

**'Promoting and Consolidating Peace in South-Eastern Europe'
Mid-Term Strategy for the Swiss Peace Policy Programme**

**Human Security Division Programme in
South-Eastern Europe, 2010 – 2012**

EVALUATION REPORT

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Executive Summary

The evaluation of the Swiss Peace Policy Strategy 2010 – 2012, structured in the thematic areas of Dealing with the Past, power sharing, confidence building, and mine action was conducted in spring 2013 by Dr. Anna Matveeva. The Strategy forms a unique portfolio aimed at engagement with elites to facilitate change and influencing society to create momentum for such change. Kosovo and BiH are the priority countries, supplemented by a regional approach. The Strategy adequately responds to the conflict context and reflects a Swiss foreign policy imperative of engagement in its European neighbourhood, despite the risks of armed violence being low. Mine action enhances human security for the affected populations. Gender has been successfully incorporated into the project design and the country-level interventions. Switzerland acts as a political donor, while HSD peacebuilding expertise, sense of partnership and readiness to tackle sensitive issues are responsible for the Strategy success.

Highlights include:

1. Political Dialogue by the Council for Inclusive Governance in Kosovo created a unified platform among Kosovo Serbs, fostered a culture of dialogue and facilitated a constructive engagement between the parties from Pristina, Belgrade and the north of Kosovo. The positions of the sides are moving closer and the recommendations produced an impact on the EU high level dialogue.
2. Efforts by the Swiss advisers, secondees and NGO partners resulted in DwP occupying a legitimate space in Kosovo public policy, demonstrated by the establishment of the Inter-ministerial Working Group on Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation, expressed government commitments and the start of alternative history education at schools.
3. ICMP identification of missing persons through DNA testing is a prominent international initiative, supported by Switzerland and other donors. 70 percent of the missing in the former Yugoslavia has been accounted for, including 90 percent of Srebrenica victims.

Lessons/ conclusions for the future strategy:

- Articulation of the Theory of Change approach to make the assumptions explicit can better define outcomes and the pathways towards them; enhance conceptual clarity between power-sharing and state-building, and how the link between DwP and reconciliation should be operationalised.
- Exclusive focus on DwP in BiH does not advance peacebuilding in a sufficient measure, given an absence of a drive towards reconciliation and an uncertain link between DwP and the potential for conflict at present. No entry points for policy work that require federal state commitment are in sight.
- Media funding is currently placed in DwP, but requires a coherent strategy, as its effectiveness is ambiguous due to a lack of clarity of the desired outcomes.
- Secondments need to better relate to the Strategy and Swiss priorities; contribution of experts to OSCE in Kosovo to resume.

It is recommended to continue support to the CIG political dialogue as a high-performing initiative. Electoral reform in Kosovo has to be part of a larger process with political backing and international expertise utilised. Engagement in BiH can be reduced as it is unlikely to make a big difference and efforts in Serbia and Macedonia can be stepped up. HSD will benefit from better project prioritization and monitoring, introduction of benchmarks and improvement in reporting standards, which should reduce large staff workloads.

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Glossary and List of Abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BIRN	Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery at UNDP
CVT	Association for rehabilitation of victims of torture - Center for victims of torture
CIG	Council for Inclusive Governance
DCAF	Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DwP	Dealing with the Past
D4D	Development for Democracy
ECMI	European Center for Minority Issues
EU LEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
HLC	Humanitarian Law Center
HSA	Human Security Adviser
HSD	Human Security Division
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICMP	International Commission on Missing Persons
ICO	International Civilian Office in Kosovo
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMWG	Interministerial Working Group on Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation
ITF	International Trust Fund
IWPR	Institute of War and Peace Reporting
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OHR	Office of High Representative, Bosnia & Herzegovina
ODIHR OSCE	Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights at OSCE
PER	Project on Ethnic Relations
RS	Republika Srpska, Bosnia & Herzegovina
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
Strategy	Swiss Peace Policy Programme 2010 – 2012: Promoting and consolidating peace in South-Eastern Europe
ToC	Theory of Change
TJS	Transitional Justice Strategy, UNDP, Bosnia & Herzegovina
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNV	United Nations Volunteers

Introduction

The evaluation assesses the extent to which the activities and projects supported by the mid-term strategy of the 'Swiss Peace Policy Programme 2010 – 2012: Promoting and Consolidating Peace in South-Eastern Europe' (Strategy) of the Human Security Division (HSD) contributed to the achievement of its strategic goals; specifically:

1. Analyses the relevance of the HSD programme, taking into account Swiss competencies, instruments and comparative advantage, in its contribution to conflict transformation in the thematic areas of Dealing with the Past (DwP), power sharing and confidence building, and mine action in Kosovo and BiH.
2. Assesses the programme performance at the level of outcomes with the aim to determine whether and which outcomes can be directly attributed to HSD-supported projects.

The evaluation provides recommendations on the directions to take and possible changes to be reflected in the strategy for 2014 – 2016.

The evaluation took place in February – March 2013 and was conducted by Dr. Anna Matveeva, Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, assisted by national consultants Mohamed Sagdati in Kosovo and Bjanka Osmanovic in BiH. The evaluation comprised a briefing in Bern, and field research in Kosovo (15 – 19 March) and BiH (20 – 23 March), covering 61 respondents.¹ The field phase commenced with reflective workshops with implementing partners in each country.² These were supplemented by key informants interviews and group discussions with project implementers, their government counterparts, HSD and Swiss embassies, direct beneficiaries and Swiss secondees, and by event observation. Three independent experts were interviewed as a control group. Further Skype and telephone interviews were conducted with the respondents based outside the region.

Documentation review took longer than expected due to a difficulty in processing and extracting relevant information from the HSD files. The number of field days was a limiting factor for travel, and respondents from Kosovo North and Republika Srpska came to the capitals to meet with the evaluator. There was not enough time for extensive grass-root consultation, while several beneficiary meetings were organised.

The evaluation followed the Theory of Change (ToC) approach believed to be conducive for peacebuilding programming.³ The key pillars of ToC approach are:

- Context for the initiative, including social and political conditions, the current state of the problem we seek to influence and that other actors are able to influence;
- Long-term change that the initiative seeks to support and for whose benefit we work;
- Process/sequence of change anticipated to lead to the desired long-term outcome;
- Assumptions of intervening parties about how change can be achieved.⁴

¹ See Annex II.

² Workshop notes are available on request. Swiss Embassy staff participated in Sarajevo workshop.

³ On applicability of development criteria for evaluating peacebuilding interventions see OECD (2012), *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results*, DAC Guidelines and References Series, OECD Publishing <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264106802-en>

The report first tackles the questions of strategy, design, Swiss approach to intervention and the conflict context, then analyses relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the projects in Kosovo and BiH, including the regional dimension, assesses incorporation of gender issues, and concludes with recommendations for the future strategy. The evaluator wishes to thank all her interviewees, and the Swiss embassies and HSD staff for providing support and sharing their insights.

General Findings

Intervention Strategy and Design

The overall goal of the 2010 – 2012 HSD Strategy is to reduce risks of violence and to build better functioning states in Western Balkans. Assessed from a conflict mitigation perspective, the Strategy targets the region with a fairly low probability of large-scale violence, while the case for peacebuilding on the global scale is not the strongest. However, proximity to Europe rather than intensity of conflict gives the region prominence for Switzerland. The HSD strategy forms a part of the Swiss foreign policy imperative, where Western Balkans is considered a neighbourhood and which includes migration considerations. Withdrawal from the region is not desirable, even if a possibility of eruption of a violent conflict is not high. The concept of peacebuilding is about supporting sustainable peace, regardless of whether or not political conflicts have recently produced violence and can be undertaken where a threat of instability exists.⁵

The Strategy tends not to make the assumptions explicit on how change is meant to be achieved. As interpreted by the evaluation, the Theory of Change behind the Strategy rests on three assumptions that determine the pathways. They are more traceable in the case of Kosovo than BiH:

- The assumption is that the issue of Kosovo status versus incorporation of the Serb interests presents a stumbling block for peacebuilding and needs to be resolved. Although Switzerland recognised Kosovo's independence and is not strictly speaking a neutral actor, it is the only donor with sufficient concern and *know how* to overcome the deadlock between the Kosovo Serbs, Belgrade and Pristina. The pathway is to build a platform among different Serb constituencies to form a coherent interlocutor ready to enter into political bargaining with Pristina. The HSD role is to eventually facilitate such bargain.
- *Dealing with the Past* (DwP) as a prerequisite for peace in the future is an important and fundamental assumption of the Strategy, which Switzerland is a standard-bearer for. The 'holistic approach' to DwP is essentially a human rights approach and consists of the Right to Know, Right to Justice, Right to Reparation and Guarantee of Non-Recurrence. In the Western Balkans it was translated mostly into war crimes prosecution and truth seeking.⁶ Still, the pathway of how DwP would enable reconciliation – rather than staying with the past, - is uncertain. Although the

⁴ Isabel Vogel, 'Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development,' Report for the UK DFID, April 2012.

⁵ OECD, *Ibid*.

⁶ Jonathan Sisson 'A Conceptual Framework for Dealing with the Past', p. 15 and 'A Holistic Approach to Dealing with the Past in the Balkans,' pp. 171 – 175, in Politorbis, FDFA, Political Affairs Secretariat, no. 50, 3/2010.

Strategy emphasises that DwP ‘remains a crucial factor for reconciliation and nation-building,’ it does not spell out how this link should be operationalised, at which point reconciliation enters the scene and how a dilemma between justice and peace should be addressed. Thus, the pathway is unclear on what is the critical junction when DwP is accomplished and a society should be able to move forward.

- It is assumed that if certain issues or voices are too marginalised in the course of state-building, they are more likely to erupt into tensions in future. The pathway is support to the causes, processes and values which can potentially be extinct if not promoted by the international community, such as minority rights and democratic procedures in Kosovo or coverage of transition justice in the region. This is based on a belief that sooner or later these values and processes will take root in societies, and that local actors will be able to make use of internationally-designed mechanisms. This is a valid assumption, with a caveat that the results could manifest in medium to long-term, and an impact assessment will be required to establish this.

The table below summarises the *change – outcome* chain of interventions in Kosovo and BiH, connecting the context to the strategy:

KOSOVO

Intended Change	Context	Outcome
Albanians and Serbs agree on shared Kosovo statehood	EU High Level Dialogue, softening Belgrade’s position, SAA between EU & Kosovo	Serbs and Albanians constructively discuss future together
Democratic procedures give Kosovo state a stable foundation for the future	Uncertainty over elections; international actors drive electoral reform in many directions	Awareness raised, while gains in electoral law and administration only tactical
Past no longer holds society hostage and allows to move forward	ICTY acquittals, closure of ICO, EULEX investigations and arrests Weak cooperation with Serbian institutions	IMWG established, young Albanians learn about the past, but challenge remains in Serbia
Mine-free Kosovo	Robust action by Kosovo Security Forces	Human security is gradually returning to pre-conflict level

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Intended Change	Context	Outcome
Past is processed and allows closure on state and society levels	Domestic war trials, ICTY high-level prosecutions, peak in DNA identifications	Risk of staying in the past; diversity groups in society recognise legitimacy only of own grievances. Closure not in sight
Reconciliation	Lack of a forward-looking vision & political will; sense that international community would not let BiH fail	Minor civil society linkages, e.g. via BIRN and TJS working group
Mine-free BiH	Weak federal government effort, competition and confusion among multiple mine-clearance providers	Unlikely to reach pre-conflict human security in a foreseeable future

On the project level, the Strategy comprises a unique portfolio and is aimed at two tiers: engagement with elites to facilitate change and influencing society to create momentum for such change to happen. It presents a mixture of supply and demand-driven activities. A

combination of four thematic strands creates an appropriate combination in Kosovo, while in BiH Switzerland is recognised for its role in DwP. In most cases NGOs identify the needs which are not yet articulated in society and act as intermediaries. HSD seldom works with grass-roots and direct beneficiaries, leaving this to SDC. The exceptions are the farmers in the mine-cleared areas (Halo Trust in Kosovo and NPA in BiH), ICMP family associations and the Centre for Victims of Torture (CVT) in BiH.

The evaluator found the division between ‘confidence building’ and ‘power-sharing’ confusing, as power-sharing normally is considered as a part of a state-building process, defined by OECD DAC as ‘an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state.’ So were the implementers: for example, ECMI in Kosovo first argued that their project ‘Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government’ was under ‘confidence-building’ but, having learnt from the evaluator that it comes under ‘power-sharing,’ was ready to argue in favour of the opposite. In reality, minorities in Kosovo, apart from the Serbs in the North, have no power to share and rely on the international community to protect their interests. Engagement with minority rights is undermined by emigration to the kin states and to the West, which weakens the standing of the remaining communities. The concept of ‘power-sharing’ makes more sense where two ethnic groups have sufficient resources to contest and share power, which to an extent is already a reality in Macedonia.

Relationship between conflict analysis and intervention is more implied than articulated. HSD and its partners work on the basis of implicit analysis, often based on their own experience. These analyses can be sophisticated and are being updated as individuals move about and talk to people. However, significant assumptions often remain undiscussed and untested. Several key projects closely follow the conflict dynamic, but the overall Strategy avoids clear benchmarks, and does not specify how the evolving context should influence strategy adjustment.

The Strategy rather stems from the existing capacities, i.e. on-going initiatives and established partnerships, which proved to work than from conflict updates and revisiting assumptions against change which was meant to be achieved. The use of static analysis became more noticeable when individual project documents were studied. BiH remains a major geographic focus, although presently the risks in Macedonia may be greater. In case of episodic interethnic violence in Macedonia turning into a more systematic one, the Strategy does not provide an answer why the situation was not addressed at a conflict prevention stage.

Allocation to media (two BIRN projects and *Sense* news agency) constitutes a part of the funding, but media work is included in *DwP*, rather than presented as a Strategy pillar *per se*. This leads to uncertainty in how to measure its effectiveness, in establishing linkages to other components and difficulties in seeing opportunities which an engagement with media entails.

Approach to Intervention

HSD made an impressive choice of partners in Kosovo. The approach there consists of working through national civil society partners, with one exception of Political Dialogue where an impartial intermediary has been essential; hence the valid choice to use an INGO (Council for Inclusive Governance). The link with international organisations was ensured

through staff secondments rather than by funding projects. This enabled a certain influence upon these organisations and a two-way relationship for information and consultation.

More diversity among partners exists in BiH, where international organisations, such as UNDP, OSCE and International Trust Fund (ITF) received funding. Reliance on local NGOs has been lower and limited to Sarajevo-based ones which represent the Federation,⁷ while past secondments were less significant for the Strategy. Partnerships in RS were said to be limited by the absorption capacity and difficulty in finding appropriate civil society organisations. Most projects are co-funded by other donors.

While Kosovo and BiH are priority countries, the regional approach is an important part of the Strategy, which enables to pursue initiatives that require a concerted effort of different countries. It is explicit in media work and in ICMP missing persons' identification through DNA testing. The approach was found relevant and mostly worked well for being pragmatic; where it did not, it was worth trying. It succeeded in involving Serbian authorities and civil society in on-going initiatives in a practical, hands-on way, without making a grand statement. For example, counterparts from Serbia are involved in the CIG political dialogue.

Expertise and involvement of HSAs, embassies and HSD forms an integral part of the approach. Implementation has been influenced by the necessity to steer the US and the EU in the same direction, or to accommodate to their priorities, given the weight of the international community in the Western Balkans. In Kosovo, 'if the EU and the US are not on your side, it is hard to convince the government.'

The approach does not overtly target sustainability, which can be understood in a variety of ways, - either in terms of sustainability of structures or attitudes. It has been argued that sustainability of a peacebuilding process is impossible to define, as logically it has to expire when a lasting peace is achieved. Efforts towards sustainability may undermine flexibility to try different approaches and take risks.

Switzerland as an actor

Peacebuilding expertise provided by HSD was found to be its strongest asset. HSD acts as a political donor when the ambassadors, the HSAs and HSD staff get closely involved in project steering, and advising on the content, as well as in lobbying and networking. Sense of partnership and closeness to the implementing organisations is a distinct feature, responsible for success. It enables nourishment of partner relations, ability to tackle controversial issues and step in with guidance and advice. Partners became beneficiaries in their own right as they improved their capacities and changed mindsets throughout implementation. The approach concentrates on how to make things work in practice, without major bureaucratic constraints.

All interviewed partners were highly appreciative and emphasised that they enjoyed trust by the Swiss, particularly when times were hard: 'they encouraged us to go on'. Swiss approach was characterised by the CIG participants as 'active,' 'making people pay attention to difficult issues, pause, reassess and try to solve a problem rather than jump through hoops.' 'The Swiss endorsed the process, but did not provide us with goals, solutions and benchmarks – this created a platform for us to search for solutions ourselves.' 'They never

⁷ The ICMP projects (DNA and family associations), NPA projects (in Posavina) and OSCE History for the Future include either direct beneficiaries in the RS or involvement of RS actors through working groups etc.

showed any favouritism to one or the other position, but rather ‘held a mirror on how we progress.’ ECMI: ‘the Swiss are a political funder for sensitive and difficult issues which most donors do not wish to touch.’ Kosovo workshop participants: ‘they are part of the team,’ ‘partners not donors.’ It was expressed that the Swiss staff offered advice and expertise, and was prepared to assist with hands-on implementation if needed. Switzerland added its credibility to the initiatives which were potentially risky or uncomfortable, but at the same time HSD staff remained impartial, did not try to micro-manage or interfere. HSD rendered expertise on DwP even to the projects it does not directly finance.

HSD demonstrated great flexibility and speed, but did not make it easy to relate individual efforts to the overall Strategy. The projects lack an integrated organisational framework. The Swiss approach does not envisage mapping of the projects to enable their coherent prioritisation and the degree to which they should be accompanied by the HSD staff. Implicitly, such prioritisation was taking place, e.g. with respect of the CIG Political Dialogue. The Swiss operational staff felt that prioritisation would be beneficial.

Consequently, no systematic approach to monitoring has been observed. Monitoring is carried out by HSAs, programme officers and HSD staff visiting from Bern. They assist partners with self-evaluation, - an exercise which the latter appreciate. External evaluation was commissioned for ECMI and was found by the organisation as helpful, as it made it reflect and re-orient its approach towards development of tools. HSD does not employ a tool to measure effectiveness and impacts, relying instead on narrative reports, event observation, conversations with implementers and stakeholders, and external evaluations. Several interviewed staff felt that these tools are sufficient to assess progress, while others thought that introduction of formal benchmarks would be helpful, especially in the cases of long-term support to the same implementers.

It was found that insufficient resources were available to manage the complicated portfolio structure. Project cycles are short and are not structured around established partnerships, making it difficult to trace continuity. Cost-efficiency of HSAs role in BiH is not obvious as accompanying and monitoring discrete projects is labour-intensive, while their remit is small-scale. Lack of standards in narrative reporting and HSD not being very demanding in making the reports coherent mean that the desk in Bern has a disproportional workload to keep track of the developments.

Swiss Expert Pool

Kosovo was the main arena for deployment of Swiss personnel. In 2010 – 2012 ten secondments were made to the EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX), five to the International Civilian Office (ICO), and several to UNDP and UNV. Switzerland halted secondments to the OSCE in the preceding period. Two appointments to the Prosecutor’s Office took place in BiH and a HSA operates at the Embassy on a part-time basis. Pristina-based HSA covers Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia. Regional adviser on *DwP* acts as a resource from Bern, deployed on short-term missions. His involvement was praised by NGO partners in Kosovo and BiH for on-the-job support and expertise.

Several strategic secondments took place in Kosovo, e.g. DwP adviser and the head of Community Affairs Unit at ICO and of Human Rights and Gender Unit at EULEX. The *DwP* adviser’s position was a key success, which came about as a result of two years’ lobbying and inclusion of the *DwP* concept into the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari

settlement plan for Kosovo. The impact of the secondment is highly visible in establishment of the IMWG in March 2013.

Secondments enabled to incorporate the Swiss priority issues, e.g. DwP and minority rights, into international agenda. The experts produced an impact by shaping the agenda of the institutions, into which they were placed. The head of the Community Affairs Unit at the ICO was effective in integrating Serb representatives into Kosovo governing structures. In this case, the establishment of the new Serb municipalities was the window of opportunity which was seized by the seconded staff. Another expert worked on decentralisation, which was not a priority for HSD, but a key issue for the SDC.

Switzerland had priorities behind the secondments not directly related to the Strategy, i.e. to gain experience and enhance visibility. HSD in Bern believes it gained invaluable information and insights from the experts, which, as in the case of the Head of Human Rights and Gender Unit, contributed to the Swiss proposals at international fora. The desk at Bern read the reports, although this was not always made clear to their authors.

Still, most interviewed experts did not perceive themselves as vehicles of the Swiss Strategy and in some cases were not aware of their connection to it.⁸ Moreover, they were given guidance that their loyalty lies with the institutions at which they work. Although the Swiss government paid their salaries, it did not expect special favours. The experts gained experience and recognition, but initially felt isolated.

An impediment to a strategic approach to secondments was limited control over positions, resulting in mostly junior to middle-ranking deployment, owing to Switzerland's non-membership in the EU and vast US influence. Those experts who entered their institutions at an early stage before their structures and policies were entrenched and who were close to the field, had a rewarding experience. Those who came later, ran against an institutional culture, especially when it was their first experience at international missions and they did not know how to navigate the bureaucracy.

The experience of the DwP adviser was telling – the ICO resisted the secondment for two years and allowed it only at the exit stage with a 'tick-the-box' attitude. Although the adviser's position was senior, *de facto* standing depended on the goodwill of the leadership, which took time and efforts to secure. The controversial and politically sensitive nature of DwP influenced the attitude. There was a question whether the Swiss side could have supported the expert more, e.g. through its Regional DwP adviser without compromising her standing at the ICO. At the same time, institutional constraints on synergies were powerful.

The experts believed that they created a legacy in their positions which would last beyond their time in the field. However, given that most experts turned around in their jobs fairly quickly, institutional memory was hard to sustain. No career plan was envisaged for the former secondees, which means that individuals had to interrupt their careers with no clear prospects. This does not impede upon junior people as international deployment presents an opportunity to learn skills, but impacts upon recruitment of senior cadre for influential appointments. It is a valid question to what extent the secondments should be regarded as a part of the Strategy, as they were not required to promote HSD priorities and their links to the Swiss-funded projects have been weak.

⁸ With an exception of the respondent who was a career HSD staff and contributed to the Strategy in his former capacity.

Conflict and Context Analysis

The evaluation inquired into the present assumptions of the implementing partners about the conflict situations in Kosovo and BiH and how they compared to 2009 when the Strategy was conceived. The commonalities were that a return to war was not likely and that irrespective of ethnic belonging, the Yugoslavia generation was more united by values and life strategies, than the post-Yugoslavia one, where attitudes are less predictable.

At present, Kosovo has a future-oriented project centred around independence, which allows a positive mobilisation within the society. Still, the state capture by a power group together with a divisive political climate makes the polity volatile, given that the leadership is strongly affected by its wartime past. Popular resentment is directed against the elite cartel as a whole which employs war-time command methods in peace time development. 'Barriers in society exist because of the war legacy' was the consensus among the workshop participants. Protest mobilisation is less likely along ethnic lines than against corruption, which serves as a public irritant.

The current conflict drivers were identified as the unresolved status of the north of Kosovo and the position of Serbs there, disappointment with the 'political caste,' social tensions over the grim state of the economy/ unfulfilled development agenda, and religious tensions on a grass root level. These changed from 3 – 4 years ago, when political issues centred around recognition of independence and taking the leverage of power from the international community. It is believed that the international community is less an actor in the conflict than it used to be.

BiH presents a contrasting picture of a divided polity and society. Power comes in many forms and in small quantities; is easily won and easily lost. Segregation enables fewer conflictual encounters and the segments of society avoid dealing with each other as much as possible. Ethnic intermixing hardly happens and people do not care about other groups, as long as their own interests are protected. No policy of reconciliation is visible that allows a way out of the deadlock.

Despite a more nationalist stance of the new RS leadership, the respondents concluded that eruption of military hostilities is unlikely and the regional climate is not conducive to border redrawing or militant nationalism. Rather, social and economic dissatisfaction can lead to a breakdown of law and order, or urban riots can be triggered by trivia, such as football fights. Basic development and youth problems are the emerging issues. The situation may change if the central state begins to impose unpopular measures, but it has not demonstrated any willingness to do so, as long as the possibility of outsourcing problems to the OHR exists.

Detailed Findings

Kosovo/ Regional

Relevance

The intervention in Kosovo was found to be highly relevant, as it combined DwP with a forward-looking agenda. On DwP it was expressed that Kosovo politicians adhere to the

‘forget-and-forgive’ notion which is dangerous because both communities continue to feel as victims. The reflective workshops’ participants identified the junction at which DwP would be satisfactorily accomplished, making closure possible. Their landmarks were:

- Political reconciliation that involves for Serbia to make a sort of general apology or an acknowledgement that wrong things were done in the past;
- Recognition of all victims as such by all sides: this can take a form of a compilation of a common history book and a museum/ monument to all victims;
- Ending the business of remnants of war, such as landmines and search for the missing;
- Ability to speak freely about the past: ‘only then we can draw a line and ensure that it will never happen again.’

The Kosovo portfolio presents a mixture of supply and demand-driven activities, inevitable in peacebuilding. As noted by a Kosovo Serb Dialogue participant, ‘we really tried to establish a common platform among ourselves; even registered as an organisation. But nothing worked because we all argued with each other non-stop, until Alex [CIG] project came about.’ DwP (Non-Formal school education by the Humanitarian Law Centre, HLC) is more supply-driven, but is recognised by the Kosovo education authorities as valid, and has been in demand by progressive school headmasters who invited HLC in.

Doubts exist with regards to the relevance of electoral reform, - and whether is it really ‘reform’ - to peacebuilding (Development for Democracy (D4D) project). Conflict analysis did not identify electoral violations as a major conflict risk, nor is the ruling party capable of organising massive fraud. The subject is extremely ‘political’ as it taps into the interests of concrete politicians. Still, the elections whose results are endorsed by the public, are part of a state-building process, and progress in state-building is likely to stabilise the situation in the long-run. Several experts expressed that without an institutional reform Kosovo cannot move forward. Thus, the evaluation gives the D4D project the benefit of the doubt.

BIRN regional project seeks to influence societies as a whole by reminding them of the turbulent history of the 1990s and informing of the present justice process. This is not a mainstream topic, and large radio stations are reluctant to broadcast BIRN’s content. However, it finds more resonance on a grass-root level: out of 300 local radio stations contacted by BIRN, 100 agreed to take their material. Another media organisation in this field is IWPR,⁹ which BIRN believes it compliments, although they cover similar ground on ICTY. Serbia presents a difficult context because ordinary people, especially youth, are losing hope in international justice and feel betrayed. However, Croatia is the hardest to influence, as the prevailing attitude towards DwP after international acquittals is that of winners, implying that the chapter is closed. The EU no longer pressurises Croatia after it joined the Union, as a result the external leverage has been lost.

Efficiency¹⁰

Funding allocation for the projects under evaluation, 2010 – 2012 (calculated by the author):

- Confidence building - 1,370,746 CHF
- Power-sharing - 552,747 CHF

⁹ Several BIRN senior staff started their careers at IWPR.

¹⁰ Efficiency was assessed only in application to the projects under the evaluation, not the entire Strategy.

- Dealing with the Past - 47,986 CHF to HLC (+ contribution to BIRN regional)
- Mine Action - 587,068 CHF

Efficiency of the Kosovo operation has been high, with no major delay occurring, and quality of outputs was equally high. For example, the Kosovo Mine Action Centre, - Halo Trust's government counterpart, - confirmed through its own monitoring reliability of the final mine survey, and efficiency of the mine clearance operation by Halo. It is envisaged that the donor conference to present the survey and invite contributions to a joint programme will improve efficiency of international demining.

Timely adjustments were made where necessary to improve efficiency. D4D quickly re-oriented its activities to research and advocacy when it transpired that the initial plan of the Electoral Law amendment could not go ahead due to the changes in political context.

A relatively small funding for HLC went a long way. It enabled to involve 1200 participants, develop a curriculum based on HLC's own research and organise 32 interactive seminars at Kosovo Albanian schools for 16 – 17 years old students. This, in the words of HLC, was 'an eye-opening experience for them'. The fact that the events were held at school premises and that the authorities backed them up contained a message. The project was highly successful as a pilot, assisted by cooperation with the Kosovo Ministry of Education. No seminars were held in Kosovo Serb schools as efforts to solicit cooperation of Serbia's Ministry of Education were unsuccessful, and so were the attempts to engage friendly Serb mayors and headmasters. As a comparison, HLC in Serbia was not allowed into schools and had to run seminars with invited students at their own premises.

BIRN is the main media partner and implements a regional *Balkan Transitional Justice* project. In less than a year an efficient operation including the countries previously at war with each other, has been established. The agency covers the entire region, while six reporters work on transitional justice only. It broke silence on DwP and fills the information gap, such as on national war crime trials in BiH. Efficiency has to be measured against the level of difficulty which in BIRN's case was considerable: problems in finding editors with the right skills and attitudes, remote operational control from Belgrade, high pace of news delivery, technological complexity and political resentment of ICTY among many Serb constituencies.

BIRN was efficient in 'thinking outside the box' and using a mixture of traditional means, i.e. small town radio stations, and new information and communication technologies, such as social media, to reach out to different target audiences. The regional network has been useful in developing larger stories which cover several countries/ entities. It has been hard to sustain quality staff in Kosovo and Croatia, and BIRN has to contribute to their salaries from the revenue generated through subscription. Overall, regional BIRN is a very labour-intensive undertaking.

Effectiveness

The efforts of the Swiss advisers, ICO secondees and local partners in DwP eventually bore fruit, although it took time to turn attention of the authorities and the international actors to the issue. On 18 March 2013 the 1st meeting of the IMWG took place, where the strategy and government commitments were publicly articulated. This was a distinct success of the Swiss Strategy. Progress on establishment of the Language Commissioner's office is also

positive, but cannot be attributed chiefly to the Swiss-funded ECMI projects, which contributed to the international efforts in the same direction.

Non-Formal Education

HLC project was found to be highly effective, close to its beneficiaries and created a good demonstration effect. It successfully connects DwP with forward-looking reconciliation through working at schools and with the young generation. Non-Formal education has been a small project, but formed a part of a wider Strategy and is connected to it in more than one way. However, it is still a delicate field where personalities of the people involved matter. The challenge remains on how to engage the Serb areas.

More efforts are needed in future in replication and scaling up to ensure sustainability and that benefits are not lost in Kosovo (and possibly Serbia). HLC can offer short courses and simulation exercises, video records of truth commissions, war crimes trials and victims' stories. It anticipates working closely with the DwP Working Group to produce a policy paper summarising the experience, support development of the school curriculum and train teachers on how to use the HLC module.

Political Dialogue

Initially, the CIG Political Dialogue encountered a high level of difficulty as Belgrade was obstructive and actively worked against the initiative. It finally accepted legitimacy of the process and its composition. The Dialogue became highly-effective, although it is vulnerable to larger political fortunes, e.g. success or failure of the track I EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. All interlocutors, - Serb, Albanian and the international community, - agreed that 'this is a unique project' and compares favourably to previous dialogue initiatives.

CIG rightly diagnosed that the problem primarily lies among the different Serb constituencies. Its philosophy was to help the people who pay a price for continuation of the conflict situation find a solution deriving from among their own milieu. It managed to get inside a closed and conflict-laden milieu of intra-Serb disputes. By contrast, PER had dealt with Serb and Kosovo institutional structures rather than with internal problems among the Serbs.

CIG brought together real decision or opinion-makers and was effective in enabling the Serbs to deal with political realities, so that they recognise the opportunities and use them to their advantage rather than stay in the victimisation mould. This was a school of political education, to make the Serbs ready to engage with the 'official' opponent. Establishing a unified and articulate Serb platform was the Dialogue's achievement.

This success was possible due to excellent facilitation, accompaniment by the Swiss side and the role and personality of Alex Grigorev, the CIG president, indispensable for the Dialogue. CIG fostered frank, but respectful discussions and carefully planned follow-up to link the dialogue rounds to the overall process. All proposals were welcome and there were no prohibited topics to discuss, while the facilitators only restrained the language of expression. However, CIG only took forward those recommendations which it believes in. CIG did not project their own views, but left it for the international players, e.g. the US State Department, to draw the lines of the remit of the possible for the Kosovo Serbs. It took a

delegation to Washington instead of telling them that 'partition is not an option.' Political stance of the Kosovo Serbs became more measured after the US study tour.

The process had a positive effect upon the emergence of a culture of dialogue: the participants learnt what it takes for a constructive discussion. An identity of a core dialogue group who are committed to its success is establishing itself. That said, inclusion of new participants takes place, as some are experts in their respective fields, and some are 'radicals' who are being integrated. The results include the development of recommendations and creation of a pool of experts. The Serb group is confident that solid expertise is available collectively among them, and they have concrete assets to offer to the Albanian counterparts. Ramifications upon wider society are emerging as the Dialogue participants influence their constituencies through a combination of formal (ICG report) and Non-Formal means (networking with supporters). CIG supplied information and ideas to EU policy-makers; some recommendations were included into the track I process and found their way into public debate.

In the words of the participants, 'all positive political change can be attributed to CIG; otherwise there won't be a dialogue on the north of Kosovo.' The main achievement is that 'the CIG proved that dialogue is possible, we were the first to believe that it is viable.' 'The Swiss did more for Kosovo Serbs than Belgrade' (a Kosovo Serb participant), because Belgrade did not analyse the situation the north of Kosovo as it really is as opposed to what it wishes it to be, and did not attempt to unite the Kosovo Serb leaders. The positions of all sides are getting closer and the linkage between the CIG dialogue and the EU process makes the participants to act responsibly.

Existing obstacles are the difficulty to convince Kosovo Albanian officials to engage seriously with the Dialogue, as they send junior representatives at times. The Dialogue is a subject to external factors beyond its control, such as the outcome of Kosovo elections, delays in implementation of Ahtisaari plan, shifts in Belgrade's official line towards Kosovo and success of the EU-led dialogue.

Electoral Reform

D4D is a highly respected partner, who has been engaged in work on elections for a long time. Progress in the current project was affected by the lack of adoption of legislation, disinterest of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and by politicians not seeing reforms in their interests. Different donors to electoral reform funded similar or contradictory initiatives in Kosovo, but could not clearly identify the problems, - a task which D4D sought to accomplish. It has achieved successes in particular local cases and in generating nascent demand from society. Its voice is heard, and its outputs are of sound quality, recommendations are in the focus of the public and taken seriously in political circles. One area where D4D was definitely effective was in preserving progressive provisions from being altered, e.g. in affirmative gender action.

However, the project was tied up to the parliamentary commission on electoral reform which worked in a stop-and-start mode. CEC, in theory a direct beneficiary of the D4D project, proved to be a dysfunctional institution not concerned with building its capacities. Effectiveness stalled because Kosovo politicians showed little interest in fulfilling an international reform agenda - a process on-going since 2000 in one form or another. There is a hope that it will pick up now, - but hope is not a plan.

Effectiveness of electoral reform has been undermined by ‘international discord,’ i.e. contradictory advice and practices over the last 13 years, which led to confusion and a sense that uncomfortable legal provisions can be easily overturned. The D4D project has not been a part of a larger process and the tasks it tried to shoulder were too great for one civil society organisation, however capable. Measuring effectiveness of projects which are dependent on the adoption of legislation has to take external factors into account, which in this case proved too powerful.

Some confusion happened on the output level: what exactly should be reformed (preferential votes, open versus closed lists) and why became so complicated that the organisation started to lose track of what was meant to be achieved. Although the evaluation endorses D4D’s self-assessment that ‘we have done more than expected in two years,’ project effectiveness beyond awareness-raising is not obvious.

Risks of substitution of government action and re-invention of already available *know how* have been traced. D4D dealt with the electoral process, such as organisation of polling stations and verification of the voters’ lists, - tasks which are the direct responsibility of the government. Guidance on electoral procedures has been developed by others, such as by OSCE ODIHR, and formulating similar recipes implies ineffective use of resources.

Civil society can advance the process only if sufficient momentum is built among political parties who have to regard the adoption of a new law as serving their own interests. Changes in the legal framework can achieve only a limited effect if mindsets of the power-holders are lagging behind, if parties see opportunities in electoral manipulation as their advantage and increased transparency and fair participation – as unnecessary complications on the road to victory. The unknown variable is the strength of public opinion on the matter: although D4D polls show a widespread belief that the last elections were rigged, the will to change it among wider society has been untested.

Demining

Halo Trust was effective in gaining recognition that Kosovo is not a mine-free country as declared by the UN in 2001, and Switzerland was the first government to endorse it. It made good progress towards reaching the overall mine clearance objective and improve human security. It was estimated that at the current pace of demining it will take Kosovo 7 to 10 years to fulfil the international obligations under the Ottawa Convention. This means that effectiveness of the Swiss contribution to demining in Kosovo shows progress towards a realistic target, in which the state - the Kosovo Security Forces - makes appropriate efforts as well as internationally-funded Halo Trust.

Balkan Transitional Justice

Effectiveness of media work is hard to prove unambiguously. On the one hand, BIRN convincingly argues that a large number of local radio stations take their content, their articles are republished by mainstream press, numbers of website users is high and increasing, and that their video production grows in popularity. BIRN presents a good example of people of different ethnic backgrounds cooperating in earnest: BIRN Kosovo has Serb contributors, and enjoys good relationship with their colleagues in Serbia.

On the other hand, the 2013 Valicon ‘Public opinion poll in the region for the need of BIRN’ survey showed a low appetite for DwP in general and limited audience for BIRN

products. Only 0.6% of respondents have spontaneously stated that they listened to the 'Roads to Justice' broadcast. When asked directly if they had listened to 'Roads to Justice' show/programme (prompted awareness), 8% of respondents claimed they have listened to it (mostly people from Montenegro and B&H).

All but one non-BIRN evaluation respondents stated that they do not use the resource regularly or not at all,¹¹ that it is 'a source for a narrow circle of war victims and their families, intelligentsia and certain politicians,' that is it too detached from the mainstream and that 'commercialisation' came too quickly. One indicator, albeit negative, is that only in Kosovo BIRN has been threatened by politicians - implying that their influence carries weight. In other places, according to BIRN, 'the authorities and radicals sideline or ignore us, it is a wall of silence.' BIRN in Kosovo has a reputation for high quality and courageous journalism, but is more known for their current investigations than DwP agenda. It may be that BTJ operated for a short period and more time is needed to gain prominence.

This brings us to the absence of media strategy and clarity of the desired outcomes, i.e. what change we seek as a result of media work: raised awareness, increased supply of alternative information, improved journalist standards or a change in attitudes towards the past?

Bosnia-Herzegovina/ Regional

Relevance

The focus in BiH is exclusively on DwP, but it was hard to establish a link between DwP and potential for conflict in BiH at present. It is also hard to identify when the past would be 'dealt with' to turn the page. At present, there is no policy on national reconciliation or a public discourse taking place. The evaluation questions the exclusive focus on DwP in BiH, as it contains the danger of keeping society in the past without moving on, unless DwP is linked to reconciliation. The workshop respondents in BiH found it difficult to name what would satisfy the demand for justice and allow closure, and appeared not to have thought in these terms before. They expressed that:

- According to surveys, 83% say that past is part of their daily life;
- No reconciliation is possible without justice done;
- New generations learn different versions of history, and the past exacerbates the divides;
- There is no winner – each side feels a victim.

Engagement was found to be supply-driven. UNDP and OSCE projects are particularly so, making the stakeholders to play along a foreign-designed scenario. The exception is work with the direct beneficiaries, such as families of missing persons and those who lived through traumatic experiences during the war. Still, some of their needs are hard to relate to peacebuilding. Relevance of OSCE history project to peacebuilding is very indirect, as it appears an education standards' programme.

Efficiency

Funding allocation in BiH for the projects under evaluation, 2010 - 2012:

¹¹ One even does not read the premium subscription material, although it is paid for.

Dealing with the Past
Humanitarian Demining

873,966 CHF¹²
1,309,841 CHF

The overall efficiency of BiH operation is fairly limited, with the exception of demining which is on target, assistance to the victims of torture and BIRN.

DNA identification by the ICMP is a high-profile, pioneering initiative that produced a visible effect in the past which continues to date. It reached impressive quantitative results on missing persons' identification and made advances in development of *know how*. At the same time, it is a costly undertaking, since DNA identification is more expensive than traditional methods, but has been politically important, especially for the Srebrenica case. Its continuous efficiency cannot be ascertained given that fewer new cases are emerging and the point is nearing when large-scale international commitment would be hard to justify.

Based on the available data, it is hard to judge whether a transfer outside BiH would increase efficiency. ICMP is adamant that no handover of the DNA database to the Missing Persons' Institute is possible and the federal government will not be allowed access to information as it would use it as a criminal records' database. How to maintain this given the planned withdrawal in September 2013 is unclear. The evaluator was presented with a four-option' strategy, but could not establish what exactly was being proposed. Exit strategy was found intangible and ICMP ambition appears in mid-air.

The biggest concerns over efficiency are OSCE History project and UNDP Transitional Justice Strategy (TJS). OSCE has been supported for three years since 2009. Switzerland contributes to a multiple-donor funded project, so has little control over it. Typically for an international organisation, OSCE implementation is expensive. The project is significantly behind schedule as it only reached the Output 2. The main Output 3 that concentrates on capacity building for introducing new methods into history teaching, is yet to begin, to be completed, at least in theory, by the end of 2013, which does not appear a realistic plan. The initial project document underwent change in terms of reducing the ambition and scope, tailoring proposed intervention to activities. Achievement was characterised as 'nobody has walked out – yet.'

UNDP TJS has been supported by Switzerland since 2006 and is co-funded by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) UNDP. The Swiss also provided expertise. TJS fell victim to a changed political course in RS, signalled by the election of the new president and a developing apprehension of being drawn into a justice and persecution process, with potentially adverse consequences. Introduction of a civil service Ethics Code, which public officials were at a loss how to interpret, confirmed the resurgence of patriotic values. The strategy adoption has been deadlocked on the highest political level since March 2011, with no progress in sight.

The TJS Expert Group did not have leverage over the RS authorities to employ in the deteriorating climate, or committed stakeholders in Banja Luka to explain that the Strategy was not a threat. When TJS ran into initial difficulties, there was no attempt at quiet diplomacy and neither civil society partners from RS nor UNDP Banja Luka office were mobilised to rectify the situation. UNDP preferred to wait and then sent international staff to negotiate with the RS authorities, but found no rapport. Subsequent attempts at the same tactic brought the same result, while the RS position became entrenched. A UNDP-

¹² Including support for ICMP DNA-led identification system which covers other countries as well.

organised roundtable to promote the Strategy in Banja Luka ended in sabotage, when media and local civil society organisations backed by the entity authorities were mobilised against the UNDP intervention, which had no counter-tactic. In April 2012 a RS member of Parliament mentioned privately to a member of the TJS Expert Group that ‘the Strategy will never be adopted in RS.’ Unlike in Kosovo, where the HSA is able to intervene directly if initiatives face difficulties, the UNDP operation was outside of the HSA remit.

UNDP’s response was to adopt the TJS at Brcko District to create a demonstration effect. The district is populated by about 60,000 people, has no ability to pass laws and establish a truth commission. It can only allocate premises, appoint liaison persons and make statements. The other tactic is to publicly promote the draft TJS, but it is applicable only in the Federation. Adoption of the TJS in the Federation alone is not an option as this is likely to create a divisive effect. UNDP offered no practical steps which can be undertaken in an absence of a formal strategy.

The results show an insufficient return on investment since 2006. UNDP does not appear to have sufficient credibility on the RS side to be able to turn the situation around, or a recognition of how its power-holding operates. The envisaged high-level visits and negotiations by the UN leadership may encounter an unresponsive interlocutor. It is believed that continuation of funding is not likely to bring different results.

Effectiveness

NPA has been efficient in the use of funds, but general progress towards human security is limited. The federal state massively lags behind its commitments, - in 2012 only 8.6 km² was cleared instead of 30 km², - and it is estimated that it will take 40 to 50 years to fulfil the international obligations. National funding is pledged, but not allocated, commercial companies compete against each other and ITF which was intended as a clearing house, is regarded as contributing to the problem and the costs.¹³ NPA is at the exit strategy and would not see through full effectiveness of the demining operation, unless it manages to build the national capacities up to the level that they are able to take the job over.

Adoption of the Missing Persons Law and establishment of the Missing Persons Institute was an achievement for ICMP, but since little is done by the state to implement it, this was a qualified success. Capacity-building of national counterparts started, but proceeds with caution. ICMP was effective in DNA identification and assured ‘The Right to Know’ in BiH and in the region more widely. It established productive cooperation with regional counterparts, including in Serbia and Croatia, but feels it has been less effective in dealing with EULEX because of external factors, such as the reserved power of the international community in Kosovo and partial transfer to the local institutions.

The CVT project on ‘Education and training of judiciary staff and multidisciplinary assistance to war torture victims, current and potential witnesses before the Courts’ is co-financed by the Oak Foundation and UN Fund for Victims of Torture. The strength of the project is in much needed professional development for judges and prosecutors in war trials, but support is too fresh, and its declared goals do not quite match the outputs. CVT’s own research does not identify burn-out syndrome while conclusions from its raw data contradict CVT’s qualitative assessment. Only small engagement with RS actors was traced, and more attention to it is needed in the next phase. Psychosocial support is appreciated by war-

¹³ 3% administrative fee is charged on the Swiss funding to NPA.

affected individuals, - as well as help with their health and social problems. However, the interviews did not confirm the connection between received assistance and court testimonies, although CVT provided post-court support. Overall, the willingness to testify is decreasing, and the Swiss efforts are concerned with how to sustain it.

Support for ICMP family associations has been long-standing and was aimed to promote them as agents of change in DwP, conveying legitimacy and respectability to them. Indeed, they took part in advocacy campaigns, but these were led by ICMP, and received small capacity-building grants to improve self-sufficiency and build themselves up as NGOs. Associations mostly consist of middle aged and elderly rural women with limited education and are monoethnic. It is uncertain whether they have sufficient cross-ethnic solidarity to bridge the divide. ICMP acknowledged that without continuous donor support some associations were likely to cease to exist. There is a risk of manipulation by politicians of these grass-root civil groups, if left on their own.

Effort to create agents of change out of these groups may have been overambitious. Achievement of self-sufficiency is doubtful: the interviewed leaders inquired how the evaluator can help to get more donor funds; while one woman searching for her son said that she did not know if she would continue when she finds him. This is a type of a development project where a traditional logframe approach with verifiable indicators suits best.

Both ICMP projects raise questions regarding sustainability, as the future of family associations is uncertain and building capacities of the Missing Persons' Institute, to which ICMP intends to hand over, has been slow. There is little desire on the state level to take over DwP issues over a long term and a sense that it can be outsourced to the international community, so that local politicians do not have to engage with uncomfortable issues.

Gender

Gender issues are found to be sufficiently addressed by the Strategy and the country-level interventions. A Gender lens is applied at the project design phase, when HSAs help the implementers to prepare proposals and encourage thinking along gender lines in their partners.

That said, gender is not equally relevant for every project and it does not make sense to artificially look for gender where it does not apply, e.g. in demining. However, there are star examples, especially in addressing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). BIRN is at the forefront with its 'Gender Justice' project. It interviews those who suffered rape and seeks to achieve recognition for them as victims. There is no law in Kosovo that covers war rapes. The aim is to empower women to come forward: after one woman lost her case in court, it worked as a cold shower for others. HLC in Kosovo seeks to shed light on rape cases that occurred during the war, and also to dispel exaggerated government figures that '20,000 Albanian women were raped by Serb forces.' CVT in BiH provides direct assistance to SGBV victims.

CIG encountered an initial problem how to ensure representation of women without decreasing the quality of the Dialogue participants, as in practice most influential people in a conservative society are men. It came up with an idea of a women-only roundtable, which proved successful beyond expectations and became a permanent strand of the Dialogue. An example was given that it took half an hour for women to come up with a practical

recommendation, while the mainstream group debated the same issue for two days before being able to work out a proposal.

D4D measured gender mainstreaming throughout the electoral process, has organisational policy on gender and successfully defended women's quotas. In BiH the majority of direct project beneficiaries, e.g. CVT and ICMP family associations, are women. Most of the senior staff among partners in BiH are women. BIRN is largely a women-led organisation where men are in minority and in mostly junior positions: 'I feel like I am working in a women's organisation,' replied one BIRN respondent when asked about gender.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The most distinct HSD asset is the expertise available among its staff, experts and secondees, and a thoughtful and professional approach to peacebuilding. Other distinctions stem from this core strength: the choice and nourishment of its partners, flexibility, readiness to step in with expertise and guidance without undermining the partners' independence, and willingness to engage with difficult and controversial issues, if a situation requires so. These assets transpire most when the initiatives are directly implemented through NGO partners, but tend to be weaker when it comes to international organisations, such as UNDP, OSCE and ICO.

The outcomes which can be directly attributed to HSD support are in Kosovo and include the CIG political dialogue, HLC Non-Formal education and the establishment of the IMWG. External factors and too ambitious aims affected progress in the electoral reform process. Altogether the impact of Swiss-supported media on wider society is hard to judge, and the evaluation was unable to come to a definitive conclusion. Lack of a media strategy influences operations: BIRN project in BiH is detached from the BIRN BTJ project financed via Belgrade.

Weak central state and strong entity institutions, lack of political will and fundamental lack of trust undermine effectiveness of all efforts beyond grass-root level in BiH. Effective projects that require government engagement are not feasible, such as constitutional reform, and there are no entry points for an outside intervention, until fundamental questions of statehood are resolved by domestic actors. Several projects in BiH were found to be heavily supply-driven and while a need for them might exist, demand has not been created, posing questions about relevance, efficient use of resources and local ownership. An exclusive focus on DwP does not advance peacebuilding agenda in sufficient measure.

It is recommended to

1. Streamline thematic issues in the future Strategy and conduct periodic checks on how intervention priorities align with the evolving conflict and context. Developing a sound and evidence-based ToC is one useful way to improve design. Reorganisation of the projects along larger programmatic directions, i.e. state-building that could include political dialogue, democratic process and minority rights, and *DwP* to embrace transitional justice, reconciliation, and missing persons, is one way of doing so. Demining is not part of *DwP*, as HSD understands it, and is a separate component.

2. Introduce benchmarks to assess progress and step up monitoring efforts. Peacebuilding programmes and policy goals tend to be rather vague, while clearer targets related to the context can improve assessment of progress. Prioritisation of the projects in importance would enable HSD to select which to accompany directly, where to rely on internal monitoring systems and for which to invite external consultants. HSD should invest in the capacity of the implementers to produce high-quality reports and be more demanding of standards, urging to account for pitfalls. Comments on the reports should be provided where necessary.
3. Bring local partners closer in strategy development and steering by involving them in consultation and conflict analysis process, and by creating synergies nationally and regionally. HSA or visiting HSD staff can conduct reflective workshops with the partners on a regular basis.
4. Address the influence of Kosovo status on Swiss policy and how the future strategy proposes to treat it. Switzerland's chairing of the OSCE in cooperation with Serbia can be an opportunity to foster the rapprochement between Pristina and Belgrade. All efforts in this direction should be enhanced, as Switzerland has real assets to bring to the OSCE.
5. Renew secondments to the OSCE in Kosovo to make the best use of the Swiss Expert Pool and aim at key positions at the organisation for information exchange and influencing. Define priority sectors for international secondments where Switzerland has strong assets to bring, e.g. DwP, political dialogue and minority issues. Build up and promote candidates strategically, with an emphasis on middle to senior appointments. Make the deployed experts more aware of the Swiss-funded initiatives in their countries and discuss their future career plans.
6. Discuss how the resources available at OSCE can supplement the ongoing efforts to improve elections in Kosovo. OSCE chairmanship can be an opportunity to form a larger international coalition for electoral reform. Even though OSCE ODIHR cannot be institutionally involved because of the status issue, it may be possible to solicit its expertise. Assess if 'Euro-Atlantic integration' is an issue that Switzerland feels compelled to promote, even if this constitutes a DCAF priority.
7. Develop a strategy of engagement with media and formulate outcomes on how media work should affect change. Streamline the current projects; assess whether contribution to *Sense* is essential, whereas BIRN already does ICTY reporting – and so does IWPR, - or the niche is saturated. Support for BIRN should continue, but within a framework of a unified programme.

No major revision is needed in Kosovo, as the Strategy is firmly on track and the progress in political dialogue even exceeds expectations. It is recommended to

8. Scale up HLC work in Non-Formal education and link it to the IMWG and with BIRN, where suitable, especially in fostering regional cooperation.
9. Reserve funds to be able to respond to emerging opportunities which CIG political dialogue may bring.

10. Invite international expertise in electoral process to help D4D to revamp its strategy; otherwise the D4D project runs into a risk of producing high-quality outputs that do not lead to substantial outcomes. A consultation among international actors to establish one strategy and a message to the government is essential for D4D efforts to be a part of a larger process before the next elections.

Scaling down in BiH is recommended, as an exclusive focus on DwP is unlikely to advance peacebuilding in a great measure and entry points for reconciliation are few.

This will help to overcome a certain fragmentation of the Strategy at the country level. In case the aspiration is to stay present in BiH, the future strategy has to reflect what can be done to help concrete people in their concrete environments. This can be links between intelligentsia from all sides who can start talking about reconciliation through non-political means, such as culture or keeping links between young people alive. BIRN can be a potential partner as it has state-wide coverage, but the Swiss strategy would need to develop trusted partnerships in RS. It is recommended to:

11. Halt support for the UNDP TJS as continuous efforts are unlikely to deliver better results. Consider funding to OSCE only after substantial modifications, in consultation with other funders of the History project. Currently, it has no pronounced link to peacebuilding and an unrealistic implementation plan.
12. Abstain from stop-gap funding to ICMP, as it is likely to withdraw the incentive to make strategic choices. ICMP as a leading institution in DNA identification deserves international support, but Switzerland is unable to shoulder the burden alone, or provide it with an international status ICMP aspires to. ICMP has to present a clear strategy with a time-bound action plan on how to move forward for the donors to agree on cost-sharing. The evaluation endorses the decision to withdraw from funding ICMP family associations and wishes that a more robust exit strategy was designed at an earlier stage.
13. Continue support for the Centre for Victims of Torture. Professional development and reflection for judges, prosecutors and other members of law-enforcement agencies can be scaled up, with an effort to include RS participants. Meetings between victims of torture associations deserve assistance, but expectations on their wider impacts should be modest. Quantitative research does not make a strong case, and would require international expertise to put it right. It is best replaced by a simpler format to monitor the impact of training and psycho-social support.
14. Support NPA in demining and in assistance for building national capacities. Expectations have to be realistic: increased human security for the affected population is advancing slowly and the Swiss contribution makes a limited impact.

It is recommended to scale up involvement in Serbia, as it is the key regional country, a pole of cultural attraction and crucial for several initiatives underway. Enhanced engagement in Macedonia is also relevant because the situation in the country is fluid and can take different political trajectories. Switzerland potentially can be effective in making a difference and achieving results, if it acts at a right stage. It is already one of the main bilateral partner of Macedonia in terms of the volume of technical assistance. Switzerland has assets to bring: a history of engagement in the country, familiarity with the context and the *know how* of political dialogue and power sharing. Still, much depends on entry points that have to be explored and identified. This would be labour-intensive for the Kosovo-based HSA and

require support by the Swiss ambassador in Macedonia. The options include for HSA to reduce accompaniment for Kosovo projects, - problematic given that CIG dialogue has reached a crucial stage, - for HSD in Bern to take the lead directly or to bring in an external consultant, as has been done with regards to the DwP adviser.

Annex I LIST OF RESPONDENTS

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- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Hermann Jost | HSD (by phone) |
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Kosovo

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| 10. Sallova Ahmet | Kosovo Mine Action Centre |
| 11. Naim Rashiti | International Crisis Group, CIG p-t |
| 12. Zeqiri Adrian | ECMI Kosovo |
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|----------------------|------|
| 1. Igric Gordana | BIRN |
| 2. Radenkovic Marina | BIRN |

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 1. Lokvancic Haris | Programme Officer, Swiss Embassy |
| 2. Boys Adam | International Commission on Missing Persons |
| 3. Holliday Matthew | International Commission on Missing Persons |

4. Kuljuh Klaudia	International Commission on Missing Persons
5. Mitrovic Smilja	Association of Missing Persons of Rep Srpska
6. Miodrag-Bozen Mirjana	Serbia's Association of Missing Persons
7. Paripovic Sanela	UNDP
8. Osorio Thomas	UNDP
9. Tadic Slobodan	UNDP
10. Hadzic-Hurem Maida	UNDP
11. Alexandra Latic	Helsinki Committee of Rep Serpska
12. Subotic Vedrana	Helsinki Committee of Rep Serpska
13. Cehajic-Clancy Sabina	Sarajevo School of Science and Technology
14. Operta Admir	Brcko district office at the Council of Ministers
15. Hadzimurtezic Dujia	Centre for Victims of Torture
16. Salcic Dubravka	Centre for Victims of Torture
17. Jankovic Aleksandra	OSCE
18. Gridinsky Andrew	OSCE
19. Batić Goran	OSCE Project Assistant
20. Lisica Darvin	Norwegian People's Aid, Head
21. Balić Amela	NPA Operations Manager and Deputy Head
22. Nezirovic Amila	BIRN
23. Music Zlatan	BIRN
24. Latal Srecko	International Crisis Group
25. Tabakovic Almir	Centre for Judicial & Prosecutorial Training
26. Comic Adela	Centre for Judicial & Prosecutorial Training
27. Račić Fata	CVT beneficiary
28. Kodžaga Nafila	CVT beneficiary

Annex II List of documents used

Project Documents

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Talia Wohl
 Marie Ursula Kind
 Alexander Hug
 Isabelle Peter
 Lukas Walther (2 reports)
 Mengistu Arefaine

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KOFF

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Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA

Politische Direktion, PD

Abteilung Menschliche Sicherheit:

Frieden, Menschenrechte, Humanitäre Politik,
Migration

Berne, 21 December 2012

**Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of the Human Security Division Programme in
South-Eastern Europe, 2010-2012**

1. Background, Context

The Human Security Division (HSD) Programme in South-Eastern Europe, a priority region for the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, is based on the mid-term Strategy for the Swiss Peace Policy Programme in South Eastern Europe 2010 – 2012 (Strategy). In accordance with this strategy, the HSD programme supports and implements activities which aim to achieve the following four strategic goals:

- 1) Confidence building: is a prerequisite for state building, for the discussion of contested issues, and for the development of democratic processes. Confidence building and State building are dealt in a constructive way in the region with broad participation of all relevant stakeholders and with constructive dialogue on divisive issues. HSD contributes with a set of activities towards the achievement of this goal, including facilitation and promotion of inter-ethnic and political dialogue.
- 2) Power Sharing: as a means to manage diversity and to include minorities in decision making processes.

Activities under this goal are undertaken with the aim to promote political participation and power-sharing mechanisms. HSD also contributes to capacity and institution building, including through the secondment of staff to multilateral/international organisations.
- 3) Dealing with the Past (DwP) / Transitional Justice (TJ): as a means to tackle the root causes and consequences of the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the past and to lay the basis for the rule of law. DwP and TJ are dealt with in a holistic way in the region by governmental and non-governmental actors. HSD contributes substantially to mechanisms of DwP, including at multilateral / governmental level. Exchanges on legacy issues are facilitated as well as advice provided.
- 4) Mine Action: HSD supports demining activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo in a view to improve human security (and socio-economic development). Furthermore, this engagement contributes to the fulfilment of the obligations under the Ottawa-Convention.

The geographic focus of the programme is on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while regional projects ensure the inclusion of other countries in the Western Balkans. Thematically, these regional projects have the overarching themes of DwP and Confidence Building / Political Dialogue. In BiH, most of the projects tackle DwP issues, while in Kosovo the focus is mainly on

projects advancing political dialogue and integration of minority communities in political life (power sharing). Mine action projects are supported in BiH and Kosovo.

From 2010 – 2012, the HSD allocated a budget of CHF 9.7 Mio for the implementation of the South-Eastern Europe Programme (2010: CHF 3.3 Mio; 2011: CHF 3.5 Mio; 2012: CHF 2.9 Mio). Per year, an average of 40 projects was implemented. The programme is supported by one Programme Officer (100%) in Berne, 1 Human Security Adviser (100%) in Pristina, Kosovo, 1 Human Security Adviser (30%) in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 2 programme officers in Pristina and Sarajevo respectively. 1 Regional Dealing with the Past Adviser contributes with expertise to the DwP aspects of the programme. Additional human resources are made available to the programme by the Swiss Expert Pool through secondments of experts to multilateral / international organisations.

2. Basis, objective and purpose of the evaluation

a) Basis

The mid-term Strategy for the Swiss Peace Policy Programme in South Eastern Europe 2010 – 2012 will expire at the end of 2012. Before drafting the new strategy 2014 – 2016, the HSD plans to conduct an independent external evaluation of the programme, covering the three-year period 2010 – 2012, which should be **summative**. The evaluation should determine the extent to which programme activities contributed to the achievement of the strategic goals. The evaluation should also be **formative**. HSD will take into considerations the findings of the evaluation, including lessons learnt, for the new strategy for 2014 – 2016.

b) Objective

The independent evaluation of the HSD programme in South-Eastern Europe has the following objectives:

- To analyse the **relevance** of the HSD programme, taking into account Swiss competencies, instruments and comparative advantage, in its contribution to conflict transformation in the thematic areas of DwP, Power Sharing and Confidence Building as well as mine action in Kosovo and BiH.
- To **identify and assess** the performance of the programme **at the level of outcomes**. The aim is to determine whether outcomes can be directly attributed to HSD-supported projects in South-Eastern Europe.
- To provide **recommendations** on the direction to take and possible changes to be reflected in the strategy 2014 – 2016

c) Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide forward-looking recommendations and lessons learnt in the implementation of the three-year peace policy program in South-Eastern Europe. The HSD will use the evaluation's findings to plan its future engagement in the region. Specifically, the findings will assist in the determination whether the focus on Dealing with the Past, Power Sharing and Political Dialogue as well as mine action shall be carried on in the next strategy.

3. Questions for the Evaluation

The evaluation is supposed to answer questions according to the following criteria:

Objective	Criteria	Questions
Appropriateness consideration and strategic alignment	Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Are the programme activities in the field of Dealing with the Past, Political Dialogue and Power Sharing as well as mine action relevant to the needs of the societies in South-Eastern Europe? ➤ Was it relevant to focus on DwP in BiH and on Power Sharing and Political Dialogue in Kosovo? ➤ Was it relevant to focus on mine action? ➤ Does Switzerland have added values in these domains? ➤ Were the instruments and strategies used appropriate to achieve the outcomes? ➤ To what extent were experts seconded by the Swiss Expert Pool to international/multilateral organisations and embassies relevant to the achievement of the strategic goals?
Output and Outcome Identification	Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Have the strategic goals been achieved through the programme activities? ➤ To what extent can generated outcomes be attributed to HSD-supported projects?
Cost Accountability	Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Were available funds economically used? (input / output) ➤ Were there sufficient resources available, including human resources, at the Desk South-Eastern Europe in Bern, as well in BiH and Kosovo to manage the portfolio? ➤ Did the project partners work efficiently and according to common practice / state of the art? ➤ Was the monitoring and steering of the programme and the projects efficiently organized?
	Cooperation / Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Did HSD find the appropriate project partners for the implementation of the programme? ➤ Have appropriate (national / local) capacities been built?
	Gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Where gender aspects appropriately reflected in the programme?

4. Procedure and Organisation

a) Requirements to the team of experts

The evaluation team must be independent, have sound experience and a proven record of knowledge of the thematic issues and in the geographic area. Moreover the members of the team should be familiar with the post-conflict situation in South-Eastern Europe and they should be aware of the challenges arising from the fragile situation in the region.

The team should be composed of one team leader and one evaluator. The evaluation team should be fluent in English and if possible in local languages in the region (Bosnian/Serbian and/or Albanian).

b) Approximate Workload

Activity	Team Leader	Second Evaluator
Study of documentation and Inception Report	3 days	1 day
Evaluation mission (incl. travel)	7 days	7 days
Drafting of preliminary report	2 days	1 day
Debriefing	1 day	
Drafting of final report	1 days	
Presentation of final report	1 day	
TOTAL	15 days	9 days

c) Proposed Time Frame

Activity	Deadline
Offer by the expert	January 14, 2013
Decision-making	January 21, 2013
Study of documents and Inception Report	February 15, 2013
Mission to the region	March 15, 2013
Drafting of report and debriefing in Berne	April 15, 2013
Final report	April 22, 2013

5. Reporting

The evaluator is expected to deliver a technical and financial offer comprising the important elements of an evaluation.

Thereafter, the evaluation team is expected to deliver an inception report, based on the present ToRs. The inception report is supposed to contain the theory of change and the provided evaluation's methodology. The evaluation shall be carried out in accordance with the evaluation standards of the OECD-DAC and the Swiss Evaluation Society (Seval).

The evaluation report, written in English, is to be delivered after the completion of the evaluation, and should not exceed 10 pages, plus annexes. The evaluation report should include the following:

- Executive Summary
- Evaluation Methodology
- Findings
- Recommendations and lessons learnt
- Annexes

6. Other Information

The documents to be provided to the evaluation team consist of the Strategy 2010 – 2012, project proposals of selected projects, interim and final reports of selected projects, HSD internal credit proposals.

The contacts at the HSD involved in the evaluation are:

Steering Committee:

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Annex IV Gender Appraisal

Activity/ Criteria	levance	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Impact	Sustainability
CIG Dia	Yes	absolutely	Yes	felt	Dia-related
D4D Elect	Yes	partially	Yes	quotas	unknown
BIRN reg	Yes	overdone	Yes	In SGBV	unknown
HLC	Yes	unsure	Yes	unknown	unknown
Halo Trust	No				
ICMP 1	Yes	Yes	Appears so	felt	no
ICMP 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	unlikely	unlikely
TJS UNDP	Yes	No	No	No	No
OSCE Hist	unclear	No	Fair	No	unknown
BIRN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Maybe	unlikely
CVT	Yes	Yes	Yes	individual	unlikely
NPA	No				
Secondments	Yes	Yes	Position dependent	unknown	Depends on overall policy

Annex V WHAT PEOPLE SAY

Reflections on CIG dialogue, in participants' own words:

Serb Journalist

It is difficult to speak to those people whom you know very well. We used to share the value and the country, and now assume too much from each other. This is a nationalism of small differences, that's why it is so entrenched. We exaggerate differences, we need to polarise to bring evidence that the opponent is so bad. Now we established two parallel political entities. I feel the gulf of separation, as I no longer live in Pristina. I live in a village instead. I wonder what it is like to live in the city now. Many among Albanian intelligentsia sleep and Kosovo politicians do not want to have critical thinkers around them.

Alex's role is key: he created a platform for people from different political spectrum to discuss, managed to bring together a whole variety and enabled critical thinking. He inspires confidence, people trust him, he gives direction and is not scared of argument. This was a learning experience and his personality produced an impact on me. Norbert is also active with his inputs and his contributions are important: as neutral as Switzerland can be.

A core group of people was created. Developing papers was important in formation of the group on *how to become a part of the future*. This is the kind of a process that is really seeking solutions. Building conditions for peace is the most important outcome of the Dialogue. Our recommendations find way into public statements of the president of Serbia and other officials; they trickle into advisory and policy circles, gain momentum and create an atmosphere of expectation.

Serb politician

CIG has been the only process which understood the need to bring together those Serbs who participate in Kosovo institutions, those who do not, and Belgrade. This is a chance for those who cooperate with Kosovo institution to speak to those who defy them. Serbs become more realistic as a result. Serb leaders from the North never speak to Kosovo Albanian politicians outside of the Dialogue meetings. This started to produce an impact even on the hard-liners who previously stayed in isolation and only spoke to each other. They started to change their positions and a style of expression.

Working with the elites is the right approach, as we still have a top-down society and ordinary people listen to leaders. A gulf between 'us and them' is more felt among young generation: the youth is often more radical than the older people. Civil society and media are sometimes more radical than the politicians.

Success is due to Alex – he is the only person among internationals who understands relations between individuals and has a good sense of judgement.

Victims' Views on Justice Process, Sarajevo, CVT beneficiaries:

I cannot forget, even if all of them [perpetrators] were killed. I won't be satisfied because nobody can bring my family back. When I see trials on TV, I just switch it off, as I want to erase it from my memory.

There is no way to forgive and forget despite trials and convictions. Trials don't make a difference, as some of them continue to live among us. There is no need for trials. They can all let them go, as far as I am concerned.