



# **OECD DAC Evaluation of Donor Activities in Support of Conflict-Sensitive Development and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka A Pilot Test of OECD DAC Guidance**

**Presentation to DPSG  
October 20, 2009**



# Agenda

- 9.00 Introduction
- 9.05 OECD Global Process
- 9.15 Sri Lanka Study
- 9.45 Q&A
- 10.15 Coffee Break
- 10.30 Recap
- 10.45 Relevance to current challenges  
Discussion around themes /options




# The Evaluation Study

## Ø *The Purpose :*

- | *to collect evidence on the applicability of the draft OECD guidance that would enable its finalization,*
- | *to provide targeted advice and support to DAC partners at headquarters and in the field to improve their effectiveness and impact*



## Ø *Three outputs :*

- (i) *a report that presents the results of the pilot exercise in Sri Lanka in November 2008,*
- (ii) *a lessons learned paper documenting the process of conducting the pilot evaluation, and*
- (iii) *edited comments on the OECD DAC Guidance.*



# Areas of focus

- Ø Initial TOR ambitious : so narrowed focus and based evaluation on large evidence base of *published* strategies and evaluations
  - | 17 strategies from 10 donors
  - | 28 evaluations from 13 donors
- Ø Excluded track 1, political/ diplomacy, security, humanitarian
- Ø No independent baseline or conflict analysis: used SCA1+2
- Ø Looked at Relevance (Strategies), Results (Evaluations), Process (Coordination)
- Ø Three phases covered:
  - | Pre-Cease Fire Agreement period
  - | 2002-2005 – CFA period
  - | 2005 on – new govt, war situation
- Ø Target groups (national, conflict-affected, and special groups: journalists, police etc)



# Timeframe

|                  |                |
|------------------|----------------|
| Ø Issues Paper   | January 2008   |
| Ø Original TOR   | April 2008     |
| Ø Team recruited | September 2008 |
| Ø Inception      | October 2008   |
| Ø Main mission   | November 2008  |
| Ø First Draft    | February 2009  |
| Ø Final Draft    | June 2009      |

## Team

Nick Chapman Team Leader, Development Evaluation Specialist

Debi Duncan, Conflict and Peacebuilding Specialist



David Timberman, Governance and Human Rights

Kanaka Abeygunawardana, Local Facilitation




# Context

- Ø Poverty: SL lower-middle income status but poverty reduction uneven. 2004 tsunami worsened poverty levels in the affected areas, and the N & E much worse than the rest of the country
- Ø Conflict: rooted in *failure to institutionalise democratic politics* not in ethnic differences (SCA2) and also *'political culture, the institutional framework of policy, uneven development patterns, and competing nationalisms'*
- Ø Development assistance
  - | ADB, World Bank and Japan account for 60% of aid (2002-07) but have no mandate to work on political / governance issues
  - | Bilaterals are either exiting or reducing their programmes
  - | Newer partners have emerged some with more pro-government stance ~ China, India, Iran and Pakistan.
- Ø Increased emphasis on global security and terrorism, but tackling sensitive issues is difficult with little financial leverage and a strong (now 'victorious') government
- Ø Fragile state thinking relatively new (DAC principles 2005)





# Strategies included

| Development Partner                                                               | Strategy                                                                                                             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Ausaid                                                                         | Development Cooperation Regional Framework 2003-07                                                                   |
| 2. ADB                                                                            | Country Strategy and Program 2002-04<br>Country Strategy and Program 2004-08<br>Country Partnership Strategy 2009-11 |
| 3. EC                                                                             | Cooperation Strategy 2002-06<br>Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2007 –10                                           |
| 4. Japan                                                                          | Country Assistance Program 2004                                                                                      |
| 5. The Netherlands                                                                | Multi Annual Strategic Plan 2005-08<br>Multi Annual Strategic Plan 2009-11                                           |
| 6. Switzerland                                                                    | Medium Term Plan for Human Security 2007-09                                                                          |
| 7. Sweden                                                                         | Country Strategy 2003-07<br>Country Strategy 2008-10                                                                 |
| 8. UN / UNDP                                                                      | Development Assistance Framework 2002-06<br>UNDP Country Cooperation Framework 2002-06                               |
| 9. USA                                                                            | Country Strategy Plan 2003-07                                                                                        |
| 10. World Bank                                                                    | Country Assistance Strategy 2003-06<br>Country Assistance Strategy 2009-12                                           |
| Four countries (UK, Germany, CIDA, Norway) were unable to share their strategies. |                                                                                                                      |



# Strategies ~ Findings

- Ø Many strategies promoted “peace,” and some provided support for the peace process. Only a few explicitly addressed the **root causes** of the conflict
- Ø Few strategies were based on in-depth or recurring **conflict analysis**
- Ø Liberal use of ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘peace dividend’. But no serious consideration of whether a “**peace dividend**” could **change the attitudes** of hardliners
- Ø Most focus on ‘**costs**’ not ‘**causes**’ of conflict. So less attention paid to power sharing, the political system and problems of injustice and impunity
- Ø Little recognition of **political risks** (such as delivering aid through a party to the conflict or supporting the agenda of a government that represented only a portion of the political spectrum and was vulnerable to electoral defeat).
- Ø Over-emphasis of the extent to which **civil society and citizens** could bring about transformation and peacebuilding.
- Ø Increasing use of **scenarios** in strategies
- Ø **Whole of government** approach an important strategic approach ~ but difficult to evaluate
- Ø A weak approach to **conflict sensitivity** in early strategies, but this aspect was more explicit in later strategies





# Theories of change

- ∅ Theories of change are not explicit in strategies, though several have implicit causal logic linking proposed actions and the achievement of outcomes


The most common involve:

- | Community reintegration and grassroots mobilisation building a culture of peace
- | Meeting basic needs and improving economic conditions leads to poverty reduction and a peace dividend
- | Reintegration of displaced people to live in relative harmony with their neighbours, will contribute to security and economic recovery
- | Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources
- | Promote peace by mobilising grassroots groups to either oppose war or to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society
- | Economic action (trade sanctions) can alter political commitment to peace



# Project Strategies

- Ø Development and governance projects treat conflict as an external factor & in the post-CFA period, adopted a **post-conflict mind-set** that saw them engage in reconstruction work under the assumption that improved socio-economic outcomes would support the transition to peace.
- Ø From 2005, socio-economic development projects increasingly accepted the need for **conflict sensitivity** and “do no harm” principles, and dropped the notion of a “peace dividend”
- Ø For peacebuilding work, there has been growing concentration on **local initiatives** through development approaches rather than more directly such as on human rights and at the “Track 1” level. Some saw development projects as a way to explore peacebuilding work in a politically sensitive environment.
- Ø Several projects focus on conflict transformation through inter-ethnic initiatives and **community peacebuilding**, but little evidence of how they explicitly addressed the driving factors of the conflict. Very few tried to address the “Sinhala south”.




# Results ~ Quality of Evidence

- ∅ Many evaluations are premature and impacts are not given time to emerge. They are more concerned with lessons for future than about impact
- ∅ Many evaluations:
  - | focus on **results** rather than outcomes
  - | are based on **partial** evidence
  - | are beset by a **shifting context** where project designs are changed as circumstances alter
  - | miss **baselines** and follow-up surveys
  - | both **natural and political events** have disrupted the orderly tracking of progress.
  - | findings are **sensitive** so weak sharing of findings and subsequent lesson learning.
- ∅ Despite this, important findings emerge around the effective delivery of benefits especially at the grassroots level; and on how conflict affects project performance. But the centralised nature of politics means local initiatives rarely have any impact on peace processes.

# Results



- Ø Some peacebuilding evaluations too **conceptual**. Some focussed more on organisational aspects than on the impact of the initiatives.
- Ø Findings on gender show mixed performance.
- Ø Some peacebuilding programmes have **shifted focus** from conflict transformation / co-existence to more classical development work, since overt peacebuilding activities are not acceptable (and also post-tsunami needs have stimulated this).
- Ø The dilemma of most peacebuilding / conflict transformation work generally is the **relevance** of a peace project when injustice and inequality are not addressed.
- Ø **Governance and human rights** projects generally have been more successful at addressing individual and/or highly localized needs than at promoting broader group-based or systemic changes.
- Ø **Community-based programmes** aimed at building “capacities for peace” were more successful at community level than in making linkages nationally. Some evidence that programmes on inter-ethnic issues created space for communities, especially those working with youth.



# Results at grassroots level

## *Rich evidence base*

- Ø Many DPs targeted grassroots groups for either development or PB purposes, with a range of results, but
  - | Weak linkage to national processes
  - | Weak capacity to do conflict transformation
  - | Muddled theories of change
  - | Small efforts individually



# But

## Ø Positive results

- | Local capacity built, community relations improved, void filled for civic participation
- | Economic and social assets built
- | Inter-ethnic trust built
- | Maybe collectively donor effort had impact on CPPB, but not yet evaluated

## Ø Nevertheless, under conditions where parties to the conflict see the continuation of war as preferable to a negotiated political settlement....

explicit peacebuilding measures are not necessarily more effective in mitigating conflict than long-term socio-economic investments





# Conducting Evaluations

- Ø Evaluation work in Sri Lanka has **limitations** even without conflict issues. Some do little independent evaluation, mainly using supervision missions, completion reports or in-house reviews
- Ø Most TORs for **socio-economic development evaluations** don't call for conflict prevention and peacebuilding aspects to be addressed.
- Ø Few evaluations do their own conflict analysis or were able to draw on a baseline against which to gauge impact.
- Ø Most evaluations were largely donor-managed exercises with **limited consultation with Govt.**
- Ø Few examples of **joint donor evaluations**, and opportunities have been overlooked, even where joint-funding.
- Ø A **shortage of consultants** with the evaluation + conflict skills, and shortage of institutional guidance on conflict sensitive evaluations
- Ø Project **M&E systems** themselves can be biased or affected by conflict setting
- Ø Only few examples where there is an explicit use of **Theories of Change**
- Ø The climate of mistrust in Sri Lanka means that information sharing is reduced and the willingness to discuss results and engage in **lesson learning** is limited.



# Donor coordination

- Ø **Coordination has declined** from the relatively strong period around the ceasefire. The level of coordination between donors and the GoSL has become increasingly difficult - and for some pointless.
- Ø For peacebuilding, the DWG \ DPSG reduced scope but set up **sub-committees**
  - | Mixed reaction: some like the opportunity to pursue themes in sub-groups, others regard structure as over-elaborate and irrelevant.
  - | Useful **analysis** commissioned that led to better understanding
  - | Weak policy coherence amongst members ~ except in some sub groups
  - | Limited consideration of **gender**, of **views** beyond Colombo, or of views of **other parties** in conflict beyond the two main ones
- Ø As donors come under increasing criticism, there is a need for stronger coordination, yet DPSG has become weaker the Trust Fund not used productively.
- Ø In donor strategies, coordination has modest importance





# Recommendations on Strategies

1. More rigorous use of **conflict and political-economy analysis** (preferably joint) will inform strategic choices
2. For strategic and programmatic reasons, be clear exactly **which aspects of CPPB** are to be addressed and **what theories underpin** how interventions will make a difference
3. Look for strategic ways to address the **root causes** of conflict
4. Careful consideration is needed of what can and cannot be achieved by offering a **“peace dividend”**.
5. More use of **scenarios / flexibility** helps strategies to be responsive and to manage risk
6. Recognise and declare **institutional capacity and comparative advantage to work on CPPB**
7. Improve **indicators** to measure strategic outcomes on conflict, and specify how they will be **measured** and what **resources** will be available to collect the data.




# Recommendations on Projects / Programmes

1. Use **short-term programmes** on CPPB, provided they have focused, specific objectives and a strategy for withdrawal.
2. Be **flexible** in choice of partners, in types of peacebuilding support, and in funding channel when working on peacebuilding in a volatile conflict setting
3. **Rethink** your programme strategy in response to major shifts in the political environment, don't carry on as normal or shift a little
4. Better address **horizontal inequalities** (between ethnic groups and geographic regions).
5. Build strategic co-ordination across **different levels** for any future peace work (i.e. across Tracks and linking national and local initiatives).
6. Don't assume that **civil society** can be a major force in support of conflict transformation
7. Deliver through **CBOs** in grassroots empowerment and conflict mitigation
8. Address **gender** aspects better in CPPB work, especially at grassroots



# Recommendations on M&E

- ∅ Require or do a **conflict analysis**
- ∅ Use **joint** evaluations
- ∅ Focus more on **impact** and be prepared to wait
- ∅ Develop more explicit **theories of change**
- ∅ Find good **indicators** at outcome level
- ∅ Use consultant teams with **mixed backgrounds**
- ∅ Plan in **advance** and be **flexible** in timing
- ∅ Allow **additional time** for preparation and expect delays



# Recommendations on Coordination

- Ø Address **leadership gap**
- Ø Use the **Trust Fund** more effectively ~ coordinated action and sharing of responsibilities helps donors reach beyond their limits
- Ø Do more **joint work** for greater buy-in (for example on how partners have provided support to NGOs).
- Ø **Newer and larger donors** must engage more fully so that coordinated approaches have a real impact on the ground. This will require finding areas of mutual interest around do no harm principles, and may preclude wider discussion on more sensitive issues.