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Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA  
**Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC**  
Foundations and Quality Division

# Cooperation Programme Evaluation Tanzania 2021-2025

Specialist Service Evaluation and Controlling - SDC



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**Annexes (volume 2, separate document)**

**Bern, December 2024**

# I Management Response

## Management Response to the Evaluation of the Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25

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### 1) Introduction

Cooperation Programme evaluations analyse the Cooperation Programmes which define the Swiss engagement in a particular country or region. The goal of cooperation programme evaluations is to assess the performance of the Swiss international cooperation and its alignment with regard to national development priorities and the relevant Federal Council Dispatch. In doing so, these evaluations help the management of the different entities involved in the Cooperation Programmes in their strategic and operational steering and in improving development effectiveness.

The cooperation programme evaluations are realized as hybrid evaluations, conducted by a mixed team consisting of one external consultant, up to two internal resource persons (peers) and, where necessary, a local consultant. The team for this evaluation included Geert Engelsman (external team leader, JaLogisch Consulting GmbH) and Romain Darbellay (peer, SDC). The evaluation team was supported by a local consultant, Stephen Kirama. The evaluation was conducted between May and November 2024.

### 2) Appreciation of Report and Evaluation Process

Overall, the report and evaluation process were well received by the Swiss Embassy in Tanzania. In particular, the team appreciated the open dialogue around some of the findings and the refreshing thoughts, which are also reflected in the main recommendations and our responses to them as depicted in section 3 of this document.

Caveats exist however, so as firstly, for the very short planning and preparation period: to fit within the planning process towards the new cooperation programme for Tanzania 2026-29, the field mission in particular could not be conducted and organized in an ideal way, as also highlighted in the limitations by the authors of the report. While this situation as such was met with a high degree of flexibility by the Embassy team in Dar es Salaam, it could not accommodate for all meetings to be held as planned or wished, including for example those higher-level meetings with government officials. Secondly, in light of the above, the report asserts some general conclusions, without indicating once again the limitations it highlights itself in chapter 1.5., al. 1-5.

### 3) Recommendations

<b>Fully agree</b>	<b>Partially agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
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<b>Recommendation 1</b>	
Should the Swiss Embassy deepen its (political) dialogue with the government, political parties, civil society, private sector, and youth leaders about the local reform space and agenda, to identify where the greatest development-relevant reform momentum is and how Switzerland can help to move these reforms forward (of course subject to them being in line with Swiss values, interests, and value-added)?	
To:	Swiss Embassy Tanzania
Timeline:	Short-term

<b>Management Response</b>		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>The Embassy of Switzerland sees much potential in further deepening the policy dialogue or the Swiss policy influencing with different actors of the Tanzanian society. The recommendation is meaningful, not only because of its general relevance to ensure the generation of impact of the Swiss cooperation actions, but also because the Embassy had started its own reflections on how to further improve the delivery of this dialogue. The current already wide range of experiences of the Embassy and the fair amount of political economy analyses it conducts at project level will serve as a good base to further enhance its approach, including all staff involved on that process. Some of the envisaged measures below will need flexible or continuous deadlines, for the often-occurring cabinet reshuffles in particular.</p>		
<b>Measures</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Get a better reading and summary analysis of the political manifestos of the main parties in Tanzania.	Governance domain	First reading by 14.03.2024
Identify key power brokers, possible veto players, and future leaders within Tanzania's political and economic elite and civil society (both in the mainland and in Zanzibar) and find ways - through the Embassy's network - to get in touch with these individuals and seek engagement with them.	All staff – lead governance domain, inclusion of HoM in process	On-going process – first reading by 14.03.2024
Explore avenues to leverage Switzerland's comparatively large engagement in Tanzania with Switzerland's interests and regional engagements in East Africa.	Joint Management Team	On-going process
Develop short sector-related notes around our perception of the key 'levers of change', e.g., <i>the need for a rules-based investment climate which, in equal measure, allows domestic start-ups and international investors to invest at scale in growth- and export-oriented business opportunities.</i>	Heads of Domain	14.03.2024

<b>Recommendation 2</b>						
<p>Should the Swiss Embassy, based on abovementioned (political) dialogue and the identification of specific, meso-level, local reform agenda(s), work with the local reform actors to develop a ten-year vision of change and how Switzerland in the next four years can help to initiate and bring these local reform agenda(s) along, through a combination of development diplomacy, policy dialogue, project interventions, and small actions, leading to a more focused and selective set of interventions?</p> <p>To: Swiss Embassy Tanzania  Timeline: Short - to medium term</p>						
<b>Management Response</b>						
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th style="background-color: #92d050;">Fully agree</th> <th style="background-color: #ffcc00;">Partially agree</th> <th>Disagree</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="3"> <p>The Embassy of Switzerland will closely follow the elaboration of Tanzania's Vision 2050 documents and the local 10-year development plans, as well as the shorter-term implementation measures foreseen by the government of Tanzania. Given foreseeable delays in the making of these plans and the pre-presidential elections period in most of 2025, the Embassy sees value in the development of its own visions of change only after the main directions of the new cooperation programme are established and after the presidential elections are concluded. It sees potential for an integration of a more in-depth exercise as part of the new cooperation programme 2026-29 in view of its mid-term review, to be foreseen by the end of 2027. The definition, i.e., breadth/depth and format of the exercise would be integrated as an objective for the new cooperation programme.</p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree	<p>The Embassy of Switzerland will closely follow the elaboration of Tanzania's Vision 2050 documents and the local 10-year development plans, as well as the shorter-term implementation measures foreseen by the government of Tanzania. Given foreseeable delays in the making of these plans and the pre-presidential elections period in most of 2025, the Embassy sees value in the development of its own visions of change only after the main directions of the new cooperation programme are established and after the presidential elections are concluded. It sees potential for an integration of a more in-depth exercise as part of the new cooperation programme 2026-29 in view of its mid-term review, to be foreseen by the end of 2027. The definition, i.e., breadth/depth and format of the exercise would be integrated as an objective for the new cooperation programme.</p>		
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<b>Measures</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Integrate a mid-term reflection process on Switzerland's own short-medium term vision, based on the results from the processes linked to recommendation 1 and on the Tanzania-led own processes around Vision 2050 and the related implementation plans.	HoC – all staff reflection	14.03.2024 (to determine breadth/depth and format for decision note)
Work with local reform actors to jointly devise, based on the local reform agenda(s), ten- and/or four-year vision(s) of change (based on the above) as well as underlying easy to understand & measure theories of change.	HoD/HoC	By end 2026

<b>Recommendation 3</b>		
<p>Could SDC benefit from a guidance document on the requisite value-added, comparative advantage, and Swissness of Switzerland's development cooperation in its partner countries?</p> <p>To: SDC Management</p> <p>Timeline: Short-term</p>		
<b>Management Response</b>		
<p>This recommendation is addressed to SDC Management. It is based not only on findings from the cooperation programme evaluation Tanzania. The specialist service evaluation and controlling (EC) will collect institutional and cross-cutting recommendations and address them in a separate management response.</p>		
<b>Measures</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Collect institutional and cross-cutting recommendations and draft a separate management response.	EC	End of 2025

<b>Recommendation 4</b>		
<p>For Swiss embassies / Swiss cooperation offices to prepare (i) more concrete and meaningful programme results frameworks, and (ii) more evaluative and analytical annual reports, both for program steering and accountability.</p> <p>To: SDC Quality and Digitalization Section</p> <p>Timeline: Short-term</p>		
<b>Management Response</b>		
<p>This recommendation is addressed to SDC Quality and Digitalization Section. It is based not only on findings from the cooperation programme evaluation Tanzania. The specialist service evaluation and controlling (EC) will collect institutional and cross-cutting recommendations and address them in a separate management response.</p>		
<b>Measures</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Collect institutional and cross-cutting recommendations and draft a separate management response.	EC	End of 2025

Bern, 17 December 2024


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## II. Evaluators' Final Report

The Evaluation of the Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-2025 has been elaborated in collaboration between the Specialist Service Evaluation and Controlling of SDC and a consultancy team constituted by JaLogisch Consulting GmbH as well as one peer from SDC.

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## Acronyms

CHF	Swiss franc
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Germany
MERV	Monitoring system for development-relevant changes, SDC internal document
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
SCO	Swiss cooperation office
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SECO	State Secretariat for Economic Cooperation
SPO	Swiss portfolio outcomes
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

## Executive summary

### Purpose and use

The evaluation of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 was commissioned by the evaluation office of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). The evaluation was to inform the development of the next four-year cooperation programme between Switzerland and Tanzania. The primary intended users of the evaluation were the Swiss Embassy in Tanzania and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section.

### Approach

The evaluation entailed a purposeful and qualitative inquiry into the development effectiveness of the current cooperation programme. Purposeful, as it sought answers to the 14 evaluation questions from the SDC. Qualitative, as it relied on the insights from interviews and documents to offer a descriptive analysis and assessment of the programme. The evaluation was conducted by two external evaluators and a senior SDC employee, who served as *'peer'* to the evaluators, the Swiss Embassy, and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section.

### The programme

Switzerland wants to help young Tanzanians *'to advance socially and economically'* and for Tanzania to become *'a middle-income country'*. Through diplomacy, partnerships, technical assistance, and small actions, Switzerland seeks to contribute to more effective state institutions, the safeguarding of civic space, and employment and income opportunities. The programme includes 19 development projects. The overall budget will be around CHF 120 million for the five-year period (2021-25). The evaluation was conducted in May-July 2024.

### Relevance

Tanzania—like any country, developed and developing alike - has different faces. On the one hand, the economy is growing, the state is gaining some capacity, the associated public services are improving, and a new government is more growth/outward-oriented and socio-politically liberal than its predecessor. On the other hand, seven years of authoritarian rule are still reverberating in the country, growth has not been inclusive, civic space remains restricted, and the country clings to a state-led and -controlled development model which prevents the release of society's potential.

Against this backdrop, Switzerland is betting on the progressive forces of change within government and society, and promoting transparency, inclusiveness, civil engagement, the private sector, and health care. This is in line with the real and present development challenges of the country and Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24.

On the SDC's specific evaluation questions, the evaluation:

- concurs with the programme's national focus - given the Tanzanian government follows a very centralized development model and many development challenges are national in occurrence - whilst specific interventions (e.g., support to start-up(s), ecosystems) are best done in certain geographies (e.g., Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar),
- acknowledges the relevance and potential for scaling up its current project on sexual and reproductive health (rights) whereby there is a need to ensure that the country's actions and rhetoric match, and are in line with, Switzerland's values and objectives,
- confirms space for increased private sector engagement, either focused on foreign direct investment or growth-oriented start-ups, or both - the choice depending on the prevalence of a local reform agenda, and
- identified a chance and need for a more intense development dialogue with the Government of Tanzania, the ruling party, opposition parties, civil society, and private sector leaders to ascertain where the true reform space and momentum is in the country, and to steer Switzerland's programme to supporting these reform agendas.



## Effectiveness, impact, and sustainability

Through the Swiss interventions, supported local governments, health centres, businesses, and, for example, the audit, investigation, and prosecution functions of the Government of Tanzania have been strengthened. The capacity of these organizations, however, remained heavily constrained and the development challenges faced by these local actors remained stark. The unanswered question that emerged from the evaluation is: what is Switzerland - together with its local reform partners - working towards? What is it, in terms of sector development, that they are striving to achieve in, say, five to 10 years' time? Answering this question—however tentatively and conditionally—is important as it can and should determine the scaling-up and replication strategy of Switzerland and its local reform partners, as well as foreshadow the ultimate impact and sustainability of all the efforts spent.

## Coherence

Switzerland provides substantial budget support to Tanzania. Its contributions to the Health Basket Fund and the Social Action Fund amounted to CHF 42,5 million between 2021-25 (36% of Switzerland's total budget envelop). This support is in line with the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation and its call for recipient country's ownership and the use of country systems. At the same time, Switzerland did not appear to have a sharp profile in Tanzania. For the Swiss Embassy, this finding raised the question of how to define Switzerland's value-added - a key strategic criterion for Switzerland's engagement in any country. As this will likely remain an engagement criterion in Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2025-28, further corporate guidance on how to define Switzerland's value-added could be beneficial.

## Swiss portfolio outcomes

The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 was one of the first cooperation programmes to include 'Swiss portfolio outcomes' in its results framework. The strengths of the Swiss portfolio outcomes are their 'development-orientation' (focusing Switzerland on broader social, economic, and/or political developments rather than individual project results), and 'process-orientation' (bringing to the fore what is needed to bring these social, economic, and/or political developments about). Unfortunately, the Swiss portfolio outcomes for Tanzania were *'too vague'*. For the next cooperation programme, it will be important to make them specific and concrete, as well as accompany them with a detailed theory of change (identifying the boundary partners and explicating the assumptions on how these boundary partners are likely to respond to support and trigger change). These adjustments will facilitate programme monitoring and steering.

## The annual reporting practice

The narrative annual reports of Swiss embassies or Swiss cooperation offices (SCOs) are often - and Tanzania is no exception - very descriptive, detailing an array of different project activities, outputs, and outcomes. They seldomly give the reader a sense of progress against the Swiss portfolio outcomes, what is working well, and what not, and how the performance ratings, included in the narrative, have come about. This (recurrent) observation raises the question whether embassies/SCOs (for program steering) and the SDC headquarters (for accountability) could benefit from more evaluative and analytical annual reports in which the embassies/SCOs systematically compare and analyse progress against the underlying assumptions and outcome objectives.

## Recommendations

Based on these observations and findings, the evaluation makes four recommendations:

1. for the Swiss Embassy to **intensify its (political) dialogue** with the government, political parties, civil society, and private sector leaders **to identify the local reform space, actors, and agenda** (at a level and scale that Switzerland can meaningfully contribute to),
2. based on such local reform agendas (for example on health financing or around start-ups), for the Swiss Embassy to work with local reform actors to **develop a ten-year vision of change and how Switzerland in the next four years can help initiate and bring along these local reform agendas**,
3. for the SDC Directorate to have a corporate guidance document prepared and disseminated **on the concepts of value-addition, comparative advantage, and Swissness** of Switzerland's development cooperation in its partner countries, and
4. for the SDC Quality Assurance and Digitalization Section to guide embassies/SCOs towards **more concrete and meaningful programme results frameworks and more evaluative annual reports**, both for program steering and accountability.

# 1 Introduction

This report documents the evaluation of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 (the programme<sup>1</sup>). The evaluation was commissioned by the Specialist Service Evaluation and Controlling of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). This opening chapter lays down the purpose and intended use of the evaluation, introduces the main evaluation questions, describes the programme, shares the evaluation methodology and limitations, and offers a reading guide to the rest of the report.

## 1.1. Purpose and intended use

The evaluation was *‘to provide a fresh, external view on the programme’* with the express purpose to inform the development of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2026-29. In short, the evaluation was to inform the strategic and operational decision-making of the Swiss Embassy in Tanzania and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section on the next four-year cooperation programme between Switzerland and Tanzania.

The evaluation was timed accordingly, with the delivery of the final evaluation report by the end of September 2024. This allowed the SDC to prepare and approve the management response to the evaluation by the end of 2024 and start the formulation of the next cooperation programme in early 2025. The primary intended users of the evaluation were, concomitantly, the Swiss Embassy in Tanzania and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section.

### *Textbox 1 Cooperation programme evaluations*

Cooperation programme evaluations principally serve three functions: accountability, learning and decision-making (SDC, 2019). However, the concept of the cooperation programme evaluations was under review at the time of this evaluation. So far, the accountability function has only been generally defined: *‘cooperation programme evaluations allow an account of Swiss results achievements ... at the level of domains ... for internal and external accountability’* (SDC 2019). Moreover, for this evaluation, no specific learning objectives or processes were formulated. Still, this evaluation indirectly served these two other classical functions of evaluation - accountability and learning - as well. Structured according to the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, the evaluation report offers an account of the development effectiveness of the programme. Institutional learning was served through (i) joint reflections with the Swiss Embassy, the Eastern and Southern Africa Section, and the SDC peer, and (ii) this report’s analysis of *‘what works, what doesn’t and why’* in programme delivery.

## 1.2. Evaluation questions

The evaluation was to answer the following 14 evaluation questions (structured along the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria)<sup>2</sup>:

### Relevance

1. How well did the cooperation programme reflect the development priorities set by the governments of Tanzania and Switzerland, and continued to do so when the development context changed?
2. Could more geographic focus reduce monitoring costs and better inform evidence-based policy dialogue?
3. What lessons does the programme hold to expand work on sexual and reproductive health rights and private sector development?

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<sup>1</sup> Depending on the context, the programme is referred to as the programme, the cooperation programme or the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25.

<sup>2</sup> Compared to the inception report, we have integrated the specific interests of the Embassy and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section and the standard cooperation programme evaluation questions into a single listing. We also moved the above question three from effectiveness to coherence, and the above question six from relevance to effectiveness to facilitate the report flow and avoid repetition.

## Coherence

4. Which role does the Embassy play within the different Swiss agencies in charge of development cooperation and vis-à-vis the national government and the donor community, and what is Switzerland's added value in Tanzania?
5. Where does Switzerland have comparative advantages and how does it make use of them?

## Effectiveness, impact, and sustainability

6. To what extent are the identified outcomes set in the results framework being achieved, which innovations generated by field experience have been scaled up through policy dialogue, alliances, networking, and dissemination, and what internal and external factors enhance or hinder aid performance and results achievements?
7. To what extent is the cooperation programme project portfolio relevant, coherent, and appropriate for achieving the Swiss portfolio outcomes?
8. Does the SDC have the most adequate tools, perspectives, concepts, and mindset for reaching systemic impact?
9. Which actions have been taken at country level to enhance the sustainability of the Swiss investments?

## Efficiency

10. Are the Swiss portfolio outcomes an adequate way to structure the portfolio, how useful are they for management and for communication?
11. How best to proceed with the Swiss portfolio outcomes / the domain logics in terms of the Embassy's development orientation, program steering, and internal organization?
12. To what extent is the process management of the cooperation programme monitoring system relevant and effective for the accounting of results and program steering?
13. How effective is the portfolio management of the Embassy and what are its contributions to an optimal achievement of results?
14. How to align the ambition to work on sustainable national reforms with a reduced budget?

## 1.3. Evaluation methodology

The evaluation concerned a purposeful, qualitative inquiry into the development effectiveness of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25. Purposeful, because the evaluation sought answers to the evaluation questions of the SDC. Qualitative, as the evaluation relied on the insights and perspectives from interviews and documentation to offer a descriptive analysis and assessment of the programme.

The evaluation was conducted by a team of two external evaluators and a senior SDC employee, who served as 'peer' to the evaluators, the Swiss Embassy, and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section. The evaluation's findings and recommendations stem from a combination of inductive and deductive analyses and have been triangulated across data sources and evaluators/peer. A second volume to this evaluation report elaborates on the evaluation methodology and data sources.

## 1.4. Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25

**Goal.** The overall goal of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 is to:

*'empower young people, especially poor young women, to advance socially and economically, thus enabling them to be a main driver of Tanzania's move to an equitable and stable middle-income country and contributing to regional stability and prosperity'* (SDC 2020).

**Outcomes.** The cooperation programme seeks to contribute to this goal through three so-called ‘Swiss portfolio outcomes’:

1. state institutions are more efficient and effective, inclusive and increasingly free of corruption,
2. civic space is protected and enables all citizens and especially young women to influence local and national policy making and implementation and protects their human rights, and
3. more youth, especially poor young women, benefit from gainful income-generating opportunities and sustainable livelihoods (SDC 2020).

**Modalities.** The Swiss Embassy works with local stakeholders and (inter-)national development partners to contribute to these outcomes and overall goal through development diplomacy<sup>3</sup>, technical assistance, and small actions<sup>4</sup>. The technical assistance takes the form of project support, either through direct contributions to specific local development initiatives or by tendering out project mandates to local or international development partners.

**Organization.** For its development cooperation, the Swiss Embassy is organized in three (sectoral) domains (governance, health, and employment), each headed by a head of domain and encompassing two or three national programme officers. The Swiss Embassy also organizes cross-domain exchanges on the individual Swiss portfolio outcomes. The programme is supervised by the Head of Cooperation.

**Project portfolio.** At the time of the evaluation, the programme consisted of 19 projects across the three domains, the three Swiss portfolio outcomes, and a cultural programme (see Table 1 and Appendix A).

*Table 1 Portfolio overview*

Swiss portfolio outcomes/domains	Governance	Health	Employment	Culture
Strengthening state institutions	2	7*		
Protecting civic space	3	1*		1
Youth employment and livelihoods		1	5	

\* One health programme (the Swiss support to the Ifakara Health Institute) serves two Swiss portfolio outcomes. Table 1 therefore adds up to 20 instead of 19 projects.

**Budget and timeline.** The total budget of the programme will be approximately CHF 120 million for the five-year period 2021-25.

**1.5. Limitations**

The evaluation faced five limitations.

1. The evaluation was fast-tracked, with four weeks between the start of the evaluation and the field mission. This limited the time for the ex-ante document review and the preparation of the field mission and prevented the reconstruction of the programme’s underlying theory of change.
2. The evaluation had - for time reasons - to sample the programme’s project portfolio. We purposefully selected, in consultation with the Swiss Embassy and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section, five of the 19 ongoing projects. Whilst these five projects were

<sup>3</sup> Diplomacy is ‘the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country’s representatives abroad’ (Definition from Oxford Languages, Google Dictionary). Development diplomacy refers to the use of the Swiss Embassy / good offices to engage in a political exchange with the political and economic leadership of a country on their development agenda. It serves to identify the reform space and garner (further) support for development.

<sup>4</sup> Small actions are one-time interventions with a value of CHF 100,000 or less. They can be decided upon at the sole discretion of the Swiss Embassy and can serve strategic objectives or, example given, foster cultural purposes/exchanges.

deemed to offer a fair and realistic portrait of the programme, given the breadth of the programme and individual project experiences, they can never capture the full picture.

3. Whilst the evaluation sought balance amongst the key informants to the evaluation (covering the relevant SDC staff, implementing agencies, local and international development partners, beneficiaries, and independent experts), we were unable to engage with relevant ministers and permanent secretaries, and only to a limited extent with independent (sector) experts.
4. One of the topics of inquiry was sexual and reproductive health rights, which is a sensitive topic and requires time to discuss. Time was in short supply and the evaluation team consisted of three middle-aged men, hampering an open discussion.
5. Whilst the evaluation was 'forward-looking', it remained an evaluation and was not a scoping study<sup>5</sup>.

These limitations were acceptable for the Swiss Embassy and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section as they deemed SDC's engagement in Tanzania '*relevant and solid*' and reckoned a '*light*' evaluation would suffice (SDC, 2023b). Still, these limitations meant that - more than ever - the evaluation constituted a probe, based on a limited data set, offering one reality of the programme. Individual actors submerged in programme components may have experienced a different reality and hold a (somewhat) different picture of the programme, the results it fostered and the lessons it bears. Such differences in experiences and perceptions are natural and unavoidable. They offer the opportunity to complement and enrich each other. This evaluation therefore offers but one building block for future decision-making. The SDC's own experiences provide additional input.

## 1.6. Reading guide

On request of the Swiss Embassy and the SDC Specialist Service Evaluation and Controlling, this evaluation report has been kept short and crisp. It is roughly structured along the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria and, within each chapter, along the main lines of inquiry of the Swiss Embassy and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section. Chapter 2 (relevance) reflects on the changing development context in Tanzania, the opportunities it provides for Switzerland to expand its work on sexual and reproductive health and with the private sector, and whether Switzerland can enhance its relevancy through greater geographic focus.

Chapter 3 (effectiveness, impact, and sustainability) zooms in on the project and portfolio outcomes, as well as their context, strength, weaknesses, and the lessons they hold. Chapter 4 (coherence) subsequently discusses Switzerland's role, value-added, and comparative advantage within Tanzania's development cooperation landscape. Chapter 5 (efficiency) addresses the implications to the programme of future budget cuts, evaluates the Swiss portfolio outcome approach, and briefly reviews the Swiss Embassy's program monitoring, steering, and reporting. Chapter 6 draws an overall conclusion, distils lessons, and offers recommendations for the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2026-29.

The report includes as appendices an overview of the portfolio, a graphical representation of the long-term development of Tanzania, the results framework (with the latest results data) of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25, and a summary of Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy's objectives and sub-objectives. A second volume to this report includes (i) the evaluation design matrix, (ii) the evaluation methodology, (iii) the sampling strategy, (iv) the reviewed documentation, and (v) the key informants list.

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<sup>5</sup> An evaluation 'looks back' to assess 'what worked, what didn't and why' in the development processes that the Swiss Embassy sought to contribute to. Based on this assessment, it formulated conclusions, lessons, and recommendations on how best to promote development in Tanzania. A scoping study can provide a much more comprehensive 'map' of the current development context, actors, opportunities, and challenges in Tanzania.

## 2 Relevance

### Evaluation questions

How well did the cooperation programme reflect the development priorities set by the governments of Tanzania and Switzerland, and continued to do so when the development context changed? Could more geographic focus reduce monitoring costs and better inform evidence-based policy dialogue? What lessons does the programme hold to expand work on sexual and reproductive health rights and private sector development?

### 2.1. Introduction

The above three evaluation questions cover six topics or lines of inquiry. Moreover, the programme's relevance can be viewed from both a programme and project level, especially because the cooperation programme contains some relatively large investments addressing specific development challenges and/or public services (e.g., the funding of primary health care through the Health Basket Fund). Consequently, this chapter reflects on the programme's relevance - past, present, and future - along the following dimensions:

1. the formal development priorities of the Government of Tanzania,
2. a changing development context in Tanzania,
3. Switzerland's priorities from its International Cooperation Strategy and Eastern Africa Guidelines,
4. project responses to specific development challenges,
5. geographic focus,
6. the need for better sexual and reproductive health (rights), and
7. the opportunities for enhanced private sector engagement.

When evaluating the relevance of development programmes, it is key to differentiate between policies and priorities, between stated objectives and lived experience. A country can have policies that are not implemented and pursue priorities without policies. At the end of the day, it is a country's or people's consistent set-of-actions, however humble, that signal relevance.

### 2.2. The policies of the Government of Tanzania

We recall that the main goal of the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 is to help *'empower young people ... to advance socially and economically'*. The programme seeks to contribute by helping make state institutions more effective and efficient, protect civic space, and promote gainful employment for the young. In short, the programme wants to contribute to *'inclusive'* state, social and economic development.

The formal priorities of the Government of Tanzania are captured in two principal documents: the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and the third National Five-Year Development Plan 2021/22-2025/26. Both are comprehensive, wide-ranging documents. They speak, amongst others, of development that is *'people-cantered, shared, equitable, and free from inequalities and all forms of social and political relations which inhibit empowerment and effective democratic and popular participation'* and that *'by 2025, good governance should have permeated the national economic structure'*, suggesting that abovementioned goal and strategy of the cooperation programme are pertinent (Planning Commission, 1999).<sup>6</sup>

Over the past two decades, Tanzania has experienced buoyant economic growth with a 220% increase in gross domestic product (GDP). Due to the rapid population growth, this only translated into a 78% growth in GDP per capita (see Appendix B for a graphical depiction). Still, this growth has allowed Tanzania to graduate from a least development country to lower

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<sup>6</sup> The main objective of the third national five-year plan is *'to contribute to the realization of the National Development Vision 2025 goals'* (MoFP, 2021). Whilst it includes numerous, more specific, objectives, one can here also find references to job creation, inclusive growth, and good and effective governance.

middle income country status (World Bank, 2024). Recent studies, however, evidence that this growth has not been inclusive, meaning large swaths of the population have not benefited from this economic growth and poverty remains pervasive (see Appendix B) (World Bank, 2019; 2020). The reason is that the economic growth emanated from a few sectors which do not employ many people, such as public infrastructure investments, gold exports, tourism, finance and insurance, mining and creative industries (POPI, 2023; SDC, 2020a).

Moreover, since 2015, the space for civic engagement and activism has shrunk. The Statistics Act, the Media Services Act, the Cyber Crime Act, and the NGO Act and Guidelines have curtailed the ability of media outlets and civil society organizations to engage in public debate and hold the government accountability (SDC, 2020a). These economic and social developments raise questions about the historical commitment of the Government of Tanzania to inclusive social and economic development and how pertinent the Swiss Cooperation Programme truly is from the perspective of the government. Having said that, Tanzania might be in for a change.

### **2.3. A changing political and development context in Tanzania**

It was under President John Magufuli, who ruled from 2015-21, that Tanzania turned inward and repressive (SDC, 2020a; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024; The Economist, 2024). Upon President Magufuli's death, Vice-President Samia Suluhu Hassan took over and changed the tone of the politics and the orientation of the country. The key informants unanimously observed that under President Samia the Government of Tanzania:

- became more open and outward-oriented, reaching out to foreign investors and development partners, and participating in and hosting international fora,
- unbanned newspapers and allowed opposition parties to hold political rallies,
- emphasized the need for family planning and for teenage mothers to be allowed back to school (something which was not possible under the previous government), and
- is intent to further foster economic growth, including through revitalizing the agricultural sector and engaging youth in agribusiness.

At the same time, the previously mentioned restrictive laws remain in place and citizens were '*reminded ... that freedom has its limits*' (SDC, 2024). Many key informants also observed that the government is committed to complete (and expand) the infrastructure investments started under President Magufuli, remains focused on attracting foreign direct investments rather than how it could tap the country's demographic dividend, health and education expenditures continue to decline as percentage of total government expenditures (see Appendix B), and the state-led development model remains ingrained in Tanzania's '*socialist*' politics.

The key informants' positive reading of the political economy in Tanzania is that the current political leadership of the country is establishing and consolidating its power, carefully balancing different interests, and - by winning the general elections in 2025 - secure a more robust mandate for political and economic reform. Based on the field mission discussions, we conclude that this reading might be correct, but that it is too early to tell. The rhetoric is mixed and not yet followed up by (consistent) actions. For the Swiss Embassy, this was the reason for extending the current cooperation programme by one year (until 2025, instead of 2024) to further monitor the political developments.

The Swiss Embassy is ready to support the current political leadership. From a development effectiveness perspective, it makes sense for Switzerland to 'bet' on the progressive forces in Tanzania's politics and government and see how it can help these forces push through social, economic, and political reforms. The other side of the same coin would then be to change or reduce the support to the Government of Tanzania if it decides to continue the country's past extractive development pathway.



## 2.4. Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy and Eastern Africa Guidelines

The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 was developed at the same time as Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24 and makes explicit reference to it, including its decision-making framework (balancing Tanzania's needs and Switzerland's long-term interests and value-added), values (democratic governance, humanitarian tradition, accountability and transparency), and objectives (economic development, the environment, human development, and peacebuilding and governance) (SDC, 2020a; FDFA, 2021). In terms of the latter, the programme focusses on good governance (making state institutions more effective and efficient, and protecting civic space) and economic development (promoting youth empowerment and livelihoods). The SDC's strategic guidelines for Eastern Africa 2021-24 confirm above reference framework and foci for Tanzania (SDC, 2020a). All in all, the Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 is well-aligned with Switzerland's strategic framework and objectives. Moreover, the Swiss Embassy's pursuit of transparency, inclusiveness, and civic engagement reflects Switzerland's values-based international cooperation, which have also been pursued when, over the last decade, these values have not been the hallmark of the Government of Tanzania.

## 2.5. Project-level relevance

The evaluation selected five of the 19 projects from the cooperation programme to study and understand the relationship between the individual projects and the programme goal and objectives. To what extent these projects contribute to the attainment of these goals and objectives is the subject of the next chapter. Here, we confirm that each project had a clear rationale, i.e., addressed real and present development challenges in Tanzania, and were - at least nominally - in line with the development policies and priorities of the Government of Tanzania<sup>7</sup>:

- **On governance.** The Good Financial Governance and Anti-Corruption Support projects respond to the need to improve public financial management and address corruption, both to enhance the financial headroom for investments in development and increase the trust in government.
- **On health 1.** The Direct Health Financing Facility offers budget support to the Health Basket Fund of the Government of Tanzania to fund<sup>8</sup>, amongst others, the medicine, medical equipment, operational expenditures, and staff overtime of Tanzania's dispensaries and health centres (and some district hospitals), which constitute Tanzania's primary health care system and, as such, are responsible for key services such as pre-natal care and supervised birth.
- **On health 2.** The Safeguarding Young People project addresses Tanzania's '*worrying statistics*' on sexual and reproductive health with teenage pregnancies (at 22%), underage marriages (29%), unmet family planning (21%), physical and sexual violence against women 20-24 years-of-age (24% and 12%), and female genital mutilation (8%) (SDC, 2023).

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<sup>7</sup> The subsequent sections and chapter will, at times, question the extent to which the Government of Tanzania prioritizes the address of these challenges.

<sup>8</sup> In this report, we refer to the Direct Health Financing Facility project mostly by the Health Basket Fund, as this is easier wording, and most people know it under this heading.

- **On private sector engagement.** The Innovation for Social Change project seeks to jumpstart entrepreneurship, recognizing that growth- and impact-oriented start-ups and small- and medium-sized enterprises can contribute to generating employment for the circa 850,000 youth entering the labour market each year (DTU, 2022), foster inclusive growth (e.g., by sourcing cashew nuts for export to the EU, Middle-East, and USA from women collector groups<sup>9</sup>), and address some of Tanzania's economic (governance) challenges (e.g., the sourcing and distribution of medicine in the country).

## 2.6. Geographic focus - yes or no?

The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 explicitly decided against a geographic focus *'to underline the ambition to work on sustainable national reforms'* (SDC, 2020a). A recent mission from headquarters wondered whether this decision should be reconsidered (SDC, 2023b). The argument being that geographic focus allows for deeper context knowledge, greater synergies between projects, reduced monitoring costs, and more solid proofs of concept, which then allows replication elsewhere. Whilst this argument is undeniably true in general, the evaluation did not find a strong case for greater geographic focus in Tanzania. For three reasons:

1. Tanzania has a very centralized state, with not the beginning of a political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization process as the SDC understands it (SDC, 2016; 2020b),
2. the programme covers a diverse portfolio of projects/investments which are either national by design (e.g., Health Basket Fund, improved public financial management), national by incidence (e.g., sexual and reproductive health), or with unique/specific locations (entrepreneurship in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar), and,
3. through its contributions, the Swiss Embassy works with large development partners, such as the German development agency GIZ and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which will have their own geographic focus which may not match SDC's foci.

If the Embassy intends to continue its support to public financial management, the Health Basket Fund, sexual and reproductive health rights, and growth- and impact-oriented entrepreneurship, then the evaluation found no reason to increase its geographic focus, over and above the geographic focus it does still partly have, e.g.,

- anti-corruption support in Zanzibar, where there is greater appetite to address it, and
- sexual and reproductive health outreach in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Kigoma, Shinyanga, and Simiyama regions where the greatest challenges persist.

Of course, in developing new projects, the Swiss Embassy should continue to consider whether geographic focus makes sense (e.g., its support to start-ups and start-up ecosystems is best done in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar).

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<sup>9</sup> As done by YYTZ Agro-processing and Dawa Mknnoni—two Tanzanian startups—respectively. These were two key informants.

## 2.7. Opportunities to expand work on sexual and reproductive health (rights)

The abovementioned statistics on the sexual and reproductive health of girls and young women in Tanzania offer a dismal picture and constitute an urgent call for action.<sup>10</sup> The Safeguarding Young People project, co-financed and implemented by the UNFPA, offers a comprehensive approach to the problems - in line with the international prevalent gender equality and social inclusion framework - addressing girls and young women's 'agency' and 'access to services', as well as the societal 'norms and policies' on gender equality and children's and women's rights (Premchander & Behera, 2023). In doing so, it works at the national, regional and grass-roots level, focusing its efforts on the five regions with the largest incidences. The work is helped by President Samia's call for family planning and for young mothers to be allowed back to school.

The evaluation, however, did not come across 'other initiatives', by the government or civil society (although some other international development agencies and NGOs are active in the field) which could amplify the Safeguarding Young People project. Moreover, statements by key informants hinted towards a potential misunderstanding, or difference in interpretation, between development partners and local authorities/leaders. The former appeared to stress 'individual rights' of young women and girls (e.g., access to family planning means, access to education for pregnant teenagers, and prenatal and childcare), whereas the latter seemed more focused on health or societal outcomes (including how to prevent or reduce the number of abortions). The question arose if such differences in interpretation could undermine the project's effectiveness and results.

Given these findings and acknowledging the limited data that the evaluation could gather, would it make most sense for the Swiss Embassy to scale and clarify the Safeguarding Young People project itself? For example, through:

- political engagement to assist the Government of Tanzania in complementing the Safeguarding Young People project's efforts with government actions in policy reform and implementation, and on-the-ground action campaigns,
- expanding the project's outreach by empowering grass-root organizations (see next chapter) and rolling out the project in more regions, and
- an open and robust dialogue with local stakeholders to test and ensure that the on-the-ground efforts of all parties involved are aligned beyond rhetoric and formal indicators (even if motivations may continue to differ).

## 2.8. Opportunities for enhanced private sector engagement

The last inquiry of this chapter—posed by the Swiss Embassy to the evaluation - is whether there is room for more private-sector-growth-oriented interventions. As noted in Chapter 1, this evaluation looked back at the programme implementation of the last three years, it did not constitute a scoping study.<sup>5</sup> Still, based on the interviews, we observe that:

- the Government of Tanzania is keen to promote economic growth - whilst currently driven by public infrastructure investments, this must ultimately be supported and superseded by business development and private sector investments,
- the two start-ups that the evaluation interviewed appeared very promising and very similar to the growth- and impact-oriented start-ups that the evaluation team interviewed

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<sup>10</sup> The discussions during the field mission did raise the question whether the SDC/UNFPA and the Government of Tanzania speak about, and strive for, the same thing when working on sexual and reproductive health (rights). According to several Tanzanian key informants, the word 'rights' has 'a *negative connotation*' in Tanzania. Moreover, some key informants suggested that sexual and reproductive health work may be seen by some as an opportunity to reduce abortions in the country (which are legally not allowed and societally unaccepted) even if this is not accompanied by a reduction in teenage pregnancies. Such differences in perceptions and goals are normal and unavoidable. At the end of the day what counts is building a coalition (even of disparate partners) and improve the sexual and reproductive health outcomes of girls and young women (in line with the Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality) and the Swiss humanitarian values.

for its evaluation (twice) of the Swiss Entrepreneurship Programme of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO,

- Zanzibar has renewed its investment act, which includes incentives to attract business investments (such as obtaining residence permits, the allocation of subsidized space in the economic free trade zone, easy port access, duty free imports, and multi-year tax holidays), and
- the seeds of an entrepreneurship ecosystem are (slowly) emerging, including a Start-up Association, accelerator programs, angel investor networks, and international development finance and venture capital.

Going forward, there are two parallel tracks for Tanzania to take:

- attract foreign direct investment in relatively large-scale, export-oriented businesses which (in a positive way) can exploit the vast labour potential of Tanzania, and
- foster domestic, home-grown, growth-oriented start-ups.

Both tracks require interventions at the macro-level (creating a credible and stable policy framework and business environment), meso-level (establishing business support structures), and micro-level (access to finance and peers to individual businesses). The SDC can provide effective long-term support for both workstreams. The question is how committed the Government of Tanzania is to either and how the Swiss Embassy could ascertain this commitment. The next section addresses the second part of this question.

## 2.9. Conclusion

The Swiss Embassy considers the cooperation programme *'to make strategic sense'* and the project portfolio to be *'relevant and solid'*. The evaluation confirms that the cooperation programme is relevant, addressing real and present development challenges of Tanzania, in line with Switzerland's values-based International Cooperation Strategy.

The evaluation also recognizes the potentially changing political economy in the country and the possible emergence of progressive forces for change. In recognition of these developments, would it make sense for the Swiss Embassy to deepen its (political) dialogue with the Government of Tanzania, the ruling party, opposition parties, civil society, and private sector leaders to assess the actual reform space and how Switzerland can help expand this space and contribute to the implementation of development relevant reforms? Would such a (political) dialogue allow the Swiss Embassy to identify where there truly is room and an agenda for reform such that the Swiss Embassy can steer its programme accordingly and support the implementation of such local reform agendas? Could this both secure and further enhance Switzerland's development relevancy?

In line with the Swiss Embassy's own thinking, the evaluation did not find strong reasons to introduce greater geographic focus in the next cooperation programme, as Tanzania follows - for now - a very centralized, state-led development model and Switzerland's intervention areas are national by design (Health Basket Fund) or national by incidence (sexual and reproductive health challenges). There is potential to scale the Swiss Embassy's work on sexual and reproductive health rights under the Safeguarding Young People project and to expand the Swiss Embassy's private sector engagement by improving and promoting the foreign direct investment (climate) and help build nuclei of entrepreneurship (with the latter having to jumpstart from Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar).

But then again, in both instances, would this potential not depend to a large degree on the willingness of the Government of Tanzania to commit to sexual and reproductive health rights and private sector development, pursue sensible policies, and learn and improve along the way? This brings us back to the conclusion, thought, and idea of the previous paragraph for the Swiss Embassy to deepen its (political) dialogue with Government of Tanzania, the ruling party, opposition parties, civil society, and private sector leaders to assess the reform space and momentum in the country and steer its programme accordingly.

### 3 Effectiveness, impact, and sustainability

#### Evaluation questions

To what extent are the identified outcomes set in the results framework being achieved? Which innovations generated by field experience have been scaled up through policy dialogue, alliances, networking, and dissemination? To what extent is the cooperation programme project portfolio relevant, coherent, and appropriate for achieving the Swiss portfolio outcomes? What internal and external factors enhance or hinder aid performance and results achievements? Does the SDC have the most adequate tools, perspectives, concepts, and mindsets for reaching systemic impact? Which actions have been taken at country level to enhance the sustainability of the Swiss investments?

#### 3.1. Introduction

This chapter turns to the three closely related OECD/DAC evaluation criteria: effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. It comes to answering the above evaluation questions through:

- a critical reflection of the cooperation programme's results framework,
- a look at Tanzania's past development,
- sharing the outcome-level results as reported by the Swiss Embassy,
- reviewing the results from the five sample projects and the questions these pose, and
- drawing a conclusion on (the sustainability of) the overall results achievement and their contribution to the strategic objectives of Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24.

#### 3.2. The programme's results framework

For easy reference, we again recall the programme's overall goal and outcome statements:

- to empower young people, especially poor young women, to advance socially and economically (*goal*),
- state institutions are more efficient and effective, inclusive and increasingly free of corruption,
- civic space is protected and enables all citizens and especially young women to influence local and national policy making and implementation ..., and
- more youth, especially poor young women, benefit from gainful income-generating opportunities and sustainable livelihoods (*outcomes*).

The observant reader will note that the formulation of these objective statements is quite broad, ambitious and ambiguous. The Swiss Embassy readily acknowledged this in our discussions.<sup>11</sup> The formulations raise the question about the quantity and quality of change that is needed to conclude that these objectives have been achieved. For example:

- when are young people 'socially and economically empowered', and how many young people need to be empowered to claim success?
- should 'all' state institutions be made more effective, efficient, inclusive, and free of corruption, or only some, and when are they more 'effective and efficient'?
- when is civil space 'protected' and are 'all' citizens enabled to 'influence' policy making and implementation?
- what exactly constitutes 'gainful income-generating opportunities and sustainable livelihoods'?

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<sup>11</sup> Moreover, one key informant noted that the results framework, including theories of change, were developed amidst the heights of the covid-19 pandemic, and did not receive the attention needed, as at that point in time *'the Embassy had greater concerns and more important things to attend to'*.

The key performance indicators of the cooperation programme do not offer much solace. As per common SDC practice, no impact indicators have been formulated. The outcome indicators constitute an amalgam of highly specific project-level results<sup>12</sup>, national scorecards<sup>13</sup>, perceptions (rather than actual/hard changes)<sup>14</sup>, or are only meaningful/can only be appreciated as part of a comprehensive intervention (of which the particular result indicator is but one success factor)<sup>15</sup>. Collectively, these indicators cannot provide a cogent picture of results achievement when used for measuring Swiss portfolio outcome level results.

The cooperation programme's underlying theories of change help to some extent.<sup>16</sup> For example, the theory of change of the first outcome objective states:

*'If, through Swiss interventions, key state institutions become more efficient and effective in raising funds and using public resources, as well as more accountable to citizens and less prone to corruption, then the delivery of basic social services in selected areas like vocational skills development, health services and social protection will be of better quality and more inclusive because reforms are implemented and processes improved, thus strengthening governance and resource allocation to social services and to local authorities'* (SDC, 2020a).

In other words, 'state institutions' likely refer to those institutions that deliver basic social services (e.g., vocational skills development, health services, and social protection). 'More efficient and effective' means the ability of these institutions to raise revenues and allocate these funds to the delivery of better quality and more inclusive services. In a similar vein, the theories of change of the second and third outcome objectives tell us that:

- civic space is 'protected' when *'new spaces for all citizens, especially youth, will be opened to express themselves freely and influence local and national policy making'*,
- gainful income-generating employment and sustainable livelihoods come with *'jobs'* and *'empowerment'*, especially of women and youth, through skills, social protection, and sexual and reproductive health.

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<sup>12</sup> E.g., *'the number of local government authorities that benefit from increased sources of revenues'* reports the number of local governments which have increased their service levies (especially the collection of business revenue taxation) under the Good Financial Governance project.

<sup>13</sup> E.g., *'the proportion of women of reproductive age who have their needs for family planning satisfied with modern methods'*.

<sup>14</sup> E.g., *'the proportion of people who believe that the media plays a role in decision-making regarding the allocation and spending of funds for the provision of public services'*.

<sup>15</sup> E.g., *'the number of births attended by skilled health personnel'*.

<sup>16</sup> 'To some extent' as the outcome-level theories of change help to 'interpret' the objective statements. They offer limited insight into how – concretely - these outcomes are sought to be achieved. A theory of change can describe the 'process' of development, by defining, by and with whom, what development is sought, as well as how the SDC support can foster this process, by defining how the supported local actors can benefit from and are likely to respond to Swiss support, and how the actions of these local actors will likely create a ripple effect and bring about the envisaged development. The cooperation programme's outcome-level theories of change, unfortunately, do not offer this level of detail and explanation. The link between the programme's projects and outcome objectives is not explicated, hampering the evaluation's ability to conduct a contribution analysis - a systematic qualitative assessment of the likely contribution of the SDC interventions to any observed outcome-level results. Besides outcome-level results indicators, the results framework includes country-level results indicators. The same applies here. Without an explicit theory of change of how the outcome-level results are likely to influence the country-level results, the evaluation lacks the reference point to ascertain the SDC's likely contribution to these country level results. Time-constraints did not allow the evaluation team to 'reconstruct' the underlying theories of change (see Chapter 1). Finally, organizational psychologists Daniel Kahneman (2011) and Adam Grant (2021) warn us to conclude causality without such a structured analysis as it is too easy to fall foul to a confirmation bias.

Based on the above reading, the programme can be assessed on the extent to which:

- public, service-oriented, institutions raise more revenues and improve the quantity, quality, and inclusiveness of their service delivery,
- new spaces emerged/were created for citizens, especially youth, to influence local and national policy making, and
- women and youth have been empowered and become (self-)employed.

With this knowledge at hand, what results can be reported at the country, programme, and project level? We discuss each in turn.

### 3.3. Tanzania's long-run development

Switzerland has supported Tanzania in its economic development for 60 years with an on-the-ground presence for 40 years (SDC, 2020a). Some projects, such as the Swiss support to the Health Basket Funding, go back to the late nineties. It thus makes sense to start off with a long view and see how Tanzania developed over the last, say, 20 years. Chapter 2 already observed that whilst the country experienced a three-fold increase in GDP during this time-period, its poverty incidence remains high. What does the data show in the SDC's three spheres of interventions: governance, health, and employment? For the sake of brevity, we limit ourselves to a few '*country development*' indicators from the cooperation programme's own results framework (for which data is available). These show that<sup>17</sup>:

- total tax revenue of the central and local government, as percentage of nominal GDP, was the same in 2023 as in 2009,
- public expenditures on education dropped from 17,1% of the national budget in 2013/14 to 13.2% in 2023/24, and public health expenditures from 8.2% to 2,8% during the same period,
- Tanzania's Human Development Index score has improved from 0,435 to 0,532 (with 1 being the maximum) over the last 20 years,
- Tanzania's score on the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index has improved from 33 to 40 between 2013 and 2022 (with 100 being the cleanest),
- Tanzania remained a hybrid regime (situated between a flawed democracy and an authoritarian regime) according to the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (with a score of 5,77 in 2013 and 5,35 in 2023 (on a 10-point scale)),
- Tanzania's Global Gender Gap Index score has improved from 0,69 to 0,74 (with 1 being the maximum), and
- Tanzania's health outcomes have generally improved: life expectancy at birth increased from 62 years in 2012 to 66 years in 2022, infant mortality dropped from 46,2 to 34,2 per 1,000 live births, under five mortality ratio dropped 67 to 43 per 1,000 live births between 2015 and 2022, and the maternal mortality ratio went down from 556 in 2015 to 104 in 2022 per 100,000 live births (MoH, 2022; 2016; Global Change Data Lab, 2024).

Just like the macro-economic data, the picture is mixed. Tanzania's health outcomes, human development, and gender equality results have steadily improved over time, whilst we saw earlier that its sexual and reproductive health indices remain 'worryingly' high. Similarly, Tanzania's score on Transparency International's corruption perception index has improved, whilst little progress has been made in democratization, raising public revenues, or keeping health and education expenditures as percentage of the national budget on par.

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<sup>17</sup> See Appendix B for full time-series and a graphical representation of the observed developments.

### 3.4. Outcome-level key performance indicators

The latest outcome-level results data stem from the Tanzania Annual Report 2023. A full results framework, including latest results data, is included in Appendix D. Our summary take-away, following the results framework's outcome indicators, is:

- local governments supported under the Good Financial Governance project have increased their revenues (mostly through more effective collection of local business taxes), and there is a slight uptick in actions taken by local governments in response to audit reports,
- most Tanzanians are protected by at least one social protection scheme, the number of births supervised by skilled health personnel has increased, whereas access to modern methods of family planning has decreased,
- there is a cautious tendency towards greater voice for women and civil society organizations in public affairs, although perceptions differ and restrictive laws have not yet been amended; through the Social Accountability Programme, Switzerland has facilitated over 100,000 citizens to participate in and seek to influence local and national decision-making, and
- through Swiss interventions, close to 500,000 youth (46% of end-target) enrolled in new or better vocational training, almost 350,000 people make use of new formal financial services (34% of end-target), and 13,000 people had new or better employment (6%).

The reported results concern mostly direct project outputs, rather than higher level outcomes. Still, the results suggest that those local governments, health centres, and people that were supported directly, have been capacitated.

### 3.5. Project results and emerging questions

As a third and final step in our presentation of results, Table 2 presents the headline results of the five sample projects of this evaluation as gleaned from the document review and the key informant interviews. The table summarizes both the observed achievements and outstanding challenges.

*Table 2 Observed results at the project level*

Projects	Results	Challenges
Health Basket Funding	– Reliable, efficient, financing of Tanzania's 6780 primary health care centres, which enabled the provision of primary health care, and contributed to improved health outcomes as reported in Section 3.3.	– Shortage of health workers at health centres (40-60%). – Unspent funds of health care centres - budget utilization rate: 64% (PORALG, 2024). – Lack of (articulated) vision on long-term funding (including, potentially, through the envisaged universal health insurance).
Innovation for Social Change	– Initial four investments in growth- and impact-oriented start-ups (3) and SMEs (1) with track record and market potential.	– Unlock local capacity for start-up support and financing to create a durable support model/entrepreneurship ecosystem.
Safeguarding Young People	– Local government health workers and local civil society organizations are able to reach girls and young women (at home, in schools, at work, in health centres) and inform them about (their) sexual and reproductive health rights/issues, which – according to the key informants - lead to better localized health outcomes.	– The 'problems around sexual and reproductive health (rights) remain big'. – Local government health workers and local civil society organizations lack funds and people to reach out to all girls and young women in their district, i.e., the issue of 'last mile' delivery.



Projects	Results	Challenges
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Some stated policies (e.g., age of consent on HIV-Aids testing, school access for teenage mothers), and school curricula have changed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Central government devolves service delivery responsibility to local governments and civil society organizations without concomitant funding.</li> <li>– Only a relatively small percentage of health care centres has a 'youth corner'.</li> </ul>
Good Financial Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– National Audit Office of Tanzania and the internal audit functions of select ministries, departments, and agencies have been capacitated/consistently deliver better quality audits.</li> <li>– Local governments have raised the collection of specific levies, e.g., service levy on business revenue.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Audits not yet put to effective use. <i>'There remains a gap in the implementation of audit recommendations'</i> (GIZ, 2024), especially on procurement.</li> <li>– 'No evidence of improved service delivery' (Witt &amp; Mwaipopo, 2023)</li> <li>– Government of Tanzania did not agree on a civil society oversight component for phase 3 of the project.</li> </ul>
Anti-corruption Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Establishment of Economic Crimes Centres in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar and capacitated investigators and prosecutors.</li> <li>– The Zanzibar Economic Crimes Centre is currently prosecuting five cases in court.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Investigation and prosecution capacity remains limited, and prosecution is a slow, time-consuming, process.</li> </ul>

Table 2 confirms the conclusion from the previous section. Through the Swiss interventions, supported local governments, health centres, businesses, and the audit, investigation, and prosecution function of the government are strengthened, but also show that this additional capacity remains constrained and the development challenges evident. Accordingly, our discussions on these challenges and the sample projects raised some questions - see Table 3.

The common denominator in these questions is the question about what the envisaged endgame - or better, intermediate station of development - of the Swiss support is. This question raises others: What is it that Swiss partners and the Swiss Embassy are striving to achieve in, say, five to 10 years' time? What should the government performance, sector, or development context look like then? The answers to these questions did not become clear to the evaluation. In the absence of such answers, questions also emerged about the sustainability of the Swiss support. Which domestic actors will ensure replication, scale, and continuity? And do these actors have the capacity, interests, incentive, and – importantly - power and tenacity to continue and build on the results achieved?

*Table 3 Emerging questions from the sample projects*

Projects	Questions
Health Basket Funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– After 25 years of development co-financing of the Health Basket Fund, what is the exit strategy of the development partners? What is the pathway for the Government of Tanzania to fully self-finance the primary health care and ensure that the health centres are fully staffed, equipped, and stocked? Why has, as of now, no long-term revenue generation strategy been developed and put under implementation?</li> </ul>

Innovation for Social Change	– What should the entrepreneurship ecosystem for growth- and impact-oriented start-ups look like in 10 years? What collective set of interventions, by whom, are needed to bring this about? How do the existing Swiss interventions (AfroGreen ClimAccelerator, Impact-linked Financing of Climate Change project, and Ifakara Innovation Hub) contribute to this goal? What else is needed?
Safeguarding Young People	– Do development partners and the Government of Tanzania speak about the same thing when referring to sexual and reproductive health (rights)? What should sexual and reproductive health (rights) look like in 10 years' time?
Good Financial Governance & Anti-corruption Support	– What is needed for the government (at all levels) to see the value of audit reports, good public financial management practices, and an end to corruption, such that it will systematically use the audit, public financial management, and anti-corruption tools provided, complement these with additional measures (e.g., change in norms and systems), and improve the (use of) public finances?

### 3.6. Conclusion

Where does this leave us? Taking the long view, Tanzania has developed significantly over the last 20 years, formally becoming a low-middle income country. Still, poverty levels and social-economic exclusion remain high. As for the three outcome objectives of the cooperation programme (as specified in Section 3.2), the picture is equally mixed:

- Public service delivery has (somewhat) improved but remains severely constrained by a lack of staff, political buy-in, and autonomy: (i) Tanzania's health centres are able to provide (improved) basic primary health care services to most people, but face serious staff shortages, (ii) the government's audit functions are able to consistently deliver better quality audit reports, but the uptake of audit recommendations and the address of economic crimes is hampered by a lack of public accountability of the government, and (iii) supported local governments have been enabled to improve their collection of specific taxes, but lack the political, fiscal, and administrative autonomy to improve their performance and service delivery wholesale (the decentralization model of Tanzania caters to better informed decision-making at the central level, rather than to the devolution of decision-making and authorities to the local level).
- Some new spaces have emerged for citizens, including youth, to influence local and national policy-making: this is, first-and-foremost, due to the different tone and messaging of President Samia (compared to her predecessor), which has been seized by, for example, the Safeguarding Young People project to help youth organizations to advocate for sexual and reproductive health rights and actions with both the central and local governments. As noted in Chapter 2, Tanzania's restrictive laws remain in place, and the new spaces can easily be closed, as illustrated by the Government of Tanzania refusing a civil society component in the third phase of the Good Financial Governance project.
- Quite a number of women and youth have been empowered through skills training and information provision, but this has so far translated into limited new employment (see numbers in Section 3.4).

What is the overall picture that emerges? Yes, Tanzania is progressing, and the Swiss interventions are contributing. But are the Swiss interventions truly gaining traction? Are they being replicated? Are the abovementioned outstanding challenges addressed head on? What exactly are Switzerland's boundary partners working towards to, and with whom? The development outcomes and the Swiss interventions raise important questions, including: what development path is Tanzania on and how can Switzerland best support Tanzania in the future? For now, we leave these questions for the reader's contemplation and reflection. We will return to these questions in Chapter 6.

Finally, Textbox 2 briefly reflects on how the abovementioned results contribute to the objectives of Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24.

*Textbox 2 The cooperation programme's contribution to Switzerland's objectives*

The overall goal of Switzerland's international cooperation is poverty reduction and sustainable development. It seeks to contribute to this goal by (i) promoting sustainable economic growth, market development, and job creation, (ii) addressing climate change and sustainably managing natural resources, (iii) saving lives through better quality basic services and reducing the causes of forced displacement, and (iv) promoting peace, the rule of law, and gender equality (FDFA, 2021). Within this strategic framework, Switzerland has defined 12 sub-objectives for the individual cooperation programmes to contribute to (see Appendix C). The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 sought to contribute to four of these sub-objectives, namely:

- sub-objective 2: Promoting innovative private sector initiatives to facilitate the creation of decent jobs,
- sub-objective 7: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services,
- sub-objective 9: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality,
- sub-objective 10: Promoting good governance and the rule of law and strengthening civil society (SDC, 2020a).

This chapter's results point to the following contributions of the Swiss Embassy to these sub-objectives:

- initiating and/or capacitating individual components of an entrepreneurship ecosystem through its support to the Daraja Impact Fund, AfroGreen ClimAccelerator, Impact-linked Financing of Climate Change project, and Ifakara Innovation Hub (whereby, for now, these have not yet been purposefully linked),
- enabling the provision of primary health care, and contributing to improved health outcomes, through the reliable and consistent financing of Tanzania's 6780 primary health care centres (in partnership with the Government of Tanzania and seven other international bilateral and multilateral donors),
- by reaching out, through local government health workers and local civil society organizations, to girls and young women (at home, in schools, at work, in health centres) and inform them about (their) sexual and reproductive health rights/issues, and
- capacitating ministries, departments and agencies in improving their audit, investigation, and/or prosecution functions.

## 4 Coherence

### Evaluation questions

Which role does the Embassy play within the different Swiss agencies in charge of development cooperation and vis-à-vis the national government and the donor community, and what is Switzerland's added value in Tanzania? Where does Switzerland have comparative advantages and how does it make use of them?

### 4.1. Introduction

It turned out that this chapter's evaluation questions were not uncontroversial. Some key informants observed that they run counter to the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation (OECD, 2011), which argued for recipient country's owner- and leadership of its own development agenda and the use of country systems in development cooperation. With budget support to the Government of Tanzania for the Health Basket Fund and the Social Action Fund—amounting to CHF 42,5 million between 2021-25, or 36% of its total budget envelop (see Appendix A) - the Swiss Embassy seeks to do exactly this. Others wondered whether - despite the Busan Partnership and in line with the Swiss International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24 - Switzerland should bring value-added and comparative advantages to warrant its development cooperation with Tanzania.<sup>18</sup> It is not for this evaluation to adjudicate this debate. Instead, we can seek to define these terms in development cooperation, share the feedback from the key informant interviews, and propose a way forward.

### 4.2. Defining value-added and comparative advantage

The Swiss International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24 states that 'the added value of Switzerland's international cooperation in comparison with other countries is based on its specific approach and competencies and Switzerland's thematic expertise, including its humanitarian tradition and good offices, federalism, International Geneva, mountain ecosystems, its innovative private sector and its education system (including vocational education and training)' (FDFA, 2021). Struggling with the same questions, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) sought to define 'Swissness' in an orientation paper (SECO, 2022). It thought about Swissness as constituting one of four attributes of Swiss development cooperation: the promotion of Swiss values (e.g., its humanitarian tradition, democratic governance, and rules-based administration (SDC, 2020a)), Swiss expertise (e.g., in research and innovation), the mobilization of Swiss service providers or institutions (e.g., Swisscontact, Helvetas, the Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, or the Swiss federal institutes of technology, etc.), or general Swiss visibility/image. The SDC's experience in Chad, Egypt, Nepal, Tunisia, and Ukraine, amongst others, adds Switzerland's development diplomacy: the ability to use Switzerland's diplomatic relations to effectively exchange with the political, economic, and civil society leadership of a country on their development agenda and promote its implementation<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24 defines three strategic criteria for Switzerland's engagement in, and approach to, international cooperation. These are (i) the needs of the population, (ii) Swiss interests, and (iii) added value of Switzerland's international cooperation (FDFA, 2021).

<sup>19</sup> The mentioning of these five countries during the field mission was controversial. Each of these countries have experienced violent political crisis and some saw in their mentioning the suggestion that Tanzania should have the same. We beg to differ. Who says that development diplomacy is limited to the resolution of political crisis? Can it not equally be used to engage in a political exchange with the political and economic leadership of a country on their development agenda, to identify the reform space, and garner (further) support for development?

### 4.3. Field mission findings

Most key informants reconfirmed some of the classical strengths of the SDC in the Swiss Embassy's engagement in Tanzania: the knowledge, thoroughness, preparedness, and collegiality of its staff and its long-term project horizon. The Swiss development partners also heralded the Swiss Embassy for its willingness to lead joint initiatives (e.g., the support to the Health Basket Fund and the idea for a universal health insurance) and invest in donor coordination. At the same time, most key informants were hard pressed to differentiate the Swiss Embassy from other development partners, such as the UK, Denmark, or Canada. There are some explanations for this. First and foremost, its budget support - in line with the Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation - automatically puts Switzerland on par with its investment partners. Second, as noted in Chapter 1, the evaluation team did not speak with ministers and permanent secretaries of the Government of Tanzania.<sup>20</sup> Third, some of the other key informants engaged directly with Switzerland's implementation agencies, such as GIZ and UNFPA.

### 4.4. Portfolio analysis findings

In addition to the above field mission findings, we note that the Swiss Embassy:

- engaged Swiss service providers and institutions: Swisscontact (on vocational skills development) and the Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute (on malaria), and
- promotes Swiss values, such as the protection of civic space and the ability of civil society organizations to engage in, and voice their opinions on, development processes, (e.g., in its promotion of sexual and reproductive health rights, empowering the media, and civil oversight of government in its good financial governance programme)<sup>21</sup>.

### 4.5. Conclusion

On the one hand, the Swiss Embassy does not enjoy in Tanzania as sharp a profile as Switzerland has in some other countries of engagement such as, for example, in Chad, Nepal, and Ukraine. On the other hand, it is debated whether Switzerland's international cooperation requires and should pursue a unique value-added, especially in a country that - at least at face value - is functioning. As said, it is not for this evaluation to resolve this debate about the extent to which Swiss international cooperation requires a unique profile / value-added in each country that it is active in—we leave this to the SDC Directorate and make a suggestion to this end in Chapter 6.

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<sup>20</sup> The question was whether this would have made a big difference. Whilst the Swiss Embassy (and other development partners) maintained (cordial) relations with the political leadership of the country, the Embassy also observed that they (and other development partners) did not enjoy very close contacts (SDC, 2023a).

<sup>21</sup> That this is not easy in Tanzania proves the third phase of the Good Financial Governance programme, where the Government of Tanzania refused the continued involvement of two civil society organizations for providing civil oversight and accountability.

## 5 Efficiency

### Evaluation questions

Are the Swiss portfolio outcomes an adequate way to structure the portfolio, how useful are they for management and for communication? How best to proceed with the Swiss portfolio outcomes and the domain logics in terms of the Embassy's development orientation, program steering, and internal organization? To what extent is the process management of the cooperation programme monitoring system relevant and effective for the accounting of results and program steering? How effective is the portfolio management of the Embassy and what are its contributions to an optimal achievement of results? How to align the ambition to work on sustainable national reforms with a reduced budget?

### 5.1. Introduction

This final thematic chapter covers three topics of interest to the Swiss Embassy and the SDC Eastern and Southern Africa Section:

- the usefulness of the so-called 'Swiss portfolio outcomes',
- the effectiveness of the programme's monitoring, reporting, and steering, and
- how to continue influencing national-level reforms with a reduced budget.

We review each topic in turn. As these are - more-or-less - three stand-alone topics, we abstain from drawing an overall conclusion at the end of chapter, instead we draw an explicit conclusion at the end of each section.

### 5.2. The Swiss portfolio outcomes

The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 was one of the first cooperation programmes to include 'Swiss portfolio outcomes' in its results framework. As the name suggests, these are outcome statements at the programme or portfolio level (see Section 1.4 or 3.2 for the outcome statements of the cooperation programme). Switzerland introduced these Swiss portfolio outcomes *'to increase the results focus of the cooperation programmes and align the programmes more explicitly to the objectives of Switzerland's international cooperation strategy and the recipient country's priorities'*. In other words, they were a means to better and more explicitly connect the project work - the backbone of any programme - with higher-level development outcomes. They also offered the opportunity to develop a narrative for how project interventions contribute to higher-level development outcomes (including intermediate milestones) and move away from presenting a series of project-level results in its results reporting (Rosemann & de Meyer, 2023). The Swiss portfolio outcomes replaced the previous domain (or sector) logic of the programme's results framework.

The Swiss Embassy recognizes the value of the Swiss portfolio outcomes, whilst it also encountered some challenges in organizing, and communicating on, its work based on them. On the positive side, the Swiss Embassy observed that it:

- helped *'break out of the "domain-logic", consider the broader development requirements, think about "who else" is needed to unlock the envisaged development ... and work on the political dimension of development'*; this stimulated the Swiss Embassy to reach out to a much broader set of 'boundary partners', i.e., people through which the Swiss Embassy sought to effect change (Earl, Carden, & Smutylo, 2001), and
- prompted a more innovative and collaborative mindset and better internal collaboration and knowledge sharing, both because the Swiss portfolio outcomes *'highlighted cross-domain synergies'* and the Swiss Embassy organized outcome, cross-domain, meetings to review how different projects could contribute to the achievements of the individual outcomes (Rosemann & de Meyer, 2023).

At the same time, the Swiss Embassy struggled with the Swiss portfolio outcomes and continued to organize the office along the traditional domain logic (quasi creating a matrix organization with domain and outcome teams). This had to do with the fact that the Swiss Embassy found it difficult to communicate - both internally and externally - on the Swiss portfolio outcomes as the outcome statements were *'too vague'* and *'not concrete enough'* for communication purposes.<sup>22</sup>

The Swiss Embassy mentioned that it is *'not 100% convinced'* about the utility of the Swiss portfolio outcome methodology in its current form. This carries the risk that - over time, and in practice - the Swiss Embassy will revert to the domain logic for both its internal organization and external discourse. However, this also is not what the Swiss Embassy wants, as it did see the value and usefulness of the outcome logic. The evaluation agrees and would caution to throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. For two reasons. The strengths of the Swiss portfolio outcome methodology, indeed, lies in its:

- 'development-orientation', focusing on broader social, economic, and/or political developments rather than individual project results, and
- 'process-orientation', bringing to the fore what is needed to bring these social, economic, and/or political developments about.

This raises a question - not about a binary choice between the outcome and domain logic - but about how to make the Swiss portfolio outcomes work better for the Swiss Embassy. In other words, how can the current system be improved? As observed, the Swiss portfolio outcomes for Tanzania are *'too vague'* and *'not concrete enough'*. The evaluation agrees (as discussed in Section 3.2). Isn't the answer then a three-pronged approach, namely to:

1. make the Swiss portfolio outcomes more specific and concrete,
2. think through and explicate how these more specific and concrete development outcomes can be brought about, and
3. consider how Switzerland can contribute through a mix of development diplomacy, project interventions, and small actions?

In following this approach, the Swiss Embassy would offer itself (i) a lodestar for its development cooperation, (ii) a theory of change for programme monitoring and steering, and (iii) the vocabulary to communicate about its programme internally and externally. This thought train is brought to a logical conclusion in the next chapter.

### **5.3. Programme monitoring, reporting, and steering**

The key programme monitoring instruments of the Swiss Embassy are the 'monitoring for context relevant changes' (the so-called MERV)<sup>23</sup>, the programme's results framework, and the internal control system. The MERV is each year prepared in August. The programme results framework is formally reviewed twice a year (in May and September). Both find their expression in the Swiss Embassy's annual report, which is prepared in October each year, alongside the office management report/internal control system report. Due to time constraints, the evaluation did not review in depth how this standard monitoring process is applied in Tanzania. At the same time, the evaluation did not come across examples where the review of the results framework has led to significant course corrections.

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<sup>22</sup> We recall here that the Swiss Embassy observed that the results framework, including theories of change, were developed amidst the heights of the covid-19 pandemic, and therefore did not receive the attention needed, as at that point in time *'the Embassy had greater concerns and more important things to attend to'*. This will certainly have been the case. However, in the evaluators' experience, Swiss embassies/Swiss cooperation offices frequently struggle with finding the right 'flying altitude' in formulating their programme's envisaged impacts and outcomes. We, therefore, expect that this evaluation's findings have wider validity.

<sup>23</sup> The MERV is an annual political-economy, macro-economic, and social sector context analysis, describing the state-of-play in a country, politically, economically, and, for example, in the health and education sectors.

The evaluation did study the main documentation. As noted previously, the MERV offers a concise, clear-eyed, and relevant depiction of the political and development situation in Tanzania. If anything, it could be more profound and analytical in identifying and understanding the politics of development in Tanzania, e.g., who the power brokers and veto players are and their specific interests (although we recognize that this is no easy task, given Tanzania's historically closed, quasi one-party, political system). The narrative annual report is very descriptive, detailing an array of different project activities, outputs, and outcomes.<sup>24</sup> It doesn't offer the reader a sense of progress against the Swiss portfolio outcomes, what is working well, and what not. It remains unclear how the Swiss Embassy arrived at the performance ratings included in the narrative, and the section on programme implications reads disconnected from the discussion of the country and portfolio results. These observations raise the question whether the Swiss Embassy (for program steering) and the SDC headquarters (for accountability) could benefit from a more evaluative and analytical report in which the Swiss Embassy systematically compares and reviews progress against the underlying assumptions and outcome objectives?

#### **5.4. A reduced budget**

The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 was predicated on the expectation that Switzerland's international cooperation with Africa would grow in budget (after Switzerland decided to conclude most of Switzerland's cooperation in Latin-America). For Tanzania, the expectation was that Switzerland's support would grow from circa CHF 22 million per year to CHF 30 million annually. A strained budget of the Swiss federal government thwarted this plan. The Swiss Embassy has been asked to reduce its 2025 commitments by CHF 2 million. For the next cooperation programme period (2026-29), the expectations are that the budget will be around CHF 20-22 million per year (down from almost CHF 26 million in 2024). It is against this backdrop that the question emerged about how to continue to promote national reforms with a reduced budget.

On the one hand, national reforms do not necessarily require large funds. They often require a change in perspective, followed by a change in norms and policies, which alter the 'rules of the game' and induce a change in behaviour of key development actors (for example, on the virtues of an open and competitive public discourse, inclusive employment practices, or allowing teenage mothers back to school). On the other hand, many national reforms require investments (e.g., high quality, compulsory, secondary education for all) and/or enforcement (e.g., anti-discriminatory practices). With less funding, Switzerland will need to strike a careful balance between the two and help Tanzania raise its domestic revenues.

The Swiss Embassy speaks in this regard about (even) greater focus and selectivity. That makes sense. Although the Swiss Embassy works on just three Swiss portfolio outcomes and within three domains (governance, health, and employment), it pursues multiple workstreams within each domain, e.g., public financial management and media empowerment in governance, malaria elimination, primary health care, sexual and reproductive health, and social security under health, and vocational training and entrepreneurship development in its private sector work. Looking at the portfolio from this perspective, would this allow for even greater focus and selectivity? (Note: Given the above, the points made on the Swiss embassy's geographic focus remain valid—see Section 2.6.)

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<sup>24</sup> A recent meta-study of cooperation programme evaluations found this to be the case for most cooperation programmes (Krapp & Salazar, 2023)



## 6 Conclusion, lessons, and recommendations

### 6.1. The picture

Over the last 20 years, Tanzania has steadily progressed towards lower-middle-income country status. Public capacity and service delivery have improved. After civic space closed between 2015-21, it is tentatively opening again. Still, poverty and exclusion rates remain high, the development agenda unclear. All in all, Tanzania makes for a difficult development context for the SDC to work in. The way the Swiss Embassy formulated, and reports on, its Swiss portfolio outcomes makes it non-the-easier. In short, we observe that:

- Tanzania follows a state and central government led development model focused on political stability and economic growth. President Samia leads by carefully crafted and balanced public statements, suggesting greater openness, whilst - for now - leaving the policy and legal framework and economic direction of the country more-or-less unchanged. The Vision 2025 and Five-year National Development Plan are outdated; with the Vision 2050 under preparation (and it being unclear to what extent that is a government or donor-demanded process). Civil society and the private sector appear to have limited voice and agency. Together, this makes the current reform space and agenda, either of the government, civil society, or the private sector, unclear.
- Swiss portfolio outcomes were introduced in Switzerland's cooperation programmes to improve the development outcome orientation of the SDC and better evidence the Swiss contribution to the objectives of Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy. In the case of Tanzania, the Swiss portfolio outcomes have been formulated in very broad, ambitious, and ultimately ambiguous terms. Moreover, they are reported on based on the results from individual projects, instead of being the culmination of work done under several interventions, with the whole becoming more than the sum of its parts. Whilst the Swiss Embassy can point to positive developments in service delivery and outcomes, especially in the (sexual and reproductive) health sphere, the development picture on governance, civic space, and human development remains mixed and ambiguous. Moreover, the Swiss interventions which the evaluation looked at a bit closer raised important questions about what it is that the Swiss Embassy is working towards to, what the long-term development effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions are likely to be, and whether greater focus and selectivity would not be possible and beneficial?

This picture raises two reflective questions:

- What if the Swiss Embassy would use its development diplomacy to engage with the political, civic, and economic elite<sup>25</sup> of the country to identify available local reform spaces, agendas, and momentum, and together with local change makers devise ten-year visions of change and how Switzerland in the next four years can help to initiate and bring such reform agendas about through a combination of development diplomacy, project interventions, and small actions?
- What if the Swiss Embassy would use such ten- and four-year visions on specific reform agendas to unpack who the agents of change and veto players are, how these agents can be supported, how these agents are likely to respond to the Swiss support, how their actions are likely to influence others and bring about the (process of) change, and to use this understanding/these assumptions to monitor and steer its interventions (i.e., to consciously and purposefully formulate theories of change and actively use them for monitoring and steering)?

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<sup>25</sup> The people who have a disproportionate ability to influence the affairs of state/the economy, and affect change (Dercon, 2022)

The critical reader will subsequently ask what these 'local reform spaces' refer to. Ultimately it is for local reform actors and the Swiss Embassy to figure this out through dialogue. For the sake of clarity, two examples to showcase 'at which level', the Swiss portfolio outcomes and theories of change could be formulated, based on the findings of this evaluation and the idea that they should be specific and concrete to foster buy-in, enthusiasm, and direction. For example:

- How can the primary health care sector be fully domestically funded in 10 years' time through taxation, insurance premiums, and out-of-pockets?
- What should the entrepreneurship ecosystem of Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar look like in 10 years' time?

These examples are both specific and concrete, and require a multitude of actions, i.e., they cannot be brought about by any single intervention/project. They offer a clear lodestar for both local change agents and the Swiss Embassy to work towards to, are specific and concrete enough to devise a local reform agenda around, whilst being flexible on how to ultimately get there. Figure 1 captures above reflection in graphical form. Figure 2 highlights the right 'flying altitude' for the Swiss portfolio outcomes, namely above individual project results (as multiple projects should be used to address different aspects of a development challenge to effectively address it), but below country- or macro-level results which Switzerland - with its limited budgetary contribution and footprint - cannot realistically and meaningfully contribute to.

Figure 1 A graphical representation of the evaluation's main finding




Figure 2 Beyond project level results, but below macro-level developments



## 6.2. Lessons learned

1. **Political economy analysis and project interventions need to be accompanied with development diplomacy and engagement with a broad range of local actors to confirm or ascertain the local reform space and momentum, ensure that one operates on the same wavelength, and foster (further) support for the consistent implementation of the envisaged local reforms.**

Background: The political economy of Tanzania is in transition and the direction of travel is not fully clear. Sustainable development is not possible without the buy-in of the political and economic elite of the country. Moreover, the Government of Tanzania and the Swiss Embassy may not always be talking about the same when working on the health basket fund, sexual and reproductive health, and decentralization.

2. **It requires a conscious and concerted effort with local reform actors to ensure and secure the development effectiveness and sustainability of Swiss international cooperation.**

Background: Switzerland supports development interventions in Tanzania which have merit and worth (e.g., primary health care financing, entrepreneurship development, promotion of sexual and reproductive health rights) but it was not always clear where Switzerland - together with local partners - was working towards and how the achieved results could be sustained.

3. **Swiss portfolio outcomes need to be linked to clear and concrete local reform agendas and be accompanied by a narrative - a theory of change - on how Swiss development diplomacy, project support, and small actions contribute to local reforms.**

Background: If Swiss portfolio outcomes are formulated too abstract/too stratospheric, then they cannot effectively guide the work of the Swiss Embassy. If the Swiss portfolio outcomes are not accompanied by a narrative - a theory of change<sup>26</sup>, then the Swiss Embassy lacks the means to assess whether (i) its ex-ante assumptions about how local actors would respond to its support are correct, and (ii) it remains on track to achieve the (intermediate) outcomes, or whether a course correction is needed. Developing a theory of change allows one to think through and critically reflect on one's assumptions; having a theory of change allows one to test whether one's assumptions are holding up in practice.

## 6.3. The way forward (recommendations)

1. **Should the Swiss Embassy deepen its (political) dialogue with the government, political parties, civil society, private sector, and youth leaders about the local reform space and agenda, to identify where the greatest development-relevant reform momentum is and how Switzerland can help to move these reforms forward (of course subject to them being in line with Swiss values, interests, and value-added)?**

**To:** Swiss Embassy Tanzania

**Timeline:** Short-term

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<sup>26</sup> Critical is that the theory of change, in terms of assumptions, goes beyond stating 'external conditions' that need to be in place to be able to be successful in the first place and also explicates (i) through whom Switzerland seeks to affect change, (ii) how these local reform actors are expected to respond to the Swiss support, and (iii) how subsequent actions of these local reform actors are expected to influence other development actors and bring about the envisaged change.

**Reason:** Tanzania's political economy is in transition, and it remains unclear what the Government of Tanzania's true (development) priorities are, especially vis-à-vis Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy objectives and values (inclusive development, transparent governance). Moreover, the Swiss international cooperation with Tanzania could benefit from clearer lodestars as to where it is working towards. It is the outcome of such a broad (political) dialogue which will ultimately confirm whether it makes sense for Switzerland to scale/expand its work on sexual and reproductive health and private sector engagement, continue its work on good governance, health, and civil society engagement, or even greater focus and selectivity is needed / a shift in the project portfolio is required.

**Possible actions:**

- identify the key power brokers, veto players, and future leaders within Tanzania's political and economic elite and civil society (both in the mainland and in Zanzibar),
- find ways - through the Embassy's network - to get in touch with these individuals,
- seek to engage in an open and continuous dialogue with these individuals about the (regional) future of Tanzania based on a strong assessment of the present,
- explore avenues to leverage Switzerland's comparatively large engagement in Tanzania with Switzerland's interests and regional engagements in East Africa, and
- as these individuals will undoubtedly inquire into the Swiss Embassy's views (vision), to develop a short vision document around what it perceives as the key 'levers of change', e.g., the need for a rules-based investment climate which, in equal measure, allows domestic start-ups and international investors to invest at scale in growth- and export-oriented business opportunities, which is the only way to absorb Tanzania's youth into the labour force and truly attain the cooperation programme's overall goal to *'empower young people ... to advance socially and economically'* (SDC, 2020a).

2. **Should the Swiss Embassy, based on abovementioned (political) dialogue and the identification of specific, meso-level, local reform agenda(s), work with the local reform actors to develop a ten-year vision of change and how Switzerland in the next four years can help to initiate and bring these local reform agenda(s) along, through a combination of development diplomacy, policy dialogue, project interventions, and small actions, leading to a more focused and selective set of interventions?**

**To:** Swiss Embassy Tanzania

**Timeline:** Short- to medium term

**Reason:** To offer the Swiss Embassy (a) clearer lodestar(s) for its next cooperation programme and make it more development and development process oriented<sup>27</sup>. To make the Swiss portfolio outcomes of the next cooperation programme more specific, concrete, and measurable. To help the Swiss Embassy think through what is needed and how it can help local reform actors and how these are likely to respond to the support, and formulate concomitant theories of change, which it can subsequently use for programme monitoring and steering. To devise a more coherent, focused and selective set of diplomatic, policy, project, and small action interventions and (further) increase the programme's development effectiveness.

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<sup>27</sup> We recall: 'development-orientation' focuses on broader social, economic, and/or political developments rather than individual project results, and 'process-orientation' brings to the fore all that is needed to bring these social, economic, and/or political developments about.

**Possible actions:**

- Work with local reform actors to jointly devise, based on the local reform agenda(s), ten- and four-year vision(s) of change, as well as the underlying theories of change. (Such theories of change best go beyond the current theory of change concept of the SDC and explicate through whom the SDC wants to affect change, what type of support these so-called boundary partners best receive, how these boundary partners are expected to respond to the support, and how the subsequent actions of these boundary partners are likely to affect other actors, trigger a ripple effect, and ultimately bring about the envisaged development).

**3. Could SDC benefit from a guidance document on the requisite value-added, comparative advantage, and Swissness of Switzerland's development cooperation in its partner countries?**

**To:** SDC Management

**Timeline:** Short-term

**Reason:** The requisite value-added, comparative advantage, and Swissness of Switzerland's development cooperation (in Tanzania) is not yet understood and/or accepted by all within Switzerland's international cooperation.

**Possible actions:**

- facilitate an internal debate on the requisite value-added, comparative advantage, and Swissness of Switzerland's development cooperation,
- develop a normative document answering three questions: (i) how exactly to define the value-added, comparative advantage, and Swissness of Switzerland's development cooperation, (ii) to what extent should the SDC strive for such value-added, comparative advantage, and Swissness, and (iii) how to deal with core contribution and budget support in this regard?

**4. for Swiss embassies / Swiss cooperation offices to prepare (i) more concrete and meaningful programme results frameworks, and (ii) more evaluative and analytical annual reports, both for program steering and accountability.**

**To:** the SDC Quality Assurance and Digitalization Section

**Timeline:** Short-term

**Reasons:**

- The overall goal and the Swiss portfolio outcomes of the cooperation programme are very broad, ambitious, and ambiguous. The quantitative results indicators do not offer a cogent picture of change at the level of the three Swiss portfolio outcomes. The results framework also does not contain a comprehensive logical narrative - a theory of change - on how the Swiss embassy is likely to contribute to the attainment of these ambitious goals and outcomes. In other words, the results framework does not offer the Swiss embassy the instruments to meaningfully monitor the programme for (i) operational and strategic steering, and (ii) accounting for the achievement of the Swiss portfolio outcomes.
- The annual reports of Swiss embassies or Swiss cooperation offices (SCOs) are often - and Tanzania is no exception - very descriptive, detailing an array of different project activities, outputs, and outcomes. They seldomly give the reader a sense of (i) progress against the Swiss portfolio outcomes, (ii) what is working well, and what not, and (iii) how the performance ratings that are included in the narrative annual reports have come about. This (recurrent) observation raises the question whether embassies/SCOs (for program steering) and the SDC headquarters (for accountability) could benefit from more evaluative and analytical annual reports in which the embassies/SCOs systematically compare and analyse progress against the underlying assumptions and outcome objectives.

**Possible actions:**

- review the current programme results framework and annual reporting practice against the observations made in the last cooperation programme evaluations,
- to formulate guidance on why and how the Swiss embassies and Swiss cooperation offices could and should make the programme results frameworks more concrete and meaningful, and the annual reporting more analytical and evaluative, and
- for the SDC directorate and sections to engage more evaluatively and strategically with the Swiss embassies and Swiss cooperation offices when discussing the annual report and results, i.e., to reflect on the cooperation programmes objectives and theory of change and analyse to what extent this theory of change is working out in practice or changes in the programme are needed. (Note: it is only the combination of these two possible actions—guidance documents and strategic discussions—that will likely trigger the Swiss embassies and Swiss cooperation offices to start preparing more concrete and meaningful results frameworks and writing more evaluative annual reports).

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
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## Appendices

# A Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 portfolio

Figure 3 Swiss Cooperation Programme portfolio (2021-25, in CHF and %)



**Note:** For full project names, see table next page.


Table 4 Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 - Overview

#	Domains	Status	Project Name	Acronym	Budget					SPO Total	SPO			Type	Main contractor	Geography	Sector
					2021	2022	2023	2024	2025		1	2	3				
1	Governance	Phase-out	Social Accountability Programme	SAP	CHF 2.174.470	CHF 1.971.963	CHF 811.927	CHF 24.849	CHF 0	CHF 4.983.209		X		Contribution	NGO South	National	Public sector policy
2		Current	Empowering Media in Tanzania - EMT	EMT	CHF 996.904	CHF 1.639.049	CHF 1.602.055	CHF 1.588.582	CHF 1.575.449	CHF 7.402.039		X		Contribution	NGO North	National	Media and freedom of information
3			Good Financial Governance (GFG)	GFG	CHF 2.092.251	CHF 1.689.651	CHF 2.279.943	CHF 1.109.107	CHF 1.390.800	CHF 8.561.751	X			Contribution	GIZ	Arusha, Dodoma, Kigoma, Mwanza, Pwani, Singida, Tanga	PFM
4			Anti-Corruption Support	ACS	CHF 891.384	CHF 1.008.170	CHF 1.057.161	CHF 474.714	CHF 1.139.851	CHF 4.571.280	X			Mandate	NGO North	Zanzibar	Anti-corruption
5		New	Uwajibikaji Tanzania Program (UTP)	UTP	CHF 0	CHF 0	CHF 21.745	CHF 1.488.414	CHF 2.127.000	CHF 3.637.159		X		Contribution	FCDO	National	Democratic participation
6	Health	Phase-out	Health Promotion & System Strengthening	HPSS	CHF 2.676.663	CHF 1.500.000	CHF 1.250.000	CHF 387.967	CHF 0	CHF 5.814.630	X			Mandate	Swiss TPH	National	Health systems, SRHR, GBV
7			Support to Saint Francis Hosp. Ifakara	SFHI	CHF 213.935	CHF 10.773	CHF 40.011	CHF 0	CHF 0	CHF 264.720	X			Contribution	NGO South	National	Health systems
8		Current	Towards Elimination of Malaria in Tanzania	TEM	CHF 1.200.000	CHF 1.400.000	CHF 1.428.795	CHF 1.000.000	CHF 1.500.000	CHF 6.528.795	X			Mandate	Swiss TPH	Kigoma, Tanga	Malaria
9			Ifakara Health Institute	IHI	CHF 418.416	CHF 306.086	CHF 362.862	CHF 208.256	CHF 9.000	CHF 1.304.620	X	X		Core contribution	NGO South	National	Health systems
10			Direct Funding for Better Health (DF4BH)	DF4BH	CHF 1.857.960	CHF 3.616.732	CHF 4.269.235	CHF 2.741.847	CHF 2.070.401	CHF 14.556.175	X			Contribution	GoT	National	Health systems
11			SYP Safeguard Young People EA Countries	SYP	CHF 959.500	CHF 914.963	CHF 972.089	CHF 900.000	CHF 940.000	CHF 4.686.552		X		Contribution	UNFPA	Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Kigoma, Shinyanga, Simiya	SRHR
12			Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF)	TASAF	CHF 5.000.000	CHF 5.720.000	CHF 5.322.041	CHF 6.828.229	CHF 5.150.000	CHF 28.020.270	X			Contribution	GoT	National	Social protection
13			Universal Health Coverage in Tanzania	UHC	CHF 0	CHF 0	CHF 76.239	CHF 1.025.482	CHF 1.250.000	CHF 2.351.721	X			Contribution	GIZ	National	Health systems
14	Employment	Phase-out	Conserving Forests through sustainable forest- Opportunities For Youth Employment	CoForEST OYE	CHF 606.505 CHF 475.000	CHF 870.860 CHF 322.099	CHF 355.743 CHF 608.641	CHF 40.426 CHF 78.072	CHF 0 CHF 0	CHF 1.873.534 CHF 1.483.812	X X			Mandate Contribution	NGO South NGO North	National Morogoro, Singida	Business support Employment creation
16		Current	Skills for Employment Tanzania (SET)	SET	CHF 2.176.874	CHF 1.153.909	CHF 2.042.644	CHF 3.061.779	CHF 3.180.000	CHF 11.615.205		X		Mandate	Swisscontact	Iringa, Mbeya, Morogoro	Employment creation
17			Innovations for Social Change	ISC	CHF 134.798	CHF 1.137.720	CHF 1.503.586	CHF 1.607.511	CHF 2.165.600	CHF 6.549.215	X			Contribution	NGO North	National	Business support
18			Impact Linked Financing/Climate Change	ILF	0	CHF 0	CHF 500.000	CHF 1.200.000	CHF 200.000	CHF 1.900.000	X			Contribution	NGO North	National	SME
19	Culture	Current	Tanzania Cultural Programme (TCP)	TCP	CHF 0	CHF 125.994	CHF 254.251	CHF 345.250	CHF 313.060	CHF 1.038.555	X			Contribution	NGO South	National	Culture
					<b>CHF 21.876.681</b>	<b>CHF 23.389.990</b>	<b>CHF 24.760.992</b>	<b>CHF 24.112.508</b>	<b>CHF 23.013.186</b>	<b>CHF 117.143.243</b>							

Note: Small actions, and closed projects with nominal expenditures in 2021-22, have not been included in the overview.

## B Selected development indicators Tanzania

### Economic growth




Source: (World Bank, 2024)

### Total tax revenue of the central and local government




Source: (World Bank, 2024)

### Total government spending on education and health




Source: author’s computation from Various Budget Books Vol. II, Ministry of Finance

### Human Development Index




Source: (Global Change Data Lab, 2024)

### Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index




Source: (Transparency Intenational, 2024)

### Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index



Source: (EIU, 2024)

**Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum**



Source: (WEF, 2023)

## C Switzerland’s International Cooperation Strategy 2021-24

‘Poverty reduction and sustainable development are the *raison d’être* of international cooperation’ (FDFA, 2021). To contribute, the Swiss Federal Council defined four objectives for its international cooperation, namely:

- contributing to sustainable economic growth, market development and the creation of decent jobs (economic development),
- addressing climate change and its effects and managing natural resources sustainably (environment),
- saving lives, ensuring quality basic services, especially in relation to education and healthcare, and reducing the causes of forced displacement and irregular migration (human development), and
- promoting peace, the rule of law and gender equality (peacebuilding and governance) (FDFA, 2021).

Table 5 subsequently lists Switzerland’s 10 sub-objectives of its International Cooperation Strategy. The Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 aims to contribute to the blue highlighted sub-objectives 2, 7, 9, and 10.

*Table 5 Switzerland’s 12 sub-objectives of its International Cooperation Strategy*

<p><b>Sub-objective 1: Strengthening framework conditions for market access and creating economic opportunities.</b> IC aims at strengthening the framework conditions for stability and economic governance through the promotion of an environment conducive to private initiatives as well as sound management of public resources, balanced trade policies and an investment-friendly environment</p>
<p><b>Sub-objective 2: Promoting innovative private sector initiatives to facilitate the creation of decent jobs.</b> IC facilitates access to capital markets and sustainable financing to promote financial inclusion. It works on market mechanisms to enable businesses and producers to benefit from globalization, integrate into global value chains and contribute to resolving global challenges. IC works in support of entrepreneurship, health systems, basic education and vocational training geared to the changing needs of the labour market and financial inclusion. It helps to create decent jobs and other adequate income generating activities for all, with a particular focus on disadvantaged populations and young people. In addition, it engages with the private sector to strengthen standards and promote good practices on sustainability, gender equality and respect of human rights.</p>
<p><b>Sub-objective 3: Addressing climate change and its effects.</b> Through its IC, Switzerland supports developing countries in their efforts to mitigate climate change (reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) and adapt to its effects, while at the same time contributing to the search for sustainable financing. The IC contributes to the sustainable management of urban and rural areas by reducing the growing risks related to the impacts of climate change and by promoting renewable energies and energy efficiency.</p>
<p><b>Sub-objective 4: Ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources.</b> IC supports the sustainable management of resources such as water, air, soil, raw materials and ecosystems as well as the conservation of biodiversity, for the benefit of all people, especially the most vulnerable, along value chains in order to respect planetary boundaries</p>
<p><b>Sub-objective 5: Providing emergency aid and ensuring the protection of civilians.</b> IC places at the heart of its work the safety, dignity and rights of populations affected by crises, armed conflicts and disasters, including forcibly displaced persons.</p>
<p><b>Sub-objective 6: Preventing disasters and ensuring reconstruction and rehabilitation.</b> Switzerland is committed to disaster risk reduction and to reconstruction and rehabilitation in order to prevent natural disasters as far as possible and to restore basic services after a disaster or an armed conflict.</p>



**Sub-objective 7: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services.** Investment in basic education, vocational training and health contributes to economic development and to mitigating population growth. Quality and equitable access to health services, education, safe drinking water and sanitation, energy, urban transport and food are fundamental. Switzerland is committed to meeting the basic needs of the poorest and most neglected, in particular migrants and refugees, young people and people with disabilities, by strengthening international standards, the capacities of state systems and state-owned enterprises, and by improving living conditions, taking into account the challenges of growing urbanization.

**Sub-objective 8: Preventing conflicts, promoting peace and respect for international law.** Switzerland contributes to the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts so that a lasting solution can be found by peaceful means. It acts through mediation, facilitation and political dialogue, as well as through the provision of expertise. As a State party to the Geneva Conventions, it promotes international humanitarian law and disarmament norms, particularly humanitarian aspects, which are essential for the protection of civilians and non-combatants

**Sub-objective 9: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality.** Switzerland defends and promotes the universality, interdependence and indivisibility of human rights. Through its IC, Switzerland is committed to the respect, protection, promotion and development of human rights. Projects and programmes that pay particular attention to possible sources of conflict avoid aggravating tensions while ensuring the participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of projects. Switzerland is committed to reducing factors of exclusion and promotes equal opportunities and equitable access to resources, public services and decision-making processes. The equitable sharing of responsibilities, duties and decision-making powers between men and women is an important driving force for sustainable development, including economic growth (higher level of education, better economic, political, cultural and social participation and choice of the number of children). IC is committed to promoting gender equality and women's rights in all its interventions and with its partners, with particular emphasis on the prevention of gender-based violence, economic empowerment and women's political participation.

**Sub-objective 10: Promoting good governance and the rule of law and strengthening civil society.** Switzerland promotes democratic values, including citizen participation, transparency and accountability, as well as the fight against corruption and against impunity. IC strengthens state institutions so that they meet the needs of the population. It strengthens the capacity of countries to base their policies on reliable data, with particular emphasis on vulnerable groups. Switzerland is committed to systemic change, aimed at strengthening the accountability of partner governments to tackle obstacles to development such as corruption, cronyism and mismanagement. IC is committed to promoting good governance in all its interventions and with its partners. Support for balance of powers and public mechanisms for government accountability and oversight are key, including through culture and the media. Switzerland strengthens civil society in developing countries because of its key role in ensuring social inclusion, advocacy, monitoring and public accountability.

Legend: IC = international cooperation. Source: (SDC, 2020)

## **D Swiss Cooperation Programme Tanzania 2021-25 results framework**

## Annex 1: Cooperation programme results framework achievements

Portfolio outcome 1		State institutions are more efficient and effective, inclusive and increasingly free of corruption					
Contributing to sub-objectives:		IC_SO_07: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services; IC_SO_10: Promoting good governance and the rule of law and strengthening civil society					
Outcome / indicator	Baseline	2021 cumulative	2022 cumulative	2023 cumulative	2024 cumulative	Target	Annual indicator value
Country outcome		Universal access to high-quality basic social services that leave no one behind (Sources: African Union / East African Community; SDG; 2025 Tanzania Vision)					
Indicator 1	Total revenue (tax and non-tax) collected by the central government TZS 21'670 billion - amount collected for three quarters of financial year 2022/23 i.e from July 2022 to April 2023 (Source: Speech on estimated government revenues and expenditures for 2023/24 by the Minister of Finance to the National Assembly)						
Indicator 2	Proportion of people who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months Police station 5%, Legal services 5%, Lands services 0%, Health Facility 3%, Highest was labour office 7% (Source: 2023 IPSOS Perception Survey)						
Indicator 3	Number of high and moderate malaria transmission intensity districts There was a reduction of 7 districts from the high malaria transmission intensity category (from 64) and an addition of 5 in the moderate malaria transmission intensity category (from 52). There was therefore a net decrease of 2 (from 116 to 114 total high and moderate transmission districts against a 2024 target of 60), To also note, annual malaria parasite incidence in children <5-years declined by 36.4% (96/1000: 2020 to 61/1000: 2022) while parasite prevalence in the same population increased by 14.2% (7% to 8.1% against a set target of 4%). (Source: HMIS/DHIS2)						
Indicator 4	Tanzania's score in Transparency in budget process No new data since AR 2022: 21/100 (Source: OBS 2021)						
Indicator 5	Tanzania's score and ranking in the corruption perception index 38/100 (Score), 94/180 (Rank) presenting a decline by 1-point in score and a 7-point increase in rank from AR 2022. (Source: 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index report released by Transparency International in January 2023)						
Indicator 6	Proportion of total government's budget allocation on essential services (education, health and social protection) Education 13.7% (down from 14.9% in AR 2022, but an increase of the absolute number of Tanzania Shilling of + 4.7%); Health 5.18% (down from 5.5% in AR 2022 but corresponds to an increase of the absolute number of TZS of + 13.3%); Social Protection 5.4% (increase of the absolute number of TZS of + 4.5% compared to 2022) (Source: <a href="#">Citizen's budget book 2022/2023</a> , Ministry of Finance and Planning,						
Indicator 7	Proportion of Local Government Authority (LGA) budget financed by own source revenue 18.6% (Total own source revenue (TZS 891.84 bn) out of total LGAs expenditure (TZS 4'807.13 bn) (Source: <a href="#">National Audit Office, Annual General Report for Regional Administration and Local Government</a> ,						

<b>Swiss portfolio outcome</b>		<b>State institutions are more efficient and effective, inclusive and increasingly free of corruption</b>					
GOV_ARI_2, Budget resources of local authorities	40	2	23	38		59	15^
GOV_TRI_4, Public Oversight & Accountability	31.0%	34.4%	32%	41.5%		50.0%	41.5%
HLT_ARI_1, Safe birth delivery	1'792'005	874'210	1'340'239	1'890'839*		2'051'090	98'834
HLT_TRI_4, Access to modern methods of family planning	42.0%	no data	40%	31.0%		75.0%	31.0%
POV_TRI_2, Social Protection	88.3%	95.03%	100%	13.9%*		90.0%	13.9%
GOV_CSI_336, Cases filed in court for: (i) prosecutions for statutorily specified offences of economic crime and corruption, and (ii) orders for asset recovery	0	0	0	5		6	5

<b>Portfolio outcome 2</b>		<b>Civic space is promoted and enables all citizens and especially young women to influence local and national policy making and implementation and promote their human rights.</b>					
Contributing to sub-objectives:		IC_SO_09: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality; IC_SO_10: Promoting good governance and the rule of law and strengthening civil society					
Outcome / indicator	Baseline	2021 cumulative	2022 cumulative	2023 cumulative	2024 cumulative	Target	Annual indicator value
<b>Country outcome</b>		<b>Promote and protect human rights for all, particularly for poor women, men and children, and vulnerable groups</b> (Source: Government of Tanzania's Five -Year Development Plan II, Chapter 4.3.8 "Good Governance")					
Indicator 1	Tanzania's score in public participation in budget process No new data since 2021: 9/100 ranking lowest in the participating East African countries (Source: OBS 2021)						
Indicator 2	Number and percentage of laws tabled and passed by national parliament under "certificate of urgency" No bills were passed under certificate of urgency between August 2022 and July 2023 (compared to 3 out of 4 laws in AR 2022) (Source: Parliament of Tanzania website)						
Indicator 3	Tanzania's ranking and score in the Global Gender Gap index (women's political empowerment) 45/146 (rank, compare to 60 in AR 2022), 0.309/1 (score, compared to 0.245 in AR 2022) (Source: Global Gender Gap Report 2023)						

Indicator 4	Tanzania's ranking and score in the World Press Freedom index rank 143/180 (compared to 123 AR 2022), score: 44.02 (compared to 48.3 in AR 2022) (Source: 2023 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders)						
Indicator 5	Tanzania's score in the Freedom in the World index 36/100 partly free (compared to 34 in AR 2022), on political rights Tanzania scores 12/40 (same as AR 2022) and civil liberties 24/60 (compared to 22 in AR 2022) (Source: 2023 Freedom in the World report from Freedom House)						
Outcome / indicator	Baseline	2021 cumulative	2022 cumulative	2023 cumulative	2024 cumulative	Target	Annual indicator value
<b>Swiss portfolio outcome</b>	<b>Civic space is promoted and enables all citizens and especially young women to influence local and national policy making and implementation and promote their human rights</b>						
FCHR_ARI_1, Space for civil society	124	111	237	133		<b>124</b>	- 104^~
GEN_TRI_3, Gender Equality - Women's influence on political decision-making (complementing the ARI on political bodies with at least 30% representation of women)	33.5%	55%	57%	54.1%		<b>40.0%</b>	54.1%
GOV_ARI_1, Citizen's participation	68'759	238'318	94'946	114'511*^		<b>82'978</b>	19'565
GOV_CSI_342, Inclusive and Responsive decision making	81.0%	75%	72%	76.7%		<b>89.0%</b>	76.7%
GOV_CSI_343, Perception of the media's role in influencing decision-making regarding allocation and spending of funds for the provision of public services	49.0%	68%	62%	81.0%		<b>70.0%</b>	81.0%
GOV_CSI_344, National and local laws abide by basic human rights concepts of access to information, freedom of expression and civic participation	0	0	0	1		<b>4</b>	1

<b>Portfolio outcome 3</b>		<b>More youth, especially poor young women, benefit from gainful income-generating opportunities and sustainable livelihoods.</b>					
Contributing to sub-objectives:		IC_SO_02: Promoting innovative private sector initiatives to facilitate the creation of decent jobs; IC_SO_07: Strengthening equitable access to quality basic services; IC_SO_09: Strengthening and promoting human rights and gender equality					
Outcome / indicator	Baseline	2021 cumulative	2022 cumulative	2023 cumulative	2024 cumulative	Target	Annual indicator value
<b>Country outcome</b>		<b>Income poverty is reduced and social protection enhanced</b> (Source: The Government of Tanzania's Five-Year Development Plan II)					
Indicator 1	Population share living in extreme poverty (below 1.90 US\$/day) 26.8% (slight reduction from 27% -- 2021 World Bank data released in 2022) (Source: World Bank Tanzania Economic Update, Feb 2023)						
Indicator 2	Total enrolment in formal vocational education, adult and non-formal education 123'352 (Females: 65'894 and Males: 57'458) (a reduction compared to 185'12231 (F: 33.36%; M: 66.64%) reported in AR 2022) (Source: Education Budget Speech 2023/24 to the National Assembly)						
Indicator 3	Innovation performance of Tanzania compared globally 113/132 (compared to 103 in AR 2022) This reflects a decline on all metrics except the Institution (political environment, regulatory environment and Business Environment). Instrument updates eg. the Tanzania Investment Act in 2022 and other governmental efforts to make the environment conducive have been the only metric that has shown improvement while other metrics like Business Sophistication, Human capital and research, Infrastructure, and Creative outputs all have either stayed the same or declined in score/value and rank. (Source: 2023 Global Innovation Index report)						
Indicator 4	Human Development Index (HDI) score score 0.549 (compared to 0.548 reported in AR 2022); rank 160/191 (same as AR 2022) (Source: World Bank-Tanzania Economic Update, Feb 2023)						
<b>Swiss portfolio outcome</b>		<b>More youth, especially poor young women, benefit from gainful income-generating opportunities and sustainable livelihoods</b>					
IED_ARI_1, Access to Vocational Skills Development	0	8'635	441'204	467'549*^		<b>1'025'201</b>	26'345
IED_ARI_2, Employment	0	2'410	10'287	12'983*^		<b>221'398</b>	2'696
IED_ARI_3, Access to and use of financial products and services	1'247	82'542	337'826	345'576*^		<b>1'013'032</b>	7'750
IED_TRI_2, Private sector in vocational skills development	0	0	0	6		<b>70</b>	6

IED_TRI_3, Vocational Education and Training system reform	0	0	3	11^		<b>50</b>	8
OTH_CSI_44, Partnerships accelerating innovations that address sustainable development challenges	1	16	23	30^		<b>25</b>	7

<b>NOTE / KEY</b>	<b>EXPLANATIONS</b>
General	<p>No projects' results were entered in RDM for 2021 and 2022. In Annex 1, 2021 and 2022 figures were inserted manually after extraction (as entered in previous annual reports), thus in some instances there is no RDM system auto calculation to cumulated data.</p> <p><b>WAY FORWARD:</b> The country office will at a later stage enter previous years' data in RDM so that the system correctly auto-calculates the cumulation for 2024 annual reporting.</p>
*	<p>Results are cumulated with previous years 2023 results are only apportioned to % Swiss contribution, while previous years' results included the full project results/data (regardless of the Swiss %)</p>
^	<p>Data have been manually adjusted against the RDM system value to reflect the difference / addition with 2021 and 2022 data that was not entered in RDM, but are reflected in this Annex 1 table</p>
~	<p>Main contributing project is in its exit phase, thus direct support to Civil Society Organizations has been deliberately reduced.</p>

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Pictures© SDC, (from left to right):

- The women in the Upendo group work as a collective, selling and renting out a range of products and running an event decoration business.
- Education on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR) has been integrated into the curriculum of many of Tanzania's FDCs.
- The fluctuating sales of flowers mean that the two women require alternate sources of revenue. They started gardening to earn supplemental income.

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