difficult to put into question. On this basis, the team sees it as highly important for JRR to have an open and honest conversation with both existing donors and other potential development agencies about any real and/or perceived ODA-limitations.

We do not think it is mutually exclusive to seek funding from MFAs or development agencies, instead we consider it mutually reinforcing. The report has presented examples of other roster agencies with various organisational set-ups and ownership, ranging from NGOs to government agencies. Common among the roster organisations/agencies is that they are funded by development cooperation agencies. This touches on a *third* reason why financial sustainability is complex for JRR. Like all other organisations, it takes time to establish and build partnerships with donors and funders. Many organisations are caught in a catch-22 in their early phases of developing internal structures, processes and systems, while at the same time proving their relevance, effectiveness and efficiency to existing and potential funders. This is a phase when both JRR and the key funders (members) have to commit considerable resources to develop and enhance JRR services; build operating capabilities for roster management, training and deployment; invest in systems that will support effective deployments; and nurture and develop partnerships. Operations at this stage may actually be upheld with negative cash flows. The key funding partners to JRR have allowed it to get established and find its niche. JRR is currently on a trajectory towards the next phase in its organisational development, and patience and commitment are still virtues. JRR is well placed to strengthen its relationships and partnerships with both existing and potential donors and funders. JRR stays committed to its mandate and cause, and this will likely pay off in terms of broader recognition and legitimacy as *the roster facility agency* within the international criminal justice sector. The complementarity programme will most likely boost and strengthen JRR's position in the roster business. JRR will gain further knowledge and experience from the field, and feed this experience back into the organisation's own research and methodology development.

We believe that JRR's partnerships are crucial to its funding. Whether it is partnerships with donors or 'end users'/receiving organisations the strength of the partnership can help and contribute to the financial sustainability of JRR. It has been argued that cost-sharing or fee for services is 'damaging for JRR's relationships' and that it is difficult for JRR to charge for its services. It might of course be so at an early explorative stage of a partnership when the parties prefer to focus on the quality in the partnership rather than financial cost-sharing models. Hopefully, many of the successful partnerships with UN Women, UN OHCHR and ICC can in due course elaborate on financing models that allow both parties to work smoothly without feeling financially constrained and without risking the long-term quality of the services.

A *fourth* reason for the complexity is the ongoing tension between reporting on total costs to enjoy maximum flexibility on the one hand, and itemising and accounting for costs in as much detail as possible to show maximum transparency and financial control of costs on the other. This is a tension we see more often between donors' requirements for transparency and accountability, and organisations struggling to maintain flexibility and effectiveness. Many organisations find themselves under heavy administrative burden to provide donors and funders with far reaching financial reporting on itemised costs which is sometimes considered difficult due to the confluence of resources and activities from many different units within the organisation. The debate about value-for-money illustrates the importance to be on top of the organisational expenditures and know what drives operating expenses. It helps organisations to measure the outputs produced from their indirect and support resources to increase their effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the work done by the internal resources.

An activity-based process-oriented costing system will likely be required for accurate measurement of the unit cost of producing output. An activity-based cost analysis provides JRR with information for its dialogue with existing and potential funders, donors and partners to state its efficiency and effectiveness. Our assumption is that a clear and mutual understanding of real costs for roster management and deployment will contribute to

convincingly making the case for entering into cost-sharing arrangements and further broadening its funding base. Similarly, it will educate new philanthropic constituencies that will be attracted to JRR's mission and operations to prevent impunity, on the real cost of operations. JRR will be able to state how much it costs to deploy an international criminal justice expert to contribute to an investigation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Information is key in campaigns. UNICEF uses the slogan that "Just \$1 can provide 40 days of clean water!".²⁸ Numbers give people and institutions a feeling of clear understanding of how they contribute. We believe it is possible and effective for fundraising for JRR to set a price tag on what it takes to contribute to preventing impunity.

A fifth reason that the issue of financial sustainability of JRR is complex is the position of JRR on the 'value-chain'. Whereas JRR is increasing its own deployments in support of States under the complementarity programme, the core of the facility's mandate is still to provide experts to be deployed by other international organisations. This means that the operational costs of the actual deployment, on which it would be reasonable to charge a percentage as overhead to cover recruitment, training and other preparations, falls outside JRR's operational budget. In fact, the bulk of costs incurred by JRR are costs that would be characterised as overhead - but to someone else's operations. The issue raises an interesting question for donors funding a deployment with a UN agency with a percentage charged as overhead, while at the same time funding JRR to assume a significant part of the same overhead cost. The semantics and definitions of various costs can be debated, but the question further underlines the importance of being able to find a unit cost measure of JRR's value proposition and clearly defining the service that is provided by the facility. This should be important both from the perspective of the funders and JRR itself.

This report presents a funding model that has been applied by DCAF's ISSAT. We think it is an interesting model for JRR to consider. It is important to recognise limitations in replicating one model to another organisation. There are surely a number of contextual factors affecting the success and failure of an organisation's funding model. ISSAT's two mechanisms for funding are pool funding and project funding. ISSAT's project funding is a straightforward set up that could possibly be applied when it is appropriate for both JRR and partners. This funding model is not ISSAT's primary model. The pool funding is the main model and structured around three streams: (i) bilateral drawdown; (ii) multilateral use; and (iii) core support. This model seems to build on its member-based organisation. The governing board members represent countries and their ministries of foreign affairs, development and defence agencies, as well as multilateral organisations. An assumption is that the governing board remains engaged by DCAF and involved in ISSAT's work to secure their commitment to the organisation. Some members might not use ISSAT's services as much as others because they partly have them in-house. Meanwhile others might solely depend on ISSAT's services. This balance might be true for some of JRR's members and constituencies, who in the future might use their own services, while others want to draw on JRR's expertise and services. The multilateral use of pool funding links with the previous discussion about cost-sharing. The idea is that a third of pooled funding is used to fund requests from ISSAT's multilateral members on a cost-sharing basis. Applying this stream of the pooled funding from members in a JRR context would mean that it would cover costs for JRR experts, while JRR's partners - the multilateral actors such as the UN, AU, EU, ICC - cover costs associated with the deployment of JRR experts (flights, accommodation and daily substance allowance/per diem). This stream does include funding of actual deployment and considers the cost of making an expert deployable by recruiting, roster management and training.

The set up of a funding model built on 'multilateral use' is a conversation JRR can have with both members and partners, and it will be underpinned by the strength of their commitment to JRR and mutual understanding of what the actual costs for roster management, training, and deployment are. This reminds us of the previous discussion about building relationships with members and partners, and the need to demonstrate unit costs. Members will be more ready to fund and partners more ready to share costs when they are confident in JRR's value proposition and when they know it is cost-efficient. It will be important to map out and learn which existing

²⁸ <http://www.unicefusa.org/mission/survival/water/tap-project>

and potential members and partners are ready to commit and use an ISSAT model to provide experts for investigations of serious international human rights and international humanitarian law violations, and address the impunity gap. As an employee explained "we (JRR) are a place to go for all international criminal investigations". Thus, an interesting question to ask is what existing members are interested in pooled funding, and see a benefit with the three streams. Similarly, JRR needs to appraise the interest among potential members and partners. Here it is particularly interesting to learn about the attitude of countries such as Iceland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Poland, and Slovenia.²⁹ Would any of these countries benefit from an ISSAT-model for pool funding? There is an expressed interest with the JRR Executive Director to bring on an Asian member on the Board, and this effort could be deepened and supported by other members.

The second concern guiding this assignment is knowledge management of JRR's operations and underlying processes and procedures. This is an area where JRR needs to focus considerably and consistently in the coming year. It needs to get the standard operating procedures in place and similarly a system for filing and documentation. Having reviewed JRR's operational process from nomination through roster and deployment to debriefing, JRR has established processes, producers and routines underpinning the quality of its services. The knowledge and application thereof is, however, often intrinsically linked with people on the task. Documented institutionalisation and greater reliance on technology would alleviate some of the current pressure on JRR staff. A feeling of indispensability among staff permeates the organisational culture - at times surely well founded. The operational processes are heavily dependent on individual knowledge in order to deliver swiftly and effectively. Knowledge of experts and their capacity for deployment must be fully documented and scored in a way that can easily and quickly be applied by the deployment manager. Quality assurance of the processes is important, but too much responsibility seems to rest on the Executive Director to ensure the highest quality of delivery of JRR's services. Here it is worthwhile to consider other quality assurance mechanisms and routines such as clear guidelines outlining each step of the operational processes, checklists for each step, principals and formats for the deployment process from inquiry, nomination, selection, training, matchmaking, contracting to deployment. A modern IT-system is an important support to uphold and strengthen the quality assurance, as well as allow a more efficient searchability for matching experts with inquiries. It would help ensure effective time-management. Today, the IT-system is a bottleneck as well as a vulnerability for JRR. While introducing new IT-solutions the management of JRR should ensure that both available technology and staff are optimised to deliver on JRR services to its partners.

In a way, processes and procedures are intrinsically linked to organisational structure. While JRR staff has job descriptions their roles and responsibilities at times seem to overlap. It is a positive attribute of a small organisation to feed an organisational culture of flexibility and collaboration but it can also create inefficiencies. Thus, a question that should be asked is how can processes and systems as well as an organisational culture and strategic leadership make the organisation less dependent on its management in the daily operations, while at the same time upholding the responsiveness and effectiveness of its services. It is time for investing in an IT-system for human resource management that allows for effective staff administration, recruitment processes, and talent management. It is an investment today that will bring return tomorrow through freed up human resources that can work more effectively to deliver on operational expectations. More time can be spent on quality assurance and in dialogue with experts, both while they are on the roster, during deployments and after they return.

Knowledge management is also vital for lessening the rotation of staff, or exit of key individuals of the organisation. It is therefore in the short term crucial to formalise and institutionalise processes. Furthermore, JRR

²⁹ These countries illustrate OECD-DAC members but which are currently not members of ISSAT and constitute potential partners for JRR to engage because partly they are OECD-DAC countries and not yet engaged in a similar ISSAT-model. However, an ISSAT-member is obviously more familiar with ISSAT's funding model and can perhaps therefore more easily assess its own benefit from supporting JRR in a similar way as with ISSAT. Countries in the Asia-region are also included partly because of JRR's interest to engage a member from this region. Iceland, Poland and Slovenia are included to remind JRR of non-traditional OECD-DAC countries which can have an interest in JRR, and therefore needs to be explored.

would benefit from setting a three year strategic document from which it can draw annual operational plans and set budgets. Both the three year strategic plan and operational plans should be used for targeting focused short- and medium-term objectives. The Executive Director needs to play a greater role in strategy formulation and implementation while the Director of Operations has her focus on setting the processes, procedures and systems in place. The leadership of the Executive Director needs to be used for building and nurturing strong and lasting relationships with both donors and partners. The day-to-day support and operations has to rest more strictly with the Director of Operations.

The third concern is about JRR's organisational structure. The management of JRR reckons that the organisation largely has the 'right' functions/positions in place in order to fulfil its mandate. The overall impression of the evaluation team is that the current composition of the JRR Secretariat has managed to fulfil its mandate within the constraints of limited resources. A recurring theme in interviews with stakeholders is that they see that the JRR Secretariat is understaffed, but the constructive engagement, responsiveness and commitment of the Secretariat's team members ensures that this does not affect operations. JRR is not necessarily significantly understaffed in relation to the scale of its operations, but it relies heavily on consultants and temporary staffing solutions. As this report suggests JRR will benefit from a few more employees employed on a regular basis, but foremost the organisational capabilities depend on application of modern and adequate IT- and web-based systems, aligned with careful management of functions, roles and responsibilities. We have in this assignment conducted a limited review of other government agencies and NGOs whom provide experts for deployment. They have all been established for more than ten years, and deploy more experts than JRR per year. It is very difficult to compare and argue normatively from a benchmark perspective, but organisations like the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and the Danish Refugee Council do employ approximately a maximum of ten people to manage their rosters and deployments. We share the view that only a few additional resources would be needed to cover some of JRR's current resource needs. There is no magic number for how large the organisation should be, but four employees in addition to the current organisational size should be sufficient to cover the management functions; core functions (training, roster management and deployment management); outreach and resource mobilisation functions (philanthropy, traditional resource mobilisation, outreach); and support functions (financial management and administration/human resources). JRR does not have an explicit organogram. The management does have a map of the organisational structure, but JRR is encouraged to formalise an organogram around which it can build processes, procedures and routines. We believe it is important to visualise the organisation in order to clearly define processes and adapt adequate job descriptions. The terms of references for the job descriptions need to carefully weigh in the importance of seniority, language skills, and academic experience in order to match with the function to which the person is assigned.

Consulted stakeholders are in unanimous agreement that the JRR Secretariat is highly responsive to their needs and that responses from the JRR team are always very timely. Although the current set-up is not optimised, the functions that have been put in place at the Secretariat must be considered suitable to fulfilling the mandate of JRR as it is currently formulated and interpreted.

5. Recommendations

JRR is already engaged in processes dealing with some of the recommendations below, and in the process of considering others together with members and stakeholders. In light of the findings and conclusions outlined above, our recommendations to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for supporting the Justice Rapid Response are:

Organisational structure

1. Additional staffing needs are reasonable. Additional human resources, and the ability to employ central staff members on regular contracts, would dramatically reduce JRR's vulnerability and provide additional space for the organisation to focus on its core activities. Hence, the evaluation team agrees with the management of JRR to secure additional four positions:
 - separate the roster management and deployment functions into two positions;
 - training coordinator;
 - finance assistant; and
 - development officer.
2. Job descriptions aligned with functions bring clarity. As the organisation develops and grows, it is important to establish clear roles and responsibilities to make the organisation both effective and efficient. Hence, the evaluation team suggests JRR to develop job descriptions that are carefully aligned with the specific function.
3. Strategic leadership requires less involvement in daily operations. The Executive Director needs to increasingly focus on building and nurturing JRR's relationships with both existing and potential donors, members and partners. Subsequently, the ED should be less engaged in the day-to-day operations, and assign the responsibility to the Director of Operations. Hence, the evaluation team suggests the Executive Director should have a focused strategic leadership role whilst supporting the function of outreach and resource mobilisation to secure sustainable funding.
4. Building processes and systems takes consistency and diligence. The Director of Operations needs to be assigned responsibility to lead the core functions (training, roster management, and deployment management) and support functions (financial management, administration, and human resources) of JRR. This responsibility focuses considerably on establishing processes, procedures, and systems and aligning them with the functions and associated job descriptions. Hence, the evaluation team suggests the Director of Operations should have a focused leadership role of the core and support function to optimise internal resources and create greatest possible effectiveness and efficiency.
5. Human resource management: One of the areas where significant improvement is needed is human resource management, including recruitment procedures, contracting, competence development, salaries, and benefit scales. This is both an issue related to organisational effectiveness and to moral and ethical employer considerations, relating to contracts, payroll management, pensions (social security), holidays, and talent management. JRR is currently elaborating an HR policy and associated processes. This is a development that should be rigorously encouraged, supported, and followed-up.

Processes and systems

1. Need to formalise and document the key processes of JRR. As the organisation develops and grows, it is important to formalise the standard operating procedures for each function of JRR. Guidelines and principles should be clearly set out to support staff in their daily tasks. Hence, the evaluation team encourages the ongoing work by JRR to document and institutionalise required operational processes as well as support functions.
2. Need to update the IT-system of JRR. As the roster grows and the number of deployments increase, JRR is in urgent need of an updated and sophisticated IT-system that supports human resource management, including recruitment procedures, contracting, competence development, salaries, and benefit scales. An IT-system should be able to support for instance a smooth searchability for the roster management to swiftly identify most relevant candidates. Hence, the evaluation team supports and encourages JRR's request for building a new IT-platform.

Funding modality

1. Funding is partnership. JRR strives to secure un-earmarked long-term funding. The most likely scenario for JRR to secure sustainable funding is to continue to build its reputation as the go-to organisation for deployments of experts for international criminal investigations. The funders of JRR in the future are most likely going to be donor states and increasingly multilateral organisations (partners e.g. UN Women). Hence, the evaluation team suggests that JRR and especially the Executive Director deepen the dialogue with existing members, donors, and partners, and broaden the funding base to include new countries, especially representing Asia and newer European OECD-DAC members.
2. Important to establish clear measure of the cost for JRR's service: This report has outlined the complexities involved in finding sources for long-term funding for JRR and the various aspects of determining the cost for JRR's service. Despite difficulties, we believe that it is essential for JRR to be able to describe the costs of its work both from an overall organisational, as well as a unit cost perspective. The cost analysis and definition of 'unit cost' should take as its point of departure JRR's position in the value chain. This is the basis for ensuring that donors and partners understand what it is they are being asked to pay for. We suggest that cost-sharing or fee for service becomes part of the conversation when the relationship with partners and their commitment to the partnership is ready.

Annex 1: Country Specific Donor Funding Summary (including UN Women) 2012-2015.

Country Specific Donor Funding Summary (Inc. UNW*): 2012-2015

per 18.11.2014

in CHF

	2012				2013				2014				2015				
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015	2012	2013	2014	2015	
TOTAL ALL FUNDING TYPES	fr. 1'434'239	fr. 2'145'464	fr. 2'067'657	220'939	fr. 810'640	fr. 1'399'076	fr. 1'385'449	56'281	fr. 1'213'339	fr. 220'900	fr. 1'923'626	fr. 221'838	fr. 1'503'330	fr. 564'326	fr. 220'939	fr. 56'281	
Australia	fr. 48'252	fr.	513'909	fr.	fr. 810'640	fr.	1'399'076	fr.	fr. 1'213'339	fr.	220'900	fr.	1'923'626	fr.	221'838	fr.	
Canada	fr.	50'178	-	-	fr.	513'909	fr.	56'281	fr.	fr. 1'217'238	fr.	50'178	fr.	56'281	fr.	-	-
Denmark	fr. 160'400	fr.	162'504	fr.	fr. 810'640	fr.	1'399'076	fr.	fr. 1'217'238	fr.	162'504	fr.	162'504	fr.	-	-	-
Finland	fr. 60'500	fr.	98'368	fr.	fr. 160'400	fr.	1'385'449	fr.	fr. 1'923'626	fr.	97'680	fr.	97'680	fr.	-	-	-
Liechtenstein	fr.	25'000	fr.	25'000	fr.	fr. 60'500	fr.	25'000	fr.	fr. 221'838	fr.	25'000	fr.	25'000	fr.	-	-
Luxembourg	fr. 20'322	fr.	31'218	fr.	fr. 25'000	fr.	30'413	fr.	fr. 1'503'330	fr.	30'413	fr.	30'413	fr.	-	-	-
Netherlands	fr. 48'020	fr.	246'021	fr.	fr. 31'218	fr.	241'180	fr.	fr. 564'326	fr.	241'180	fr.	241'180	fr.	-	-	-
Sweden	fr. 86'109	fr.	80'809	fr.	fr. 48'020	fr.	122'551	fr.	fr. 62'962	fr.	122'551	fr.	122'551	fr.	-	-	-
Switzerland	fr. 129'829	fr.	93'070	fr.	fr. 86'109	fr.	123'470	fr.	fr. 62'962	fr.	70'840	fr.	70'840	fr.	31'281	fr.	-
USA Dept of State: SS	fr.	-	-	-	fr.	93'070	fr.	70'840	fr.	fr.	394'220	fr.	394'220	fr.	-	-	-
USA Dept of State: ICI	fr.	44'346	fr.	-	fr.	fr.	44'346	fr.	fr.	fr.	44'346	fr.	44'346	fr.	-	-	-
UNWomen	fr. 257'208	fr.	310'681	fr.	fr.	fr.	85'536	fr.	fr.	fr.	85'536	fr.	85'536	fr.	-	-	-
<i>In Kind</i>	<i>fr. 623'599</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>746'387</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>682'208</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>164'658</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>682'208</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>164'658</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>51'752</i>	<i>fr.</i>	<i>-</i>
Canada	fr. 360'444	fr.	356'242	fr.	fr.	fr.	517'52	fr.	fr.	fr.	356'242	fr.	311'678	fr.	51'752	fr.	-
Columbia	fr.	-	fr.	-	fr.	fr.	27'299	fr.	fr.	fr.	27'299	fr.	27'299	fr.	-	fr.	-
Netherlands	fr.	-	fr.	38'909	fr.	fr.	77'959	fr.	fr.	fr.	38'909	fr.	77'959	fr.	-	fr.	-
Switzerland	fr. 263'155	fr.	263'691	fr.	fr.	fr.	112'906	fr.	fr.	fr.	263'691	fr.	265'271	fr.	112'906	fr.	-
USA	fr.	-	fr.	87'546	fr.	fr.	-	fr.	fr.	fr.	87'546	fr.	-	fr.	-	fr.	-

*Excluding all non-government donors/philanthropic donors, except UNW