

Inching Towards Stable Peace: The Role of SALW and Landmine Related Programs in Burundi



© Ananda S. Millard (Landmark for last demining operation in Burundi, left and weapon destruction workshop, right)

Report, November 1st, 2012

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Executive Summary

Background

The Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Human Security Division funded a number of initiatives in the field of Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW) and Landmines in Burundi between 2006 and 2010. In view of the efforts funded, the second inter-ministerial conference on the Geneva Declaration which took place in 2011 and the declaration by Burundi of its mine free status also in 2011, this evaluation was considered timely.

In the field of Human Security, the Swiss engagement focuses on the following pillars:

- Mediation, facilitation and democratic dialogue
- Transitional Justice (TJ)
- Human Rights
- SALW and demining¹

These pillars were evaluated in 2010 in a workshop setting by Swisspeace, a Bern based organisation. One conclusion from this evaluation was that the need to conduct an assessment of the activities in the field of SALW and of how/if programs in this field could lead to violence reduction particularly during the pre-election period in Burundi. In this way, the work by Swisspeace served to prompt the conduct of this evaluation. SALW is clearly one of the more recently introduced pillars as Switzerland holds a long-standing tradition in the field of mediation, facilitation and democratic dialogue, as well as in TJ and Human Rights. Hence, one issue discussed here has also been on how SALW can be integrated and/or synergised within/ along with the former pillars.

Additionally, the Swiss FDFA counts with three strategies, two public and one internal, to govern the work conducted in the field of Landmines and SALW in Burundi:

1. A strategy that governs work in the region: Strategie du DFAE pour la Region des Grands Lacs 2009–2012 (Internal Documentation);
2. A strategy that governs work in the field of SALW: the International Combat Against Illicit Trade in and Abuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons Switzerland's strategy 2008-2011 (Public);
3. And a strategy (two different documents covering the period under evaluation) governing the work in the field of landmines: The Mine Action Strategy of the Swiss Confederation for the Period 2008 to 2011 and The Mine Action Strategy of the Swiss Confederation for the Period 2012-2015 (Public).

The efforts funded in Burundi included support for civilian disarmament, support for the formulation of legislation, stockpile destruction and safe storage; as well as landmine surveying, demining and building a national demining capacity.

¹ Additionally, specific support for the Burundi Configuration of the Peace Building Commission (PBC) was provided. This is not an overall FDFA Human Security pillar of work, however. Factsheet: Great Lakes Region, Human Security Division.

Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology

This evaluation aimed to both provide summative findings on the activities conducted in Burundi, as well as provide some formative guidance regarding what can and should be done by the Human Security Division in the field of SALW and Landmines in the future not only in Burundi or the great Lakes Region but also elsewhere else around the globe. To this end, the work was anchored to both delineating the *theory of change* for each field (i.e., Landmines and SALW) as well as examining, by following the results chain, the relevance, the effectiveness, the efficiency and sustainability of the efforts undertaken. In addition, cross cutting issues such as the role of Switzerland as a donor, gender factors, coordination, as well as the need/usefulness of a regional approach are also examined. The evaluation utilised documentation review as well as key interviews, an online survey and field visits/observation as the key approaches to arrive at the findings presented.

Evaluation Team

A team of three Nordic Consulting Group consultants carried out the evaluation; two team members conducted the research and write-up while one focused on quality assurance of the deliverables. The evaluation took place between May and July 2012.

Findings and Conclusions

Overall, the evaluation found that the projects funded had met all the outputs and outcomes delineated in the respective project proposals. However, the theory of change which included for both SALW and Landmine efforts an element of support for broader peace consolidation was in general, not achieved. This is not because these types of efforts (e.g., SALW and Landmines) inherently cannot support peace consolidation more broadly, rather because in order to do so they require a more nuanced understanding of what and how peace can be consolidated.

Still, the efforts in the field of SALW did have very positive outcomes in improving the security of weapons held in police armouries which included some infrastructural support and installing gun racks; in addition to collecting weapons through civilian disarmament as well as collecting obsolete weapons in the domain of the security forces, and by destroying some of the obsolete surplus weapons. A shortcoming here was the lack of capacity building that could have ensured the ability of the Burundian government to manage their stocks appropriately in the future.

In the field of landmines, the Swiss funding enabled Burundi to declare itself mine free as per the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty (APMBC). The work in Burundi included surveying- but most recently, the clearance of the last known mine fields, and the establishment of a local capacity to respond to mine problems in the future. The “mine free” declaration is now disputed. Besides that issue, the Swiss funding did build capacity locally, and hence, left behind a contingent of trained and equipped staff that can meet future demining challenges.

Also notable the fact that Switzerland is consistently identified as a flexible, responsive and engaged donor. These characteristics are regarded as very positive ones which should be capitalized on to ensure that future endeavours have the best possible chance to maximise their respective impacts.

Recommendations

These recommendations have been identified by the virtue of their relevance to the work in the Human Security field, generally and SALW and Landmines, specifically. They are not usually intended for exclusive use in Burundi or the Great Lakes Region, but have been identified as having relevance elsewhere around the globe as well.

- Given the limited funding available for Burundi at the Human Security Division, and generally within the Human Security Division for SALW, the FDFA should consider whether it wants to commit more substantial resources to SALW as this field requires, in order to make an impact on the ground at the programmatic level; or limiting their funding in the field of SALW in favour of other areas (i.e., the first three pillars of focus within Human Security). Another opportunity would be to contribute to a small component of an otherwise large programme where funding is largely available (i.e., work as part of a consortia of donors). Although, the latter option may be ill suited for the FDFA's Human Security Division and more akin to the approaches that can be taken by the SDC. Generally, contributing to smaller programmatic initiatives which are not part of a long-term holistic engagement are not likely to deliver the outcomes and impacts desired by the current theory of change.
- The FDFA should clearly map and problematise the *theory of change* of projects prior to funding them to ensure the projects are in fact able to meet their ultimate goals.
- If the FDFA wants to contribute to SALW without increasing their current budgets and types of engagement (i.e., limited resources), the FDFA should explore their ability to engage in the creation of joint donor funds which would enable them to contribute to SALW issues in a comprehensive way while not having to carry the full financial burden of long term projects.
- The FDFA should enter into a clear agreement/commitment with the recipient country outlining the obligations of the recipient country and the Swiss commitment prior to making any support efforts that aim to enable countries to meet Article 5 obligations.
- The FDFA should ensure that all efforts that they fund, be they landmine or SALW related, have a clear approach to ensure sustainability such as clear plans for capacity building and a clear commitment from the recipient government to utilise the capacity built (i.e., including, financing the running costs of the capacity built once the funded project is finished).
- The FDFA should require that organisations they fund are active members of civil society at large and have a clear approach (i.e., written strategy) on how to engage with other actors to ensure that their efforts serve to further impact Human Security, generally.
- The FDFA should utilise the research (and operational work) that is conducted with Swiss funding (e.g., GICHD and SAS) more actively. This should include the development of a forum where findings by the different organisations are presented to the relevant FDFA staff on a routine basis and/or where recipients of funding (e.g., GICHD, SAS) align their priorities with the relevant Swiss Strategies. The FDFA should request to be informed of the planned activities by the different institutions so that they are better able to benefit from the outputs. GICHD and SAS should be made aware of the other efforts funded by the FDFA and should be **actively encouraged** to engage with other FDFA partners (i.e., countries and organisations being funded). A system for an on-going dialogue and communication between the different agencies (i.e., FDFA-GICHD and FDFA-SAS) should be established. The ability to include the aforementioned issues into contractually binding mechanisms should be explored by the FDFA.
- The FDFA Human Security Division should discuss the GD with the SDC (and any other FDFA division as may be relevant). If all the parties agree to actively support

the GD in order to turn it into a dynamic process that plays a clear role in the discussion and operationalisation of armed violence reduction worldwide then the FDFA organically should ensure that all relevant projects are framed within the GD scope and utilise the GD as a starting platform. This will serve to legitimise both the project and the GD.

- The FDFA should ensure gender factors are included in a manner that approaches the subject in an innovative and catalytic way. Otherwise, the inclusion of gender may have no real impact at all. One way to identify innovative approaches could be the utilisation of the findings and capacity of the Gender Mine Action Program (GMAP). In the field of SALW there is very little evidence of how the gender issue can/should be integrated but this is a demonstration of the lack of knowledge and not a lack of relevance. Therefore, the FDFA should desist from requesting that token women be included into projects and instead require the organisations to be innovative in their inclusion of gender issues. Operator agencies receiving Swiss funding should be actively encouraged to utilize the GMAP as a resource in the field of gender, generally and gender inclusion, specifically.
- The FDFA should explore possibilities for regional support/activities, but these should be guided by the relevance of this type of approach for the theme (i.e., legislation vs. disarmament). Legislation, for example, can lend itself well to regional work while less to disarmament efforts, given the different dynamics governing SALW proliferation present in each country. Supporting the development of regional legislation in the field of SALW export/import/holding etc. can be one area where regional intervention would be positive but this should be weighed against the regional will and costs for such an effort. Similarly, GBV not linked to armed conflict can also be an area that benefits from regional interventions. Programmatic efforts in the field of disarmament, stockpile management, war related GBV, etc. for example will not benefit from a regional approach as the conditions in each country are too different to begin with. Regions where there are very different challenges in the neighbouring countries, may benefit from a common approach to legislation but with very different approaches to programmatic activities. Hence, this recommendation can also be applied outside the Great Lakes Region.

Acknowledgements

The team would like to thank the staff of FDFA, both at headquarters and in Burundi, for their time, assistance and openness in responding to our questions. In particular we would like to thank Lukas Probst, Cedrine Beney, and Oliver Hoehne for their efforts in identifying relevant respondents, facilitating interviews and generally enabling this evaluation.

We would also like to extend our gratitude to all staff from the FDFA generally, partner institutions, as well as institutions working in the general subject areas including various NGOs, UN agencies, and government representatives for taking the time to share with us their experiences, knowledge and perceptions regarding the situation in Burundi, generally and specifically, and on topics related to SALW and Landmines. Our specific gratitude is extended to Landry Ninteretse from Insight Conflict for his support in identifying key players in Burundian civil society; and the staff at MAG Burundi, particularly Julie Claveau, for facilitating our field visits and serving as door openers with the Armed Forces in Burundi.

The views, perceptions, and experiences from all those interviewed, and from survey respondents, proved invaluable in the conduct of this evaluation, however, the findings presented here are the views of the evaluation team and of its understanding of the data collected. Despite our best efforts to validate and check information, any errors found are our sole responsibility.

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Acronyms

AOAV	Action Against Armed Violence
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention
CENAP	Le Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits
CNAP	Commission Nationale Permanente Contre la Prolifération des ALPC
DCA	Danish Church Aid
DFID	Department for International Development
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FDN	Forces de Defense Nationale
FSD	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GD	Geneva Declaration
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GMAP	Gender Mine Action Program
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
PoA	Program of Action
PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SSD	Security Sector Development
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TJ	Transitional Justice
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

1.0 Introduction

Burundi is a country in the process of consolidating peace and establishing a stable government based on good governance principles. However, the degree to which this is actually being actively pursued by the government is a matter of debate. At the moment, the country has a government which is not accustomed to opposition, a very weak opposition with a limited presence within the country, a lack of free press, a civil society that is under threat, a high level of impunity, and a police force that is ill-trained and not accountable. Some argue that political instability is causing much of the violence (Human Rights Watch, 2012), but at the same time it is noteworthy that the general population appears to feel increasingly secure (CENAP/CREDESS-Bdi 2012).

In terms of armed violence and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in particular, the most recent thorough study on the issue dates back to 2007 (Geneva Declaration), yet while this data is clearly ageing, many of the conclusions of the report remain relevant today-The need for people to have security, the desire of the general population to be disarmed, and the high levels of impunity and misconduct practised by the police. While the report stresses that the Burundian people are not keen on having weapons in homes, the incomplete success of the civilian disarmament effort in 2009 showed that the general population was not too enthusiastic to relinquish all of its weapons either. This is largely attributed to the limited security felt by the public at the time.

In the field of landmines, Burundi was very mildly affected to begin with and Switzerland, following its strategic focus to support countries that are close to reaching their Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APMBC) obligations under Article 5 supported Burundi in achieving its mine-free status. This has since been tarnished by the latter country's subsequent declaration that they are, in fact, not mine free.

Generally, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) does not receive huge monetary allocations for Human Security programmatic engagements. Hence, they are constrained over the question of the type of efforts they can justifiably support. To this end, this evaluation explores the ability of Swiss FDFA in achieving their goals given the relatively scarce funding. Assuming that both landmine and SALW initiatives generally require vast sums, the availability of funding and how best to yield benefits from the said funding is a key concern for the FDFA. This report focuses on both summative and formative findings with a view to not only assess the work conducted in Burundi, but also provide insight based on the Burundian experience into how the FDFA may best ensure a proportionally high degree of impact given their operational limitations (i.e., limited funding and limited presence on the ground) elsewhere in the world.

This report includes 8 Sections. In addition to this brief Introduction: Section 2 focuses on the methodology; Section 3 introduces the SALW issue including the *theory of change* and both summative and formative findings along the result chain; Section 4 emulates Section 3 but turns its focus to landmines; Section 5 focuses on general cross-cutting issues, and Section

6 is on general conclusions; Lessons learned with a formative finding aim are introduced in Section 7; and Section 8 provides recommendations.

2.0 Methodology

This evaluation was conducted between May 3rd and July 4th, 2012 by a team of three consultants: Dr. Ananda S. Millard, Ph.D. and Sylvere Nsengiyumva as the Core Team and Nora Ingdal from NCG headquarters as the Quality Assurer. The study included a field visit to Burundi between May 14th and 25th and utilised four main methodological tools:

Documentation review: Both project and general documentation, government strategies, UN summary reports and research documents were reviewed. A detailed list of the documents reviewed is available in the bibliography.

Interviews: A total of 45 interviews were conducted over the study period: 27 of these interviews were conducted in person in Burundi during the field visit, and the remaining interviews were conducted over the phone, via Skype or in person.² A full list of interview respondents can be found in Annex 3. The interviews, which were semi-structured, generally followed the interview guidelines found in Annex 2.

Survey: An online dynamic survey was used to assess the perception of the work supported by Switzerland, as well as the perception of the country as a donor. This survey was sent to a combination of civil society in Burundi, as well as to international organisations. Additionally- some foundations, the UN staff, Swiss government representatives, and independent researchers were also targeted. The survey was fielded in both French and English and was also sent as an annex to an e-mail to enable people with poor internet connections to respond to the questions. The response characteristics of the survey are listed in the table below:

Comment	Data (n=23)
Addresses provided by the FDFA	16
Addresses provided by the evaluation team to supplement the FDFA addresses	62
Addresses that bounced	30
Total number of addresses which received the online survey	48
Number of these addresses which also received an email with the survey in an annex	10
Number of respondents that viewed the survey online	42
Number of partial responses to the survey	23
Number of completed responses to the survey	10
Number of respondents who belonged to an NGO	7
Number of respondents who belonged to a research Institution	2
Number of respondents who belonged to an	6

² One interview was conducted over email, as the other methods (i.e., phone and Skype) proved unsuccessful.

organisation that they chose to categorise as “other”	
Number of respondents based in Burundi	2
Number of respondents who identified at least one of their areas of work as “landmines”	12
Number of respondents who identified at least one of their areas of work as “SALW”	4
Number of respondents who identified at least one of their areas of work as “Human Security”	9
Number of respondents who identified at least one of their areas of work as “Human Rights”	6

The low response rates can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, it is important to note that the survey reached and was viewed by a number higher (n=42) than the targeted number (n=30) as was outlined in the inception report. Indeed, given that so many addresses were not verified it was important to send the survey to a number of respondents far greater than the number of responses expected. Secondly, the high number of ‘views’ was not coupled by an equally high number of responses. The reasons for this can be multiple. Firstly, respondents may have experienced technical difficulties. An attempt to minimise this problem was made by sending word versions of the survey to institutions based in Burundi. Secondly, the limited general knowledge of the work by the FDFa may have given respondents doubt over either the legitimacy of the survey or how their investment was in any way worth their while. Thirdly, the survey respondents may not have felt qualified enough to answer questions which would confirm the limited knowledge they have of interventions in the field of Swiss support, SALW and Landmines, unless they have been directly involved in this kind of activity. Given the low response rate, in future it may be wise to explore the option of preceding the survey with an official request from the donor, in this case the FDFa, which would add legitimacy and weight to the process.³ It is important to stress that the information from the survey has not been used as statistically representative, but rather as supplementary to data gathered through interviews.

Observations: The team also conducted a number of field visits, including a visit to a former mined area around the electrical pylons of Bubanza. The team also visited the stockpiled destruction workshop in the armed forces headquarters in Bujumbura. These visits were facilitated by MAG and conducted on the 16th of May, 2012.

Two factors proved challenging to the evaluation: first, that much of the staff involved in the projects have long left Burundi, making their identification difficult and; second, the low response rate of the survey yielded less responses than had been hoped. However, since the survey was utilised not to identify trends but rather to gather data from individuals who could not be interviewed given the time frame of the evaluation, the evaluation team feels that the responses obtained were valuable nonetheless.


³ This may be something which the FDFa may wish to do if funding surveys in future, and will be a practice introduced by the evaluation team in future use of surveys such as this one.

3.0 Small Arms and Light Weapons Projects: A Way towards Peace?

This section presents the theory of change that was intended for the work on SALW in Burundi, as well as the findings relevant to the work conducted. In order to facilitate the discussion some key background to the field of SALW in relation to violence reduction, peace consolidation and the like are presented first.

The OSCE describe the challenge of armed violence reduction as requiring a multi-pronged approach which responds to armed violence as a dynamic process (see Figure 1). The approach requires that those affected by violence be viewed as the main targets of a varied number of approaches which include: 1) Institutions and how those can be activated to promote violence reduction; 2) Perpetrators and an understanding of them within the given context (i.e., people, communities), and; 3) Instruments and the dynamics/factors that enable their availability, distribution, etc. This model for understanding armed violence makes the need for an approach that is more global, rather than focused on technical aspects and proficiency alone, important. The focus should then shift away from activities such as disarmament and weapon destruction as central, to examining how weapons and weapon destruction interacts with other factors in relation to facilitating/minimising violence in a given community.

Figure 1: OSCE Armed Violence Structural Factors



Source: OECD 2009. Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development


The OECD (2009) has also noted a growing link between political conflict and crime, and calls for the conceptual broadening on how to respond to the issue. Similarly, the Dutch government in their funding for work in the field of Security Sector Development (SSD) in Burundi has also taken an all-encompassing broad perspective to the work. The Dutch approach to SSD recognises the complexities involved in changing behaviour and institutions and how important it is to both change institutions in terms of procedures, but also 'institutional culture'. Furthermore, how these changes have to be supported by a wider communal understanding of the end goal. Indeed, the Dutch understanding of the Security Sector and how it can be reformed and supported has led to an eight year long commitment consisting of four two year phases which are broadly conceptualised, but which are designed as the program moves forward. It is an approach which is both holistic and adaptable. The Dutch approach is relevant here because it further corroborates that having a durable impact in the field of SSD or Security Sector Reform (SSR), peace building, and violence reduction is far more complex than dealing with a single aspect or factor that contributes to the SALW problem.

As will be shown in the following pages, the efforts funded by the Swiss FDFA were commendable and had an impact, but this impact may not have been as heartedly felt as would have been wished for, and may not have fulfilled the estimation of the theory of change which is presented in Section 3.1.

3.1 SALW: A Theory of Change

Identifying an adequate *theory of change* is an important component of successful programming. In this case, a number of characteristics to the different steps (see Figure 2) of the *theory of change* of the projects funded by the FDFA are discussed with a view of identifying the degree to which the assumptions underpinning the theory of change were accurate; and also in order to identify which components could/should be replicated and which ones should be revisited in the future.

Figure 2: Theory of Change



In Burundi, the expectation was that the SALW efforts funded by the FDFA would **contribute to the consolidation of peace**. Overall, the efforts in Burundi were identified in a somewhat haphazard way in so far as they were not part of an overall strategy to focus concerted effort on SALW in Burundi, but rather to fund relatively small initiatives which were part of either a larger initiative (UNDP) or intended to spearhead interest in a specific type of intervention (MAG). Indeed, the initiatives funded were identified not proactively, as an area of general Swiss interest, but rather reactively as a way to support initiatives which would otherwise be discontinued or not started due to the lack of funding. Moreover, pressure by the perceived danger of SALW given the upcoming elections (at the time) was an incentive for funding the initiatives. In both cases the initiatives were understood as falling within the broader Swiss goal of supporting the peace process, but this understanding was based on how they were presented by the operating agency and

not by a clear delineation of how the initiative would ensure that they would support peace consolidation. Hence, the discussions with operating agency staff showed that the focus of the interventions was very technical (i.e., less weapons inherently means a more stable environment) rather than a reflective approach to ensuring that the interventions met their goals. There was little evidence to suggest that there had been a clear link made between different areas of engagement such as the Geneva Declaration (GD) on one hand and the operational work on the other. Indeed, while funding for the GD armed violence mapping was also Swiss, there was no evidence that this effort was linked to, or utilized by, the other interventions as a norm. The only exception appeared to be the observatory of armed violence which was formerly kept by UNDP and was tied directly to the armed violence mapping, but which seems to be no longer updated now that the national authority has responsibility over it. The government's overall commitment to SALW, and the GD in particular, was not tangibly visible on the ground. Therefore, as is discussed below, it is difficult to determine the degree to which the Swiss intervention has actually met its overall goal.

The drivers utilised for the SALW efforts were comparatively limited but employed a substantial proportion of the funding available for Human Security issues in Burundi⁴ (see Section 3.2) and has as their ultimate goal peace consolidation. The conditions in Burundi were, and are, such that multiple factors have threatened sustainable peace. These include a very weak governance structure (i.e., fragile democracy, limited transparency, threat to human rights, encroachment of free press, etc.), extreme poverty and very limited provision of services (i.e., policing, effective judiciary, health care, education, etc.).

In the area of security, as relevant to SALW, the impact of this state of affairs is severe. Not only is Burundi's police system new (e.g., post-war), but it also faces challenges rooted in its structure and background. Including, for example, the fact that the police was, for political reasons, staffed with members of multiple parties to the conflict. This approach, while politically very much necessary, has led to a fragmented police with different and conflicting allegiances. Some even argue that the police has multiple leaders and leadership structures in which the unofficial trump the official chains of command. In addition, the background of current police officers (e.g., former combatants) does not lend itself to creating a solid force that is tasked with protecting the citizens of the country. Adding to the problem, the police are credited with abuse of power, utilising or renting out their weapons for illegal activities and, at the most extreme level, extra judicial executions. This contributes to a lack of trust of the police by the general population. Trust which is further eroded when accusations of police misconduct are not responded to with an effective judicial process, but rather most often the population must rely upon NGOs and the media to bring attention to the cases- all the while both NGOs and the media are under threat themselves. This has prompted the population to take their protection and, to some

⁴ According to an FDFA memo dated 28th August, 2012, the FDFA Human Security division's funded efforts in Burundi between 2006 and 2011 to the tune of 10 873 495 CHF .

extent, justice into their own hands. That in turn, has led to the keeping of weapons in the household and hence, rendered the efforts to disarm civilians less effective.

While civilian disarmament is an important component to peace building measures, in Burundi the effort was truncated by the aforementioned factors and hence, should not be understood as a success overall. Still, as Section 3.2 outlines, the work did yield result with the confiscation of weapons, but this was achieved while the people retained some weapons in the home. Some interviewed respondents also noted that the high compensation provided for weapons was, in a country as poor as Burundi, a key driver to the return of “surplus” or “obsolete” weapons held in the home (See Section 3.2). However, the survey conducted in the context of the Geneva Declaration (2007) suggested that most people were eagerly willing to be disarmed. Given the limited disarmament that took place thereafter, it appears that a lack of sense of security and effective judicial system were the two contributing factors to limiting the success of the intervention. An additional contributing factor could have been the very short life span (few weeks) of the disarmament process.

The aforementioned requires that our attention be turned to the question of **good governance** and how it relates to disarmament efforts. It is clear that in the absence of good governance, full civilian disarmament is difficult to achieve. Most interviewed seemed to agree that without good governance SALW interventions were largely futile. Additionally, some respondents to the survey noted that good governance was an essential stepping-stone. Only one respondent thought that disarmament could be effective even in the absence of good governance.⁵ Other respondents interviewed stressed that both efforts can, and should, occur in tandem. This requires a careful plan and a wider perspective which includes long term and concerted attention, and programming which would be able to deal with a wide range of issues. An additional factor worthy of note is that Switzerland has a remarkable experience in the area of human rights, negotiations, etc. and hence, could be in a very good position to actively support more traditional aspects of fostering good governance.

In terms of good governance and policing, it is also crucial to consider that establishing a working police force that meets the minimum requirements of good governance is not a quick or easy enterprise. In Burundi today, consolidating the police forces as professional and trustworthy is an effort that appears in urgent need of achieving the balance between being fast enough to ensure that the population do not become discouraged and are able to foster their own trust in the police, and slow enough to ensure that changes are deeply rooted within the police structure. Achieving this balance as part of a long-term effort is central to ensuring the success of civilian disarmament as it pertains to being able to gather most, if not all, the weapons which remain in civilian possession. While some weapons were collected as part of the disarmament effort in 2009 (see Section 3.2) and the effort is credited with having created some measure of stability in the 2010 pre-election period, the degree of influence that this effort has had is difficult to measure.

⁵ Other respondents either skipped the question or refused to answer.

Projects to destroy surplus weapons in the armed forces and to secure weak storage facilities held by the police, are the types of initiatives that can also contribute to peace consolidation. However, such contribution requires that the effort be understood and implemented as part of a broader conceptual mandate. The said mandate calls for two central components: the practical and the rhetorical. The practical components were met during the projects implemented in Burundi. Those include all the technical competence needed to ensure that the securing of weapons and the destruction of surplus is conducted in an appropriate manner. However, the rhetorical component of utilising the destruction of the stockpile and/or the securing of armouries as a way to build confidence amongst the general population and building on the government's accountability measures were neither explored nor exploited. Hence, while the effort reduced the ability of a single individual to utilise a weapon for harm, this does not necessarily provide a reliable contribution towards peace building. Essentially, the efforts in Burundi focused on instrumentality (see Figure 1), but did not take into account the dynamic nature of armed violence or other factors which threaten peace and stability and are linked to SALW.

Generally, the *theory of change* purported for the work on SALW in Burundi had goals which are in accordance with what can be achieved through these types of operations. Mainly that SALW disarmament, stockpile management and destruction can be utilised as means to consolidate peace efforts. However, the understanding of the *theory of change* by the implementing partners and the problematising of the said theory required a more holistic understanding of peace and conflict in order to yield the maximum impact possible. Hence, it is not the case that the theory alone was erroneous or ill-fitting, but rather how it was understood and implemented was too simplistic and therefore, the implementation of projects truncated the more firm achievement envisioned by the *theory of change* (see Section 3.2).

3.2 Following the Result Chain: SALW

The Swiss government funded seven projects in the field of SALW between 2006 and 2011, the period under review. The executors of these projects have been MAG and UNDP. The total expenditure of the projects has been 1,039,074 USD for projects executed by UNDP and 535,000 CHF for projects executed by MAG. That is almost 1.5 Million CHF. The individual projects and their respective objectives are outlined in the table below.

Table 1: Projects SALW Funded by Switzerland between 2006 to 2011

Project Executor	Time Frame	Amount of Swiss Contribution	Title and Objective of Project
UNDP	01.04.2007-31.12.2008	400 000 USD +43 619 USD for UNV	Support the UNDP project on arms control and civilian disarmament in Burundi. The overall project objective was to support the implementation of the strategy to disarm civilians and fight against the proliferation of small arms adopted in October 2006 by the Government of Burundi. The project also aimed to improve security more broadly in the country.
MAG	01.10.2008-28.02.2009	100 000 CHF	Support to the Nairobi Protocol Phase I. Provide MAG and the PNB with the information required to plan and allocate resources for the second follow up project (see below).
UNDP	01.10.2008-31.12.2010	400 000 USD	Support the UNDP project on arms control and civilian disarmament in Burundi. This effort supported three pilot projects: 1) Capacity building of the Technical Commission for Civilian Disarmament and the Fight Against the Proliferation of SALW; 2) improvement of capacities to control and manage stockpiles, weapons held by the civilian population, and the ability to destroy surplus of arms and ammunition; 3) launching of initiatives to support the model, "weapons a threat to development". This includes efforts in the field of awareness-raising.
MAG	01.03.2009-31.12.2009 extension: 30.04.2010	100 000 CHF	Improvement of physical security of PNB armories in support of the Nairobi protocol Phase II. Police Region South. To strengthen PNB capacity to manage state-owned SALW by reducing the quantity of weapons stored, improving the physical security of the armours, and training the armourers, thereby reducing PNB SALW vulnerability to theft, trafficking and accidents.
MAG	01.10.1009-30.06.2010 extension 28.02.2011	150 000 USD	Assessment of FDN SALW in support of the Nairobi Protocol. Reduce the risks of diversion and accidents posed by the FDN-owned SALW while supporting the Government of Burundi to implement the Nairobi Protocol.
MAG	01.01.2010-31.12.2010	335 000 CHF	Comprehensive Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSN) project with the PNB in support of the Nairobi Protocol

			Implementation. Phase II, West. To support the Government of Burundi in applying Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Nairobi Protocol by building the capacity of the PNB to manage and secure SALW, and to provide solutions to the problems identified in a previous survey.
UNDP	01.07.2010-31.10.2010	45 455 USD	Control of SALW and civilian disarmament in Burundi Phase II-Policy, service of record keeping and civilians. The aim of the project is to contribute to fight against proliferation. The effort will focus on building capacity in the area of SALW destruction, stockpile and registration.
Total			1 039 074 USD + 535 000 CHF

As visible from the above Table 1, the funding fell into four general categories: civilian disarmament, stockpile securing and destruction, advocacy, and to a limited extent capacity building. These efforts led to a series of outputs which included the drafting of legislation in accordance with Nairobi Protocol, the conduct of civilian disarmament in 2009 prior to the elections, as well as a series of initiatives to support the safe keeping and destruction of weapons in the possession of the armed forces and the police. The efforts on the part of UNDP were part of a larger program on SSR, but this programme appears not to have had a wide reaching approach/concept of what SSR entails. Notably however, the Swiss funding enabled components of the program which may have gone under or unfunded and hence may have not materialised at all. The MAG efforts were not part of a broader programme attempting to tackle SSR, but rather single initiatives focusing on certain aspects of SALW.

3.2.1 Relevance: How Relevant Was the Intervention vs. How Relevant it Could Have Been

In terms of the relevance of the input by the Swiss FDFA it's important to note that the projects funded conducted the activities mentioned in their project plans, and achieved their respective output obligations. The target obligations were generally delineated as an output document (i.e., legislation), process (i.e., conduct of civilian disarmament) or statistic (i.e., number of armouries secured). However, the focus on specific deliverables did not ensure the success in terms of the impact desired as per the **theory of change** (see Section 3.1). That is to say none of the outputs as reported proved that the effort has served to consolidate peace in a meaningful way.

The legislative support provided has resulted in national legislation and in general compliance, at least on paper, with the Nairobi protocol. Burundi also has a national authority that is responsible for dealing with all aspects related to SALW, but this institution suffers from chronic lack of funding. An example of this is the observatory on armed violence which housed the UNDP. This system has been transferred to the national authority, but it seems apparent that nothing is currently being done because there is no financial capacity to support its upkeep. However, it should be noted that as this evaluation came to completion, the team was informed that a British NGO, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), had secured substantive funding in the form of a framework agreement with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that would enable them to provide capacity development support to the Commission on Small

Arms (CNAP-Commission Nationale Permanente Contre la Prolifération des ALPC), as well as revive the observatory and in general support the community of local stakeholders in Burundi on the field of SALW and armed violence. This effort is certainly worth following to see the degree to which the intervention is able to build sustainable capacity locally and also how Switzerland could support the initiative either directly (i.e., direct funding) or indirectly (i.e., supporting other initiatives that can be synergised with the aforementioned effort).

The civilian disarmament project which took place in October 2009 included a large effort in the field of awareness raising that employed staff in the provinces who were sharing information, distributing pamphlets and T-Shirts: in addition, radio segments were also used to raise awareness about the programme. However, it seems that these efforts were primarily focused on disarmament per se and not on how disarmament is a central component to building peace, or on how the population would be protected if and when they relinquished their weapons. All of these efforts led to the collection of a number of weapons and munitions (see the Table 2, below).

Table 2: The SALW Collected During the Civilian Disarmament

Munitions	160,557
Grenades	12,820
Assault rifles	2,186
Bombs	540
Pistols	389
Mines	38
Team weapons	19
Other equipment	Recorded, but not subject to incentives

Source: Gujan, 2011

The civilian disarmament project aimed to gather weapons and munitions subject to a pre-identified point system, provided people with a voucher which they could later redeem against goods (see Table 3 below).

Table 3: The Compensation Distributed Following the Civilian Disarmament

Concrete	6,135
Metal roofing	11,633
Bicycles	278
Cloths	11,780
Chairs	141
Telephones	133

Hoes	1,463
Soap	26,040

Source: Gujan 2011

This disarmament effort, much like the effort to secure armours and to destroy weapons (see Table 4 below), achieved its direct outputs.

Table 4: Outputs of MAG Activities Since 2007

Destroyed 312 MANPADS
Destroyed 1,500,000 ammunition
Destroyed 10,800 weapons
Surveyed 55 storage sites and provided structural support to make them more secure (i.e., included gun racks as well as building infrastructural support)

Source: MAG Briefing notes/PPP

3.2.2 Efficiency: The Factors that Contribute to Efficient Results

Clearly fewer available weapons mean that fewer can be used, but weapon numbers are not static and hence, removal of weapons (disarmament) does not mean that the numbers of weapons remains low indefinitely. However while removing weapons through disarmament meant less weapons available, at least at the time of the disarmament as discussed in Section 3.1, the outcome of the efforts was more elusive in terms of its broader **peace consolidation** aims. Peace consolidation is a process that requires far more and deeper efforts than the physical removal of weapons from civilians. For example, an understanding by the civilian population of what the overall aim of the disarmament is- a disarmament process that aims to secure peace also requires a recognition and popular agreement that the agency that will provide security is indeed qualified and able to do so, etc.

Moreover, the degree to which the funds allocated to the tasks were warranted is ultimately a subjective question because it relates to the proportion of funds invested in this type of activity versus what can be achieved by similar funds in other activities. Still compared to other countries, or even to the full investment on SALW related activities, the investment in Burundi is relatively small. Yet, the investment is substantial in terms of the proportion of funds available to the FDFA in the Human Security field for Burundi.

As pertains to the degree to which partners operated in an efficient manner it must be highlighted that while institutions fulfilled their contractual obligations, the impact of their operations could have been further maximised if the efforts had been conceptualised as part of a broader effort (as noted in Section 3.1). This shortcoming at the conceptual level can be credited to both a general misunderstanding of the issue of SALW and also, particularly as it relates to MAG, the identity of the institution. The former issue is discussed previously, hence, the focus will be on the latter.

MAG is an institution that was born to respond to Mine Action, primarily demining efforts, therefore, much of its identity has been deeply tied to issues of technical competence. Although MAG has been innovative in some of its operations worldwide

and has introduced new approaches to work with communities, for example, the review of their activities in the field of SALW in Burundi showed that they did not actively engage with other organisations involved in peace building more generally, or even SSD or SSR, specifically. Indeed, their principal focus has been on the provision of technical support in their areas of competence. In addition, to their limited relationships with other actors their relationship with the Police has worsened. It is something that can most likely be attributed to differing expectations. Reportedly, the relationship between MAG and CNAP was formerly a good one, but it has soured over the years. Different reasons are noted to justify the discord, but the evaluation team was not able to ascertain with certainty the source of the problem. The relationship between MAG and the Armed Forces has remained good. Indeed, the cooperation with the latter continues. All the above factors combined have not facilitated the identification of MAG's work as part and parcel of the peace process. Arguably, this has also affected **efficiency** as it has limited the impact of the efforts made by MAG.

The relationship between UNDP and other actors, particularly the Burundian government, should be a transparent one that yields capacity and facilitates the efficient achievement of the project goals. In the case of the SALW work in Burundi, the relationship between UNDP and government actors seems to have generally yielded the project expected outputs (i.e., civilian disarmament and legislation). However, how efficient the activities were achieved and the degree to which an uncooperative relationship was to blame is debatable. Some respondents with UN experience posed that the government had not been a cooperative partner, while others felt that it had. These varied perceptions could be tied to expectations of the different individuals and also to what was needed at different stages of the projects. It is important to stress that no one interviewed posed that this relationship ever rendered the projects ineffective. The relationship between the UN and MAG appears to be a cordial one, but also one where there is little evidence of engagement by either agency in the activities of the other. Respondents claim that other civil society actors were far more engaged than MAG, and stress that MAG appeared to operate on the fringes of the discussion while focusing primarily on technical proficiency.

3.2.3 Effectives: The Factors that Affect it and Translating Activities into Effectiveness on the Ground

The **effectiveness** of the Swiss funded efforts have been impeded by the aforementioned relationships (see section 3.2.2). While the technical approach taken to support SALW efforts is not discussed here but appeared to adhere to the recognised norms; the key lesson learned from the field of armed violence, SSR, DDR which were relevant here pertains to effective cooperation (e.g., viewing the work as a component of a more holistic approach). To this end, networks with other actors that focused on peace building more generally could have been better established and would have had a positive impact overall. Furthermore, effectiveness has varied depending on the output expected.

In terms of the Nairobi Protocol and the Program of Action (PoA), the efforts funded by the Swiss FDFA did contribute to the formulation of legislation and to its enactment. The degree to which the Burundian government is able to implement the said legislation is less certain. The legislation prohibits, for example, the civilian holding of weapons and requires the clear management of stocks (database and recording prior to the destruction of surplus). However, it is clear today that much of the civilian population, numbers unknown, still has weapons and that there is no current capacity to enforce the law. In terms of stockpile destruction, some advance was made through the destruction projects managed by MAG and of course the previously noted civilian disarmament. However in terms of effectiveness, a problematic aspect related to SALW and Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) is that the issues persevere and hence, sustainability is a key to effectiveness as discussed below. As pertains to the GD and the findings of the Armed Violence mapping, in Burundi those interviewed who formed part of the government did not seem to see either document as something of their concern and/or regard. Indeed, the mapping done in the context of the GD does not have a direct impact on the ground. There is no concrete plan for their use. Small Arms Survey (SAS) stresses that they have modified their deliverables from reports to shorter and more accessible documents in an effort to make research more relevant to the different sets of stakeholders. They also note that current research efforts aim to have stronger links to interested parties on the ground.

According to the statistics recorded by the Observatory of Armed Violence, while managed by UNDP (Gujan, 2011), the number of incidents, homicides and injuries had declined in the months preceding the disarmament (prior to October 2009) and continued to decrease until November of the same year. In December 2009, both incidents and injuries increased. In January to March 2010, the number of incidents remained stable while injuries declined in February 2010, but increased again in March 2010. The number of homicides stayed largely stable since the disarmament until the latest records in the Gujan report (2010). Although, there has been some fluctuation, the numbers suggest decreases in all areas prior to and following the disarmament effort. Since 2010, however, data has not been made available. CNAP allegedly holds the database, but it was not possible to confirm how the database is populated or its current degree of accuracy. This may change in future with the AOA intervention mentioned earlier.

A more recent report by CENAP/CREDESS-Bdi (2012) shows a clear increase in perceived security, where 90% of the population perceive security as “very good” and 75% of the population perceived an improvement in security over the last 12 months, even though over 25% of the population have been victims of crimes or offences and slightly more than 1 in 10 people identified the police as the source of the said offence. According to the report, the population is hopeful and has a positive outlook/perspective, even though these data suggest that crime, poverty and unemployment, alcoholism and land-disputes are the sources for the insecurity.

3.2.4 Impact: SALW Interventions and What They Mean on the Ground

To what extent have the efforts led to the **impact** expected? And to what degree have the funded efforts contributed to the consolidation of peace in Burundi?

Answering these questions is difficult because given the presence of multiple efforts it's difficult to attribute success and/or failure. While clearly the presidential elections of 2010 did transpire without a return to conflict and this is seen as a positive step; and today while peace is fragile in many ways, it seems unlikely that Burundi will spiral into armed conflict in the near future. As previously noted, there is a growing sense of security. Hence, before delving into the impact question specifically, it is relevant to respond to a number of more general questions which are seminal in order to understand how and what can generate impact in the field of SALW interventions.

Firstly, what are the causes of armed violence? While clearly weapons and perhaps to an even greater degree, ammunition when this is required (e.g., not in the case of grenades, for example), **enable** the use of arms for belligerent action, the presence of weapons alone does not cause aggressive action. Indeed, there are many examples of countries that have a very high number of weapons where political conflict and discord is not resolved at the barrel of a gun. Yemen, for example, which according to the SAS in 2007 ranked 3rd in the world with a gun holding of 54.8 per 100 residents, preceded only by Serbia with an estimated 58.2 guns per 100 residents, and the United States with 88.8 guns per 100 residents (SAS, 2007). However, until the recent political turmoil in Yemen, the availability of weapons had not turned to belligerent acts of violence with a political undertone. In Rwanda, to cite another extreme, the 1995 Genocide did not rely on SALW but rather on bladed weapons, mainly the machete which is readily available and has numerous household uses, also. Incidentally, the machete is as easily an available weapon in Burundi. To cite another example, the availability of SALW in countries like Guatemala where violence levels are high to begin with and amongst pastoralist societies in Uganda, Kenya and Sudan- where **cattle rustling** is somewhat common place- the availability of SALW has increased their use in types of events which would have otherwise relied on other means. This shift in how conflicts are solved (i.e., using SALW) has increased the injury and death rates in the aforementioned countries.

The above examples point to two general and interrelated conclusions: first, that availability of SALW is not a causal factor of conflict and; second, that the lack of SALW does not prevent conflict. In short, it would be naïve to say simply that fewer available weapons prevent violence or conflict, and hence to disarm populations or destroy weapons are positive steps towards peace consolidation without considering the costs of the effort made. This is particularly so in countries where there is an undoubted need for support in multiple areas. This naiveté presumes that individuals flippantly resort to weapons because these are available. Given the geographical location of Burundi and the porosity of its borders, it is unlikely to ever be a serious preventative factor against groups that may resort to armed violence as a means to an end. However, disarmament and destruction of weapons and their securing can have a symbolic role in a peace process and as such it can be a valuable and highly

visible tool to encourage the population to support peace consolidation and gain confidence in an electoral process. In Burundi weapons were destroyed at a symbolic event, but this seems to have been a standard destruction for media purposes rather than a well thought-out project that would reinforce the peace building process for the population at large.

Turning our attention to the legislation formulated, this is undoubtedly a step forward. However, its impact is questionable at this time. While it may be the case that the role of this legislation may increase in the future, for the time being it is clear that even at the more basic levels there is a lack of understanding of the judicial system by the general population. Therefore, on one hand, the government is not able to implement many of the laws, as noted earlier, for lack of capacity as well as funding (i.e., CNAP has very little means); and on the other hand, the population is unaware of legislation more generally (CENAP/CREDESS-Bdi, 2012). The aforementioned issues combined question both the long-term *impact* of interventions in the absence of the creation of, or support for a good governance system that can sustain the efforts made.

3.2.5 Sustainability: SALW Efforts and What Remains of Them Long Term

The *sustainability* of projects in the field of Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) is debatable. In order for PSSM to be sustainable, an understanding of its importance and a long-term commitment by the government to continue to manage its stocks in a responsible way is needed. At the moment in Burundi, there exists a project managed by MAG to destroy the surplus. This project, which follows the same approach as the previous one funded by the Swiss, seems to require continual external monitoring. There does not appear to be an internalisation of the process which would enable its full control and command by the Armed Forces. Similarly, the securing of armouries has lacked capacity building mainly due to funding. The focus was solely on the physical securing of the weapons but not on the solid training of personnel to ensure the sustainability of the effort and a long-term impact. 'Impact' here is directly tied to a shift in the way armouries and weapons are viewed. Undoubtedly, capacities have been nurtured but these seem to be unable to operate independently and this severely threatens their sustainability. On the other hand, the national authority argues that the capacities exist and hence, support in this area is not needed. While technically this may be true, the degree to which a culture of weapon care is strongly present within the Armed Forces and the Police seems questionable as numerous examples of their respective treatment of weapons and ammunitions show.

4.0 Landmines: Meeting International Obligations

This section presents the *theory of change* that was intended for the work on Landmines in Burundi as well as the findings relevant to the work conducted. In order to facilitate the discussion, some background on landmines in Burundi is presented first.

The landmine threat in Burundi has never been colossal. Indeed, the armed conflict, while brutal, did not utilise landmines extensively. A survey of 96 suspected areas determined 12 mined areas. These were then cleared by MAG. The landmine threat in Burundi is also believed to be responsible for the death and injury of relatively few individuals. The landmine monitor (2011) estimates the number of landmine victims as 6000, which is a relatively small proportion of a population estimated in 2010 by the World Bank as reaching almost 8.4 million. Still it is worth noting that according to the Burundian Authority on Landmines (Direction de l'Action Humanitaire contre les Mines) no survey of victims has been conducted and hence, the number provided by the landmine monitor is not an official statistic.⁶ Overall, among its many challenges, Burundi was spared a serious landmine impact.

However, Burundi did have some landmines and these did pose a threat to the population primarily due to the scarcity of land. Landmines also threatened infrastructure in so far as the areas mines were around, electrical pylons prevented access to the pylons for any repair required. The above issues recognised, it is also important to note that Burundi as a signatory to the Anti-Personnel Ban Convention (APMBC) which they signed and subsequently ratified in 2003, was obliged to clear landmines within its territory as well as destroy all stocks, except those kept for training purposes within 10years of having ratified the document. Given the understanding that the remaining landmine threat in Burundi was minimal, the Swiss government entered into a contract with MAG in 2009 in order to support the clearance of the last known remaining landmines in the country and the creation of a national capacity that could identify and destroy any devices found in the future. The demining process successfully ended in 2011 in Cambodia in November 2011, where Burundi was proclaimed free of mines. Soon after Burundi declared itself compliant with Article 5 of the APMBC, Burundi announced that in-fact they were not mine free, after all. To the contrary, new mine fields had been found in the south of the country which, in the view of the Burundian government, requires further funding in order to ensure clearance.

⁶ Landmine monitor unverified data has been questioned before by donor governments and mine-affected countries alike, and without a clear methodology for how the estimate was arrived at, it is not possible to comment on its degree of accuracy.

4.1 Landmines: A *Theory of Change*

As noted in Section 3.1, identifying an adequate *theory of change* is an important component of successful programming. The *theory of change* maps the expected outcome as an end-state of a chain of events which starts with drivers (i.e., the guiding vision or long term outcome that is expected by the given investment or input), and is followed by the desired outcomes or a delineation of what the funded effort is expected to change. The desired outcomes are translated into key strategies and actions to be undertaken, which in turn are linked to the output of the program in terms of how much effort will be involved in engendering a change. A final step in the *theory of change* approach is the identification of outcome indicators or mechanism to verifiably measure the change that is expected. This approach enables programming to trace how a change can be achieved. Here, like in Section 3.1, a number of characteristics to the different steps (see Figure 3.1) of the *theory of change* of the landmine related projects funded by the FDFA are discussed with a view of identifying the degree to which the assumptions underpinning the *theory of change* were accurate; and also in order to pinpoint which components could/should be replicated, and which should be revisited in the future.

Firstly, it is important to stress that demining can have a role in **consolidating peace**, which was the broader goal of the FDFA work in Burundi. However, in the Burundian case the demining funded by the Swiss government was largely for a narrower goal. Here, one of the key drivers was to support Burundi in trying to meet its **APMBC** obligations. This effort, and particularly as pertained to meeting **Article 5** required that Burundi clear all its known mined areas, destroy its stockpile and be in a position to respond to future landmine threats. In addition to demining, Burundi also needs a way to respond to the needs of victims (i.e., short and long term support) and provide education where it may be needed in order to reduce the overall risk posed by any mines that remain in the country. To this end, the Swiss FDFA funded MAG in order to both carry out the demining in the last known mined areas, as well as train a national capacity which could meet future needs if they were to arise.

The Swiss strategy to support nations nearing their fulfilment of **article 5** has as an additional driver to encourage other countries with landmine threats to commit to meeting their legal obligations under the **APMBC**. Overall, from a programme perspective, Switzerland seems to have undertaken the required steps. Indeed, Burundi did declare itself mine free. However, the events that have followed (i.e., declaration that in fact Burundi is not free of mines) leaves room to pause.

Generally, it does not seem that the *theory of change* per se is mistaken in terms of its drivers and desired outcomes. However, the **strategies** employed may have enabled the above noted output. While on one hand it is understandable that Switzerland supported MAG directly, not the Burundian government, to secure the demining and building of capacity; the indirect relationship with the government has allowed for misunderstandings and ultimately for an output and outcome that fell short of what was intended.

As pertains to the general view of the support by Switzerland to Burundi and how other countries and cases may benefit from this support, the output is harder to measure this early. As noted in Section 5, Switzerland generally has a very good reputation as a donor. However, this is a general finding and not one that appears to be closely linked to the demining efforts in Burundi. Additionally, the retraction by Burundi regarding fulfilment of Article 5 may negatively affect efforts to support countries in meeting their Article 5 obligations, as the uncertainty regarding the declaration (i.e., are the countries in fact “mine free”) is a potential disincentive to donors as it shows lack of regard by mined countries on the importance of the APBMC and its fulfilment. Simultaneously, acceptance of behaviour such as that exhibited by the Burundian government can serve to weaken the APBMC. Although, not all respondents agree that the implications of Burundi’s recent actions are so severe. Some respondents also note that the time frame is too short to know what the impact of the Article 5 fulfilment retraction will be.

Still, from an international perspective, Switzerland is recognised as a donor of demining efforts in Burundi, at least by institutions which work in the landmine field. The survey conducted by this evaluation revealed that 4 out of a total 11 responses identified MAG as a key recipient of funding. Landmines are identified 5 times (as opposed to good governance- 3 times, human rights- 3 times, mediation facilitation and democratic dialogue- 4 times, SALW- 3 times, and transitional justice- 2 times) as areas funded by the Swiss. This perception is not all surprising since 12 institutions identified their work as including mine action related activities, as opposed to 6 institutions in the field of Human Rights and 4 institutions in the field of SALW. It should be stressed however that these perceptions pertain to the international view as only 2 institutions who participated in the survey are based in Burundi; and the interviews conducted in Burundi confirmed a very limited knowledge of Swiss funding related to mine action activities.

Returning to the broader question of peace consolidation and the role that landmine related activities can play, it’s important to note that aside from the practical aspects of enabling access to land, and in the case of Burundi access to infrastructure, the role of demining in peace-building is largely symbolic. It enables parties to capitalise on their commitment to peace by supporting, facilitating and enabling the demining process. Utilising demining as a peace building tool (i.e., confidence builder), requires much like in the field of SALW a clear and sustained rhetoric that is made known to the general population. In Burundi, given the limited threat to start with, the impact that demining can have as a peace building mechanism, even if fully exploited, is limited as most of the population was not mine affected. The limited knowledge amongst the NGOs operating in Burundi, however, shows that the demining process was not capitalised upon at all.

4.2 Following the Result Chain: Landmines

Over the years only three institutions have worked on demining related activities in Burundi. These include the Danish Church Aid (DCA), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). FSD and MAG have both operated in Burundi during the period under review and have benefited from Swiss funding. FSD and MAG have received funding from the FDFA totalling 176,000 USD and 315,000 CHF, respectively. The distribution of this funding in terms of single initiatives is outlined in the Table 4 below. Currently, the only international organisation present in Burundi with demining related experience is MAG. FSD appears to have left soon after the project ended. Their work was funded by the FDFA and is noted as having encountered difficulties while in Burundi.⁷ The details of this case remain obscure. However, DCA had also left Burundi some years ago but the details of their programming remain unknown.⁸

Table 4: Landmine Projects Funded by Switzerland between 2006 to 2011

Organization	Time Frame	Amount of Swiss Contribution	Title and Objective of Project
FSD	01.06-31.12.2006	150,000 USD	Demining community liaison teams; Burundi. To diminish the risk caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war by deploying a national rapid response capacity (NRRC) in Ruyigi and Rutana.
MAG	02.04.2010-31.10.2010	26,000 USD	Survey of landmine and UXO contamination in North-West Burundi. The objective of this project is to produce a survey of the landmine and UXO contamination in this area.
MAG	01.11.2010-30.06.2011 extension 31.12.2011	275,000 CHF (additional 80,000 CHF)	Clearance of the remaining land contaminated by landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War in North-West and Southern Burundi. Assist the government to meet the Burundian obligations in relation to Article 5 of the APMB
Total Amount		176,000USD + 315,000 CHF	

The above mentioned input generated the expected output in so far as the missions by MAG⁹ conduct the survey, built national capacity within the Burundian Civil Protection in order to respond to threats by mines in the future, and removed the mines that were understood at the time to be the last mines in the country. Additionally, the national authority has been given the required equipment for them to respond to any technical demining task in the future. MAG's work has led to the following **outputs**:

⁷ Efforts to speak with FSD were made but were unsuccessful.

⁸ Efforts to speak with DCA were made but the efforts to discuss with the person then responsible were unsuccessful.

⁹ In the absence of completion reports by FSD and not having been able to secure an interview, this section limits its comments to the MAG activities. This approach has been confirmed as acceptable by the FDFA.

- A survey of a total of 96 areas which led to the identification of 12 remaining mined areas/suspected areas
- Conducted MRE for over 2000 beneficiaries
- Trained 9 Civilian Protection staff
- Cleared a total of 17,440 square meters which led to the identification of 3 AP mines, 11 grenades and 3 mortars
- Conducted a total of 34 rapid emergency interventions

However, a few caveats require mention. As is clear, the number of mines was very small. ERW were a larger threat and potentially remain so. While MAG built national capacity to demine and to respond to ERW threats up to EOD Level 1, there is a degree of disagreement regarding what this enables the staff to do in future. The government proposes that the capacity is sufficient and able to respond to future threats, while MAG poses that the current capacity is potentially unable to respond to future threats. While this appears to have fuelled the discord between MAG and CNAP, the reality, as noted by MAG, is that till now there are no confirmed EOD tasks which require knowledge beyond EOD Level 1.

In terms of partnerships, demining appears to have fostered a far better relationship between MAG and the national counterpart than the experience described above. The relationship between the Civilian Protection and MAG seems to have been, and remain, a positive one. The claims that Burundi has mines still is an issue that has remained largely not discussed between the different parties in the country. Hence, this has in no way affected the relationship. One of the key positive aspects of the work has been the building of national capacity. This did, arguably, make more difficult the work by MAG at times in that the government, rather than MAG, identified the deminers. The management chain was as a consequence, diluted during operations but this appears to have only caused minor mishaps and in no way negatively affected the final output. On the contrary, it ensured an existing national capacity after the operations ended.

4.2.1 Relevance: The Mine Threat and Meeting Article 5 Obligations

With regards to the **relevance** of the work conducted it is, as mentioned in Section 4.1, difficult to link the work done in Burundi in the field of demining as a solid component to peace consolidation. This is partially rooted in the character of the mine threat in Burundi (i.e., very small) and also in the way it was executed. The latter has solid ties to issues mentioned in Section 3 regarding MAG and its institutional origin. MAG, as most other demining agencies, has traditionally placed most of its focus and attention to technical proficiency at the expense of being active members of the peace making and peace building community at large. This has meant that few other actors understand mine action and are able to see the role of mine action as pivotal to strengthening peace processes. In terms of the **outcome** this isolationist approach has implied that demining efforts do not yield all the benefit that they could in terms of supporting peace at a perception level.

However, as pertains to the Swiss funded effort in Burundi and its achievement of the narrower objective of supporting Burundi's ability to meet its Article 5 obligations, the

Swiss engagement has been successful. The relevance of the supporting countries to meet their APMBBC obligations is important in international terms as it serves to solidify the international legal framework on landmines. Furthermore, this type of work is very much in line with the Swiss efforts to support international legislation both diplomatically and operationally. The shortcomings regarding Burundi particularly should not obscure the relevance of supporting countries with limited means to reach international obligations they have committed themselves to.

4.2.2. Efficiency: The Accomplishments of the Mine Action Efforts

Aside from the inability to maximise the outcome (and the impact) (i.e., peace consolidation) of the operations due to the limited vision held by the operating agency, the work seems to have yielded according to the technical expectations outlined in the relevant project documents: demining last known areas, including the building of capacity within Civil Protection and the provision of equipment that may be needed for future tasks. These elements enabled Burundi to meet their Article 5 obligations. Hence, the effort did attain the immediate expected **outcome**. The reasons for why Burundi has essentially retracted its mine-free status after its declaration at the state party meeting in late 2011 are unclear. On one hand, the government says that new suspected areas in the south of the country, around pylons, are now reasonably suspected of having landmines. On the other hand MAG poses that questions regarding the now suspected area were discussed prior to the “mine free” declaration and at that time there were no reasons to believe that the areas were mined. Thus far, no surveying or demining has started and hence, it is not possible to know if indeed the new “suspected” areas have landmines or not. However, this turn of events does call into question the effort, how it was handled, and what could have been done to prevent it. Given the lack of clarity regarding why the Burundian government declared itself mine free so soon prior to its announcement of new suspected areas is problematic and calls itself into question. If the government suspected that mines remained then the declaration of compliance with Article 5 of the APMBBC should have not been made.

4.2.3 Effectiveness: Meeting Article 5 Obligations and Beyond

The problems linked to the issue of the identification of new mines in Burundi should not obscure the objective of the work and although, potentially short-lived, the efforts funded by the FDFA were **effective** in meeting the Article 5 obligations.

An aspect that remains underdeveloped is the question of data gathering, management and storage. MAG, as the operator, has clear records of the tasks they have conducted and of their respective outputs. This data has also been handed over to the national authority. However, the national authority does not have a mechanism for storing the data. Given that the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is largely a Swiss product which has received and continues to receive substantial funding from the Swiss government, the lack of any mechanism to store data once countries are declared mine free is problematic. According to the Information Department at the GICHD which is responsible for IMSMA, they were neither clearly aware that Burundi was nearing completion/met Article 5 obligations nor were they aware that the Swiss government had funded the effort. This is troublesome since the GICHD is part of the Swiss government's meeting where

decisions on what, and how support in the field of mine action are shared. While Burundi has received IMSMA support in the past, their most recent requests have not been prioritised because the GICHD experience with Burundi has repetitively showed that efforts to build capacity were not supported by the national government and hence the impact of the investment was short-lived. The Information Department also noted that they are currently developing the capacity to host databases for countries which do not have the capacity to do so themselves.

4.2.4 Impact: Mine Action and the Long Term Effects of the Efforts Made

As noted earlier, the *impact* of the demining may be obscured today, but it must be stressed that even without a working database the physical removal of landmines has taken place and this has helped Burundi meet its legal obligations. As pertains to MRE and victim assistance, a few issues require attention. First, MAG as noted earlier, has conducted MRE as part of their earlier projects. While at the moment there appears to be little attention paid to the issue, the national authority states that this is linked to the limited need for MRE. This is partly due to the apparent growing understanding by the population which link the Civil Protection (trained by the MAG project funded by the FDFA) as the key personnel to respond to the threat of landmines.

Victim assistance is more complex. Firstly, it's important to stress that in Burundi there seems to be a clear understanding that providing assistance to mine victims should be done through the same mechanism as available to all other handicapped and/or injured individuals. One exception was the view voiced by the national authority for mine action that felt that having a survey that would clearly identify mine victims was essential, but the reasons for this need were unclear. Secondly, the government has established a working group including government ministries, agencies, as well as NGOs. This group on the behalf of the Ministry for Public Security has produced the national strategy to provide assistance to victims of mines and other handicapped persons. However, a number of interviews with international and national NGOs, as well as government personnel made it very evident that while a strategy now exists, Burundi has little ability to respond to the needs of handicapped people. There are a limited number of centres able to support handicapped people but these are primarily supported by NGOs with Handicap International (HI) key among them, and there seems to be little ability on the government's behalf to allocate the funding required in order for the needs of handicapped people to be met. Given the general poverty of the country it is not surprising that handicapped people are not prioritised in terms of funding allocations.

4.2.5 Sustainability: The Government's Ability to Respond to Future Mine Action Threats

It terms of *sustainability*, while the previously mentioned issue (i.e., victim support) is one area that is currently not sustainable without external support based on the previous demining experience (i.e., the type of mines found), the current national capacity is sufficient to respond to potential needs. The government has also been provided with the equipment necessary. Hence, the only factor which could affect Burundi's ability to meet future demining needs would be a need for minimal operational costs such as fuel for vehicles. Indeed the national authority claims that

the areas which have been recently identified as potentially mined could be cleared with the existing capacity but that the government lacks funding to cover operational costs such as transport to the mined location.

5.0 Over-Arching Issues

In this section we turn our focus to issues that are relevant to both SALW and Landmines including the following subjects: ***gender, the Great Lakes Region, the perception and the role of Switzerland as a donor, and the partners of the FDFA.***

5.1 Gender: Utilising Projects as Agents of Change

In terms of ***gender***, a number of issues are worth noting. Clearly, gender is an important issue and one that requires attention, and most of those interviewed recognised this. However, how gender can and should be conceptualised and integrated into programmes in the field of SALW and Landmines is an area that required further attention in Burundi and in general. Gender has unfortunately come to mean counting of the number of women included into operational activities, rather than a broader understanding of masculinities and femininity and how these can affect or be affected by SALW/Landmine related issues. Simple inclusion of women staff does not serve to initiate or support any re-thinking about gender concepts. The narrow view given to the activities (i.e., disarmament, weapon destruction, demining) which focused on the technical rather than contextual factors also affected the way gender was understood and included.

The sole 'indicator' of gender inclusion into projects in Burundi was the inclusion of women into the projects. MAG noted that there are not enough women in the police or armed forces to meet the demands for inclusion by donors. While somewhat humorous at the shallow level, the case confirms a much larger and deeper problem. Since women were included in the FDFA funded projects, it can be said that the projects met their obligations of "including women" but were not able to go beyond such a requirement. In some ways this can be understood given that gender, particularly in the SALW field has not been studied in any depth. However, more and more knowledge is available on Landmines and gender. Not in the least, the work done by the Gender Mine Action Program (GMAP) which also receives Swiss support. It's also worth noting that in Bern, the understanding of how gender should be included or even what gender meant, varied. In some cases, respondents were unable to conceptualise at all over what gender could mean in programmatic terms and noted that it is something that can become a simple tag along "include women" into project contracts.

New knowledge in the field can serve as a platform for a more nuanced understanding of the gender implications of SALW and Landmines. Not only as what pertains to aspects such as the traditional sex of deminers or soldiers but also to what the impact of landmines, demining, weapon availability, disarmament, legislation, etc. can have on both women and men, their respective gender roles, their participation in society, etc. As noted earlier, within the FDFA there were clear gaps regarding the knowledge of how gender could/should be included into programming. This highlights an issue which is also present amongst the operating agencies. In short, unless there is a clear and concerted effort to examine the gender aspect, its inclusion in programming is largely futile. Efforts to include token women do not have an impact on gender relations or the role of any one gender in society at large and to the contrary may serve to perpetuate the misunderstanding of gender,

its importance and how it can and should be highlighted in the field. This is not something that affects Burundi alone, but rather affects programmes at large.

5.2 The Great Lakes Region: The Importance of Burundi's Neighbours

The **Great Lakes Region** and its impact on what happens within Burundi and what dynamics affect Burundi is also a factor that warrants attention here. The degree to which Burundi should understand itself/identify most strongly as a part of the Great Lakes and the importance of this is a somewhat philosophical discussion regarding the countries identity. Here, the distinction being made by respondents is based on a presumption that looking towards the Great Lakes as 'inspiration' can be translated to mean looking towards the DRC and Rwanda and that this would truncate Burundi's ability to be forward looking (i.e., towards its potential) in favour of looking back at its past (i.e., the conflict). Alternatively, focusing on the East African Community as an example of a politically stable environment with growing economies can be more beneficial to Burundi. Generally, it's a question of where should Burundi look for inspiration as it moves ahead and the degree to which it has the ability to extricate itself from the dynamics of conflict around it. Without siding with either position, it is important to highlight a couple of key factors:

- 1) That Burundi is a small country with porous borders under threat of DRC's instability in so far as Burundi can, and some argue is, the transit point for much of what traffics in and out of DRC.
- 2) Burundi has suffered greatly in recent years, has a very weak government structure in terms of its provision of services (i.e., security, health, etc.), is a very poor country overall but does not come with the type of destabilising agents such as DRC and hence it is not possible to simply compare needs. Similarly, unlike Rwanda, it does not count with a strong government.

Overall, this means that while Burundi should be supported in exploring opportunities that reach beyond the Great Lakes Region, efforts to support the country should also be cognisant of the regional Great Lake specific dynamics and of how Burundi is affected by them. As pertains specifically to SALW and Landmines, the differing situations in each country would appear to generally preclude the utilisation of similar approaches for programmatic efforts. However, legislation, for example, is one area that could benefit from a regional approach. Legislation, unlike programmatic interventions, can and should be shared amongst countries in the region in order to add strength to the legislation. For example, efforts to legislate weapon trafficking could clearly benefit from a regional approach that supported a single perspective/approach. To this end, efforts to support regional legislation could strengthen rather than weaken the intervention. However, this would require a common view/agreement amongst governments. Operationally, the different contexts experienced by each country would limit the ability to replicate programmes from one setting to another. The GD could, for its part, be utilised as a tool to support a more regional view of armed violence and its implications. However, such an effort would require considerable effort as the GD does not appear to be understood today, by at least the Burundian government, as a platform for either development or work in the field of SALW. Still, the GD could be a useful tool as a foundation, or common ground, from where other initiatives could be spring-boarded.

5.3 Switzerland: Its Image, Role and Potential as a Donor

A further subject explored by this evaluation was the perception of **Switzerland as a donor**. First and foremost, it is important to stress that the Swiss government and its efforts are very well perceived. Generally, respondents characterized Switzerland as being an active, responsive and flexible donor. Switzerland was also characterized

as a donor who is willing to fund initiatives first and hence paves the way for other donors. This approach has advantages/positive aspects as it may open the door for funding of important issues. However, the drawbacks include providing funding for initiatives that may not be sustainable or part of a more holistic programme/project with more far reaching goals; this ties directly into the expectations by Switzerland and the proposed *theory of change* (See Sections 3.1 and 4.1).

Regarding the Swiss role generally, 7 survey respondents (out of 13) felt that Switzerland could play a special role as a donor. Of those who responded favourably to this question, 6 respondents elaborated upon their answers. Of these the majority identified human security, Human Rights and dialogue as key areas where Switzerland could play a key role in the future. One respondent focused specifically on armed violence citing the support that the Swiss government has thus far provided to the GD effort, and how this support should be followed up with more solid operational support. This perception is most likely a result of multiple factors including that Switzerland is a small country without a colonial past and hence, is perceived as neutral. In addition, its funding for key institutions working in the field of SALW and Landmines- as well as the hosting of multiple institutions, organisations and conferences in Switzerland (Geneva)- also enables Switzerland to have a comparative edge. However, this comparative edge appears not to be exploited on a consistent basis. Traditionally the Swiss role has focused on diplomacy (i.e., dialogue, mediation, Human Rights) and these efforts may very well be far more adept to the type of funding and institutional structure of the FDFA.

Indeed the degree to which Switzerland was recognized as a donor in the field of Landmines and SALW varied. While international organisations surveyed seemed to recognize Burundi as a recipient of Swiss funding (8 of 9 respondents), these respondents were foreign agencies, not those based in Burundi. Amongst NGO and government representatives interviewed, few were aware that Switzerland had funded work in the field of Landmines and SALW.

There are clear linkages between SALW, Landmines and other human security sectors which can be explored by Switzerland in the future and which would better enable Switzerland to capitalise on its general experience in the field of Human Rights, dialogue, diplomacy, etc. Both SALW and Landmine related activities could be actively used as mechanisms to support the perception of peace consolidation: for example by flagging the destruction of weapons, the compliance with Article 5 of APMBBC, the securing of weapons, to show the population that the government and the security forces are committed to peace and are compliant with international legislation, etc. The SALW and Landmine issues can also form key components of negotiation agreements between opposing parties (as was done in Sri Lanka in early negotiations which included clear demining elements). However, their inclusion requires that both donors and practitioner actively see SALW and Landmines respectively as active instruments of peace which are directly related to institutions and agents and not simply as “instruments” (see Figure 1).

One of the challenges for Landmine related activities, and particularly demining, has been to identify themselves as part of a broader intervention that is not limited to the removal of landmines. While victim assistance has long been recognised as an aspect that should be rooted in the support and assistance for anyone with a

disability or victim of a dramatic accident, demining has had difficulty framing itself as a component of a larger peace consolidation or development effort. This does not mean that it is not part of a broader effort but rather that the general reticence by organisations to embrace broader fields of work such as “peace consolidation”, “development,” etc. in a more holistic fashion has been injurious to the output. In Burundi, MAG identifies itself in its self-presentation as part of the broader SSR effort but there was no evidence that this translated into how they are perceived, how and with whom they associate, or to how they conducted their work. To the contrary, they are not recognised as a player by other actors in the peace consolidation or SSR efforts and appear to exist on the fringes of the environment while providing valuable technical support.

Similarly, efforts to support the field of SALW were in the early days understood as part of a wider UNDP SSR effort but the degree to which the approach to SSR included a “bottom-up” or “population focused” approach appears to have been limited. The issues mentioned above regarding MAG’s approach to landmines also apply to their efforts in the field of SALW.

These factors can be identified as missed opportunities but should not be understood as having caused the failure of the intervention, rather as having truncated the intervention’s ability to have an even greater impact. To this end, Switzerland is well positioned. Its role as a “neutral” actor which focuses on peace consolidation more generally can serve to enable the promotion of projects which actively engage in synergising activities with broader peace building efforts. This requires that within the Human Security sector, initiatives in the field of SALW and Landmines be funded when linkages are clearly made between individual projects and their respective roles in peace consolidation. It is also important to stress that doing this can only be effective when the funding is to: cover the cost of an initiative which has been for some reason overlooked by other donors; identify a new approach of doing something as a way to engender donor support; or when there is a Swiss commitment for more far reaching programming which is backed by substantial funding over a long period of time. In short, very small interventions are not part of a broader effort that may not have the ability to support peace consolidation more broadly because they are too small.

5.4 Synergising Swiss Funding: The Partners and How Work Can be Capitalised Upon

As pertains to the inter-institutional synergies that can be built based on Swiss funding, a number of issues are worth highlighting. Two organisations which receive substantial funding from Switzerland, and which operate in the field of Landmines and SALW respectively, are the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and Small Arms Survey (SAS). However, the degree to which the outputs from these organisations are utilised by the FDFA and other Swiss government agencies varies.

In Demining there is an active working group which includes the FDFA and the GICHD, and while this should have ensured that Swiss funding were maximised,

there is room for improvement. Not least the issue of **data management** mentioned in Section 4.2. The GICHD was characterised by some respondents as an institution that was not a keen responder to Swiss government requests even though their main donor is the Swiss government. It was also highlighted that while the GICHD are informed on all mine related activities funded by the FDFA, they seem to not utilise this knowledge as a basis for planning within the institution. These issues are worrisome since they would seem to reduce the potential impact that the FDFA can have overall as well as that of the GICHD as it appears to not favour synergies with other donors either.

To the contrary some of the efforts of GICHD focus mentioned by respondents seemed to be on expanding their area of work, in some cases into fields which would render their outputs a clear duplication. One area is their effort to expand into SALW and another to design systems to manage information on stockpile, something which is readily available and in use by any armed forces and police which has adequate stock pile management practices, not least the Swiss government. Moreover, there seemed to be little effort to synergise the work of the GICHD with that of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) which is housed at the GICHD. Indeed, the general impression was that the GICHD acts guided by its own initiatives and not ones which benefit from or support existing efforts. While GICHD was noted as wanting to keep its independence, synergising is not necessarily a way to relinquish independence. Given the substantial funding provided by the FDFA to the GICHD it appears that clearly exploring how the funding is used to support mine action overall, including other efforts by Switzerland is worth some attention. Thus far, the inclusion of the GICHD in the Landmine working group which includes representatives from the FDFA and all other relevant branches of the Swiss government seems not to have yielded a clear impact in terms of the GICHD activities.

As regards the work in the field of SAS, there appeared to be less cooperation between the FDFA and SAS that there could be. It appears that recently SAS started to explore opportunities for dialogue with different desks and offices within the FDFA and SDC. Prior to this change SAS had a single focus person within the Swiss government and was requested to not make direct contact with other government offices as this could be misunderstood as an effort to double dip. This meant that SAS outputs, and their utility within different offices of the Swiss government and the Swiss government's ability to influence work conducted by SAS, was limited to the efforts of the single desk officer responsible for SAS. While this has since changed, the efforts made by SAS to link itself to other desks and offices are still in its infancy. Currently, both the FDFA and SAS agree that the outputs produced by the latter are not utilised to the maximum extent possible by the FDFA or by other Swiss actors. Traditionally, SAS outputs appeared to often lack a clear link to operational impact. More recently, some efforts to conduct outreach after the conduct of studies have been made. However, many of the studies, including the armed violence mappings conducted within the context of the GD lack a clear goal or aim beyond providing a research output. This in turn decreases their ability to have an impact overall. One of the measures taken by SAS has been to modify the format of its outputs, and in so doing, increase their accessibility. They also have, in some cases, partnered with an

organisation locally that intends to utilise their outputs. While these are positive steps ensuring that the information collected, analysed and presented by SAS has a clear operational impact these approaches require far more attention.

At the operational level, the FDFA could enter into a clear dialogue with SAS to ensure that studies conducted by SAS are on subject matters that are of relevance and utility to the FDFA. While this may require that academic findings be translated into operationally useful ones, the role of SAS would still serve to contribute to the bettering of FDFA efforts in the field. Another approach to ensure that SAS outputs have an impact on the ground would be to ensure that outreach becomes a stronger component of SAS work and has clear objectives which go beyond the accessibility of information to the utilisation of information by third parties. This may require that SAS become far more outward looking and reflective when identifying areas of study: in short, new subject areas must be identified because there is a clear need, use and end-user for the data being gathered.

As pertains to synergies and cooperation between different Swiss government actors, the mine action field appears to have a far stronger approach where regular coordination meetings which enable the different government actors to inform others about their choices and discuss new interventions take place. These meetings also include the GICHD as a matter of course. In the field of SALW, the coordination within the government is strong, but its inclusion of relevant external actors, such as the SAS, seems to be more ad hoc. This is perhaps a product of a lacking cohesive view of how to move forward in the best possible way. The degree to which the Swiss government will commit its' funding to the field of SALW and armed violence reduction is still unclear and hence, unsurprisingly, there is no active coordination mechanism that includes all government and key Swiss funded institutions. The GD, while an interesting document, appears to have contributed to the uncertainty in terms of Swiss commitment. SAS has been a key partner in the GD effort but it does not see itself as a guiding voice. Thus far, from discussions had with the FDFA's Human Security division, SDC, SAS and GD staff, it is unclear what the long-term goals of the effort are. While the document is understood as valuable, it does not have any legal underpinnings. Hence, the effort remains fully subject to the whim of its parties. Burundi, for example, appears not to have actively engaged in efforts to ensure their practical commitment to the GD. Indeed, the armed violence mapping conducted in Burundi in 2007 yielded interesting data but it is unclear how this knowledge has been used, if at all, beyond providing a source for quotation. In the early days it appears the data was actively utilised by UNDP but there is no clear evidence of that now. This can be a product of lack of record keeping rather than lack of utilisation, however. Today, it is undoubtedly the case that the mapping is regarded as the authoritative document on armed violence in Burundi, although people are quick to stress that the data is old and may no longer be valid. Still, beyond using the information as a reference, it's unclear what value it has had in terms of programming and active efforts to reduce violence. In contrast, the most recent study on security conducted by CENAP/CREDESS-Bdi (2012) is to be a key component for the programming conducted by the Dutch in relation to their SSD programme. Overall, this would suggest that both a utility for the data is crucial as is

the ability to either conduct subsequent mappings or build a capacity locally that can execute subsequent mappings.

As pertains to the topic of synergies more generally, there are clear linkages between SALW and Landmines and Transitional Justice (TJ), Human Rights, Mediation, Facilitation and Dialogue. These linkages include, for example, understanding disarmament efforts as linked to TJ efforts in so far as TJ justice should include components to ensure that populations feel safe and realise that in the future they need not protect themselves. Along the same lines, SALW issues can be utilised to support human rights efforts such as by making the police more accountable to the use and administration of their weapons. Similarly, Mediation, Facilitation and Dialogue can clearly include aspects related to SALW and Landmines as mechanisms to consolidate peace. These are areas where both the GICHD and SAS can be utilised as entities to identify opportunities or to actively support synergies in the field.

6.0 General Conclusions and Findings

In this section, some general conclusions are presented. The section includes a set of SWOT diagrams (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) focusing on Landmine, SALW activities and Switzerland as a donor, respectively. These diagrams are introduced as frameworks for the presentation and discussion of the general conclusions of this evaluation.

6.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons

SWOT - SALW	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported initiatives which lacked funding Providing clear technical assistance to areas which required it Supported Burundi's ability to meet Nairobi Protocols 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programming does not conceptualise as part of a more global peace building effort Minimal local capacity which can operate independently Minimal (perhaps, none) effort to incorporate a bottom-up approach Inability on the part of MAG and CNAP to work together effectively Limited sustainability given the lack of government support
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Utilise SALW programs as a means to further the peace consolidation process more generally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited sustainability, given the lack of government support Limited sustainability, given the lack of local capacity Activities should be rooted in local conditions and capacities (i.e., the judicial system that is able to operate and enforce punitive damages) Efforts must be clearly linked to activities that can and will be supported by the government after the project/programme has ended In order for successful SALW interventions, good governance must be solidified

Clearly, disarmament is by nature, a good initiative. Less weapons in the public domain is an inherently positive outcome. However, this does not mean that the effort in Burundi was able to attain its overall and ultimate goal of peace consolidation. To this end, it is too simple to say that disarmament inherently assists to consolidate peace. The presence of SALW alone does not cause armed violence. Therefore, an examination into causal factors is required in order to measure the

degree to which SALW are a central enabler of armed violence. Given this scenario, simple disarmament is not necessarily a key to stability.

SALW projects such as disarmament and stockpile destruction can have a central symbolic role in the peace consolidation process but it requires that the projects be managed in a manner that ensures the symbolic role to be adequately exploited. The symbolic role of these efforts in Burundi has not been activated.

Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) are important both as mechanism to consolidate peace but also to ensure the safety of the general population. Even when the impact of such efforts is not maximised (i.e., the project limits itself to technical aspects) the value of these types of interventions can be the key to safeguarding the population from a catastrophic event (i.e., armoury explosion). However, it is crucial that PSSM efforts include a solid capacity building component which is sustainable after the project is completed. Not doing this will negate the success of the effort soon after their completion. Unlike landmines, PSSM is an issue that requires long term and consistent support. It is not like demining which is largely a single event affair only. It is also important to note that knowledge and practice in PSSM is part and parcel of the way militaries and police forces operate in developed countries, Switzerland included. Hence, capitalising on this ‘in-country’ knowledge may be worth exploring for Switzerland.

The efforts in the field of SALW in Burundi have created some capacity but its degree of solidity and ability to work independently is debatable. To this end, the operator on the ground should have been funded to focus primarily on the building of capacity at the operational and administrative levels rather than on the building of low-level capacity and hence, perpetuating advisory and monitoring dependence on external supervisors. The approach of utilising continual external supervision may work in the short term but will lead to the consequences of being both disempowering and limiting the government’s responsibility over the activities.

6.2 Landmines

SWOT - Landmines	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building of local capacity (personnel) • Leaving behind physical capacity (equipment) • Supporting governments to meet Article 5 obligations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No existing database of what has been done in Burundi • No clear commitment by the government to be able to utilise the capacity left behind
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilising the capacity of other entities supported by the Swiss government to support the FDFA initiatives (i.e., IMSMA) • Utilise demining as a symbolic aspect of building peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of a clear understanding by the government regarding what it would mean to receive support to meet Article 5 obligations. • Lack of a documented agreement/commitment between the

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Utilising demining as a symbolic step forward towards a more gender equitable environment 	Swiss FDFA and Burundian Government to ensure that all parties are committed to meeting Article 5 obligations
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The effort to support countries that are close but financially unable to meet their APMBBC is a commendable and necessary one. However, it is also important to ensure that the effort by the donor government, in this case Switzerland, be understood and well regarded locally. One of the ways that this can be achieved is by ensuring that there is a written understanding/compromise between the donor and the recipient government that delineates the aims of the funding and the expected outcomes. In the case of Burundi, it is unclear whether the government was fully aware/cognisant of the obligation they had in terms of the APMBBC, and of the role of the Swiss funding. Additionally, the case of Burundi calls for a re-examination of the current procedure which allows governments to identify themselves as mine free prior to submitting their voluntary completion reports.

The creation of a national capacity that can respond to the mine threat is the key for the supporting countries to meet their Article 5 obligations. This was done by MAG, with Swiss funding, in Burundi. These efforts should be coupled, however, with a clear commitment from the host government, in this case Burundi, to finance the operationalisation of the demining capacity if and when it is needed.

6.3 FDFA Support

SWOT – FDFA Support	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ability to respond quickly to the pressing needs Flexibility Solid participatory engagement by the donor in the funded activities Recognised as a key actor in the field of peace consolidation Coordinated approach to mine action efforts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does not utilise all the outputs from organisations they fund in order to maximise overall impact Limited term funding Limited funding for projects truncates their ability to be all-encompassing (holistic)
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can utilise the findings and/or support provided by GICHD and SAS in a more active way to support other funded initiatives Can spearhead the use of GD as an operational starting point 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Swiss FDFA funding is not recognised/known about by all the actors Funding may be too piecemeal and hence, fail to achieve what it would setout to

Small countries such as Burundi where the government is relatively weak and donor intervention is welcomed, are keen opportunities for the latter such as Switzerland to play a key role. In Burundi there is a general consensus that the government is

willing to enter into dialogue with donor countries in an effort to find solutions to some of its problems. Hence, it is an ideal scenario for humanitarian and development investment by countries that want to be solidly engaged. This engagement may include substantial funding or in-kind technical support, for example, but should, whatever its form, ensure that it is sustainable in the long term and counts with the full commitment of the national government.

7.0 Lessons Learned

Here, lessons learned from the Burundi case are presented as a basis for the formative findings of this evaluation. Hence, these lessons have been identified not because they explain what occurred in Burundi, rather because they have a value for programmes elsewhere in the Region as well as worldwide. In this way, the Burundi example was utilised as a platform to understand the challenges faced in the field of SALW and Landmines, and on how to improve the FDFA's involvement in this activities in the future. However, some of those can also serve to inform the work conducted by other Swiss agencies or institutions:

- **Theories of change** must be carefully problematised prior to the funding of projects in order to ensure that the expected outcome and impact is attained. Otherwise, it is more likely that the overall goal may not be achieved. In the case of Burundi, the *theories of change* were rooted in the wish to support peace consolidation. Notably, the landmine efforts also had the implementation of Article 5 of the APMBC as a key goal. The experience in Burundi shows that it is both possible and beneficial to see SALW and Landmine issues as key issues that support peace consolidation. However, doing this requires that the program implementation be conceptualised as a peace consolidation effort. If peace consolidation is understood as both a collection of practical activities and the engendering of a peace seeking society then efforts to consolidate peace must both target practical aspects as well as the perception of the local population. For example: the removal of landmines or disarmament must be perceived as efforts that are being undertaken because in a post-conflict environment where weapons are not needed or useful. Hence, understanding efforts as peace consolidating requires a heavy investment into how the efforts are understood and perceived. The simple removal of landmines and or disarmament, stock pile destruction, etc. do not on their own consolidate peace.
- **Switzerland** is generally perceived as a responsive, flexible and involved **donor**. These are attributes that should be maintained. There is a clear need for donors who are not overly bureaucratic and are able to respond to the pressing needs. Often, projects are short of funding at particular points during their life span or there is a need for recognising an intervention as useful even though it has not been attempted before. Under these circumstance Switzerland can, and sometimes does, play a role. This, combined with the Swiss' highly involved approach to funding can serve to highlight areas in need of intervention. This also means that Switzerland is in a key position by the virtue of their high involvement/participatory approach to ensure that projects and programmes funded utilise lessons learned in the field are based on the best practice, and meet their respective *theories of change*.
- Ensuring that institutions funded are able to build strong **relationships** with relevant institutions in order to foster the work that they conduct is crucially important to ensure the desired outcome. The Burundi experience demonstrates that eroded relationships between key organisations in the field can have devastating effects for the program outputs and outcomes.

Therefore, the FDFA should ensure prior to funding that the key relevant stakeholders have positive, nurturing relationships with one another to ensure that the projects and programs do not suffer unduly from bad relationships between key institutions.

- Ensuring that a **clear agreement** between the donor and the government of the country funded is drafted to ensure that the beneficiary government meets its roles and obligations relevant to the conduct and sustainability of the project or programme. This can mean, for example, in terms of **Article 5 obligations** delineating the different expectations and responsibilities in order to prevent situations such as those experienced in Burundi (i.e., mine fee declaration followed by retraction). This includes, for example, a commitment by the beneficiary government to be able to utilise the capacity built locally and be responsible for its operational costs. In the field of SALW, efforts to support stockpile management should be coupled by a clear beneficiary government's commitment to institute, and become responsible for the stockpile management mechanism in the long-term.
- Ensuring that **synergies** are capitalised upon. The GICHD and SAS are recipients of substantial Swiss funding. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the work carried out by the GICHD or by SAS is actively utilised by the FDFA. The funding to these agencies does not appear to have been part of a more holistic approach to support mine action or interventions in the field of SALW. In order to maximise the impact from Swiss funding, the FDFA could/should utilise the Swiss funded resources within GICHD and SAS to inform its own fields of work. One constraint to ensuring the use of outputs is that Swiss funding to both of these institutions primarily supports core costs rather than projects. This, therefore, requires that a discussion with each institution be held early on (planning stages) to ensure that the work they conduct is both in line with the Swiss priorities (i.e., the respective strategies) and can be useful to the FDFA. While this could be understood as affecting the independence of the institutions, the effort to synergise work can be seen as a way to maximise the impact of both the FDFA on the one hand and of SAS and the GICHD on the other. Additionally, all relevant desks at the FDFA should work jointly through the respective focal points to ensure that knowledge gained through the work conducted by the GICHD and SAS feeds into the work conducted/funded by the different FDFA desks (i.e., regional and subject desks) and by the Swiss Development Cooperation. Lastly, the GICHD and SAS should be made aware¹⁰ of the funded projects in different countries and actively encouraged to ensure that their work in respective countries is informed of, and where ever possible includes, other Swiss partners (i.e., Swiss funded agencies).
- **Integration** of SALW and Landmine initiatives into broader human security, transitional justice, Human Rights efforts is an area where the FDFA could play a key role as Switzerland has a long standing reputation in the aforementioned areas. The experience in Burundi highlights that the principal

¹⁰ For the GICHD this is already the case.

difficulty in doing this lies with the very institutions that are traditionally involved in technical demining and SALW technical projects (i.e., disarmament, stockpile destruction, etc.). This difficulty is rooted in the culture of the operating agencies which have normally not seen themselves as part and parcel of the larger efforts in peace consolidation, development, SSD, etc. One way to generate this change would be for the FDFA, as a donor, to demand that operating agencies re-think their programming strategies and actively engage with other actors to ensure that the outputs of their operations have an impact in other fields.

- Ensuring that programmes funded have clear **capacity building** components is important as it serves to enable **long-term sustainability**. In Burundi the mine action effort included clear capacity building while the work in the SALW field did not. This means that the latter requires consistent and long-term donor support. At the same time building capacity can pose challenges for the operator. For example, diluted the chain of command as was the case with the MAG in Burundi. The overall gain far exceeds the costs posed by the operational challenges encountered along the way. The Burundian experience does, however, call for more attention to be paid to the governmental commitment (beneficiary) to utilise the capacity left behind. In Burundi, capacity in the mine action sector, including equipment has not stopped the government for searching for funds to cover operational costs which are very small to begin with. In the field of stockpile management, the Burundi example shows that little efforts were made to build local capacity and support the local ownership of the effort. As a consequence, , stockpile management has so far failed to become an internalised process as part of the common operations of the armed forces.
- SALW efforts generally require **long-term** and **far reaching support**. This means that the expectations of short-term projects should be realistically quite limited to begin with. Expectations in terms of project impact should be carefully tied to the type of investment made (i.e., short, medium, long term as well as broad or narrow project activities). While there may be a good reason to support a short-term intervention, the most effective interventions will be those that are holistic in nature and clearly understand that SALW issues are not simply about hardware instruments (i.e., the weapons) but part of a far more complex dynamic which includes the need to also grasp the role of agents and institutions, and that all three factors need to be understood in relation to the people they affect (see Figure 1). To this end, the Dutch approach to SSD in Burundi is one that is far better likely to produce results than, for example, the single efforts to support the securing of armouries conducted by MAG. This is not because the MAG effort is not useful, but because the MAG effort was single pronged and lacked a holistic vision which could ensure that the project outputs were supported more globally through a process of education, capacity building, etc.
- Challenges to **gender constructions** and the creation of an environment that fosters greater gender equality and benefits more from said equity is not something that can be attained from simply including women on projects. In Burundi there was no evidence to suggest that the token women included as

part of field projects had any impact on the general conceptions of gender at any level. While gender requires attention and supporting a shift in the way gender is constructed locally is an important component of supporting development, this requires a much more nuanced effort. An effort to support changes in gender perspectives should include an understanding of concepts about femininity and masculinity and a clear idea of what part of these concepts is to be challenged. Based on this kind of understanding programmes/projects can attempt to formulate activities which target specific gender issues. Simply including token women as part of projects pacifies the gender issue rather than actively supports shifts in the conceptions of gender.

8.0 Recommendations

Here, a limited number of recommendations for the FDFA, and particularly, the Human Security Section, are listed. These recommendations are intended to not only have implications for Burundi and the Great Lakes Region but for work in the field of SALW and Landmines at large. The recommendations have been identified by the virtue of their relevance to the work in the field of Human Security more generally and hence, should be understood as such.

- Given the limited funding available for Burundi at the Human Security Division, and generally within the Human Security Division for SALW, the FDFA should consider whether it wants to commit more substantial resources to SALW as this field requires, in order to make an impact on the ground at the programmatic level; or limiting their funding in the field of SALW in favour of other areas (i.e., the first three pillars of focus within Human Security). Another opportunity would be to contribute to a small component of an otherwise large programme where funding is largely available (i.e., work as part of a consortia of donors). Although, the latter option may be ill suited for the FDFA's Human Security Division and more akin to the approaches that can be taken by the SDC. Generally, contributing to smaller programmatic initiatives which are not part of a long-term holistic engagement are not likely to deliver the outcomes and impacts desired by the current theory of change.
- The FDFA should clearly map and problematise the *theory of change* of projects prior to funding them to ensure the projects are in fact able to meet their ultimate goals.
- If the FDFA wants to contribute to SALW without increasing their current budgets and types of engagement (i.e., limited resources), the FDFA should explore their ability to engage in the creation of joint donor funds which would enable them to contribute to SALW issues in a comprehensive way while not having to carry the full financial burden of long term projects.
- The FDFA should enter into a clear agreement/commitment with the recipient country outlining the obligations of the recipient country and the Swiss commitment prior to making any support efforts that aim to enable countries to meet Article 5 obligations.
- The FDFA should ensure that all efforts that they fund, be they landmine or SALW related, have a clear approach to ensure sustainability such as clear plans for capacity building and a clear commitment from the recipient government to utilise the capacity built (i.e., including, financing the running costs of the capacity built once the funded project is finished).
- The FDFA should require that organisations they fund are active members of civil society at large and have a clear approach (i.e., written strategy) on how to engage with other actors to ensure that their efforts serve to further impact Human Security, generally.

- The FDFA should utilise the research (and operational work) that is conducted with Swiss funding (e.g., GICHD and SAS) more actively. This should include the development of a forum where findings by the different organisations are presented to the relevant FDFA staff on a routine basis and/or where recipients of funding (e.g., GICHD, SAS) align their priorities with the relevant Swiss Strategies. The FDFA should request to be informed of the planned activities by the different institutions so that they are better able to benefit from the outputs. GICHD and SAS should be made aware of the other efforts funded by the FDFA and should be ***actively encouraged*** to engage with other FDFA partners (i.e., countries and organisations being funded). A system for an on-going dialogue and communication between the different agencies (i.e., FDFA-GICHD and FDFA-SAS) should be established. The ability to include the aforementioned issues into contractually binding mechanisms should be explored by the FDFA.
- The FDFA Human Security Division should discuss the GD with the SDC (and any other FDFA division as may be relevant). If all the parties agree to actively support the GD in order to turn it into a dynamic process that plays a clear role in the discussion and operationalisation of armed violence reduction worldwide then the FDFA organically should ensure that all relevant projects are framed within the GD scope and utilise the GD as a starting platform. This will serve to legitimise both the project and the GD.
- The FDFA should ensure gender factors are included in a manner that approaches the subject in an innovative and catalytic way. Otherwise, the inclusion of gender may have no real impact at all. One way to identify innovative approaches could be the utilisation of the findings and capacity of the Gender Mine Action Program (GMAP). In the field of SALW there is very little evidence of how the gender issue can/should be integrated but this is a demonstration of the lack of knowledge and not a lack of relevance. Therefore, the FDFA should desist from requesting that token women be included into projects and instead require the organisations to be innovative in their inclusion of gender issues. Operator agencies receiving Swiss funding should be actively encouraged to utilize the GMAP as a resource in the field of gender, generally and gender inclusion, specifically.
- The FDFA should explore possibilities for regional support/activities, but these should be guided by the relevance of this type of approach for the theme (i.e., legislation vs. disarmament). Legislation, for example, can lend itself well to regional work while less to disarmament efforts, given the different dynamics governing SALW proliferation present in each country. Supporting the development of regional legislation in the field of SALW export/import/holding etc. can be one area where regional intervention would be positive but this should be weighed against the regional will and costs for such an effort. Similarly, GBV not linked to armed conflict can also be an area that benefits from regional interventions. Programmatic efforts in the field of disarmament, stockpile management, war related GBV, etc. for example will not benefit from a regional approach as the conditions in each country are too different to begin with. Regions where there are very different challenges in the neighbouring countries, may benefit from a common

approach to legislation but with very different approaches to programmatic activities. Hence, this recommendation can also be applied outside the Great Lakes Region.

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10.0 Annex 1: ToR

Termes de Référence

Appel d'offres:

Evaluation externe des projets appuyés par la Division Sécurité Humaine du Département Fédéral des Affaires Etrangères Suisse dans le domaine du contrôle des armes légères et de petit calibre ainsi que les mines anti-personnel au Burundi 2006 - 2011

1. Introduction

L'engagement de la Division Sécurité Humaine au Burundi se base sur 4 piliers :

- Médiation, facilitation et dialogue démocratique
- Justice transitionnelle / traitement du passé
- Droits Humains
- Contrôle des armes légères et de petits calibres (ALPC) / Action antimines

Les différents projets que la Division Sécurité Humaine soutient au Burundi en matière de sécurisation des armes sont arrivés à terme courant 2011. De plus, la 2ème Conférence ministérielle d'examen de la Déclaration de Genève s'est déroulée à Genève les 31 octobre et 1^{er} novembre dernier. La Division Sécurité Humaine souhaiterait profiter de cet instant propice pour évaluer les activités qu'elle soutient dans le secteur ALPC.

Entre 2006 et 2011, la Division Sécurité Humaine a notamment envoyé du personnel expert en la matière et a soutenu un certain nombre de projets dans ce domaine. Son engagement s'est alors basé sur les quatre hypothèses suivantes :

1. La collecte et destruction d'ALPC, la sécurisation des stocks d'armes de l'armée et de la police (notamment dans la zone Ouest du pays) ainsi que la création d'un registre des armes détenues par les forces de défense et de sécurité contribuent à la diminution de la violence armée dans le pays et de manière plus large à la consolidation de la paix et du développement.
2. La Suisse dans une approche globale « whole of gouvernement ») joue un rôle de coordinateur et de rassembleur autour de cette thématique.
3. Les projets financés par la Suisse favorisent, à travers une approche directe de réduction de la violence armée, la mise en œuvre du Protocole de Nairobi, du Programme d'action des Nations Unies ainsi que de la Déclaration de Genève sur la violence armée et le développement.
4. La Suisse soutient des projets de déminage afin d'améliorer la sécurité humaine et le développement socio-économique au Burundi. Cela permet également de contribuer à l'accomplissement des responsabilités du Burundi dans le cadre de la Convention d'Ottawa.

2. Buts et objectifs de l'évaluation

L'évaluation donnera un aperçu sur les résultats atteints et sur l'impact de l'engagement suisse dans le secteur ALPC depuis 2006. Elle fournira également une base de décision pour la continuation ou non d'un futur engagement suisse et donnera des recommandations pouvant permettre d'améliorer l'efficacité et l'efficience de l'apport suisse, au cas où celle-ci déciderait de poursuivre son engagement. La méthode à utiliser combinera donc les aspects de l'évaluation "summative" avec les aspects de l'évaluation "formative". Comme le Burundi a accompli le déminage dans le pays conformément à l'article 5 de la Convention d'Ottawa, il est le bon moment d'évaluer également l'action antimines de nos partenaires (qui sont les mêmes que pour les ALPC).

3. Objectifs spécifiques

Pertinence :

- Est-ce que le domaine du contrôle des ALPC est pertinent en vue de promouvoir la consolidation de la paix au Burundi ?
- Est-ce que la Suisse peut faire valoir des atouts dans les domaines ALPC et action antimines qui la distinguent d'autres acteurs ?
Quelles sont les principales leçons apprises par rapports à l'action antimines et le déminage plus spécifiquement ?
- Quels sont les liens existants et/ou à développer avec les activités de la DDC/DFAE et du DDPS ?
- Quels sont les liens existants et/ou à développer avec d'autres domaines d'engagement de la Division Sécurité Humaine ?

Efficacité :

- Est-ce que les actions et projets soutenus étaient utiles et efficaces :
 - Par rapport à la mise en œuvre du protocole de Nairobi, du programme d'action des Nations Unies et de la Déclaration de Genève ?
 - Par rapport à la réduction de la violence armée dans le pays ?
 - Par rapport à l'accomplissement des obligations sous l'article 5 de la Convention d'Ottawa ?
- Est-ce que les partenaires ont travaillé de manière efficace ?
- Est-ce que les partenaires se sont référés aux meilleures pratiques et leçons apprises dans le domaine ?

Efficience :

- Est-ce que les moyens à disposition ont été utilisés de manière efficiente (relation input/output) ?
- Est-ce que les partenaires ont travaillé de manière efficiente ?

Partenaires :

- Est-ce que des partenariats pertinents et de bonne qualité ont été choisis et développés?
- Appréciation de la collaboration avec les partenaires dans le cadre du groupe de suivi de la mise en œuvre des recommandations de la Déclaration de Genève
- Appréciation de la coordination de l'action antimines et du déminage plus spécifiquement ?
- Qualité de la collaboration avec
 - le Gouvernement ?
 - Position du gouvernement par rapport aux projets soutenus, Quelle compréhension ? Quel degré d'implication ?
 - Les attentes envers le gouvernement étaient-elles clairement indiquées dans le projet ?
 - les Nations Unies ?
 - la Société Civile
 - d'autres sections de la DP IV/DDC/DDPS ?
- Est-ce que la Suisse a pu avoir une valeur ajoutée dans la mise en réseau des différents partenaires ?

Résultats et Impact :

- Quels sont les résultats au niveau des armes en circulation, de la gestion des armes des forces de défense et de la police nationale ?
- Quel impact sur le processus de consolidation de la paix ?
- Les stratégies et instruments utilisés ont-ils permis de remplir les objectifs visés ?
- Est-ce que les capacités nationales pour faire face aux problématiques des ALPC ont été renforcées suite à l'engagement suisse ?
- Est-ce que les capacités nationales et la coordination ont pu être renforcées dans le domaine du déminage ? Quelles sont les leçons apprises ? Quel est l'héritage durable des capacités développées dans le cadre du déminage ? Quelle est la capacité EOD (standing capacity) ? Quelles sont les mesures dans le domaine de l'éducation au risque des mines et l'assistance aux victimes ?
- Les activités financées par la Suisse ont-elles un caractère durable ? Et quelles conséquences un retrait de l'engagement Suisse dans ce domaine pourrait-il engendrer?

Inclusion du genre :

- Est-ce que la dimension genre a été prise en compte ?
- Participation et formation de femmes dans le cadre des projets ?

Perspectives :

- Quelles seraient les recommandations pour un engagement futur de la Suisse ?

- Est-ce qu'une approche régionale transfrontalière serait plus pertinente et si oui quelles seraient les suggestions de mise en oeuvre ?
- Comment améliorer les synergies avec les autres axes d'interventions du programme de politique de paix dans la région des Grands Lacs ?

4. Méthodologie de l'évaluation

L'équipe d'évaluation soumettra une première proposition délimitant le cadre de l'évaluation ainsi que les axes méthodologiques. Après sélection de l'équipe d'évaluation mixte (un(e) expert(e) burundais(e), un(e) expert(e) international(e)), le concept méthodologique sera peaufiné en collaboration avec la personne en charge de la gestion du processus.

L'évaluation se basera sur les principes d'évaluation définis par l'OCDE-DAC et la "Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Activities" (www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork).

L'évaluation prévoit l'étude des documents, une série d'interviews à Berne et par téléphone ainsi qu'une mission au Burundi. Selon l'appréciation du comité de pilotage et des évaluateurs, un séminaire rassemblant divers partenaires pourrait être envisagé afin de partager les résultats de l'évaluation.

5. Plan d'action et chronologie

Le programme d'action ci-dessous est estimé. Le processus devrait se terminer au plus tard le 31 mai 2012. Le délai de postulation quant à lui est fixé au 15 février.

Activités	Estimation du nombre de jours
Étude des documents	5
Mission Berne	1
Interviews par téléphone	2
Mission au Burundi	10 (inclus jours de voyage)
Rédaction du rapport	5
Présentation du rapport à Berne	1
Finalisation du rapport	2
Workshop	1

6. Profil des évaluateurs et processus de sélection

L'équipe d'évaluation consistera de deux experts (national et international) qui disposent en tant qu'équipe des qualifications suivantes :

- Expérience prouvée dans le domaine d'évaluation externe
- Excellentes connaissances du domaine des armes légères et de petits calibres
- Expérience de la problématique des armes légères au Burundi
- Expérience de travail dans le domaine de consolidation de la paix et/ou du développement avec des acteurs gouvernementaux et non-gouvernementaux

- Working experience with both governmental and non-governmental actors
- Langues de travail: Français, Anglais, Kirundi

Les évaluateurs postuleront ensemble et l'équipe sera sélectionnée par le comité de pilotage en consultation avec le conseiller en consolidation de la paix à Bujumbura.

Toute candidature sera transmise à carole.despont@eda.admin.ch et comportera :

- ✓ Une proposition méthodologique détaillée
- ✓ Un CV détaillé
- ✓ Un emploi du temps détaillé
- ✓ Une proposition de budget

11.0 Annex 2: Questions Posed Through Interview

The list of questions below is not a full list of the questions that were asked, but a guideline to determine the key questions which were to be asked. It served to provide a general idea of the type of information that was elicited. The questions below exclude interviews which focused on more technical questions such as approaches utilized for mine clearance (demining-community relationships); support for victims (type of medical facilities); technical capabilities in relation to SALW destruction etc. The lists of questions below are divided by general respondent type.

Government representatives:

- 1) How would you characterize the (landmine/SALW) problem in the country?
- 2) Do you think there is a link between the peace building process and (landmine/SALW)? If yes, how do you characterize that link? If no, how do you view (landmine/SALW) in relation to the long term development of Burundi?
- 3) What do you believe have been the most pressing problems affecting Burundi in relation to (landmine/SALW) in the last decade/five years?
- 4) Have any of these challenges been met? How would you, in your opinion characterize the current situation?
- 5) What types of measures have been taken in Burundi to meet the demands of (the APMBC, the Cartagena and Nairobi Plans of Action; the Nairobi Protocol, Geneva declaration, the armed violence mapping of Burundi, etc.)?
- 6) Which donor governments/institutions have been at the fore of supporting Burundi in meeting the (landmine/SALW) challenges?
- 7) Who are the main partners for Burundi in supporting work in the field of (landmine/SALW)?
- 8) How has the partnership functioned?
- 9) What do you think has been learned from these partnerships?
- 10) Have there been efforts to build national capacity to respond to the (landmine/SALW) challenges? If yes, what have these efforts been?
- 11) Currently, what type of capacity does the government have to respond to (SALW/Landmines) issues in future? (Note: While Burundi has met its article 5 obligations the possibility of single stray landmines remains a threat, I am sure)
- 12) What type of capacity does Burundi have to meet the requirements of the APMBC in relation to Victims and MRE?
- 13) Has gender been considered in any of the projects led by the government? If yes, how?
- 14) What type of capacity/experience does Burundi have that it could share with other countries (South-South Cooperation)?
- 15) Are you familiar with the support provided by Switzerland in the field of (landmine/SALW)?
- 16) How would you characterize the impact of the Swiss contribution?

17) What would have happened if Switzerland had not funded the projects they funded?

UN and NGO Representatives/Funding recipients:

- 1) Have the resources that have been made available by Switzerland for (landmine/SALW) been sufficient?
- 2) How have these resources been used (input/output)?
- 3) How has the relationship with partners been?
- 4) What challenges have been encountered in working with partners?
- 5) Have the projects and activities funded by Switzerland been useful and effective in relation to implementing the Nairobi Protocol, the United Nations Programme of Action and the Geneva Declaration, the Cartagena and Nairobi Action Plan, Article 5 of the APMBC? If yes, how?
- 6) What are the results of the interventions in terms of weapons in circulation, the management of the arms of the defence forces and of the national police? Demining?
- 7) What are the impacts of the interventions on the peace building process?
- 8) Have the national capacities to address issues of SALW/Landmines been strengthened as a result of the Swiss commitment?
- 9) Are the activities funded by the Swiss sustainable? How so?
- 10) Does Switzerland add value in networking with/between the various partners?
- 11) Was gender taken into account as part of the efforts made? If yes how, if no why not/how could it have been included?
- 12) Were women actively included as participants and trainees of/in projects?
- 13) Based on your experience, what recommendations can be made to inform future Swiss engagement?
- 14) Would a regional trans-border approach be more relevant and if so what are the suggestions for implementation?
- 15) How can synergies with other areas of intervention in the field of peace building in the Great Lakes region be improved?

Specific project issues:

- 16) Exploring the theory of change, could we walk through the different initiatives and outline what the thinking behind each was?
- 17) (for MAG) I found that the reporting of the 2009 project (SALW) consistently reported outcomes lower than those expected, could you elaborate as the reasons for that and the implications of these circumstances in terms of work in Burundi and elsewhere (lessons learned)?
- 18) (for MAG) In your reporting you highlight that the end of the project will coincide with the existence of sufficient local capacity to carry out the tasks at hand (SALW), do you feel that this goal has been accomplished?
- 19) (for MAG) You have worked with similar projects in different parts of the country and sometimes with funding from different donors? Have you experienced differences in outputs/outcome/impact in different areas of the country? What determined your reasoning for approaching any one donor for any one region of the country?

Donors:

- 1) What do you think are the key aspects to consolidating peace in Burundi?
- 2) What do you think are the key aspects to reducing armed violence in Burundi?
- 3) what is your experience from Burundi in the field of SALW/Landmines?
- 4) What do you think are the most pressing needs in the area of SALW/Landmines?
- 5) In your view does Switzerland have a specific role that it can play for which it is better suited than other donors?
- 6) Does Switzerland add value in networking with/between the various partners?
- 7) What kinds of partnerships are currently in place?
- 8) How are these partnerships operationalized?
- 9) What is the added value of these partnerships?
- 10) Do you think there are opportunities for synergies that would allow for a more regional approach to support in the human security field?
- 11) Do you think that Burundi has a role to play in leading south-south cooperation?
- 12) What do you think is the future of the SALW/Landmine issue in Burundi?

Switzerland (desk officers and representatives in the field):

- 1) Do you think the field of SALW control relevant to promote the consolidation of peace in Burundi? If yes, why/how? If no why not?
- 2) In your opinion does Switzerland have an advantage in promoting the consolidation of peace through SALW related initiatives which set it apart from other players? If yes, why? If yes what are these advantages? If no why not?
- 3) The strategy on SALW and Mine Action clearly outline the division of roles and responsibilities between different federal agencies, what are the practical linkages to other fields of Swiss support (i.e., including, for example, SDC, FDFA, DDPS)? How this type of structure function in reality? What are their strengths and weakness? What do you think can be learned from this approach thus far? How could the current approach to work be improved?
- 4) What are the linkages between different areas of engagement by the Human Security Division (i.e., Landmines, Transitional Justice, Human Rights, Mediation, Facilitation and Dialogue)? In your opinion does this approach best serve the fulfilment of the different government strategies? What lessons can you draw from your experience thus far? Are there aspects that could be improved? If yes, how?
- 5) How good has the experience of collaboration with partners been? What can be learned from this experience (ex: Geneva Declaration Monitoring group, governments, civil society, other donors, etc.)
- 6) How does Switzerland understand gender and its inclusion into project work?
- 7) Which areas of work, do you think, can benefit from synergies which are not in place today?
- 8) What do you think can be learned from the Burundi experience?

- 9) How do you think the Burundi experience can be utilized in other contexts?

Other NGOs

- 1) What do you think are the key issues that are required to solidify the peace process?
- 2) How do you see the SALW/Landmine situation in the country today (state of play)?
- 3) What are the results of the interventions in terms of weapons in circulation, the management of the arms of the defence forces and of the national police. Demining, Victim Assistance, MRE?
- 4) In your view, what are the impacts of the interventions on the peace building process?
- 5) Which organization or donor has been most influential in the field of SALW/Landmines in Burundi and why?
- 6) In your opinion, have the national capacities to address issues of SALW been strengthened as a result of the Swiss commitment?
- 7) Do you think that Switzerland has played an important role in Burundi? How/why?
- 8) Do you think that Burundi is in a position to share its experiences with other countries in the region? If yes, what do you think would be the benefit of this kind of approach?

12.0 Annex 3: People Interviewed

List of interviewees met with during the field visit to Burundi

Date	Name	Function/Post	Phone Number	E-Mail
14, 21, and 25/05/2012	Oliver HOEHNE (Intro mtg, interview and debrief mtg)	Swiss Mission Burundi/ Political Advisor	+ 257 79 949407 + 257 22252 263	Oliver.hoehne@eda.admin.ch
14 and 24/05/2012	2.Julie CLAVEAU(Interview and clarification of information mtg)	Program Director/MAG	+257 79b296 342 + 257 22 259 382	Julie.claveau@magburundi.org
14/05/2012	Léonce MUSAVYI	Directeur de la Direction de l'Action Humanitaire contre les Mines: security Minsiter	+ 257 79 927 335	musleonce@yahoo.fr
15/05/2012	Landry NINTERESTE	Insight Conflict	+ 257 79 563 855	landry@350.org
15/05/2012	Celcius BARANKIRIZA	Ligue Iteka/ Point focal et Représentant du réseau burundais d'action sur les ALPC		celciusbara@yahoo.fr
17/05/2012	Thadée MANIRAKIZA	Membre de FNL RWASA chargé de la mobilisation	+257 79 989 658	bamarley2@yahoo.fr
17/05/2012	Dave BEER	Head Office/ DFID	+257 78 901 615 + 257 22 246 500	d-beer@dfid.gov.uk
18/05/2012	Joseph NDAYISENGA	Directeur Général de la Solidarité./ Président du comité interministériel et sectoriel de coordination de la mise en œuvre du Plan d'Action National d'Assistance aux victimes de mines/REG et autres personnes en situation d'handicape. (PANAVMP SH).	77 742 748	ndayijos@yahoo.fr

17/05/2012	Eric NIRAGIRA	Centre d'Encadrement et Développement des ex combattants/CEDAC	79 912 027	ericniragira@gmail.com
17/05/2012	Denis GAHIRU	OPCI : Officier de Police de première Classe. Conseiller du Directeur Général de la Protection Civile, Ancien Directeur Général	77 733 343	gadenir@yahoo.fr
17/05/2012	12.Claver NSENGIYUMVA	Survivor Corps	79 931 016	silao@yahoo.fr
21/05/2012	14.Caroline DUCONSEILLE	Handicap International Belgique/ Directrice des programmes	79 943 425	dp@burundi.handicap.be
22/05/2012	Ian DUPONT	UNDP	71 578 780	ian.dupont@undp.org
22/05/2012	Col. KAGEZA	Brigade Logistic's Commandant	79 957 639	Kge1968@yahoo.fr
22/05/2012	Singo STEFFEN	International Conference on the great lakes region	79 430 790 22 25 68 24	Mwachofi.singo@cglr.org
23/05/2012	Lt Général Germain NIYOYANKANA.	Ex Ministre de la Défense et ex combattants	79 932 170	germnyk@yahoo.fr
23/05/2012	Major Général Diomède NDEGEYA	Chef d'Etat Major Général de l'Armée Adjoint	79 933 408	ndegeyadio@yahoo.fr
23/05/2012	Zénon NDABANEZE	Président du CNAP/ Commission Nationale Permanente contre la prolifération des ALPC	79 969 881	iphyndaba@yahoo.fr
23/05/2012	Selima MAWAD	Impunity Watch	75 513 123	Selima.mawad@impunitywatch.org

24/05/2012	Serge RUMIN	Program Manager/ Développement du Secteur Sécurité (DSS). Nederland -Burundi	71 265 339	Serge.rumin@gmail.com
24/05/2012	Dr Godefroid KAMWENUBUSA	Chargé de maladie Chronique/ Ministère de la Santé	77 737 381	gkamwe@yahoo.fr
24/05/2012	P Claver MBONIMPA	APRODH	79 923 135	Mbonimpa50@yahoo.fr aprodhasbl@yahoo.fr
24/05/2012	Serge NIBIZI	Radio Public Africaine/RPA	79 909 134	nibiziserge@yahoo.fr
24/05/2012	Obianju NWOBI	UNDP		nwobi@un.org
24/05/2012	Jacques NTIBARIKURE	CPD/ Colonie des Pionniers pour le Développement «Association des handicapés »	79 905 384	pionniersfr@yahoo.fr
24/05/2012	Serge NTAKIRUTIMA	CENAP		ntakirutimana@cenap.bi
25/05/2012	André NDAYAMBAJE	Général de Birgade. Bureau Instruction, opération et transmission	78 945 821	ndayandre@yahoo.fr

List of interviewees interviewed by phone or met in Geneva

Date	Name	Function/Post	Phone Number	E-Mail
11/05/12	Gilles LANDBERG	Former political officer at the Belgian Embassy	+65 62207677	Giles.Landsberg@diplobel.fed.be

11/05/12	Col Mbaye FAYE	Former SSR Unit BINUM	Unknown	Mbayafeye.feye7@gmail.com
04/05/12	Asiata DE	Former UNDP Deputy Director	Unknown	Aissata.de@undp.org
05/06/12	Markus LEITNER	Deputy Head of Human Security Division, former Chief of FP II Section	+41 31 322 14 40	Unknown
05/06/12	Siro BELTRAMETTI	Deputy Chief of Multilateral Section, in charge of SALW	+41 31 322 35 39	Unknown
05/06/12	Lukas PROBST	Programme Officer for the Great Lakes Region	+41 31 323 89 17	lukas.probstlopez@eda.admin.ch
06/06/12	Jeannette SEPPEN	Former head of Mission NL Embassy	+32-2-6791761	Jeannette.Seppen@mimbuza.nl
08/06/12	Cyril CALAME	Military adviser, SSR Unit	+257 22 20 5844	calame@un.org
11/06/12	Sharmalla NAIDOO	Advisor, Mine Action, Security and Development	+41 22 906 8322	s.naidoo@gichd.org
12/06/12	Daniel ERIKSSON	Head, Information Management	+ 41 22 9061 684	d.eriksson@gichd.org
15/06/12	Claudia MOSER	Programme Officer, Mines in the Multilateral Section	+41 31 322 08 16	claudia.moser@eda.admin.ch
15/06/12	Luigi DE MARTINO	Geneva Declaration Project Coordinator	+ 41 22 908 57 85	luigi.demartino@smallarmssurvey.org
15/06/12	Regina GUJAN	Former UNDP Program Manager	+992 37 224 73 16	regina.gujan@sdc.net
18/06/12	Francesco QUATTRINI	Chief of FP II Section	+41 31 322 33 34	francesco.quattrini@eda.admin.ch
27/06/12	Sophie DELFOLIE	Implementation Support Specialist	+41 22 906 16 60	s.delfolie@gichd.org
27/06/12	Keith KRAUSE	Program Director, Small Arms Survey	+41 22 908 5777	keith.krause@graduateinstitute.ch
04/07/12	Armin RIESER	Program Manager Conflicts and Human Rights Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, South Asia Division	+41 31 325 93 07	armin.rieser@deza.admin.ch
Via email	Herve GONSOLIN	Former UNDP	Unknown	herve.gonsolin@undp.org

13.0 Annex 4: Online Survey

List of address used for the online Survey:

The list below is the full list of addresses that were sent the online survey. Some of these address (all those in Burundi) were also sent an email attachment version of the survey.

tsh@dca.dk	Active
adampforbes@gmail.com	Active
patricia.ntahorubuze@undp.org	Active
ananda.millard@ncg.no	Active
k.brinkert@apminebanconvention.org	Active
s.delfolie@apminebanconvention.org	Active
s.husy@gichd.org	Bounced
p.rapillard@gichd.org	Active
kasia@icblcmc.org	Active
isabelle@icblcmc.org	Active
nhogg@icrc.org	Active
Philip.Kimpton@dfat.gov.au	Active
glaurie@unog.ch	Bounced
juergstreuli@bluewin.ch	Active
reto.wollenmann@eda.admin.ch	Active
robert.diethelm@vtg.admin.ch	Active
robert.amsler@vtg.admin.ch	Active
francois.garraux@vtg.admin.ch	Active
natacha.antille@deza.admin.ch	Active
armin.rieser@deza.admin.ch	Active
s.naidoo@gichd.org	Active
christian.holmboe.ruge@ilpi.org	Active
rebekah_roberts@yahoo.co.uk	Bounced
info@bi.acordininternational.org	Active
afd-burundi@cbinf.com	Bounced
afd-burundi@usan-bu.net	Bounced
burundi@africahumanitarian.org	Active
aha@cbinf.com	Bounced
arpbdi@usan-bu.net	Bounced
carebur@careburundi.org	Bounced
csi-burundi@usan-bu.net	Bounced
cecibdi@cbinf.com	Bounced
caidburundi@usan-bu.net	Bounced
buj_bujumbura@icrc.org	Active
john.minto@concern.net	Bounced
croixrou@cbinf.com	Bounced
pm.burundi@dca.dk	Bounced

echobdi@telema.bi	Bounced
oxfamhpc@cbinf.com	Bounced
ribur@ri.org	Bounced
intersos@usan-bu.net	Bounced
grandslacs.advocacy@jrs.net	Active
msfbe@usan-bu.net	Bounced
tdhbu@cbinf.com	Bounced
smora@sfcg.org.bi	Bounced
abuco@ymail.com	Bounced
disarm@wilpf.ch	Active
ucodemf@yahoo.fr	Bounced
R.C.Willems@uu.nl	Active
vanessaf@npaid.org	Active
pbongard@genevacall.org	Active
wille.christina@gmail.com	Active
info@landmineaction.org	Active
mail@halotrust.org	Active
rsimpson@aoav.org.uk	Active
kepps@ploughshares.ca	Active
nic@prio.no	Active
stephaniepezard@yahoo.com	Bounced
cagboton-johnson@unog.ch	Active
gerard.chagnot@undp.org	Bounced
admafricare@usan-bu.net	Bounced
nicolas.florquin@smallarmssurvey.org	Active
luigi.demartino@smallarmssurvey.org	Active
contact@aprodh.org	Bounced
parcem@yahoo.fr	Active
ndayiziga@cenap.bi	Active
info@coped.org	Bounced
ndayijo@yahoo.fr	Active
forschburundi@gmail.com	Active
pninahazwe@yahoo.fr	Active
nkwetasa@unhcr.org	Active
rresmini@ictj.org	Active
LouisMarieN@globalrights.org	Active
coordo.rcn.bu@gmail.com	Active
ericniragira@gmail.com	Active
apd.togetherforpeace@gmail.com	Active
addf91@yahoo.fr	Active
cedac20054@yahoo.fr	Active

Online survey questions: Fielded

Below you will find the questions that were part of the online survey. Please note that the survey was available in French and in English and that questions were put forth in a dynamic format (i.e., questions were tied to respective answers)

given by the respondent, for example if yes/if no...) therefore not all the questions below were seen by all the respondents.

Hello: You are invited to participate in our survey Small Arms and Light Weapons and Landmines as may be relevant to your field of work. In this survey, approximately 30 people will be asked to complete a survey that asks questions about SALW and/or Landmines and the Swiss contribution to these fields. It will take approximately 15 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project. However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can withdraw from the survey at any point. It is very important for us to learn your opinions. Your survey responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will be reported only in the aggregate. Your information will be coded and will remain confidential. If you have questions at any time about the survey or the procedures, you may contact Ananda S. Millard, Team Leader, at +42 548 1667 or by email at ananda.millard@ncg.no. Thank you very much for your time and support. Please start with the survey now by clicking on the Continue button below.

Please provide the name of the organization you work for (this information will not be disclosed with your responses, but will allow us to know which organizations participated in this survey)

Please specify the type of organization you work for/represent.

1. Government agency
2. Government funded organization
3. NGO
4. Research institution
5. United Nations Agency
6. Other

Where is your organization based?

1. Burundi
2. Other

Please characterise your work as belonging to any of the following fields (mark as many as apply, note that the list is not mutually exclusive)

1. Development
2. Education
3. Environment issues
4. Food security
5. Gender
6. Good Governance
7. Human Rights
8. Human Security
9. Humanitarian intervention
10. Landmines
11. SALW
12. Other

Are you familiar with Burundi or the Burundian Peace Process?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

What do you think are the main challenges to sustainable peace in Burundi today?

Are you aware of the areas which Switzerland funds in the field of human security?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Which ones? (Mark as many as you believe apply)

1. Education
2. Food security
3. Good Governance
4. Health care
5. Human Rights
6. Landmines
7. Mediation, facilitation and democratic dialogue
8. SALW
9. Transitional Justice
10. Other

Were you aware that the Swiss government has been involved in funding efforts in the field of human security in Burundi?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Do you know which types of work were funded by Switzerland?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

Which ones? (mark as many as apply)

1. Education
2. Food security
3. Good Governance
4. Health care
5. Human Rights
6. Landmines
7. Mediation, facilitation and democratic dialogue
8. SALW
9. Transitional Justice
10. Other

Are you aware of which institutions and or organizations have received funding from Switzerland in Burundi?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Which ones? (mark as many as apply)

1. Burundi Civil Society Organizations
2. DCA
3. MAG
4. SNV
5. The Burundi Government
6. UNDP
7. UNHCR
8. UNICEF
9. HI
10. Other

What do you think characterizes Switzerland as a donor?

Do you think that Switzerland is poised in a special position as a donor?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

What areas do you think it has a stronger role to play and why?

Do you think the Swiss can assume a specific role in the Burundian context?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

What role?

Are you familiar with... issue generally?

1. Landmines
2. SALW
3. Armed Violence
4. All
5. Neither

Are you familiar with the Landmine Ban Treaty?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Are you aware that it requires countries which are signatory to the convention to destroy all landmines in mined areas?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Are you familiar with the donor initiative to support countries in meeting their article 5 obligations (i.e. do not leave the affected country when the major demining tasks have been completed)?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Which governments do you know support-demining missions which aim to rid the country of its last land mines in order to meet its article 5 obligations?

1. Austria
2. Belgium
3. Germany
4. Japan
5. Netherlands

6. Norway/
7. Sweden
8. Switzerland
9. United Kingdom
10. Other

Were you aware that Burundi had landmines?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

To your knowledge do they still have land mines?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

Do you know when they finished their demining?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

When?

Do you know which donors supported Burundi in their demining efforts?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Which ones?

1. Austria
2. Belgium
3. Germany
4. Japan
5. Netherlands
6. Norway/
7. Sweden
8. Switzerland
9. United Kingdom
10. Other

How important to Burundi do you think it is to meet the Landmine Ban treaty requirements?

1. Very Important
2. Not so important given other priorities in Burundi

Do you know if there is an existing capacity/organization that can demine if a new device is found somewhere in the country?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Which organizations?

Are there any rehabilitation centres for amputees in Burundi?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

Are there any efforts to conduct MRE in Burundi?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

Who conducts these efforts?

How do you view the work of demining operators in Burundi?

What is your opinion of the sustainability to Burundi's efforts in demining/MRE/Victim Assistance?

What is your opinion regarding national coordination in Mine Action generally (in Burundi)?

Are there lessons learned which can be shared with other mine-affected countries?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

What are they?

Are you aware of any initiative that has tried to curb the armed violence in Burundi?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to Answer

Which type of initiative?

Do you think this initiatives have been useful in reducing armed violence?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

How so?

why not?

It terms of SALW what do you think are the major threats to reducing armed violence in Burundi?

Do you think that civilian disarmament can be effective in Burundi as an armed violence reduction scheme?:

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse to Answer

How so?

Why not?

Other than civilian disarmament, what other initiatives can be taken to reduce armed violence in Burundi?

Good governance is understood as a key to stabilization and peace, can disarmament be effective in the absence of good governance?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know

4. Refuse to Answer

What do you think have been the main reasons for why individuals were not keen to relinquish their weapons during the civilian disarmament process?

Are there lessons learned which can be shared with other armed violence affected countries?

Any Additional Comments: