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**EVALUATION OF THE SWISS FUNDED PROJECTS
OF THE NGO EUROPEAN CENTER
FOR MINORITY ISSUES KOSOVO**

Final Report

10 January 2012

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The comments contained herein reflect the opinions of the consultants only.*

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AOGG	Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender (within the OPM)
CSO	Community Service Organisation
CCC	Consultative Council for Communities (within the Office of the President)
CRICR	Committee on the Rights and Interests of Communities and Returns (attached to the Parliament)
ECMI	European Centre for Minority Issues
EU/EC	European Union / European Commission
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FDFA- DP IV	(Swiss) Federal department of Foreign Affairs – Political Directorate / Political Affairs Division IV, Human Security
HQ	Headquarters
HRSAP	(national) Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan
ICO	International Civilian Office
Law on Communities	Law on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Communities and Persons belonging to Communities in Kosovo
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
LOGOS	Local Governance and Decentralization Support
MCR	Ministry for Communities and Returns
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLGA	Ministry for Local governance and Administration
MP	Member of the Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCA	Office for Community Affairs (within the OPM)
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN)
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PBA	Peace Building Adviser (FDFA)
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës)
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
PM	Project Manager
RAE	Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian (communities)
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SfC	Strategy for Communities
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TOC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNICEF	UN Children’s Fund
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
USAID	US Agency for International Development

A. Executive Summary

Background

- i. The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Kosovo, created in 2001 as a field office of ECMI Germany, is currently one of the main NGO partners of governmental institutions engaged in the sector of promotion and protection of minority issues in the country. [§1, 96, 98, 107-113, 118]
- ii. In the framework of this approach which corresponds quite closely to the main concerns of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) policy in Kosovo, three successive ECMI projects have been funded by the FDFA between the end of 2006 and January 2011, for a grand total of 620.402,85€. These projects are the focus of this evaluation. They have been carried out in a political context which was both complex and evolving rapidly. Such a situation has often influenced the projects' objectives and activities. [§2-16, 73, 95, 97]

Objectives and approach of the evaluation

- iii. The main purpose of this evaluation was to provide the FDFA with the answers to a set of key evaluation questions about the effectiveness, relevance and efficiency of the three projects, as defined by the ToR (Annex 1), as well as recommendations and lessons learnt for potential future project proposals. [§17-18]
- iv. To respond to these requests, an Evaluation Matrix (Annex 2) combining questions, criteria and indicators has been used by the evaluation team members in a consistent manner whenever they performed interviews with stakeholders, individually or in group. [§19-20]
- v. After a desk study (Annex 5) and a short briefing/inception phase, the field visits in Kosovo took place between 24th and 28th October 2011. They were carried out by two evaluators, who focused respectively on ECMI's relations with institutions, and on beneficiaries and field communities. The comprehensive agenda of meetings and visits (Annexes 4 and 6) allowed the triangulation of findings among the main categories of actors and stakeholders. [§21-23]

Key findings and conclusions

- vi. From an overall and policy point of view, ECMI presents several key advantages as an implementing partner for FDFA.
 - The NGO is positively perceived by the large majority of actors and stakeholders in Kosovo, both at central level and in the field. ECMI is seen as neutral or at least impartial – i.e. not inclined towards a specific party or ethnicity - amongst the complex and changing political landscape, despite the fact that they have been deeply engaged in political activities for nearly 10 years. As one external observer has put it: “they can swim”. [§114, 129-130]
 - ECMI is currently the only prominent NGO of its kind, and therefore also a valuable asset for the donors. Despite its limited scale (10-12 staff working in one medium-size apartment, without luxury), it is quite knowledgeable about the situation and is well known by all key actors in the country. The evaluation could not determine any possible ‘competitor’ or contender organisation that could offer a comparable range of services and quality in its core sector of politically-oriented projects (ECMI does not currently perform development projects). As a result, they are currently carrying out projects for no less than 6 donors. [§101-113, 129]
 - More specifically, ECMI's activities are fully relevant to the FDFA policy and DPIV mandate of protection of minority rights and core focus on decentralisation¹. [§126-131]

¹ It should be noted that decentralization is still a key issue for the present and future of Kosovo, which needs clarification and streamlining. From the Kosovo/Serb point of view, decentralization means protecting their rights (sometimes through parallel system of education, health etc funded by Serbia) in particular in the 5 new municipalities with Serb majorities, whereas for the Kosovo Albanians the concept is perceived as devolution of authority to the most appropriate level, which

- Some of the results of project 1 have been far-ranging, and have managed to achieve longer-term positive impacts (see below). The draft Law on Communities and other provisions first defined at the Durres workshop in May 2007, have now been translated into legislation and the Constitution. The rights of e.g. the RAE (Romans, Ashkalis and Egyptians) are reportedly more advanced in Kosovo than anywhere else in Europe. These key advances are furthermore protected from changes, as these would require the approval of 2/3 of the Parliament as well as 2/3 of the communities. [§24-25]
 - Such achievements have inevitably entailed some constraints. ECMI is sometimes assessed as being much “donor aware”. It is indeed endeavoring to do its best to meet donors’ expectations and may be seen as eager to please them, producing suitably ‘polished’ official/public reports. This is however still a relatively young organization – with an equally young staff -, which is relying much less than previously on the HQ in Germany, and is still ‘learning by doing’. Despite ECMI’s increasingly balanced approach (expected results were better expressed and less widely optimistic in projects 2 and 3 than in 1), risk assessments (see theories of change) still need to be further developed prior to starting a project. Although ECMI is not a whistle-blower, it could also be more assertive. [§115, 119-121]
 - In this perspective, the past habit of discussing verbally and informally the issues with the Swiss Peace Building Advisor (PBA) was not complemented with e.g. short written notes with the raw facts (to be classified as confidential if necessary), which would have provided a welcome added value from the point of view of institutional memory and balanced information required by a donor organisation. [§122-124]
- vii. The three projects have been very different in their objectives and approaches, which makes an overall comparative judgment rather difficult.
- Project 1 was arguably the most successful, and brought significant positive impacts on the Kosovo legislation for communities’ rights, as already stated. Its main objective was to support the ongoing Status Settlement negotiations from the perspective of the minority communities, and to assist with impartiality all the key communities in taking part fruitfully in these negotiations and guaranteeing their rights, whereas projects 2 and 3 were much more technical in nature. According to a very senior and knowledgeable external political observer who had been much active in the Status negotiations, ECMI provided ‘professional guidance’ in this framework. Direct outcomes were significant, such as: [§27-34, 46-47, 51-54, 70, 74-75]
 - “breaking the ice” with the Serb communities, showing the willingness of some of them to dialogue and having them participating to a certain extent in the negotiations;
 - the enhanced status of the CCC (Consultative Council for Communities, originally a brainchild of ECMI), which could play a key role in the negotiations and allowed the community representatives to become pro-actively involved. The CCC ultimately became an institution (in 2008), although it still needs strengthening.
 - In contrast with Project 1, Project 2 (and also 3) was rather like a ‘bet’ made by ECMI on the inner political working of the Kosovo government. Instead of supporting communities directly, ECMI adopted a ‘two-pronged’ approach, putting a stake on the apparently strongest institution, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and supporting it with advices and capacity building (to the detriment of other institutions which appeared weaker such as the Ministry for Communities and Returns - MCR). Although this approach could appear as reasonable at the time - it was also strongly promoted by e.g. USAID, as the OPM seemed in the best position to ‘get things done’ – it took place in a highly volatile context, whereas mandates of concerned institutions lacked clarity and staff was weak (partly due to low and unattractive official salaries). [§35-37, 42, 48-49, 71, 76]

must happen equally in all Kosovo municipalities, majority or minority-led. Support to the 5 new municipalities is already targeted by ECMI with support from Finland.

- The second prong consisted in approaching the field communities through a scattering of those NGOs which appeared the most appropriate, and building their awareness of rights through workshops and corresponding booklets. Outcomes could vary to a large extent, for a number of reasons: poor capacity of some NGOs, lack of participatory approach in project preparation (which would arguably have taken longer), workshops and distributed booklets – however well done- which are not a substitute for training and follow-up, all resulting in a sometimes weak sense of ownership. Some of the NGOs visited by the evaluation were e.g. waiting for ‘ECMI to tell them’ to take further dissemination and information initiatives even though they operated radio stations that could have been used for that purpose. [§60-69, 77, 79-82]
 - The 3rd project was a continuation of the second, with increased focus on capacity building of the newly created OCA (Office for Community Affairs) within the OPM. ECMI e.g. provided a full-time Project Manager who was working *intra muros* in OCA. The skills of this PM were much appreciated and resulted in multiple outputs, although outcomes and impacts were found to be lacking due to problems which were generally not within ECMI’s control and appeared during the project. Apart from political turmoil, a key issue was the conflict which developed between the Director and his Deputy at OCA. This resulted in the resignation of the Deputy Director – who was instrumental for project implementation - and long subsequent delays, as he was not replaced. The credibility of OCA decreased dramatically as a result. Initial risk assessments in the project proposal also appear rather weak (low salaries were e.g. not mentioned as a potential cause for turnover and poor skills of staff). [§38-41, 43-45, 50, 55-59, 72, 83-86]
 - This situation was an opportunity to assess the steering procedures of ECMI in difficult settings, though. Discussions took place rapidly with the PBA about options and ECMI proceeded to do an ‘internal evaluation’. However, the lack of adequate backstopping capacity at HQ level (there is no M&E function) led to an assessment made by the same ECMI field staff who were already involved in the project implementation and supervision, a process which potentially lacks the required independence. On that basis, it was decided to try shifting some of the activities to other contiguous institutions (MCR, AOGG²), and to continue cooperating with the (not appropriately committed) Director of OCA on other issues instead of stopping or postponing. However, as these other potential institutions had not been supported earlier, the diversification came too late; overlapping mandates could not be bridged, and commitment was lacking. Activities which were left within OCA have not led to outcomes to date. [§102-106]
 - The quality of the proposals and reporting was duly improved between projects 1 and 3, in a perceptible learning process: activities are described more systematically, and can be monitored more easily in better structured mid-term and final reports. The sequential numbering of activities needs however still to become more thorough (see Annex 3). [§119-121]
 - Another key approach in Project 3 was also found to be adequate: the tools which have been developed (database and EthnoPolitical map) are the most clearly remaining outcomes of the project, even though their handover modalities and sustainability need to be improved. [§87-94]
- viii. A theory of change (TOC) has also been presented by ECMI, in the absence of LFA. Even according to the more basic /simple approach of TOC followed by FDFA (a “travel in rational thought” rather than a fully structured “pathway of change”), this approach allows for a better reflection regarding what needs to be done and why. TOC may in particular be helpful to determine the longer-term ‘vision’ of an organization, to be followed with both determination and flexibility, although it could hardly avoid the short-term and often unpredictable problems encountered during projects 2 and 3. Nevertheless, the TOC did not clearly distinguish between contributing to create first a conducive legal environment (the main focus of project 1 and a

² Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender

precondition for projects 2 and 3), and secondly the two-pronged or dual approach which has been followed thereafter. The approach would benefit from a more thorough assessment of risks and assumptions. [§116-117]

Key recommendations

Strategic level – Recommendations for a follow up project: to pursue the two-pronged approach, options below to be discussed jointly between FDFA and ECMI. [§132-135]

- R.1. At central level, to mainstream the promotion of community rights through the delivery to the Kosovo government of a 'curriculum' (i.e. a set of courses) designed to provide capacity building for the staff of concerned institutions. This curriculum could be based e.g. on the material already developed for OCA, but adapted for general use by any institution involved in working with communities. Whenever one of these institutions would feel the need (staff turnover etc), it could e.g. hire a training expert to teach the curriculum.
- R.2. At field level, to support decentralisation through capacity building for the municipalities which have set up structures to deal with their minority communities. This approach should be consistent and complementary to the support already provided by SDC and other key donors.
- R.3. The CCC could possibly also benefit from capacity building to allow it to use its planned secretariat to an optimal effect and provide quality advice to the government, e.g. by monitoring a set of indicators on the implementation of communities rights at municipal level. The risks and assumptions of a possible future project should however carefully assess the current position of the CCC within the Office of the President, and its alleged political ambitions.

Operational level - Efficiency and organisation. [§136-143]

- R.4. To keep an edge on quality, ECMI should further improve its structured approach in proposals and reporting, with e.g. a clear sequential numbering of the activities for easy follow up.
- R.5. In parallel, to develop a better assessment of risks and assumptions in the proposals.
- R.6. To complement public reports by confidential ones, short and with raw facts/data as feasible, but which can feed the institutional memory of a major donor organisation and provide well-balanced information for transparency and accountability purposes.
- R.7. The approach of providing the government with "tools" for policy or capacity building purposes that can be used by any relevant institution, should be developed. Such tools (database, map, curriculum – see below) should be handed over with due accompaniment and under the provisions of an MoU which governs their use and maintenance/sustainability.
- R.8. ECMI should set up a (possibly part-time) M&E 'function' at HQ level, i.e. an internal staff member who is trained in M&E techniques, knows already the organisation, and can be sent rapidly to the field for a evaluation, using e.g. the Real-Time Evaluation methodology (RTE).
- R.9. In the dual management framework of a PBA in the field and a project officer at HQ level, FDFA should adopt a tool similar to the European Commission "FichOp", informal and rapid, but which ensures institutional memory. As such procedures, even though rather informal, would nevertheless increase somewhat the workload, the later should also be commensurate with the number of projects to be supervised, and the number of staff in charge.

B. Main Report

B.1. Background

1. The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Kosovo, created in 2001 as a field office of ECMI Germany, is currently one of the main NGO partners of governmental institutions engaged in the sector of promotion and protection of minority issues in the country. ECMI Kosovo aims at contributing to the development, strengthening and implementation of relevant legislation, supporting the operationalisation of governmental bodies working with communities, and enhancing the capacity of civil society actors.
2. This approach corresponds quite closely to the main concerns of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) policy in Kosovo, focused on the protection of minorities and decentralisation (see also chapter B.3.2.4).
3. As from the end of 2006, ECMI has been supported by the FDFA. Up to early 2011, three ECMI projects have been funded, for a grand total of 620.402,85€.
 - (i) 2006-2008 - The first project (implemented from January to December 2007) focused on supporting community participation in relation to Kosovo's Status negotiation process, by integrating communities' concerns and opinions into the agenda of the Kosovo Delegation. Project costs amounted to 242.400,76€.
 - (ii) July 2008- August 2009 - The second project, "Support to Minority Communities in Kosovo during the Kosovo Status Transition Period" was aimed at supporting the Kosovo government in community rights implementation, during a period of transition towards independence, more specifically by strengthening the capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister. Total costs were 205.324,30€.
 - (iii) 2009-2011 - The third project, "Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government", implemented from 1 December 2010 to 30 November 2010 (with a two-month project extension until 31 January 2011), was intended to further extend strengths and capacities of Kosovo government to address minority communities' issues. Costs amounted to 172.677,79€, after mid-term project re-orientation.
4. These three projects were carried out in a political context which was both complex and evolving rapidly. Such a situation has often influenced the projects' objectives and activities. It is therefore useful to summarize below the main events that took place in Kosovo throughout that period.

1999-2005

5. UNMIK (the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) was established on 10 June 1999 to manage the entity on behalf of the international community, following the war with Serbia. UNMIK was divided into four "pillars", which covered Police and Justice; Civil Administration; Democratization and institution building; and Reconstruction and economic development.
6. In 2001, UNMIK promulgated a Constitutional Framework for Kosovo that established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), including an elected Assembly, a Presidency and the Office of Prime Minister (OPM).
7. Late in 2005, the UN Special Envoy Maarti Ahtisaari initiated a Status Settlement process in order to define a sustainable political framework for Kosovo, with all the parties concerned (mainly the Serbian and Kosovo authorities, and the international Contact Group).

2006

8. The Status Settlement negotiations started in February 2006 and focused on technical issues which were crucial for Kosovo's long-term stability, such as the rights and protection of the

minority communities – in particular the Kosovo Serbs. Other key and contiguous issues concerned the decentralization of local government, economic issues, property rights, protection of Serbian Orthodox Church heritage and institutional guarantees for the rights of Kosovo's minorities.

9. At the end of the year, despite some progress on technical matters and the endorsement by the Contact Group of Ahtisaari's plans to develop a comprehensive proposal for a Status Settlement, both parties remained diametrically opposed on the question of status itself. The CCC (Consultative Council for Communities), an organization created by ECMI, took part in these negotiations and was supported by the 1st Swiss-funded project.

2007

10. On 2 February 2007, Ahtisaari delivered to representatives in Belgrade and Pristina a draft Status Settlement proposal. Whilst not mentioning the word "independence," the draft included several provisions that were widely interpreted as implying statehood for Kosovo. After several weeks of intensive consultations in Vienna, the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs remained in complete disagreement regarding their central demands (respectively independence vs continued sovereignty of Belgrade over Kosovo). Concluding that there was little hope of the two sides reconciling their positions independently, Ahtisaari submitted on 26 March 2007 to the UN Security Council his own proposed status arrangements, the "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement". The proposal envisaged independence of a viable and sustainable Kosovo, and created a "mental transitional period". Events then accelerated and framed the context for the 2nd and 3rd projects.

2008

11. On 9 January 2008 Hashim Thaçi, the leader of the main Kosovo Albanian political party (PDK – Democratic Party of Kosovo) became Prime Minister. 1 month and 8 days later, on 17 February, the independence of Kosovo (from Serbia) was proclaimed by the Assembly.
12. On 7 April, the constitutional commission proposed a final draft based on Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Proposal. The new constitution was submitted by the President to the Assembly on 9 April, and the fundamental law entered into force on 15th June 2008. The constitution guaranteed that minority communities were to be represented in the Kosovo government, e.g. two Serbs were to be Ministers of Community and Returns, and of Labour and Social Welfare; a Turk was to be the Minister of Environment and Spatial Planning. Three Deputy Ministers positions were also foreseen (2 Serbs, 1 Bosniak).
13. On 11 May 2008, Serbia organized one-sided elections of the members of the parallel administrations in the Serb communities. These elections were declared illegal by the UN.
14. In August 2008 after the Kosovo Constitution came into play, the UN decided to cut staff levels by 70% during a UN reconfiguration in the country. Much of the UN powers in Kosovo were transferred to the Kosovo Government, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and – to some extent – to ICO (the International Civilian Office), whose task is to supervise the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan.

2009

15. Local elections were held in Kosovo on 15 November and 13 December 2009. These were the first local elections to be held after the declaration of independence. The ballot voting was to elect mayors and municipal councils in 36 municipalities, and was contested by 37 ethnic Albanian parties and 21 Serb lists, as well as another 16 electoral lists of other communities (Bosniak/ Gorani, Turkish and RAE).

2010

16. In October 2010, the Kosovo Government fell, due to political turmoil. The parliamentary elections were set for 12 December. In February 2011, after weeks of difficult negotiations, Hashim Thaçi formed a new coalition government with several small parties and was re-elected as

Prime Minister by the parliament. He secured the support of one of his coalition partners, the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR), by agreeing to back AKR founder Behgjet Pacolli's bid for the presidency. Atifete Jahjaga, was designated as Kosovo's first female President by parliament in April 2011, after her predecessor, Behgjet Pacolli, stepped down only two months into his term. It should be noted that throughout that period and until today the elected Prime Minister (and his Office) have retained most of the State authority – which explains the emphasis of ECMI's support (and others, such as USAID) to the OPM.

B.2. Methodology

17. The main purpose of this evaluation has been to provide the FDFA with the required information on the three projects as defined by the Terms of Reference (ToR, see annex 1), as well as recommendations and lessons learnt for potential future project proposals. The evaluation had three specific and interlocking objectives, as follows.
 - To analyse the projects' effectiveness in promoting and protecting minority rights in Kosovo, including the projects' contribution to:
 - the capacity of the government to implement measures to protect minorities;
 - the capacity of government institutions and their staff to deal with needs of the targeted local communities and their members;
 - the development of a legislative framework as safeguard to minority rights;
 - the participation by members of the communities in all walks of public life, including access to social and economic opportunities available;
 - the quality and impact of research carried out as a part of the projects.
 - To carry out an ex-post SWOT analysis of ECMI's efficiency, organization, resources and constraints during the projects.
 - On the basis of the SWOT, to provide as feasible some forward-looking recommendations and lessons learnt regarding the sector of minority rights in Kosovo.
18. As indicated in the technical proposal and the inception report, and in accordance with the provisions of the section 4 of the ToR (to the preparation of which ECMI has been associated), the approach has been based on the methodology of evaluation questions, to be complemented by criteria - which correspond to the main concerns of the donor and usually draw from the list of criteria defined by OECD/DAC – and by indicators. This methodology is specifically designed to provide answers as objectively as possible to the various evaluation questions which are listed in the ToR.
19. As a result of the above process and in order to ensure overall coherence, a standard Evaluation Matrix (the key evaluation tool) has been proposed to FDFA and reviewed during the inception phase, including a number of remarks from ECMI. The Matrix has been used by the evaluation team members in a consistent manner whenever they performed interviews with stakeholders, individually or in group. Distinct parts of the Matrix have been utilised according to the activity assessed or the position of the interviewee. The Matrix can be found in Annex 2; it also indicates the sharing of tasks between the evaluators, and provides cross-references with the main chapters of this report, to feed in the findings.
20. For reasons of consistency with the evaluation questions defined in the section 4 of the ToR, the order of the list has been kept and has formed the basis of the subdivision of chapter B.3 into 12 sub-chapters (B.3.1.1 to B.3.3.5). Under each sub-chapter, the evaluation question as phrased in the ToR has also been copied.
21. The field visits in Kosovo took place between 24th and 28th October 2011; they were carried out by M. Van Bruaene, who focused principally on ECMI's relations with institutions, and P. Rafailovic who covered the beneficiaries and field communities. The evaluators were assisted by an

experienced local logistician and translator into Albanian. The comprehensive agenda of meetings and visits (see Annexes 4 and 6), allowed the 'triangulation' of findings which is necessary to define patterns and draw conclusions. Triangulation could be achieved among each of the following categories of interviewees.

- Implementing actors and stakeholders involved in the projects (ECMI, OCA, CCC etc).
- Political actors and representatives of minority communities at central and local levels (Serbs, RAE, Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani).
- Field communities and NGOs visited in the municipalities (see map in Annex 6).
- External observers.

22. The budget of the evaluation amounted to 24.290€, i.e. 3,9% of the total costs of the projects evaluated.

23. It should finally be noted that, in this report, the term 'communities' will sometimes be used to designate minorities (we will also use minority - or non-majority - communities), in accordance with the Constitution of Kosovo which refers to 'communities' for all ethnic groups regardless of whether they are in the numerical majority or minority.

B.3. Findings

B.3.1. Effectiveness – Outcomes, impacts, lessons learnt and sustainability

B.3.1.1. Progresses towards achievement of expected projects outcomes

1. What are the progresses made towards the achievement of the expected project outcomes and results?

24. The overall table in Annex C ('Follow up of objectives and achievements') provides the basis for a systematic assessment of the actual results (outputs and outcomes) achieved by the three successive projects, as compared to their initial objectives, listed by activity. Due to some inconsistencies in ECMI's format of reporting (see chapter B.3.3.4) and for illustrative purposes, the outstanding issues are outlined in red for project 3 (the most structured report). The sources of the table are the project proposals, the mid-term and the final reports submitted by ECMI to FDFA.
25. Apart from the impact achieved in the sector of the legislative work under project 1 (see below), the key direct and indirect outcomes of the Swiss funded projects and some other ECMI activities are as follows.
- All the communities, majority and minorities, are now involved in the definition of the concept of the Kosovo State.
 - The rights of all the Kosovo communities to be respected through their identity, languages, education etc are duly protected in the Constitution.
 - At the decentralized level, in every municipality Deputy Mayors from the minority communities are nominated.
 - The CCC, originally a direct contribution of ECMI to help involving proactively all communities in the Status Settlement negotiations, has become a new institution in February 2008, within the President's Office. The CCC is highly visible and has helped to create confidence (which is still much lacking for the central institutions). It was supported by UK and Germany during projects 2 and 3, although this was rather weaker than in project 1 (no secretariat /operational capacity).
 - Regarding education, classes could be established for minority children even if the defined minimum number of pupils per class is not reached.
26. More specifically, the achievements (or the lack thereof) are presented as required by the ToR in the four sub-chapters below, which respectively cover (a) the legal frameworks, (b) the policies and implementation aspects, (c) the capacity building efforts, and (d) the levels of satisfaction among beneficiaries. It should be noted that in some cases the topics of implementation, strengthening of capacities and outreach to communities, being closely linked in the projects' activities, have been somewhat overlapping. Similarly, activities which were at first classified under capacity building (e.g. developing the database in project 2) became part of policy in a follow up phase (project 3).

B.3.1.1.a. Legal frameworks

a. What are the changes in legal frameworks resulting from the projects?

27. The first of the Swiss funded projects implemented by ECMI Kosovo was focused on supporting community participation in relation to the final negotiations on Kosovo's status. The aim was to push communities' concerns and opinions into the agenda of the Kosovo Delegation, as reflected

in the Ahtisaari Proposal³. Although the project consisted of two inter-related components (legislative and institutional building), only the first component was aimed at legislative drafting in particular. The project proposal stated the following objectives:

- to enhance the ability of community representatives in the drafting process;
- to assist the Kosovo Delegation to understand specific human and minority rights issues arising from the constitutional drafting process; and
- to enhance understanding of options for resolution of different constitutional issues related to human and minority rights, informed by a comparative perspective of practices existing in other countries and regions.

28. All three objectives were satisfactorily achieved, and are closely linked to the main outcomes of this component, i.e. the drafting of the relevant legal provisions and the enhancement of the role of the CCC into an official institution, as outlined below. A high-level conference that should have involved the Kosovo political leaders to discuss the draft constitutional texts never took place, though.
29. Two workshops were held in Antalya, Turkey (February 2007) and in Durres, Albania (May 2007). They resulted in (i) a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of the Ahtisaari proposals in relation to non majority communities' rights and interests, and (ii) the drafting of the Special Law on Communities⁴, which is the most important law for community rights together with the Law on the Use of languages. In addition to the draft law, the Durres workshop also managed to come up with a draft for two Constitutional Chapters⁵ covering human and minority rights; "II - Fundamental Rights and Freedoms", and most crucially "III - Rights of Communities and Their Members". Due to the protracted Status discussions, the approval of the legislative documents was postponed until their adoption by the Kosovo Parliament in February 2008.
30. These laws are clearly direct outcomes of project 1; they have been qualified by the institutional stakeholders met by the evaluation as "far-ranging", "generous" and a basis for "longer-term positive impacts" - pending their full implementation. Two aspects of the laws should be outlined.
31. Regarding the RAE (Romas, Ashkalis, Egyptians), the legal provisions ensure e.g. that the rights of these communities (language, political/institutional representation, employment, education, health, culture, religion) should be considered as the most advanced in the region, as shown in the table below, and reportedly in Europe. The rights are furthermore protected from changes, as these would require the approval of 2/3 of the Parliament as well as 2/3 of the communities.

Table 1

Country	Status	Central Level	Local Level	Education	Use of Language
Kosovo	RAE community (Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian) Along with Serbs, Bosniak/ Gorani and	-at least 1 MP - <u>dual majority of votes for passing laws of special interest for ethnic communities</u> -at least 2 in CCC -Ministry for	Deputy Mayor for Communities (Community & Returns Office at municipal government)	Entitled to attend classes in Roma Language (pre-school, primary and secondary)	Official language at municipal level, if > 5% +demographic criteria, if >3% [many difficulties in practical level]

³ Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Addendum to the Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council [source: <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>]

⁴ Special Law on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Communities and Persons belonging to Communities in Kosovo [source: Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo: http://www.gazetazyrtare.com/e-gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=148&Itemid=56&lang=en]

⁵ Draft Chapters 'Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' and 'The Rights of Communities and Their Members' of the Constitution of Kosovo [source: <http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Constitution1Kosovo.pdf>]

	Turks)	Communities and Returns		level) [lack of teachers, textbooks, etc.]	
Serbia	Roma National Minority (along with 19 national minorities)	-currently 1 MP -National Council of Roma National Minority (35 repr.) [19 national councils in total, of all national communities] -Ministry for Human and Minority Rights	- no particular mechanism for representation of national minorities/communities at municipal level	Entitled to facultative classes in Roma language (primary school) [lack of teachers, textbooks, etc.]	Official language at municipal level, if > 15% [in practice, no cases]
Macedonia	Roma National Minority (along with Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs, and Bosniaks)	-currently 1 MP - <u>dual majority of votes for passing laws of special interest for ethnic communities</u> (majority of votes of the total number of deputies plus majority of votes of deputies who belong to minority communities)	- no particular mechanism for representation of national minorities/communities at municipal level - however, sporadic cases that local strategy for Roma is adopted by municipal assembly (Delchevo)	Entitled to attend facultative classes in Roma Language (pre-school, primary and secondary level) [lack of teachers, textbooks, etc.]	Official language at municipal level, if > 20% (Constitution amended with provisions of Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001) [in practice, only in one municipality in Macedonia]

32. Romas in Kosovo are e.g. in a better legal position than those living in Serbia and Macedonia, from the point of view of positive discrimination. The lower threshold of population (3-5%) required at municipal level to benefit from the rights should however not create difficulties in neighboring countries (as this was suggested by some), since many Roma families have fled Kosovo in last decade and have therefore increased the local populations across the borders.
33. The Chapter III of the Constitution also formally envisaged the creation of the CCC (see institutions below), which was originally an informal spin-off of ECMI and was proactively used as a key instrument in project 1 for involving the various communities in the Status Settlement negotiations. According to a very senior actor in the negotiations, the CCC managed to “create a lively process” which has been much appreciated, and in which e.g. the Serb and RAE communities are still very active.
34. There may however be some reservations regarding the extent of the actual representativeness of the community leaders who took part to the key workshops at Antalya and Durres. These representatives were members of the ‘informal’ CCC, However, the fully-fledged establishment of the CCC (role, proposed institutional position, election procedures etc) had still to be formally discussed and agreed – which was done during the same workshops where the CCC incidentally drafted the law for its own creation.
35. Projects 2 and 3 did not focus anymore on legislative drafting except indirectly, in assisting in the preparation of the ToR for OPM/OCA and in trying (inconclusively) to resolve issues of overlapping mandates with MCR, AOGG⁶ etc.
36. It should also be noted that under project 3 (activity C.6) ECMI carried out the monitoring of the Strategy on RAE Integration. Kosovo is not formally included among the 12 European countries

⁶ Ministry for Communities and Returns; Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender

taking part in the "Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-15". To compensate this fact, a "Strategy and Action Plan for the Integration of RAE Communities in the Republic of Kosovo 2009-2015" has been defined by the government and the Soros Open Society. The Strategy has benefited from the advanced Kosovo legislation in the sector of minority/community rights, despite a certain lack of political will at central level and a lack of information to the municipalities.

B.3.1.1.b. Policy and implementation resulting from the projects

b. What are the changes in policy and implementation resulting from the projects?

37. Project 2 included 4 activities, the 2nd of which aimed at establishing policy frameworks for the implementation of human and community rights through the development of the Integrated Strategy for Communities (SfC). The SfC could not be set up due to the overlapping of mandates between OCA and the MCR.
38. Under project 3, the 3rd objective ("to support the OCA/OPM Governmental Coordination and Policy Activities") was specifically dedicated to policy development through a set of 6 activities: publications (booklets, studies), coordination and communication, policy database, management capacity, EthnoPolitical map, and monitoring functions. All of these activities were however closely interlinked with the capacity building efforts of OCA (below), as they involved support and training.
39. As a result, together with the capacity building, the policy-related activities were negatively impacted by the internal management problems of OCA which affected severely its staffing in the first months of 2010 (see the complete OCA background below), and by the fall of the Government in October of the same year.
40. The project strategy had to be evaluated and reoriented (see also below and B.3.3.1), but all the activities were negatively impacted, at various levels.
 - The publications were either much delayed (Employment study) or their dissemination was curtailed (the five field workshops on the "Know your Rights" booklet were not followed up), which led to weak outcomes.
 - The support to OCA's coordination and communication mechanisms was cancelled.
 - The capacity building of the Deputy Director and the policy officer was nullified by their departure without proper handover or replacement.
 - The support to monitoring could not be properly transferred from OCA as intended in the reorientation, due to the poor capacity of the other institutions considered.
41. In this rather poor framework, the database and the EthnoPolitical map were probably the least affected, as they are either already under the care of the Government or still retained by ECMI (see B.3.2.3). A key lesson learnt would therefore be that the provision of "tools" (for policy or learning purposes) to the Government for the capacity building of the relevant institutions and according to their own timetable and resources may be a relevant approach. This would nevertheless probably require complementary long-term coaching efforts, to mitigate the low levels of skills in many such institutions, and memorandums of understanding with these institutions to regulate the modalities of handovers and define the respective tasks of the parties.

B.3.1.1.c. Strengthening of capacities of relevant offices in government institutions

c. To what extent have the capacities of relevant offices in the government institutions been strengthened?

The main institutions targeted by the projects are discussed below.

42. The OPM/OCA (Office for Community Affairs at the Office of the Prime Minister) was created in July 2008, as the (final?) output of a long process which can be followed indirectly in the narrative

- reports of the successive ECMI projects⁷. The OCA was strongly supported by the US, as it was thought that its position within the structure of the Office of the very powerful Prime Minister would significantly enhance its authority. The salaries of the Director and his Deputy (a 2nd Deputy Director was never nominated) were funded by the US through UNMIK.
43. However, a strategy plan for OCA prepared in 2009 reduced the planned staffing from 16 to 6 (or 7) persons only, reportedly for budget reasons (the Deputy Prime Minister declared that the government 'could not afford it'). This reduced staffing was not conducive to implementing the multiple tasks envisaged. To these problems was added a growing personal conflict between the Director (Serb, though politically unaffiliated) and his Deputy (Roma), who had been instrumental in setting up and managing the Office. The Deputy Director resigned in February 2010 and was never replaced (see also B.3.3.1)⁸.
 44. The Director increasingly appeared as inappropriately committed to the position, which resulted in increasing delays in most activities of project 3. However, when ECMI carried out an internal evaluation in agreement with DPIV and decided about a diversification of its strategy towards other institutions (CRICR⁹, AOGG, CCC) it was already too late¹⁰. These institutions were not prepared, were in need of capacity building, and had overlapping mandates which were not easy to streamline. Most of the remaining tasks of OCA were managed by the key policy officer, who had been in function since 2010 and had benefited from most of ECMI's training¹¹.
 45. When the policy officer finally left OCA in September 2011 (despite her workload and skills, she was only paid the official salary of 280€ per month, which is not sufficient to live in Pristina), the much under-strength Office counted only 2 staff (the grants and administrative officers) to assist the new Director (the former had become a diplomat abroad). 2 new employees may be hired in 2012, although capacities are often low due to poor salary levels, and the sustainability of the outputs of ECMI projects cannot be guaranteed.
 46. More specifically, the component B of project 1 aimed at supporting policy commitments and capacity building of the OPM; there were 4 specific objectives, which were rather optimistic:
 - to convert legal obligations and policy decisions into concrete program actions for minorities;
 - to ensure that OPM has an ongoing strategy for integrating inputs of different initiatives from governmental offices dealing with minority issues into one unified and holistic strategy;
 - in so doing, to assist OPM in establishing a Coordination Cell for minority issues;
 - to help setting up a permanent FDFA-funded Advisor for minorities affairs within OPM.
 47. There were minor achievements only as regards the first 3 objectives (e.g. some workshops in October 2007) due to the volatile political situation in 2007 during the inconclusive negotiations; project activities focused on component A (legislative drafting). the ToR for the Advisor were prepared and accepted.
 48. Project 2 aimed specifically at strengthening the OPM capacity. Out of 4 main activities, the 1st (institutional restructuring of OPM and creation of Task Force for Community Affairs) and 3rd ones (developing a comprehensive database of communities in Kosovo, including an ethno-political

⁷ The "coordination cell" foreseen in project 1 was successively transformed by the NHRSA (National Human Rights Strategy and Action Plan) in early 2008 into a "Task Force for Community Affairs" in project 2, and then into an "HR coordination office" within the OPM.

⁸ His departure decreased 'by 90%' the confidence of the RAE community in the OCA; after initial US support to the remaining Director (which may have prompted ECMI to do the same), the growing ineffectiveness of the Office initiated the gradual withdrawal of donors' support.

⁹ Parliamentary Committee on Rights and Interests of Communities and Returns

¹⁰ An additional part of the problem was that on FDFA's side both the desk officer in Berne and the PBA in Pristina were quite new on their positions and not yet familiar with ECMI and its project.

¹¹ She cumulated the tasks of the communication/public information officer (who had also left and has not yet been replaced), of outreach to communities, managing the OCA web site, monitoring the legislation, organizing ad hoc work groups, sending questionnaires to municipalities, managing the relations with donors, preparing reports (employment, languages), writing speeches etc. She had also inherited all the problems faced by Gaëlle Comuz, the ECMI PM seconded to OCA, who had tried to make the Office more operational and practical.

map of Kosovo) concerned capacity building, while activity 2 was dedicated to policy (above) and activity 4 to outreach to communities (see B.3.1.2).

49. Achievements were encouraging (the envisaged Task Force finally became the OCA and the web tools were duly developed) although constraints persisted from overall political volatility, weak staffing and the first issues of overlapping mandates with MCR and AOGG.
50. Strengthening of OPM/OCA was again the focus of the first 2 main activities in project 3 in a more systematic 'technical assistance' approach i.e. (i) a thorough assessment process and (ii) a corresponding capacity building of the staff by coaching and training. As already outlined, the internal management of OCA at first postponed the outputs and ultimately nullified most outcomes.
51. The **CCC** (Consultative Council for Communities), which has originally been created in 2005 as an informal brainchild or spin-off of ECMI, became involved in the Status Settlement negotiations as an ad hoc body in the framework of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). As already discussed, based upon the provisions of the draft Constitution prepared under project 1, the CCC has finally been established by presidential decree on 15/9/2008 as a permanent institution of Kosovo and was allocated its budget in January 2011. Two thirds of its 30 members are bound to be representatives from 8 minority communities (Ashkali, Bosniak, Gorani, Egyptian, Montenegrin, Roma, Serb and Turkish), out of whom 8 'may' also be members of the Parliament. The remaining third consists of representatives from government or other public agencies with special concerns for minorities.
52. Such remarkable achievements nevertheless do not ensure a comfortable and stable future. The CCC was only marginally supported during projects 2 and 3 by ECMI (with funding from Germany, UK and Norway), and its current operational capacity appears rather weak. Its budget is limited to 90.000€, which is bound to be a constraint for the planned strengthening of its Secretariat (there is only one secretarial staff at present, which does not allow an adequate operationalisation such as producing the planned advices and studies for the Government, or liaising with the various concerned municipalities and communities in the field). This situation is not enhanced by the CCC position within the still weak Office of the President (pending a full election of the President of Kosovo), and raises questions as to the type of further support that may be usefully provided.
53. Furthermore, the involvement of the CCC in politics (representatives of minorities in CCC are often opposed politically to their own MPs) is increasingly resented by some political parties¹².
54. Should the strengthening of the CCC Secretariat become reality, one of its tasks could e.g. be to monitor a set of indicators of progress of the implementation of community rights at municipal level – although this would probably require an independent M&E function within the CCC to avoid potential conflicts of interest due to the already strong presence of its members in the field.
55. The capacities of most of the **other institutions** (AOGG, CRIC¹³, MCR) which may have been supported by ECMI in parallel with OCA are reportedly still inadequate, under the 'thin upper layer' of skilled managers. The overlapping of their mandates, which could not be resolved, has been qualified by ECMI as a 'fact of life'. AOGG has responsibilities regarding policy development within its general mandate on human rights, which may have a potential impact on communities. CRIC is authorised by the Constitution to propose laws that address the concerns of communities. MCR has primarily been concerned to date with issues of returns, but it could also legally (provided that it gets adequate capacity) develop communities-related policies.

¹² Minister Yagcilar (Public Administration, also Head of KDTP – Kosovo Turk Democratic Party) was e.g. 'not satisfied' with the CCC, which is felt as seeking to compete politically with the Parliament (the CCC has tried to amend the law by stating that its 8 eligible members 'must' – not 'may' - be members of the Parliament).

¹³ Committee on the Rights and Interests of Communities and Returns

56. An example of the institutions which (should) have indirectly benefited from the projects is the “Commission for Languages” within the OPM, which is tasked with supervising at central level the complex implementation of the Law on the Use of Languages. Under project 3, ECMI has organised 3 workshops in Pristina, Gjilan/Gnjilane and Prizren, to explain the rights about the use of languages to the various communities, based on a policy study (see outputs in chapter B.3.2.2).
57. In the framework of ECMI’s support to OPM, the President of the Commission for Languages was invited to the 3 workshops, which were ‘well attended by all those concerned’, to explain publicly the role of his organization. According to the President, the results of the workshops were quite positive, as many participants expressed their interest and satisfaction about the existence of the Commission. Beyond these statements however, the outcomes appear quite low¹⁴.
58. The workshops were not replicated, as the president felt that these were ECMI’s initiatives, and probably does not have the resources and capacity to continue, despite some support from OSCE in 2010 and 2011. The Commission is only a part-time body, with a weak capacity and no permanent office. The President, Vice-President and 5 experts (structure established by law) are all unpaid volunteers who perform these tasks after their normal working hours (the President is normally a staff of the OPM department dealing with the Official Journal). The President stated that they would need a re-organisation and a clearer mandate. The Commission tries to respond rapidly to the requests for information or complaints which are addressed to them, and should have the right to decide whether such cases should be opened in the constitutional court. However, the number of cases reported to the Commission appears very limited (‘3 or 4 cases in 3 months’, and not from north Kosovo), which does not seem to reflect in any measure the real extent of the language issues in Kosovo.
59. This example illustrates the widespread lack of trust in central institutions by minority communities, who would still rather raise their concerns (as per tradition) with the perceived leader of their community (e.g. Turks would seek advice from Minister Yagcilar/Public administration, and Serbs from the Deputy Minister of the Interior Rasic).

B.3.1.1.d. Satisfaction of beneficiaries

4 (a) To what extent are the intended beneficiaries satisfied with the results?

60. The *direct* beneficiaries of the projects have been the representatives of non-majority communities of Kosovo (Serbs, Bosniak/Gorani, Turkish and RAE) working at central (government institutions, parliament) and local levels (community Service Organizations CSO/NGOs), together with the institutions and organisations concerned by capacity building efforts. The *final* beneficiaries (target groups) were all the members of the non-majority communities in Kosovo.
61. At the institutional level, the actors interviewed have unanimously¹⁵ expressed their appreciation of ECMI’s work. They largely confirmed the statements reproduced in various chapters of this reports, e.g. that the objectives of the projects corresponded to actual priority needs, the organization was appropriate, and results were generally achieved when most of the intervening factors were within ECMI’s power to control. Due to the focusing of the approach, senior participants (Minister Yagcilar, V. Surroi) confirmed in particular their satisfaction about project 1, which produced “few achievements, but very important ones”.

¹⁴ In the meantime, supported by ICO, the government has established a working group on the Language commission reform, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Petrovic. The goal of the working group, organized by OCA, is to establish an “Office of the Language Commissioner”. The Swiss Embassy and ECMI act – besides others – as observers of this working group

¹⁵ This highly favorable opinion was partly mitigated only by two former actors who have had somewhat negative professional experiences during projects 2 and 3 (the former Deputy Director of OCA and the former Swiss Advisor to OPM), although these experiences can hardly be attributed totally to ECMI.

62. The community representatives interviewed during the field visits (see Annex 4) are also generally satisfied with the implementation of the three projects and its numerous outputs. It has to be pointed out that ECMI, simultaneously to the three FDFA-financed projects, has been implementing several projects in the same sector financed by other donors, which required very specific and repeated questions from the evaluator. Furthermore, only a few of the community representatives- leaders of CBOs/NGOs interviewed had been actively involved in the implementation of all of the three projects, which is a common issue for ex-post evaluations and tends to produce sometimes scattered findings. Nonetheless, the data collected from the field confirmed overall patterns, e.g. that the beneficiaries were satisfied mostly with the legislative drafting part of the 1st project (Law on Communities and chapters on rights in the Constitution).
63. Regarding the series of workshops carried out during the 1st and 3rd projects, the NGO/CBO leaders interviewed were generally not able (anymore) to remember and distinguish clearly between the concerned project activities and a number of other workshops, seminars and meetings that they have attended in the same period. Regarding to the other project outputs, the interviewees expressed their satisfaction about the physical outputs such as the booklet “Community: Know your Rights” (see below), which was found to be well-designed and understandable for the beneficiaries¹⁶ – notwithstanding the somewhat sporadic outcomes.

B.3.1.2. Impact on capacities of communities

2. Horizon impact: To what extent have the capacities of communities and their members been strengthened?

64. The number of NGOs in Kosovo is currently estimated at some 6000, although many may not be permanently active. In this vibrant framework, ECMI has consistently tried to target the most relevant and representative NGOs, including those with a specific gender approach.
65. In accordance to the provisions of the Law on Communities and the relevant chapters of the Constitution, the members of the four non-majority communities are entitled both to a comprehensive set of fundamental rights and freedoms (e.g. use of language, education, health care, equal job opportunities, cultural heritage and religious service) and to the right to be institutionally represented at local (municipal) and central (parliament, government) levels. More specifically, the institutional representation of non-majority communities is provided on the basis of the mechanism of positive discrimination, such as parliamentary representation of at least 20 MPs (out of the total of 120 MPs in the unicameral Parliament of Kosovo, 20 seats are reserved for non-majority communities) as well as at local self-government level in the municipalities in which each of the non-majority communities include at least 5% of the total population of the municipality. This approach corresponds to a certain extent to the Swiss focus on decentralization and devolution of authority at the most appropriate level.
66. The above legislative provisions are clearly an outcome of project 1, and the (still incomplete) implementation of these provisions is beginning to have an impact as well on the effective respect of communities' rights. At local level, the members of communities are entitled to elect deputy mayors as well as vice presidents of municipal assemblies in charge of communities and returns. Each of non-majority communities is also represented in the CCC. Two thirds of CCC members are elected from NGO representatives, and one third from MPs belonging to community lists.
67. Sustained impact from outputs of projects 2 and 3 has been hindered by an inadequate interrelation between the two components of the projects, at central (institutional) and local (direct outreach) levels. The main (arguably excessive) focus of the two projects was the capacity building of OCA: the various project objectives were e.g. not sub-divided into a clear two-pronged approach by ECMI (like the 2 components of project 1) but were all linked somehow to the

¹⁶ It was however noted that there were some problems with missing fonts in the booklet, e.g. in the Roma language, which was tested on the spot by asking one of the members of RAE NGO to read one passage of the text.

expected actions of OCA which have often failed to materialize. It should be stressed that ECMI duly attempted to involve community representatives in the designing of OCA's ToR in project 2 through a series of five consultative workshops with NGO/CBO leaders (activity n°4), but this was prevented by a 'lack of funding' at that time¹⁷. The intended inclusion of communities in the project was further hindered by e.g. the abandonment of the Strategy for Communities (SfC) due to a confusion of mandates between OCA and MCR which could not be overcome.

68. The weak interrelation and a certain lack of feedback from the communities could also be partly explained by some socio-political factors completely exogenous to the project, such as political divisions inside some of the communities (e.g. Serb, Bosniak, Gorani) or election processes of community representatives to both the central and local self-government institutions that still lacked transparency.
69. Finally, the modest impact of the rights awareness-raising campaign linked to the booklet "Communities: Know your Rights" (project 2 – see below under outputs) is probably due to the fact that the five workshops organized to promote it were held approximately a year and half later (project 3) and have not been further followed up to this date¹⁸.

B.3.1.3. Shortfalls

3. What are the reasons for any shortfall or failure to achieve expected outcomes?

70. Although project 1 provided undoubtedly the highest impact (see above), there was nevertheless a certain shortfall in the initial participatory approach among community NGOs in the preparation phase, which lasted until after the crucial workshops of Antalya and Durres. A comprehensive needs assessment was only carried out at the end of the project 1, when the political context of final Status negotiation required a broader dialogue and agreement on the prospective legislation from the representatives of all the communities. ECMI then decided to carry out four workshops with the grassroots/community-based organizations, which gathered no less 37 NGOs from four non-majority communities.
71. Shortfalls of project 2 are related to the approach aiming at placing the expectations for community rights essentially into the hands of the politically all-powerful Prime Minister's Office. This process was hindered by the volatile political context, which was out of ECMI's direct control. Major obstacles appeared e.g. in the lack of budget for the staffing of the Task Force for community affairs (which became the OCA) and in the overlapping of its mandate with e.g. the MCR (Ministry for Communities and Returns). As a result, the development of Strategy for Communities (SfC) had to be cancelled and scheduled consultative workshops with community NGO leaders were replaced by field visits and individual meetings.
72. Major failures of project 3 included the inappropriate capacity building and the ensuing lack of credibility of OCA, although this was also essentially due to management and personality problems within OCA and to wider political turmoil (fall of government in October 2010 and new elections), again out of ECMI's direct control. The political volatility may have caused OPM to somewhat overlook e.g. the strategy and the staffing problems of OCA. There were also rather weak outcomes from the rights awareness-raising activities at community level, due to project delays within OCA and a subsequent poor sense of ownership towards some belated and scattered outputs (see below).

¹⁷ Final report of project 2, page 10 §2.

¹⁸ Perhaps due to this situation, the understanding of the use of official languages by more than a half of the community representatives/actors interviewed during the field visits seems incomplete, as they tend to mix up the two official languages in Kosovo (Albanian and Serbian) with the third one, English language, which is used in public for primarily practical reasons.

B.3.2. Relevance

B.3.2.1. Adequacy to needs

4(b). To what extent did the project satisfy the needs of the intended beneficiaries?

73. It has been confirmed by every actor and stakeholder interviewed that the objectives of the projects duly corresponded to priority needs for the promotion of community rights in Kosovo, in the framework of the evolving political context. This adequacy to needs reflects the in-depth knowledge of ECMI of the situation, both at central and field levels, which was also repeatedly stated.
74. The component A of the 1st project, implemented during the Status Settlement negotiations (i.e. the basis for the future Kosovo Constitution), aimed at setting up a conducive legal environment for all the minority communities, by enhancing their capacity to contribute to the drafting process of relevant legal provisions. A secondary objective was to assist the Kosovo Delegation to better understand specific rights issues arising from this constitutional drafting process. The participation of the Serb community to the CCC, the main instrument used by ECMI to gather the representatives of the various communities around a common purpose, delivered e.g. some crucial information about the Serb position (mixed support by some) towards the negotiations.
75. In this regard, the component B of the 1st project also included a needs assessment of civil society organizations (37 active community NGOs/CBOs) representing the four main minority communities (Serb, Bosniak/Gorani, Turkish and RAE) - although this activity, which was carried out in the form of the four workshops (October 2007) and was not originally planned in the project proposal, would have been even more relevant if it had been carried out earlier, i.e. before the Antalya and Durres workshops.
76. Projects 2 and 3 were implemented after the end of the negotiations, in a framework of urgent State building after the independence had been proclaimed by the Prime Minister on 17 February 2008. The approach corresponded rather more to a 'bet' by ECMI than to actual priority needs. Project 2 was focused on the capacity building of the apparently strongest institution, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), which appeared as the most able to 'get things done' rapidly. This approach, which was strongly supported also by the US, involved stepping into local politics, in a highly volatile context, with weak staffing levels and unclear mandates. With hindsight, it was arguably a remnant of the UNMIK-time approach of enforcing decisions of the international community instead of leaving this prerogative to existing governmental institutions. The 3rd project was a continuation of the second, with increased focus on capacity building of the newly created OCA within the OPM. As already discussed, despite the efforts of ECMI, internal problems at the OCA resulted in delays and poor outcomes.
77. A second prong of projects 2 and 3 consisted in building the capacities and awareness of field NGOs through workshops and booklets. Although this component corresponded closely to the needs of the communities, outcomes were found to vary to a large extent.

B.3.2.2. Dissemination and use of projects outputs

5. How and to what extent have outputs produced by the projects (research, guidelines, manuals and other publications) been disseminated and used?

78. The 3 projects have produced a large number of physical outputs (32 of them are e.g. listed in Annex 5.B and most can also be found in the overall table of activities in Annex 3), on top of the many workshops and events. The main project outputs are discussed below in chronological

order, excluding minor ones or those that have been too short-lived to be assessed by the evaluation (successive work plans, TORs, briefing documents, etc). The legal outputs have been discussed above (B.3.1.1.a) and the web-based databases and EthnoPolitical map will be considered separately in chapter B.3.2.3.

79. The booklet “Communities: Know your Rights” was printed and published during the second half of project 2; it is available in Albanian, Serbian, Turkish, Romani and English, as well as on-line. The booklet intends to provide, in an accessible manner, key information about e.g. legal provisions concerning community rights, institutional framework and protection of minorities.
80. There are not precise data about booklet distribution in the reports; field findings seem to indicate that about 200 booklets were distributed per municipality/community/language. The distribution of the booklets took place during field visits to communities, and also through the CCC and LOGOS (see B.3.2.4). In project 3, ECMI also carried out five workshops aimed at presenting its contents (together with language issues) and initiating discussions, although these were only held some 18 months later.
81. This gap did not appear conducive for proactive engagement of the communities on the basis of the booklet information. Copies of the booklet could often be found on the bookshelves of the visited NGOs, generally in pristine condition – which may indicate that have not been much used. Discussions tended to indicate rather a passive attitude and a lack of ownership of the communities vis-à-vis the booklet. In two instances, opportunities to use e.g. NGO radio stations to disseminate relevant information were not considered as the recipients stated that they were “waiting for ECMI to tell them”. Some scattered positive outcomes have also been reported to the field staff of ECMI, e.g. a women NGO battling with the municipality to include budget provisions for rights.
82. The “Guidebook for Professionals Working with Communities in Kosovo” (available in Albanian, Serbian and English) is the ‘institutional’ counterpart of the above booklet, in line with the two-pronged approach of ECMI. It is intended for the use of government (and other) officials from all sectors that work in areas of relevance to communities, and offers a comprehensive guide to issues facing communities, information on governmental and non-governmental resources available for communities, etc. As the publication was foreseen after the end of project 2 (in August 2009), the final report did not offer details about dissemination and use, which could not be assessed either. Anecdotal comments (e.g. from the Deputy Minister for Diaspora and Vice President of CCC) confirmed however that the guidebook was “very good and useful”.
83. At the request of OPM/OCA, the policy study “Employment of Members of Non-majority Communities with Kosovo Civil Service and Publicly Owned Enterprises” was carried out by two ECMI research associates (one international and one local), from February to July 2009, in the course of project 2. The report was handed over to OCA/OPM at the end of the project. Under project 3, in the context of OCA’s internal problems (the Deputy Director had resigned mid-February) and after months of advocacy by the ECMI PM towards the ‘reluctant’ OCA Director, the study was finally published and presented at the end of March 2010 in a large public conference. The conclusions of the study pointed at a significant under-representation of minority staff in institutions and implementation problems of the legal framework. There is no further information to be found in the reports on this issue, as the strategy of project 3 had to be reoriented (below). The evaluation could not find indications about the actual use of the study results.
84. The reoriented activity of policy support to OCA in project 3 after May 2010 focused on a new study “Language Policies in Kosovo- Implementation in Relations with Public Bodies”, which aimed at investigating the extent to which language policies had been effectively implemented by

the relevant Kosovo institutions. This protracted process included the dissemination of questionnaires (by August 2010), focus groups (in October) and a report (December). The focus groups were carried out with the participation of the Language Commission, which had also been consulted on the methodology (see B.3.1.1.c). However, the OCA Director refrained from releasing the report pending the establishment of a new government – which finally happened in February 2011, after the end of project 3.

85. In the framework of the reorientation of project 3, and the attempted broadened support from OCA to CCC and CRIC, ECMI produced rather belatedly in January 2011 another booklet called "Kosovo Legislative Process: Handbook for Community Political Participation Bodies", which compiled all the research undertaken during the project. The final report states that the objective was to present the research to the three institutions (hence the number of intended copies was probably limited), but this effort was also impeded by the fall of the government and the new elections. The handbook was however discussed during the training of the CCC Legislation Working Group, and was reportedly appreciated by the participants.
86. A final key output of project 3 launched after the reorientation was the shifting of the support provided to OCA in "Evaluating the Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in the Republic of Kosovo 2009-2015" (RAE Strategy) to OGG and CCC. Reasons were "the lack of clarity surrounding the OCA mandate" and the "reluctance" of the OCA Director in assuming responsibilities for this activity due to its "limited capacity" and his desire to "avoid conflict with the OGG". However, the final project report stated that OGG was "not receptive" in improving its monitoring structures, and ECMI had to redirect its support for this output on a CCC Working Group for RAE. The evaluation report was finalised in a workshop on 28 January 2011, although much of the field work seems to have been conducted by ECMI staff. The project report does not provide details on the expected outcomes of this activity, such as the building of the CCC evaluation capacities.

B.3.2.3. Use of web-based resources

6. How and to what extent have the web-based resources been used?

87. In the course of projects 2 (activity 3) and 3 (activities C.3 and C.5), ECMI has invested a significant portion of its Swiss-funded resources in the development of a comprehensive database (or databases) of communities-related issues, as well as an ethno-political map of Kosovo. It is not entirely clear to what extent the "database of communities" developed in project 2 (which included information about legislation) has contributed to the more focused output of project 3 (variously called "database on Kosovo legislation on communities" or "policy database"). Final accounts for the concerned activities indicate that 36.930,23€ were spent under project 2 (27% of the costs for activities) and approximately (these activities are sometimes mixed with others) 16.369,20€ under project 3 (16%). These figures do not include e.g. the possible share of the work performed by the management team, nor ECMI's own contributions to the schemes. To this date, it is still impossible to assess the cost effectiveness of these outputs, as the numbers of their users are unknown.
88. It should however be noted that the OCA web site, built up with the support of ECMI, had been recognized as 'the best in the Government' and was the only one to use e.g. Facebook and Twitter.
89. Under project 3, the database aimed at including all legislative and policy provisions of relevance to communities. ECMI's legal experts have collected every provision of laws, sub-legislative acts and strategic or policy documents impacting on community rights, and have sorted them out

according to the area of community right protection concerned and the institution responsible for implementation. As a result, the database includes provisions relating to community rights from more than 200 different sources.

90. The objective in the proposal was to hand over the database to OPM/OCA, but due to OCA's management problems ECMI proposed in the project revision (May 2010) to offer it to a 'broader range of institutions', such as the CCC Working Group on Legislative Strategy. For reasons that are not entirely clear in the final report, the database was delivered only to OCA at the end of project 3 (although other institutions had been trained in its use).
91. Despite the risks due to OCA's poor situation, ECMI does not seem to have concluded any specific memorandum to cover the database management (guarantees, tasks, use), which should be included in the general provisions of the global support agreement with OCA (not assessed by the evaluation). The database is reportedly still in the process of being linked to the institutional users (e-mail connections and passwords) who would be authorized to have access (restricted) by a specialized IT service of the Ministry of Public Administration. There would however still be a need for a focal point to promote the use of the database and update it. There was no information about any deadline or status for this process.
92. The EthnoPolitical map of Kosovo¹⁹, which had benefited from the prior ECMI HQ experience in developing an "Ethnopolitical Map of Europe", had to be significantly updated under project 3 as some previous information had become outdated due e.g. to the creation of new municipalities.
93. At the end of the project, this very comprehensive and users-friendly tool was however not handed over as foreseen to OPM/OCA, but was merely linked to the Office website. The final report stated that ECMI had retained "the final authority over its content, which guarantees the quality and independence of the information". Apart from the fact that this statement translates the perceived current inability of OCA to maintain properly and update impartially the map, it raises the question of the ultimate sustainability of the tool. ECMI acknowledges that the map should ideally be transferred to a body which would have to be (i) an institution, (ii) politically neutral or perceived as suitably balanced, and (iii) with a sufficient capacity for field contacts and updating. These criteria are not currently fulfilled by any Kosovo institution.
94. Contrary to the database, the EthnoPolitical map is fully accessible to the general public. It is however not equipped with a counter for number of visits to the website, which prevents an assessment of its cost-effectiveness.

B.3.2.4. Relevance to mandate and policy of DP IV

7. Was ECMI the appropriate partner for DP IV, given DPIV mandate, Swiss foreign policy and the objectives of the project?

95. Since 2005, when the UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari initiated the Status Settlement process for Kosovo, the Swiss policy in the country has been focused on the few areas where the specific knowledge and expertise drawn from the political structure of Switzerland could provide an added value - and could contribute to achieving an impact (or to "make a difference").
96. In this perspective, ECMI's approach appears to be fully relevant to the two main concerns of the FDFA in Kosovo: protection of minority rights (since its setting up in Kosovo in 2001) and (increasingly) decentralisation. ECMI's mission statement has been phrased as follows.

¹⁹ <http://www.ecmi-map.com/map/index.php?lang=en>

ECMI Kosovo advances majority-minority relations through the protection and promotion of minority communities and their interests, with the overarching aim to develop inclusive, representative, community-sensitive institutions that support a stable multi-ethnic Kosovo. ECMI Kosovo contributes to the developing, strengthening and implementation of relevant legislation and best practices in governance and supports the institutionalisation of communities-related governmental bodies, while it enhances the capacity of community representatives from civil society, political parties and the government to engage with one another in a constructive and sustainable way.

97. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is implementing a much larger programme than DP IV, with an annual budget of some 10 million CHF for Kosovo against 1,6 million CHF for DP IV. The strategy of SDC (together with other cooperation agencies) in Kosovo for 2009 - 2012 focuses on (i) economic growth and sustainable employment, (ii) central and local governance, rule of law and democratic processes, and (iii) access to basic infrastructures. Some of these activities are very complementary to the protection of minority communities and the reinforcement of their capacities pursued by ECMI, such as e.g. property rights, employment and water supply. Through the LOGOS project (Local Governance and Decentralization Support), SDC has sought since 2007 (the project has a timeframe of 8-10 years) to promote the development of governance and decentralization reforms in selected municipalities of Kosovo, thus contributing to the overall stabilization of rule of law and democratization. The main target area of LOGOS is the South-East region of Gjilan/Gnjilane, together with some neighboring municipalities (Kamenicë/Kamenica, Viti/Vitina), where minority issues are still crucial and poverty levels are comparatively high.
98. ECMI is currently launching the 2nd phase of a project in 5 neighboring municipalities of Eastern and South Kosovo²⁰, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland²¹ (the 1st phase was qualified a 'success story'). The project aims –inter alia- at promoting relations between communities in these 5 'newly created municipalities' with a Serb majority and assisting the Ministry of Local Governance and Administration (MLGA) in dealing with community issues and decentralisation.
99. It should be noted that the US strategy on minority communities is similarly focusing on supporting municipalities (starting also with the 5 new municipalities) and decentralisation. From the US point of view, the focal point for these efforts at central government level should therefore be the MLGA, rather than OCA as in the past.
100. Considering the potential synergies in the above framework and for coherence and complementarity purposes, it would be relevant to assess (e.g. by a SWOT table) the added value of focusing a possible future Swiss-funded ECMI project on the same municipalities – or, at the opposite, to target an entirely different geographical area.

B.3.3. Efficiency

B.3.3.1. Organization of steering procedures and monitoring

8. *Were the programme steering procedures/monitoring efficiently organized?*

101. **Staffing and gender balance.** ECMI Kosovo currently employs up to 11 staff, on top of the Director: 3 projects managers (PM), 2 project officers, 4 assistants, and 2 financial officers, which seems consistent with the normal management of a portfolio of 7 projects for at least 6 donors (see Table 3). There are also a varying number of temporary external research associates (up to

²⁰ Gračanica/Graçanicë, Ranillug/Ranilog, Kllokot/Kllokot, Partesh/Partes and Novo Brdo/Novobërdë

²¹ "Support to Minority Communities during and after the Decentralisation Process".

20) who carry out field studies etc. The gender balance within ECMI Kosovo seems adequate at all the levels under the Director. During the 3rd project, 3 of the 4 PMs were e.g. female, including the PM who worked full time *intra muros* at OPM/OCA. The staff appears also adequately multi-ethnic.

102. Monitoring and steering procedures. Under normal circumstances, the monitoring of a project is done by the PM, under the supervision of the Director. This procedure is usual for a small structure, which can hardly afford the overhead cost of a dedicated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) position. Monitoring would however definitely benefit from a more thorough structuring of the activities (starting in the proposals) for easy follow up, with a monitoring plan ('what to monitor and when'). As stated in the project proposals, a reporting on the activities is published monthly in the ECMI Newsletters, although this could hardly be used for monitoring purposes (see B.3.3.4). There is no evidence that the projects have also been monitored operationally by ECMI's HQ (as also stated in the proposals), except for the monthly payment requests (below).
103. A more developed monitoring framework has not been requested by DP IV, although a monitoring plan/table in a simple format could be used for ad hoc discussions and mid-term reporting. The new project to be implemented for EU/EC may in that respect bring some methodological innovations and further quality improvement to ECMI.
104. In exceptional or difficult operational settings, such enhanced monitoring tools would be quite useful, though. These circumstances would also require improved steering procedures from ECMI, as illustrated e.g. in early 2010, when internal problems at OCA were threatening the timetable.
105. Discussions (without written records) took place between ECMI and the PBA, who recommended to present options to sort out the issue. ECMI thus proceeded to do an 'internal evaluation'. However, the lack of adequate backstopping capacity at HQ level (there is no M&E function in Flensburg) led to an assessment made by the same ECMI field staff who were already involved in the project implementation and supervision, a process which potentially lacks the required independence and can lead to confusion of interest. On that basis, it was decided to try shifting some of the activities to other contiguous institutions (MCR, AOGG) and continue cooperating with the Director of OCA on other issues instead of stopping or postponing them, despite the latter's lack of commitment and the crucial weakness of OCA's capacity after the resignation of the Deputy Director and the non-fulfillment of other positions. In the internal evaluation report, most of the blame was put on the Deputy Director, who was not interrogated²². The evaluation only reported the statements of the Director, and the objective of the US embassy to maintain its support to OCA as a perceived key institution for Kosovo.
106. The project ended in part failure, as the other institutions considered were lacking in capacities and the overlapping of their respective mandates could not be overcome. The institutional weakness of OCA increased, as key positions were not replaced and ECMI's capacity building efforts were not sufficient to maintain the lost momentum, which ipso facto denied the proposed exit strategy.
107. Relations with the ECMI HQ in Flensburg have significantly evolved. In the 1st project, decisions were reportedly made mostly by the Executive Director in Germany, which was e.g. reflected in the content of the project proposal. As from 2009, the direction was shifted to Pristina and ECMI Kosovo acquired a double status, being both still a branch office of ECMI Germany and also being registered as an independent NGO in Kosovo. Apart from the accounting procedures (below), the HQ backstopping concerns some short-term expertise, although short and longer-

²² His 8-pages long letter of resignation, stating the alleged reasons (nepotism and corruption by the Director, etc), was not mentioned either.

term external experts are usually recruited by ECMI Kosovo, to ensure that they are suitably aware of the local context before being hired. This approach seems appropriate, as anecdotal remarks (there is no triangulated pattern of findings on this issue) mentioned e.g. some problems with an expert sent from Germany in February 2009, to help defining OCA's operational strategy.

108. Accounting and cost control. Accounting tasks are shared between Flensburg and Pristina, as follows. When projects are won internationally by the HQ, original accounts and invoices are kept in Germany, with copies only in Kosovo. For 'local' projects (those acquired locally by ECMI Kosovo), the reverse system is followed: original documents are kept in Pristina, and copies in Germany. There is no direct access by electronic links to the HQ accounting system; hard copies of documents have to be sent every month to Flensburg.
109. This system has some limitations for the local control of international projects, as it was the case for the Swiss-funded ones. Upon request by the evaluation for financial reports of the projects (to compare with the narrative ones), the locally kept copies of accounts had first to be compiled with the audited accounts at the HQ (which had made the reports for FDFA).
110. Accounts are certified every year as audits are made (mandatorily) once per year, both in Kosovo by legal auditors certified by the Government /tax administration (this is a new law, as there were only 'independent' auditors until a year ago) and in Germany, by German auditors. To this date, UNICEF is the only donor to have carried out its own audit (mandatory for projects of more than 100.000 US\$).
111. The accountant has been working for ECMI Kosovo since 2006 and appears to be quite proficient. He is also involved in the preparation of the budgets in the project proposals (to ensure that proposed costs are coherent with registered expenditures and narrative proposal), but regular cost control of the projects expenses are made by the Project Manager (supervised by the Director for approval of accounts before payments).
112. Payment requests are then forwarded by the accountant in his monthly reports to HQ. Money is transferred from HQ on that basis. Since transfer time from Germany can take 1 week, ECMI Kosovo keeps an "overhead account" in case of emergencies.
113. As far as the evaluation could ascertain by comparing proposals to final accounts (the ToR did not require this study), nearly all budget items have been duly kept within the projected limits, with only minor variations for e.g. bank charges, which cannot be accurately predicted. It should be noted that the 'international project associate' from HQ which had been budgeted for project 2 (6.000€) was not invoiced, which may reflect the growing independence of ECMI Kosovo from Flensburg. Although timesheets were not made available (nor were they requested), the variations in actual amounts charged for local personnel costs (usually lower than the budget) seem to reflect an accurate follow up of the workload of the project staff. According to the accountant, for budget discrepancies (especially if an item increases by more than 10-15% as compared to forecasts and cannot be compensated by other items), approval is systematically requested to the donor.

B.3.3.2. Specific approach of ECMI

9. What is ECMI's specific approach compared to other organizations?

114. The approach of ECMI Kosovo is rather unique for an NGO, due to its in-depth knowledge of both the Kosovo institutions and field communities, and its use of highly skilled experts. The project approach reflects the institutional skills by adopting usually a dual or two-pronged focus and providing practical capacity building and support to (i) government institutions (most NGOs would rather be doing 'advocacy' and would be afraid or diffident of authorities), and (ii) civil society within communities. Only in case of problems would ECMI (reportedly) resort to advocacy.

The organisation therefore generally combines, to a certain extent, the skills and resources of a consultancy company, the political savvy of a think-tank, and the commitment of an NGO. Due to these factors, ECMI is currently the leading NGO in Kosovo regarding (minority) community issues. As a knowledgeable external observer has put it, “they can swim”.

115. Such achievements have inevitably entailed some constraints. ECMI is sometimes assessed as being much “donor aware”. It is indeed endeavoring to do its best to meet donors’ expectations and may be seen as eager to please them. This is however still a relatively young organization – with an equally young staff -, which is relying much less than previously on the HQ in Germany, and is still ‘learning by doing’. Despite ECMI’s increasingly balanced approach (expected results were better expressed and less widely optimistic in projects 2 and 3 than in 1), risk assessments (see TOC) still need to be further developed prior to starting a project. Therefore, should ECMI be faced with severe implementation problems or hard choices during the course of a project (e.g. between meeting expectations or protecting its position, and applying its mandate to the full), it may potentially be inclined to follow the 1st choice and avoid ‘making waves’. Although ECMI is not a whistle-blower, it could be more assertive, as also stated below.
116. At the request of DP IV, ECMI has attempted to translate this approach into the Theory of Change (TOC), in the absence of LFA (logical framework analysis). It should be noted that the TOC as utilized by FDFA do not necessarily include a structured “pathway of change” (which can present a backwards mapping of five main project stages from identifying long-term objectives to expected outcomes, activities and indicators, much like an LFA), but can more simply be seen as a “travel in rational thought” by the implementing partner and should provide answers to questions such as “why do we think that activity X will have impact Y”. This more basic /simple approach still allows for a better reflection regarding what needs to be done and why. TOC may in particular be helpful to determine the longer-term ‘vision’ of an organization, to be followed with both determination and flexibility. It would however hardly avoid entirely the problems encountered during projects 2 and 3, which derive from short-term modifications of the highly volatile political context of Kosovo.
117. Nevertheless, the TOC description handed over to the evaluation did not clearly distinguish between contributing to create first a conducive legal environment (the main focus of project 1 and a precondition for projects 2 and 3), and secondly the two-pronged or dual approach which has been followed thereafter (building capacities at both State and communities levels). This two-pronged approach, although effectively present in projects 2 and 3, was not reflected either in the sequential numbering of activities (e.g. no dual sub-division into project components like in project 1). The TOC approach of ECMI would furthermore benefit from a more thorough assessment of risks and assumptions, which is often minimal in the project proposals.

B.3.3.3. Strengths and weaknesses of ECMI

10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of ECMI as a partner in these projects?

118. The main strengths and weaknesses of ECMI-Kosovo, which are outlined in other sections of this report, can be summarized as follows.

Table 2

STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
ECMI is positively perceived as neutral or at least impartial by the large majority of actors and stakeholders in Kosovo, both at central and community levels.	Inadequate monitoring and steering procedures in case of strong implementation problems ; there should be a dedicated M&E function at the HQ for backstopping

Its effectiveness and in-depth knowledge of the situation also makes of ECMI a country leader in the sector of politically-oriented projects.	Uneven report production in terms of contents; reports are not yet sufficiently structured and systematic; the risk assessment needs to be improved; the polished and politically acceptable tone of the public reports needs to be balanced by confidential annexes
ECMI's activities are fully relevant to the FDFA policy and DPIV mandate of protection of minority rights and core focus on decentralisation.	Young project management staff which is not always able to capture the big picture (this may be helped by an improved TOC approach); there is also a lack of specialized field staff
It can provide relevant project designs and can coordinate effectively and with flexibility the implementation, with an adequate level of cooperation with the actors and donors.	
The management has demonstrated a steep learning curve ('learning by doing') and an adequate capacity to improve the quality between successive projects.	

B.3.3.4. Reporting

11. Did the reports provide an impartial and objective view of the activities and results?

119. Without necessarily imposing a fully-fledged LFA (which has its own limitations as its quality is essentially due to the skills and understanding of the actors), the reporting of ECMI would benefit from a more thorough and systematic follow-up of the various activities between proposals and mid-term/final reports. As shown in the overall table of Annex 3, it has often been found difficult to attribute systematically and to assess achievements, and hence the level of effectiveness. The numbering of activities should in particular be as systematic and structured as feasible.
120. ECMI demonstrated its learning capacity by improving this approach in the 3rd project – and even more so in the overall list of activities and related documents which has been provided to the evaluation. It should be noted that the fact that the 3rd project was more of a technical assistance nature has probably made easier the more structured presentation of the various activities in the proposal and reports.
121. Nevertheless, and probably due to the complexity of the 3rd project, a significant number of inconsistencies are still to be found (unclear or erroneous issues are highlighted in red in Annex 3). For example, the important Employment Study among the policy-making tools in Activity C (which demanded so much efforts and advocacy by the PM and was kept aside by the 'reluctant' OCA Director) was variously mentioned under C.1 in the proposal, under C.3 in the interim report, and disappeared altogether in the project revision and in the final report.
122. Being deeply involved in politically-oriented projects – its core activity – and having learned to steer through regular political turmoil, ECMI has developed a capacity to produce politically acceptable reports. Although this approach is quite adapted for documents that are bound to be publicly disseminated, more balanced information is needed for the complete information of the donors, as well as for the sake of transparency and accountability.
123. The past habit of discussing verbally and informally the issues with the PBA and not handing over short written notes with the raw facts (which could be classified as confidential if necessary) on top of the 'smooth' official/public reports, would be much appreciated from the point of view of

memory and balanced information required by a donor institution. Implementing agencies are dealing with institutions which are employing numerous staff members present and future, not only the persons present in the field at a certain time, with whom one can discuss informally. There were no such reports available to the evaluation.

124. As mentioned in the project proposal, monthly progress reports are also produced, in the form of all-purposes Newsletters posted on the ECMI website. Although the Newsletters are informative and provide a commendable measure of public accountability, they are also rather general in nature and remain short (2-3 pages); they aim at summarising the latest political developments as well as providing updates about all the projects implemented and some internal news. These updates are hardly usable for monitoring purposes by a demanding donor, though. The information provided about the Swiss-funded projects are usually developed in a few lines, which would essentially mention some key *outputs* or activities taking place (workshops etc), without much indications about *outcomes*. At that level, the information is correct while remaining 'smooth' as fits public dissemination. The Newsletters of June-September 2010 mentioned e.g. correctly that 'developments outside the direct control of the project team have impeded the realisation of certain objectives of the project', OCA was 'hiring new staff', a 'project evaluation' had taken place, a 'new strategic direction had been adopted', and 'activities were widened to include other institutions', without further detrimental details. The format of this reporting does not allow either (nor does it aim at) a structured and systematic follow up of all the activities of a given project.
125. Finally, although this may not always be relevant and does not have to be necessarily applied, options for exit strategies should continue to be systematically considered in project proposals.

B.3.3.5. Cooperation with FDFA and other key international actors

12. How was the Swiss regional PBA involved? How was the collaboration with the Swiss Liaison Office, later embassy, in Pristina? And how did the cooperation affect the project impact and development?

126. The cooperation between DP IV and ECMI has been reported as good by all parties throughout the implementation of the three successive projects, even when DP IV was represented only by a regional PBA (Peace Building Adviser) in Skopje, between April 2005 and January 2010. Furthermore, the PBA could only visit Kosovo 1-2 times per month at the beginning, and most reports and discussions with ECMI were done verbally, without systematic records for institutional memory purposes, either public or confidential.
127. To alleviate this situation, a liaison officer /local assistant was appointed at the embassy in Pristina as from the summer of 2008. In addition, the new regional PBA was permanently transferred to the embassy in Pristina in March 2010, with the rank of 1st Secretary.
128. An illustration of this effective cooperation could be demonstrated when delays and problems appeared during project 3. ECMI rapidly reported to the PBA, options were jointly considered, and the project was re-oriented (see above), although not optimally. It should be noted that the PBA was quite aware of the situation, even without specific information from ECMI.
129. ECMI is currently working with at least 6 international donors (Finland, Norway, UK, OSCE, UNICEF and EU – see table 3) on as many different projects, all of them related to the protection of minority communities and decentralization. In recent monthly Newsletters, some references were also made to projects funded by UNOPS and OHCHR, although these are listed among the 'current projects' on ECMI website.

Table 3

Donor	Project
Finland	Support to Minority communities during and after the Decentralization, (and?) Support to Minority communities during the Decentralization (phase II ?)
OSCE (High Commissioner on National Minorities)	Provision of Language-learning Opportunities for Municipal Officials in Kosovo
OSCE	Building sensitivity for RAE communities in schools
Norway, UK (Germany in the past)	Institutionalisation of the CCC
UNICEF	Improving service delivery and minority rights awareness at the municipal and civil society level
EU/EC	Enhancing the Positive Impact of the Law for Vulnerable and Marginalised Groups (VMGs) in Kosovo
UNOPS ?	Increasing the Awareness and Participation of Isolated Minority Communities in Kosovo on the Census
OHCHR?	?

130. This portfolio, which does not include some other donors with whom ECMI has also been cooperating on a rather regular basis (DP IV, USAID), testifies of the fact that the NGO is widely known and appreciated in Kosovo, despite the highly volatile political context and the subsequent problems into which an implementing organisation could easily lose its reputation. ECMI has e.g. been able to steer between the sometimes diverging supports provided for a time by the US to the OPM/OCA (owing to the assumption that the powerful Prime Minister could “get things done”), and by the EU to the MCR in a more constitutional perspective (notwithstanding the fact that the EU has not yet fully recognized the independence of Kosovo, which undermines its position).

131. International coordination on the rights of communities is however currently rather weak in Kosovo. General issues are discussed during weekly meetings by the ambassadors of USA, UK, France, Italy and Germany, and on a biweekly basis by the offices of the same 5 embassies to which are added UNMIK, ICO, the EU/Greek special envoy, and the representatives of Russia. There is no structure dedicated to minority issues only.

B.4. Recommendations

B.4.1. Strategic level – Recommendations for a follow up project

To continue the two-pronged approach through e.g. the following recommendations, which should be discussed jointly between ECMI and FDFA.

132. At central level, to mainstream the promotion of community rights through the delivery to the government of a curriculum on the protection of community rights and HR. This curriculum could be based on the material already developed for OCA, but adapted for general use by any institution involved in working with communities. No single institution should be targeted, leaving the government to decide of its dissemination (OPM/OCA, CCC, MCR, MLGA, CRICR, AOGG, KIPA – Institute for Public Administration, etc). Whenever one of these institutions would feel the need, it could hire an expert to perform a single training session or a regular cycle of training (internal, external, trainer of trainers) based on the curriculum to cope with the (unavoidable) turnover of staff due e.g. to low salaries.
133. At field level, to support capacity building and competences within the municipalities (which have set up Offices of Communities where the percentages are sufficient). This approach should be consistent and complementary to the support already provided by SDC, but also by other key donors such as e.g. the US and Finland.
134. The CCC could also benefit from capacity building to allow it to use its planned secretariat to an optimal effect, and provide quality advice to the government (e.g. studies regarding further decentralisation at sub-municipality or village level of the Offices for Communities, as perhaps envisaged). Due caution should however be exerted, as the CCC is no longer a spin-off of ECMI but has become a fully fledged Kosovo institution, and could be envisaging to play a political role on top of being an advisory body. Should it retain its advisory role only, a key task of CCC could be to monitor a set of indicators regarding the achievements of the above objectives and the support to communities rights at municipal/decentralised level (perhaps in coordination with OSCE). Since CCC members are already present or well-connected in many concerned municipalities and could therefore not be seen as neutral anymore, a (part-time) M&E function could be created within the expanded CCC Secretariat, with a statute that would guarantee its independence. Such indicators could e.g. be used for the annual planning and reporting exercise by the government. A pilot testing of the indicators could be done at first in a few selected municipalities.
135. The possible role of the CCC should be carefully assessed in any potential risks and assumptions of a future project, through e.g. its current position within the Office of the President, or its alleged political ambitions (see B.3.1.1.c). As outlined by a key external observer, as long as the President of Kosovo has not been democratically elected (which is tentatively scheduled for 2012), the function will entail a certain political weakness when facing e.g. the elected and powerful Prime Minister. This weakness is bound to be reflected in the activities of the CCC, whose (both advisory and regulatory) role should contribute bridging the divide between law and reality by using the presidential power and promulgating laws. The same should be true for e.g. OCA within OPM, should the authority of the Prime Minister be somewhat decreased or his priorities be set on other more pressing issues.

B.4.2. Operational level – Efficiency and organisation

Recommendations for ECMI Kosovo

136. To keep an edge on quality, ECMI should further improve its structured approach in proposals and reporting, with e.g. a clear numbering of the activities, to allow for easy follow up.
137. In parallel, to develop a better assessment of risks and assumptions in the proposals.
138. Possibly, to consider following a monitoring plan ('what to monitor and when')
139. To complement 'smooth' public reports by confidential ones, short and with raw facts/data as feasible, but which can feed the institutional memory of a major donor organisation (agencies are dealing with institutions implying numerous staff members present and future, not only persons in the field with whom one can discuss informally). Donors are bound appreciate well-balanced information for transparency and accountability purposes, which can also be used for M&E.
140. Although this may not always be relevant and does not have to be necessarily applied, options for exit strategies should continue to be systematically considered in project proposals.
141. The approach of providing the government with "tools" that can be used by whatever institution is found relevant or in charge, should also be developed, instead of putting all the eggs in the same basket and betting on chances in a political environment which is bound to remain volatile. Such tools (database, map, curriculum – see below) should be handed over under the provisions of an MoU which governs their use and maintenance/sustainability.

Recommendations for ECMI HQ

142. ECMI should set up a (possibly part-time) M&E 'function' at HQ level, i.e. an internal staff member who is trained in M&E techniques, knows already the organisation, and can be sent rapidly to the field for a rapid evaluation (following the methodology of the Real-Time Evaluation / RTE). Being from HQ and not the project, the necessary level of independence should be preserved, which should also be ensured in the job description and statutes of the function. The report can be either internal or public, which is easier when no externals are involved. This saves on time and costs, as it allows to avoid hiring (expensive) external consultants which must furthermore become acquainted with the internal functioning of the organisation.

Recommendations for FDFA

143. In the dual management framework of a PBA in the field and a project officer at HQ level, FDFA should adopt a tool comparable to the "FichOp" used by the European Commission (DG ECHO) in similar settings, but which ensures institutional memory. The FichOp is a confidential/internal document, informal and rapid, to be used jointly by the field expert and the desk officer. Both of them are feeding in separately their honest opinions (sometimes contradictory) about a given project at crucial times of the Project Cycle Management, such as proposals, mid-term and final reports, or monitoring visits. As such procedures, even though rather informal, would nevertheless increase somewhat the workload, the later should also be commensurate with the number of projects to be supervised, and the number of staff in charge.

ANNEXES

1. Terms of Reference



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Directorate of Political Affairs DP
Political Affairs Division IV, Human Security

Berne, 5 July 2011

Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the Swiss funded Projects of the NGO *European Center for Minority Issues Kosovo (ECMI)*, in Kosovo

1. Background

The European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo (ECMI Kosovo) has been working to protect and promote minority rights in Kosovo since 2001. ECMI Kosovo is the only local organisation dedicated exclusively to the protection and promotion of minority rights in Kosovo, with strong relations with the government and community representatives.

ECMI initially worked almost exclusively with minority community groups. In 2004, the organisation expanded its scope and supported the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, in the Standards Implementation Process. This included assisting the Government to adopt and draft five key pieces of legislation. During the status negotiation process, ECMI Kosovo assisted members of minority communities to formulate their views and advocate for their inclusion in the decision-making process. After the introduction UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's *Comprehensive Proposal for the Final Status of Kosovo* in 2007, ECMI Kosovo participated in the drafting of key minority rights legislation. With Kosovo's independence in February 2008, ECMI Kosovo has engaged in the building of institutions, as well as the providing of technical support, for the effective implementation of these laws.

The protection and promotion of minorities is a strategic priority in Kosovo and ECMI has been the main partner in this field. Therefore the purpose of this evaluation is to evaluate the effectiveness of a strategic field, through these 3 projects.

From 2006 to 2010, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has funded three ECMI projects:

- 2006-2008 - The first project (SAP 530703, 376'334.40€) focused on supporting community participation in relation to the final status negotiations on Kosovo's status. The aim was to push communities' concerns and opinions into the agenda of the Kosovo Delegation, which was later reflected in the Ahtisaari Proposals.
- 2008-2009 - The second project, 'Support to Minority Communities in Kosovo during the Kosovo Status Transition Period' (Ref: K.234.4-KOSOV / SAP No. 531560, 208'736€) aimed at supporting Kosovo

government in the implementations of community rights during a period of transition into independence, specifically by strengthening the capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister.

- 2009-20011 - The third project, 'Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the work of the Government' (Ref: K.234.32-KOSOV-CNS / SAP No. 532921, 172'457€) furthered the work of strengthening Kosovo government's capacity to address issues facing minority communities.

2. Aims of the evaluation of the projects in Kosovo 2006 – 20011 and the mandate of the evaluation

Swiss FDFA seeks an independent evaluation of ECMI Kosovo Swiss funded projects. A summative and formative evaluation is sought with the following objectives:

1. To analyse the effectiveness of ECMI Kosovo's actions in promoting and protecting minority rights in Kosovo, including assessment of the projects' contribution to the following:

- The capacity of the government to implement measures to protect minorities.
- The capacity of government institutions and their staff to deal with needs of communities and their members.
- The development of a legislative environment that can safeguard minority rights.
- The participation by members of the community in all areas of public life, including access to all socio-economic opportunities.
- The quality and impact of research completed as a part of the projects.

2. To identify strengths, weaknesses and challenges of the projects and ECMI.

3. To provide forward-looking recommendations and lessons' learnt in the area of minority rights in Kosovo.

3. Expected Use of Evaluation

Swiss FDFA will use the evaluation findings to assess past projects and potential future project proposals. The findings will also be made available to ECMI Kosovo and may be shared with other project stakeholders in order to improve future project programming.

4. Evaluation Questions

It is expected that the evaluation will address the following questions for each project:

Effectiveness - Lessons learnt and sustainability

1. What are the progresses made towards the achievement of the expected project outcomes and results? :
 - a. What are the changes in legal frameworks resulting from the projects?
 - b. What are the changes in policy and implementation resulting from the projects?
 - c. To what extent have the capacities of relevant offices in the government institutions been strengthened?
2. Horizon impact: To what extent have the capacities of communities and their members been strengthened?
3. What are the reasons for any shortfall or failure to achieve expected outcomes?

Relevance

In Kosovo

4. To what extent are the intended beneficiaries satisfied with the results/did the project satisfy their needs?
5. How and to what extent have outputs produced by the projects (research, guidelines, manuals and other publications) been disseminated and used?
6. How and to what extent have the web-based resources been used?

To the DPIV mandate and Swiss foreign policy

7. Was ECMI the appropriate partner for DP IV, given DPIV mandate, Swiss foreign policy and the objectives of the project?

Efficiency

8. Were the programme steering procedures/monitoring efficiently organized?
9. What is ECMI's specific approach compared to other organizations?
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of ECMI as a partner in these projects?
11. Did the reports provide an impartial and objective view of the activities and results?
12. How was the Swiss regional PBA involved? How was the collaboration with the Swiss Liaison Office, later embassy, in Pristina? And how did the cooperation affect the project impact and development?

The evaluator can raise other questions as necessary.

5. Expected Deliverables

The evaluator is expected to deliver the following:

1. An evaluation outline submitted in the first week of engagement/inception report, including theories of change.
2. An evaluation report of max. 20 pages plus annexes, in English, including:
 - Executive Summary
 - Evaluation Methodology
 - Findings
 - Recommendations and lessons learned.
 - Annexes, including interview list and summary of sources
3. PowerPoint presentation of findings and recommendations.

VI. Methodology and Timeframe

The evaluation is an independent assessment of the effectiveness of Swiss FDFA / ECMI Kosovo projects. In the frame of the given budget, the information is expected to be gathered mainly through a desk review of existing documentation and interviews in Kosovo and Bern.

The evaluation will be in three stages:

1. *A desk review* of relevant documents (to be provided¹).
1 Project proposals and project reports (ECMI and DPIV), Research reports produced by the projects, Publications produced by the projects, tools, manuals and other materials produced by the projects, data on use of web resources, data on the use of materials produced by the project, etc...
2. *Interviews* with stakeholders, intended beneficiaries, Swiss personnel involved in the projects and other participants to project activities, in Bern and Kosovo.
3. *Drafting* of final report.

The team is invited to further elaborate on the proposed methods and tools for the evaluation.

7. Evaluator Competencies

The evaluation team (2-3 persons) must have sound skills in evaluation and assessments, and a proven record of performance/knowledge in the thematic and geographical area. Members of the team should have knowledge of legal issues, Kosovo political institutions and experience in minority rights protection.

Team members should have excellent knowledge in written and spoken English as well as, if possible, the local languages (Albanian/Serbian).

The evaluation shall analyse, assess and validate the work of ECMI in its specific complex environment and give advice to the management and donors to foster optimal results in the field of minority protection and promotion.

8. Schedule

The evaluation should take place as early as possible, but not later than October 2011. The envelope is the following:

Evaluation timeframe

It is suggested to have a team of two international or local evaluators, supported by a local person, in charge of logistics and translation.

	Team leader	Team member	Team member
Preparatory phase Desk review Presentation of an evaluation outline	6 days	4 days	1 day
Evaluation mission	5 days + travel	5 days	5 days
Presentation of draft report	5 days	4 days	
Presentation of final report	3 days	-	

2. Evaluation Matrix

Criteria	Sub-criteria	Key Evaluation questions	Indicators	Tasks		Cross-reference with chapters of final report
				MVB	PR	
A. Relevance	A.1. Relevance of objectives	<i>A.1.1. Did the project objectives duly correspond to identified priority needs and to ECMI's and donors' (FDFA) strategies?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adequacy of identification of initial situation - Adequacy of changed situation - Consistency with relevant assistance policies 	X	X	B.3.2.1
	A.2. Design quality and preparation	<p><i>A.2.1. How appropriate and thorough were the assessments of needs, of project partners, of expected results, and of corresponding required implementation set up?</i></p> <p>A.2.2. What is ECMI's specific approach compared to other organizations?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adequacy of preparatory/ programming documents , including risk assessment - Adequacy of project partners (selection criteria),including community leaders/ NGOs - Adequacy of plan to enhance visibility of the donor (if applicable) 	X	X	B.3.2.1 B.3.3.2.
	A.3. Institutional arrangements	<p>A.3.1. Was ECMI the appropriate partner for DP IV, given DPIV mandate, Swiss foreign policy and the objectives of the project?</p> <p><i>A.3.2. How appropriate were the institutional relations between ECMI and FDFA DPIV, the project partners, and the other concerned donors and international agencies (especially EULEX and USAID)?</i></p> <p>A.3.3. How was the Swiss regional PBA involved? How was the collaboration with the Swiss Liaison Office, later embassy, in Pristina? And how did the cooperation affect the project impact and development?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quality of relations - All relevant parties are represented - Clarity and non-duplication of TOR and mandates of Kosovo institutions supported by ECMI/FDFA - Regularity of meetings/written correspondence - Speed of decisions and follow up - Speed of budgetary disbursement - Coherence, complementarity and coordination with other funding instruments and/or interagency/EU/UN coordination bodies (especially their level of commitment to fully protect rights of minorities) 	X		B.3.2.4. B.3.3.5. B.3.3.5.
B. Effectiveness	B.1. Achievements	<p>B.1.1. What are the progresses made towards the achievement of the expected project outcomes and results?</p> <p>B.1.2. What are the reasons for any shortfall or failure to achieve expected outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of (quantifiable) objectives achieved (if not, why not?) - Degree of overall ECMI's and/or FDFA's visibility (if applicable) - Degree of overall visibility and authority of Kosovo institutions (e.g. CCC, OPM) supported by ECMI/FDFA 	X	X	B.3.1.1 B.3.1.3.

Criteria	Sub-criteria	Key Evaluation questions	Indicators	Tasks		Cross-reference with chapters of final report
				MVB	PR	
	B.2. Quality and monitoring	<p>B.2.1. Did all the delivered workshops, publications and other services satisfy their intended goals?</p> <p>B.2.2. Were the project steering procedures/monitoring efficiently organized?</p> <p>B.2.3. Did the reports provide an impartial and objective view of the activities and results?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adequacy of quality of work/services (norms?) - Adequacy of monitoring (quality of indicators, regularity, reporting) 	X	X	<p>B.3.1.1</p> <p>B.3.3.1</p> <p>B.3.3.4</p>
	B.3. Stakeholders satisfaction on project implementation	<p>B.3.1. To what extent are the targeted beneficiaries satisfied with the results/did the project satisfy their needs? (see also A.1.1)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree of satisfaction of each community (Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, RAE etc) - Within communities, degree of satisfaction (per item, disaggregated per gender, age – if applicable); if not, why not 		X	B.3.1.1.d
C. Efficiency	C.1. Project management	<p>C.1.1. Were the operational capacities of ECMI adequate?</p> <p>C.1.2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of ECMI as a partner in these projects?</p> <p>C.1.3. How did ECMI respond to exogenous changes that impacted on the projects?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quality of management, reactivity, implementation, communication etc - Adequacy of response time and flexibility by ECMI (- vs -) - Adequacy of supervision/backstopping by ECMI HQ 	X		<p>B.3.3.2</p> <p>B.3.3.3</p> <p>B.3.3.3</p> <p>B.3.3.1</p>
	C.2. Cost efficiency	<p>C.2.1. How far were the costs of the project activities justified by the benefits? (provided that benefits can be quantified and/or translated into monetary terms)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cost per beneficiary (were all the minority communities covered by the partner leaders/ NGOs?) - Cost per project component (e.g. workshop, field survey, international expertise etc) - Control of project component costs (planned vs. final) 	X	X	B.3.3.3
	C.3. Schedule	<p>C.3.1. Were the works, facilities and services delivered within the expected time periods?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Timeliness of items and overall achievements (compared to planning) 	X	X	B.3.3.3
	C.4. Cost control	<p>C.4.1. Was the control of the costs of the works, facilities and services appropriate?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adequacy of accounting books (norms?) - Regularity and adequacy of cost reports - Timeliness of payments 	X		B.3.3.3

Criteria	Sub-criteria	Key Evaluation questions	Indicators	Tasks		Cross-reference with chapters of final report
				MVB	PR	
	D.4. Environmental and health outcome/impact	<i>D.4.1. Are there any outcomes/ impacts on the health of the beneficiaries and/or their environment, which can be attributed partly or totally to the project?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access of project beneficiaries to public health services (by gender, age) - Environmental issues related to local communities, such as waste dumps (if applicable) 		X	B.3.1.2
E. Sustainability	E.1. Institutional sustainability	<p><i>E.1.1. Are the necessary supporting measures in place, at every relevant decision-making and policy level, to sustain the delivered works, facilities and services after the end of the project funding?</i></p> <p>E.1.2. What are the changes in policy and implementation resulting from the projects?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Commitment to sustain outputs at all appropriate project partners/beneficiaries levels (through actions by relevant State institutions and/or communities) - Internal regulatory and administrative instruments adopted and functioning - Degree of ownership/empowerment and integration of outputs in relevant ministries/ local communities - Setting up of an adequate exit strategy by ECMI 	X	X	<p>B.3.1.1.b</p> <p>B.3.1.1.c</p> <p>B.3.1.1.b</p>
	E.2. Financial/ economic sustainability	<i>E.2.1. Are the necessary supporting measures in place, at every relevant budgetary and economic level, to sustain the delivered works, facilities and services after the end of the project funding?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Budgetary capacity to maintain outputs, future organizational improvements considered? - Other donors involved (if applicable) - Setting up of an adequate exit strategy by ECMI 	X		<p>B.3.1.1.b</p> <p>B.3.1.1.c</p>
	E.3. Socio-cultural sustainability	<i>E.3.1. How far are the delivered works, facilities and services (incl. New drafted laws) integrated into the socio-cultural, legal framework and rule of law of the recipient country?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coherence and complementarity with socio-cultural, legal framework (parliamentary or presidential system?) and rule of law of the recipient country - N°/type/relevance of project partners involved during project implementation and after completion, and influence/authority of selected community leaders 	X	X	<p>B.3.1.1.a</p> <p>B.3.1.1.b</p> <p>B.3.1.1.c</p> <p>B.3.1.1.d</p>
	E.4. Environmental sustainability	<i>E.4.1. How far are the delivered works, facilities and services integrated into the environmental framework of the recipient country?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - N/A 	-	-	-
	E.5. Technical sustainability	<i>E.5.1. Are the necessary supporting measures in place, at every relevant technical level, to sustain the delivered works, facilities and services after the end of the project funding?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adequate technical capacity to maintain outputs (organizational capacities, staff skills, etc. at all operation levels including web, databases, ethno-political map) - Setting up of an adequate exit strategy by ECMI 	X		<p>B.3.1.1.b</p> <p>B.3.1.1.c</p>

3. Overall table of objectives, activities and achievements

Project 1 (K.234.4 / SAP 530703 for 376.334,40€; implementation 2006-2008)							
Project proposal (26/10/2006)			Results in mid-term report (Sep 2007)	Results in Final report (10/04/2008)	COMMENTS		
Project A Participation in legislative drafting process (3 specific objectives)	1. Support community reps to initiate drafting of Special Constitutional Law on Communities	Workshop by CCC	Workshop in Antalya/Feb 2007		-The 3 specific objectives are not clearly linked to the 3 activities -Lists of assumptions (globally optimistic) and risks rather short in project proposal? -Expected results are mixing outputs (workshops) and outcomes ('improved...') -Many expected outcomes (and some outputs) are not mentioned in final reports		
		Draft law agreed by representatives of communities	Workshop in Durres/May 2007, agreed draft special law draft HR chapter of Constitution	Drafting of law concluded by minority representatives			
	2. Support agreement of draft law with authorities, and draft Constitutional chapter on Human and Minority Rights	Workshop	Antalya workshop, work halted to wait for slower UN SC				
		Draft chapter agreed		Draft presented in March 2007, no decision			
		Improved communication between minorities and authorities		?			
	3. Support consultation and approval by Assembly of Kosovo	High level conference to discuss draft texts		Series of meetings			
		Consensus among all key political leaders		?			
		Improved cooperation and commitment		?			
	Project B Support to Office of Prime Minister (OPM) (4 specific objectives)	1. Ensure that policy commitments and legal obligations are fulfilled	Actions plans	Delays due to politics		Workshops for needs assessments with NGOs/ communities (separately with Serbs, Bosniak/ Gorani, Turks, RAE), Oct 07	-Confused relations of 4 initial objectives with 3 activities and results in final report -Unclear whether HR chapter relates to project A or B
			Ministerial working group			Draft HR chapter of Constitution revised with OGG, Dec 07, with matrix for action plan	
M&E				?			
Strengthened OPM capacity to protect minority interests		TOR for Swiss Minority Affairs Advisor accepted	Advisor also presented as result of activity 2 below	-Advisor foreseen in objective 4, but not so clearly in activities			
2. Assist OPM in establishing coordination		Coordination Cell in OPM	HRSAP created by government, with HRU and coordination offices; ECMI changes strategy to support	-workshop with OPM, Dec 07 -workshop with HRU, Aug 07 No more action due to change in government	Setting up of HRSAP was unexpected?		

	mechanism		this		unclear
		Staff trained		?	
		Communications established		?	
	3. Support reporting of government to EU/UN	Performance targets set		?	
		Improved understanding of govt on minority issues		?	
		Key govt actors trained		?	
Improved reporting practices		Reporting tasks transferred to OSCE			
Project 2 (K.234.4-KOSOVO / SAP N° 531560 for 208.736€; implementation: 2008-2009)					
Project proposal on 09/01/2008		Results in mid-term report (July 2008)	Results in Final report (17/08/2009)	COMMENTS	
?	?	“Project A” Constitution and Legal drafting process”? Delays in status settlement, draft law suspended	?	This ‘project’ was not in the initial proposal?	
1. Restructuring of OPM and creation of Task Force (TF) for community Affairs	Task Force established	Modified due to HRSAP; ECMI envisages to support HRCO at OPM; MoU and Swiss Advisor support	-Creation and mandate of Office for Community Affairs (OCA); -TOR done, but weak staffing -‘Guidebook for professionals’	-Sub-division into projects A and B is tentative; the proposal mentioned only activities 1-4 -Disagreement between ECMI and Advisor regarding OCA structure? Made after final report	
	Coop of TF with main actors		MoU of OCA with others, but coordination/ mandate problems of OCA with MCR and OGG		
	Streamlined structure of TF		Incomplete -operational strategy for OCA 2009-11, Nov 2009		
	M&E for TF		?		
	Consultation process betw. TF and communities		Workshop in July 2009		
	Participation of communities in TF		?		
2. Development of Integrated Strategy for Communities (SFC)	SFC developed		Overlaps of mandate of OCA with MCR precludes strategy development		
	Consultation system among communities		?		
	Dialogue facilitated betw. Communities and Ministries		?		
	Set of recommendations		?		
	Unified approach towards communities		Study on employment?		
	Full participation of communities in drafting SFC		Postponed due to overlapping of mandates		

3. Database and ethno-political map	Database and map developed		Work done by 2 local field researchers	In budget: "5 research associates"?"
	Info on internet		?	
	New web site		OCA website under development	
	Skills at OPM to maintain and updated database		Not enough trained staff, maintenance by ECMI	
4. Direct outreach to communities	5 workshops with OPM and community leaders		-Due to lack of funding (?), communities could not be involved in discussion on OCA development -Field visits and 'Know Your Rights' booklet disseminated	unclear
	Continue work to broaden support to SFC and TF		?	
	Capacity training for communities		?	
	Facilitate dialogue among communities via forum		?	

Project 3 (K.234.32-KOSOV-CNS / SAP N° 532921 for 172.457€; implementation: 2009-2011)

Project proposal on 09/11/2009		Results in mid-term report (31/05/2010)	Revision after evaluation (also dated 31/05/2010)	Results in Final report (31/01/2011)	COMMENTS
A. (or 1) Capacity assessment of OCA	A.1. Capacity assessment	Due to staff change (Deputy Director fired in mid-Feb 2010 (reasons?); Policy Officer fired for 'unprofessional behavior'), assessment on hold	Postponed due to lack of staff	-Started only in Sep 2010 -Assessment report "accepted by ECMI" on 19/10	-Interim evaluation by ECMI (Apr '10) to adjust strategy after changes; interim report was nonetheless delivered -No-cost extension approved from 30/11/2010 to 31/01/2011 -Reports were also accepted by OCA?
	A.2. Training program			-done, report "accepted by ECMI" on 19/10	
	A.3. Materials for capacity building			2 trainings done (TOR, strategy, rights (with handbook/best practice manual)	
B. (or 2) Capacity building of OCA staff	B.1. Coaching of staff	Being done (Policy, Grants, Communication Officers)	Postponed due to lack of staff	Done by PM intra muros, as much as possible	-'Lack of clear mandate since the creation of OCA/OPM' (not explained in report)
	B.2. Training on mandate/TOR, strategy and management	Due to staff change, no formal training (postponed)		-Training on TOR short and 'Informal' -Strategy stopped by of OCA Director	
	B.3. Training on minority rights	(As above)		Done end 2010	
	B.4. Training during coaching	(As above)		-Basic skill done by mentoring of PM -PCM to be done later by	

	B.5. Best practice manual	(As above)		TASCO () done	Not clearly explained
C. (or 3) support OCA governmental coordination and policy activities	C.1. Finalization of publications (guidebook, booklet, employment study) and conference	() (employment study now under C.4)			Wrong numbering of activities in the interim and final reports
	C.2. Support to coordination and communication mechanisms	(C.1) Conference due in September 2010	Activity broadened with new title "support to governmental coordination and policy activities"	Delayed by fall of government in Oct 2010 and new general elections, and cancelled by ECMI	The final report still used the old activity title
	C.3. Development of policy database	(C.2) started in April 2010	To be offered to CCC Working Group on legislative process	Training for CCC, but database finally delivered to OCA	Not clear why database was not given to CCC
	C.4. Capacity building to Deputy Director and Policy Officer	(C.3) -Study on employment (ex C.1) presented on 31/03 - Scope of study on languages presented in Mar-Apr. study foreseen in June		Study on languages: questionnaires in August 2010, focus groups in Oct., report in Dec., but publication delayed by no government and by OCA	Very long chapter in the final report Reasons of OCA to postpone publication until June 2011 are not clear
	C.5. Maintenance and transfer of ethno political map	(C.4) Started in march 2010		Map linked to OCA website, but final authority on modifications (for 'quality and independence) still with ECMI	Lack of trust in OCA's 'independence'?; what about sustainability and exit strategy?
	C.6. Support on M&E for the strategy on integration of RAE	(C.5) -OCA/OPM "increasingly reluctant"; ECMI proposes to shift support to OGG	To shift support to OGG	-Support shifted from OCA to CCC, as OGG 'not receptive' ()	Unclear
			(C.6) -Support to CCC and CRICR to clarify roles and build capacities -facilitate consultations with CRO	-lack of cooperation between CRICR and CCC, despite efforts of ECMI -workshops done (CRO, CRICR)	Unclear; 'CCC needs support to claim its rights and produce concrete results'
D. (or 4) Awareness raising among communities	D.1. 5 workshops on the "Know your Rights" booklet	To start in June 2010		-Training done in 5 workshops (Oct 2010) -Handbook for 'Community Political Participation' published (n° of copies?) -but 'level of awareness and contributions to discussions varied greatly'	Unclear

4. List of persons met

4.A. Briefing / Inception period - meetings in Bern (FDFA)

Date	Time	Name	Organisation	
Thursday 13/10/2011	13H45	Marijana Rakic, Program Assistant SEE	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Directorate of Political Affairs (DP), Division IV	
	14H00	Claudia Moser, Program Officer (former Program Officer for SEE Jun 2007- Jun 2010)		
	15H15	Armin Rieser, Program Officer Conflict and Human Rights (former Peace Building Advisor for Kosovo, Apr 2005 - Jan 2010)	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	
	16H00	Kuno Schläfli, Policy Advisor Decentralisation and Local Governance, Western Balkans Division	SDC	
Friday 14/10.2011	09H00	Steering Group : -Caroline Tissot, Deputy Head, Peace Policy, Europe, Asia, mediation, Democratisation -Monika Egger Kissling, Head of strategic Controlling -Anne Moulin, Program Manager Western Balkans -Marijana Rakic, Program Assistant SEE	FDFA, DP IV FDFA, DP SDC FDFA, DP IV	
		10H15	Anne Moulin, Program Manager Western Balkans	SDC
		11H15	Raphael Nägeli, Regional coordinator SEE	FDFA, DP
		13H15 (tele-conference)	Nicole Töpferwien, Expert on issues in State organization (support for the drafting of law on Communities in Kosovo)	External expert
	15H30	Debriefing: -Caroline Tissot, Deputy Head, Peace Policy, Europe, Asia, mediation, Democratisation -Marijana Rakic, Program Assistant SEE	FDFA, DP IV	

4.B. Field visits in Kosovo (field meetings that could not take place were complemented by some later e-mail discussions, e.g. with the International Civilian Office ICO)

Date	Location	Time	Activity / Stakeholder	Persons Met / Interviewed	Evaluators	
					MVB	PR
Monday, 24/10/2011	Prishtinë/ Priština	08:30-10:00	Briefing at ECMI Kosovo Meeting with rep. of new municipalities-Serb communities, during the launching of Phase II of the Finland-funded ECMI project, at the Gorenje Centre	Adrian Zeqiri, Executive Director of ECMI Kosovo Igor Artonović Deputy Mayor of the Municipality of Gračanica Saša Marković, Deputy Mayor of Partesh (formerly Municipality of Gnjilane)	X	X
		10:30-14:00			X	X
		14:30-16:15	Second part of the briefing at ECMI & defining interviewees and appointments	Adrian Zeqiri, Executive Director of ECMI Kosovo Gazmen Salijević, Project Officer	X	X
		16:30-17:45	Briefing at the Embassy of Switzerland, Regional Peacebuilding Office	Norbert Ruetsche, First Secretary-Peacebuilding Adviser	X	X
Tuesday, 25/10	Gračanicë/ Gračanica	9:15-10:30	Meeting with Serb community representative: NGO "Communication for Social Development (CSDK)"	Ivan Nikolić, Program Manager		X
	Prishtinë/ Priština	8:30-10:00	Assessment of ECMI procedures	Adrian Zeqiri; Burlim Gagica, Financial officer	X	
	Novobërdë/ Novo Brdo	11:00-12:30	Meeting with Serb community representative: Association of Women Returnees "Our Home"	Vesna Stajić, Executive Director		X
	Prishtinë/ Priština	10:00-11:00	Meeting	Mahir Yagcilar, Minister of Public administration (Head of KDTP - Kosovo Turk Democratic Party)	X	
	Prishtinë/ Priština	11:30-12:30	Meeting	Shqipe Hajredini, former Policy Officer at OPM/OCA	X	
	Prishtinë/ Priština	12:30-13:30	meeting	Georg Eckborg, OSCE senior Communities Policy Advisor	X	
	Kllokot/ Klokot	14:00-15:45	Meeting with Serbn community representatives: NGO "Association of Women Klokot" NGO "Radio Klokot"	Biljana Marinković, Director Nikola Stolić, Manager		X

Date	Location	Time	Activity / Stakeholder	Persons Met / Interviewed	Evaluators	
					MVB	PR
	Prishtinë/ Priština	14:00-15:00	Meeting	Monica S. Bland, US Political officer and Maja Markovic, USAID, protection of minorities	X	
	Prishtinë/ Priština	15:00-16:00	Meeting at OPM/OCA	Srdjan Popovic, new Director of OCA	X	
Wednesday, 26/10	Prizren	11:00-12:00	Meeting with RAE community representative: NGO "Durmish Aslano" - Radio "Romano Avazo"	Nexhip Menekshe, Director Shpresa Murati, Bosniak Coalition "Vakat", MP in Kosovo Parliament 2004-08	X	X
		12:15-13:45	Meeting with Bosniak community representative:		X	X
	Prishtinë/ Priština	16:15-17:30	Meeting with Gorani community representative: NGO "Youth Association of Gora"	Avnia Bahtjari, Executive Director; Secretary of CCC		X
		16:15-17:00	Meeting at ECMI	Gazmen Salijević, Project Officer	X	
Thursday, 27/10	Prishtinë/ Priština	9:00-10:00	Meeting	Bashkim Ibishi, former Deputy director of OPM/OCA	X	
	Prishtinë/ Priština	10:00-10:30	Meeting	Snezana Karadzic, Adviser at MLGA Ministry	X	
	Pejë/ Peć	10:30-11:30	Meeting with Bosniak community representatives: NGO "KUNN"	Ismet Marković, Executive Director; writer, translator, political analyst Zaim Elezi, Director, human rights activist at PAVK, IFS, Kosovo Law Centre, REKOM		X
		12:00-13:45	NGO "Better Perspective"			X
	Prishtinë/ Priština	10:30-13:00	Assessment of ECMI procedures	Adrian Zeqiri	X	
	Prishtinë/ Priština	14:00-15:00	Meeting with the OPM Language Commission	Fehmi Stubla, Head of Language Commission Naser Canolli, Director of the Official Gazette	X	
	Prishtinë/ Priština	15:00-16:00	Meeting at the Kosovo Local Government Institute	Besnik Tahiri, Director	X	

Date	Location	Time	Activity / Stakeholder	Persons Met / Interviewed	Evaluators	
					MVB	PR
	Prishtinë/ Priština	15:40-16:50	Meeting with Bosniak community representative: "Kosovo Bosniaks Forum"	Çerim Bajrami, Deputy Minister for Diaspora, Vice President of CCC		X
Friday, 28/10	Prishtinë/ Priština	08:30-09:30	Debriefing at ECMI	Adrian Zeqiri, Executive Director of ECMI Kosovo	X	X
		09:40-10:40	Debriefing at the Embassy of Switzerland (trilateral)	Norbert Ruetsche, First Secretary-Peacebuilding Adviser Adrian Zeqiri, Executive Director of ECMI Kosovo	X	X
		11:30-12:00	Meeting at the Foreign Policy Club	Veton Surroi, Chairman of the Board; "Koha Ditore" Daily News founder, MP in Kosovo Parliament 2004-08	X	X

5. Bibliography

5.A. Documents received by mail from FDFA

#	Document Title	Date Drafted/ Submitted	Project No*	Document Type
1	ECMI Kosovo Country File Mär06.doc	01 March 2006	1	country profile
2	CREDIT PROPOSAL Oct 2006-KA KOSOV ECMI PP-Corrected IJAN07.doc	26 October 2006	1	project proposal
3	KA 530703 KOSOV ECMIJan07.doc	13 February 2007	1	financial doc.
4	KA APR 07- KA Kosovo ECMI participation Töpperwien 2 workshops Apr07.doc	04 April 2007	1	financial doc.
5	Memorandum of Cooperation between OPM and ECMI	11 July 2007	1	MoU
6	ECMI progress report August 2007	01 August 2007	1	project progress report
7	Progress Report.pdf	01 September 2007	1	project progress report
8	ECMI 2008 - 2009 Annex.doc	09 January 2008	2	annex to project prop.
9	ECMI 2008 - 2009.doc	09 January 2008	2	project proposal
10	Final Narrative Report.pdf	10 April 2008	1	project final report
11	KA ECMI SAP no 531560 .doc	17 July 2008	2	financial doc.
12	ECMI-Draft Policy Briefing Paper on Governmental Institutional Framework for Communities.doc	21 November 2008	2	progress report
13	ECMI-Strengthening the Institutional System for Communities in Post-Independence Kosovo.pdf	01 January 2009	2	project final report
14	CCC Meeting - The Election of the Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons.pdf	17 March 2009	3	activity report
15	OCA ECMI Letter.pdf	05 June 2009	3	letter of Kosovo's governmental support to ECMI
16	Update Project Activities April-May 2009 and Objectives.doc	09 June 2009	2	activity report Apr+May09
17	CONCEPT PROPOSAL TO THE SWISS FDFA.pdf	01 July 2009	3	project proposal
18	Budget Strategy 2010-2011 and Projects Narratives and Budgets - Final English.pdf	06 August 2009	3	project proposal

19	Final narrative report vom 17.08.2009, 531560	17 August 2009	2	project final report
20	A guidebook for professionals working with communities in Kosovo	23 November 2009	2	Guidelines
21	532921_KA_ECMI-Project Community Concern_25112009_MSC.doc	25 November 2009	3	project proposal
22	KA vom 25.11.2009 - ECMI-Project Community Concerns Kosovo - 01.12.2009 - 30.11.2010 - SAP-Nr. 532921.pdf	25 November 2009	3	project proposal incl. budget
23	Invitation and Agenda for CRICR CCC Workshop.doc	11 January 2010	3	invitation to workshop
24	ECMI Launch the Project "Enhance and Integrate Community concerns within the Work of the Government"	20 January 2010	3	publication
25	Project Evaluation - Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government	19 April 2010	3	evaluation report
26	ECMI Project Revision-Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government-Swiss Comments.doc	31 May 2010	3	project report + revision req.
27	Project Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government of Kosovo (01.12.2009-30.11.2010 SAP 532921.pdf	31 May 2010	3	interim report Dec 09-Apr10
28	FW- ECMI Project Revision Document.eml	11 June 2010	3	comments on reports
29	FW- CCC meeting 24 Sep 2010.eml	27 September 2010	3	activity report
30	FW- CCC working Group on RAE strategy .eml	08 October 2010	3	activity report
31	Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government - Narrative Report 102010.doc	19 October 2010	3	progress report
32	Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government - Narrative Report 102010.doc.eml	19 October 2010	3	ibid.
33	ECMI Kos extension.pdf	22 October 2010	3	project extension doc.
34	ECMI Kosovo Information Bulletin - CCC Training 8-9 October 2010.pdf	25 October 2010	3	activity (training) report
35	ECMI Kosovo Information Bulletin - 'Language Policies-from theory to practice' 15, 18, 20 October 2010.pdf	25 October 2010	3	activity (training) report
36	ECMI Kosovo Information Bulletin - Training on Community Outreach 13 October 2010.pdf	25 October 2010	3	activity (training) report
37	FW- ECMI Kosovo Information Bulletins- 'Language Policies in Kosovo', MPT Community Outreach Training and CCC Training.eml	25 October 2010	3	cover letter to 3 activity reports
38	FW- Request for no-cost extension of ECMI project K.234.32-KOSOV-CNS, SAP 532921.eml	25 October 2010	3	cover letter-project extension request
39	FW- Report on Training Needs Assessment of the OCA.eml	28 October 2010	3	cover letter to training needs assessment report
40	Report - Annex 1 and Annex 2.doc	28 October 2010	3	training needs assessment
41	532921_ECMI Community Concerns Aenderung der Laufzeit.doc	01 November 2010	3	financial doc.

42	Begründung für Aenderung der Laufzeit des KA 532921.doc	01 November 2010	3	project extension note
43	FW- KA 532921 ECMI - Antrag auf Aenderung der Laufzeit.eml	01 November 2010	3	email correspondence on project extension
44	FW- ECMI Kosovo Information Bulletin - 'Community- Know your rights' 3 and 7 December 2010 .eml	12 January 2011	3	cover letter to activity report
45	Information Bulletin-'Community-Know your rights' 3 and 7 December 2010.pdf	12 January 2011	3	activity (training) report
46	ECMI Information Bulletin - A New EthnoPolitical Map of Kosovo.pdf	06 April 2011	3	political map + link
47	FW- Updated EthnoPolitical Map of Kosovo.eml	08 April 2011	3	cover letter to new political map
48	Final Narrative Report 2.pdf	13 April 2011	3	project final report
49	ECMI Kosovo audit cert.pdf	12 May 2011	3	audit certificate
50	ECMI Kosovo fin.report letter.pdf	17 May 2011	3	financial doc.
51	#76 Kos EIC 2009 FDFA - Budget and report 2011.xlsx	19 May 2011	3	financial report
52	FW- ECMI Kosovo EIC final financial report.eml	19 May 2011	3	cover letter to final financial report
53	FW- ECMI Final project report .eml	24 May 2011	3	comments on final rep.
54	FW- ECMI Narrative Report.eml	30 May 2011	3	comments on final report
55	Agenda Ang..doc	12 September 2011	3	meeting agenda
56	Agenda-ser .doc	12 September 2011	3	ibid.
57	Agjenda.doc	12 September 2011	3	ibid.
58	ECMI Theories of Change	11 October 2011		explanation
59	ECMI Comments on Prolog Consult's Technical Proposal	11 October 2011		explanation
60	SDC Cooperation Strategy Kosovo 2009 - 2012	14 October 2011		publication

***Project No**

- 1 2006-2008 - the first project (SAP 530703, 376'334.40€)
- 2 2008-2009 - the second project, 'Support to Minority Communities in Kosovo during the Kosovo Status Transition Period' (Ref: K.234.4-KOSOV / SAP No. 531560, 208'736€)
- 3 2009-2011 - the third project, 'Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the work of the Government' (Ref: K.234.32-KOSOV-CNS / SAP No. 532921, 172'457€)

5.B. List of Documents received on ECMI's USB key (some are duplicating the documents above, received from FDFA)

PROJECT I

- 1.1. Credit Proposal 'Support to Minority Communities in Kosovo During and After the Final Status Process', 26 October 2006
- 1.2. Progress Report to Swiss FDFA, September 2007
- 1.3. ECMI Narrative Report for 2007, 10 April 2008
- 1.4. Follow-Up Workshop on Community Issues in Kosovo, Antalya, 16-19 February 2007
- 1.5. Drafting Workshop for Special Law on the Promotion and Protection of Rights of Communities and Persons belonging to Communities in Kosovo, Dürres, 25-28 May 2007
- 1.6. Draft Special Law on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Communities and Persons Belonging to Communities in Kosovo
- 1.7. Draft Chapters 'Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' and 'The Rights of Communities and Their Members' of the Constitution of Kosovo
- 1.8. Community Needs Assessment Workshops with Serbian, Bosniak/Gorani, Turkish and RAE Community Non-Government Organisations, 2007
- 1.9. Draft Chapter 'The Rights of Minority Communities' of the Kosovo National Human Rights Strategy Plan, September 2007
- 1.10. Analysis of Governmental Institutional Framework for Communities in Kosovo, December 2007
- 1.11. Proposals of the Community Consultative Council, Antalya, 16-18 February 2007
- 1.12. Draft Job Description for Minority Affairs Adviser / Office of the Prime Minister
- 1.13. Organisational Capacities of Community Civil Society Organisations in Kosovo, November 2007

PROJECT II

- 2.1. Credit Proposal 'Support to Minority Communities During the Kosovo Status Transition Period', 9 January 2008
- 2.2. Progress Report to Swiss FDFA, Project Phase II – Proposed Implementation Strategy - July 2008
- 2.3. Final Narrative Report ' Support to Minority Communities in Kosovo During the Kosovo Status Transition Period', 17 August 2009
- 2.4. Proposals for Reform of Governmental Institutional Framework for Communities in Kosovo, June 2008
- 2.5. Institutional Reform for Communities, 2008
- 2.6. Organisational Structure for the Office of Community Affairs, OPM
- 2.7. ECMI/OCA Briefing Document: 'Prime Minister's Office for Community Affairs, August 2008
- 2.8. OCA Work Plan
- 2.9. Essential components in ECMI support to the work of the OCA/OPM
- 2.10. Briefing note: Issues Impeding the Delivery of the Terms of Reference of the OCA
- 2.11. Draft OCA Recommendations to the Prime Minister

- 2.12. Communities: Know Your Rights [Available in Albanian, Serbian, Turkish, Romani and English at <http://www.ecmikosovo.org/>]
- 2.13. Communities: Know Your Rights (PowerPoint)
- 2.14. Communities in Kosovo: A Guidebook for Professionals Working with Communities in Kosovo [Available in Albanian, Serbian and English at <http://www.ecmikosovo.org/>]
- 2.15. ECMI Kosovo Ethnopolitical Map of Kosovo [Available in Albanian, Serbian and English at <http://www.ecmikosovo.org/>]
- 2.16. Strengthening the Institutional System for Communities in Post-Independence Kosovo, January 2009
- 2.17. Workshop on Community Engagement and Institutional Coordination, 25 July 2009
- 2.18. Employment of Members of Non-Majority Communities with Kosovo Civil Service and Public Owned Enterprises [ECMI research published by OPM/OCA]
- 2.19. ECMI/OPM document: Operational Strategy for the OCA 2009-2011, November 2009

PROJECT III

- 3.1. Project Proposal 'Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government of Kosovo', 9 November 2009
- 3.2. ECMI Project Evaluation 'Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government', 19 April 2010
- 3.3. ECMI Project Revision 'Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government', 31 May 2010
- 3.4. Final Narrative Report 'Enhance and Integrate Community Concerns within the Work of the Government'
- 3.5. Language Policies in Kosovo –Theory to Practice, October 2010
- 3.6. Assessing the Implementation of the Strategy for the Integration of RAE Communities 2009-2015, January 2011
- 3.7. Ensuring the Implementation of the Strategy for the RAE Communities, 28 January 2011
- 3.8. Report on Training for the CCC Legislative Working Group
- 3.9. Kosovo Legislative Process: Handbook for Community Political Participation Bodies, January 2011
- 3.10. Report on the Training Needs Assessment for the Prime Minister's Office of Community Affairs, October 2010
- 3.11. Best Practice Manual: Handbook for Induction and Capacity Development of the OCA
- 3.12. OCA/ECMI Policy Study II - Language Policies in Kosovo: Implementation in Relations with Public Bodies, January 2011
- 3.13. Policy and Legislative Database[ECMI DVDs]

6. Map of Communities visited

Source: Statistical Agency of Kosovo [<http://esk.rks-gov.net/>] and <http://pop-stat.mashke.org/kosovo.png>

