



GCSP Website

**“External Evaluation of the Geneva Centres, GCSP, GICHD and DCAF”  
(2010-2013)**

**Final Report**

By the INNOVABRIDGE Foundation, Caslano / Switzerland

Sophia Procofieff, Anna Matveeva, Dieter von Blarer (Team Leader)

Submitted: 16 June 2014

## Table of Contents

<b>ACRONYMS.....</b>	<b>4</b>
Summary Recommendations .....	9
<b>SUMMARY REPORT .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>21</b>
1.1 Background .....	21
1.2 Methodology .....	21
1.2.1 Data collection .....	22
1.2.2 Staff reflective workshops .....	22
1.2.3 Field trips – Primary case studies .....	23
1.2.4 Secondary case studies.....	23
1.2.5 Data analysis.....	23
1.2.6 Key methods, informants and sources of data.....	24
1.2.7 Limitations of the evaluation.....	25
1.3 Report structure .....	25
<b>2. THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) .....</b>	<b>27</b>
2.1 Summary of findings and recommendations .....	27
2.2 Background .....	28
2.3 Evaluation and analysis .....	29
2.3.1 Relevance.....	29
2.3.1.1 Relevance of vision/mission .....	29
2.3.1.2 Contribution to Swiss Foreign Policy .....	35
2.3.1.3 Opportunities and risks in the future .....	36
2.3.2 Effectiveness.....	36
2.3.2.1 Does the Centre achieve its strategic objectives? .....	36
2.3.2.2 Objective 2: Tailor-made short courses.....	39
2.3.2.3 Objective 3: Intercultural understanding and building bridges.....	39
2.3.3 Efficiency.....	45
2.3.3.1 Expansion of funding base.....	47
2.3.4 Conclusions.....	47
2.3.5 Recommendations.....	48
<b>3. THE GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD).....</b>	<b>51</b>
3.1 Summary of findings and recommendations .....	51
3.1.1 Strength / weaknesses / critical challenges .....	51
3.1.2 Summary of recommendations .....	51
3.2 Background.....	52
3.3 Evaluation and analysis .....	53
3.3.1 Relevance.....	53
3.3.1.1 Relevance of vision/mission .....	53
3.3.1.2 Relevance of the institutional environment analysis .....	54
3.3.1.3 Relevance of strategic objectives .....	55
3.3.1.4 Implementation of the strategy .....	56
3.3.1.5 Excellence .....	57
3.3.1.6 Opportunities and risks in expanding the scope of work.....	58
3.3.2 Effectiveness.....	59
3.3.2.1 Does the Centre achieve its strategic objectives? .....	59
3.3.2.2 Monitoring arrangements .....	61
3.3.2.3 Instruments and context .....	62
3.3.2.4 Sustainability of achievements.....	62

3.3.2.5	Quality of staff .....	63
3.3.3	Efficiency.....	65
3.3.3.1	Management .....	66
3.3.3.2	Value for money/cost effectiveness.....	66
3.3.3.3	Expansion of the funding base .....	67
3.3.4	Conclusions.....	68
3.3.5	Recommendations.....	70
<b>4.</b>	<b>THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF).....</b>	<b>72</b>
4.1	Summary of findings and recommendations .....	72
4.1.1	Strengths /weaknesses /critical challenges.....	72
4.1.2	Summary of recommendations .....	72
4.2	Background.....	73
4.3	Evaluation and analysis .....	74
4.3.1	Relevance.....	74
4.3.1.1	Relevance of vision/mission .....	74
4.3.1.2	Relevance of the analysis of the institutional environment.....	76
4.3.2	Effectiveness.....	80
4.3.2.1	Does the Centre achieve its mission?.....	80
4.3.2.2	Reporting and monitoring arrangements.....	83
4.3.3	Efficiency.....	85
4.3.3.1	Management .....	85
4.3.3.2	Governance arrangements.....	86
4.3.3.3	Value for money .....	89
4.3.3.4	Cost – Effectiveness ratio .....	89
4.3.3.5	Expansion of funding basis and use of funds from the main donors .....	89
4.3.4	Conclusions.....	92
4.3.5	Recommendations.....	93
<b>5.</b>	<b>CROSSCUTTING ISSUES (GOVERNANCE / INTERNATIONAL GENEVA / GENDER).....</b>	<b>96</b>
5.1	Governance .....	96
5.1.1	Legal set up and Independence.....	96
5.1.2	Governance arrangements within the Foundations .....	98
5.1.3	Recommendations.....	101
5.2	International Geneva and the Maison de la Paix .....	101
5.2.1	How do the Centres position themselves within the Maison de la Paix? .....	101
5.2.2	Opportunities and challenges for the Centres within the concept of the Maison de la Paix .....	102
5.2.3	Potential synergies and models for cooperation within the Maison de la Paix.....	102
5.2.4	Recommendations.....	103
5.3	Gender.....	104
5.3.1	GCSP.....	104
5.3.2	GICHD.....	106
5.3.3	DCAF .....	107
5.3.4	Overall conclusion .....	111
5.3.5	Recommendations.....	111
<b>ANNEXES</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>112</b>
	Annex 1: Description of the mandate and terms of reference .....	112
	Annex 2: Presentation of the team .....	112
	Annex 3: List of interviewees .....	112
	Annex 4: List of reviewed documents.....	112
	Annex 5: Google survey on GICHD website .....	112
	Annex 6: GICHD download statistics.....	112

## ACRONYMS

AB	Advisory Board
APM	Anti Personnel Mines
APMBC	Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AVR	Armed Violence Reduction
BAKS	Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (Germany)
BOMCA	Border management Central Asia
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munition
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDP	Comité de Pilotage
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoF	Council of Foundation
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDPS	Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDO	Deputy Director's Office
DFAE	Département Fédéral des Affaires Etrangères
DPS	Division for Security Policy in the FDFA
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ETC	European Training Course (GCSP)
EU	European Union
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GMAP	Gender and Mine Action Programme
GPP	Geneva Peace Building Platform
HALO	The HALO Trust (International Demining NGO)
HSD	FDFA's Human Security Division
IATG	International Ammunitions Technical Guidelines
ICBLCMC	International Campaign to ban Landmine-Cluster Munition Coalition
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IHEID	Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Graduate Institute)
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
ISU	Implementation support unit to the APMBC
ITC	International Training Course
JPO	Junior Professional Officer

MA	Mine Action
MACCA	Mine Actions Coordination Center Afghanistan
MAPA	Mine Action Program Afghanistan
MAS	Mine Action Standards
MASD	Mine Action Security and Development Program
MdP	Maison de la Paix
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East & North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
Mol	Ministry of Interior
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NISC	New Issues in Security Course
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
ODA	Official Development Aid
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Police Cooperation Convention
PTEC	Partner Training and Education Center
PFP	Partnership for Peace
QM	Quality Management
QUNO	Quakers United Nations Office
RBM	Results Based Management
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SCO	Swiss Cooperation Office
SCR	UN's Security Council Resolution
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SG	Steuergruppe
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSR	Security Sector Reform
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToC	Theory of Change
TNFA	Trust Fund for North Africa
UN	United Nations
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMAS	United Nation Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODA/IATG	International Ammunitions Technical Guidelines
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
WBCSD	World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WG	Working Group
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The evaluation of three Geneva Centres, - the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP, founded 1995); the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD, founded 1998) and the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF, founded 2000) - was commissioned by the FDFA/DDPS Comité de Pilotage and conducted by the INNOVABRIDGE Foundation<sup>1</sup> from February to June 2014. The conduct of an evaluation in 2014 was a part of the 2011 Framework Agreements with the Centres and a condition of the four-year framework budget (2012 to 2015) in the 2010 Message to the Parliament. The objective is two-fold: accountability and learning. 214 respondents were interviewed individually in the course of the evaluation, 24 participated in workshops. Field visits, which supplied material for the case studies, were paid to South Eastern Europe, Tunisia and Central Asia. Documentation provided by the Centres, the FDFA/ DDPS and collected independently was studied. The scope is representative, but not comprehensive, due to the evaluation's institutional nature.

Although the three Geneva Centres came from the same root, having been established as foundations by the Swiss government and core-funded by it, they have by now developed into different institutional personalities. The DCAF became operational in the field and acquired a global remit, working in international development to affect change in regions of conflict and instability. The GCSP is more distinctly a service provider for training and dialogue facility, firstly in the Transatlantic, and presently – in the global framework. The GICHD's institutional identity lies in consultancy, in being a locus of documentation and expertise for international mine action. What the Centres have in common is that they have intellectual influence in their respective spheres, have developed *know how*, which they are renowned for, and possess the asset of Swiss neutrality. The DCAF is considered a think tank in its distinct field of security sector reform and security governance.

The **GCSP** is mostly an education centre for diplomats and the military. It provides a positioning for Switzerland in the international security landscape and presents it as a responsible global citizen. It is a strategic investment, because it can provide access to power and influence in foreign and security policy establishments, though this potential is so far insufficiently utilised. The GCSP's agenda has revolved around NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), where it is still relevant, especially in South Eastern Europe. The GCSP seeks to adapt to a changing context, and enters a less institutionalised and more volatile global world, engaging from Columbia to China

The Centre's assets are its civil-military nature, comprehensive approach to security characteristic of Switzerland, excellent methodology for adult training, use of International Geneva and a truly global intermix of people in their courses. Participation in courses is both a gain in knowledge and a policy insight. Recently, the GCSP's focus has moved away from hard security issues towards international affairs.

The **GICHD** positions itself as a credible provider of technical expertise and research to the mine action community. Its niche is unique as it is neither an operational, nor an academic body. The GICHD serves as a supply of *know how* and independent analysis, as well as information management, capacity building and monitoring tools. It sometimes appears to outsiders as a collection of independent experts with projects, rather than a research institution. The GICHD is an international Centre, but mainly funded by the Swiss government (78% in 2012).

The context for demining is changing. It is a competitive business, where NGOs and commercial operators bid for contracts. Mine action may have reached its peak on the quantitative side, but the disorganised nature of violence challenges international instruments and makes further demining dependent on volatile contexts. The Centre is traditionally dealing with mines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war, as they bear upon human security. The Centre has widened its scope from the traditional MA sector to

---

<sup>1</sup> The evaluation was conducted by Dr. Anna Matveeva, London, Sophia Procofieff, Geneva and Dieter von Blarer (Team Leader), Basel (Presentation of the team in Annex 2)

ammunition storage management. It has also broadened its reach to development and environmental issues and armed violence reduction. The Centre can respond flexibly to the changing context, as it heavily relies on consultants, who can be selected according to needs.

Respondents assess the demand for GICHD's products in contradictory ways: a number of respondents believe they are highly relevant and used as a reference point of best practice. Others maintain that although they were very pertinent in the past, their relevance subsided as the field became saturated and issues have stopped changing as quickly over time. The GICHD has normative power where it acts as a secretariat for the maintenance and development of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and supports legal evolution, partly basing its institutional relevance on it. At the same time, the continuous need for revision has been questioned, as systems are in place, standards mature and issues do not move fast.

The **DCAF** has an excellent reputation as an organisation with solid expertise. The DCAF's relevance to the international community is proven by the fact that only about half of its financial needs are provided for by the Swiss core contribution. Its role as promoter of ideas and knowledge has influence across the entire field of SSR/G and wider as shown by the support to drafting the *Montreux Document* and its role as a host of the secretariat of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association. The DCAF's identity is that of a think tank with operationalisation, and an international foundation with Swiss branding, which symbolises quality and neutrality.

The DCAF's success in expanding and adapting to new trends lies in its vision, which is supported by flexibility and rapid reaction capacity, made possible by the way in which the core budget is used. A growth business model is an integral part of its institutional personality. The approach is to be proactive and capitalise on the right momentum, then to develop a project on that basis, for which more long-term funding is sought. Beneficiaries view the Centre as flexible and participatory in its approach, and quick in its response to opportunities and challenges. At the same time, a number of respondents underscored that an aura of mystery surrounds the DCAF.

Unlike the GCSP and the GICHD, which have institutional strategies and objectives, there is no equivalent at the DCAF and no internal structured process for rolling it out. Instead, regional programmes with field presence (South Eastern Europe, MENA region) develop their strategies, which have buy-in from national authorities. Most work is undertaken on a project basis with about 400 projects ran every year. Each division has significant independence, and there is no centralised fundraising function.

### ***Swiss Government – Centres' relationships***

The Centres' Annual Agreements with the FDFA stipulate tasks and activities expected during the year. While the expectations towards the GCSP does not allow great flexibility, the agreement with the GICHD, while expecting certain activities, does allow for a wider margin of manoeuvre within the frame of expectations. The DCAF operates as a service provider for a larger number of clients and is less dependent on the core funding from the Swiss Government. The Annual Agreement with SDC (2014) lists a wide range of expectations also related to actual Swiss Foreign Policy interests such as the support to the Swiss Chairmanship of the OSCE.

A Comité de Pilotage<sup>2</sup> (CDP) provides on one side for a steering mechanism of the Swiss funds to the Centres and strategic oversight. The Swiss Government also proposes the Directors of the Centres and the Presidents of the Foundations to the respective Council of Foundation (CoF). The Treasurer of the CoF is traditionally the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN-Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (UNCD). Since 2011 the FDFA has the sole responsibility for the management of Swiss contribution to the Centres. The DDPS still participates in the CDP. To maintain an integrated foreign and security policy approach of Switzerland towards the three Centres the continuing representation of the DDPS in the CDP remains important.

---

<sup>2</sup> According to the message to parliament of 2010 the FDFA and the DDPS appoint members to the CDP

The Governance of the Centres with the CoF on one side and the CDP on the other reflects a certain ambiguity. The division of responsibility and influence between the CoF and the CDP as the steering body is not always clear. If the Centres expand their funding base as expected, the governance arrangements might become questionable in the future and will need attention.

### ***Effectiveness***

The execution of tasks has been of high quality at all three Centres. The *GCSP* course offer is driven more by supply rather than demand. Trainees of good calibre continue to attend courses and the sheer amount of people trained is impressive. The courses were positively appraised by the participants, and attending the course advanced the careers of some. The *GICHD*'s field operations/interventions have been largely effective, although some national interventions, for example when the *GICHD* has applied generic tools to a particular context, were seen as being less contextualised. The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) tool is used successfully in some places, while in other, more fragile contexts, the implementation is harder and may not deliver expected results. Maintenance of IMAS keeps the field integrated, and the Centre's knowledge products are internalised into the operations of other actors. The Language Outreach Program and land release approaches have been named as particularly suitable for the needs of the targeted beneficiaries<sup>3</sup>. The *DCAF* is considered to be a helpful and respectful organisation in the regions where it works, and the quality of its inputs is described as high. Its effectiveness depends on the context and on the *DCAF*'s reading of that context. In South Eastern Europe it proceeded very well. Achievements are most likely to be sustainable, and are facilitated by overall political trajectory towards Europe. Concrete outcomes beyond South Eastern Europe are harder to determine<sup>4</sup>.

### ***Funding***

*DCAF* has entered a stage when Swiss core funding remains still critical, but is no longer the unique source of future financial growth, because the Centre is sufficiently embedded in the international donor environment and positioned for further growth. The *GCSP* and the *GICHD* are still widely depending on Swiss funding. While *GICHD* has developed some "marketable" products, it has to be careful not to be perceived as an unfair competitor within the MA community. The *GCSP* has in the past mainly delivered what was requested by the FDFA. Whether it has the potential to develop training products, which are marketable for a wider clientele remains to be seen.

### ***Monitoring and Reporting***

The HSD as contractual partner for the *GCSP* and the *GICHD* requests reporting on activities. The SDC asks *DCAF* for a results-based reporting. Even though results-based reporting against indicators might be difficult for the *GCSP*, the reporting requirements of the Centres to the FDFA need harmonization.

### ***Efficiency/Financial management***

Overall the Centres operate efficiently and are on their way to use state of the art QM systems to follow up the operational and financial development of their projects and interventions. *GICHD* and *DCAF* have introduced full auditing of their finances while *GCSP* remains with a simple audit. On a critical note, the evaluation states it is difficult to follow up on the allocation of finances from the core budget of *DCAF* to the different activities agreed upon in the annual agreement with SDC.

### ***International Geneva / Synergies***

The assumption behind the creation of the "Maison de la Paix" (MdP) was that the Centres would keep their individuality and independence, while fostering synergies. In fact, the *DCAF* articulated an inspiring vision for MdP in 2013. The *GICHD* proposed a vision for knowledge sharing and capacity-building. The *GCSP* has not articulated a vision but supports the vision of *DCAF*<sup>5</sup>. The Graduate Institute (IHEID) clearly sees the potential of collaboration with the *DCAF* and the *GICHD* in the security field.

---

<sup>3</sup> French, Arab and Persian/Dari/Farsi speaking countries

<sup>4</sup> In Tunisia, the *DCAF*'s advocacy resulted in the adoption of two provisions in the new constitution, and its efforts improved the quality of information released by the Ministry of Interior to the public.

<sup>5</sup> Comment of the *GCSP*'s Director on 16 May 2014



The actors at the MdP consider it important for the FDFA to be at the centre of the driving mechanism, i.e. the strategic working group, in order to foster synergies and meet at the MdP and not just in Bern to create a sense of ownership.

The GCSP and the DCAF are both involved in the field of security training and *ad hoc* cooperation has taken place<sup>6</sup>. The DCAF argues that much of its training is programmatic and tailor-made, and is different from the GCSP's generic offer, but this argument hardly applies to borderguard offers, which are also generic.

In the view of the evaluation the MdP provides the potential to cluster capacity of the three Geneva Centres and the IHEID to enhance cooperation and work towards a "one stop shop" for post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, peace building, development and SSR/SSG. There is also a risk that the MdP might be perceived as an attempt of Switzerland to crave for more visibility through implementation of expensive physical infrastructure<sup>7</sup>. There is a sense of the MdP being a "fait accompli" orchestrated by the FDFA and the leadership of DCAF and the IHEID. Representatives of the INGO community, with exceptions, are rather sceptical concerning the added value of the idea. They feel that civil society is being excluded or late coming to participate at the development of the MdP's potential.

## **Summary Recommendations**

### ***On strategic level the evaluation recommends to the CoFs and Directors***

- To develop in cooperation with the FDFA and the IHEID a five to ten year vision with institutional and strategic options for a comprehensive cooperation of the three Centres and the IHEID within the MdP.
- To use the opportunity of the MdP to develop in cooperation with Switzerland in view of the upcoming new framework budget a comprehensive strategy for the development of services, trainings, activities related to post conflict rehabilitation, peace building, development and SSR/SSG including the IHEID and other Swiss and Geneva based international actors as<sup>8</sup> potential partners.
- To develop in cooperation with the CDP a comprehensive modus of cooperation and interaction between the CoF (Bureau's), the CDP and the Directors (top management) of the three Centres.
- Agree in cooperation with the CDP on a common fund of seed money for the development of joint activities and a common visibility within the MdP and from the outside.

### ***The evaluation recommends to the CoFs***

- To develop or adapt according to the needs of the Foundations a ToR and professional requirements for the President, the Secretary, and the Treasurer of the Foundation and for the Directors of the Centres.
- To clarify the different roles of the CoFs and their area of interaction.
- To agree on a course of action on how to select the respective Centres' Directors and on rules related to the term in office of the Directors.

### ***The evaluation recommends to the FDFA and the DDPS***

- To ensure the continuing representation of DDPS in the CDP.
- To clarify the CDP's role and area of interaction with the three Foundations and the Geneva Centres.
- To ensure that the Swiss Government (FDFA) strategic level working group on the MdP becomes fully

---

<sup>6</sup> E.g. on Myanmar

<sup>7</sup> Some interlocutors suspect Switzerland to use ODA for implementing and maintaining the MdP e.g. through the payment of high rents or rather prestigious and expensive infrastructure, a suspicion the evaluation is not positioned to confirm.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. HSD, SDC, CSS, Swiss Peace

operational with a ToR and a defined list of members with clear roles and responsibilities.

***The evaluation recommends to the FDFA (HSD/SDC)***

- To develop clear and as much as possible harmonized reporting expectations for the core contributions to the Centres.
- To explore the possibility of having the Directors of the Centres contracted directly by the respective Foundations.

***The evaluation recommends to the respective management of the three Centres***

*On a strategic level*

- Introduce and maintain a platform for the development of joint activities and strategies to meet future strategic operational and institutional challenges.
- Make the development of a joint vision for the MdP with ownership of all staff and important stakeholders a goal for the three Centres and the IHEID in 2015.
- Agree on or lobby jointly for a fund for the development of joint activities and common visibility for the MdP.

*On an operational level*

- To set up a comprehensive monitoring and reporting system for outcomes and to introduce results-based management in the Centres.
- To conduct an internal gender and diversity policy audit and to introduce gender/diversity-disaggregated indicators and reporting.
- To use staff secondments between the Centres for the development and implementation of synergies. Outside secondments should be actively sought in partner organisations, such as the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform network.
- Develop together with the IHEID joint training modules for integrated post conflict reconstruction, peace building and development strategies with a SSR/SSG focus.

***The evaluation recommends to the GCSP***

*On a strategic level*

- To enter into a strategy process to develop options on the future of the Centre taking into account the capacities and offers of the other Centres within the MdP including the IHEID. The strategy development should also include the development of future institutional options.
- To improve the institutional funding support from like-minded member-states with the help of FDFA upon concrete proposals of the Centre. The FDFA may consider the introduction of financial incentives for the GCSP. Non-Swiss seconded personnel may also be vested with responsibility for fundraising.

*On an operational level*

- To introduce a publications' download count on their website for monitoring purposes, and to register their academic staff on Google Citation Index.
- Maintain the focus on security relevant aspects in training and the value of training for actual or future military and civil leaders from different cultures as a platform for interaction on security relevant issues.

***The evaluation recommends to the GICHD***

*On a strategic level*

- The upcoming strategy development should be inclusive within the Centre and interactive with key actors/partners of the wider Mine Action Community. The GICHD should seize the opportunity to define more precisely where it is broadening its thematic offering. The strategy development should also include the development of future institutional options.

#### *On an operational level*

- To broaden its funding base but stay attentive to perceptions of unfair competition by other actors of the MA community and maintain the identity as an impartial provider of distinct services.
- As the GICHD is a relatively small organisation, a healthy ratio between management procedures and 'real work' for meaningful operations needs to be maintained.
- To keep an appropriate balance of staff hired directly by the Centre and consultants from outside the Centre and to develop clear guidelines on how consultants act (in their own name, or in the name of the Centre).

#### ***The evaluation recommends to the DCAF***

##### *On a strategic level*

- The DCAF CoF and Management should enter into a phase over process in view of the future change of Director and the future strategy of the Centre. The process should also include the development of future institutional options. The development of a new or the consolidation of the actual strategy may be a task of a new leadership.
- To envisage taking the lead in adapting/drafting RBM guidelines for the SSR/G field that would help to measure the impact in SSR, based on the extensive operational experience accumulated over the years. This would be useful for collaboration with SDC and external partners.

##### *On an operational level*

- To ensure that all the dimensions of the Theory of Change are used while introducing it as appropriate.
- To develop instruments in order to improve transparency of the allocations of core contribution funds to annual planning and different projects/activities.
- To clarify criteria for opening/closing offices in the field.
- To envision joint DCAF/SDC assessment missions to strategic DCAF programs.

##### *On governance the evaluation recommends to the Centre*

- The Centre should revitalize the HR function in a way that embraces the various aspects of HR.

## **SUMMARY REPORT**

### **Relevance**

Although the three Geneva Centres came from the same root, having been established as foundations by the Swiss government and core-funded by it, they have by now developed into different institutional personalities. The DCAF became operational in the field and acquired a global remit, working in international development to affect change in regions of conflict and instability. The GCSP is more distinctly a service provider for training and dialogue facility, firstly in the Transatlantic, and presently – in the global framework. The GICHD's institutional identity lies in consultancy, in being a locus of documentation and expertise for international mine action. What the Centres have in common is that they have intellectual influence in their respective spheres, have developed *know how*, which they are renowned for, and possess the asset of Swiss neutrality. The DCAF is considered a think tank in its distinct field of security sector reform and security governance.

The **GCSP** is mostly an education centre for diplomats and the military. It provides a positioning for Switzerland in the international security landscape and to present itself as a responsible global citizen. It is a strategic investment, because it can provide access to power and influence in foreign and security policy establishments, though this potential is insufficiently utilised. The GCSP's agenda has revolved around NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), where it is still relevant, especially in South Eastern Europe. The GCSP seeks to adapt to a changing context, and enters a less institutionalised and more volatile global world, engaging from Columbia to China.

The Centre's assets are its civil-military nature, comprehensive approach to security characteristic of Switzerland, excellent methodology for adult training, use of International Geneva and a truly global intermix of people in their courses. Participation in courses is both a gain in knowledge and a policy insight. The aim is to enable participants to think in a way that would allow them to develop a security policy. Since 2011 - 2012 the GCSP's focus has been moving away from the hard security issues. Some relevant academic staff, who led in the fields of peacekeeping and arms control, left the Centre. By the end of 2013 one expert worked part-time on the subject of weapons of mass destruction. Recently, the GCSP's focus has moved away from hard security issues towards international affairs. Its well-established image is on a traditional, state-centric and institutional side.

A large measure of the GCSP's institutional personality is to service the Swiss government agenda. However, in terms of its own development, the Centre's identity and purpose have been in flux in the last three years. The organisation's frequent changes of direction served to create uncertainties more than they determined a clear path forward. The previous director served from 2006 until end of July 2013, and a new Director - for the last five months of 2013. In the period under the evaluation, the 'research or not to research' debate has come to occupy undue significance. Themes were picked up, engaged with, side lined for the pursuit of new ideas; as a result the GCSP is not reputed as having a distinct niche and expertise like the DCAF and the GICHD do. It has a broad and comprehensive focus, which is needed for teaching, but not sufficient for a reputation of excellence, although individual experts on subjects in soft security enjoy high profiles.

The **GICHD** positions itself as a credible provider of technical expertise and research to the mine action community. Its niche is unique as it is neither an operational, nor an academic body. The GICHD serves as a supply of *know how* and independent analysis, as well as information management, capacity building and monitoring tools. It sometimes appears to outsiders as a collection of independent experts with projects, rather than a research institution. The GICHD is an international Centre, but mainly funded by the Swiss government (78% in 2012).

The context for demining is changing. It is a competitive business, where NGOs and private operators bid for contracts. Mine action may have reached its peak on the quantitative side, but the disorganised nature of violence challenges international instruments and makes further demining dependent on volatile contexts. Since day one the Centre has been dealing with mines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war, as they bear upon human security. The GICHD's operations predominantly concentrate on transition countries. It seldom works in conditions of open conflict and when it does so, this happens within a UN operation and/or under a tight security assessment coordinated with the UN. The Centre can respond flexibly to the changing context, as it heavily relies on consultants, who can be selected according to needs.

Evidence of demand for the GICHD's products is contradictory: a number of respondents believe that they are highly relevant and used as a reference point of best practice. Beneficiary national authorities e.g. in Lebanon and Afghanistan perceive the GICHD's strategy as adequate for their needs. Other actors maintain that although they were very pertinent in the past, their relevance subsided as the field became saturated and issues have stopped changing as quickly over time. The strategy for getting work is either to respond to requests by the UN, the partner governments or INGOs to render expertise or offer services to them. Respondents also raised questions regarding the ownership of needs assessment by affected nations and the added value of publications.

The GICHD has normative power where it acts as a secretariat for the maintenance and development of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and supports legal evolution, partly basing its institutional relevance on it. At the same time, the continuous need for revision has been questioned, as systems are in place, standards mature and issues do not move fast, - with an implication that the updating and knowledge products associated with it may be self-generated and more of a luxury than a need. Another dilemma is between staying true to the core mandate and expertise, and expanding the remit.

The **DCAF** has an excellent reputation as an organisation with solid expertise. Despite being the youngest to the field, it has risen to prominence. The DCAF's relevance to the international community is proven by the fact that only about half of its budget comes from Switzerland. Its role as promoter of ideas and knowledge has influence across the entire field, as shown by supporting the development of the *Montreux Document* and its role as a host of the Secretariat of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association. The DCAF's identity is that of a think tank with operationalisation, and an international foundation with Swiss branding, which symbolises quality and neutrality. The Centre is recognised for its capacity to provide multiple competences, such as research, policy formulation, toolkits, training and tailor-made advice, being a 'one stop shop' in policy development and implementation. According to some external partners the DCAF recently has also started to play the role of donor.

The DCAF's success in expanding and adapting to new trends lies in its vision, which is supported by flexibility and rapid reaction capacity, made possible by the way in which the core budget is used. A growth business model is an integral part of its institutional personality. The approach is to be proactive and capitalise on the right momentum, then to develop a project on that basis, for which more long-term funding is sought. Beneficiaries view the Centre as flexible and participatory in its approach, and quick in its response to opportunities and challenges.

Unlike the GCSP and the GICHD, which have institutional strategies and objectives, there is no equivalent at the DCAF. DCAF is guided by a rather programmatic strategy (2012 – 2015). Regional programmes with field presence (South Eastern Europe, MENA region) develop their own strategies, which have buy-in from national authorities. Most work is undertaken on a project basis with about 400 projects ran every year. Each division has significant independence, and there is no centralised fundraising function.

The DCAF has its generic tools developed in its 'traditional' areas, which it adapts and applies in new contexts. Training provision is one of the DCAF's main areas and one where it has a truly global roster of experts. Legal analysis and research is another dimension where the DCAF excels and gives experts from the regions voice and ownership. The unique features of the Centre are its ability to penetrate the security sector of recipient states (which is necessary for entering into partnerships), establishment of multi-stakeholder platforms, expertise on gender and SSR, and on public/ private partnerships. The DCAF was said to have become too operational in policing, which some see as being too far from the Centre's mandate. The DCAF has started to introduce Theory of Change and should make sure to use all of its aspects, especially the analytical approach, and not only as a new way of reporting to donors.

### **Effectiveness**

The execution of tasks has been of high quality at all three Centres. The **GCSP** course offer is driven more by supply rather than demand, - recruitment mostly relies on Swiss embassies, - but trainees of good calibre continue to attend courses and the sheer amount of people trained is impressive. The courses were positively appraised by the participants, and attending the course advanced the careers of some. The core courses are accountable for the GCSP's professional reputation as an institution. It was observed that most attendees from the West are military, rather than foreign ministry officials. The question is whether the governments would continue to send people, especially if asked to contribute towards fees, when some have training facilities of their own. What happens to former trainees is little known, and they have not been seen as a resource for Switzerland to access power and influence abroad. Due to insufficient data, the strategic effectiveness of training is unknown. Further research is needed.

Outside training, the Centre does not pursue a programmatic approach to interventions. It is not funded by an ODA budget and is not guided by OECD categories. A good practice of dialogue exists within the GCSP, but happens opportunistically; dialogues are reactionary, non-strategic and contacts-based. Bern is mostly the goal-setter for dialogues, which cannot be evaluated in isolation of the FDFA's own interventions. As a result, the GCSP is a house for dialogue rather than an institution. Training institutions in Sarajevo, Dakar and Bishkek should be able to deliver courses independently, as a result of their capacity building. However, no strategy for regional capacity building has been found. In principle, regional work could be the most impact-oriented, but the objective of relationship-building in the 'global South' has been unclear, as few have evolved into sustained engagements yet.

The GCSP's achievements in building institutional capacities for Swiss foreign and security policy are sustainable, because enough of its graduates work in leadership positions. Not much can be said about the long-term positive influence over policies and institutions of other countries. The sustainability of training methodology will be tested when the GCSP enters the market and runs demand-driven courses. Outcomes are in any case hard to determine because the formation of regional and global security communities is too intangible a goal, while the evidence base of the notion that a shared experience of people from all over the world trained together should impact security, stability and ultimately peace is too small. The challenge is to maintain the platform and dialogue capacity of the courses, where Iranian and North Korean officials meet their US counterparts, without losing sight of the purpose of such interaction, and to gradually develop indicators towards measuring outcomes.

The **GICHD's** field operations have been largely effective, although some national interventions, such as when the GICHD has applied generic tools to a particular context, were seen as being less contextualised. In other places, such as Vietnam, the Centre's work was considered very suitable. The IMSMA tool is used successfully in some places, while in other, more fragile contexts, the implementation is harder and may not bring about expected results. The GICHD has worked with the UN to facilitate transition from UN-led operations to national ownership in a number of countries. Respondents noted the high calibre of technical support offered by the GICHD. Maintenance of IMAS keeps the field integrated, and the Centre's knowledge products are internalised into the operations of other actors.

Outcomes of the GICHD's operations are mostly felt at country level. Support to adoption of national standards on the basis of IMAS is one of the Centre's achievements in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Laos, and has brought a change in understanding mine action in countries such as Vietnam. The introduction of quality management systems, for example, in Afghanistan, Angola and Iraq, makes mine action more systematic and allows for a strategic planning process. These achievements are likely to be sustainable because legal and technical infrastructure in the selected countries has been put in place, national capacities have been built and tools supplied, while the GICHD can provide remote support if required. The GICHD expanded participation in international mine action community for non-English speakers through a dedicated language outreach program, which benefitted Arab, Persian (Farsi/Dari) and French speakers.

The **DCAF** is considered to be a helpful and respectful organisation in the regions where it works, and the quality of its inputs is generally high. Its effectiveness depends on the context and on the DCAF's reading of that context. In South Eastern Europe it proceeded very well; for example, border police regional cooperation resulted in common operations and preparedness for EU integration. Achievements are most likely to be sustainable, and are facilitated by overall political trajectory towards Europe. Concrete outcomes beyond South Eastern Europe are harder to determine. In Tunisia, the DCAF's work resulted in the adoption of two provisions in the new constitution that improved the quality of information released by the Ministry of Interior to the public and led to the establishment of a national database on Tunisian security sector legislation. Furthermore, the DCAF received a formal mandate to assist the Minister in putting in place a strategic planning unit. However, the Tunisian government's ambitious reform plans have yet to materialise. Many inputs are produced in West Africa, but how much change happens is uncertain. Central Asia is a difficult terrain for any reform as the resilience of the inherited institutions is too great. It is also hard to see SSR in Ukraine as a success story at present.

### **Funding base**

The DCAF has entered a stage where Swiss core funding still remains critical, but is no longer the unique source of future financial growth, because the Centre is sufficiently embedded in the international donor environment and positioned for further growth. The GCSP has not pursued a growth-oriented model and has not been pro-active in raising funds, although some member-states have signaled to the evaluation team that they could put money into the institution if it came up with a proposal. Both the GICHD and the GCSP are unsustainable institutions without Swiss funding and are directly dependent on their continuous relevance for Swiss foreign and security policies, and the Swiss Federation's domestic priorities. The GCSP is more distinctly Swiss than the DCAF, which is international, and the shadow of the big donor (which almost entirely sponsors it), may not leave much space for others. Other potential funders would need good reasons to fund it.

The GICHD was 78 percent-funded by the Swiss government in 2012.<sup>9</sup> It has developed products and services, which are marketable and should allow it to attract funds and reduce dependency on Switzerland, but it has lost Norway as an important funder. The GICHD mostly does not participate in tenders, but has provided consultancy services to the UN for fees. One tender was won in partnership. There is a body of opinion that says that if the GICHD bids for donor funds as INGOs and UN do, it would lose its independent and objective voice in mine action affairs, and its reputation for impartiality would be jeopardised. The world of mine action is very competitive, and the "industry" may not welcome a new contender with a solid reputation and a funding base. It will be hard for the GICHD to win on costs. The UNMAS may prefer to hire the GICHD as experts to deliver a service on their terms rather than take note of their independent advice, which may not always coincide with the UN's own views.

### **Monitoring and Reporting**

Monitoring and measuring results have not been requested by the Swiss donor from the GICHD and the GCSP, as FDFA committed the Centres to provide activity reports. The SDC requests results-based reporting from the DCAF. The Centres have developed systems suitable for their needs, such as programme monitoring at the DCAF's Trust Fund for North Africa (TFNA). The GCSP routinely conducts course evaluations as a quality control mechanism. Apart from the MA course, the trainees are not tested and knowledge gain is not formally assessed. The GICHD has not measured its own results consistently. There is a download count on its website which enables it to see how people use it and what the popular products are. The DCAF freely disseminates its publications, but ask for a contribution to mailing costs in case of individual orders via website<sup>10</sup>, and keeps track of its bestsellers, such as the 'Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector' and the 'Gender and SSR Toolkit' among others. The Centres' strategies do not have appropriate monitoring mechanisms. While all three provide education and guidance to external audiences on how to monitor and evaluate results, these approaches do not transpire into their own houses, begging the question to what extent the Centres live up to the values they teach.

### **Efficiency**

The GCSP's implementation has been expensive, but it offers superb quality of training and Geneva experience for its participants. It can be argued that such high quality is worth the cost, The GCSP's leadership is aware of the need to live according to their means and invest into the future, and is believed to be on the right track. However, the GCSP has spent much of its energy on internal issues in the last three years and has become inward-looking. Low morale and change fatigue have developed into obstacles on the road to recovery. Since the arrival of the new director a more strategic turn around process has been set in motion. While the outcome of this process is open, there is potential to position the GCSP as a distinct actor in a challenging environment.

---

<sup>9</sup> Other main donors are Sweden, Finland, Australia and Germany.

<sup>10</sup> For example: Megan Bastick, Kristin Valasek, 'Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit,' DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW 2008 ISBN:978-92-9222-074-7, available to purchase at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Gender-Security-Sector-Reform-Toolkit> (18 euro)

The assessment of the GICHD's efficiency is positive. The internal management and tracking instruments set up prior to the last evaluation have settled in. Financial reporting is transparent and congruent with activity reporting. The system allows staff to check different donors' contributions to specific activities. The GICHD has instruments and procedures in place to efficiently and transparently manage operations and finances. Its knowledge hub for the mine action community is maintained and contributes to the sector's efficiency through fast access to relevant and up-to-date information. Some feedback from staff mentions the administrative burden of following the procedures to supply data to the internal control and management system.

The DCAF has moved from a limited audit to its first complete audit in 2013. The example of SIDA-funded projects in Belgrade shows that external experts are recruited according to project needs and in accordance with SIDA procurement procedures. The ISSAT has shared audited accounts with other members and has improved its financial planning.

### **Contractual arrangements and relationship with the Swiss Federal Government**

The evaluation found that the GCSP's Annual Agreement with the FDFA stipulates numerous tasks and does not allow great flexibility. From the main donor's perspective the GCSP remains a relevant and reliable vehicle of delivery on the core mandate and commissioned projects, while the Centre has a sense of ownership even when the designs come from the FDFA. It feels it has the freedom to turn general ideas into concrete products without intrusiveness from Bern. Thus, the GCSP perceives its contribution to Swiss foreign and security policy as quality implementation of services under the Agreement; it is content with this role and aspires for more direction from Bern. The latter rather wishes it to follow an independent path and attract funds, but the Centre has so far had little impetus to do so. At present, expectations that it can act as if it were an independent and developmental actor are unrealistic.

The GICHD is named as an important partner in mine action for Switzerland and its operations were found to be in line with the Swiss strategy. The GICHD promotes the Strategy by hosting the Implementation Support Unit to the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and by providing technical support to the development and maintenance of IMAS and the Information Management System in Mine Action (IMSMA). Priorities in enhancing land release, and strengthening national ownership and capacity are aligned with the Strategy. The Agreement is phrased in broad terms with few tasks mandated, and leaves much room for manoeuvre.

The responsibility for the Swiss contribution to DCAF's funding shifted from DDPS/ FDFA to the SDC and took place in 2011. In addition to the core tasks, the DCAF implements various projects and co-financed programmes with the Swiss government. Some of these, such as cyber security or public-private partnerships, are in line with new trends. The relationship with SDC is ambiguous as SDC is monitoring the core funding through the annual agreement and the reporting thereto and it is also a strategic and operational partner for specific projects and programs such as the TNFA.

### **Governance**

The Message to the Parliament vests a Committee to Pilotage (CDP), comprised of FDFA and DDPS representatives, with responsibility for steering and monitoring the Swiss financial contribution. A 'Foundation' model, based on membership by states who apply or are invited to 'join the club' is an appropriate modality for the working context, as it allows for buy-in by the governments and justifies the Centres' claim to international status/identity. The three Centres have the same formal structure: the supreme governing body is a Council of Foundation (CoF), which is assisted by a Bureau with operational responsibilities. Beneficiary mine-affected countries are represented on the GICHD's Bureau. The GCSP bureau is mostly Swiss, while the DCAF has Swiss and other donor representatives. The CoF and Bureaus are chaired by Presidents, who advise on strategic directions, prepare and run the CoF meetings. The Centres have Advisory Boards used to check ideas, outreach and pool expertise, but they are not part of the



governance structure. Trust Funds and specific programmatic units have their own reporting and steering mechanisms.<sup>11</sup>

CoFs are important for representation purposes, as a platform for members to express their interests, connect to the Swiss foreign policy establishment and manifest commitment, as well as for fundraising. The Councils approve decisions usually made elsewhere. The CoF, President and Bureau are more active and exercise certain strategic steering capacity at the GICHD. At the GCSP, the Bureau and the President facilitate the process on behalf of the Swiss government, look after the GCSP's reputation, manage finance and oversee the Director's work.

The Directors are appointed by the CoFs, following a proposal by the FDFA.<sup>12</sup> They have the freedom to strategise, propose or refuse ideas, which come from the Bureau or CDP. However, the system has few effective safeguards against mismanagement. Currently, the Directors bear a lot of responsibility, which while a great privilege requires them to establish their internal authority and an external reputation, although they are not judged by their ability to attract funds.

Directors are assisted by management teams. The GICHD's arrangements are adequate for the purpose allowing the Director to be removed from daily business, although a 7-person management team (including the director) seems top-heavy for a 50 staff institution.<sup>13</sup> The same applies to the GCSP with an 8-person senior team for 60-staff. DCAF's directing board meets once a week, transversal cooperation is encouraged and internal communication is considered to be good. The Director is in the lead, but divisions have a lot of leeway in their fields.

The CDP's role is pivotal for all three Centres, but because the DCAF has a wider funding base, it has more independence. The more the Centres depend on Swiss government funding, the more the government's steering mechanism becomes a parallel governing mechanism. While the Centres' independence is guaranteed *de jure*, the CDP has an important *de facto* influence as it is vested as "la plus haute instance de pilotage des trois centres de Genève"<sup>14</sup>. For example, "crisis management" concerns both the CDP and the CoFs, but the CDP, as an instrument of the main donor carries, in the opinion of the evaluation, more influence. Strategic steering mostly happens between the Directors and the CDP, while the CoFs can and, in the GICHD's case, do play a substantive role. The structure of the Foundations could be made to fit the governance purpose better, if the key functions<sup>15</sup> had more professional expertise in project management and financial oversight. Clear terms of reference for the Treasurer, Secretary and President positions would be beneficial along with clear professional and managerial requirements for the Director as well as clarification of the steering functions between the CDP and the CoFs. The evaluation has taken note of the more open and ToR guided process for the selection of new Directors for the GICHD and the GCSP during 2013.

### **International Geneva / Synergies**

The assumption behind the creation of the MdP was that the Centres would keep their individuality and independence, while fostering synergies. In fact, the DCAF articulated an inspiring vision for MdP in 2013. The GICHD proposed a vision for knowledge sharing and capacity-building. The GCSP has not articulated a its own vision but supports the vision of the DCAF. The Graduate Institute (IHEID) clearly sees the potential of collaboration with the DCAF and the GICHD in the security field.

The actors at the MdP consider it extremely important for the FDFA to be at the centre of the driving mechanism, i.e. the strategic working group, in order to foster synergies and meet at the MdP to create a

---

<sup>11</sup> Steering boards oversee ISSAT and TFNA at DCAF.

<sup>12</sup> The GICHD's statute does not foresee a proposal by the FDFA for the appointment of a Director. However, the Message to the Parliament requires this as a condition for funding.

<sup>13</sup> The total of 50 includes part time employees and excludes ISU personnel.

<sup>14</sup> Message to the Parliament item 2.6

<sup>15</sup> President, Secretary, Treasurer and Director of the Centre

sense of ownership. The IHEID owns the MdP, which is perceived as a competitive disadvantage for the Centres, because they have to rent it. The lack of transparency and communication regarding the financial arrangements between the IHEID and the Centres results in a lack of ownership of the MdP. The GCSP team was responsible for the ICT's infrastructure and installation of telecommunications. There is a sense of unease. It has not been decided who will be responsible for the overall web platform and no help is available to navigate through the complex buildings for visitors.

The DCAF will move at the end of 2014 and has great expectations on strengthening its internal collaboration. It is envisaged that synergies will follow and there are already ideas for how this will happen. The Service Centre, which covers the ICT dimension is a positive example, and an agreement has been concluded by the Centres to accept IHEID students as research interns. Information and experience sharing, human resources management and administrative processes can also be closer integrated.

Discussions on synergy inspire a sense of opportunity, but also apprehension. There is anxiety about a potential merger, which the Centres seek to avoid, emphasising the differences in identity between them. These differences are indeed significant, because not all states which are members of the GCSP CoF would want to engage with the DCAF due to its 'democratic control' agenda. Another concern focuses on the risk of competition from executive education offered by the IHEID. The third concern is of overplaying a convening function, in case all organisations in the MdP seek to promote the brand among the same audiences.

Certainly, the MdP and the Geneva Centres can make a Swiss contribution to peace and security more visible in International Geneva and globally, if they were to add a think tank dimension, but enacting this vision requires a streamlined and joint planning and implementation approach of all involved and might require additional (ear marked funding) from the Swiss Federation.

So far, programmatic synergies between the three Centres have been minimal. The GCSP and the DCAF are both involved in the field of security training and *ad hoc* cooperation has taken place, such as on Myanmar. The DCAF argues that much of its training is programmatic and tailor-made, and is different from the GCSP's generic offer, but this argument hardly applies to training offers for border guards, which are also generic. When the Centres are involved in the same country/city, as is the case in Sarajevo, Tunis or Bishkek, they could explore avenues for cooperation. It appears that the DCAF saw itself in a different category than GCSP and GICHD, and did not attribute high value to cooperation.<sup>16</sup>

There is an opportunity for the GICHD and the DCAF to cooperate over stockpile security and management as a part of a defence sector reform, to which the DCAF can bring policy experience and the GICHD can bring technical expertise including setting of standards. An opportunity may exist for GCSP/ DCAF synergies, if the GCSP were to seek to move from a Swiss model<sup>17</sup> to a more international one.

## Gender

Efforts have been made to mainstream gender into programmes and activities, and the GICHD and the DCAF successfully developed specialised gender expertise in their respective areas. The GCSP has incorporated gender-related topics into the curriculum of its core courses and seeks to improve representation of women in their courses. Academic and programmatic gender expertise exists and is promoted globally. At the same time, gender has not been internalised by the Centres with regards to their own staffing, shown by a significant gap in gender ratio when it comes to the most senior level at each organisation: 6 men versus 2 women in the GCSP, 7 men and no women in the GICHD, and 12 men versus 4 women at the DCAF, and no women head regional offices. Their Bureaus are exclusively male and 2 out of 3 Presidents are men. Data on salary ratios for men and women was provided only by the GCSP, and the GICHD's ratios were calculated by

---

<sup>16</sup> A good example of using synergies is the once a year design, monitoring and evaluation trainings for the three Centres which GICHD is organizing as well as the Small Arms Survey.

<sup>17</sup> The main donor and the main client of the GCSP is the FDFA, which sets in the view of the evaluation to a high degree the agenda of the Centre.

the evaluation. In the GCSP case, there is a salary gap for men and women.<sup>18</sup> Only the GICHD has a written Gender and Diversity Paper, which applies to internal issues, as well as to programmatic activities.

There appears to be a genuine belief among many interviewed men among staff and guest speakers that gender problems exist 'out there,' but not in Geneva where women enjoy equal opportunities. When women are viewed as beneficiaries, their need to strive towards gender equality is recognised, but gender aspects at one's own workplace tend to go unacknowledged. The lack of reporting to the donor on gender mainstreaming at the Centres makes it easy to overlook problems back home.

## Conclusions

The **GCSP** can be interpreted as a Swiss foreign policy asset, and also as a distinct training provider for military and diplomats with unusual composition of classes (North Koreans and Iranians are trained together with US and European colleagues). It is at times struggling with its identity: is it an extension of the FDFA in Geneva as some see it, or an independent provider of training and dialogue platforms? Where does it have freedom and where is it an executor of others' requests? It is not always clear what change it seeks to affect and where. Academic credentials outside of the University of Geneva-certified course are hard to interpret as the GCSP is not a university and as its distinct niche is in the non-competitive area of education for government officials and the military. It is uncertain if the GCSP can stand on its own in the field of security policy simply on the quality of its teaching, for which intermixing of participants is essential. The Centre is in need of modernisation and change, and the role of the leadership in this process is key. The competitive environment of executive training makes expanding into this market challenging. More strategic cooperation within the MdP and the international Geneva might bring synergies but also help to sharpen the distinctiveness not only of the GCSP but of also of other actors in the MdP.

The **GICHD's** future opportunities lie in using its mine action methodology for widening its scope of work and sharing its *know how*, but they also carry the threat of duplicating work of UNMAS and national armies. Overall, the mine action niche may narrow in the next decade while the problem of residual remnants of war might be on the agenda over a longer term and may require support on approaches, standards, methods and tools. Ultimately the GICHD may face three options: to stick to its technical knowledge and international standard-bearer role, but expand its thematic remit and strategic cooperations as well as participating in tenders; seek strategic cooperation within the MdP namely with the IHEID, DCAF, GCSP and SAS to generate synergies and maintain critical mass or to stay within a limited scope of MA and develop a transitional strategy towards a phasing out while keeping in mind the needs to manage residual contamination<sup>19</sup>.

Coherent or not, the **DCAF's** institutional approach has delivered results. Swiss core funding has given it a launch pad to grow, develop and reach new heights. There is great wisdom in the saying 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it.' However, to what extent this success is sustainable in the new era when donors set more exacting standards and request proof of added value, remains to be seen. The other issue is the lifespan for the DCAF in South Eastern Europe – how long will it continue with its field presence and what are the benchmarks for withdrawal? The DCAF has now entered a different period with the SDC as a steering and monitoring agency for the Swiss core funding. There is now a need to recruit new experts, enhance the Centre's human resources management and appoint a new Director in future. If the Centre expands into new areas, it must be mindful that the success and experience gained in some geographical contexts where the DCAF is well established, may hamper its capacity to re-analyse the Centre's strategy in new regions.

Moving to the MdP provides chances to the Centres to develop closer cooperation and strategic partnership in order to enhance their visibility but also sharpen their distinct identity. With states as members of the CoF's the Centres reflect true international ownership. As different countries share the missions of each of the Centre's their independence remains a distinct asset of a specific identity.

---

<sup>18</sup> GICHD's data is incomparable, as there are no women at the decision-making level.

<sup>19</sup> Natural disasters such as the recent floods in the western Balkans (May 2014) are examples of challenges to be met with managing residual contamination.

## Lessons

The Centres still occupy a unique niche in the security field, although their continuous relevance depends on the evolution of political and developmental agendas, correct identification of their roles and the ability to fit into the evolving context. Their *raison d'être* is not static, as new actors keep arriving in the field of security policy, and needs to be rigorously reviewed at critical junctions. In their work, GCSP and DCAF partly also apply tools which worked successfully in EU/ NATO ascendant countries in more volatile and precarious new contexts.

The activity of the three Centres is mostly based on supplying products and services in the expectation of fostering demand from their respective fields, which takes place to some extent. Correlation between supply and demand will need to be carefully watched not to overdo on the supply side.

Systems and their underlying values that the Centres promote externally are not always applied in-house. The three Centres were measured by different standards and criteria by the main donor (the Swiss Confederation), had a combination of ODA and non-ODA funds and had parallel governance structures. This created many uncertainties and complicated strategic steering.

The present system of core funding does not provide much impetus for growth, and leaves the choice whether to develop new products and raise external funds to the Centres' leaderships. 'Swiss identity' can be a great asset as it gives the Centres a reputation for neutrality, but it is also a liability in terms of attracting external support, since the shadow of the big donor could be seen as overwhelming.

The concept of 'synergies' brings not only a sense of opportunity, but also a degree of fear in what the future bears. The MdP should be more than a sum of its parts, but it needs to be filled with intellectual content and cooperative spirit.

Investment in people is a strategic asset for Switzerland only if they continue to be connected to the Swiss orbit and networks are used strategically. Intermixing of nationalities in training courses (e.g. of GCSP) makes education richer, but the impact on the promotion of peace and security is uncertain. Nevertheless, in specific regional post-conflict contexts such as the Western Balkans, regional capacity building approaches, such as those developed by DCAF, can have a very direct impact on regional peace and security.

If the FDFA wants the GCSP to stand on its own feet more and to develop an institutional personality, a clearer distinction between its service provision and independent actor functions would be beneficial.

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background**

The Message to the Swiss parliament on funding of the Geneva Centres and the Framework Agreements between the Swiss Confederation and the Centres envisages commissioning of an independent evaluation on the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Geneva Centres for 2014. The “Comité de Pilotage” which consists of FDFA and DDPS decided that one team shall evaluate all three Geneva Centres and on 23 November 2013 launched a call for proposals.

#### **Scope and objectives**

The evaluation assesses aspects of the corporate and strategic governance of the Centres. It covers the period of 2010 – 2013 and the year 2014 is outside of the evaluation scope. The report comments on the on-going and planned developments in 2014 where it deems appropriate. The pre-2010 period has been a subject of previous evaluations and is referenced when essential for understanding of the current issues.

The evaluation has two interrelated objectives:

1. Accountability for the work done in the 2010 – 2013 period and the results achieved in order to inform the Swiss Parliament on the implementation of the current framework credit line.
2. Institutional learning to increase the objective-oriented and results-based management, to strengthen the quality of governance and administration.

The evaluation focus is on strategic orientation, and the quality of implementation in terms of services and the Centres’ achievements, as well as on the analysis of the governance structures, institutional mechanisms and management procedures. It will also assess the relevance of the Centres for Swiss Foreign Policy and the International Geneva. It is expected that the assessments, conclusions and recommendations of the current evaluation will contribute to the next Message to Parliament for the up-coming credit frame period 2016 - 2019.

While the internal decision-making mechanism of the CDP is out of the scope of the evaluation, in the evaluators view the CDP’s influence/impact on the governance of and contractual arrangements with the three Centres are part of the dynamics to be assessed. The Swiss Federation is the main donor of all three Centres. Therefore, leaving the influence of the FDFA on different aspects of the Centres functioning out of the evaluation’s scope would negatively impact on the credibility of the evaluation. This includes that the evaluation takes the liberty to address recommendations also to the FDFA if it may help, in the view of the evaluators, to clarify the level of action required to follow up recommendation.

Assessing the contributions as being ODA eligible or not is in the view of the evaluators not within the scope of the evaluation. It would require a deeper assessment and knowledge on the Swiss Federation’s ODA reporting. The evaluation does not have this information and does not include an assessment on the justification of the Swiss contribution to the Centres being ODA or not. It should however be noted that through the decision of OECD ministers, DCAF has the status of an international development organisation, and financial contributions from member states are ODA-deductible. If the qualification of contribution as not being ODA has an impact on the evaluation approach or analysis as it is to a certain extend the case with the GCSP this is mentioned where it seems relevant<sup>20</sup>.

### **1.2 Methodology**

The evaluation was conducted in three phases:

---

<sup>20</sup> The contributions to GICHD and DCAF are mentioned in the list of Swiss multilateral ODA on SDC website. The GCSP is not mentioned on this list.

1. An inception Phase consisting of an in-depth document review and initial interviews. The Inception report was validated on February 26<sup>th</sup> during a meeting with the CDP.
2. Data collection phase – interviews with internal and external key stakeholders. Reflective workshops. Data collection (from 1 February to 22 April 2014) overlapped with the inception and with the analysis phase due to busy schedules of some respondents.
3. Analysis, synthesis and elaboration of the report phase – 22 April to 14 June 2014

### **1.2.1 Data collection**

A set of questionnaires was prepared to respond to the ToR and was adapted to each group of key respondents of semi-structured face-to-face interviews and reflective workshops. All major involved stakeholders, such as selected members of the Bureaus, the CoFs and Advisory Board members were covered. Interviewees were divided into four categories:

1. Partners, beneficiaries, research and expert collaborators;
2. Centres' staff and close associates, e.g. involved Bureau members or former staff;
3. Control group: independent observers, funders, other significant actors in the field and external stakeholders<sup>21</sup>
4. Swiss federal government officials

'During the evaluation phase 262 individuals were contacted for an interview. For example, in 29 cases the interview meeting did not take place.

Inquiries were made through public inquiry forms at websites of the following institutions to solicit interviews:

- Atlantic Council
- The US Army War College
- Wilton Park
- UK Defence Academy
- International Institute of Strategic Studies
- US Postgraduate Naval College
- BAKS
- UK Stabilisation Unit
- George C. Marshall Centre

Three public inquiries were responded to by BAKS, the US Army War College and SU.

214 interviews took place (with 78 women and 136 men) either through individual interviews, during reflective workshops, by phone or Skype. 12 respondents answered in writing (see Annex 2 for the list of respondents).

The interviewees spoke under Chatham House rule, unless they were employees of beneficiary governments and were speaking on behalf of their institutions. The evaluation team is happy to discuss further if specific questions on responses arise, but will be guided by the need to protect their sources as appropriate.

### **1.2.2 Staff reflective workshops**

The rationale for the workshops was to foster a collective reflection about the strategy and a common vision, and the different roles of the actors involved in the programme.

---

<sup>21</sup> External stakeholders' are those individuals and institutions who are not staff, former staff, CoF and Bureau members, and Associate Fellows. It was difficult to identify such stakeholders on GCSP. Two of the GCSP-identified respondents failed to respond to inquiries. The EU contacts were not available for interviews. One UN respondent was interviewed in Geneva. Four NATO representatives indicated by the FDFA refused to give interviews citing little knowledge of the Centre. The same applies to a US army respondent. To move the inquiry forward, the evaluation contacted about 10 organisations through public inquiry forms on their websites (list in the chapter 1). Two of them responded, one with a respondent on GCSP and one – on DCAF.

The rationale for the workshops was to foster a collective reflection about the strategy and a common vision, and the different roles of the actors involved in the programme.

Three reflective workshops were held at the GCSP and the DCAF (Geneva and Tunis) in each case with a group of six staff members (mix of seniority, gender, nationality, and length of service) alongside a set of prepared questions to ensure comparability of findings. Due to unexpected circumstances the reflective workshop could not take place in GICHD. Eighteen persons participated in the workshops altogether.

During the field visits one reflective workshop with DCAF staff members was held in Tunis and one with beneficiaries at Serbia's Ministry of Interior in Belgrade.

### 1.2.3 Field trips – Primary case studies

Two fieldtrips took place during the data collection phase.

1. South Eastern Europe - from March 10 to March 14 – total of 23 interviews:
  - March 10-11 - DCAF Ljubljana Office (BSP program and PCC secretariat)
  - March 12-14 – Belgrade – visit of two projects funded by SIDA implemented at the Ministry of Interior – interviews mainly with beneficiaries, but also donors, Swiss representatives, partners.
2. DCAF Tunis – March 24-28 – 27 interviews with various stakeholders – mainly partners, donors, other actors and not that many beneficiaries. TFNA implementation.

### 1.2.4 Secondary case studies

The aim of the secondary case studies was to ensure that there was one field operation for each Centre to evaluate each Centre more in-depth. The idea was also to see how the Centres operate in difficult/ fragile contexts.

1. DCAF Central Asia (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), February. Seven interviews were held. The case allowed a brief assessment of DCAF's operations in an unpromising political climate and of the quality of the relationship with UNDP and OSCE as intermediary organisations for interaction with the national governments. The interview with the person responsible for the Border guards programme in Central Asia at DCAF, directly attached to the Director, took place very late due to schedule constraints.
2. GICHD – Afghanistan: GICHD supports the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA). Impressions from the field were acquired through Skype and personal interviews with organisations operating in mine action in Afghanistan.
3. GCSP - OSCE Academy (Kyrgyzstan),<sup>22</sup> March 10 - 19: GCSP supported the OSCE Academy in Bishkek since 2004 by providing advice and visiting lecturers for the Master of Arts Programme in Politics and Security. The contribution of GCSP to the development of the Academy was assessed by interviews with the management, the students, alumni and former Directors of the Academy.

The field phase largely relied on qualitative data collection methods, such as in-depth key informant interviews, reflective workshops with the Centres' staff, engaged field observation and on-going documentation study. The evaluation also relied on quantitative data collected by the Centres themselves, such as on gender ratio, and drew data from public sources, such as Google Scholar citation index, to assess how widely the Centres' publications are read.

### 1.2.5 Data analysis

#### Triangulation of data

The evaluation team has applied a **set of research methods and tools** to collect and analyse data. To ensure the accuracy and validity of study findings the team ensured:

---

<sup>22</sup> Proposed by InnovaBridge in the response to tender and accepted by the CDP at the meeting on 28 February 2014. The case study was entered in the inception report. Efforts were made to identify another case study together with the GCSP by inquiries sent to the Deputy Director by the evaluation in March 2014, but no appropriate case study was identified, as no other proposal came from the GCSP than to evaluate the ICT, which has been certified and is regularly assessed.

- Source triangulation: information from different sources was compared, i.e. at various management levels within different functional units,
- Method triangulation: Team members compared information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews, reflective workshops, document review.
- Researcher triangulation: Comparison and collation of information collected by different team members during the course of their research to align the conclusions.
- Context triangulation. The evaluation triangulated findings from different countries and operational contexts.
- Interlocutors can speak openly and that findings cannot be attributed to one interlocutor;
- Conclusions are clearly based on findings, and recommendations are clearly based on conclusions;
- All outputs are practical, easy to read, and useable for the target audience.
- The evaluation employed the Theory of Change approach to the analysis of programmatic interventions. The team tried to make the Centres' assumptions on the context and change explicit by activating critical reflection. It explored:
  - The context for the interventions, including social and political conditions, and the donor environment;
  - Process and sequence of change anticipated to lead to the desired long-term outcomes; and
  - Assumptions about how these changes should happen; whether the activities and outputs are appropriate for influencing change in the desired direction.

The findings for DCAF were put into the Theory of Change Evaluation Matrix 1. The evaluation found it appropriate to do this in the case of DCAF as its activities need very long term perspectives to bear fruit and show results and are depending on complex dynamics.

Data from each source was placed into the evaluation framework to assist in identifying key findings, conclusions and results. Data analysis has been carried out throughout the assignment alongside the criteria in the section on 'Key Questions' of the Inception Report. The evaluators formed preliminary conclusions by the end of the field missions, which are reflected in the current draft report.

The analysis has been carried out in accordance with the OECD-DAC evaluation standards and the Swiss Evaluation Standards (SEVAL-Standards),<sup>23</sup> paying attention to the key concepts, such as Transparency of Value Judgments: 'the underlining reasoning and points of view upon which an interpretation of evaluation results rests are described in such a manner that the bases for the value judgments are clear' and Anticipating Political Viability.

The International Mine Action Standard 14.10 on "Evaluation of Mine Action interventions" has been applied to the GICHD if specificity for GICHD so required.

### **1.2.6 Key methods, informants and sources of data**

#### **Control group**

The evaluation team identified 'control-group' respondents who were aware of the activities of the Centres, but are not direct clients or beneficiaries, and could offer an impartial view. Donors were among this category. The examples include respondents from the following institutions:<sup>24</sup>

- International organisations: OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, ICRC, NATO
- Federal College for Security Studies (BAKS)
- Norwegian Peoples Aid<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> SEVAL Standard: Version 5 December 2000.

<sup>24</sup> See full list in Annex.

<sup>25</sup> In its comments to the evaluation team, the GICHD objects that three out of 15 control group respondents are Norwegian and may have a potentially strong strategic and political position regarding MA or may be a direct competitor, which would affect the impartiality of those respondents. Being asked about main competitors of GICHD, respondents did not mention NPA. NPA is listed however as one of the main partners of the GICHD on the website. The Norwegian Embassy was mainly interviewed on GCSP and



- Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
- US Army Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute
- US Army War College
- Swedish MFA, SIDA, Folke Bernadotte Academy
- Norwegian MFA
- UK Aid
- International NGOs: Saferworld, Small Arms Survey
- Peace Research Institution in Oslo
- UN agencies, e.g. UNDP, UNESCO, UNITAR and UNMAS
- Razumkov centre Ukraine

### 1.2.7 Limitations of the evaluation

The different stage in which the Centres are at the moment, the different mandates and the different funding situation challenges the evaluators to produce a consistent assessment for each Centre of the achievements/challenges they have reached/faced since 2010 and at the same time synthesise the findings in an overall report on synergies and comparisons.

Measuring impact is a challenging undertaking in development and policy influencing as it is difficult to assess the level of attribution with respect to overall change. The issue of attribution arises because of multiple influences and the involvement of other actors. The team used the contribution analysis to underpin the questions in the ToR and to assess the different levels of contribution. The main limitation was that measuring GCSP by OECD DAC categories<sup>26</sup> was only partially possible, because the Centre was not requested to abide by them from the start, and because it is not funded through the ODA budget. The evaluation gathered data as it could, but the nature of the Centre's activities is such that not all questions could be answered to full satisfaction.

## 1.3 Report structure

The report is structured as follows: the executive summary outlines the main findings, key strategic and managerial recommendations follow. The summary reporting provides for a broader outline on all aspects of the evaluation making broad comparisons between the Centres where necessary. The evidence for the assessment is presented in the chapters of the main report. The *Assessment* paragraphs reflect the evaluation's own views. Chapter 1 introduces the evaluation, describes methodology and the process of data collection. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 contain dedicated analysis on the individual Centres – GCSP (2), GICHD (3) and DCAF (4). They are intended for the CDP and specifically for each Centre. Chapter 5 deals with cross cutting issues including governance, International Geneva and gender, and is meant to be shared with all Centres to allow a reflection on these broad themes. The report is followed by seven annexes.

Dieter von Blarer is the team leader and the author of chapter 3 (GICHD), the case study on OSCE Academy for GCSP and the section on governance in chapter 5 as well as the executive summary. Sophia Procofieff is the author of chapter 4 (DCAF) and the section on International Geneva in the Cross-cutting issues. The summary report, chapter 2 (GCSP), the gender chapter and case studies on Tunisia and Central Asia for DCAF are written by Anna Matveeva. Sophia Procofieff and Anna Matveeva co-authored chapter 1 (Introduction).

The evaluators wish to thank all the respondents for so generously sharing their ideas and insights, and the Centres and the FDFA/ DDPS for their assistance with our inquiries. Our special thanks go to the staff of DCAF's Ljubljana, Belgrade and Tunis regional offices for their outstanding support during the field missions.

---

DCAF and just mentioned an obviously dissenting (to GICHD) opinion on MA policies and the future of MA. SIPRI was only contacted on GCSP and is also mentioned as one of the main partners on GICHD website.

<sup>26</sup> The Categories of OECD evaluation standards are: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. The evaluation relates also to the OECD DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Evaluating Peacebuilding in Settings of Conflict and Fragility (2012)

The assessments and conclusions are our own independent evaluation.

## **2. THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP)**

### **2.1 Summary of findings and recommendations**

#### **2.1.1 Strength /Weaknesses/Critical Challenges**

##### *Strengths*

- Convening power in Geneva
- Methodology of training for public officials in integrated security dimension
- Body of knowledge in fundamental security concepts to equip its audience to grasp globality
- Truly global, non-ideological intermix of people

##### *Weaknesses*

- Lack of a clear vision/ inability to implement the stated vision
- Low visibility/ reputation outside of own network/ use of human capital
- High dependency on the Swiss government, growth at the expense of state service procurement rather than through self-generated products
- Frequent shifts and loss of a sense of direction, low morale
- Gender aspects

##### *Critical Challenges*

- Ongoing turn around process to position the Centre in a challenging environment.
- Identity as a service provider for the FDFA or an independent provider for training and dialogue platforms?
- International credentials and academic reputation
- Cost-effectiveness

#### **2.1.2 Summary of recommendations**

##### **The evaluation recommends on a strategic level**

- To work on/develop options for the future as a distinct Centre for training/research and dialogue with comprehensive mix of the three or as a training and convening point; a service Centre to provide tailor made training and capacity building for the security sector and related fields such as peace building; strategic partnership with Swiss<sup>27</sup> and other actors as well namely DCAF, GICHD and HEID to develop a comprehensive understanding of armed violence control and protection of people within a whole of government approach.

##### **The evaluation recommends to the Centre**

- To develop a strategy with clearly defined outcomes, and qualitative and quantitative targets, establish a baseline against each outcome, introduce indicators to measure progress against each objective and to trace more general impacts, and work on putting in place RBM tools.
- To examine who the GCSP allies are on the CoF and enter into negotiations on potential cooperation/ funding plans.
- To introduce, for monitoring purposes, publications' download counts on their website and to register their academic staff on Google Citation Index.

##### **The evaluation recommends to the CoF**

- To develop or adapt according to the needs and requirements a Terms of reference for the President, the Secretary, and the Treasurer of the Foundation and the Director of the Centre.
- To agree with the CDP on a MoU for the strategic guidance and steering of the Centre.

---

<sup>27</sup> e.g, the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH, Zürich and Swiss Peace in Bern

### The evaluation recommends to the FDFA

- To provide clear reporting expectations to the Centre in the framework agreement and in the annual agreements.

## 2.2 Background

The Centre was established in 1995 as an instrument of Swiss foreign and security policy after the Cold War and as its contribution to international security. Until 2004 it was financed and overseen by the Ministry of Defence, then co-financed with the FDFA and finally solely funded through the latter since 2010. DDPS is represented at the CDP and the CoF, and contributes to individual GCSP efforts.

### An overview

*Governance and Human Resources (according to commercial register and Centre's web-site)*

Management	Staff/ Head count	Council of Foundation	Bureau	Advisory Board
8	60	45 States + Canton Geneva	5 (4 Swiss)	25

*Finances 2013 in CHF (according to PWC audit)*

Revenues 2013	Swiss Contribution <sup>28</sup>	Non-Swiss Contributions <sup>29</sup>	Deferred from 2012 and other <sup>30</sup>
10'377'287	8'449'138	1'169'160	763'489
Expenditures 2013	Core Activities and Governance	Projects <sup>31</sup>	Transitory carried forward
10'376'732	5'199'445	4'531'092	646'195

The Message to the Parliament of November 2010 stipulates the following expectations:

- Global alignment and demand
- Program Focus on university level (Bologna conform) educational products (cooperation with University Geneva and IHEID)
- Training for Swiss Security and Peace Building Policy
- Point of Reference for the EU and interface of the EU to international Geneva
- Services for the UN (training modules/ policy development)
- Knowledge development and teaching
- Support of security and peace building dialogue
- Diversification of international alignment and of finances

An evaluation of the period 2006 – 2010 was conducted by a former NISC course director. The evaluation concluded that GCSP was a 'worthwhile expenditure of public resources'. It recommended to:

- Diversify funding sources and develop a strategy for dealing with possible budget cuts;
- Reorganise activities into thematic programmes and address imbalance in administrative support to programmes;
- Consider if 3 core courses are a good return on investment and review the ETC.

<sup>28</sup> Including CHF 509'313 from FDFA for additional projects and CHF 786'825 from the DDPS.

<sup>29</sup> Other contributions from: Nestar Foundation, partner institutions, China, Latvia, Sweden, Estonia, Germany and Organisation de la Francophonie.

<sup>30</sup> Contributions transferred, interests, release of provisions, and other.

<sup>31</sup> Leadership in conflict management, Emerging Security Challenges, Regional Development, Outreach, MdP.

## 2.3 Evaluation and analysis

The evaluation scope covers the period 2010 – 2013. The evaluation is aware of an ongoing change/turn around process under the new director of the GCSP. Some conclusions of the evaluation as well as recommendations might therefore be out-dated regarding the actual situation of the Centre.

### 2.3.1 Relevance

#### 2.3.1.1 Relevance of vision/mission

The GCSP Strategy stipulates ‘our vision is that by 2015 the GCSP will be the principal centre in Europe for professional training in security policy in a select number of fields for participants from around the world.’

GCSP’s strategic niche lies in working with governments and international organisations. The strengths lie in its comprehensive approach to security, which is characteristic of Switzerland, expertise in legal aspects of security which connects it to the UN and other international bodies, its ability to relate to different systems, e.g. UN and NATO, and to embed itself into the intellectual and institutional infrastructure of Geneva. Its civil–military nature, and multilateral umbrella and neutrality, which open the door to difficult partners in international security, are among its distinguishing features. Participation in the courses is both a knowledge win and a policy insight. The Centre is striving for a broad mix of guest speakers and has a convening capacity to bring together people, who might not meet in other venues.

GCSP’s mission is historically connected to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), although the Centre’s establishment pre-dates the latter. It is still regarded as a ‘donation’ to NATO and enjoys a continued relevance in the Western Balkans, an important aspect of Swiss-NATO cooperation. It is one of the 23 officially-recognized Partner Training and Education Centres (PTEC). As a member of the PTEC community, it provides value to the Alliance and its partners. The GCSP offers its cooperation in various domains in defence<sup>32</sup> within the PfP network and interacts through a Swiss representative at the functional Clearing House for Defence Education programmes, who acts as a liaison between emerging requests and the Centre’s capacity to respond.

GCSP’s reputation of being associated with NATO had been an advantage and a liability, - since people from some CIS and West African countries viewed it with suspicion, - but this perception has subsided.<sup>33</sup> Many respondents argued that outside the Balkans the PfP agenda is reaching its limits: ‘it does not make sense anymore, but we cannot cancel it, so we bypass it.’ Those who could join NATO perhaps have already done so, while a relationship of trust with Russia after NATO’s expansion cannot be rebuilt, which makes the Russia/ NATO dialogue adversarial.

About ten respondents noted that GCSP outgrew a security policy agenda post-PfP and is now engaged in multilateral affairs. International affairs appear to be gaining prominence at the GCSP in lieu of concentration on security policy *per se*, as a credible argument can be made that the demand for security policy education is diminishing. It has a global mission, which is at the same time chance and also a challenge.

**Assessment:** *If the main task used to be to bring people from the post-Communist world on par with their West European counterparts, so that they could share the same concepts and adequately participate in European and Transatlantic security discourse, this purpose may have been largely fulfilled. Therefore it made sense to widen the geographic focus and include also a North/South perspective. However the development in Ukraine demonstrates that the consolidation of the post-Communist “security arrangements”*

---

<sup>32</sup> Such as assessing defense education in Afghanistan; curriculum development with the European Security and Defense Masters program in Georgia or participation of partners defense attachés’ course.

<sup>33</sup> The evaluation promised anonymity to the interviewees. This observation derives from an interview with a former UN employee who was based in Geneva for 10 years and knew GCSP in their previous capacity and in the current capacity as a guest lecturer. This was checked with [by now] former GCSP staff and further confirmed in a telephone interview with an external European stakeholder with knowledge of GCSP. This observation is consistent with the evaluation’s own.

*might be on the agenda again under a different label and might provide opportunities for the Centre to use its reputation as an impartial training outfit and dialogue platform on security policy.*

### **Relevance of the institutional environment analysis**

The GCSP is a unique institution because there are few training centres dedicated to training mid-career government officials and the military together, and the GCSP is an acknowledged leader in this field. A UN partner expressed that it is a 'training centre of excellence, good resource, interesting speakers from the field, fantastic research papers, participants are well-treated – it has what one needs to improve one's professional expertise.' Other relevant European institutions are the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (Germany), which is more military-oriented in its customer base, Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden), which tends to be more civilian and NATO Defence College in Rome.<sup>34</sup> Only the GCSP has a truly global outreach. The influence of the FDFA is not very visible to external audiences, which is important to maintain credibility and reach out internationally. The Centre is not seen as a crude instrument of Swiss foreign and security policy, but rather as a Swiss contribution to the development of global security policy. The presence of international staff contributes to this perception.

It is regarded as an established and renowned centre with an extensive network, into which the participants can integrate. The GCSP's reputation is that it mostly plays a safe hand without going for great challenges. GCSP staff named their partners as the Swiss government, NATO PfP, ministries of defence and foreign affairs, which send seconded personnel, OSCE, ICRC, Geneva-based diplomats, UN permanent missions, and training centres in the regions. The GCSP fulfils a role acting as an adviser to various governments on the diplomatic backstage, which is an important dimension of the Swiss policy. Although the GCSP's main client is the Swiss government, there is a growing engagement with other governments, such as Finland which uses the GCSP's good offices: 'We value the Centre for the opportunities it offers – for example, a semi-public platform on Middle East – a zone free of weapons of mass destruction where Finland was appointed by the UNSG as a facilitator. We take advantage in discreet diplomacy using the GCSP instead of an international NGO, and we value it.' GCSP is important for France in the context of upholding Francophonie in the context of its general policy towards international Geneva. Secondments are used to introduce French input into the training curriculum and approaches to security policy. In this, Geneva is one of the few European arenas where France is at an advantage to promote itself.

### **Relevance of strategic objectives**

This evaluation takes the 2011 – 2015 Strategy as the reference point. The new Strategy document was unavailable at the time of writing. The objectives contained in the 2011 – 2015 Strategy are to:

1. Deliver educational and training opportunities that equip leaders to transform knowledge into action and ensure that these opportunities constitute an effort to[wards] positive change.
2. Provide opportunities for demand-led short courses attracting external sponsorship by interested ministries, international organisations, funding institutions and the private sector.
3. Promote intercultural understanding and build bridges by providing an independent and impartial platform for research and policy dialogue on peace and security issues.

The objectives (1) and (2) have been relevant for the period under the evaluation. The long courses continued to attract participants, although real demand cannot be assessed in an absence of commercial incentives. Demand-led short courses are essential for attainment of better financial self-sufficiency. The objective (3) is too vaguely defined for a tangible evaluation. Moreover, the objectives are not directly related to the three GCSP pillars (below) and do not serve as the basis for their further elaboration.

---

<sup>34</sup> In response to the SG comment that NATO Defence College is an inappropriate comparison, the evaluation has to say that this view was articulated by the respondents knowledgeable of the field, including an academic previously associated with the College. Therefore, the evaluation considers it a fair comparison.

**Assessment:** *The Strategy provided a weak guide to operations during the period under evaluation. The organisation's frequent changes of direction in 2011 – 2013 served to create uncertainties more than they determined a clear path forward.*

### Implementation of the strategy

GCSP fulfils its mission of promoting peace, security and stability through **training, research and dialogue**.<sup>35</sup> The factsheet identifies the key activity areas as executive education and training, applied policy research, international conferences and workshops, and forum for dialogue.<sup>36</sup> Whereas a strategy for training development is established and regularly revised, research and dialogue dimensions do not have dedicated strategies.

In terms of **training**, the GCSP has largely stayed within the parameters of training public servants and military personnel. The GCSP is known for its broad approach, On the whole, externally the GCSP is regarded as adhering to a traditional, institutional, realist paradigm in teaching, but at the same time is practicing interactive and engaging training delivery, to which its target audience responds well. The courses offer comprehensive coverage, keeping to their core competencies and incorporating emerging issues. There is a consensus among external respondents that hard security is not the GCSP domain.

Each director contributes their personal vision, which is important in bringing in new spirits and ideas. The weapons of mass destruction/nuclear disarmament topic has been one of the core subjects under the previous leadership. The Emerging Security Challenges programme is the most flexible and the strategic niches for NISC lie in cyber security, terrorism/ organised crime and autonomous weapons.<sup>37</sup> NISC also explores the issue of human security and the impact of non-state actors on traditional thinking about security. The changes brought about by the new leadership are not yet apparent, but crisis management appears to be an upcoming theme. It was remarked that the GCSP may become too flexible in shifting subject areas and incorporating new themes. A course participant noted that coverage of subjects was too brief, not allowing in-depth exploration.<sup>38</sup> However, if the GCSP sees its role in providing an overview of the modern security agenda, it is natural to try to fit a lot in.

The main subjects can be identified as follows:

- Transition and regional security threats in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – expert publications, trainings, such as courses in Rabat (security issues in Mediterranean) and public events, e.g. 3 conferences in Vienna with the OSCE.
- Disarmament has been strongly promoted by the previous leadership, given that the UN Conference on Disarmament and other treaty bodies are located in Geneva.
- The GCSP fostered a strong relationship with UNIDIR, but an attempt to build a platform on disarmament between the Graduate Institute, UNIDIR, QUNO and the GCSP did not materialise.<sup>39</sup> Instead work on an Arms Trade Treaty was developed (2012 – 2013), then scaled down. There is a sense among external and some internal stakeholders that disarmament is presently undervalued, with one dedicated expert working part-time.
- Peacebuilding – participation in GPP, joint courses with Swisspeace (SP), a new MAS, short courses, such as 'Enhancing Leadership for Peacebuilding' and training workshops. The GCSP has joined forces with SP in the Swiss Peacebuilding Training Course and in the Swiss Senior Level Course in Peacebuilding for the higher army commanders and the FDFA.
- Cyber security – two staff are doing research in the Emerging Security Challenges programme, their findings are used for teaching and are highly regarded externally.

The GCSP incorporates a number of SSR-related themes, as well as includes SSR directly in some of its programmes, such as training for Defence Attachés and members of the Swiss Armed Forces. The Swiss

---

<sup>35</sup> GCSP 2012 Annual Report

<sup>36</sup><http://www.gcsp.ch/About-Us-Qui-sommes-nous/Mandate-and-Vision>

<sup>37</sup> Autonomous weapons are weapon systems that can select and fire on targets on their own, without any human intervention. Fully autonomous weapons can be enabled to assess the situational context on a battlefield and to decide on the required attack according to the processed information.

<sup>38</sup> Lists are provided for further reading.

<sup>39</sup> International Security Forum was supposed to be a launch-pad for this under the former GCSP Director.

Peacebuilding Training Course for the Swiss Expert Pool includes aspects of DDR, rule of law, transitional justice and human rights.<sup>40</sup> A view was heard that the GCSP and MdP should concentrate more on international humanitarian law as a contribution to International Geneva. The GCSP used to also be known for its expertise in the UN system and peacekeeping.

### **Are people trained in relevant subjects?**

The Centre demonstrated flexibility in revising and incorporating new topics to ensure that it stays on top of the modern agenda, and actively solicits new ideas for course development. The asset of the long courses is their multisectoral dimension, which enables to combine 'hard' security themes with emerging soft issues. NISC gives a taste of a variety of topics, such as natural resources, cyber security and application of international law, new ICTs, links between climate change and health/ food security.

### **Are the relevant people trained?**

The strategic objective is to train 'future leaders.' Participants are mostly recruited by embassies rather than competing for places (although this varies between courses) and informal networks are also used. US Air Force trainees, for example, have chosen the ITC in lieu of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government when given a choice between the two. Presumably the best mix of academic and teaching processes, which exposes people to different ways of thinking and approaches, from which they all draw benefit influence decisions. The Centre has limited ability to select participants for longer courses, especially when they come from a politically important country and are nominated by their governments as single choices. The Centre rejected the idea of streaming participants, thus enabling an intermix.

It is harder to attract quality participation in a 9-months course, and approaches partly based on distant learning, which combine classroom and online teaching, are discussed as a way forward. However, bringing people together remains crucial for the type of experience the GCSP provides. It was reported that some are sent for reasons other than training, and quality, bias and language skills can be problematic. If in doubt, phone interviews are held to determine English skills.

The current trend in Western Europe is to nominate participants from the ministries of defence, while foreign affairs ministries have workloads, which are too large to allow their staff off duty for long. Participants from the ministries of justice, interior and customs have started to attend courses. Western countries have their own staff training facilities, e.g. l'Ecole de Guerre in France or the UK Defence Academy, which provide alternatives. France, for example, trains its military at the Institut de Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, where mid-career officers study for 1 day a week and continue with their daily jobs.

Programme heads reported that they did not experience a reduction in attendee numbers, but a slight increase instead. Some have two to three applications per place and the GCSP cannot respond to all requests because of funding constraints. It was observed by guest speakers that the calibre of participants has slightly decreased, the variety of backgrounds diversified and that more junior people are now attending.

**Assessment:** *Including new aspects of security into the GCSP's curriculum is forward looking and keeps the Centre open for new challenges. More traditional aspects of security policy might however remain relevant and keep deserving attention. The courses have been relevant for the training needs, but given the defence budget cuts in many European states and an existence of national training providers in these states, it is uncertain how long the GCSP's core courses will stay relevant enough for European governments to continue sending people to. As most courses do not charge fees, it is impossible to adequately estimate demand. Still, it is hoped that the GCSP quality of teaching and overall international Geneva experience will continue to draw people in.*

In terms of **research**, the University of Pennsylvania Global *Go To Think Tank* Index Report 2013 mentions GCSP in a category of 'think tanks to watch' in the 51<sup>st</sup> place.<sup>41</sup> The issue of whether GCSP should be a think

---

<sup>40</sup> Swiss Support to Security Sector Reform and Related Areas, 25 May 2012.

<sup>41</sup> <http://gotothinktank.com/dev1/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/GoToReport2013.pdf>



tank has become a bone of contention during the evaluation period. The FDFA and the President's views and perspectives are not in favour, pointing out that the purpose of core funding is different. Few outside interlocutors believe that GCSP is a research institute. It was said that 'the Centre would need to have different people if it wants to pursue substantial research'. 'Temptation towards research is best resisted, as barriers to entry are too high.' At the same time, there is a contradiction: the Centre seeks to attract staff of a certain calibre without fostering a research agenda, which could have offered them a career lift at the appropriate level and make them attractive on the job market, should they wish to move from the GCSP.

Strategy shifts in the period resulted in the research dimension being scaled up, then down, and finally rejected. Building up larger themes, such as disarmament or NATO/ European security has been prominent in the past, but has subsided. Several individuals enjoy high research profiles, having successfully published externally and contributed to key scholarly and policy debates. Staff made individual choices to either concentrate on teaching or pursue research and build up their publication profiles, while on staff time, which, as some argue, was an inappropriate use of resources.

One argument is that research puts GCSP on a global intellectual map, and those who were prepared to work hard, were able to combine different tasks. 'Policy research-informed training' is a GCSP mission and its omission will lead to a loss of identity. Training without research will become boring for the people who deliver it, and they will tend to leave in pursuit of more intellectual stimulation. This is already taking place to an extent. The counterview is that the GCSP's management error in the past was to not make it explicit for staff that it is not a research institution. This led to an overemphasis on research covered from the core budget, and an ungoverned situation when individual research agendas did not speak to each other.

These two lines of thinking have been in contestation with each other during the period under the evaluation, and eventually the latter line has won over. Research at present is decentralised into programmes with no central function. There are no restrictions on research freedom in the choice of subjects and no agenda-setting from above, but at the same time no stimulus to develop major projects. Individual experts concentrate on their areas. Staff is not encouraged to apply to academic grants and buy-out of teaching is not on offer. Those who have a semi-independent standing due to their positions being co-funded, continue with their research, but the environment has grown harder for others.

**Assessment:** *The Centre employed a number of high-profile academics during the evaluation period whose research directly or indirectly promoted the Centre. At the same time, the GCSP as an institution has not acquired research excellence. Expertise is not built institutionally and transferred internally, but remains with a person(s) who occupies this niche and fades away when such individual leaves. Experts do not build a following among junior staff. As put by one respondent, 'it is a house for research rather than a research institution.' The evaluation endorses this view.*

In terms of **Dialogue**, it comprises a set of various short and long-term interventions. The initiatives identified from interviews are outlined below;<sup>42</sup> several attracted funding from Bern:

- MENA Conference on disarmament: Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – upon request from Bern, developed by the previous Director. An external participant regarded it as excellent. The advice was to maintain it and include more Arab countries.
- Other dialogues on nuclear issues, e.g. with the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) – originally a Swiss government idea, implemented by the GCSP, understood as a series of policy debates, meetings, conferences with different government participants and outreach.
- Caucasus 2025 – seminars on the South Caucasus with officials and civil society actors, including from non-recognised states, – two seminars were held and a third planned. The aims are to foster cross-border cooperation and resource management, combat hate speech, and influence the agenda of international organisations and formal peace negotiations.

---

<sup>42</sup> The GCSP's own documents and publications attribute the term 'dialogue' to a very broad set of activities, which are often undistinguishable from seminars and training events.

- Syria – two dialogues, the GCSP’s own idea, Bern came at a later stage. These were semi-public events – the GCSP selected speakers and ambassadors. International roundtable on the Crisis in Syria in 2013 was organised with PeaceNexus.
- Chambesy talks on European Security (2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013), NATO/ Russia relations to inform and allow reflections on policy-making in conventional arms control. Participants from NATO, OSCE, EU and 12 states freely discussed the European Security Treaty (but no tangible result came out of it).
- Zermatt format on North-East Asian Security comprising Japan, China, North Korea, Russia and the US – supported by Bern directly to help develop their thinking on regional security. Dialogue built on the experience of a Swiss secondee, a former ambassador to China.
- Dialogue with China– concentrates on China/ US relations and territorial disputes; includes Sino-European cyber dialogue (1,5 track) – designed at the GCSP; the FDFA entered later and was happy to learn about it and sponsor it.
- Non-public dialogues on marginalised countries (Iran, North Korea) – directly guided by Bern.
- The Myanmar training programme also serves a dialogue purpose.

Dialogue patterns vary, and are understood differently by different parties. Bern’s role is the key variable. An *assessment* is provided in the ‘effectiveness’ section of the chapter.

### Excellence

Institutional identity of the GCSP is characterised by a duality, which makes it a hybrid institution: on the one hand, it is a multilateral organisation, while on the other hand it is an instrument of Swiss foreign policy. This raises the question of its purpose and of how its value can be interpreted. The Centre means different things to different people. Seventeen external respondents answered the question on the GCSP institutional identity and seven declined to comment.<sup>43</sup> Most agreed that it is a training provider, but beyond that a wide disparity of opinions exists (see below). They give a sense of the GCSP’s external reputation, irrespective of whether the evaluation agrees with these opinions or not. The views were largely positive and only a minority were critical.

Some respondents consider GCSP as ‘a combination of scholars and practitioners, with the benefit of a Geneva location. It is an international foundation modelled on such examples as the International Committee of Red Cross, but for high level executive training.’ It is ‘partly a think-tank, partly a mix of the military and diplomats with a global outreach that includes people from pariah countries’. ‘It is a cross between a think tank and a training institute for diplomats combined with military personnel.’ ‘It is a valuable think tank, network of different interlocutors in the field of security.’ Others feel that it is definitely not a think tank, but first and foremost a training provider, whose strength lies in training government officials. Some also believe that it is an instrument of Swiss foreign policy, an extension of HSD in Geneva, and a service provider for confidential dialogues. Another view is that its identity lies in applied research in-between academia and policy worlds, and that the alumni network provides Switzerland with entry points to countries where former participants work. A pessimistic view is that it was turning into a *de facto* conference centre and away from its core training services.

An ambiguity regarding excellence lies in the situation that the GCSP’s expertise is not widely appreciated, as it is not a university *per se*. This is perhaps not very relevant for practitioners with clear career paths in the Ministries of Defence, but can be of significance for junior people who may consider changing their professional direction in the future. Older contributors fondly recall the atmosphere of the 1990s when there was more enthusiasm for learning and exchange, but these were different historical times. One new initiative was participation in the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP).<sup>44</sup>

According to the perspective of international civil society,<sup>45</sup> the GCSP is a highly regarded institution but is only comfortable with a top-down approach to research and dialogue, it is ‘state-centric and bureaucratic in

<sup>43</sup> The list is available upon request.

<sup>44</sup> GPP set up in 2008 as International Geneva’s contribution to the UN peacebuilding architecture, together with the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) of IHEID, Interpeace and the QUNO.

<sup>45</sup> 262 individuals were contacted for the three centres’ evaluation and 214 were interviewed. Most refusals were on the GCSP. Among them 16 GCSP external respondents agreed to answer and 14 either declined or did not answer.

its thinking,’ and ‘engagement with civil society’ is a new and not entirely comfortable idea. While the GCSP is well-connected and well-respected at the level of international diplomats based in Geneva, ministries of foreign affairs and defence, and several defence education establishments (as above), it is barely known and connected in the more programmatic bottom-up sphere, which has an impact on how relevant and effective their work is for actual change on-the-ground.

**Assessment:** *The GCSP achieved excellence in a narrow niche of training of civil servants and defence officials. However, GCSP is not a research institution and ‘policy research’ as a strategy pillar appears to have an undue prominence. Institutional relations with IHEID could be developed towards a more strategic partnership. The GCSP’s sphere of influence is rather small: while a specialist audience knows it, the wider community does not. Interviews by the evaluation suggest a weakness of relations with international security institutions and a not very high visibility and profile on the global security arena. Given time the ongoing effort by the management to reposition the Centre might mitigate these findings.*

### 2.3.1.2 Contribution to Swiss Foreign Policy

The GCSP provides a positioning for Switzerland in the international security landscape, firstly in the Euro-Atlantic framework and presently – in the global context. It is a great asset in representing Switzerland as a responsible global citizen, which does not send troops abroad<sup>46</sup>, but contributes in the areas where it has real expertise. The GCSP puts Switzerland on the security map and gives access to exclusive foreign and security establishments in global capitals. Alumni could be a way to access power relations in line with Swiss political priorities, which makes the Centre a strategic investment for Switzerland.<sup>47</sup> In Central and Eastern Europe there is a whole generation of security experts and officials, who have gone through the GCSP’s education, for example the Deputy Foreign Minister of Moldova. However, the potential available through its former trainees, - given that many are positioned to exercise influence, - has been insufficiently utilised. The alumni network rejuvenated only recently and most efforts go into the compilation of basic data on alumni.

Most of the GCSP’s cooperation is with the FDFA. The GCSP’s usefulness for Bern mostly manifests through a dialogue platform that the Centre organises on its behalf, as well as tailored training courses, which form a part of the FDFA’s own peacebuilding interventions, such as Myanmar. Experts include their research findings, e.g. on cyber security and confidence-building measures (CBM) in disarmament, into policy-making by the Administration. Presently, the GCSP contributes its expertise to the Swiss OSCE chairmanship. The DDPS is involved as a historical funder and as the Centre’s connection with the hard security domain. The GCSP provides training services for Swiss military professionals, a course for young diplomats and a number of programmes in cooperation with the DDPS. Swiss embassies are actively involved in the recruitment of course participants, attend events abroad and seek to be informed of GCSP activities.

GCSP operations are determined by the Annual Agreement and are mostly in training delivery, which does not leave a room for great flexibility outside of the agreed parameters. The GCSP perceives its contribution as being efficient service delivery under the Annual Agreement. The staff is grateful to the Swiss government, as the quality of services they achieved would have been impossible without stable funding. However, there is an aspiration to become financially independent to be able to run more courses, which staff believe in.<sup>48</sup> The Swiss government is seen as important at the initiation stage of dialogues, training events and conferences, but the GCSP converts general ideas into concrete products and has enough freedom and ownership of them. There was no sense of intrusiveness or undue interference from Bern. Gender mainstreaming and Human Security were mentioned as key policy concepts in official documents, but there was no guidance for or monitoring of their implementation.

---

<sup>46</sup> Exceptions are non-combatant contingent at the KFOR, the SWISSCOY, military observers at the UN observation missions and civil police officers at the UN police contingents.

<sup>47</sup> However, interviewed Swiss ambassadors in Serbia and Tunisia did not use the GCSP graduates as a network in their countries, although invitations to courses go out of the embassies.

<sup>48</sup> According to the opinions expressed during the staff reflective workshop, Geneva, 17 March 2014.

To answer the ToR question ‘How is the cooperation with involved Swiss federal offices in terms of thematic coherence, alignment and burden sharing?’ the following data was collected. An expectation exists among GCSP respondents that Bern should provide more guidance and attention. The view was often heard that the government can and should use the Centre more often in designing course agendas, in shaping its training programmes and in policy messaging. Ex-staff expressed that the FDFA and the DDPS were not willing to influence the Centre programmatically by providing guidelines or suggestions on training curriculum or research.

**Assessment:** *The existential question is to what extent the GCSP is a tool of Swiss foreign and security policy or an independent institution with an agenda and priorities of its own, which may not always match those of “Bern”. The Centre has been largely content with the former role under the previous leadership. Who was in the lead from 2011 to 2013 in the FDFA/ GCSP relationship was unclear. The government at present would like the Centre to be free in program -setting and attaining an institutional personality. A systemic issue is that it is hard, but not impossible, to develop the Centre’s own identity if the donor regards the Centre as a service provider.*

### 2.3.1.3 Opportunities and risks in the future

External stakeholders suggest that the context is changing, old successful models come to a natural end and the Centre needs to adapt to it by:

- offering a wider range of short courses, tailor made for the audience;
- expanding its audience to include groups beyond government officials recruited through the Swiss formal network.

The counterargument is that executive education is already offered by the IHEID, which increased its budget from CHF 600.000 to 6 million in several years. What advantages and distinction the GCSP will offer remains to be seen, as its orientation moves thematically towards international affairs and away from security policy, and its focus – to include representatives of the private sector into the so far restricted to public servants and military personnel audience. The question is whether there is a relevant market for the GCSP or whether it should stay true to its core expertise. There is a risk that the envisaged direction may take the GCSP too far into international affairs and away from security policy, which it has built up over the years.

**Assessment:** *A number of external respondents questioned the viability of the GCSP. Some suggest the possibility of the three Geneva Centres considering much closer cooperation or even “merger” under the roof of the MDP. In agreement with many statements opposing a “merger” the evaluation finds that the GCSP as well as the two other Centres have developed into distinct entities with a unique “ownership” structure (see chapter 5.1) and specific identities. The GCSP is an asset for Swiss foreign policy but also for a wider security/diplomatic community. Hence the question is rather how to develop strategic partnerships within the MdP in order to use synergies but also to further develop the distinct identity and profile of each of the Centres under the “physical” roof of the MdP.*

## 2.3.2 Effectiveness

### 2.3.2.1 Does the Centre achieve its strategic objectives?

The evaluation gathered self-reflections on the effectiveness of programmes and projects at the Centre. This was done to partially offset the lack of criteria in the Strategy and build a fuller picture geared towards outcomes rather than reporting on activities.

#### Self-Perspective on Achievements: How the Centre sees itself:<sup>49</sup>

- One-week Swiss army training course expanded the participants’ views on foreign militaries.
- Training on Weapons’ Law improved practice among the participants.

---

<sup>49</sup> Based on reflective workshop notes

- Defence attaché courses in Africa were appreciated, confirmed by positive comments, emails and course evaluation feedback.
- The GCSP developed partnership links with the l'Ecole de Guerre de Paris and Ministry of Defence of France.
- Long courses make a major impact, create bonds in networks and facilitate exchange of ideas, but this impact has not been monitored.
- The Centre got better at organising courses, using past participants as guest speakers, and there is an added value of working in teams. Training has become more interactive, with an emphasis on exercises and small group work.
- The Centre indirectly contributes to peace by establishing relations between political opponents, e.g. North and South Koreans. An example was given of two former course participants calling each other to avert a crisis between their countries.
- Training for trainers produces a multiplication effect, e.g. partners in Dakar and Sarajevo should soon be able to run the courses independently.
- Technology is more used to adapt to the new environment, discussions take place online. An online disarmament course<sup>50</sup> was a big success, but it stopped
- The GCSP acts as a convener in international Geneva with public discussions and seminars, because networking needs a personal interface.

The objective (1) 'to deliver educational and training opportunities that equip leaders to transform knowledge into action and ensure that these opportunities constitute an effort to(wards) positive change' has been adequately reached in the training delivery aspect. The only monitoring tools applied are course evaluations<sup>51</sup> and certifications of the long course. Quality control is taken seriously by the GCSP, and modifications are introduced in light of the participants' feedback.

The GCSP's reputation is formed by its three core courses – the landmark International Training Course (ITC), historically the first and ran for 28 years, the European Training Course (ETC) – ran for 18 years, and the New Issues in Security Course (NISC) – ran for 15 years. Master of Advanced Studies (MAS) in International and European Security is fully accredited by the University of Geneva and the GCSP.<sup>52</sup> The core courses have an established reputation and former participants recommend them to others. About 15 courses are mandated by the government and 20 plus are designed by the GCSP, some of which have been very successful and one has a waiting list.

The Centre's training methodology attracted the highest praise, and it is obvious that the GCSP excels in this regard. There are superb conditions for the participants, who form bonds and keep in touch with staff and each other: 'team-building exercises at the beginning helped to relax and enjoy the course together.' This is how the interviewed participants describe what they view as the most valuable.<sup>53</sup>

#### **Voices of Former Trainees (interview quotes)**

- |   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interaction with 25 different nationalities - a diverse, but well-balanced group, unique opportunity to meet unusual people (North Koreans, Turkmen), opportunity to engage with trainees on other courses through joint events;</li> <li>• The whole package was valuable: interesting topics and different skills taught, including presentation, crisis management, media communication. 'All together it was a life changing experience, and I still take reference to my time in Geneva many times.'</li> <li>• Listening to outside views on European security to reflect on: 'where do we stand on foreign policy? What does the world expect from us? Is what we are doing good?' Many perspectives changed by the end of the course as a result of open discussions, guest lecturers from different backgrounds and a breadth of viewpoints.</li> <li>• The content was not very important, most topics were already known to European participants,</li> </ul> |
|---|

<sup>50</sup> Together with DiploFoundation.

<sup>51</sup> In an answer to the SG inquiry, course evaluations are available.

<sup>52</sup> This is a fee-paying course, with scholarships and reductions in fees available, jointly ran by the GCSP and the University of Geneva (IEUG). The GCSP originally approached IHEID to accredit the course, but they refused and IEUG agreed. Certificate in Advanced Studies (CAS) was also offered, but nobody has applied in two years.

<sup>53</sup> Participants were chosen by the GCSP and came from the UK, Germany, Serbia, Ghana and Pakistan.

but it was good to hear different viewpoints. Gaining specific knowledge was not the main objective.

- General skills, such as networking and media training. Learning how diplomats think attain their goals, learning diplomatic skills (a military respondent).
- ETC: parts on NATO and the EU, its missions, long-term institutional approaches to security were useful. Non-European participants learnt how security policy works in Europe, how European institutions interact, which was confusing before. Trips to Vienna (OSCE, Atomic Agency) and Brussels (NATO) sensitised to diplomacy in action. Eye-opener on security situation in Europe, relevant for Africans because Africa is Europe's neighbour.
- Great learning environment, treated with respect, sense of joining a GCSP family, helpful, efficient, comfortable.

The suggestions were to change the name by removing 'European' from ETC, because the content and the range of participants are changing. More in-depth coverage of Africa and analytical tools to understand evolving issues would be beneficial.

#### *Intermix – to what effect?*

The added value of the GCSP is in the mix of people from different regions and backgrounds trained together. 'The GCSP is the only place in the world where all sorts of nationalities can mix.' However, the US training centres apply the same principle and have up to 90 nationalities represented in their courses. An overwhelming majority of the respondents noted that the GCSP had two participants from North Korea, which was thought to be the major attraction. This is a unique selling point.

Guest lecturers observed that the quality of participants is good and their motivation is genuine. A participant from Pakistan paid his own expenses to attend an ETC in Geneva. One participant was offered to take the course and one applied directly to the GCSP. All the interviewed trainees participated on a tuition-free basis. Some applied through an internal advert in their own ministries and were selected. Participants agreed that if their governments had to pay tuition fees, they would not send people to Geneva.

Two ETC participants remarked that GCSP can be more selective in who it trains. The GCSP cannot fail trainees, but in extreme cases can ask them to leave. A more tangible stick is to send negative feedback to one's Foreign Ministry. Two [west European military] participants expressed that some form of assessment/regular testing should be introduced to bring more discipline and goal-orientation. They also felt that the course directors/staff have been too lenient, allowing people to get away with inadequate performance.<sup>54</sup> Two civilian women had the opposite view – a feedback letter to their respective ministries worked well and the lack of a formal assessment reduced the pressure during the course.

#### *Skills applied?*

The sheer amount of people trained is impressive.<sup>55</sup> However, concrete outcomes are hard to define. It can be argued that impacts exist, but have not been monitored. Attendance of a GCSP course is partly a career step, both for the Swiss and the internationals, and partly a gain in knowledge. The courses' impacts are felt by the individuals rather than by institutions, and may be possible to trace if these individuals are in authority/policy positions. Tracing careers of alumni can show whether participants were chosen correctly and how effective the training has been. A participant said that the course was more for general interest rather than supplying applicable job skills, but noted that the knowledge may be useful in future. Interviews with 6 participants of 2013 courses revealed that three believed that it made a direct impact on promotions: 'due to the course I now have a leadership job.' Two others felt that it is likely to be so, but that it is too early to say,<sup>56</sup> and one considered the knowledge useful for personal development, as his job is too remote from the subjects taught.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> For example, some had course tasks done for them by their Embassies, and others knew about that.

<sup>55</sup> For example, in 2013 the GCSP had 794 participants from 111 countries.

<sup>56</sup> One had a boss who was also a GCSP alumnus, which was a plus.

<sup>57</sup> He applies knowledge as a guest lecturer at a university in his home country.

**Assessment:** *Training delivery is consistently of high professional standard, while the intermix of participants and presence in international Geneva makes the experience richer. Effectiveness of influencing change is uncertain.*

### 2.3.2.2 Objective 2: Tailor-made short courses

The objective ‘to provide opportunities for demand-led short courses attracting external sponsorship by interested ministries, international organisations, funding institutions and the private sector’ has been met to a limited extent, as income generated through participants’ course fees is fairly modest: CHF 32’523 in 2012 and CHF 21’031 in 2013.<sup>58</sup> The GCSP regards the ‘demand-led short courses’ in 2011 – 2013 as follows:

- a roundtable on ‘Afghanistan 2014’ organised on behalf of the Lithuanian mission, and a workshop on ‘Diasporas and development’ co-organised with the Romanian mission. In both cases the direct costs for the events were covered by the missions.
- 5<sup>th</sup> iteration of a training course for Afghan officials in Baku in 2013, partly funded by the Finnish government [the most recent contribution was in 2011 of 50’000 EUR].
- 2<sup>nd</sup> version of a training course for professionals from Myanmar, funding for which was won through a competitive tender from the FDFA.<sup>59</sup>

Other information gathered by the evaluation suggests that a successful tailor-made course has been offered to UNDP/ DPA on new security challenges. The GCSP said that it was useful for UN speech writers. NATO and OSCE paid for their staff to go on short courses. A senior level peacebuilding course received good feedback from an interviewed OSCE participant. There is a question whether individually-tailored courses are a good return on investment, because preparation of a new course is labour-intensive.

Increasingly, the courses are done in partnerships with others – IHEID, Interpeace, Swisspeace, UNITAR and local training centres, such as the OSCE Academy. They see a value in partnering with the GCSP and are confident in their quality assurance. Respondents also noted that the GCSP is more interested in the UN logo than its expertise, is unwilling to coordinate in MENA and closely controls its regional partnerships. The GCSP was said not to be very open and inclusive, tries to capture the maximum possible ground, does not share their curricula or expert lists, nor attempts to compliment existing training providers.

**Assessment:** *The reality is that peace and security training has become a business, and training providers compete to secure an institutional logo, such as UN, EU or AU. The GCSP may have started to act the same. Demand is hard to ascertain in an absence of market incentives.*

### 2.3.2.3 Objective 3: Intercultural understanding and building bridges

The objective to ‘promote intercultural understanding and build bridges by providing an independent and impartial platform for research and policy dialogue’ has four sub-objectives:

1. To enhance the programme of public discussions and policy briefings for International Geneva, supported by the GCSP web editorials on timely issues;
2. To encourage the engagement of the Alumni network in the exchange of views and perspectives;
3. To develop the scholarship programme to allow the integration of marginalised, transitioning or isolated states into discussions on security policy;
4. To contribute to the development of local ownership in security policy dialogues in selected regions.

In the evaluation assessment, sub-objectives 1 – 3 are activities rather than outcomes. While the courses target individuals, policy analysis and dialogue promotion should open the door for big picture. This section structures sub-components differently than the Strategy, in order to make it easier to understand the

---

<sup>58</sup> ‘Income from partner institutions - year ended 31 December 2013,’ provided by Alan Sheldon in response to evaluation inquiry, 15 April 2014.

<sup>59</sup> Based on information provided by the Head of Finance in response to the evaluation inquiry, 15 April 2014, by email.

operations. It explores dialogue, policy research and regional capacity development, which objective (3) touches upon.

### Dialogue

Swiss neutrality is an asset for political dialogue. Some governments, such as the Russians or Iranians, would not engage if the same activities took place in a less neutral country. When dialogues are initiated by the GCSP, HSD is consulted and sometimes attends, but does not bring an agenda for the GCSP to convey on their behalf. In other instances, e.g. Chambesy,<sup>60</sup> Bern selected officials, while the GCSP chose experts, and a concept was created together.

There was a strong view that the GCSP should be more involved in active diplomacy and that dialogue strategy is needed for credibility, fundraising and pulling together in-house expertise. The counterview is that at its current stage, the GCSP does not have enough people capable of designing and running such interventions.' The evaluation found that 4 to 5 staff members have a serious interest in the GCSP as a platform for dialogue in its own right. The perception however is, that the leadership does not see the promotion of dialogue as part of the strategic orientation but rather a service provided on demand of Switzerland.

**Assessment:** *Good practice of dialogue exists within the GCSP, but it happens opportunistically. Dialogue-type activities are reactionary to events or requests, non-strategic and contacts-based. The evaluation agrees with the view that 'things do not follow one another in dialogues – they are a series of one-off events with no programmatic approach to influencing change.' As a result, the GCSP is a host rather than an institution for dialogue, and altering this would require a more systematic approach. Pursuing a strategy for dialogue does not exclude service provision for Bern. Simply, the GCSP would have to maintain stand-by capacity to respond to the government's requests.*

### Policy research

In 2011 – 2013 the GCSP produced 10 *Geneva Papers* in its *Conference and Research* series, 17 *Policy Briefs* and one *Issue Brief*.<sup>61</sup> The majority of publications concentrate on the effects of transition in the MENA region and post-Arab Spring security challenges. The ambition behind the GCSP publications was to transform fundamental research into documents accessible for a policy audience. Several interlocutors confirmed that they read the papers and briefs, which were said to be of good quality, discussed interesting topics in soft security and were easy to read. Two different lengths serve the purpose, as 'it is impossible to give justice to a complicated subject in 5 pages.' Research is used for teaching, and some papers found their way into the curriculum of other training establishments, for example, the policy brief on the *Nexus of Terrorism and Organised Crime* is used by NATO Defence College. The GCSP has extensive archives on security matters useful for baseline checks.

It was noted that publications do not come out very often. Dissemination has room for improvement, as in practice it is unclear who the targets are – global policy-makers or an expert/ intellectual community - what readership the Papers have, and what the end use of the research is, apart from incorporation into teaching. Sometimes they get circulated through personal networks. None of the respondents who said that they read the GCSP papers received them through a mailing list.

Themes which had been prominent in the past appear to be left behind, and international partners wonder whether the GCSP intends to return to them. International peacekeeping is one such example. A US Army Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute respondent expressed that a good partnership was developing: in 2012 the Institute supported the GCSP in joining the Challenges Forum,<sup>62</sup> to which it contributed expertise

---

<sup>60</sup> Four 'Chambesy' roundtables on European security were held in 2009 – 2013 by the GCSP. Read more, for example, at <http://www.gcsp.ch/Regional-Development/Events/4th-Chambesy-Roundtable-on-European-Security>

<sup>61</sup> Counted according to the GCSP website. The brief on Mali is published in English and French versions.

<sup>62</sup> The Challenges Forum is a global network of 44 leading peacekeeping-related organisations in 19 partner countries, <http://www.challengesforum.org>.



on the future of peace and stability operations, and pitched to the UN on transnational criminal organisations. The Institute used GCSP research for its curriculum development for senior officers and policy formulation. The US Naval Postgraduate School was also in this partnership and attended civil-military interaction groups organised by the GCSP in Geneva. They thought the engagement to be very productive, were impressed by the available expertise and convening power in Geneva. The respondent was not sure whether the GCSP is on it at present as there has been no contact since the key people left. According to him, the Institute would be interested in re-engaging if the Centre came up with an initiative.<sup>63</sup>

### **Regional capacity building**

The Centre has invested a great deal of effort in relationship-building in the 'global South,' having performed training events in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, mostly in relatively stable contexts. For example, there was an investment in developing institutional relations with Korea and China: some wonder if this would lead to a long-term orientation/cooperation. Another example is that a defence education programme in Moldova was executed as a Swiss priority on the request of the DDPS, but seemed to have stopped there.

Regional courses were organised in New York, Sarajevo, Amman, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Dakar, Accra and Baku. It is envisaged that Sarajevo and Dakar can deliver such courses themselves in future, as there was a progressive reliance on their own staff to build up their capacities and enhance local ownership. Afghan officials were trained on the base of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy; it is hoped that Baku would fund the next training event.

Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) were developed with many regional partners. For example, a MoU was concluded with the Diplomatic Training Institute in Tunisia after a co-organised event on 'Challenges of Political Transitions' in 2012, which promised various kinds of assistance to the Institute. The Institute is interested as it seeks to develop its capacities, but no follow-up took place, partly because its director changed, and partly because it was hard to run a capacity-building programme in a transition country from Geneva amidst other priorities.<sup>64</sup> At the same time, the DCAF has a regional office in Tunisia and could have been involved in cooperation, but after the initial meeting in Tunis the GCSP and the DCAF went their own ways.

### **OSCE Academy in Bishkek: Case study on GCSP contribution**

*The mission of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek is to promote regional cooperation, conflict prevention and good governance in Central Asia by offering post-graduate education, professional training and intellectual exchange.* The OSCE Academy emerged out of OSCE cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic and operates on the basis of a MoU signed in 2002 with the government. It offers MA programmes to students in English. It is governed by an international Board of Trustees including representatives of the OSCE, the donor community, Central Asian states and academic institutions, with the GCSP being one of them. The Academy mostly caters for the foreign aid-sponsored employment segment in Central Asia: 45 percent of graduates find jobs in international organisations, 9 percent - at NGOs. Of the rest: 15 percent continue further research and education (some abroad), 12 per cent work in the private sector, and only 8 percent take public sector jobs. The Academy is funded by foreign grants and has an international director, currently ex-GCSP staff. NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) is the most important strategic partner of the Academy and contributes in kind and financially, and the GCSP is also seen as a valuable partner.

Cooperation with the GCSP started in 2004. Since 2008 the GCSP has provided two modules for MA studies in Politics and Security on *Peace and Security Challenges in Central Asia* and *Central Asia and China*. The courses regularly receive high ratings from the students. The former students interviewed rated them higher than the courses taught by NUPI. Since 2005, the GCSP has hosted MA students for three-month

<sup>63</sup> The evaluation is not sure that GCSP is aware of this former partnership. It stumbled upon it by writing to the US Army War College general inquiry form on their website seeking external respondents on GCSP, which after several stages led to the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. No contacts at the US Naval Postgraduate School were available at GCSP in response to the evaluation inquiry, while an inquiry through a public website form yielded no result.

<sup>64</sup> Alumnus also could not be found in Tunisia. GCSP is currently seeking to revive the partnership.

internships each year, covering a scholarship and accommodation in Geneva. The internship at the GCSP is one of the top destinations for students. The GCSP also contributed to the MA at the Academy by coaching students for their MA theses, which has a certain linkage to internships. According to the students coached by the GCSP, they regularly achieve some of the highest marks for their theses. Two students participated in ITC. The student from Kyrgyzstan stated that this *'was the best programme I have had in my academic career. The level of expertise was high and assistance by GCSP staff was very valuable.'* He currently serves as an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The OSCE Academy, jointly with the GCSP, launched a Central Asia Security Policy Briefs Series in November 2010.<sup>65</sup> 14 Briefs were published by Central Asian or Western authors. While it is a commendable goal to bring out voices from the region into the security debate and raise the level of that debate by building their capacities, the value of publishing Western academic writing for regional capacity building is less certain, especially when the authors already serve as advisers to their governments.<sup>66</sup>

**Assessment:** Cooperation was driven by individuals at the GCSP rather than by a programmatic approach. The GCSP moved away from its core audience and engaged with students, mostly young. The quality of support has been well-appreciated by the Academy in the development of their students and building its regional profile. Institutional support, such as internships, scholarships and coaching of thesis, will probably continue because of the Academy Director's link to the GCSP.

The impact is less certain. The OSCE Academy itself might not be a sustainable institution if international funding phases out. The claim that their students might be the future leaders of Central Asia can be viewed differently. A realist argument is that since only 8 percent enter government jobs and the majority aim for international community or education abroad, this takes them out of career paths, which can lead to leadership roles in their own governments. A more idealistic argument is that somehow in the future these two worlds would merge and the skills would transfer. Still, since 2004 there are few identifiable cases of graduates in policy positions. The value of the annual expert seminar on security in Central Asia, which has been running since 2008 together with NUPI, and the Near East-South Asia Strategic Studies Centre (Washington D.C.) in building the GCSP's own profile is uncertain and may drown in the abundance of international conferences in Kyrgyzstan, some of which are run by DCAF.

The GCSP does not aspire to be operational in fragile contexts and is not developing capacities for this purpose. Still, some participants come from fragile countries. Scholarships are available for the list of countries stipulated in the Annual Agreement, but the principle is elusive; for example, a wealthy country such as Kazakhstan is sponsored (Participant in 2013), but Pakistan is not on the list.<sup>67</sup> Some scholarships have been covered by member-states, such as the Netherlands for Serbia and Georgia.

**Assessment:** *Some regional work was found to strengthen an international institution, teaching students (OSCE Academy in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia), another example showed that there was an appropriate national partner, but work did not progress beyond a single event (Tunisia). In yet another example, regional capacity building was disconnected from the HSD strategy in that region, although the work was funded by the same ministry (Sarajevo). In the meantime, the DCAF is developing a long-term training programme with the OSCE Borderguard Staff College in Tajikistan, Central Asia, where officers drawn from the OSCE-wide area are trained together – the kind of assignment that, in theory, the GCSP could have been involved in. Regional capacity building could be the most impact-oriented out of the activities under the objective (3), but the risk is that the GCSP is spreading too thin. The purpose of interventions is unclear: is it to train a certain number of people or to produce an impact on some change? The reality is that all three programmes do*

<sup>65</sup> <http://www.osce-academy.org/en/research/policy-briefs>

<sup>66</sup> For example, Roger Kangas, 'Is There a Viable Future for US Policy in Central Asia?' Policy Brief no. 11, available for download at [http://osce-academy.net/upload/Policy\\_briefs/Policy\\_Brief\\_11.pdf](http://osce-academy.net/upload/Policy_briefs/Policy_Brief_11.pdf). Dr. Kangas is a distinguished US academic and has made this argument in other outlets.

<sup>67</sup> Pakistan, for example, is not on the list and therefore not legible. For a self-funded participant from Pakistan it was hard to be next to people on scholarships.

*various regional events, trainings and conferences organised by different people. In the end it is hard to keep track of what was achieved or was meant to be achieved, and who was driving the overall regional strategy. If regional/field work is to take more prominence, larger hubs would be more effective, with key solid partnerships formed.*

### **Monitoring arrangements**

Measuring results has not been required by the donor.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, no monitoring tools have been put in place, although the management consultants designed a system, which has not been used.<sup>69</sup> Statistics have not been collected.<sup>70</sup> There is no download count of GCSP publications, which would allow assessing which papers are popular.<sup>71</sup> The evaluator was unable to locate key staff on the Google Citations Index, which would provide data on their GCSP papers and the impact of the publications.<sup>72</sup> No evaluation of how the training was useful for the participants over time has been done.<sup>73</sup> Doubts were expressed by staff whether monitoring results beyond the quality of activities is possible. The GCSP is not funded through an Official Development Aid (ODA) budget and is therefore, and in view of the evaluation justifiably, not familiar with OECD DAC criteria. This does not mean, the GCSP shouldn't comply with defined quality standards and results based management requirements.

### **Sustainability of achievements**

Sustainability is a part of the Strategy. No criteria to measure sustainability are defined by the Strategy. It mentions sustainability in three places:

1. 'Supporting sustainable capacity development in specific regions, including through promoting civil-military relations, senior mentoring, and training trainers'
2. 'Providing a sustainable platform of contacts and expertise, including GCSP's Alumni'
3. 'Trained together, this heterogeneous group mirrors conditions in the field and in government, where integrated, cross-discipline and inter-institutional approaches are the ones practitioners are most likely to find sustainable success'.

In relation to (1), it is hard to judge the sustainability of regional capacity development based on the available data.

In relation to (2), the following data was gathered. A person becomes an alumnus if they have attended a course longer than 5 days. There are 3,200 GCSP alumni. A new strategy was adopted in October 2013. New software was purchased, a database established and a dedicated staff member with a marketing background works part-time on alumni relations. A 12 person-strong Alumni Advisory Group was formed and elected for two years. The purpose of the alumni network is to focus on the ability to invite guest speakers, create a pool of expertise for courses and conferences, fundraise, promote and market, and potentially - measure impact. Alumni may act as 'ambassadors' for Switzerland: 'the larger the alumni pool the better it works. Informal contacts of future decision-makers can make a difference at some point. It is a long term projection, but should not be underestimated.'

Annual Security Policy Conferences (2012 in Geneva and 2013 in Berlin) are the main events, which bring alumni together. Attendance is at one's own expense, but the GCSP can make small contributions towards costs for people from poorer countries. It was said by the GCSP that an alumni club exists in Belgium and the Rome network is also active. Alumni can attend elective courses and GCSP events. The network provides an

---

<sup>68</sup> See FDFA – GCSP Annual Agreements.

<sup>69</sup> Staff interviews, e.g. with the Deputy Director of GCSP

<sup>70</sup> Statistics are available, for example, in the case of the GICHD in the count of downloaded publications. No similar statistics was found in the GCSP annual reports and the activity reports to the FDFA.

<sup>71</sup> The GCSP-provided data and staff interviews.

<sup>72</sup> One has to be registered for this purpose on Google Citation Index. Google Scholar does not need registration, but gives large volumes of raw data, which needs to be sorted manually, includes namesakes and is suitable only for a broad overview.

<sup>73</sup> This question was put to the GCSP in writing by the evaluation, but was not answered.

opportunity to promote themselves and their institutions. It has already been utilised for regional events, such as in Vienna and Oman.

Work is put into compiling an alumni directory, and a group on Linked-in was created in 2013. It will serve as a resource for people who, for example, move to a new career posting and would like to access the GCSP network in that country. As this is getting more known, the GCSP has started to receive more inquiries for alumni contacts.<sup>74</sup> Programme staff does not yet use the network to find guest speakers, but it is hoped that this will happen. Interviews with recent trainees revealed that they were interested in staying in touch and regard the alumni as a great asset for their future.<sup>75</sup> In practice, people tend to stay in touch informally with those they studied.

**Assessment:** *Alumni are a potential political capital for Switzerland capable of evolving into regular partnerships. They are also an asset for the GCSP as “ambassadors” but also as lecturers and potential role models for GCSP trainees. A closer look into the functioning of the network and potential “outcomes” might improve its effectiveness and sustainability. In relation to (3), e.g. if sustainability of achievements is understood as skills, knowledge, connections and values acquired through the courses stay with the participants for a long time and influence their institutions and ways of interaction, it is quite possible that the GCSP has this effect. However, proving this requires interaction and tracing life histories. Sustainability can be understood as the core courses being well-designed from the start, continuing to draw new recruits and proving their viability over a long time.*

### **Quality of staff**

The Centre has been affected by a turnover of some senior long-serving faculty members. This is not a critical situation in itself, because it is fair that people with a different vision for the Centre’s future make their choices. Currently, there is a temporary ban on recruitment, introduced by the Director, in order to balance the books and work out what kind of staff is required to fit the new vision. However, staff departure opened a gap in post-Soviet expertise, which used to be strong, but resulted in limited internal capacity, and can lead to a short-fall in teaching on ITC.

The GCSP hosts ten secondees at present, - five of them Swiss, – whose salaries are covered by their ministries of foreign affairs or defence. They find roles in training, dialogue and research depending on their interests, experience and level of activism, and act as a buy-in of their member states. A successful Francophonie engagement in Africa was launched through a secondee from France. No significant side-effects of secondments were traced. The process of secondee nomination has been opaque. For example, the Bureau member was unaware of how recruitment of secondees from his country was done. It is possible to view secondments as a place holder for personnel before retirement, but off active duty. New job descriptions will help to streamline future secondments towards greater effectiveness.

### **Assessment of outcomes**

*The realisation of the vision is that ‘by 2015 the GCSP will be the principal centre in Europe for professional training in security policy for participants from around the world’ is impossible to verify, as state-sponsored training for government officials is not a competitive field and rankings are not compiled unlike in the cases of universities or business schools.<sup>76</sup> The ToR question to what extent has GCSP contributed to the development and implementation of security policy at a national, regional, and global level cannot be answered in full.<sup>77</sup> Some respondents when asked during the interviews believed that the question is misplaced.*

---

<sup>74</sup> For example, the Kyrgyz ambassador who is a GCSP alumni, asked to access other alumni from her country.

<sup>75</sup> For example, a Ghanaian diplomat moved to a posting in Nigeria and was looking for alumni there.

<sup>76</sup> Combinations such as ‘executive security policy training ranking’ on Google and Yahoo outside Switzerland bring self defence training and private security companies with a high page rank. Search engines in Switzerland sometimes pick up the GCSP (statistics are available on request).

<sup>77</sup> Contribution to Swiss foreign and security policy discussed above.

*Evaluated against developments in larger contexts of conflict, progress is hard to trace, e.g. Russia – NATO relations deteriorated to the point of a near breakdown, while the South Caucasus remains a stalemate despite multiple efforts to provide interaction platforms. One example to watch out for outcomes may be the effectiveness of training for Afghan officials, e.g. to what extent they occupy senior jobs where they can impact security policy after the international withdrawal.*

*How effective dialogue is in contribution to security policy is impossible to judge, as the goals of each dialogue are not known and were often determined in Bern. Another type of potential impact is the contribution to national security strategies in transition or post-conflict countries. However, tracing and reinforcing them is possible only if the core courses were more integrated with regional capacity building, for example, by providing support to alumni in policy positions in their countries.*

*It can be said that the GCSP research contributes at an internal policy level, such as to state building in transition in the MENA region, at the regional level, e.g. to transnational terrorism, and at the global level, e.g. to cyber security. The International Security Forum acts as a debating venue and dissemination tool for various security-related themes, and in 2013 it attracted some 700 speakers.*

### **2.3.3 Efficiency<sup>78</sup>**

#### **Management**

Since the arrival of the new director in August 2013, a more strategic turn around process has been set in motion. In 2012 – 2013 the GCSP has undergone a change management process, Restructuring ended the division into Faculty and non-Faculty, re-organised the Centre into three programmes and created an eight person-strong senior management team in a 60-staff office. Positive views on change were that it made the Centre's core expertise clearer, streamlined training by consolidating programmes from 9 into 3, made academics concentrate on teaching as their primary responsibility, scaled down research done in staff time, empowering former non-Faculty members and give the management team more collective power. It resulted in new job titles, job descriptions for staff and secondees, and remuneration scales dependent on formal qualifications and experience, in which there were winners and losers. The process ended the culture of informality, which thrived under the previous Director, when arrangements could be negotiated on an individual basis.

However, the endeavour created a great sense of unhappiness over 'a never-ending change process which goes nowhere,' raised expectations which have not/or cannot be fulfilled, unleashed multiple grievances over personnel decisions, while a culture of authority, sometimes insensitively exercised, replaced previous informality. Jobs became too specific to allow freedom, and teams were formed for the tasks, which did not interact. The mandatory solidarity fund to which staff should contribute external income, turned into a bone of contention because of the suspicion that not everybody pays who should, and that some have more spare time to generate income on the side. In reality, such income is virtually impossible to trace. One view was that the main courses became institutions within an institution, ring-fenced from the rest, while an ex-staff member expressed that they became 'unionised'. Many recommendations of external consultants remained on paper. All in all, low morale reined at the Centre. It has become inward-looking, spent energy on internal issues, and staff felt de-motivated and defeated.

There were no staff appraisals in 2012 due to change management. It was said that the salaries were very high. Staff receive bonuses and in 2013 everybody got an equal bonus of 1,000 CHF as an expression of gratitude. In the meantime, promotions were frozen. An unbalanced distribution of work has been a recurring issue.

The leadership and the Bureau did not seem to anticipate the internal crisis in 2011, while the 2010 evaluation did not warn about the risk. They dealt with the problem by hiring management consultants

---

<sup>78</sup> This section is based on perusal of the GCSP narrative and financial documents, management consultants reports, interviews with the current and former members of staff and three involved stakeholders..

rather than making radical change. This was perceived as largely inefficient use of resources, as the consultancy lasted for 18 months and cost CHF 320.000 for an allegedly modest benefit.

**Assessment:** *Strategy setting and change management took place in the wrong order of priority. The appointment of a new Director should signal a new vision and strategy, and then a decision on the type of internal changes required to enact the vision (and the possible use of consultants). Designing strategic recommendations when the Centre was in-between leadership change is difficult, as there is no guarantee that they pull in the same direction. Managerial changes, such as job descriptions or pay-scale review, arguably could have been accomplished in less time and expense. This implies insufficient oversight.*

*The arrangement during the evaluation period has been that a Swiss Ambassador held the directorship, working with a non-Swiss academic as a deputy. Opinions were expressed that both positions should be held by the Swiss. If the value of the GCSP is understood as responsibility to its funder and client, i.e. the Swiss government, then directorship by a serving ambassador is an appropriate arrangement. However, it was expressed that if the Centre is meant to position itself as an independent global actor, opening the job to external competition may bring additional impetus. This dilemma will have to be addressed by the Centre in some future.*

### **Value for money**

The GCSP is viewed as an efficient service provider by external respondents: 'they know how to organise a course or an event,' although the cost of delivery is quite high. The Centre was audited in 2012 by PricewaterhouseCoopers and identified minor deficiencies. These are believed to be acted upon by the management.<sup>79</sup>

The new Director's view is that the Centre did not sufficiently invest in the future, as the environment grows more competitive, costs are rising, - e.g. the move to MdP cost the GCSP CHF 1 million, - while core funds are diminishing. There is an apparent diminution in activities in 2014 compared to 2013 to the amount of CHF 1 million. The Centre is undergoing technical modernisation prompted by the move and plans to invest in the future. New knowledge management systems and software are put in place to save labour costs in the long run, e.g. access alumni, send invitations and manage contacts. Re-branding is part of the Centre's modern image, as is equipment such as flat-screen multi media tools and the use of social media.

The evaluation found a certain resistance to innovation dubbed as 'artificial modernity' reinforced by the sentiment that the GCSP's client base of military establishments feels more comfortable in traditional settings.

The efficiency of external communications has improved lately. Associate Fellowships and a 'GCSP Group of Friends', under the previous director, also served the Centre's outreach purpose. Some courses, such as NISC, have established a Facebook group. Younger staff feels that GCSP should raise its profile and be known more.

### **Cost – Effectiveness**

In 2010 the government reduced funding to the GCSP and transferred responsibility to the FDFA from the DDPS. This led to staff reduction, but did not appear to bring greater efficiency. Concerns were expressed about the cost-efficiency of guest speakers (157 come to ICT), about the fact that there are too many administrators to support the teaching staff, about relationship-building trips, attending conferences and maintaining Advisory Board at GCSP expense. There was a sense that core funding was used in the past for relationship-building with unclear target outcomes, and to fit the agendas of prominent individuals at the Centre. The new Director is mindful of these concerns, which coincided with the need for budget cuts. Measures to improve cost-efficiency are introduced, i.e. use of alumni as guest speakers, who may give lectures on a fee-free basis, or putting the Advisory Board on hold. Cost-effectiveness of the governance

---

<sup>79</sup> Management Response to Audit Report, by the former Director, 2013.

structure (Bureau/CoF/President) is currently being re-assessed. It appears that the Centre is on the right track in this respect.

### 2.3.3.1 Expansion of funding base

The GCSP is mainly dependent on funding from the FDFA. The following table gives an overview on proportion of Swiss and other funding. The latter declined since 2010:

Funding (in CHF)

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Swiss <sup>80</sup>	8'757'966	8'578'289	9'153'811	8'958'445
Other <sup>81</sup>	1'244'402	1'140'010	776'674	736'532
Transfer from previous year	782'817	638'907	879'104	682'310
Total	10'785'185	10'357'206	10'809'589	10'377'287
Swiss /Other <sup>82</sup>	86%	88 %	92%	92 %

Source: GCSP Financial and audit reports 2010 to 2013 to the CoF

In 2014 donations were expected from Sweden – SEK 500'000, Latvia – EUR 20'000, and USD 10,000 was received from China. Other governments contribute mostly in kind and have covered scholarships for participants from the global South.

This dependency keeps the Centre vulnerable to dynamics and shifts not only in Swiss foreign policy priorities, but also to the internal politics and financial constraints of the Swiss Confederation in future. Although funding was reduced in 2010, the GCSP did not endeavour to decrease its dependency on Bern in 2011 – 2013 by developing specialised products/ expertise, which could attract external funds. The Centre did not pursue a business model oriented towards growth as it had sufficient secure Swiss funding for its needs, thus reducing the impetus. Interviews with two CoF members indicated that funding is in principle available from their governments, should GCSP come up with a viable proposal. It was suggested by a CoF member that a more forthcoming engagement by the FDFA to attract funding from likeminded countries might be helpful. Some interlocutors commented that the GCSP is too well-funded, which reduces its incentives, and that staff are more comfortable than in comparable institutions, with good salaries, job security, abundance of support staff and no hard field work requirements.

**Assessment:** *GCSP's identity is more distinctly Swiss than DCAF's, which is international, and foreign donors will need a good reason to fund it, for example Switzerland's neutrality identity may be valuable. Still, a shadow of the big donor may not leave much space and ownership for others. Irrespective of the fairness of such a perspective, it can be an obstacle for fundraising. In theory, it should be possible for staff to develop and fundraise for their own projects, and some secondees have done so from their governments. In practice, the real obstacles are a lack of time, low prioritisation, a lack of support by the senior management and a dearth of viable project ideas. Few incentives and a lack of growth-oriented model led in the past to an absence of tradable products to offer to external donors.*

### 2.3.4 Conclusions

Execution of tasks has largely been of high quality, training for the military and diplomats is well-regarded, with minor suggestions for improvement; shorter and e-courses modernise the GCSP offer. Research rested with individuals and has scaled down among institutional priorities in the period under evaluation.

<sup>80</sup> Including DDPS and FDFA additional project funding

<sup>81</sup> Nestar Foundation, Partner Institutions, China, Latvia, Sweden, Estonia, France, Norway, Slovenia, Denmark, Finland, Germany (not all Countries contribute every year), other income, interests and release of provisions are included in this position.

<sup>82</sup> Does not include the transfer from previous year.

A dialogue dimension lacked a strategy, and there has been no sound distinction between ‘dialogue’ and a convening function for public events and conferences. A variety of non-training activities are qualified as ‘dialogues.’ Regional capacity building amounts to a sum of training and relationship-building activities in increasingly diverse parts of the world, from Columbia to Kyrgyzstan, but lacks an intervention strategy and a rationale of what kind of change it seeks to affect. This is partly explained by the situation that the GCSP was not funded through an ODA budget and did not have to take OECD criteria into account.

As the Centre’s priorities have shifted in 2011 - 2013, it has not adapted well to the evolving international context. The evaluation acknowledges the new Director’s view that ‘It doesn’t take into account the work of the last months in order to put together a vision and a strategy as well as the preceding environment analysis.’<sup>83</sup> The question is whether it is appropriate to expect an independent strategy from an institution used for service provision with little incentive to step out of this role.

Donor’s expectations are fairly ambiguous and may be exaggerated. On the one hand, the GCSP has a procurement agreement with the government to deliver services, which allow little flexibility, and on the other hand, “Bern” wishes to see the GCSP as one of the leading think tanks in the world. Certainly, the MdP and the Geneva Centres can make Swiss contribution to peace and security more visible in International Geneva and in the world, if they add a think tank dimension, but it requires a major game change to enact such a vision.

To attain this latter goal, the GCSP would require a leadership chosen from among high-profile international figures on a competitive basis, who would present their agenda and bring their own team. Original research would have to be placed much higher among its priorities. Expectations towards the Centre’s position within European/global security training and research institutions need to be realistic and adjusted to the capacity of the Centre.

It is unfeasible to assess the future strategy of the new leadership without seeing it. It is understood that the proposed route is to make the Centre more commercially-oriented and expand into executive education.<sup>84</sup> The evaluation does not have sufficient expertise to assess the viability, but observes that given the competition in International Geneva, and the GCSP’s fairly low market brand at the higher/further education market,<sup>85</sup> this may not be an easy task.

In the future, the Centre has to re-assess to what extent it should be an extension of Swiss foreign policy in Geneva, (which would mean that the GCSP is an executor of designs made elsewhere), or it may decide to split service provision from its other functions. The evaluation suggests making a distinction between GCSP’s roles as a service provider to the Swiss government, and as a self-generating institution. In the first role, the GCSP would fulfil the client’s strategy and implement the tasks set out by FDFA and the DDPS, including training in security policy for international and Swiss government officials, host dialogues and events relevant for the Swiss policy, and contribute expertise for foreign and security policy-making.

### 2.3.5 Recommendations

#### **The evaluation recommends to the Centre on a strategic level**

- To work on/develop options for the future as a distinct Centre for training/research and dialogue with a comprehensive mix of the three or as a training and convening point; a service Centre to provide tailor made training and capacity building for the security sector and related fields such as peace building; strategic partnership with Swiss and other actors as well namely DCAF, GICHD and IHEID.
- To enter into a strategy process to develop options on the future of the Centre taking into account the capacities and offers of the other Centres within the MdP including the IHEID. The strategy

---

<sup>83</sup> Spelling quoted verbatim.

<sup>84</sup> The Director presented a forward-looking strategy, which was not seen by the evaluation. Neither did the director share his outreach activities, which may bare fruit for future development and branding of the Centre.

<sup>85</sup> For example, no NATO or EU respondents that were contacted were prepared to be interviewed on the GCSP.



development should also include the development of future institutional options.

- To improve the institutional funding support from like-minded member-states with the help of FDFA upon concrete proposals of the Centre. The FDFA may consider the introduction of financial incentives for the GCSP. Non-Swiss seconded personnel may also be vested with responsibility for fundraising.

#### **The evaluation recommends to the Centre on an operational level**

- To develop a strategy with clearly defined outcomes, and qualitative and quantitative targets, establish a baseline against each outcome, introduce indicators to measure progress against each objective and to trace more general impacts, and work on putting in place RBM tools.
- To examine who the GCSP allies are on the CoF and enter into negotiations on potential cooperation/funding plans.
- To introduce, for monitoring purposes, publications' download counts on their website and register their academic staff on Google Citation Index.
- Maintain the focus on security relevant aspects in training and the value of training for actual or future military and civil leaders from different cultures as a platform for interaction on security relevant issues.
- Staff secondments/ exchanges to develop essential skills can be a useful tool to bring renewed vigour to the Centre. Sister centres – DCAF and GICHD – are the places to start, as well as partner institutions in GPP.
- Attracting additional funding will require a growth-oriented business model. Apart from executive education, other promising arenas for fundraising are dialogue programmes and capacity-building in the regions where GCSP has a comparative advantage through staff specialisation or an alumni network. It is recommended to examine who the GCSP allies are on the CoF and enter into negotiations on potential cooperation/funding plans.
- Foreign secondees can be pro-actively used to solicit resources for the GCSP from their governments.
- Investment has been made into external relations and improving the brand. However, there is still a long way to go in terms of compiling names and contact details, and researching and establishing contacts with external actors outside Switzerland. Mailing should be more targeted, so that guest speakers do not receive invitations to enroll into courses they teach.
- For monitoring purposes, introduce a publications' download count on their website and register their academic staff on Google Citation Index.

#### **On the ETC86 the evaluation recommends**

Firstly, to considering the following: the course is institutions-based, while there is room to make it more issues-based (although different issues than NISC). Secondly, it recommends introducing a constructivist conceptual framework in addition to the predominant realist school of thought. This can be discussed, e.g. through discourse analysis to explore how alternative narratives are constructed/deconstructed. This will serve to equip trainees with analytical tools to grasp emerging issues. As suggested by the present evaluation, the themes can include:

- International intervention, responsibility to protect versus state sovereignty, also related to the changing/diminishing role of the UN. Case studies such as Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Mali, etc. Participants may have to deal with such dilemmas or their regions may be affected by interventions of their neighbours.
- Ethics in security policy – responsibility for national security versus protection of human rights and civil liberties: how far should we go in spying on our allies? Is rendition a necessary evil or an abhorrent practice? What about internet security?
- Role of international civil society in shaping global foreign and security policy agenda: how do they build their arguments and what are their sources of influence?

---

<sup>86</sup> It was suggested by the GCSP to the evaluators to look into the ETC in more depth. The recommendation is based on ETC 18 curriculum and its Concept Note, and interviews with former trainees. It proved impossible to meet with the course director and observe classroom teaching.

- International security assistance packages: how to interpret military assistance, official development aid, democratic control over armed forces and security sector reform?
- The course can familiarise trainees with non-state actors based in Geneva by making a visit to international NGOs. For example, Interpeace shares premises with many such organisations, which can be visited in one day, while the DCAF, GPP and SAS are next door. This will also help the GCSP appear less state-oriented.

**The evaluation recommends to the CoF**

- To develop or adapt according to the needs and requirements a Terms of reference for the President, the Secretary, and the Treasurer of the Foundation and the Director of the Centre.
- To make sure changes on legal representation for the Centre are expediently registered in the relevant registry.

**The evaluation recommends to the FDFA**

- To provide clear reporting expectations to the Centre in the framework agreement and in the annual agreements.

### **3. THE GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)**

#### **3.1 Summary of findings and recommendations**

##### **3.1.1 Strength / weaknesses / critical challenges**

###### *Strengths*

- Convening and normative power in the Mine Action community
- Recognized and up to date knowledge hub (one stop shop)
- Clear program with clear offerings
- Flexibility in the use of human resources

###### *Weaknesses*

- Clarity of identity: International Organisation? Consultancy? International NGO?
- Depending partly on outside know how
- High dependency on Swiss funding
- Irregular reporting on outcomes and results

###### *Critical Challenges*

- Maintain relevance in a competitive and changing environment
- Look out for strategic partnerships to gain/hold critical mass rather than be perceived as an unfair competitor
- While broadening the scope of work remain in a distinct niche of expertise and consultancy
- Mature and saturated Mine Action “Industry” may be on its peak and funding for research and development of tools, policies and instruments might be dwindling

##### **3.1.2 Summary of recommendations**

###### **The evaluation recommends to the Centre**

###### *On a strategic level*

- Within an inclusive strategy development process use input/feedback of other actors/partners including the relevant INGOs to define pertinent objectives to eventually broaden its scope of work and elaborate options for the future development of the Centre (3.3.1.6).
- To develop more strategic cooperation with Swiss (e.g. SDC) and other actors, namely DCAF, GCSP and SAS.
- To develop a comprehensive understanding of armed violence control and protection of people within a holistic (whole of government) approach.
- To develop clear indicators to show achievements and successes while keeping a balance between the requirements to maintain internal M&E systems and the burden on staff to comply with requirements thereto.

###### **The evaluation recommends to the CoF**

- To develop or according to the needs amend a Terms of reference for the President, the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Foundation and for the Director of the Centre.

###### **The evaluation recommends to the FDFA**

- To provide clear reporting expectations to the Centre in the frame work agreement and in the annual agreements.

### 3.2 Background

The Swiss Federation founded the GICHD in 1998 as one of three Geneva Centres.

*The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is an international expert organisation based in Switzerland that works to eliminate mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards. By undertaking research, developing standards and disseminating knowledge, the GICHD supports capacity development in mine-affected countries. It works with national and local authorities to help them plan, coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate mine action programs. The GICHD also contributes to the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (mission statement on GICHD web site).*

#### An overview

##### Governance and Human Resources

Management	Staff/ Head count <sup>87</sup>	Council of Foundation	Bureau	Advisory Board
8 males	16 males 36 females	23	6 (3 Swiss)	22

##### Finances

Revenues 2013	Swiss Funds including rent	Non-Swiss Contributions <sup>88</sup>	Deferred from 2012 and Extraordinary	
11'847'176	8'677'200	2'036'724	1'133'251	
Expenditures 2013	Programmes	Laws and Standards	Outreach	Management Admin/Support
11'825'125	8'095'101	686'246	966'558	2'077'219

The FDFA and DDPS have developed together a Swiss Mine Action-Strategy (MA Strategy) for 2012-2015, which states:

*"Despite the fact that the attention of some countries tends to shift away from mine action, Switzerland will continue to oppose this trend and to support the momentum to implement the relevant conventions..."* With this commitment Switzerland makes clear that supporting MA and the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) remains a priority for its security and foreign policy, as well as for its civilian peace building efforts.

The Swiss government's financial support to the GICHD is based on four yearly framework credits, endorsed by the Swiss Parliament. In its last statement, given on 17 November 2010, expectations of the GICHD, in the context of 2012 to 2015 funding were as follows:

- context analysis and strategic alignment;
- strategy development and program consultancy with systematic integration of gender specific approaches and aspects related to minorities;
- technical and operational consultancy;
- information management;
- mine action standards (IMAS);
- support for the implementation of international instruments;
- international participation and diversification of financial support.

The Swiss Parliament has pledged 36.2 million Swiss Francs to support the GICHD for the 2012-2015 period.

<sup>87</sup> Information from GICHD as of 30 March 2014 including ISU.

<sup>88</sup> Non-Swiss contributions are mainly coming from Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the US, DFID and UN Agencies.

In 2010 an MA expert and a gender expert evaluated the GICHD; their evaluation is partly reflected in the expectations of the 2010 parliament statement. It also recommends several areas which require attention, including:

- clearer definition of outputs and outcomes;
- clearer definition of measures of quality and success;
- use of better defined outputs against existing well-defined inputs to yield valid indicators of efficiency;
- a more rigorous assessment process for selecting new projects, continuing existing projects and shutting down those which are no longer necessary or justified;
- promotion of gender and diversity sensitive policies and practices in the wider MA world;
- development of a better system for bridging language barriers in the delivery of services;
- adopting a more active approach to managing relationships with key actors within the working context.

Following the 2010 evaluation, the GICHD commissioned a MA working context analysis (July 2011) and a communications review (November 2012). It developed a 2012-2014 strategy and a 2013-2014 communications strategy. A new strategic process will be launched by GICHD at the end of April 2014.

The GICHD still views itself as a leading Centre of excellence on mine action and as a service provider bridging gaps between research, lessons learnt and practice.

### **3.3 Evaluation and analysis**

#### **3.3.1 Relevance**

The mine action environment has changed in recent years. The community has become more mature and expertise related to technical demining and management approaches (including EOD/ERW/UXO) is more widespread. International NGOs have become significant actors, which develop approaches taking into account the socio-economic and development aspects of post armed conflict clearance. National MA Centres, such as those in Afghanistan and Lebanon, strive to play a more important and relevant role on a regional level. While mine clearance may have reached its peak on the quantitative side, more complex aspects of clearance, such as its socio-economic impact and relevance for development, may become more challenging in the future. Complex situations, such as those in Libya and Syria, where different armed groups hold weapons in unknown quantity and quality, challenge the traditional understanding of how international conventions and standards can be implemented.

The Swiss MA strategy acknowledges the growing complexity of post armed conflict clearance in a larger sense.<sup>89</sup> The Swiss strategy takes into account the growing relevance of synergies between MA, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, peace building and security.<sup>90</sup> The strategy mentions the GICHD as one of the main implementation partners.

##### **3.3.1.1 Relevance of vision/mission**

*The GICHD strives for a world free of mines and other explosive hazards, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment, conducive to development (GICHD strategy 2012-2014).*

The GICHD provides services for State Parties to the APMBC and for the wider MA community. While it is not involved in mine clearance and clearance of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) the Centre “*bridges the gaps between research, lessons learnt and practice; it promotes evidence-based policies, develops standards*

---

<sup>89</sup> This includes ERW (abandoned explosive ordnance, forgotten ammunition, improvised explosive devices and cluster ammunition) as well as “Certain Conventional Weapons” regulated in the CCW.

<sup>90</sup> The support to develop instruments of measurability on ERW clearance and Physical Security and Stock Pile Management (PSSM) is mentioned as an activity.

and enhances professionalism, making mine action faster, cheaper, safer, more effective, sustainable and inclusive” (GICHD Strategy 2012 to 2014).

Since 2010 the Centre has made considerable efforts to reposition itself within the MA community and maintain what has in the past been seen as its unique and distinct expertise. The Centre’s vision is in line with the APMBC’s objectives and the Swiss Mine Action Strategy 2012-2015. The aim includes not only the clearance of APM but also of other explosive hazards. The Centre’s strategy looks towards emergence of new needs and trends such as stock pile and ammunition management, environmental issues and ARV.

### 3.3.1.2 Relevance of the institutional environment analysis

#### Institutional environment

The GICHD is not only a service provider for the MA community, but also supports the secretariat of the APMBC and has an observer status to the convention including the Intersessional and Preparation meetings. It has observer status to the State Party Meetings on the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Centre also provides the Secretariat for the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and manages and updates the standards on behalf of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

**Assessment:** *The GICHD operates in a complex and dynamic institutional environment. While it has an institutional obligation related to the implementation of international “disarmament treaties”, it is a strategic partner of UNMAS and a service provider to National MA Institutions, UN Agencies and the wider MA community. National and international NGOs are arguably also institutional partners depending on the specific relationship between them and the Centre in various mine action theaters<sup>91</sup>. The cooperation with SDC has so far been less prominent. There might be a potential to be explored in the future to jointly develop with SDC and other Swiss actors (DCAF/HSD) comprehensive strategies and approaches to link conflict transformation post conflict rehabilitation, peace-building and development.<sup>92</sup>*

#### Competition

Through the interviews conducted with different actors in the MA sector it became clear that GICHD has no direct competitors, as long as it operates in its distinct field of services for the whole MA community. The nearest to a competitor might be the James Madison University’s Center for International Stabilization and Recovery<sup>93</sup>, which is more of an academic institution, but also provides specific services to National MA institutions.

Interviews have also raised the question whether the GICHD, in its effort to secure a wider funding base, risks competing with other actors in mine action. This brings up the dilemma we look at under 3.4 (expansion of funding base). As a mainly Swiss (government) funded institution, with comfortable core funding, the Centre could be seen as an unfair competitor if it participates in competition for funds. This may have a direct impact on the Centre’s relevance:

#### Competition and relevance

The Centre is recognized as an institution, which not only delivers services to the mine action community, but also largely as an “international organisation”. The Centre has normative power in the development and management of IMAS, and in hosting the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the APMBC (and in the future the CCM) under an agreement with the state parties to the Conventions. The GICHD is perceived or has been perceived as an impartial, or even neutral research and service provider for the MA community and for National MA Centres. For many actors this is an important feature of the Centre’s relevance within the MA community and contradicts the Centre’s potential efforts to compete with other actors in the “industry” for international tenders. Therefore, this dilemma must be taken into account when attempting

<sup>91</sup> The evaluation could establish the institutional relationship e.g. for Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Vietnam and Lebanon.

<sup>92</sup> e.g. the GICHD’s IMSMA and tools/instruments for land release comprise potential for such cooperation

<sup>93</sup> [www.jmu.edu](http://www.jmu.edu)

to broaden the Centre's funding base.

The UNMAS and other UN-Agencies are strategic partners for the GICHD. Potential overlap and areas of competition are a risk to the GICHD. For example, the UN mine actions strategy 2013-2018<sup>94</sup> is very similar to the GICHD's strategy 2012 – 2014. The different roles of the UN and the GICHD mitigate but do not exclude overlap.

These strategies share similar objectives in their support for national MA Centres. While there is wide scope for cooperation and mutual support, there may also be space for less productive turf fights and competition. Interlocutors from the commercial sector and larger NGOs, as well as from the UN, suggest that the GICHD runs the risk of not being distinct enough in its mandate compared to the UN. Some have even bluntly said that now that the systems are in place and the standards mature, there will be no reason for the GICHD to exist in the foreseeable future (five to ten years).

**Assessment:** *The GICHD still plays a distinctive role for the MA community. In widening its scope of work and using tools and methodologies developed for the traditional MA sector on other fields such as stock pile management and linking them e.g. to environmental and development issues the GICHD may maintain its relevance as a developer of tools, methods, QM as well as M&E for a wider community working with holistic approaches on post conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and development. It must however be careful to avoid creating a sense of unfair competition with other actors by keeping in mind that it **serves** the MA or a wider community. If the Centre's capacity and expertise are specifically requested, it does not have to shy away from entering into "business" with clients or partners.*

### **Identity and Swiss Foreign Policy**

Like the other two Geneva Centres the GICHD is a Janus headed institution. This may be an asset as it allows referring to it as typically Swiss when addressing the Swiss donor. It also allows arguing that it has a distinctive international face being governed by a CoF composed of member states. Interviewees look at this rather relaxed and think it is justified to use the ambiguous identity of the Centre for the good of the cause and in a pragmatic way. Some national MA authorities maintain it is important that the Centre has a Swiss label and works out of Geneva rather than out of New York. The neutrality of Switzerland and its convening power are recognized and appreciated. As a service provider within the MA community the excellence of the Centre's performance is relevant and not its Swiss label. People do not see the Centre as an instrument of Swiss foreign policy but rather as a service mainly financed by Switzerland to mitigate the security threat to persons through APM and other REW.

The security of people is a corner stone of Swiss contribution to humanitarian aid, post conflict reconstruction, peace-building and development. As a strategic partner within the Mine Action Strategy of the Swiss Federation for 2012 - 2015, the GICHD looks more like a Swiss foreign policy asset.

#### **3.3.1.3 Relevance of strategic objectives**

The GICHD defined its strategic objectives for 2012 – 2014 as follows:

##### **Strategic Objective 1**

###### *Global Clarity on explosive hazards*

Interviews and a review of documents demonstrate the relevance of on-going endeavours to clarify the scope of explosive hazards contamination. While the implementation of the APMBC is widely regarded as a success, the challenge of dealing with ever new "explosive hazards" in changing environments of armed conflicts requires constant research and adaptation of strategies, approaches and operations. While the GICHD is well placed to play a leading role in working towards this objective, it has to coordinate with other actors in order to make the most of a joint effort towards clarity in the sector. Objective 1 is also in line with the Swiss Mine Action Strategy 2012 - 2015 (page 12 on top).

<sup>94</sup> [http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine\\_action\\_strategy\\_mar15.pdf](http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_strategy_mar15.pdf)

## **Strategic Objective 2**

### *High performing national authorities and national ownership*

National MA authorities or national MA Centres are key to achieving the aims formulated for the GICHD in the Swiss MA Strategy and the UN's MA strategy. Interviews, document review and the case study on Afghanistan confirm the crucial role the GICHD has played and can play in the future to strengthen the performance and ownership of national authorities. Contextual sensitivity and recognition of existing national capacities is crucial to maintaining the relevance of the support the GICHD provides.

In 2011 the GICHD commissioned a paper called "Mine Action - a description of working context". Together with the 2010 evaluation of the Centre, this paper is an important input to the organisation's strategic development. In view of the upcoming strategizing process (2015 to 2018) the Centre commissioned an update of the context paper. Thus, the GICHD is trying to not only rely on its own analysis of a changing and dynamic environment, but is also looking for outside input to improve and check its own strategizing and planning processes.

### **3.3.1.4 Implementation of the strategy**

Objectives need to be aligned with operational strategies and mechanisms, which are reflected in Programs, and ultimately in projects. The GICHD defines specific programs, which work towards achieving its strategic objectives. It also defines specific longer term activities, such as support to standards, laws and outreach.

#### **Programs**

##### *Strategic management*

- Linking Mine Action, Security and Development Sectors
- Quality Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

##### *Operations*

- Land Release
- Stockpile Destruction, EOD and Technology

##### *Information management*

- Information management capacity development
- Information tool maintenance and development
- Research, Innovation and prototyping

A thematically organized program helps the Centre to stay in a process to achieve its objectives. Also, the programmatic openness towards a development and violence reduction agenda provides potential for GICHD to participate in and contribute to a wider debate on e.g. poverty reduction and AVR. The new GICHD Handbook, "10 steps to a national quality management system", as well as the new edition of the MA Handbook are good examples of how the Centre is integrating AVR and wider development agendas into its tools/publications<sup>95</sup>.

#### **Standard setting and support to International Law**

##### *Standard Setting*

The GICHD provides support to the development of Standards by running the secretariat of the IMAS Review Board, participating in the IMAS steering Group and developing, reviewing and disseminating the IMAS, the Technical Notes for Mine Action (TNMA) and the Test and Evaluation Protocols (T&EP).

While this service provided by the GICHD to the MA community is viewed positively by most, some interview partners consider the GICHD's position as monopolizing a sector, which is no longer relevant as standards

---

<sup>95</sup> MA Handbook (March 2013) p. 96 (on poverty reduction) p. 197 (more general)



are already set and the MA industry is saturated. However, national actors assess GICHD's role in standard setting positively. Some see the GICHD as an impartial leader with normative power and pertinent know how, which enable it to support the development of national MA standards. The contribution of the Centre to the IMAS is important for harmonization of the MA-sector. The GICHD plays a distinctive and important role in the development and dissemination of IMAS and its instruments. This role does not remain uncontested and the Centre has to justify its position in this realm by convincing its critics. Some critics, especially those from NGOs and the commercial sector, as well as some from the UN system, believe the Centre should amend IMAS only if important and relevant new feedback from the field suggests that another round of amendments is needed, because routine amendments are a costly routine exercise<sup>96</sup>. Also some interviewees suggest that while input from civil society and private actors is often taken on board for discussion on IMAS, these views are not always taken into account when standards are finally set. Therefore, the question arises of who sets the pace of standard development: the UN (UNMAS) or GICHD.

#### *Support to International Law*

The GICHD hosts the Implementation Support Unit of the APMBC (ISU-APMBC). Cooperation is governed by an agreement between the GICHD and the state Parties to the APMBC. A similar arrangement is envisaged for the ISU of the CCM.

The GICHD also supports legal and political processes aimed at reducing the humanitarian and development impact of weapons at the request of national authorities or the UN.

The arrangement whereby the ISU works under an agreement with the GICHD is widely accepted. However, there are some critics, who contest the *raison d'être* of the GICHD and believe that the ISU could work under the UNMAS or another UN body, or have its own structure.

#### **Outreach and publications**

##### *Knowledge hub for mine action*

The GICHD is a nearly undisputed hub of information for the MA community. Its effort to improve communication and make technical and policy information on MA and related fields available for the MA community and for researchers is positively recognized, with the GICHD seen as a *one stop shop* for information on MA and related fields. The up-to-date website and use of social media support the access to MA information developed and provided by GICHD (sometimes in cooperation with other actors) and foster communication on more tailor made and specific information, e.g. on IMAS. However, some actors question the *per se* added value of new publications and handbooks. According to them, the knowledge in the sector has increased in the past five to ten years. The Centre has to be careful to produce publications and methodologies, which provide evidence-based value for the MA community. Some interlocutors believe that the Centre's comfortable funding situation leads to the risk of producing information on the basis of "nice to have" rather than needs-based<sup>97</sup>.

##### *Linguistic outreach programs*

The Centre's Linguistic Outreach Programs have a positive resonance within the targeted language groups. Representatives of Persian, Farsi, Dari and Arabic language groups not only see a potential for wider information dissemination, but also a potential for more cooperation within the language group and for potentially setting up centres of expertise in the language relevant area.

#### **3.3.1.5 Excellence**

While the relevance of the Centre is widely undisputed, its excellence as a Centre does not remain uncontested. Statements suggest that the excellence of the Centre is highly dependent on its experts. Some interlocutors have noted that highly respected experts have recently left the Centre. This is not an unprecedented situation and shows that firstly, the Centre is under continuous scrutiny from the MA

---

<sup>96</sup> Support to law and standards cost CH 787'000 in 2013, which includes the costs for staff in the unit.

<sup>97</sup> According to the Centre the 2012 – 2013 statistics will show a considerable reduction of new publications.

community. Secondly, it reminds the management of the Centre to continuously develop the social and technical capacity of its staff and keep the working environment attractive for the best female and male experts on MA and related fields.

#### Interview quotes

*In general, the Centre produces high quality work, has sound expertise, contributes to policy thinking and occupies a useful niche. The fact that it is less operational and has an independent funding base means that it provides less biased information and analysis than UNMAS and NGOs, which have their own agendas and which are too driven by operational considerations to be able to delve into policy. It is positive that GICHD is not operational and should not go down that route. There are many operators, while GICHD is unique.*

*GICHD should beware of mission creep. Needs should be based on the realities in affected nations, rather than being determined by GICHD. It is up to the Council of Foundation to keep GICHD within the bounds of needs, rather than becoming akin to a GICHD business development plan.*

**Assessment:** *The Centre has a reputation of excellence in its field. However, as explained later, the notion of excellence often depends on individuals who interact with clients and partners. Those individuals are often consultants contracted by the GICHD. Many actors see the Centre as a “one stop shop” for information and development of standards as well as a reference point for providing support for a wider field of post armed conflict clearance and ammunition management. While the comfortable core funding makes an objective assessment difficult as many services and the information hub are provided for free, the positive feedback by other (non-Swiss) donors on specific contracts suggests a good reputation for delivery of services. The developed tools and publications are to a certain extent demand driven. Would they also be in demand if not provided for free?*

#### 3.3.1.6 Opportunities and risks in expanding the scope of work

The GICHD has a set of tools, methodologies and approaches on offer, which enable it to bring added value to a widening sector dealing with explosive hazards outside the traditional MA environment.<sup>98</sup> If it sticks to its strengths as a provider and developer of know how, a knowledge hub and a convening point for a wider community aimed at improving people’s security and AVR, it capitalizes on what it has developed and remains in line with its mandate and vision. A holistic approach, which includes developing an interface between clearance, stock pile and ammunition management on one side and conflict transformation, post conflict rehabilitation, peace building and development on the other, would benefit and help to engage also more with other Swiss actors, as well as strengthen ties within the MdP.

Broadening the scope of work bears also risks. The GICHD needs to acknowledge that other actors have developed over time and have positioned themselves within the wider AVR debate. The risk for overlap and competition may rise and use up energy, which could be invested to better ends elsewhere. Cooperation with the DCAF and the SAS, which should be intensified within the MdP, will support the GICHD’s meaningful development beyond the scope of the mine action sector to bring about an approach to influence also civilian military interface where appropriate. Expanding the scope of work bears as well the risk that the expertise level of the staff in specific areas may become shallow and the GICHD becomes more vulnerable to turnover or more dependent on outside consultants. The GICHD may mitigate the risks it faces when expanding its scope of work through continuous and objective analysis of the context and its own relevance, through strategic cooperation with other actors, in order to group together the expertise of different players to gain *critical mass* rather than to compete<sup>99</sup>.

**Assessment:** *The evaluation encourages a forward strategy of the GICHD widening its scope of work while keeping in mind, that the main mandate will stay with the Centre for an unforeseeable future and the*

<sup>98</sup> e.g. ammunition safety, stock pile management and destruction

<sup>99</sup> Various interview partners perceived the alleged attempt of merging with the SAS as unfriendly takeover and commented it rather negatively.

*growing complexity of MA with managing residual risks and new challenges (e.g. non-state actors/environmental dynamics) need on-going attention. Other options include a development of merger or a transition to phasing out strategies.*

#### **Options for the future**

- The GICHD has the option to go a proactive path by widening its scope of work, its funding base through tenders and strategic cooperation to maintain critical mass, relevance and independence within a wider sector of MA and AVR.
- Tighter cooperation and strategic partnering within the MdP namely with the IHEID, DCAF, GCSP and SAS may bring about synergies, maintain critical mass and suggest in the longer term a more comprehensive structure (e.g. holding/managerial and administrative roof/etc.).
- GICHD may also decide to stick within a more narrow scope of mine action and work on a transition towards a phasing out strategy.

### **3.3.2 Effectiveness**

#### **3.3.2.1 Does the Centre achieve its strategic objectives?**

##### **Strategic Objective 1**

##### *Global Clarity on explosive hazards*

GICHD has set up a variety of instruments supported by studies, which attempt to clarify explosive hazards contamination and how to dispose of or manage them. Examples are<sup>100</sup>:

- The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which has recently had an update including capabilities for victim focused information management.
- Land Release, which includes a series of activities to better define areas of contamination and promote efficient mine/EWR clearance.
- Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Contamination Study  
*Lessons learned from World War II; ERW risk management should give a new perspective on risk management in countries affected by more recent wars (e.g. Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos).*
- Standard setting activities to reach a unified understanding of technical and legal approaches to MA and newer topics such as ammunition safety management.

While management of residual ERW is a relatively new activity of the Centre, IMSMA and Land Release are part of the core instruments to achieve strategic objective 1. Both instruments have been developed further throughout the period under evaluation. According to feedback from the MA community and National MA-Centres the newest version of IMSMA with the addition of victim focused information management has reached a sophistication and broadness enabling competent users to extract useful information for national institutions responsible e.g. for rural development or public health. Land release instruments do not only contribute to improvement of efficiency and cost effectiveness but also encompass legal aspects in order to gain clarity over owner or user rights, once the land is ready to be handed over.

To enable the GICHD to measure outcomes and impact related to the instruments developed and provided for the MA community, it will be important to consistently introduce RBM based ToC monitoring tools.

There may be an overlap between the UNODA/IATG and the IMAS in standard setting related to ammunition safety management. This was raised at the AB meeting in May 2012. The conclusion was: *“On the matter of*

<sup>100</sup> Examples taken from the 2013 Annual Report.

*standards, participants stressed that the IATG and the IMAS are different conceptual sets of standards which are complementary rather than overlapping, even though the approach may be better unified”.*

## **Strategic Objective 2**

### *High performing national authorities and national ownership*

It is one of the core competences and tasks of the GICHD to support national mine action authorities and enhance national ownership (see also message to parliament pp. 8200/8201). To this end, the GICHD provides strategic and management support to national MA authorities and also provides evaluation for national MA programs. Specifically, the GICHD has different levels of intervention to achieve this objective:

- support the development of NMAS in line with IMAS;
- support to strategic planning processes and management (e.g. South Sudan and DRC);
- support of learning processes and development of good practices through country case studies (e.g. DRC, Vietnam, Tajikistan);
- provision, implementation and maintenance of IMSMA;
- development of Quality Management Systems and publications, as well as capacity building (10 Steps to A National Quality Management System);
- organisation of regular meetings of Mine Action National Program Directors and UN Advisors (also open to NGOs and other actors in the MA sector).

According to interviews with actors on different levels (NGOs, national MA authorities, academic institutions, UNMAS in the field) the instruments, research and publications that the GICHD has developed over time, usually reach their target audience. Some have said that the publications are too dense/complicated to be used on a community level.<sup>101</sup> Representatives of national MA Centres confirm that they use the handbooks and encourage their staff to do so as well.

Since the introduction of French, Arabic and Persian (Farsi, Dari, Persian) outreach programs, the GICHD has improved the dissemination of IMAS in these languages (for the time being in French and Arabic) and provides regional training to improve cooperation of national MA authorities.

The GICHD's achievements in strengthening national MA authorities are widely recognised (e.g. Vietnam/Afghanistan/Lao PDR/Iraq/Tajikistan). Often the GICHD's achievements are described as bringing about a change in mind sets on the national level, which make political leaders or mine action authorities understand that in mine affected countries, MA is ultimately the responsibility of the state/government and the state should take a leading role.

### **Interview quotes**

*Vietnam may have been engaged in MA since 1975, but they had never thought about a national program or strategy. The response was patchwork, but with no system to record or connect activity. Each ministry had its own activity, but there was no coordination, no plan.*

*When GICHD came they found this gap. They then supported the Vietnam authorities to set up a national mine action programme (MAP). This was a great achievement. MA in Vietnam costs around \$100m per year; the problem wasn't lack of money (it mostly comes from the Vietnam Government), but the fact that there was no master plan.*

*Now the country has a strategy and plan and that is almost entirely as a result of GICHD involvement (with the support of IC-VVAF102).*<sup>103</sup>

*I was involved in the start of the contracting mine action study. I remember the discussion. The intent was to capture best practice. In the end it focused on a couple of countries that people wanted to go to or which*

<sup>101</sup> Interview with a representative of an academic institution providing also support to National MA Centres

<sup>102</sup> The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and the International Centre

<sup>103</sup> <http://english.vov.vn/Society/Vietnam-strengthens-intl-cooperation-in-demining/256758.vov>

*GICHD wanted to support. This is typical. Studies are driven by results from a couple of countries that people want to go to or support.*

The Centre introduced a Mine Action Security and Development Program (MASD) during the period under evaluation<sup>104</sup>. The program aims to provide tools and information to mine action and development practitioners to link MA with a wider development agenda of countries and International Organisations.

**Assessment of achievements:** *From interviews with actors in the field and with national authorities the evaluation can conclude that the GICHD produces achievements through its interventions. Since the 2010 evaluation, the GICHD has improved its outreach capacity through the language outreach programs. The Centre does expose its new strategies and objectives to the AB, as a sounding board. The MASD is a significant step forward on the road to link MA with a wider development agenda and hopefully also towards improvement of civilian/military cooperation. The statements made by the interviewees on achievements and results of the GICHD's interventions in different countries and contexts suggest that it is possible to measure achievements as well as, to a certain extent, impacts. The CoF took this up in the 29 November 2013 meeting (item 19 and 20 of minutes). During the visit to the Centre the evaluator observed that the Centre is on the way to developing instruments and also a theory of change approach<sup>105</sup>.*

### **3.3.2.2 Monitoring arrangements**

Effective monitoring tools and methods are a prerequisite for transparent and realistic reporting and effective/efficient program/project management. Since the evaluation in 2010, the GICHD has started to think more about an RBM approach for its own programs and projects. While the GICHD provides state of the art evaluation and management consultancy to national mine action authorities and those in the wider community who ask for it, it has so far not put in place the instruments it promotes to the MA community into its own activities for the whole Centre<sup>106</sup>. To follow up projects internally, the operations consultancy unit however has set in place an M&E procedure, including a yearly update on the basis of a ToC approach.

#### **External Reporting and monitoring**

In its bi-annual report to the FDFA, the GICHD mainly reports its activities (outputs) rather than its results or impacts (outcomes). The framework agreement of 9 December 2011 between the HSD/CDP and the GICHD under item 6.1 asks for:

1. A mid-yearly activity report by 31 July of the respective calendar year
2. An activity report on each year by 30 June of the following calendar year
3. ....

Annual agreements ask for the same reporting, meaning that the main donor asks the GICHD to report on its activities. Simply asking the Centre to provide additional information to the FDFA upon mutual agreement (frame work agreement 6.2) is not enough. Other donors explicitly ask for results based reporting (Germany) or for a Results Assessment Framework (RAF), developed by the GICHD measuring the achievements of the specific action (Sweden's SIDA).

The Centre has set up results based reporting systems based on the requirement of specific donors. Consistent contractual obligations with the main donor for reporting on outcomes and results would also enhance the GICHD's improvement in this area.

#### **Internal monitoring / Quality management**

The GICHD runs an online participants survey for its training workshops (Management Consulting Section). The results are mainly used by the training teams to identify specific areas for improvement and are not

---

<sup>104</sup> Mentioned and explained in the Annual Report 2011 p. 6

<sup>105</sup> According to the Head of Management Consulting at GICHD some units already use RBM and ToC approaches. The evaluation got the impression that tools and capacity exist, but that they have not yet been introduced systematically.

<sup>106</sup> The Activity report

analyzed systematically. In the current year, the GICHD is introducing an M&E system for training workshops and country interventions. A systematic approach to information management capacity building, based on assessed baselines and targeted development plans, should also come under way this year. What GICHD calls results in its reporting to the FDFA and in its annual activity reporting (e.g. 2012) are in the view of the evaluators rather output than outcomes understood as measurable results<sup>107</sup>.

The Management Support Unit uses back office reporting to adjust and improve on-going projects. The unit also uses a ToC approach to measure the development of outcomes once a year. Some staff complain about time consuming follow up procedures, which eat into their time for action development and implementation.

**Assessment:** *While the GICHD does not yet have an overall and systematic complaints or internal quality management system, interviewees confirm that complaints, suggestions and inputs are taken seriously and are swiftly answered. Usually, complaint confirmations arrive quickly and a substantial reaction may follow a priority complaint. GICHD is not far from being able to produce RBM and ToC based reporting. Some donors require it already. While QM systems and RBM/ToC are important monitoring instruments, they must be designed and implemented in a way to be supportive to the staff. An inclusive process to introduce these instruments would help to make them part of a positive working culture.*

### 3.3.2.3 Instruments and context

The GICHD uses different instruments to achieve its objectives; some of the main ones are:

- training and workshops;
- quality management support;
- evaluation and assessment;
- development and dissemination of standards;
- development and introduction of handbooks;
- development and testing of new technical and programmatic approaches.

Most of the respondents give a positive assessment of how the GICHD uses its instruments. In some events (e.g. South Sudan and sometimes in Afghanistan) there have been comments that the GICHD has not done enough testing on the ground before an intervention or has not created a tailored enough approach. Digging deeper into such anecdotal evidence shows that there is sometimes a problem of attitude, meaning that issues in coordination and communication may lead to misunderstandings with other actors on the ground, rather than a lack of preparation. Some interviewees explained they would therefore rather engage the GICHD with a clear contract and pay for its services in order to remain the unrivalled owner of a specific process.

### 3.3.2.4 Sustainability of achievements

The GICHD develops know how, provides knowledge transfer, develops and maintains standards and offers capacity building in strategic planning and quality management. It also hosts the ISU to the APMBC and, will eventually host the ISU to the CCM and the GMAP. The Centre can also implement M&E tools for national MA authorities and MA implementers. It sometimes provides research and case studies in cooperation with others.<sup>108</sup>

The MA knowledge hub and publications provided by the GICHD are widely regarded as useful and are known to be used. On-going interaction with key actors in the field, national authorities but also NGO representatives<sup>109</sup>, will keep these instruments updated and sustainable. As other actors also develop new

---

<sup>107</sup> Interviews with GICHD management and staff confirm this impression.

<sup>108</sup> E.g. joint GICHD/SIPRI research on impact of Anti Vehicle Mines (AVM); GICHD Case study on Action on Armed Violence and post conflict Rehabilitation and Reintegration.

<sup>109</sup> E.g. MAG, NPA, DDG or ICBLCMC as a more activist and policy oriented actor.

tools, further cooperation will improve the quality and mainstreaming capacity of the instruments.<sup>110</sup> The web page count keeps the GICHD informed about the number of requests for information (Annex 4). The download statistics provide evidence based numbers on the demand for publications (Annex 5)<sup>111</sup>. The google analysis shows a high access rate to the GICHD's website, it becomes how ever obvious, most "hits" originate from western countries. But there are also considerable amounts of "hits" from mine affected countries. The download statistic shows a respectable interest for the Centres publication within a rather small "industry".

The 2010 evaluation of the Centre delivered an analysis of whether the Centre is achieving its mission (item 4.2.1). This analysis is partly still valid and the recommendations relevant. The management of the Centre acknowledges that while it is on its way to developing instruments to measure outcomes and achievements including sustainability, it has not yet arrived there. While the restructuring of the management team (valid since 2014) has concentrated operations consulting and management consulting teams under the Director of Operations, after such short time it is not yet clear if the different teams are acting together in a more concerted way. Reactions from the field (less from national authorities than other actors) suggest that information exchange and follow up on the potential sustainability of the GICHD's achievements might improve internal M&E instruments and their value in internal planning and strategy development. To improve and maintain effectiveness it is important to make sure that different teams within the Centre interact and use know how and knowledge synergies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that with the dynamic staff turnover during the last four years and the move to the MdP, some of the previous silo structures have been broken up and more horizontal interaction and cooperation now takes place.

### 3.3.2.5 Quality of staff

To be effective, staff needs to be qualified and motivated. For efficient consulting a credible development of management tools and research, as well as, certain closeness to the action is certainly positive. On the other hand, to be an impartial and neutral observer, developer, advisor and researcher, a certain distance from the field is also required. The 2010 evaluation states:

*"A widely expressed view (although not amongst National Centres) is that some of the Centre's staff have been away from field programmes too long and are out of touch with current practice. ...If the Centre's representatives are seen as being out of touch then, whether they are or aren't, audiences are likely to pay less attention to them and ascribe less credibility to the information they are providing."*

Interlocutors, especially from commercial actors and some larger NGOs have expressed similar views during interviews for this evaluation. A short assessment of the turnover at the GICHD shows that since 2010 the staff turnover at the GICHD has been slightly above 30%<sup>112</sup>. Some of the new operational staff have come directly from the field (NGOs) and have worked as consultants in mine action, have a military background in MA and ERW or worked previously at an IO, such as the UN (e.g. UNMAS) or the ICRC. There seems to be a good mix of seasoned MA experts, younger professionals with experience and JPOs.

Also, the GICHD spends between 30% and 40% of total human resources costs on external consultants. On the one hand, this is an asset because it provides flexibility, but on the other hand it makes the GICHD dependent on outside resources. On the whole, the mix of turnover, core staff and outside consultancy adds to a dynamic atmosphere. It is not clear if external consultants to GICHD represent the Centre when they are on assignments or if they act only in their own name. The evaluation suggests to look at this situation and to clarify the functions especially of regular consultants and the methods on how those can improve the

---

<sup>110</sup> The Mine Action Intelligence Tool MINT of GICHD might have some overlap or similarities with instruments developed by DRC/DDR and other NGOs.

<sup>111</sup> In 2013 GICHD got orders for 58 books and 72 CDs through the website, it distributed 2'888 hard copies and 1'099 CD's through workshops and conferences.

<sup>112</sup> Turnover in four years has been more than 30% at the Centre. Administration and support staff have been more stable while in operations turnover has been more dynamic.

visibility of the Centre (e.g., business card, clear communication to the client, etc.). This might also not be desirable for consultants who desire to promote their own brand.<sup>113</sup>

While the language outreach program (obviously) provides for language diversity, other sections in the Centre are still dominated by Western, or rather, European experts.<sup>114</sup> In this respect the language question as part of overall effectiveness and efficiency (reaching the audience directly), has not noticeably improved. The challenge might be mitigated by flexible cooperation between different teams and strategic cooperation with local experts.

The GICHD staff have high dedication. This is reflected in the positive feedback on the work done in the field. As any other organisation with a consultancy approach, the Centre's own prestige depends on the quality and prestige of its experts. Feedback from clients related to the quality of interventions was generally positive. However, within an overall positive assessment of an intervention the following criticisms were brought up:

- GICHD only coordinated the intervention with the donor and not with the recipient
- Country assessments use up time of staff, who are already dedicated. GICHD did not collect feedback nor took recommendations from actors in the field for the country assessment seriously.
- In singular instances GICHD may have overstepped the mark in relation to national ownership, by becoming too involved in implementation and not remaining within an advisory only function.

#### **Case Study Afghanistan**

Afghanistan is one of the most mine affected countries in the World. Various internal conflicts and also the war against the former Soviet Union have left mines, unexploded ordnances (UXOs), as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), which threaten the security of people. As the International Security Assistance Force ISAF is slowly phasing out it leaves, according to the director of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) new challenges related to battlefield clearance behind. NATO does reluctantly share know how on how to safely conduct clearance on NATO ERW with MACCA or even UNMAS for that matter. Afghanistan is still a fragile environment in many regions and situations can move quickly. However, under the guiding support of UNMAS, the MACCA has over time developed into a strong national mine action authority. Many actors are working in the field, which renders coordination and cooperation a challenge.

GICHD started to support the demining in Afghanistan in 2003 by leading an assessment of options for a transition to national ownership. It has then conducted Afghan Landmines & Livelihood surveys from 2009 to 2012 and case studies on national transition and Strategic Planning in mine action. In cooperation with UN-Habitat GICHD conducted a support mission on mine action and land rights in 2012 and 2013, which led to a publication with a Frequently Asked Questions document on MA and land rights in Afghanistan. This document was translated into Dari and Pashto, for dissemination to key actors in Afghan mine action. With a lens on Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) GICHD commissioned an Afghan case study on HALO Trust's Reintegration of former combatants into demining. GICHD provided the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to MACCA and supported its implementation. From December 2013 to March 2014, under a UNOPS IM contract, GICHD prepared and tested the IMSMA upgrade, which includes also a Victim focused information management. At the same time it delivers capacity building in MACCA to bring MACCA to autonomy in running IMSMA. Mainly since 2009, GICHD provided training, support and capacity building for development of QM systems and a national M&E system. GICHD was instrumental to support the development of National Mine Action standards (NMAS). It has started the language outreach program in which Iranian, Afghan and Tajiks

<sup>114</sup> In 2013 an Arabic speaker and in 2014 an Urdu and Farsi speaker joined the management support section. Apart from Spanish and Portuguese the operations consulting section does not have experts with language skills who are able to communicate with local staff of national MA centres, who do not speak English or French.



cooperate to transfer inter alia technical terms of IMAS into Farsi/Dari/Persian. In 2013, GICHD/GMAP delivered a Gender assessment on the Mine Action Program Afghanistan (MAPA) as well as training on gender sensitive action plan development. It supported mainly the development of MACCA in cooperation with the UN-system. Field Research was provided for the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and HALO trust.

Recipients of the GICHD services to Afghan Mine action are on a whole very positive in assessing GICHD's intervention. They highlight the professionalism of the experts and the relevance of the services. The GICHD was a key contributor to the development of NMAS, the installation and maintenance of IMSMA, the transition process to nationalisation of MAPA, the implementation of QM, as well as, M&E systems and the development of gender sensitive mine action policies. Achievements in these fields can be largely attributed to the GICHD. The services were timely, adequate and context sensitive. The recently started language outreach program is seen as a relevant contribution not only to the development of NMAS, but also to supporting regional cooperation.

When the Centre intervenes with its own activities such as country study or other types of research, it is sometimes perceived as not coordinating sufficiently with local actors and requiring support and inputs at short notice. Such support to GICHD self-initiated activities often took considerable time and energy from local staff. Also GICHD sometimes delivered services when it was not asked. Therefore, UNMAS had to intervene and make sure GICHD delivers what it is asked and when it is asked.

*Assessment: The "Afghan case" illustrates the potential of GICHD in the fields where it is strong and where it is perceived being unique and providing expertise over a wide range of MA. The activity over time and the results/achievements thereof are remarkable. It is probably hard to find another actor in MA who is capable to deliver such a wide range of targeted expertise out of a one stop shop. However, GICHD needs to be careful to serve the demands of clients who are in the field and not the assumed necessities thought out in Geneva. It has to be aware of its relative distance to the field. This is a strength (objective outside view) and also a weakness (assumptions made without reality check). Sensitivity to clients' needs and situations is especially crucial when GICHD does research and country studies out of its own means and driven partly by its own interests.*

**Assessment of outcomes:** *The GICHD has a good and measurable track record of empowering and supporting National Mine Action Authorities. The support to the implementation of National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which are in line with International Standards (IMAS) but adopted to their context, directly impact the improvement of national mine action management and national legislation. IMSMA and the land release program provide clients with information and tools to improve quality, efficiency as well as cost effectiveness. They also serve the MASD Program. The Language Outreach Program in Arabic and Persian/Dari/Farsi opens access to a wider circle of mine clearance professionals, who are not comfortable in English. It also opens up the opportunity for neighbouring countries (with the same language) to better cooperate on mine action. References to long term programs, such as those in Afghanistan and Vietnam, prove the longer term impact of the implementation of quality management and information management systems.*

### 3.3.3 Efficiency

The overall assessment on efficiency remains positive (see also evaluation 2010). The instruments set up before the last evaluation have settled in. The financial reporting to the CoF is transparent and congruent with activity reporting. In a very short time, the system allows to check the contributions that different donors make to specific activities. Apart from the on-going introduction of M&E instruments, some aspects of governance need attention in view of the upcoming strategic process.

### 3.3.3.1 Management

Aspects of governance related to all three Centres are discussed in a chapter on Governance related to all three Centres. In the report related to the GICHD, the evaluation assesses the management arrangements, their dynamics, as well as their opportunities and challenges.

#### Management structure

The Management structure has slightly changed as of January 2014. The Operations Consulting unit and the Management Consulting unit are now headed by a Director of Operations. They remain otherwise unchanged as separate units under a head of unit. The logic behind this change is not obvious to the evaluator, because the management has not become leaner. The main gain of the change may be more coherent cooperation of the important sections of operations and management consulting.

#### Management arrangements

There is positive feedback on how the previous Director managed the turnaround process for the Centre and was able to repair some of the frictions in international actors' relationships (see also p. 25 of 2010 evaluation). However, some staff feedback suggests that the management style was perceived as being rather top down and not very inclusive. Interlocutors explain that important management decisions, including the structure change of 2014, were not accompanied by appropriate consultations with the staff.

The development of the 2012 to 2014 strategy has been partly inclusive. While the input from the operations side were gathered more systematically and partly taken into account, there was allegedly less input from the administrative and support side. Also it is not easy to have a fully inclusive strategizing process when staff, including key staff, are travelling a lot. The interaction with the AB and the CoF seemed appropriate for the development of the strategy.

One might also argue, strategy development and management arrangements are within the scope of the strategic leadership of the director and the management in cooperation with the governing bodies of the Centres. There might not be a lot of space for long and potentially contradicting or heated discussions for the development of a new strategy.

#### HR-Management

The GICHD developed over time procedures and rules for HR-Management. It has a clear and transparent table for functions & salary. Recruitment procedures are driven by the HR-management, which is professional. An annual staff appraisal system is in place. Its implementation has improved over the years. Some staff members still see it more as a routine than an instrument to improve staff performance and staff development.

**Assessment:** *In an expert organisation like the GICHD, appropriate involvement of staff in change management processes and strategy development is advisable. Staff identification with the institution is high in this environment as it should be. On the other hand, strategy development and change management can be cumbersome processes, which may also have a negative impact on efficiency and effectiveness over time. If such processes are led in a climate of inclusion, and perceived to be the result of a consultative approach, the results might yield higher identification and improved effectiveness and efficiency over time. Despite the criticism of these processes, the evaluation can state that during the last four years the Centre's capacity to deliver timely and adequate services to a wide range of clients has improved. The Centre is rather well positioned in a complex environment.*

### 3.3.3.2 Value for money/cost effectiveness

The Centre's financial reporting system allows the assessment of financial inputs into its activities. The value of the instruments developed and made available to the MA community and the national MA-authorities cannot be easily measured. Investment in developing and maintaining tools on a state of the art level is costly. Some interlocutors suggest that IMSMA is now developed and should not become more complex

through ever new updates. Reactions from the Centre take these caveats into account. IMSMA's recent update should now be followed by consolidation and maintenance of the system on a high level. The Centre has so far failed to set outcome and result measuring instruments and processes in place. It is positive to note that as this evaluation took place, the Centre proved credibly that it is now making a serious effort to develop and implement an M&E system for its own activities and products. At the operational level and for reporting to other donors such instruments are now available. Until the Centre streamlines M&E systems and reports consistently on outcomes and results and on concrete examples of how it measures cost effectiveness, the observations of the 2010 evaluation remain valid.<sup>115</sup>

Geneva is an expensive location to set up a large consultancy and research institution. Competitive salaries are relatively high. Ultimately, it is a political/policy decision to have the majority of the Centre's activities run out of Geneva. This has an impact on the cost-effectiveness ratio. Some interviewees suggest that having part of the activities set up nearer to the field would raise the Centre's credibility and make more means available for the Centre's mission or for other Swiss MA related activities. On the other hand, Geneva is an important hub for cooperation between actors in the wider security and disarmament sector, as well as, in the sector of post conflict operations, peace building and development. On the whole, the gains delivered in cost cutting would be balanced or outweighed by the loss of direct communication and cooperation capacity within international Geneva.

The Centre's financial management system allows staff to follow the development of costs in each activity sector and program. It also allows staff to answer critical questions from the governing bodies, the auditing and the Swiss Government as the main donor, if they wish to check the effectiveness of expenditures. The system assures planning and implementation to take place according to available funding. Costs, including staff costs, are allocated according to the budget set for the Centre's specific goals, relative to the input delivered for the goal.<sup>116</sup>

The Centre has not calculated real overhead costs. It cannot bill them to third donors, because Switzerland is financing the costs related to the headquarters and infrastructure.<sup>117</sup> Management costs from the expenditures table for financial reporting 2012 amount to CHF 2'232'148.00. These costs include support activities (CHF 1'005'868.00)<sup>118</sup>. It also includes the rent of the office premises, which are paid directly by the FDFA (CHF 525'800) and the costs for the Governance structure (CHF 368'300.00). Purely administrative costs, which also include services to goals 1, 2, 3 and 4, amount to CHF 929'107.00. The administrative costs include human resources and financial management, audit costs, and administration of Trust Funds<sup>119</sup>. Taking into account in-kind expenditures which are estimated at CHF 1'100'000.00, the administration managed total expenditures of CHF 13'290'000.00 in 2012. The administration represents 6.99% and support 7.86% of the total expenditures managed<sup>120</sup>.

**Assessment:** *While the instruments and procedures to measure cost effectiveness are in place at the GICHD and there is no evidence that the Centre spends funds ineffectively, it is difficult to have a clear assessment of the cost effectiveness without a systematic outcome and results based reporting system.*

### 3.3.3.3 Expansion of the funding base

GICHD is mainly dependent on funding from the FDFA. This makes it vulnerable to dynamics and shifts in Swiss foreign policy priorities, the country's internal politics and most importantly, potential future financial constraints of the Swiss Federation. The contribution of Switzerland to the GICHD has been constantly between 75% and 80% in the last three years.

---

<sup>115</sup> 2010 evaluation report 4.3.1

<sup>116</sup> Draft Financial Report 2012 for the CF meeting on 28 June 2013 - see p. 4-6 with an explanation of expenditures.

<sup>117</sup> Annual Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and GICHD on 20 December 2012 Item 4.3

<sup>118</sup> (Including salaries) to programmes, events, ICT acquisition and maintenance, training courses, travel organisation for staff members and visitors of events and exchange rate losses.

<sup>119</sup> TF ISU-APMBC, TF APMBC SP, TF CCW SP, TF CCM SP and GMAP,

<sup>120</sup> Source: Auditing report Deloitte 2012, Statement of the Treasurer to the CoF meeting on 28 June 2013

#### Funding (in CHF)

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Swiss	8'627'479	8'001'739	8'201'990	8'151'400
Other	2'546'367	2'453'316	2'202'220	2'036'724
Total	11'173'846	10'455'055	10'404'210	10'188'124
Swiss	77 %	76 %	78 %	80 %

Source: Annual Financial reports 2010 to 2013.

By statement of the message to parliament, statute and contractual agreement with the Federal Council (25 February 2003) the Centre is free and independent to use its funds according to the statutory scope of its mission. However, as explained, Switzerland provides the core funding of up to 80% of the Centre's revenue. While the annual agreements related to this funding provide for considerable freedom of action, they also give clear instructions on what activity sectors the donor wants the funds to be spent. Some third donors contribute to specific activities of the Centre or to the execution of its core mandate. Therefore, the Centre's independence depends on the political will of the Swiss parliament to continue financing it, and to uphold its independence within the wide spectrum agreed in the framework agreement and in the annual agreements.

The GICHD can continue to choose to rely on the conviction that the Swiss parliament will continue funding it. However, this could be a risky choice.

**Assessment:** *GICHD staff and management are aware of the risks related to the dependency of Swiss funding. The financial crisis since 2008 made donors generally more critical. They want to see results in order to report ultimately to taxpayers. The Centre tries to take the changing donor environment into account and is seeking for instance multi-year funding agreements and/or to initiate contacts with new potential donors. In a longer perspective the Centre needs to also show its main donor, that its product and services are in demand. The Centre has failed to substantially broaden its funding base since 2010<sup>121</sup>. It has lost Norway as an important donor. It will need a concerted effort of the management, the CoF and Switzerland to broaden the funding base in the future through strategic cooperation and also through the marketability of some services, which GICHD provides today out of the core budget.*

#### 3.3.4 Conclusions

GICHD is an expert organisation, which is well introduced as an important worldwide actor to eliminate mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards. Switzerland founded the Centre in 1998 to support the international cooperation in humanitarian demining. At the time of the evaluation the Centre delivers services to around 50 countries. Over time the Centre has developed different instruments to support the growing mine action community and to empower and support national mine action centres in taking over the responsibility for professional, safe, effective and efficient demining. This support resulted in the development of national mine action capacity and the positioning of mine action on the national agenda (Vietnam) and as an important contribution to national development strategies (Afghanistan).

The mine action environment has changed in the past years. The "industry" has grown more mature and other competent actors also offer services and know how.

To meet new challenges GICHD has therefore launched a strategy for 2012 to 2014. The strategy is in line with the Swiss mine action strategy for 2012 to 2015. It takes into account the growing complexity of hazardous explosives contamination and new threats to security of people. GICHD hosts and administers the Implementation support unit to the APMBC. It has an observer status to the state parties meetings on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and provides technical input to minimize humanitarian impact of such weapons. Since 2006 GICHD is mandated by the state parties to administer the CCW sponsorship program. GICHD participates as an observer at the meetings of the state parties to the APMBC

<sup>121</sup> New donors are: UK through DFID (since 2010), Qatar and the UAE with small contributions in 2012.

and the Convention on Cluster Munition (CCM). Through organizing the regular meeting for National Mine Action Program's Directors and UN Advisors, GICHD keeps regular contacts with key actors in Mine Action worldwide.

The organisation and the agenda setting of events hosted and/or financed by GICHD are generally regarded as being professional and relevant. The evaluator participated in parts of the 17<sup>th</sup> meeting of National Mine Action Programs and UN Advisors in Geneva and experienced a lively and well organized platform for exchange, contacting and contracting, the presentation of new tools or approaches by different actors and the reporting on policy impacts (e.g. Gender in Mine Action Policy) in different mine affected countries around the world.

GICHD has developed over time an important knowledge hub with wide information on mine action and related fields. Its web page is in demand and the feedback by most interviewees is positive. Researchers as well as practitioners use the publications and value the *one shop stop* quality of the website and the Centre. The high level of knowledge throughout the MA-community is challenging to the relevance of new publications. The statistics of downloads and hits as well as orders for publications demonstrate the demand for them. In Vietnam and Afghanistan publications combined with training yielded lasting results and at times the explanation in a GICHD publication helped to end a conflict on how to approach a specific situation.

The support of GICHD to standard setting accounts for its normative power. While this activity is appreciated by most and especially by National Mine Action Authorities, critical voices suggest the costly procedures could be performed in a slower pace. The process of Standard setting while being inclusive does not always acknowledge sufficiently the input from the field namely from NGO's.

The GICHD relies on a functioning governance structure with an active bureau, a CoF with members taking actively part in the meetings and asking relevant questions related to the strategic development of the Centre. The current strategy has been discussed and approved by the CoF. Norway, who was also an important funding member withdrew from the Council as it did not agree with the Centre's new strategy and was also not in support of the Centre's attempt to host the ISU of the CCM.

By organizing conferences the GICHD offers an excellent convening potential for the whole industry. It is in a strategic cooperation with UNMAS on the development of international standards. There might at times be overlap with UNMAS and also tensions if interventions in the field are not always coordinated well. The Director of UNMAS has however expressly applauded the Centre's strategy to broaden the scope of its mission.<sup>122</sup> The cooperation with national mine action authorities yields positive reactions. Some larger INGOs are more critical about the current strategy of GICHD and also of its cooperation within the community. They suggest GICHD should stick to its MA mandate, shrink with the demand on mine clearance and vanish within five to ten years. They suggest the funding can be used more efficiently if invested in direct action. They also think that GICHD is too far from the field and has lost touch to base. On the other hand, GICHD has an on-going cooperation with a larger operator in mine action with DFID funding. It cooperates with SIPRI on a research activity on the humanitarian impact of anti vehicle mines. GICHD is still a competent actor and has wide recognition for its services delivered to the MA-community. It is no longer regarded as the outstanding and unique place to go for advice and development of new approaches by everyone. The further away interviewees are from the Centre, the more critical they become. People and institutions working closely with GICHD appreciate its expertise and its inputs. Most of them also appreciate a widening of the scope of the GICHD's work.

GICHD's attempt to widen its scope of work and link up its IMSMA and land release tools to a wider development agenda merits support and acknowledgment. However, it needs to maintain the quality and appearance of a niche player, which offers services and products in demand for the MA and eventually a

---

<sup>122</sup> Statement of UNMAS Director in the CoF meeting on 29 November 2013.

wider community. It has to be careful to remain within the expertise it has developed with instruments, approaches and services. Strategic cooperation may help to reach a *critical mass* in areas in which the Centre wants to widen the scope.

GICHD's management arrangements still look a bit heavy with 7 (all male) members of the management in a 50 staff institution (without ISU and including part time staff). Nevertheless, the management structure is functional for the time being. It will need attention as part of the upcoming strategy development. While the overall gender balance in the Centre seems good, there is a sense that the management remains a "boys only club". Change management and strategic processes need to involve stakeholders on all levels appropriately.

### **3.3.5 Recommendations**

#### **The evaluation recommends to the Centre**

##### *On a strategic level*

- That the GICHD uses its impending strategy development to ensure a working perspective, which takes into account the dynamic development of the MA environment and the development in other fields of interest to the Centre. While the Centre needs to remain relevant in the core of MA portfolio, it is justified to widen the scope of its activities. While widening the scope the Centre needs to remain in a niche as a service provider and knowledge sharing hub for a widening and growingly interlinked community of post armed conflict clearance, post conflict reconstruction, security, development and peace promotion. The Centre needs to elaborate realistic options for its future development including a potential phasing out strategy (see 3.3.1.6).
- The upcoming strategy development should be inclusive within the Centre and interactive with key actors/partners of the wider Mine Action Community. The GICHD should seize the opportunity to define more precisely where it is broadening its thematic offering. The strategy development should also include the development of future institutional options.
- That the Centre develops more strategic partnership with Swiss actors such as SDC as well as with DCAF, GCSP, IHEID and the SAS to develop a common Swiss understanding of armed violence control and protection of people.

##### *On an operational level*

- While broadening its funding base, to stay attentive to perceptions of unfair competition by other actors of the MA community and maintain its identity as an impartial provider of distinct services.
- To actively include donor requirements in on-going development of a Results Based Management and the use of a Theory of Change approach to measure and report on changes.
- To develop clear indicators to show achievements and success while keeping a balance between the requirements to maintain internal M&E systems and the burden on staff to comply with requirements thereto.
- To steer and coordinates the pace of IMAS revision and IMSMA maintenance according to the needs and requirements of the MA community and the national MA authorities.

#### **On governance the evaluation recommends to the Centre**

- To further improve the cooperation and synergies between its different units.
- To assess its management structure mid-term into the next funding cycle.
- To maintain a healthy ratio between management procedures and 'real work' for meaningful operations.
- To keep an appropriate balance of staff hired directly by the Centre and consultants from outside the Centre and to adapt the existing guidelines on how consultants act (in their own name, or in the name of the Centre).

**The evaluation recommends to the CoF:**

- To provide guidance and if necessary instructions to the Centre's management for reporting, which includes, achievements and assessment of outcomes using a ToC approach.
- To make sure changes on legal representation for the Centre are expediently registered in the relevant registry.

## **4. THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES (DCAF)**

### **4.1 Summary of findings and recommendations**

#### **4.1.1 Strengths /weaknesses /critical challenges**

##### *Strengths*

- Bridging research, policy and operations
- Gender expertise
- Quality of training
- Flexibility, adaptability
- Organisation of multi-stakeholder platforms
- Strongly locally rooted in contexts where it has been present for a long time

##### *Weaknesses*

- Organisational development – HR and administrative function not corresponding to the size of the organisation
- No gender policy – no clarity about the gender breakdown and correlation with salaries
- Lack of transparency in allocation of core funding to specific projects/activities

##### *Constraints and challenges*

- Introducing RBM and understanding of the benefits of the ToC analytical and monitoring tools
- Integration of growing representation of new members in the Bureau on decision making and organisational decision making
- Full transparency in the allocation of core funding to specific projects/activities
- Upcoming change of Director

#### **4.1.2 Summary of recommendations**

##### **The evaluation recommends**

##### *On a strategic level*

- To envisage taking the lead in adapting/drafting RBM guidelines for the SSR/G field that would help to measure the impact in SSR, based on the extensive operational experience accumulated over the years. This would be useful for collaboration with SDC and external partners.
- To ensure that the next Strategy paper is more results oriented with mid-term and long-term objectives.
- To initiate timely the process towards a new leadership of the Centre
- To be aware the new leadership needs to be part of any major structural and managerial changes in order to prevent a double effort on difficult change processes.

##### *On an operational level*

- To ensure that all the dimensions of the Theory of Change are used while introducing it – analysis, strategic planning, description, monitoring and evaluation, and learning.
- To develop instruments in order to improve transparency of the allocations of core contribution funds and annual planning

##### *On governance the evaluation recommends to the Centre*

- In the view of the future change of Director, the Centre should revitalize the HR function in a way that embraces the various aspects of HR.
- To refer to the gender breakdown of staff in the same spirit as to employee nationality numbers in external communication.

##### *The evaluation recommends to the CoF*

- To clarify the role of the members – representing their country for member-states, Public servants or ad personam for Swiss federal and cantonal representation. Verify if Canton de Genève wants to have two



representatives as stipulated in the By Laws.

- To define or adapt according to the needs and requirements a Terms of reference for the President, the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Foundation and the Director of the Centre.
- To clarify the different roles of the CoF and its area of interaction.
- To agree on a course of action on how to select the respective Centre's Director.

*The evaluation recommends to the FDFA/SDC*

- To adequately appreciate the DCAF's flexibility while providing the organisation with the necessary tools to help the Centre face the challenge of changes related to its growth, in terms of staff management, reporting and monitoring tools.
- To ensure coherence in cooperation and communication between the Centre and the responsible units in the FDFA and enhance coordination between units in charge of core contribution and projects.

## 4.2 Background

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed forces (DCAF) is an international foundation established in October 2000 under Swiss law and by the initiative of the Swiss government. It maintains permanent offices in various countries. According to its organisational chart, in 2013 DCAF had offices in Beirut, Brussels, Ljubljana, Ramallah, Tripoli and Tunis. For the current framework budget the DCAF has entered into an agreement with FDFA/SDC on 9 December 2011. For 2014 it has entered into an Annual agreement with the FDFA/SDC. Its field of expertise is security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). The DCAF is firmly committed to a policy of strict neutrality, impartiality, discretion, gender sensitivity and local ownership.<sup>123</sup>

### An overview

*Governance and Human Resources (according to Centre's annual report 2013 and provided data)*

Management	Staff/ Head count	Council of Foundations	Permanent observers	Bureau	Advisory Board
16 (12 men 4 women)	103 (63 women 40 men)	61 member states + Canton Geneva	4 member states 2 international organisations	7 (3 Swiss)	40

*Finances 2013 in CHF (according to annual report)*

Overall contributions 2013	Swiss cash & in kind contribution	Non-Swiss cash & in kind contributions	Swiss transitories from 2012	Non-Swiss transitories from 2012	Other income contribution
35,051,501	16,270,723	8,350,918	1,825,085	7,875,924	728,851
Total Expenditures 2013	Personnel, general operating costs and statutory bodies	Divisions & Offices  Core	Divisions & offices  Projects	Divisions & offices  Transitories	Central reserve, Transitories and special reserves
32,278,305	9,399,777	3,636,693	10,444,125	6,327,534	2,470,177

<sup>123</sup> Yearly annual reports – DCAF at a glance

The Message to parliament lists the following main expectations of the DCAF for the period of 2012 to 2015:

- Global alignment and adjustment to new needs
- Strategy development and consultancy
- Practice oriented publications
- Implementation of programs and projects
- Police and border guards in the West Balkans
- Integration of crosscutting thematic and approaches
  - Human rights
  - Gender
  - Minorities
- New trends
  - Private security firms
  - Public private partnerships
  - Cyber Security
- Diversification of international alignment and finances

DCAF is being evaluated by the Swiss Confederation every four years. The most recent one took place in 2010. It underlined the fact that the DCAF's activities were growing and diversifying and that they had hit or exceeded most of the goals of the present Strategy (2007).

### **4.3 Evaluation and analysis**

#### **4.3.1 Relevance**

##### **4.3.1.1 Relevance of vision/mission**

This evaluation takes the 2012-2015 strategy as its reference point. Work on the next DCAF strategy will take place in autumn 2014.

The DCAF sees its core mission in assisting its Member States, partners and the international community at large in their efforts towards good governance and reform of the security sector.

It is based on the recognition that good governance of the security sector is an essential precondition for peace, stability, sustainable development, the rule of law and democracy. Furthermore, an effective, efficient and well-governed security sector is key to ensuring national and human security, and the ability of States to face new and emerging security challenges.

The DCAF is recognized by its partners as offering unique expertise in the field of SSR/SSG. The DCAF is definitely part of the SSR/G process as a player and influencer. The Centre ensures the sustainability of knowledge on SSR/G and is often invited to set the frame and provide background information at conferences. In the Balkans, the long-term approach valued by the Centre and the access and network it has created gives it access to difficult "clients" - Ministries of Interior and Defence Ministries feel confident in working with them, much more than with NGOs and IOs. The Centre is perceived as unique in this field by its partners because of its capacity to tackle subjects from all angles. The organisation is praised for its flexibility, adaptability, and quick response. In newer geopolitical contexts like Tunis, the DCAF is still finding its niche.

The DCAF is seen as a "think tank with operationalization", an international organisation with Swiss branding – a symbol of quality and neutrality, a training provider, and in some regions like the Balkans - a deeply locally rooted organisation, which you can trust, with a HQ in Switzerland.

In some cases, the composition of the CoF, which includes member states, like those in the Balkans and the

Caucasus, creates ownership at national level, with partners feeling that they are already members of the organisation. It is interesting to note that this sense of ownership does not exist with UN agencies. In Tunis and Central Asia, the DCAF is well-respected but remains an external organisation.

While many institutions work on one or other aspect of SSR/G, the DCAF is recognized as having the capacity to provide various competences (research, policy, toolkits, training, tailor-made advice), being a “one stop shop” in this field. Many respondents stressed the fact that the DCAF will always stress that Gender is part of SSR.

This perception is in line with the comparative advantages as described in the Strategy:

- “Neutrality and impartiality”;
- The combination of policy-oriented conceptual and analytical work with strong operational capabilities;
- The ability to rapidly deploy tailored operational support across the SSG/SSR spectrum in order to reinforce the capacity of the international community;
- A holistic approach to SSR/SSG, i.e. the ability to provide expertise across practically the entire spectrum of SSR/SSG issues;
- The position of the organisation at the crossroad between a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) and an intergovernmental organisation, combining the flexibility of the former with international membership and mobilisation capability of the latter.<sup>124</sup>

The numerous respondents were unanimous on the specificity of the DCAF, being a unique player in the field of SSR/SSG. The combination of policy development and implementation, its dissemination role, training support and tailor-made advisory services amongst others were mentioned as its unique capabilities.

This is perfectly in line with the description of the DCAF’s mission, as described in its strategy for 2012-2015<sup>125</sup>.

Being a Think Tank is definitely one facet of the DCAF, which was listed twice in *The Global go to Think Tank* 2013 report:

- 17<sup>th</sup> position in the list of the Top Transparency and Good Governance Think Tanks, and
- 34<sup>th</sup> position on the list of the Top Defence and National Security Think Tanks<sup>126</sup>.

The DCAF is one of only six actors worldwide to be represented in both categories. The ranking is based on an analysis of 6,800 think tanks from 182 countries.

DCAF’s normative power is mainly expressed through its cooperation with the UN and regional organisations in setting international standards for security sector governance, which subsequently underline its practical involvement in implementation through training and capacity building activities, amongst others, and supported by the creation of various tools translated into the local language. This is valid for the area of Parliamentary oversight, police and border management, private security governance, defence reform and gender and security, which are areas in which the evaluation could have an insight. The evaluation did not have the opportunity to study in depth the DCAF’s performance in intelligence governance during the evaluation.

An illustration of the normative power and sustainable impact may be the long term activities that the DCAF deploys in the area of Police and Border management in the Balkans. Through the work of its regional legal working group, the DCAF has supported the elaboration of the Police cooperation convention, and has hosted the secretariat since the adoption of the convention. Together with the long running involvement of the Border security program, this gives the DCAF an overview of existing regional and national frameworks

---

<sup>124</sup> 2012-2015 Strategy, p.3

<sup>125</sup> 2012-2015 Strategy, p.2

<sup>126</sup> DCAF is listed twice on this list, it appears on the 37th position also.

and allows it to use existing synergies in police cooperation, for example in the management of the 2012-2016 Swiss regional police cooperation program in the western Balkans.

The DCAF has played an instrumental role through its legal working group and WG on education. Firstly, this was in achieving the harmonization of legislation, and structures and of Border Police of the region. Secondly, the DCAF played a vital role in creating an atmosphere of mutual trust between former belligerents through regular common trainings, which lead, among other, to the creation of a regional Network of Police academy directors and police experts. This preparatory long term work enabled the move to the next step - the implementation of common operations in the region that DCAF is organizing and coordinating. The common operations were widely covered by the media and received general public interest and support.

There is a similar approach in the fight against illegal migration – the DCAF Working group on legal reform will work on the elaboration of a legal solution, monitor the EU legislative framework on this issue and ensure the harmonization of the beneficiary countries in the region. The existing network and work on common operations in the region is already tackling the issue of illegal border crossing.<sup>127</sup>

A similar approach has been taken with the public private partnership – the DCAF supported the drafting of the Montreux document, is now developing training and policy tools based on the study on the Montreux document implementation, and is hosting the secretariat of the ICoC association (International code of conduct for Private Security service Providers) whose role is to ensure monitoring, certification and run the complaints process.

#### **4.3.1.2 Relevance of the analysis of the institutional environment**

In 2009 the DCAF decided to add under its acronym, which was already well known, the explanation “*a Centre for security, development and the rule of law*” in order to accurately portray the areas in which they were working. It was felt that the mention of armed forces became too restrictive, because the Centre was also working with the police, ministries of Interior and Justice and the private security sector.

The DCAF is seen as a forward thinker, who is always ahead in the game, by the vast majority of respondents. It is trusted for its quality of studies and research by numerous practitioners who do not have the time to look for information in this field due to their daily workload. These people said that if they needed information they would rely on the DCAF to provide them with the necessary material.

At a national level, partners value the DCAF’s approach as being context sensitive. Their approach is first to ask “what can we do for you?” “what can we do together”, meaning that the buy-in of the national authorities and partners is the Centre’s starting point. The DCAF is recognized as a helping organisation, extremely flexible, not too bureaucratic and very participatory in its approach. However, the field visit in Tunis showed that in order to be successful at the program implementation level, the DCAF also needs to be extremely agile and keep its analysis in line with the changing environment.

#### **DCAF strategy**

The current Strategy paper covers the period for 2012 – 2015 and has been adopted by the CoF in November 2011. This short document sets the framework for the evolution of SSR/G for this period, describes the DCAF’s mission and comparative advantages and then moves to the operational implications it will have on the organisation’s geographical scope, substance, quality control, structures and finances.

This document encompasses all the potential activities that DCAF divisions will develop for this period mainly on a needs based approach. The strategy does not define clear objectives or expected results. In 2012 following a request of the SDC, the DCAF drafted a log frame according to SDC standards for the period 2012-2014. The overall goal of the DCAF is described as “Improved security sector governance fosters the

---

<sup>127</sup> Observations from the fieldtrip in the Balkans

rule of law, development, human rights and democratization. DCAF is recognized to contribute to that outcome”<sup>128</sup>.

There is no overall structured process for the further roll out of the strategy and no consolidated annual programs. Each division has wide leeway to further develop its own strategy/work plan. This will be done according to the various multi annual projects they implement or tenders they win, within the scope covered by the Strategy. The documents of the divisions are extremely diverse: from a 17 page document for ISSAT<sup>129</sup> to a two-pager work plan for 2014 for the Research Division.

The DCAF either performs studies and research itself or contributes to various UN and IO policy papers. The DCAF is very vigilant to invite regional researchers to participate in their publications. This adds to their local ownership approach, because it gives them voice and ownership in the region. For example, the DCAF was the first organisation to give voice to the Palestinians in the field of democratic control of armed forces; a more recent example is a publication with the participation of researchers from South East Asia where the DCAF has started work.

The DCAF publishes numerous publications: a series on SSR and studies on specific themes. Its research publications are considered by respondents as being timely and of high quality. The Handbook guides and tool kits are seen to be very useful and practical. DCAF’s “best sellers” are the ‘Handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector’ (which has been translated in over 40 languages) and the Gender and SSR tool kit. These practical tools are translated into the local language when necessary and usually accompany the development of activities in a given country. Their publications are seen as very useful and practical by the respondents. This was confirmed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where DCAF studies and translations are in high demand.

Training provision is one of the DCAF’s main activities. According to the respondents, they provide a good balance of theory and practice. They start with a presentation of their research findings and then work on practical case studies. External experts are carefully selected for their capacity to help the participants on a given subject. Trainers are very careful not to say that there is one model, but instead they create discussions around cases. The trainings are real “give and take” opportunities for speakers and those interviewed who took part in training as experts valued the exchange.

DCAF has very good expert rosters, which compares favourably to those of the EU, which are restrictive in terms of nationality, while the DCAF’s are truly global.

### **DCAF’s identity and Swiss foreign policy**

DCAF was founded on the initiative of the Swiss Confederation by a group of states. The Swiss Federal Council firmly believes that DCAF makes an important contribution to Swiss foreign policy. This forms the basis of a special relationship, and Switzerland’s elevated level of support allows for Switzerland to make special requests of DCAF.<sup>130</sup> During the period under consideration, as illustrated from the examples below, the DCAF has been advising and supporting the Swiss authorities in the implementation of Switzerland’s international support to peace and development (2012-2015).

The DCAF’s programmatic framework is found to be consistent with Swiss programmatic framework.<sup>131</sup> For many respondents Switzerland has more impact on discussions in the field of SSR/G at multilateral platforms, where the DCAF is presenting the subject than through the Swiss official delegation.

The annual agreement for 2014<sup>132</sup> between the DCAF and the FDFA, which acts through the SDC describes 11

---

<sup>128</sup> DCAF’s log frame 2012

<sup>129</sup> Revised ISSAT strategy – January 2014

<sup>130</sup> Credit proposal Swiss core contribution to DCAF 01.01.2014 -31.12.2014, p.10

<sup>131</sup> Credit proposal Swiss core contribution to DCAF 01.01.2014 -31.12.2014, p.10

tasks for which the DCAF assumes full responsibility. The tasks are broadly defined – e.g., collaboration with the UN in the field of SSR/G and general assistance to the Swiss chairmanship in the Office of the OSCE. This is followed by a non-exhaustive list of 23 separately funded projects and co-financed programs indicating with which department DCAF is to cooperate. Each project is subject to a separate agreement. Some of these projects are in line with the development of new trends as mentioned in the message to the Parliament.

For example, the DCAF will support other numerous Swiss initiatives. Among them is support to the establishment of a Cyber Governance group for Swiss Foreign digital policy in the WMO Building, as per the FDFA's mandate (Human security division).<sup>133</sup>

The recently created Public Private Partnership division is heavily involved in supporting and advising the Directorate for International Law and the HSD of the FDFA for the following:

- Activities with regard to the Montreux document on Private military and security companies;
- Establishment of an independent oversight mechanism for the International code of conduct for Private security providers;
- Implementation of national legislation on Private military and Security companies;
- Swiss chairmanship of the Voluntary Principles agreement;
- Various FDFA initiatives in the field of business and human rights.

OSCE: the general assistance that the DCAF is to provide is mentioned in the project list as “Concrete support to the Swiss Chairmanship in the Office of the OSCE through a set of specific activities defined in the cooperation agreement 2013-2015 between the DCAF and the SDC, as well as the FDFA's OSCE Chairmanship Task Force (SDC OZA)”<sup>134</sup>.

The DCAF has already prepared a study on the role of the OSCE in SSR/G, which was extremely well received. The Secretary General of the OSCE worked with the DCAF in 2006-2007 during Slovakia's non-permanent membership on the UN SC on a SSR/G related agenda and values the Centre's expertise.

The shift of responsibility that took place in 2011 from the DDPS and the FDFA (PDIV) to the SDC was aimed at reducing the complexity of the steering process for the Swiss core contribution.

In addition to the financial contribution, the SDC supports the DCAF on the following three axes:

1. Positionnement comme centre de compétence de renommée mondiale et orienté vers les résultats ;
2. Réforme de la structure de gouvernance et d'administration conformément aux standards d'un centre international de ce calibre;
3. Diversification durable des sources de financement et dialogue avec les autres bailleurs de fonds.<sup>135</sup>

Those three points are developed further in the relevant parts of this report.

**The next page provides a ToC matrix elaborated by the evaluation helping to visualize processes and conditions for DCAF intervention to become relevant towards achievement of change.**<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>132</sup> Previous annual agreements were not shared with the consultants, but they apparently follow the same template from year to year.

<sup>133</sup> Annual agreement 2014, 81019249. Geneva Centre for the Democratic control of armed forces.

<sup>134</sup> Annual agreement 2014, 81019249. Geneva Centre for the Democratic control of armed forces.

<sup>135</sup> Note to the Federal Council D. Burkhalter p.2 on 07 November 2013

<sup>136</sup> More details on DCAF interventions in Central Asia and Tunisia are summarized in Annex 6.

**DCAF Theory of change matrix - elaborated by the evaluation helping to visualize processes and conditions for DCAF intervention to become relevant towards achievement of change**

Desired Change	Pathways	Facilitating Factors	Obstacles	Outcome	Questions
<b>Tunis:</b> Improved relationship with citizens; Strengthened Mol strategic management capacity; Reform of the institutional (intelligence and legal framework); Strengthening SS oversight role of media and civil society <sup>137</sup>	Own programme Supply of training, expert advice and experiences; production of studies & documentation; concentration on capital elite level; mostly on the state level. Expenditure against budgeted, (2013): 364.3% intelligence service reform, 34.7% for media, 2% civil society	Recent transition country to democracy, Constitution, Vibrant media & civil society, Relative peace, Proximity to Europe; Connections with power-holders & in security ministries, Tunis DCAF member, knowledge products	Stage in SSR curve: euphoria passed, fear of jihadism: 'bring security back!' Turn from oppressors to protectors; Consolidation of security apparatus: The System is back Internationals offer equipment, infrastructure & bullets	After almost two and a half years into the process of democratic transition, only very limited institutional and legal reforms have been initiated. <i>Country Strategy 2013 – 2014 for DCAF's assistance to security sector reform in Tunisia (July 2013)</i>	Is it a good time to do SSR? Is grand institutional reform still possible? Has the time for it passed? Is it the right angle /different angle has to be found at the new phase of SSR?
<b>Central Asia:</b> Improve public security provision Develop the capacity of democratic institutions to perform oversight tasks	Most work with other intl actors, own work with civil society. Supply of documents, training offers, study trips. Promise of complementary capacity building training by the Crisis Management Centre of the French Mol.	UNDP & OSCE as entry points, Human rights activists, DCAF has post-Soviet expertise, time & money for investment in relationship-building	No functioning democratic institutions, but resilience of inherited ones, constraints on civil society in Tajikistan, turnover in power in Kyrgyzstan	Beyond building capacities of researchers and civil society outcome uncertain; statements adopted in Kyrgyzstan, but the effect on operations??	Reform in non-dem policy possible? Worth to organise trips to Paris for partners? Keynesian employment system for intelligentsia?
<b>Balkans Border security programme</b> Acceleration of the regional path towards EU membership, common and undivided security cooperation with no regards to border Sustainable regional policy Increase regional practical cooperation Fight against illegal migration	Regional action plan based on agreement at the 9th annual ministerial review conference on SEE border security, education and training, Defining legal framework, study trips	DCAF is established in the region, network. Continuation of existing program. Adherence of the partners DCAF hosting secretariat for the PCC and running other programs in the region EU membership Adherence of Border police chiefs Schengen integration	At the beginning of the program 10 years ago – lack of trust between former belligerents. Resistance from respective Mol MoD Negative consequences of EU visa liberalisation for Western Balkans	Increase of mutual trust Readiness of western Balkans countries to work together in crime prevention Common operations raise high media attention and have a positive impact on general population in addition Contribution to the visa liberalisation for Serbia	Access to police operational information? Is it in DCAF mandate?

<sup>137</sup> DCAF has other projects going, such as 'gender and security' which is very interesting, but as the study was on-going, outcomes beyond awareness raising are hard to judge.

## 4.3.2 Effectiveness

### 4.3.2.1 Does the Centre achieve its mission?

#### **Operations in various roles at varying levels of complexity reflect the DCAF's creativity and agility:**

- Selection of projects – either they win a tender, or are in a roster and are selected due to their track record and expertise (example: EC (Instrument for Stability) where they fall under crisis management procedures) or they are asked directly by a country to do a fact-finding mission and then a baseline study which forms the basis of a project (recent example: Serbia and Moldova).
- The DCAF wins a research grant – the most recent example is the Project won from the Swiss National Science Foundation. This project was developed and will be implemented as a joint initiative of DCAF's Operations I and Operations IV divisions. The DCAF's success in winning a highly competitive tender process was a result of the effective combination of geographical knowledge and subject area, as well as expertise of the two Divisions with an approach that clearly demonstrates its regional partners' ownership. As a result, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) provided full support to the project with a grant of CHF 287.307.
- Alternatively, they are mandated directly by a Governing Board member to provide support (ISSAT)
- The DCAF is contacted by a country (Slovakia, Mongolia)
- The DCAF approaches a country if it assumes its services might be of good use (e.g. Tunisia)
- A member-state of the CoF asks the DCAF to consider cooperation either with an international or regional organisation or with the political authorities of a given country.

DCAF's different roles may be described as:

- Project manager – example of a SIDA funded project implemented in MoI in Serbia.
- Program manager – police cooperation in South East Europe – the DCAF manages the program on behalf of the SDC.
- The DCAF manages the Trust Fund for Security Sector Development Assistance in North Africa established in June 2012.
- Implementing projects, organizing conferences, events
- Hosting Secretariats:
  - Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe,
  - Steering Committee of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service providers (ICoC)
- Lending staff to the UN (DPKO) – DCAF staff are temporarily deployed to the UN as consultants, in the framework of a Swiss financial contribution to the UN.  
ISSAT – providing advisory field support, training, knowledge management and advocacy and outreach services – always acting to reinforce the team of the Governing Board member (bilateral donor or multilateral agency) mandating it, in line with its mandate which is to help build the capacity of the international community to better support SSR.

Most of the time a division will work on a project basis, but they may use part of the core funding they have been allocated to help initiate a new area of work or complement on-going project activities.

The Director's and Deputy Director's offices and each division get between 15,000 CHF and 500,000 CHF from the core funding, which allows them to react and quickly adapt to new requests, to proactively participate in events/ conferences which are judged to be strategically important, but to which the DCAF has not been invited as speaker, or to organize visits in order to present their latest research/activities in tactically important countries. The ISSAT, which has a different and independent function with its own governing board, is not taken into account here.

#### **International Security Advisory Team (ISSAT)**

The ISSAT is one of the divisions of the DCAF. The ISSAT was established in 2008 in response to the need to increase the international community's capacity to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes, to enhance the effectiveness and quality of SSR programming, and to facilitate the coordination and coherence of international assistance for nationally driven SSR processes.



It has its own governing board, which is currently composed of 14 member-states and five multilateral actors (UN, EU, OSCE, OECD, OIF), with the African Union and African Development Bank as observers, since September 2012, and which meets twice a year. The representatives of the member-states usually come from the capitals and are the operational leads for SSR programming. For example, for the UK, two representatives attend the Governing Board, from DFID and the Stabilisation Unit respectively, for Sweden, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, and for France, it is a representative from the Department of Cooperation, Security and Defence in the MFA.

During the period under consideration the ISSAT has continued to provide its members with Advisory Field Support, training support, developing a community of practice and advocacy, and outreach activities. The ISSAT acts on the requests of its members to support either their own activities or multilateral processes. In addition to single requests for support, the ISSAT has multi-year advisory mandates, examples being support to the UK's Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform programme in the DRC, where they undertake an annual evaluation mission, and a three year advisory program in Honduras for SDC.

The members see their performance as relevant and well executed (as evidenced by an annual internal review). Their advisory services are seen as useful and well executed by respondents and thus confirm the annual feedback of the members. This is especially true in cases of multi-year engagement, where regular short missions are proved to be more useful than external advisory consultancy, because the team already knows the context and development of the project.

ISSAT has developed various training products (various levels on SSR and peace support operations and SSR and police reform), including face-to-face training and online courses. Over 1,700 people have signed up for on-line courses since the launch of the ISSAT website and their training manual has been downloaded over 13,000 times.

ISSAT's training is delivered upon request of its members, is tailor made, short (average 4 days) and delivered on location. For example, following Austria's request, the ISSAT organised training on SSR, with a focus on inter-agency cooperation for high level officials in Armenia; it was supported by the OSCE and the Armenian MFA. In another example, the EU – European Commission service for Foreign Policy instruments requested the ISSAT to run training for their staff who work in delegations on projects financed by the Instrument for Stability.

Nevertheless, the ISSAT's and the GCSP's "tailor made" short course content could be analysed to identify potential duplications.

When executing a field mission, ISSAT staff forms part of the mandator team it is reinforcing thus avoiding confusion with activities by other DCAF divisions. It is not clear to what extent the lessons learned process that ISSAT develops for the community of practice is used in a more analytical way by the DCAF. There is interaction between ISSAT staff and other DCAF colleagues when it comes to training participation, which is apparently appreciated. The move to the MdP will end ISSAT's physical isolation.

The potential bureaucratic overlap between two governing bodies could be monitored independently in order to explore potential synergies.

The evaluation concludes that it makes sense to have ISSAT as distinct body with its own structure to keep it attractive to others donors and to maintain its own operational flexibility and responsiveness.

## South East Europe Case Study

The field visit to the Balkans confirmed that in this part of the world, where DCAF has been working since 2001, the organisation is extremely well established. In Belgrade, where the DCAF runs two projects (on HR management and strategic management) for the Ministry of Interior on behalf of SIDA, program beneficiaries said that the DCAF was an obvious choice because the Centre is a known and trusted partner. The DCAF is perceived as a local organisation with a HQ in Geneva. Some were extremely sceptical at the beginning of the project on strategic management thinking, expecting that it would be just another training, but the trainings provided were acknowledged to be extremely useful and applicable.

In Ljubljana, the DCAF's Head of Office has three hats, which are interlinked with each other – the border security program, the secretariat of the PCC and part of the management of the DCAF Ljubljana office with links to the Swiss regional Police cooperation program. Some respondents wondered whether this aggregation of various roles may confuse external partners, but emphasised the fact that it did not hamper the quality of the implementation.

The Border Security program has existed since almost the beginning of the DCAF's presence in the Balkans, it has evolved and adapted during those years and was restructured in 2012 to correspond to beneficiaries' evolving needs. The development of common and coordinated police operations, in which former enemies work together and are armed, is usually extremely well covered, appreciated and effective.

Nevertheless, some partners questioned whether there is a danger in the DCAF becoming too operational in police related matters and if it corresponds to the DCAF's mandate.

Ljubljana's office also runs the Police Cooperation Convention Secretariat. It sees this role as an enabling factor in the implementation of this convention, which brings the local police up to the European Union standards.

In 2012 the DCAF was mandated by the SDC to design, manage and oversee the implementation of the Swiss regional police programme in the Western Balkans. By playing this role, the DCAF is perceived as a donor by the organisations applying for tenders.

**Assessment:** The DCAF is well anchored in the region; it has adapted its activities during the years and kept its competitive advantage. The regional approach to promote border police cooperation between states has been contributing to peace and stability in the region and to the preparation of countries for EU membership. This long-term presence illustrates the multifaceted approach of the DCAF and its capacity to adapt its support and programs to the changes in the region, changes to which the DCAF action also contributed.

**Assessment:** Overall, during the period under consideration the DCAF has confirmed its leading role in the SSR/SSG field at analytical, strategic and operational levels. It continued to play an important advisory role to the UN, the EU, the OSCE and other multilateral actors. The DCAF expanded its activities in West Africa with the signature of an MoU with ECOWAS in 2010. The Centre is involved in the development of the second UNSG's report on SSR, has continued to receive analytical and operational mandates from the EU and is supporting the Swiss chairmanship at the OSCE in defining the role of the organisation in SSR/SSG.

The DCAF confirmed its position as the expert on Gender and SSR by providing expert advisory support to gender and security policy making and policy review processes, producing relevant publications, organising capacity building workshops and seminars and taking part in conferences.

The DCAF has continued to support the development of innovative approaches in the regulation of private military and security companies and received the mandate to act as an implementing agency for the International code of Conduct for Private military and security companies.

#### 4.3.2.2 Reporting and monitoring arrangements

##### SDC and DCAF – establishing working relations

Since 2011 the SDC and the DCAF have familiarised themselves with each other and their cooperation is becoming smoother. As a first step, a log frame for the DCAF was developed in 2012 covering the 2012-2014 period on the SDC's initiative. The log frame developed in 2012 does not seem to have been further used by the Centre internally. The 2010 evaluation does not give detailed information about the way the reporting and monitoring was organized.

Related to the management of the core contribution the factsheet to the annual agreement for 2014 points out: *"Synthesis of the outcomes of the current partnership phase with focus on outcomes and outputs covered by the Credit Proposal:*

- .....
- *To increase the result orientation management of the Geneva Centres;*
- *To strengthen the quality of governance and the administration;*
- *To strengthen coordination and coherence among key donors on strategic and operational level.*"<sup>138</sup>

The SDC started a RBM workshop with DCAF staff in Spring 2014. By the end of 2013, the DCAF divisions had embarked on designing their theory of change and plan to draw an overall ToC for the organisation. ISSAT already had a theory of change that was approved by its Governing Board in 2011.

Thanks to the Swiss core contribution each Division has a lot of room to manoeuvre. This has been noticed by external partners. The various monitoring tools used by the DCAF reflect the modus operandi of the organisation at this stage. Each division has its own way of reporting its activities and depends heavily on the various donors' requirements.

The DCAF runs about 400 different projects every year. This part of the evaluation will concentrate on the way projects funded by the main donors (Switzerland and Sweden) in the Balkans and Tunisia, where field visits took place, are monitored.

The Swiss contribution to DCAF's core funding is approximately 11 million CHF, as well as around 5 million CHF to various projects. The Deputy Head of the Corporate Domain, Regional Cooperation is the Secretary of the Bureau. In addition to the core budget, the DCAF is implementing or running projects either with the SDC or with various units at the FDFA, such as HSD, Directorate for International Law, Division for Security Policy and with the DDPS (SIPOL), which is why the role of SDC in the CDP is crucial for DCAF.

According to the annual agreement<sup>139</sup>, the reporting mechanisms are a mid-year results report for the first semester, an annual results report, a detailed financial report for the year and an audit report of the statutory auditor on their extended audit compatible with DCAF international standards.<sup>140</sup> The DCAF has been reporting to the FDFA accordingly.

SDC relates on different levels to DCAF. Sometimes it is selected among other candidates through a tender, as is the case for ISSAT in Honduras (although this mechanism was a unique case for ISSAT). In another case, the mandate to act as project manager, facilitator and coordinator for the Regional Police cooperation program was given directly and an exception was made to the SDC procurement rules. It was said that it was because the DCAF is the only organisation in Switzerland with the know how in managing a program this size and with adequate expertise in this field.

---

<sup>138</sup> Factsheet to Annual Agreement 2014

<sup>139</sup> Annual agreement 2014

<sup>140</sup> Annual agreement 2014

The success of the DCAF in expanding and adapting to new trends is the result of a vision supported by flexibility and quick reaction capacity. This is made possible with the way the core budget assigned to the different divisions is used. On the other hand the DCAF has entered a new phase, in which it is developing monitoring tools, and in this regard the support of development agencies from member states, such as the SDC, will be extremely helpful. Up to now, the DCAF has been mainly reporting on activities.

One reason might be that the reporting on the use of the core budget, which is steered and monitored by the SDC is not perceived as being transparent and detailed enough while cooperation on projects in the field are reported to be positive. For example, the Swedish MFA and SIDA in Belgrade are pleased with the quality of the cooperation with the DCAF and the compliance with the requirements in terms of reporting and monitoring of activities. The MFA is also considering RBM.

**Assessment:** *It might be worth to explore the potential for developing a more strategic partnership with SDC, which would include an assessment of the different roles and functions. . This may include SDC and DCAF developing a coherent cooperation and enhance the coordination between divisions in charge of core contribution and projects. The levels of different interaction might need further attention in order to reach a mutually satisfactory cooperation. The upcoming changes are a good opportunity to work towards the establishment of such a relationship*

### **Theory of change (ToC) – analytical tool**

The DCAF has just started to introduce Theory of Change and should be careful to use all the aspects of ToC. This especially concerns the analytical approach, and ToC should definitely not only be used as a new monitoring tool for donors.

It is important to understand that the Theory of Change approach teaches that the levels and direction of an intervention have to match the context adequately and reflect, to what extent the action is still relevant to the changes in context, or if the context has moved on.

An external evaluation of the DCAF programme “Assisting Security Sector Reform in the Palestinian territories” done in 2013 underlines the fact that “all projects succeeded in creating a common motivational horizon and in planning concrete activities and high quality outputs that were to become the foundational building blocks to get there. However, the interventions were not guided by a shared ToC” and recommends to the DCAF “to take a ToC planning approach to their country programme”<sup>141</sup>.

Furthermore the DCAF will have to ensure that the ToC tool is not only used for reporting but is also at the program level, and for this “they need to take into account the extra commitment of staff and the time required to map change processes and validate the ToC and power maps regularly with key stakeholders”<sup>142</sup>.

In late 2013 - early 2014 each division engaged in the definition of Theory of Change. The ISSAT developed its ToC a few years ago and is providing training on the subject. For example, during the EU Instrument for Stability Training Week, the ISSAT gave a presentation on the use of ToC in conflict-prevention, crisis response and peace-building projects.

### **Result Based Management (RBM)**

At project level – monitoring & reporting is usually done according to the requirements of the donor – in Belgrade the DCAF rigorously follows SIDA guidelines<sup>143</sup> to the satisfaction of the latter.

---

<sup>141</sup> Evaluation of DCAF programme « Assisting Security Sector Reform in the Palestinian Territories » Leitmotiv – consultoria social – August 2013. p. 9

<sup>142</sup> Evaluation of DCAF programme « Assisting Security Sector Reform in the Palestinian Territories » Leitmotiv – consultoria social – August 2013. p. 9

<sup>143</sup> Guidelines for applying result orientation for programs and projects supported by SIDA, SIDA reporting requirements & SIDA procurement Guidelines.

The ISSAT has the most advanced monitoring tools - it has a performance management system with ToC and has developed balanced score cards, which are perceived as reliable and efficient by members. They are completely donor driven and act only on request of their members, which is restrictive in long term planning. One of their mottos is to learn from experience and their "action learning process is a strong asset, however some members find the systematic filling of forms and questionnaires too bureaucratic.

In March 2014, the SDC has invited the Heads of Division to a workshop on RBM and other workshops will be organized during the year.

Working on RBM is on the agenda for the TFNA with the support of an external consultant and aims should be discussed during the next steering committee meeting.

So far the work done by the DCAF in the police cooperation program in the Western Balkans is perceived as being good work in terms of M&E, but the reports are more about activities than results.

DCAF & SDC started to work jointly on RBM and on defining appropriate indicators. With regard to the Police cooperation program it is important to bear in mind that, as programme manager, the DCAF relies on reporting and monitoring carried out by its partners, IOM and UNODC.

The Swiss core contribution document mentions that the human resources available to manage the partnership with the DCAF are (as percentage of total employment): 15% for the SDC<sup>144</sup>. In view of the evaluation this is not sufficient to support the DCAF as foreseen by the frame work agreement and suggested in the note to the Federal Council D. Burkhalter (FN 136).

**Assessment:** *While RBM and ToC tools and instruments are used by some programs of the DCAF, especially by ISSAD, the Centre has not yet introduced them as standards for managing operations and reporting. The SSR/G field needs adapted RBM tools, this could be an opportunity for DCAF to take the lead by creating a RBM system adapted to the SSR/G field. Out of the three Centres, the DCAF is the only centre, with field presence and operations of all divisions in fragile contexts, such as Libya, Palestinian territories, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC or Myanmar. This presence in fragile contexts might be used more strategically in cooperation with GCSP's and the GICHD's expertise to gain weight within such contexts.*

### 4.3.3 Efficiency

#### 4.3.3.1 Management

##### Organisational structure

According to the DCAF's organisational chart of 2013, there are 5 offices. While certain offices like Tunis and Ljubljana are very active, others do not seem to have the same level of activity. In 2013, what is the role of the Beirut and Brussels offices? Do the activities justify the maintenance of an office? What are the criteria for opening/closing an office? Is it related to challenges in hiring adequate staff in countries where they are implementing projects? The DCAF works in many countries directly from Geneva without opening an office, with Central Asia being one example.

An example of recruitment issues is that TFNA could not implement its MoU with the Ministry of Justice in Tunisia, because they could not hire adequate staff. On the other side, in Belgrade the team is hosted within the Ministry of Interior and runs many different activities. De facto, there is an office, but it is not mentioned as such in the annual report. The team is scattered between Belgrade, Geneva and the Denmark and despite the distance the projects are running efficiently.

The Brussels office was established in 2005 to deepen the DCAF's cooperation with the EU and the Brussels based international community and still mentioned on the site and annual reports. The Ljubljana Office does not need the support of the Brussels office, because it deals directly with its EU partners (FRONTEX, EUPOL, EC etc.). The ISSAT deals directly with EEAS, the Commission and where relevant, other EU bodies in Brussels

---

<sup>144</sup> Credit proposal, Swiss core contribution for DCAF von 01.01.2014 – 31.12.2014

(as well as EU Delegations in the field). Thus, it does not act as a liaison office and it is not clear what kind of activities it develops. The Brussels office manages a series of papers on Crisis Management and Migration and the Security Sector. The added value of running those series in Brussels and not Geneva, where the Research division is established, is not obvious.

### **HR management**

Today's HR rules have been developed on the basis of the rules used within the confederation, but have since then evolved in their own manner. HR is managed by one staff member (part time) and the Director. It should be mentioned that the DCAF still has a very high retention rate and that the staff are extremely passionate about their work and do not seem to be concerned by the existing system. This point has not been part of the evaluation and has not been tackled specifically.

The DCAF's divisions are very independent and a dynamic approach is encouraged – in some cases, the Research division plays the role of an “incubator”, the most recent example is that the Public Private Partnership division was initiated in the Research division before becoming a division itself last year. Along with running the overall publications, the Research division concentrates its policy-oriented research and guidance development on a series of specific key themes in the area of SSG/SSR and its operational activities currently on one region, Southeast Asia, where it runs a number of regional and in-country assistance programmes with emphasis on Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand.

DCAF's internal task forces (e.g. on UN, EU, Africa, Asia, police, parliaments) are used as platform to ensure cross-divisional information exchange.

Another example of “incubating” role is the border guards program in Central Asia, which is attached to the Director's office and not to the DDO NIS division, as per the logic of the organisational chart.

Neither the organisational Chart for 2013 nor the information on the website clarify these dynamics, which could be the result of habit and an unwillingness to change a functioning system by extremely busy staff.

The DCAF is already facing problems when it comes to the recruitment of qualified experts. The legislation is restrictive and it is difficult to retain non EU nationals (the natives of “new” EU member states such as Baltics countries are also facing difficulties in obtaining work permits). The consequences of the February 9<sup>th</sup> vote on the Initiative to reduce migration into Switzerland may affect capacity of the Centre to hire the experts that are necessary to keep up the quality of the work. The advantage of being recognized as an IO might be a way to mitigate those challenges if the Initiative will result in negative impact on the recruitment capacity of the Centre. Another option would be to outsource some capacities to locations where it is easier to receive working permits for European and non-European Experts.

**Assessment:** *With the continuous increase and diversification of staff, the growing participation of donors other than Switzerland, and the future change of the Director, the DCAF will certainly have to review its HR management system. There is no HR function as such that could include the various aspects of HR such as recruitment, staff development (training, a uniform appraisal system measured against objectives and job descriptions), establishment of a complete salary grid and standardised job descriptions, and the drafting and implementation of policies (in collaboration with the Divisions), such as Gender equality. Some training has been organised on project management, which grouped staff from different operations together. The feedback was that they all appreciated the possibility to exchange experiences and learn together.*

### **4.3.3.2 Governance arrangements**

#### **Role of FDFA/CDP**

The exchange between the Director of the DCAF and the Chairman of the CDP seems to be frequent, but there seem to be no regular formal meetings between the CDP and the Director. Apparently there are also no regular formal meetings between the CDP and the President of the CoF.

Reforming the governance and administrative structure according to the standards of an international Centre of this calibre is the second axis of cooperation between the SDC and the DCAF.

As mentioned previously the role and responsibilities between SDC and the DCAF need further clarification. The SDC is a member of the CoF, secretary of the DCAF Bureau and member of the CDP. The evaluation understood that the SDC receives formal instructions related to DCAF from the CDP and not directly from the SDC management.

What exactly is the SDC's role as member of the CDP? Is it a monitoring role, does it cover all DCAF activities or only those funded by Swiss money? What are the responsibilities of FDFA representatives within the CDP? Should the SDC try to rationalize the reporting and monitoring mechanism together with the other main funders? Is this done at the level of the CDP or the Bureau where the SDC is also represented? How will that affect the functioning of the Bureau/CDP? In this regard, the change of director will also be a challenge.

### **Role and Influence of the Council of Foundation members on strategic decision making**

In 2013 the CoF comprised 61 member states (including the canton of Geneva) and six permanent observers. In 2010 there were 51 member states.

For some members, especially those coming from abroad, the possibility of meeting informally before the meeting is important, while for others it is just an additional place where they can see their counterparts (for example: Ambassadors on Disarmament meet on many occasions in Geneva).

Since 2008 the CoF has also had permanent observers – this status creates confidence, shows the Foundation's openness, but should not be too important in numbers.

CoF members are generally happy with the role Switzerland plays and expect that it will continue. The DCAF also has bilateral relations with interested member-states (not members of the Bureau) and the latter mention that they usually get the information they need from bilateral meetings, rather than from the Council meeting.

According to the by laws the Republic and Canton de Genève shall designate two members, both Canton de Genève representatives, but since 2000 there has been one representative from the Canton. Traditionally the Centre developed relations with the Department for Security of the Canton. What is the statute of the CoF members? The rule is apparently to have representation ad personam and not by public servants, which is adhered to by the Canton de Genève, while Bern sends public servants.

### **Role and Influence of the Advisory Board**

The Advisory Board reached 80 members in the mid 2000s. At the beginning the members of the advisory board were playing an outreach role for the DCAF, making the Foundation's activities widely known. In 2007, it was decided to reduce the number of members, and in 2013 there were 35 members.

The Advisory Board meets once a year for a two-day meeting. According to some of the members, these are intense meetings where DCAF strategy and activities are presented and discussed. Their input is considered important according to some of the members, but this aspect has not been assessed, because no minutes are available.

### **Role and Influence of donors**

As a result of the increasing interest of other donors, the number of the Bureau members increased from five to seven in June 2013 with the entry of Norway and France. It should be noted that Switzerland, which was at the origin of the creation of the DCAF, does not have member majority any more and consequently does not have the majority of votes within the Bureau.

The newcomers seem to be happy to have become members of the Bureau and believe that this will create ownership.

### **Role and Influence of DCAF management**

The Director runs the Foundation. The Director shapes the strategy with the board, then shares it with the President and then the Bureau for recommendations. There is no involvement of the members in this.

The four-year cycle dictated by the Message to the Parliament provides the tempo for the Foundation's strategy development. According to many partners, the directing board plays an important role in the management of the Centre and each associated Director has broad independence in the implementation and design of activities.

### **Special instruments of DCAF**

The ISSAT is one of the DCAF's divisions. It has its own governing board composed of 14 countries, four multilateral actors and two observers (African Union and African development Bank) – the activities of ISSAT are driven by the formulated needs of the members and the flexibility of the system is appreciated by the donors.

TFNA was created by the CoF in June 2012; it has a Fund steering committee composed of the contributing states. Both instruments, ISSAT and the TFNA, are overseen by the DCAF Directing Board and the DCAF CoF.

### **Upcoming change of Leadership**

The succession of the actual director, who has led the organisation since its creation, has to be well prepared. There are already questions at recruitment level and the SDC prefers an open recruitment process of international candidates for the CEO position. The Message to the Parliament stipulates that Swiss authorities designate the Directors of the Centres. Some argue that in numerous contexts the title of Swiss Ambassador conferred to the Director of DCAF is an efficient "door opener" and allows easy contact at Ministerial levels, while for others, the reputation of the DCAF has become so strong, that this title is no longer needed. Some see it as essential to have a Swiss national to steer the Centre because of the necessary access and network within the various Swiss federal departments and at Parliament.

*The evaluation suggests a phased approach towards the change of the leadership at DCAF. It is advisable to refrain from major managerial and structural changes until a new leadership is on board. Changes under a new leadership might be more sustainable. The example of GCSP demonstrates the risks if change management processes are initiated just before or during the change of leadership. The main risk lays in frustrating and overburdening the staff with changes after changes. Meaningful changes in the cooperation with and the reporting to the main donor may be, however, initiated and implemented as soon as possible.*

**Assessment:** *The DCAF is a dynamic Organisation with considerable self generated forward looking and innovative energy. The actual leadership has manifold influence on Swiss and international level. The somehow "patriarch" and management wise unconventional leadership is in the view of the evaluators part of the DCAF's success. It is also part of future challenges. The DCAF seems strong and capable through its leadership. The downside is a lack of transparency towards the main responsible on the side of the FDFA, the SDC. The informal ways of the leadership to bring about success does not help to improve this picture. But it is also true that to change a successful model might bear its risks. The evaluation maintains that in the case of DCAF the somehow unclear chain of command within the FDFA and between the SDC and the CDP as well as the parallel governance structure (see on Governance 5.1 below) do not help to improve transparency. Hence, in view of the upcoming change of leadership it is a "condition sine qua non" for all stakeholders to look soberly and objectively on how to manoeuvre the DCAF strategically and structurally into a future without the actual leadership.*



#### 4.3.3.3 Value for money

The Centre's financial reporting system does not allow the assessment of financial inputs into its activities. The financial reporting on projects is made according to the requirements of the donors.

The main issue, as already mentioned is the transparency and level of details of the financial reporting of the Swiss core budget.

To develop and maintain such tools might be costly. The DCAF could benefit from the recent experience of GICHD. The DCAF has so far failed to set outcome and result measuring instruments and processes in place. It is positive to note that as this evaluation took place, the Centre proved credibly that it is now making a serious effort to develop and implement an M&E system for its own activities and products. At the operational level and for reporting to other donors such instruments are now available. The progress of the Centre to streamline M&E systems and reports consistently on outcomes and results and on cost effectiveness will need time and monitoring or even support by the main donor.

#### 4.3.3.4 Cost – Effectiveness ratio

Geneva is an expensive location to set up a large institution. Competitive salaries are relatively high. Ultimately, it is a political/policy decision to have the majority of the Centre's activities run out of Geneva. This has an impact on the cost-effectiveness ratio. Geneva is an important hub for cooperation between actors in the wider security sector, as well as, in the sector of post conflict operations, peace building and development.

The Centre has not calculated real overhead costs. It cannot bill them to third donors, because Switzerland is financing the costs related to the headquarters and infrastructure.<sup>145</sup> Personnel costs and general expenses from the expenditures table for financial reporting 2012 amount to CHF 11,430,402. This is a high number, which amounts to 38.7% of expenses totalling CHF 29,438,337.<sup>146</sup>

**Assessment:** *The evaluators are rather confident that the DCAF uses its financial resources effectively. It remains however difficult to have a clear assessment of the cost effectiveness of the Centre without a systematic outcome and results based reporting system, which does also show the finances used for the respective activity. The relatively large sector of activities financed by other than Swiss donors raises the question if the Annual Agreement (FN 134) does also cover overhead for those activities and if this is a conscious decision by the main donor, which in the in view of the evaluators would make sense. The situation is different for the DCAF then for the GCSP and the GICHD as it has a higher proportion of third party funding. DCAF and SDC may look into this aspect of the contractual agreement. The issue might also be discussed at the occasion of donor coordination. .*

#### 4.3.3.5 Expansion of funding basis and use of funds from the main donors

##### Evolution of cash contribution to the DCAF

According to the figures from the Annual reports of the period covered, the overall cash contribution to the DCAF increased by 25,2 % between 2010 and 2013 and will certainly continue.

---

<sup>145</sup> Annual Agreement for 2014 between the Swiss Confederation (SDC) on 09 December 2014 item 3.3

<sup>146</sup> Pwp audit report on financial statement 2012, p.8

## Evolution of cash contribution to the DCAF

Cash contribution (CC) in CHF & transitories (TR)	2010	2011	2012 <sup>147</sup>	2013
Swiss (DDPS & FDFA)	12,940,011 ( CC) 592,790 (TR)	12,945,346 (CC) 1,531,235 (TR)	13,199,777 (CC) 1,642,841 (TR)	15,600,723 (CC) 1,825,085 (TR)
Other member states	6,964,522 (CC) 4,915,320 (TR)	8,098,103 (CC) 5,183,705 (TR)	7,936,536 (CC) 6,330,227 (TR)	6,515,659 (CC) 7,875,924 (TR)
<b>Total</b>	25,412,643	27,758,389	29,109,381	31,817,391
% Swiss contribution	53%	52%	51%	55%
<b>Total without transitories</b>	19,904,533	21,043,449	21,136,313	22,116,382
% Swiss contribution without transitories	65%	62%	62%	71%

Source: DCAF Annual reports

The percentage of the Swiss cash contribution increased from 65% to 71% and this is due to the increase of project funding - from 1,703,472 in 2012 to 4,229,365 in 2013, while the core funding and DDPS contribution remained stable (approx. 10'000'000/900,000 CHF).

The 2010 Message to the Parliament recalls that by 2015 due to the diversification of its funding, the Swiss contribution may diminish from 48% to 40-45% (2.3 p.7475). Without knowing how the percentage in the message to the parliament was calculated, it is not possible to understand the reasoning for the difference between the percentage of the Swiss contribution from the annual reports and forecast included in the message to the parliament.

The DCAF's transitories are very high<sup>148</sup>, in 2012 they accounted for 5,508,790 in 2010 and for 9,701,009 in 2013 with 1'825'085 for Switzerland. According to the audit report the main reasons are the late payment of contributions, among them Sweden, and delays in establishment of the TFNA and multi-year programs in the Balkans, which led to temporary cash holdings and the creation of reserves at unprecedented scale for the move to the MdP.<sup>149</sup>

**Assessment:** *The logic of accumulating and holding this level of financial reserves is not clear to the evaluation. The Centre needs to explain in the future if the transitory funds are earmarked for specific activities and for which or if they just serve to secure a slump of funding and maintain operational "stamina" through such period? Past transitories might be shown as reserves or accumulate funds of the foundation.*

### Swiss core budget and project funding

With regard to the projects – a MoU is signed between the concerned Unit/department and the DCAF; financial reporting is done in accordance with this agreement. For example, narrative and financial reporting is done in a timely and accurate manner for the border guards program in the Balkans.

During the period under consideration the DCAF moved from a limited audit, as required by legal regulations for Swiss foundations to its first complete audit in 2013. The proportion of core staff and external experts is not available. The DCAF runs about 400 projects per year. The example of the SIDA funded project in

<sup>147</sup> It is only in 2012 that a distinction was introduced between DFA core and project funding.

<sup>148</sup> See explanation in pwp audit report on financial statement 2012. Appendix 3

<sup>149</sup> See detailed explanation in pwp audit report on financial statement 2012. Appendix 3

Belgrade shows that external experts are recruited according to the needs of the projects and in accordance with SIDA procurement procedures. The ISSAT has shared audited accounts with GB members and has improved its financial planning.

Most of the time a division will work on a project basis but may use a part of their core funding to quickly react to a demand (Tajik Border Command request for distant learning on management and leadership). The Director's and Deputy Director's offices and each division receive between CHF 15,000 and CHF 500,000 from the core funding, which allows them to react and quickly adapt to new requests, be proactive in participating in events/ conferences which are judged strategically important, but to which the DCAF has not been invited as speaker, and to organise visits to present their latest research/activities in tactically important countries.

Another illustration of the way the DCAF operates and allocates resources, is based on the case study on Central Asia. In this example, assistance to different streams comes from two sources at the DCAF and there is a regional strategy. The non-border Central Asia projects are funded under the Partnership for Peace mandate by Switzerland and Latvia, and have modest allocations. The Situation Room project in Kyrgyzstan is joint with OSCE and the French MoI with all parties covering their own costs. Evolving offers to the border guards are covered by the core budget of the Director's office.<sup>150</sup>

**Assessment:** *While the attribution of the core budget to the divisions is positive, without consulting detailed financial reporting it is not always easy to know how the divisions use it. The evaluation has not enough information to establish how the core contribution is used and accounted for towards activities/projects and a deep analysis of this area is beyond the scope of the evaluation. It would require an examination of the use of subsidies according to Swiss law as it has been already done for the two other centres.*

The ISSAT, which has a different and independent function, with its own governing board, is not taken into account here.

#### DCAF and main non-Swiss donors

- Norway funds the DCAF through three different departments in the MFA – at the time of this evaluation another evaluation by Norad commissioned by the MFA was taking place to study the possibility of Norway entering a strategic partnership with the DCAF. This would allow core funding and allow Norway to participate in the quality control mechanisms and planning tools for the DCAF. The person sitting on the Governing Board of the ISSAT is also from the MFA. In 2013 the overall Norwegian cash contribution amounted for CHF 1,550,900. From this amount CHF 394,846 was allocated to ISSAT as core contribution.
- Sweden is one of the Centre's main contributors after Switzerland. The country is a member of the CoF and the Bureau. This table encompasses some of Sweden's contributions to the DCAF. Sweden has decided to keep DCAF core funding under its MFA (more flexible than through SIDA), because their allocated budget allows this and because the MFA values the role the DCAF plays as an advisor. The Swedish MFA also values the fact that its representatives can come to Stockholm on short notice and organise ad hoc high quality informative sessions/briefings for the staff of the MFA and other ministries. The last time core funding was given was from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013. For 2014 the core support will cover the financial year from January to December.

#### Articulation of Swedish contribution to the DCAF

Funding entity	CORE FUNDING (MFA funded)	MFA funded (core and projects)	PROJECTS (MFA funded)	PROJECTS (SIDA funded)
Attribution	DCAF core funding	ISSAT	TFNA	BELGRADE
Amount	Core funding from July 2012- 31	CHF 250,000 core funding (MFA) included	CHF 700,000 for Tunisia window	Overall amount of projects - 1,1 million

<sup>150</sup> From case study Central Asia

	December 2013 was CHF 1,350,000	in the CHF 1 350,000  CHF 6,955 project (included in projects MFA funded)	from MFA	CHF – strategic management (March 2011- June 2013) 1,4 million CHF – HR management (Dec 2011 – May 2014) Final instalment paid by SIDA for HR project CHF 675,700 was included in DCAF budget 2013 but not part of overall project funding
Who represents Sweden	MFA	Folke Bernadotte Academy	MFA Ambassador at large	SIDA monitors in Belgrade and then sent reports to Stockholm
Who is involved		MoD, MFA, SIDA members	Steering Committee	Mol
Monitoring	DCAF complies with reporting requirements (no matter if it is core or project support) by filling in the final report form			According to SIDA requirements
Comments from Swedish representatives	Allows flexibility, briefing from DCAF at MFA on request, short notice possible. Extremely pleased with quality.	Extremely pleased with quality, efficiency of mission in Serbia (Sweden police representative in Belgrade) for the Serbia, Liberia, Kenya bilateral police program.	Slow start but pleased with the mechanism.	Swedish mission in Belgrade is extremely pleased with the quality of timely reporting and monitoring and the running of these complicated projects Mol programmes. DCAF is a trusted partner. DCAF Project manager's salary is paid by the projects.

Source: interviews, field visit and annual report

The other projects that were funded by the MFA in addition to TFNA and ISSAT are: Palestine, Gender and West Africa projects.

### Fundraising

The DCAF Director and Heads of Division are extremely active and successful in finding new sources of funding. There is apparently no overall written strategy for the organisation and this is a decentralized function.

Switzerland, represented through SDC, is DCAF's largest donor, and is working on donor's coordination and its leading role in this regard seems adequate to the evaluation.

### 4.3.4 Conclusions

Overall, during the period under consideration the DCAF has confirmed its leading role in the SSR/SSG field at analytical, strategic and operational levels. It continued to play an important advisory role to the UN, the EU, the OSCE and other multilateral actors. During the period under consideration the DCAF expanded its activities in West Africa with the signature of a MoU with ECOWAS in 2010. The Centre is involved in the development of the second UN SG report on SSR, has continued to receive analytical and operational

mandates from the EU and is supporting Swiss chairmanship at the OSCE in defining the role of the organisation in SSR/SSG.

The DCAF confirmed its position as the expert on Gender and SSR by providing expert advisory support to gender and security policy making and policy review processes, producing relevant publications, organising capacity building workshops and seminars and taking part in conferences.

The DCAF has continued to support the development of innovative approaches in the regulation of private military and security companies and received the mandate to act as an implementing agency for the International code of Conduct for Private military and security companies.

The ISSAT has continued to reinforce the capacity of the international community to support SSR in line with international good practice. According to internal surveys of ISSAT, the 14 member-states and the multilateral organisations were satisfied with the quality of services provided (training, Advisory field support), and in 2012 the community of practice doubled.

The DCAF has started to work in new contexts and is experiencing new roles, for example as in 2012 with the creation of TFNA together with SDC. Adaptability and flexibility from the organisation are essential in order to achieve its objectives.

The growth of the organisation illustrates the need for the various types of expertise and support the organisation provides to many stakeholders. International interest in SSR/G will certainly continue to increase and its role as a conflict prevention, peace building and development tool is increasingly recognised. During the period under consideration, cash contributions to the DCAF grew from 25 million Swiss francs in 2010 to 32 million in 2013, representing an increase of 25,2% while the proportion of Swiss funding versus other member states has stayed relatively the same: 53% in 2010 55% in 2013.

However, the DCAF's growth and the preparation for succession of the Director are also bringing its own set of challenges. The Director's length of term, his vision and energy are closely linked to the success and steady growth of the organisation. This has also left its footprint on the way the organisation is managed: on the one hand there is wide freedom for the Divisions but there is no real HR function. The change of Director is an opportunity to adapt the administration and HR to the size of the organisation and to ensure strong support to the operational divisions.

The DCAF makes an important contribution to the development of the SSR/G field and with its capacity to catch and develop new trends, such as Private-public partnerships which are in line with recent developments in the field of Business and human rights (John Ruggie's UN guiding principles).

The core funding has allowed the organisation to grow and occupy the position it has today and has framed its reputation as a flexible and adaptable organisation capable of a quick response. With the ISSAT, PCC secretariat, TFNA and its program management role the DCAF has proved that it is willing to learn and adapt to new situations. The reporting and monitoring mechanisms should be improved to give full satisfaction to the donors and allow accountability by the SDC to the parliament, as well as flexibility, which is definitely part of the DCAF recipe for success.

#### **4.3.5 Recommendations**

##### **The evaluation recommends on strategic level**

###### *To the CoF and the Management*

- The DCAF CoF and Management should enter into a phase over process in view of the future change of Director and the future strategy of the Centre. The process should also include the development of future institutional options. The development of a new or the consolidation of the actual strategy may be a task of a new leadership.

- To ensure that the next Strategy paper is more results oriented with mid-term and long-term objectives.
- To reflect on the added value of a centralised funding strategy.
- To use the move to the MdP as an opportunity to create a more strategic partnership with the GCSP and the GCIHD. Analyse course content of ISSAT training, which is delivered on member request, and the GCSP's "Tailor made short courses" to identify duplications if any.
- To initiate in a timely manner the process towards a new leadership of the Centre.
- To be aware that the new leadership needs to be part of any major structural and managerial changes in order to prevent a double effort on difficult change processes.

### **The evaluation recommends on an operational level**

#### *To the Centre*

- To envisage taking the lead in adapting/drafting RBM guidelines for the SSR/SSG field that would help to measure the impact in SSR/SSG, based on the extensive operational experience accumulated over the years. This would be useful for collaboration with SDC and external partners.
- To ensure that all the dimensions of the Theory of Change are used while introducing it – analysis, strategic planning, description, monitoring and evaluation, and learning.
- To develop instruments in order to improve clarity on the allocations of core contribution funds to annual planning and different projects/activities.
- To clarify criteria for opening/closing offices.
- To envision joint DCAF/SDC assessment missions to strategic DCAF programs.

#### *On governance the evaluation recommends to the Centre*

- In the view of the future change of Director, the Centre should revitalize the HR function in a way that embraces the various aspects of HR:
  - Recruitment and staff development (identification of training needs, appraisal system based on objectives and job descriptions);
  - Establishment of a comprehensive salary grid and standardised job descriptions;
  - Drafting and implementation (in collaboration with the Divisions) of policies such as Gender equality/ Gender & Diversity.
- To continue organising training /workshops for staff across the whole organisation in the same spirit that the project management training took place.
  - Bring together field staff who work on gender to share experiences and expertise for capacity-building, gender mainstreaming and applications of UN SCR's.
  - Organise training across the organisation, ensuring an adequate understanding and use of analytical and monitoring tools.
- To refer to the gender breakdown of staff in the same spirit as to employee nationality numbers in external communication.

### **The evaluation recommends to the CoF**

- To clarify the role of the members – representing their country for member-states, Public servants or ad personam for Swiss federal and cantonal representation. Verify if Canton de Genève wants to have two representatives as stipulated in the By Laws.
- To make sure that changes on legal representation of the Centre are expediently registered in the relevant registry.
- To clarify the different roles of the CoF and its area of interaction.
- To agree on a course of action on how to select the respective Centre's Directors.

### **The evaluation recommends to the FDFA/SDC**

- To pay adequate attention to appreciate DCAF's flexibility while providing the organisation with the necessary tools to help the Centre face the challenge of changes related to its growth, in terms of staff management, reporting and monitoring tools.
- To ensure that the SDC and DCAF cooperation are coherent and enhance coordination between

Divisions in charge of core contribution and projects.


- To further clarify and define the role and responsibilities of the SDC towards the DCAF. If deemed necessary, allocate sufficient human resources to provide SDC with capacity along the three defined axes of SDC support.
- To further clarify and define the role of the SDC within the CoF and the Bureau of DCAF.
- To organize an independent assessment of the potential bureaucratic overlap between two governing bodies of the DCAF and the ISSAT in order to explore potential synergies.
- To ask for a revision on subsidy use according to Swiss law if explanation on allocation of core funding to different projects/activities remain unsatisfactory.
- To provide clear reporting (including financial reporting) expectations to the Centre in the framework agreement and in the annual agreements.
- To envision joint DCAF/SDC assessment missions to strategic DCAF programs.

## 5. CROSSCUTTING ISSUES (GOVERNANCE / INTERNATIONAL GENEVA / GENDER)

### 5.1 Governance

In this section we describe, analyse and compare the governance arrangements (de jure and de facto) of the three Centres and the influence of the steering mechanism provided by the message to parliament on the governance of the system (the system being the three Geneva Centres). The three Centres are independent Foundations according to the Swiss Civil Code. They are governed by legal requirements of Swiss law and their statutes. The membership of the Council of Foundations is special and rather unique, as members of the CoFs are countries<sup>151</sup> with an interest in the activities of the respective Centre. The Swiss Confederation finances a core contribution to each Centre, which is arguably the financial lifeline of the Centres (less so for DCAF than for GCSP and GICHD). The Swiss parliament decided on the financial contribution to the Centres based on a message by the Swiss Federal Council (17 November 2010). The message provides for a “Comité de Pilotage” (CDP) for being “la plus haute instance de pilotage” related to the Centres. The message also vests contracting and oversight responsibilities in the SDC and the HSD (both Divisions of the FDFA). Some interlocutors perceive this set up as being Janus headed. Some perceive the Centres as being IOs working out of Geneva and mainly supported by Switzerland. Others perceive them as being particularly Swiss but providing services to the International Community or countries in need. The “Swissness” on one side and the internationality of the Centres on the other can be seen as a strength but are, in view of the evaluators, also a challenge.

#### Governance, contracting and communication:



#### 5.1.1 Legal set up and Independence

##### Legal set up

The three Centres have the legal status of Foundations according to the Swiss Civil Code. The Swiss Confederation founded the Centres on 21 December 1995 (the GCSP), on 19 May 1998 (the GICHD) and on 2 November 2000 (the DCAF). The Centres are legally independent entities.<sup>152</sup> Each of the Centres is governed

<sup>151</sup> Countries send the representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) or representatives from their UN-Delegation to Geneva to the CoFs of the Foundations.

<sup>152</sup> Under a contract between the Federal Council and the GICHD (25 February 2003), the Federal Council fully recognizes the legal capacity of the Centres in Switzerland. Further, the Federal Council guarantees full financial independence in the use and management of the Centre's funds.



by a Council of Foundation (CoF), which is supported by a Bureau. While the CoF in all three Centres is composed of member country representatives, the Bureaus have been dominated by Swiss members until recently. Changes in the CoF's and the Bureaus have to be registered in the commercial registry.<sup>153154</sup>

The message to the parliament provides for steering of the Geneva Centres on different levels:

*„Le pilotage de la contribution de la Confédération aux trois Centres de Genève s'effectue à plusieurs niveaux: par le Comité de pilotage de la Confédération, par les Conseils de fondation et les bureaux des Conseils de fondation des Centres de Genève, par le biais des services du Département fédéral de l'intérieur (DFI) chargés de la surveillance des fondations ainsi que par les contrats-cadres et les contrats de prestations conclus entre le DFAE (Division politique IV et DDC) et les Centres de Genève. Le Conseil fédéral désigne par ailleurs les directeurs des trois Centres“<sup>155</sup>.*

### Strategic role of the Council of Foundation

The Councils of Foundations have a strategic steering obligation according to their statute:

*“...to define the general orientation of the Centre, shall establish the annual budget and shall adopt, at the end of a financial year, the balance sheet as well as the profit and loss statement”* (GICHD statute Article 12/2; mutatis mutandis also DCAF statute Article 12/2).

*“Le Conseil de Fondation travaille à la réalisation du but de la Fondation en soutenant les activités du CENTRE...., en appuyant politiquement ses objectifs et en contribuant de manière active à l'établissement d'effet de synergie entre les différentes actions du CENTRE.”* (GCSP statute Article 13 a) / Article 13 b deals with financial competences).

### Steering mechanism of the Federal Government

The message to the parliament describes the responsibility of the CDP as follows: *“Il est la plus haute instance de pilotage des trois Centres de Genève et élabore les instructions pour les représentants de la Confédération siégeant dans les Conseils de fondation”* (see FN 159).

The CDP is composed by representatives of different divisions of the FDFA and the DDPS<sup>156</sup>.

SDC (with DCAF) and HSD (with the GCSP and the GICHD) conclude a Framework Agreement and annual agreements detail the operational scope for spending the Swiss contribution. According to annual agreements and the message to parliament the Centres provide bi-annual financial and operational reporting. HSD and SDC monitor the implementation of the contractual agreements and control the use of the contribution.

### The evaluation concludes

*According to the message to parliament, the CDP has a strategic steering role (la plus haute instance de pilotage). The CoFs have a strategic steering obligation based on their statute and the Swiss Civil Code. The HSD and SDC have operational and financial control functions<sup>157</sup> related to the use of the core budget provided by the Swiss Federation. The CoFs are vested with oversight functions according to Swiss law and the foundation statutes. CDP and CoFs have a similar and potentially conflicting role in steering and controlling the centres.*

---

<sup>153</sup>As of 14 April 2014 the new directors of GCSP and GICHD have not yet been registered as legally competent to sign for the Centres. At the end of May 2014 the changes are registered for the GICHD but not yet for the GCSP

<sup>154</sup>Swiss law requires registration of all members of a Foundations council (see also: Eidgenössische Stiftungsaufsicht, Leitfaden für Stiftungen gemäss Art. 80 ff ZGB item 10.1). The Federal Supervision Authority on Foundations may grant exemption from this requirement

<sup>155</sup> Message to the parliament item 2.6

<sup>156</sup> FDFA: HSD/SDC/ DPS; DDPS: General Secretariat and Swiss Army with the General Staff and International Relations Defense

<sup>157</sup> Message to Parliament item 2.6: According to the message the Centres report to the FDFA (Copy to CDP) on activities and finances. The HSD provides the steering of the contribution to GCSP and GICHD. The SDC is responsible for the steering of the contribution to DCAF.

## Governance culture

Statements taken from Interlocutors suggest that the steering of the Centres work according to mechanisms provided for Foundations by law and the statutes. The contractual agreements between the FDFA (HSD and SDC) and the Centres regulate the funding, monitoring and reporting arrangements. The CDP meets four to five times a year as required by the message to parliament. The CoFs and the bureaux meet as a rule twice a year. The higher cadence of meetings by the CDP suggests an intensive involvement/interest in the Centre's development and performance. On the other hand, some CoFs seem to be content with their more formal role. The Evaluation got the impression that the exchange and consultations between the Directors and the FDFA are more intense than the interaction between the Directors and the governing bodies of the foundation. While in the past steering by the DDPS happened on a "long leash"<sup>158</sup> the FDFA is perceived as being more directive. Switzerland uses its leverage diligently. However, it did intervene during a management crisis in the GCSP (see 2.2.3), provided for management consultancy and accompanied the change of leadership. It also used its influence as an employer to bring about change in the leadership of the GICHD. From the outside the changes in the leadership of the two Centres were brought about by consensus/cooperation between Switzerland and the respective CoFs.

## Assessment of independence and steering mechanisms

*The governance arrangements of the three Centres are complex. They are on one side dictated by the Swiss Civil Code and their statutes, and on the other side by the framework agreements and the annual agreements. Switzerland has a strong obligation in steering and overseeing the three Centres. HSD and SDC are in charge of monitoring and controlling the core contribution. The framework contracts and the annual agreements partly mitigate the supremacy (plus haute instance de pilotage) of the CDP as representation of the main donor. However, in case of conflict Switzerland has the potential leverage to impose its will<sup>159</sup>. The Swiss Confederation may consider to contribute to a strengthening of the Centres CoFs as a governing body capable to deal with difficult situations and professional enough to see potential crisis/risks coming before they erupt. The Swiss Confederation may also consider supporting the direct employment of the Directors by the Foundations. In the view of the evaluation such measures would strengthen the perception of independence and the capacity of the institutional governance within the Centres. The CDP would remain a credible "decider" of last resort. In the view of the evaluation such steps may also be conducive to broaden the funding base of the Centres, which has so far been an expectation of them<sup>160</sup>.*

### 5.1.2 Governance arrangements within the Foundations

#### Role and Influence of the Council of Foundation (member states)

According to the statutes, the CoFs define the general direction, establish the annual budget and approve the annual financial report, following the auditor's recommendations. While debates in the CoF of the GICHD<sup>161</sup> are quite animated and not always consensus driven, CoF meetings in the GCSP and the DCAF seem more formal and real decisions (e.g. on how to use annual core funding) are made between the Directors and the FDFA.

Some donors are represented in the **bureaus** of the Council (Australia and Germany in the GICHD; UK, France, Norway and Sweden in DCAF, and France and the Canton of Geneva in the GCSP). According to the statutes, the bureaux "shall manage the current affairs of the Foundation unless such affairs have been delegated to the Director" (the GICHD and the DCAF). The GCSP has a similar provision in its statute (Article 16). However, most or all of the bureau's management authority is delegated to the Director.

The arrangements for the CoFs are adequate to fulfil their role. The membership structure, which consists of like-minded or interested countries, gives the Foundations international legitimacy and the member

---

<sup>158</sup> Which does not mean the DDPS was less engaged

<sup>159</sup> The Directors of the Centres are on the FDFA's payroll. In a conflict with the Director, Switzerland could potentially use this as leverage against the will of the CoF.

<sup>160</sup> Only DCAF has been successful in broadening its funding base, largely due to the selling capacity and network of its Director.

<sup>161</sup> The discussion in the GICHD CoF on 16 December 2011 documents a lively discussion over the strategy 2012 to 2014.

countries a sense of ownership. The international composition emphasises the main donor's wish to have the Centres at the service of the international community and not just as instruments of Swiss foreign policy. The Presidents of the Foundations are elected by the CoFs upon a recommendation by the Swiss Confederation (read the CDP). The presidency prepares and moderates the CoFs' meetings. The Presidents ensure the communication and cooperation between the Director and the CoF. While all three Centres impress as being management driven, the GICHD seems to have the most active CoF (22 member states) and Bureau (6 members). GCSP with 45 members in the CoF and five members in the Bureau and DCAF with 60 members in the CoF and seven in the bureau seem more heavy as strategic steering bodies. The combination of CoF members in the GICHD with important donors and delegates from mine-affected countries provide for a real sense of ownership. In GCSP and the DCAF there might be members in the council who share a sense of ownership (e.g. from the Balkans). On a whole the composition seems not as interest based as it is in GICHD. Clear ToR and selection of key Bureau members<sup>162</sup> according to a required professional know-how and experience might improve the CoF Bureaus' capacity to intervene in crisis situations. Such steps might also strengthen the perception of independence of the Foundations.

### **Role and Influence of the Advisory Board**

The three Centres have Advisory Boards (AB). These boards can be established by the CoFs in the GICHD and the DCAF and are headed by the Director. The GCSP's AB consists of 25 members. The last meeting of the AB in 2013 has been cancelled due to a financial burden. The GICHD's AB consists of 21 members, who are part of the MA community or are active in related fields<sup>163</sup>. They meet two or three times a year. The content of the meetings are recorded by minutes. The DCAF started with an AB of 80 members and reduced this number to 35 in 2007. The AB has an annual two-day meeting, the outcomes of which are difficult to assess.

ABs are useful in developing policies and testing new ideas around the Centres' thematic work. The GICHD's AB has a ToR. The meetings minutes of the GICHD's AB reveal that animated discussions and inputs are useful for the Centre, because they help it to remain in touch with the community and expose new products or strategies to critical assessment. The ABs work well if they have a clearly defined role and the value/relevance of the exchange within them can be assessed.

### **Role and Influence of the donors**

Donors usually sit in the CoF of the three Centres, and the Centres have bilateral contacts with them. As a rule, donors contribute to specific projects and have their own monitoring and control instruments. Operational cooperation with donors usually happens between the Centres and the donor ministries (e.g. Finnish MFA and Swedish SIDA for the GICHD; Norwegian and Swedish MFA and Swedish SIDA for the DCAF; the GCSP has no relevant external donors).

The CDP's role guarantees Switzerland's influence at the Centres. There is definitely a need for more donor coordination, especially if substantial new donors were to come on board. As the main donor, Switzerland may make an effort to move towards more donor coordination. Some initial steps have already been made. The first step in donor coordination for DCAF is harmonizing reporting and monitoring requirements as much as possible.

### **Role and influence of the Director and the management**

In general, interlocutors believe that it is an asset for the Centre to have a Director with the title of Ambassador at the helm of each Centre. Some respondents said that in many countries it grants contacts at ministerial level and is a "door opener". Some interviewees suggest that the selection process for the Director needs to focus on their managerial competence rather than simply appointing a diplomat. The selection process for the GICHD's and GCSP's new Director seem to have taken this into account.<sup>164</sup> Some also suggest the Director should have a longer term appointment than just the usual diplomatic position term (four to five years). Some have also suggested that international candidates could be a good choice because

---

<sup>162</sup> President, Secretary and Treasurer

<sup>163</sup> E.g. FSD, SAS, Geneva Call, National MA-authorities

<sup>164</sup> At the final stage of the selection processes there was a choice between an outside person and a Swiss diplomat.

they would strengthen the Centres' international identity.<sup>165</sup> The careful selection of a director is cost relevant. Mismanagement or other failure of a director may lead to additional costs to repair the damage and of putting the Centre back on track.

If the Director has to play an important role in shaping the strategy, as well as in implementing instruments and giving a public face to the Centre, two four-year terms could make sense and provide stability for the management.<sup>166</sup> Another opinion supports having a strong management body to drive strategy and operations. In this version, the Director would have the role of moderator and exterior representative for the Centres. Directorships, which last more than ten years make the Centres highly dependent on one individual, making the transition into a new era more difficult.

### **Financial governance**

As financial governance relates to effectiveness and efficiency, considerations are made under these topics in the specifics to the Centres reports. It remains to note, that until 2011 the Centres were audited with a simple audit. In 2012 GICHD and in 2013 DCAF introduced a full audit.

### **Assessment of governance arrangement**

*The governance structure puts most of the responsibility/pressure of leadership on the Director, who has to establish his authority internally, as well as have an international reputation. Being elected by the CoFs upon proposition of Switzerland the Directors have in the past remained staff of the FDFA. Advisory Boards may be vehicles used to either mobilise external political support for the Director and/or the Centre and/or as sounding boards for strategic decisions and contextual reality checks. When things go wrong, issues are resolved through direct interaction with the FDFA and the CDP, making "Bern" a de facto decider. Clear professional requirements for a director and open tender for his/her recruitment may strengthen the position. While it is legitimate for the main donor to have a say in the recruitment process for the director, it would strengthen the independence of the Centres, if directors would not only be elected by the CoF, but also be employed by the foundations.*

*There is no agreement among the evaluators on a clear recommendation related to the director's term in office. One opinion suggests the possibility of having a director e.g. for two four-year terms. This could strengthen stability of the top management. The other opinion insists a maximum five-year assignment of the director would foster dynamic and independence of the director from having to be re-elected. It depends on the role of the director, which should be defined more precisely, which system is more conducive to the Centres' management approach. If the Director is more of a representative to the outside and a moderator inside, a shorter term seems appropriate. If the Director is expected to drive the management and have an impact in operations, a longer term might prevent shifts in management approaches whenever a new Director appears.*

*Swiss supremacy in the governance structures of the Centres and the clear connection of key positions with the FDFA administration may be seen as a reflection of the Swiss financial contribution to the three Centres. However, they might also be an obstacle to broadening the funding base and the ownership of the Foundations. The bureaus are composed of individuals who have a dense agenda elsewhere and are not necessarily proficient in the management (including financial oversight) of medium sized organisations with relatively complex and diverse operations. If things run smoothly, this is not a problem. However, it is questionable whether these structures are able to prevent mismanagement or abuse of power inside the Centres. GICHD and the GCSP have seen during the period under evaluation interventions by the FDFA/CDP resulting ultimately in the change of Directors. The crisis has caused considerable problems for GCSP while GICHD's operational capacity and managerial steering was not deeply affected and the hand over was smoother.*

---

<sup>165</sup> The example of SIPRI was mentioned where the Director is selected among international personalities for two five-year terms.

<sup>166</sup> Items Nr. 32 to 35 of the GICHD/CF meeting minutes 28 June 2013 point in this direction.

*It is not per se wrong or unusual to have strong influence on a foundation by a Founder or the main donor or a public entity<sup>167</sup>. Even if there are many concepts on how to steer and influence a foundation through functions and power designed in the statute, the state of affairs related to decision-making on issues of strategic relevance for the Geneva Centres needs clarification. The CDP and the Foundations need to clarify their role in strategic decision-making related to the Centres including the appointment of and the contractual arrangements with a director.*

### 5.1.3 Recommendations

#### The evaluation recommends to the CoFs

- To develop or regularly adapt according to the needs and requirements a ToR and professional requirements for the President, the Secretary, and the Treasurer of the Foundation and for the Director of the Centres.
- To clarify the role of the director within the management of the Centres. Is it more that of a driver and operational leader or that of representative and moderator?
- To agree on a course of action on how to select the respective Centres' Directors and on rules related to the term in office of the Directors.
- To clarify if the actual practice to register the bureaus of the CoF's in the commercial registry is in line with the requirement of the Swiss Civil Code and to make sure changes in the Bureau (or the CoF's) are timely registered in the relevant commercial registry.

#### The evaluation recommends to the FDFA and DDPS

- To clarify together with the CoFs the different roles of the CoFs and the CDP and their area of interaction.

## 5.2 International Geneva and the Maison de la Paix

The message to the Parliament provides a political/legal legitimacy to implement the vision of the MdP, which hosts the three Geneva Centres, the Graduate Institute (IHEID), and other institutions, such as the SAS. The main assumption is that the Centres will keep their individuality and independence as stipulated in the legal and institutional set up.

The MdP is expected to:

- Improve future synergies and cooperation of the three Centres and other institutions located at the MdP and achieve better coherence and visibility for Swiss contribution to security, conflict management and post conflict reconstruction;
- Strengthen Switzerland's international standing through a foreign policy initiative that is easy to understand, pragmatic, obviously useful and effective;
- Strengthen International Geneva.

### 5.2.1 How do the Centres position themselves within the Maison de la Paix?

The Graduate Institute (IHEID) is the owner of the building and is clear about the advantages of the presence of the Geneva Hub (the three Centres), which enable it to create links and collaborate with the Foundations. The various departments of the IHEID cover a large range of subjects, including Peace and Security. The Graduate Institute clearly sees the potential of collaboration with the DCAF and the GICHD. The situation of the GCSP is more complicated and depends on the direction the Centre will take.

The IHEID Director sees potential to collaborate in a field where Geneva is relatively weak – security. “De

---

<sup>167</sup> Big Family Foundations, such as the Jacobs Foundation often vest influence in the Founder's Family e.g. related to the election of the CoF President. More public Foundations like the Christoph Merianische Stiftung (CMS) are strongly influenced and partly steered by a public entity (in the case of CMS this is the “Bürgerat” of Basel Town) who elects a commission to steer the foundation. For the Foundation “Pro Helvetia” the Federal Council appoints the 9 members of the Council of the Foundation.

plus, avec les trois centres du DFAE basés dans la Maison de la Paix, nous pourrions lancer des collaborations dans un domaine où Genève est relativement faible: la sécurité. A New York se trouve le Conseil de sécurité. Ici, nous avons les dimensions positives de la sécurité, que ce soit le désarmement, l'intervention humanitaire ou la reconstruction après les conflits, par exemple par le déminage et la reprise du contrôle civil sur l'appareil militaire."<sup>168</sup>

DCAF is the only organisation which has not yet moved to the MdP, but it is also the one whose Director has a clear vision.<sup>169</sup> "The MdP's objectives are to strengthen Switzerland's contribution to conflict prevention, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction, Switzerland's international standing and influence and that of International Geneva. MdP is a platform for policy, which aims to transform Geneva into the leading place for debate of new security challenges in a globalizing world, and the home of a new rapid reaction mechanism for Peace". The vision concerns the MdP itself and is not about DCAF's role in MdP; this vision was voiced mid-2013.

The GICHD developed its vision, after the move to the MdP and shared it with the members of the strategic working group. According to its vision, the Centre sees MdP's possible functions 'in the field of knowledge development and sharing, as well as capacity-building, setting the agenda and providing integrated solutions.' The GICHD calls for a broad consultation with key stakeholders for defining a vision and ensuring its implementation.<sup>170</sup>

The GCSP has so far not shared a vision or a strategy for the MdP, but supported the vision of DCAF. It may be related to the fact that before offering a vision for MdP, the GCSP has to finalise a strategy for itself.

### **5.2.2 Opportunities and challenges for the Centres within the concept of the Maison de la Paix**

On the practical level, there was a monthly meeting between the representatives of the three Centres and the Graduate Institute, which has a technical assistance team, whose role was to support the move and the tenants after the move. Those who have already moved think that it is important to continue to have these regular meetings, because the exchanges are seen to be very productive.

#### **Staff perception**

The staff of the two Centres are in the process of discovering their new office and getting acquainted with it. However, there is a clear need for communication within the two Centres that moved, regarding the financial arrangements that were agreed between the Graduate Institute, the Canton and the Confederation. The contribution of the Confederation was to rent for twelve years for the three Centres the premises owned by the IHEID. This allowed the IHEID to carry out the project and use the lease agreement as a collateral. Whatever the arrangements, some staff in the two Centres feel the move has been imposed from Bern, and thus there is no ownership of the move to the MdP yet.

The staff's buy-in plays an important role in the success of any given process.

### **5.2.3 Potential synergies and models for cooperation within the Maison de la Paix**

Potential synergies are perceived at different levels. The synergies will not happen by themselves and it is important to have a driving mechanism. This should be the role of the Working Group (WG). The involvement of the FDFA is seen as extremely important and the input by the strategic working group established by the FDFA is crucial. This being said, the WG from the FDFA should definitely enable bottom up initiatives and encourage them from various MdP residents. The meetings of the WG should be held in the MdP and not in Bern, because this would contribute to the creation of a sense of ownership.

Idea creation has already started. For example, an NGO has made a concrete proposal to develop online

---

<sup>168</sup> Le Temps « La MdP – une effervescence pour Genève – 26 septembre 2013

<sup>169</sup> A vision for the MdP, T. Winkler, February 2013

<sup>170</sup> La Maison de la Paix – a vision developed by GICHD

training modules in Gender in Peace and Security with the three Centres. Another avenue to explore is the presence of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), which for example could be of interest for the public private partnership division of the DCAF. Another example is the DCAF's support for establishing of a governance group for Swiss foreign digital policy, which will take place in the WMO building. The GCSP has a Finnish expert on cyber issues and could participate in this work if it was deemed relevant.

There is an opportunity for the GICHD and the DCAF in control over stockpile security and management as a part of defence sector reform, to which the DCAF can bring policy experience and the GICHD – technical expertise. An opportunity may exist for GCSP/ DCAF synergies, if the GCSP were to seek to move from a Swiss model<sup>171</sup> to a more international one, but the logic of the CoF's composition by "member states" and of standby service provision for Bern would have to alter.

When the Centres are working in the same country as is the case in Bosnia, they could explore potential synergies.

#### **Administrative aspects – HR – Accounting - Reporting**

- The existing "service centre" which covers the entire IT dimension is a positive example. However, the function of the Service Centre and allocation of funds and services to the three Centres does not seem transparent to all involved actors.
- Various agreements exist on the use of experts by the Centres. Examples include a MoU on interns, signed in June 2013 between the IHEID and the GCSP and an agreement for positions of Research Assistant for IHEID students between the GCSP & the DCAF. GICHD and the IHEID agreed in 2012 to give students of the Graduate Institute an opportunity for internships at the Centre.
- Information and experience sharing should also intensify between the Centres in HR management and other administrative matters. Some Centres already have policies, for example the GICHD has a gender and diversity policy, while the GCSP and the DCAF have none. This could be a dimension to explore for the three Centres within their new dynamic. Shared Services existed in the past, but this was not very successful, with the IT section and facility officers the only one to survive.
- Existing successful reporting mechanisms, such as the accounting system directly linked to projects, which was developed by the GICHD, could be useful for the other Centres. An alignment would certainly benefit all stakeholders – the Centres and FDFA/SDC.

In the view of the evaluation the MdP provides the potential to cluster capacity of the three Geneva Centres and the IHEID to enhance cooperation and work towards a "one stop shop" for "positive dimensions of security" such as post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, peace building, development and SSR/SSG. There is also a risk that the MdP might be perceived as an attempt of Switzerland to crave for more visibility through implementation of expensive physical infrastructure<sup>172</sup>. There is a sense of the MdP being a "fait accompli" orchestrated by the FDFA and the leadership of DCAF and the IHEID. Representatives of the INGO community, with exceptions, are rather sceptical concerning the added value of the idea. They feel, the civil society as being excluded or late coming to participate at the development of the MdP's potential.

#### **5.2.4 Recommendations**

##### **On a strategic level**

*The evaluation recommends to the CoFs and the Directors*

- To develop in cooperation with the CDP and the IHEID a five to ten year vision with institutional and strategic options for a comprehensive cooperation of the three Centres and the IHEID within the MdP.
- To use the opportunity of the MdP to develop in cooperation with the CDP in view of the upcoming new

<sup>171</sup> The main donor and the main client of the GCSP is the FDFA, which sets in the view of the evaluation to a high degree the agenda of the Centre.

<sup>172</sup> Some interlocutors suspect Switzerland to use ODA for implementing and maintaining the MdP e.g. through the payment of high rents or rather prestigious and expensive infrastructure.

frame work budget a comprehensive strategic partnership among independent actors for the development of services, trainings, activities related to post conflict rehabilitation, peace building, development and SSR/SSG including the IHEID as a partner.

- To agree in cooperation with the CDP on a common fund of seed money for the development of joint activities and a common visibility within the MdP and from the outside.
- To ensure that the Strategic level working group becomes fully operational with a ToR, a defined list of members with clear role and responsibilities.

*The evaluation recommends to the Directors*

- To clarify the questions around the management of the so called Ex Service Centre (in the books of the GCSP).

*The evaluation recommends to the Centres*

- In order to maximise the chances of successful synergies and cooperation models and to boost the creative process from the bottom, the management of the two Centres that have already moved should ensure timely and transparent communications in this regard.
- To continue or reinstate the monthly working level meeting, because these meetings proved to be a good platform for information exchange and are crucial to the early identification and solution of problems.

### 5.3 Gender

#### **Obligations related to gender mainstreaming**

The Message to the Parliament (2010) includes a commitment for a systematic integration of gender-specific approaches for all three Centres. Gender mainstreaming is an obligation for all three Centres in their annual contracts with the FDFA:

*In its implementation of the above mentioned tasks... the Centre... shall ensure the systematic gender mainstreaming of all its programmes and projects, taking into account the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related UN resolutions. Gender mainstreaming is to be integrated in project planning and reporting.*

#### **5.3.1 GCSP**

The 2011-2015 Strategy stipulates that the Centre strives to be inclusive and mainstream gender. According to the annual agreement with FDFA, gender mainstreaming shall be evidenced and included into project planning and reporting. There has been little guidance from Bern, apart from a request to include gender in the training for Afghan officials, which the GCSP found challenging. There is no dedicated annual reporting on gender mainstreaming to the FDFA, but the mid-term reports mention gender aspects, such as seeking better representation of women among course participants, covering gender in NISC or a public discussion on Women's Land Rights.<sup>173</sup>

Gender-related topics are incorporated into the training curriculum of the core courses. A GCSP senior programme adviser is an expert on 'gender and security', who has provided dedicated sessions in ITC for the past 5 years. A NISC course director lectures on gender from a human security perspective. There are optional events on women, peace and security, which participants can attend. The subject of female combatants is covered in the crisis management exercise. Several staff took part in gender training by the DCAF and others. Guest scholars on gender issues are regularly invited. In the words of one: 'They have picked me as a lecturer, because I am a woman. They seem to pay attention to the fact that as a woman ambassador I can address foreign policy issues.' There were also unsuccessful examples of guest speakers who produced a discouraging effect.

---

<sup>173</sup> Mid-Year Brief 2013 on the Contract on the Provision of Services.



The programmes are mindful of gender balancing when invitations to recruit course participants go out. Gender specific scholarships are provided. Nine women out of 23 trainees participated in the 17<sup>th</sup> ETC, the highest number so far. Interviewed female course participants felt comfortable in the environment and the way they were treated. UN SCRs are covered by external speakers, but staff workshop participants were unaware of them and some were confused by the question.

Annual reports provide no gender-disaggregated data except for the senior management team (SMT), which has 2 women among 8 members.<sup>174</sup> The Director, Deputy Director and the Heads of Programmes are men, while there are 4 women among 12 senior appointments at the Centre.<sup>175</sup> There are no women in the GCSP Bureau and 1 woman on the Advisory Board, among approximately 25 members. The staff gender ratio shows that more men hold senior jobs. Out of 64 staff there are:

- 21 men (including 6 in Management and 2 in Faculty positions);
- 28 women (including 2 in Management and 2 Faculty positions);
- 10 secondees (all men and all Senior Programme Advisors);
- 5 interns (all women).

The GCSP is the only Centre, which made data on male/ female salary ratios available, demonstrating an effort to be transparent in this important subject. This is in line with the willingness of the current Director to increase the importance of gender issues at GCSP and shows that there are already grounds for a serious talk on gender. The analysis below is certainly superficial, as it “takes no account of the type of activity undertaken, age, experience, training and competence of the personnel concerned.” In order to have more meaningful information, a detailed analysis of like for like positions is necessary.<sup>176</sup> At the same time, analysis has to start somewhere, and this is a good place to start. An overview picture shows that a salary gap exists, although not in any dramatic proportion.

#### **Salary Ratio for Women versus Men in Permanent Employment, Percentage<sup>177</sup>**

Three Years ending 31 December 2013

	<b>2013</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2011</b>
<b>Faculty &amp; senior management</b>	79.3 %	88.8 %	92.4%
<b>Others (coordinators, director’s assistants, IT, HR, facilities etc.)</b>	82.5 %	77.8 %	78.3 %

The apparent downward trend in ‘faculty and senior management’ category in 2013 is explained by the reorganisation of the GCSP’s structure, which resulted in the promotion of two relatively junior women to a senior level. Their salaries for the year 2011 are included in the ‘others’ category.’ Besides seniority, the GCSP salary scale depends on other factors, such as competences, experience and a length of service.

The GCSP is seen externally as a male-dominated institution with an old-fashioned attitude to gender issues, where women mostly work in junior or support roles. Men are mostly teaching and women are mostly organising. Interviews with female staff showed that the respondents did not feel entirely comfortable in the working environment. The academic expertise available on gender does not serve as an institutional resource for internal learning. Interviews with male staff revealed little enthusiasm to incorporate more gender-

<sup>174</sup> Annual Report 2012: ‘In total, the Centre had a staff of 57 at the end of 2012, representing 17 nationalities.’

<sup>175</sup> Excluding secondees

<sup>176</sup> Alan Sheldon, Head of Finance at GCSP, 4 April 2014, by email.

<sup>177</sup> Data covers full-time permanent employees in employment during the year on the basis of their gross salaries. The former director’s salary is not included for the reasons for data comparability as he was seconded in 2011 and employed by the Centre in 2012 and half of 2013. The current director is seconded by the FDFA. Information provided by GCSP to the evaluation, April 2014, by email.

related themes into the training curriculum: ‘the courses are already packed, it is impossible to insert gender. It is not welcome by our participants.’ Gender was not viewed as being particularly relevant for their audiences, and short courses ‘should cover more important ground’. ‘Maybe gender is included in ITC as they have more time.’ The GCSP leadership agrees that more can be done on gender mainstreaming. However, there is a consensus that affirmative action should not be practiced.

**Assessment:** *Although in its outward role the Centre pays attention to gender mainstreaming, the in-house situation is not as straightforward. Gender is often understood as referring to women’s rights and their empowerment, rather than to how conflict and insecurity affect men and women differently, and the role that gender plays in prevention, protection and participation. Gender is not regarded as a priority vis-à-vis other challenges facing the Centre at present, and this affects the ‘GCSP brand.’*

### 5.3.2 GICHD

The GICHD has a good reputation throughout the community for mainstreaming gender in its program operations. Feedback from across the industry suggests that the GICHD was one of the first demining organisations to mainstream gender systematically and to develop a Gender in Mine Action policy, such as in land release, contracting procedures and assessments<sup>178</sup>. External respondents expressed that ‘the GICHD tries harder than most others. Most documents attempt to include gender aspects.’ The balance in the Centre itself appears generally good for external observers, and the GICHD sends both men and women to the field. For example, it is important that national counterparts in Vietnam see that women can work in mine action, because in their own Ministry of Defence women only work in the database department. However, as with all gender related matters, the direct impact is hard to measure or attribute beyond merely saying that the Centre has acted in a certain way and its personnel policy may have contributed to changing societies.

The GICHD also produced a study on gender and setting priorities in mine action.<sup>179</sup> Setting up support to the GMAP (the Gender in Mine Action Programme), which has now solidified, provides credit to the GICHD for being gender sensitive. The GMAP has an advisory role on gender issues from mainstreaming to advice on internal rules and regulations (IRR). There is training on gender in mine action; for example, the GICHD delivered a workshop on gender in Mine Action in Laos. A participant observed that it could be developed further, especially to help better understand the different needs and requirements of women, girls, boys and men. Another respondent added that gender did not need to be a major focus in training courses, but that it was referenced appropriately where necessary. However, apart from dedicated workshops on gender, those who observed operations, e.g. in Laos, have not really noticed gender aspects in concrete terms, as generally a topic that is needed to show why it is good to talk to women in villages.

While the GICHD does not specifically report on its gender mainstreaming policy, it clearly communicates its integration of gender aspects into programming, projects and products on its website. Gender mainstreaming is a recurring topic in the GICHD’s publications and handbooks.<sup>180</sup>

In April 2013 the GICHD has introduced a Gender and Diversity Policy Paper to address both internal human resources and external working practices. This happened allegedly after considerable pressure by female employees<sup>181</sup>. However some respondents felt that the policy does not transform into reality. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at times opportunities to promote female experts to a managerial level have not been used. The organisational structure has been changed instead, which reduced the number of management functions, with an implication that fewer positions became available for internal promotions<sup>182</sup>.

---

<sup>178</sup> <http://www.gichd.org/mine-action-topics/gender-and-diversity/#.U0fn8MfJoA>

<sup>179</sup> <http://www.gichd.org/mine-action-topics/gender-and-diversity/#.U0fn8MfJoA>

<sup>180</sup> E.g. the “Source book on Socio-Economic Survey” or “10 Steps to a National Quality Management System”

<sup>181</sup> According to the management the initiative came from a male staff member.

<sup>182</sup> According to the GICHD management three managerial positions were published internally in 2013 but no female candidates applied

Data shows that senior management jobs are held by men, while women are a majority in administration. The GICHD employs 60 persons (24 male and 36 female). Seven management positions including the Director are filled by men. Eight out of 15 senior experts are men, while there are five women among six senior administrators. The GICHD contracts individual consultants, out of whom 13 are female and 21 are male. The GICHD has a woman CoF President and all Bureau members are male.

The GICHD has clear and transparent salary policies with a table of functions and salary classes. This instrument supports equal opportunity and equal salary policies. GICHD has not provided the salary ratio for men and women, but only raw data. This data (status 01.04.2014) suggests that staff members are paid according to equal treatments principles, although the overall salary difference would be considerable at the organisation level as no women occupy any posts at management level.

**Assessment:** *The GICHD pays attention to gender mainstreaming in its outward activities. While the management points to the introduction of the said policy, some female interviewees doubt that the management adheres to it especially when recruiting/promoting to management positions. They believe that the management had opportunities to break up the “boys club”. We suggest that if and when such opportunities arise in the future, they should be taken.*

### 5.3.3 DCAF

Respondents believe that the DCAF has developed a solid expertise in gender and SSR, where it occupies a niche, over the years. The Centre is recognised among its international partners as the only one to succeed in operationalising the UNSCR 1325. They view that while many organisations are speaking about SSR and UNSCR 1325 agenda, not many have the practical and pragmatic approach of DCAF. *I think very highly of the DCAF Gender Unit; in comparison to others, they are solid on their feet and produce good outcomes. They know how to contextualize – for example, a project on gender bias in courts with Bosnian NGO The Atlantic Initiative.*

The DCAF has a specialized Gender and Security Programme, whose expertise, quality of training and publications are considered excellent by the Centre’s partners. They appreciate that DCAF is proactive, flexible, focused on the longer term and knows how to contextualise the gender dimension. *The Gender Unit is a very good asset of the DCAF. Gender and police reform is their distinct niche where they go in-depth. They are perceived as credible and substantial in Women Security Sector circles in the US.*

‘Gender and SSR Toolkit’<sup>183</sup> is the DCAF’s best seller, praised as pragmatic, specific and uncommonly practical. The Gender and Security Programme follows the DCAF’s general methodological pattern that some interlocutors qualified as ‘sophisticated’ for being able to work on different levels. It comprises of a sequence of steps from:

- legal review;
- research and analysis;
- policy development and operationalisation;
- implementation of policy, capacity building, training feeding theory and vice versa;
- organising events for participants from different parts of the society, such as government officials and civil society representatives, and then creating networks on that basis.

The principles for developing activities are as follows: to work directly with the authorities, to identify their needs in a participatory manner, and to be sure that there is an added value of the DCAF activities and long term engagement.

The focus on ‘gender and SSR’ has been the right strategic choice, as it positions the DCAF in the SSR sector. In many respects, the DCAF has normative power: *they shape policy and deliver concrete tools. The DCAF is a pool of trusted and recognized intellectual resources in thinking on Gender.* It can be an entry point in some

---

<sup>183</sup> Megan Bastick, Kristin Valasek, ‘Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit,’ DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW 2008 ISBN:978-92-9222-074-7, available to purchase at <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Gender-Security-Sector-Reform-Toolkit> (18 euro)

cases because gender is seen as less threatening for national counterparts in the field of hard security. The DCAF typically tries to include the ministers in charge of gender when developing programmes, indirectly empowering them in this way. As an example, the Minister in charge of gender in Sierra Leone became a member of National Security Committee.

*DCAF has an inclusive approach to governance, which is very systemic on institutional and personal levels. The team is extremely knowledgeable - they develop very useful tools on the basis of their research. They are also very operational and train the trainers; their work in Liberia is excellent. DCAF is doing tremendous work on gender-integrated approach. They are the only ones to successfully explain why the 1325 Resolution is important and how to apply it. We even use them in educating our own staff.*

Interlocutors believe that the DCAF should expand the Gender & SSR in future as it is an integral part of the Centre, which should be ready for expansion. The leadership is knowledgeable on the subject and is conscious that gender expertise contributes to the 'DCAF's brand', which is a competitive advantage in terms of funding. The DCAF cooperated with the Gender department of the Graduate Institute, and the move to the MdP will make the contact easier.

Gender staffing: DCAF made the strategic choice to have a strong gender and security team, which consists of 12 persons in Geneva for 130 staff today (they were 2 in 2005). This is an important ratio to use when comparing to other non-gender specialised organisations. Out of 12 experts there are two male gender specialists, with one being the deputy assistant director in charge of gender. This is a wise decision, because it is good to have a man addressing issues related to gender in the male-dominated security sector world. The gender unit conducts internal training once a year. Female DCAF staff in the regional offices we visited in Ljubljana and Tunis came across as enthusiastic about their work and happy in their work settings.

However, when it comes to senior and governing levels, the picture is less rosy. Men occupied 12 out of top 16 positions at the Directing Board.<sup>184</sup> All regional offices are headed by men.<sup>185</sup> All seven Bureau members are male, as well as the President. Women fare better in middle-ranking positions, and show an upward evolution from 2010 when they were 25 percent to 36 percent in 2013. There are one female Head of operations head and three deputy heads of operations/divisions are women. Women are concentrated at the junior level – they made up 70 percent of research/projects assistants in 2013, up from 58 percent in 2010. This latter trend is partially explained by the fact that the DCAF employs more women now (60 percent) than in 2010, when they were 50 percent.

---

<sup>184</sup> According to DCAF website <http://www.dcaf.ch/Staff/Directing-Board>, accessed 23 April 2014.

<sup>185</sup> Ljubljana, Tunis, Ramallah and Brussels.

## DCAF Geneva-based 2010 & 2013

2010	women	men	Total
Interns	2	0	2
Research/Project Assistants	10	7	17
Project Officers	9	5	14
Project Coordinators	6	2	8
Administrative staff	6	4	10
Senior/Managerial level positions	8	24	32
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>83</b>

2013	women	men	Total
Interns	2	0	2
Research/Project Assistants	19	8	27
Project Officers	10	5	15
Project Coordinators	12	4	16
Programme Manager	1	0	1
Administrative staff	8	4	12
Senior/Managerial level positions	11	19	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>103</b>

Information on the salary ratio for men and women in 2011 – 2013 was not available following the evaluation request. However, there is data that illustrates the situation at present. The salary policy of DCAF for junior and mid-level staff in Geneva office was provided. At the middle level women have a slight lead over men: in 2014 there are 6 project coordinators at DCAF – 3 men and 3 women. The average salary of the female project coordinators is CHF 93'400.67, that of their male colleagues CHF 90'757.33. This changes when it comes to the Directing Board and their deputies: the average salary of the men is CHF 179'961.60 and that of the women is CHF 147'729.40<sup>186</sup>. Only one woman is quite senior as she heads a division. She is the third best paid DCAF staff and the second best paid head of division. Two are deputy heads of divisions, both recently promoted and the forth is executive secretary/ head of administration.<sup>187</sup>

**Assessment:** *The DCAF has no written internal gender equality policy, which is interesting considering the importance of the Gender and Security Programme for the organisation. This is linked to the fact that there is no HR department to analyse gender and diversity and develop policies. The Gender and Security Programme could certainly be involved in this process, because they are working on those issues with their partners. The explanation given was that the Gender and Security Programme was very busy, meaning that it was not currently possible to work on this issue, but that this may be possible in the future. The subject of internal gender equality policy may also be raised by the DCAF's other donors such as Sweden and Norway.*

<sup>186</sup> Comments from the DCAF: These salaries reflect also seniority. One women who is with the DCAF since the outset has a salary that is superior to that of all her male colleagues (who is also with the DCAF from the outset and holds on top both a PhD and a professorship). The two female Deputy Heads of Division rose from the ranks and made a very steep career in the DCAF. Additional female staff is systematically prepared for senior positions.

<sup>187</sup> Based on information provided by Theodor H. Winkler, Director of DCAF, on 22 April 2014 in response to evaluation inquiry, by email.

### Gender representation at senior and governance levels, three Centres (2013 figures)

Centre	Decision-making	Senior experts / administration	Junior <sup>188</sup>	Bureau	President
GCSP	6 men, 2 women	12 men, 2 women	13 men, 24 women	5 men	Male
GICHD	7 men	8 men & 7 women senior experts; 1 man & 5 women administrators	9 men, 25 women	6 men	Female
DCAF	12men, 4 women	9 men, 10 women <sup>189</sup>	17 men, 41 women	7 men	Male

#### DCAF in Tunis

Work on Gender and Security was initiated by DCAF with Tunisia's Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in 2013. The Ministry has a gender focal point, who oversees women's rights, reparations for women who suffered under the old regime and deals with ending violence against women now. In March 2013 a visit to a female prison was organised by the Ministry following capacity-building by the DCAF, which identified failures in detention conditions. This will be one of the core aspects in future prison reform. In 2014 the DCAF published the Arabic version of its 'Women's Guide to Security Sector Reform' aimed at empowering women to transform the security sector in their local community. Still, interviews revealed that the applicability of 1325 and other UN SCR in Tunisia has not been well-understood, because they speak about conflict and war, when the country is in transition and has not experienced major conflict.

In the meantime, the DCAF engaged in fundamental research of law and practice of the security sector from a gender perspective. The project on Identification of Needs for Gender Mainstreaming in Security Sector is implemented with a civil society partner, the Arab Institute of Human Rights, for the integration of a gender perspective into the security sector. It carries out a gender baseline study to identify legal gaps, a discrepancy between law and practice, unveil representation of women at the ministries, and to shed light on such sensitive issues as brutality and harassment of women in the security and justice sectors. The project was introduced at a workshop with 40 government security and civilian officials, using the DCAF's 'Gender and SSR Toolkit.' A research team of legal experts on human rights and on CEDAW was set up. In October 2013 the project representatives met with the Minister of the Interior, H.E. Mr. Lotfi Ben Jeddou.

Initially, 'gender and security' was not seen as a priority for Tunisia by the ministries, but the DCAF approached the stakeholders individually prior to setting up interviews to explain the methodology and objectives to them. The methodology includes a study of laws, policies and initiatives towards gender and security sector reform.<sup>190</sup> The research team carries out interviews with various service providers, such as security and civilian bodies, including the Ministry of Defence, HR and TJ, Finance, Economics and Customs, Foreign Affairs, Women's Affairs and Family and penitentiary institutions. Some interviews were easier to organise than others. The Ministry of Defence did not agree to individual interviews but preferred a group discussion, in which servicemen and women participated, including a female aviation colonel. The DCAF had a good reception there and the MoD was impartial and professional. The Head of Government's office and the parliament were approached, but did not respond. The DCAF still awaits authorisation from Civil Protection and National Guard.

It emerged that it was possible to speak to both men and women on SGBV and abuse inside institutions. The respondents did not shy away from the subject. A police woman, who was the first female to reach the rank of a police commissioner, was interviewed. Currently she is the Deputy Director of Judicial Police, which oversees moral conduct within the force and deals with allegations of abuse within the institution.

<sup>188</sup> This excludes interns and temporary staff. In March 2014 there were 5 interns at GCSP and 2 at DCAF, all women.

<sup>189</sup> This includes one Programme Manager, although her position was not entered as 'senior.'

<sup>190</sup> [http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/En/articles/77/1/partenaire\\_7](http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/En/articles/77/1/partenaire_7)

Five focus group discussions were held on perceptions and expectations of beneficiaries throughout the country, mostly human rights activists. Questions were asked whether the beneficiaries feel safe and what their perceptions on the role of women in security provision are. People were reasonably open, but nevertheless the DCAF's staff member felt that more should be done in terms of gender awareness, with the DCAF bringing a *know how*, and social and cultural sensitivity, rather than imposing a gender perspective.

Data collection proved a very laborious process. Sometimes absolute numbers were given, and in other cases – only percentages. The same ministry could provide one set of data, e.g. how many women are judges and prosecutors, but refused data on prison guards and those who work in the penitentiary system, because they consider a release of such data risky. The DCAF has already included gender-disintegrated statistics into its legal database collected in the process.

There will be bilateral validation meetings with the MoI and MoD to discuss the results and recommendations in order to adapt the draft before publication and assure them that it will be done in compliance with national laws and regulations. However, the DCAF is not seeking their formal approval. A series of presentations of the draft will be organised in the regions to integrate the findings into the draft. There are various potential follow up steps discussed, such as work on gender issues in the penitentiary system or how to deal with cases of harassment and abuse within forces. It was said that the General Inspectorate of the MoI and the MoJ are interested and mean well.

#### **5.3.4 Overall conclusion**

Efforts have been made to mainstream gender into programmes and activities, and the GICHD and the DCAF have successfully developed specialised gender expertise in their respective areas. The GCSP incorporated gender-related topics into the curriculum of its core courses and seeks to have more women in their courses. Academic and programmatic gender expertise exists and, in the case of the DCAF, is promoted globally. At the same time, gender has not been internalised by the Centres with regards to their own staffing. Data on the salary ratio for men and women exists only at the GCSP and shows that there is a certain salary gap. Only the GICHD has a written Gender and Diversity Paper, which applies to internal issues as well as to programmes. There appears to be a genuine belief among many interviewed men that gender problems exist 'out there,' but not in Geneva, where women enjoy equal opportunities. When women are viewed as beneficiaries, the need to strive towards gender equality is recognised, but gender aspects of one's own workplace tend to go unacknowledged. The lack of reporting to the donor on gender mainstreaming at the Centres makes it easy to overlook problems back home.

#### **5.3.5 Recommendations**

- An analysis of salary ratios for men and women would certainly be a good opportunity for the organisation to reflect on gender issues and align their external expertise on gender with internal knowledge on their own situation and challenges.
- A written gender equality policy could help the Centres to set objectives and indicators, avoid bias and be aware of imbalance.

## **ANNEXES**

**Annex 1:** Description of the mandate and terms of reference

**Annex 2:** Presentation of the team

**Annex 3:** List of interviewees

**Annex 4:** List of reviewed documents

**Annex 5:** Google survey on GICHD website

**Annex 6:** GICHD download statistics