




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Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
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Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA  
**Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC**  
Staff of the Directorate

# Cooperation Strategy Evaluation

## South Sudan 2017 – 2020

Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division SDC





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# **Cooperation Strategy Evaluation**

## **South Sudan 2017 – 2020**

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**Bern, December 2021**

## Why conducting evaluations of cooperation strategies/programmes?

In 2010 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) developed an approach for evaluating cooperation programmes (formerly known as cooperation strategies) through a pilot process. The central pillar of this approach is the promotion of the exchange and the sharing of knowledge within our institution and among an evaluation team led by an external consultant. The major difference between evaluations of cooperation programmes (CoPr<sup>1</sup>) and other external evaluations managed by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division (E+C) is that SDC staff is involved in the evaluation team, acts as an evaluator but with an inside knowledge of the institutional issues and debates.

The goal of CoPr evaluations is to assess the relevance and coherence of the Swiss development cooperation in regard to national development priorities and the Dispatch on Switzerland's International Cooperation (since 2021 IC Strategy). They assess the results achievement of the cooperation programme portfolio at the level of domains of intervention. In doing so, these evaluations help SDC's management in their strategic and operational steering and in improving aid effectiveness. Evaluations of cooperation programmes support the definition of new cooperation programmes strategically and stimulate learning.

Country and regional CoPr evaluations are defined as hybrid evaluations as they are undertaken by a mixed team composed by an external consultant and two peers from SDC and, if relevant, other federal agencies. E+C decided to develop this approach to valorise the knowledge and competencies of the SDC staff and enhance internal learning, while still benefitting from an outside view of an external consultant.

The E+C evaluation programme is approved on an annual basis by SDC's Senior Management. SDC mandates evaluations as instruments for organisational learning, strategic guidance and ensuring accountability.

CoPr evaluations are conducted according to the OECD DAC Evaluation Standards. The relevant department(s) responds to the recommendations with a written Management Response.

### Timetable of the CS Evaluation South Sudan 2017-2020

Step	When
Desk study and inception report	December 2019 – March 2020
Interruption and adaptation due to CoVid crises	April 2020 – September 2020
Evaluation on-site and draft report	Due to travel restriction, the on-site evaluation was conducted by a consultant based in Juba (November 2020); Draft Report December 2020
Final evaluation report	February 2021
SDC Management Response	December 2021

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<sup>1</sup> Till 2020 CS was the abbreviation for the now called cooperation programmes, but for ease of reference its abbreviation has been kept in the final version of the report.

# **I. Management Response**

## **Management Response to the Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy South Sudan 2017 - 2020**

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### **1) Introduction**

Cooperation Programme evaluations (formerly known as Cooperation Strategy evaluations) analyse the Cooperation Programmes which define the Swiss engagement in a particular country or region. The goal of cooperation programme evaluations is to assess the performance of the Swiss international cooperation and its alignment with regard to national development priorities and the relevant Federal Council Dispatch. In doing so, these evaluations help the management of the different entities involved in the Cooperation Programmes in their strategic and operational steering and in improving aid effectiveness.

The cooperation programme evaluations are realized as hybrid evaluations, conducted by a mixed team consisting of one external consultant, two internal resource persons (peers) and, where necessary, a local consultant. The team for this evaluation included Anne-Lise Klausen (external team leader, Nordic Consulting Group, NCG), Barbara Züger (peer, Peace & Human Rights Division (PHRD), formerly known as Human Security Division (HSD) and Alexandre Ghélew (peer, SDC). Ellen Rushforth, based in Juba, joined the team in the analysis and reporting phase. Ayla Yurtaslan, NCG, assisted the team with the desk review in the Inception Phase.

The evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy for South Sudan (2017-2020) was conducted between December 2019 and February 2021. The evaluation process followed the planned schedule until March 2020 when COVID-19 changed the possibilities to conduct fieldwork as planned in April 2020. It was at this point decided to postpone fieldwork until the autumn of 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to pose travel and other restrictions throughout 2020. In October 2020 the Evaluation Team was enlarged with a consultant based in South Sudan in order to conduct a field visit, and support with interviews, analysis and triangulation processes.

Cooperation programme evaluations follow a standardised matrix with evaluation questions. For the purpose of this evaluation, the matrix was adjusted during the inception phase according to the stated needs and received inputs from the different units involved in the South Sudan programme. These changes were also discussed and agreed upon with the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division. The final matrix was incorporated and approved in the inception report.

### **2) Appreciation of Report and Evaluation Process**

We thank and commend the evaluation team for the timely submission and good quality of the Final Evaluation Report of the Cooperation Strategy South Sudan 2017-2020 as provided to us on 22 December 2020. It was consulted, discussed and commented upon by SDC and PHRD colleagues (Peace & Human Rights Division, formerly HSD) in Juba and in Bern and we are satisfied with the reflection of our consolidated response in the final report.

We are aware of the extraordinary challenges, difficult circumstances and changes that this review process had to go through due to the COVID-19 crisis. As a team, you were forced more than once to adapt your usual ways of working, which cost extra time and efforts. In the end, the idea of the team visiting different project sites in South Sudan was doomed to fail entirely – instead, a consultant based in South Sudan was brought on board to conduct a limited amount of field work. We thank you all for your creativity and patience. Against the

odds, the team remained committed and dedicated towards the goal of providing SDC and PHRD with critical insights and reflections of our common work in South Sudan since 2017.

We are satisfied with a number of key findings of the evaluation. Besides many other positive and also more critical findings – which will all help us in shaping the new Cooperation Programme South Sudan 2022-2025 – your overall analysis concludes that the three thematic domains (food security & livelihoods, protection & human rights and peace- and nationbuilding) of the current cooperation strategy (CS) have proven relevant and will remain so for a number of years to come. In addition, your analysis confirms that the context analysis and its three scenarios were useful for a context that is marked by great fragility, by developing a scenario of improvement, but also one of rapid deterioration. Moreover, certainly a fundamental finding, the strategy is found to be in line with Swiss policies and appears relevant in terms of assessing the needs of the target population – this is encouraging!

Of course, more conclusions are still to be drawn from the evaluation, in order to produce best possible lessons learnt for effective integration into the new Cooperation Programme 2022-2025. But the findings do already indicate that the new programme for South Sudan is most likely to benefit more from the question of **how** we are doing things, rather than looking at **what** we are doing.

### 3) Recommendations

Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
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#### 3.1) Recommendations on cooperation strategy and context analysis

Recommendation 1		
The context analysis and the scenarios of the future Cooperation Programme should build on more broadly founded political economy analysis, including private sector dynamics to inform the future engagements, both in programmes and in dialogue and advocacy. The Cooperation Programme should also include relevant regional dynamics.		
Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
Agreeably, the inclusion of a private sector dimension has the potential to add value to the future portfolio. However, one must not forget that the private sector in South Sudan is not per se a positive force. Many of the bigger enterprises are linked to the country's war economy. For example, the oil sector has predominantly been – and continues to be – a driver for conflict rather than for peace.		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
Establish/maintain contacts with private sector actors with an eye for promising opportunities and a sense of conflict sensitivity.	SCO Juba	Ongoing

Recommendation 2		
With regard to conflict sensitivity, it is important to continue to acknowledge the extremely localized nature of conflicts in South Sudan, which in many cases are orchestrated from above and therefore has national significance. Structured feedback loops should be developed to ensure that the community in Juba capture information from the subnational level. There should also be awareness that there are different narratives in Juba and in areas of engagement.		
Management Response		
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
True, localized conflicts do not happen in a vacuum but are frequently ignited by national politics and elites. The protracted state of fragility in South Sudan is fuelled, to a large extent, by different conflict layers at national, subnational and local level.		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
Push the localisation agenda forward as planned and continue to make effective use of existing partnerships, i.e. CSRF/BAC, to better understand local/subnational aspects of the SSD conflict and ensure feedback loops to the community in Juba.	SCO Juba	Ongoing

Recommendation 3		
In the formulation of the upcoming Cooperation Programme, options should be explored for deepened collaborative efforts and work with relevant stakeholders and for think tanks and facilities such as CSRF to undertake joint analysis, and on that basis develop a solid theory of change and realistic expectations.		
Management Response		
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
Joint, collaborative efforts in analysis and programming are certainly an area of work, where our efforts should be further improved, particularly in a country as vast, complex and needy as South Sudan. As reflected in the results framework of the current strategy, expectations were partially set too high. A well-developed theory of change will be helpful to level expectations and to keep a future results framework flexible and light.		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
Involve CSRF and other relevant partners in the drafting process of the new cooperation programme.	SCO Juba	Drafting process of new cooperation programme.

### 3.2 Recommendations on relevance and appropriateness of the portfolio

Recommendation 4
Advocate for better integration of conflict/context analysis in protection programming. SGBV programming needs to be based on a solid protection analysis. Do no harm and quality considerations must be given greater weight and be required also from implementing partners. Interventions should ideally address also broader rule of law aspects (and obstacles). The drafting of a comprehensive intervention in this field needs to be based on the perspective of a long-term engagement and be done with a back-up from specialists. At a strategic level, thematic advisers at the regional and HQ level would

be valuable for SCO to request support from, whereas at a programmatic level, ad-hoc support may be an effective resource.

Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>Conflict/context analysis constitutes an important part of SCO's protection programming and greatly influences decisions on programmes. It is also important to note that South Sudan context is fast changing and so are the protection needs and risks, this needs to be approached a greater understanding and flexibility.</p> <p>Longer-term programmes will be pursued where possible to ensure the realisation of meaningful change or outcomes, especially for SGBV and community based protection, which have a big emphasis on perceptions beliefs and attitudes.</p> <p>The existence of weak institutions and rule of law system, insecurity and poor accessibility poses a greater challenge to ensuring quality SGBV programming and monitoring, while efforts will be made to ensure quality, this is not going to change in the short term but will be a continuous process. The current SGBV interventions also seek to address broader issues related to access to justice and rule of law as this is a crucial component in SGBV response, this however is very limited to SCO's areas of intervention. Current PHRDs Victims Coalition Project might provide a good basis to further explore opportunities in this area.</p> <p>More focus looking forward will be on consolidating existing interventions in SGBV, community based protection and child protection, given the limited financial and human resources. The coordination with other likeminded donors and actors will be improved to ensure a greater effect. Complementarities across domains will be sought and strengthened particularly with the food security and livelihoods sector and peace and human rights.</p>		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
<p>The ongoing country program development process offers an opportunity to jointly reflect on programmes and outlook.</p> <p><u>Examples</u></p> <p>Enhance existing interventions in SGBV, community based protection and child protection. Where possible seek or strengthen partnerships that involve integrated programmes.</p> <p>Ensure improved coordination and communication with other donors and actors to ensure programme complementarity.</p> <p>Secondments to fill in critical gaps in protection would provide an added value</p> <p>Make use of existing partnership with CSRF and knowledge base to improve on analysis to inform programming.</p>	SCO Juba	Ongoing

Recommendation 5
<p>Delineate emergency food assistance from resilience-seeking interventions in the design of the next programme in order to facilitate internal decision-making, steering of the project portfolio and deepening programmatic dialogue on resilience with partners and interested development partners (in particular those funding both humanitarian and development interventions). The food security and livelihood domain (FSL) should aim to reduce general food distribution, focus on resilience and disaster risk reduction, and</p>

employment/economic opportunities and increase targeting towards women, youth and vulnerable groups.

#### Management Response

<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
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The resilience agenda is key for South Sudan. It should be prominently enshrined in the next cooperation programme. Reduction of general food distributions in favour of more sustainable food/nutrition solutions, disaster risk reduction, employment/economic opportunities, and targeting towards women, youth and vulnerable groups are all part and parcel of this agenda. But there is more to it:

As the grave economic situation increasingly affects all aspects of the society in a negative way, monitoring of the economic developments in 2022 and beyond, as well as stronger engagement of international finance institutions in South Sudan, is also required. In addition, achieving better resilience for the people of South Sudan could be enhanced by engaging the private sector. A proper analysis on what role Switzerland could play in this regard is highly recommended. Further to this, resilience must be programmed across all domains, not just in FSL. Switzerland, through its Peace- & nation building and protection domains, is in a favourable position to upscale efforts in this regard alongside other actors.

Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
<p>Frame the new cooperation programme in a way so that it promotes resilience-oriented programming across all domains (FSL, Prot, Peace).</p> <p><u>Examples:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Define a percentage threshold for emergency-versus resilience programming;</li> <li>- Identify partners with clear resilience/emergency profiles (i.e. SSHF being emergency);</li> <li>- Set geographical focus areas (i.e. a %-split between green belt (Equatorias) and conflict-/emergency prone areas like Jonglei).</li> </ul>	HQ Bern / SCO Juba	Drafting process of new cooperation programme.

#### Recommendation 6

The peace- and nation building domain should continue to maintain a balance between convening (Tukul) and address community level peacebuilding activities in support to peace actors in civil society, and at the same time pursue entry points to support core elements of state building (such as federalism, R-JMEC). This includes the continuation of building partnerships and increasing focus on women and youth and give attention to gender roles (including men and boys).

#### Management Response

<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
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The domain will continue to balance approaches in order to support peace dynamics comprehensively and with a particular interest in inclusiveness. It is key for Switzerland to strengthen its own reputation and standing as a bridge builder and convener for difficult conversations. The Tukul meetings on the Swiss compound therefore have a particular value. At the same time, the programme portfolio carefully seeks to balance approaches on several tracks and geographic dimensions, in order to comprehensively work in, on, and along the peace process.

Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
<p>In order to strengthen the outreach beyond the “Juba dynamics” new partnerships with civil society organisations will be developed, some of whom specifically work in remote conflict areas such as Jonglei, and some of whom seek to support the voices of women in the monitoring of the R-ARCSS peace agreement.</p> <p>The workshops towards the new Cooperation Programme will also serve as a reflection space to steer and redirect the peace / conflict resolution portfolio.</p>	HQ Bern, SCO Juba	Drafting process of new cooperation programme

Recommendation 7		
<p>Strengthen the emphasis on nexus programming. It could be an option to establish the linkages with multilateral, bilateral and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) partners, and capitalizing on the strong presence of peace and nation building to draw in these aspects including conflict sensitivity most notably in the FSL engagements.</p>		
Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>We agree that the Swiss engagement should make better use of complementarities in the sense of a nexus approach. We propose, however, to be careful not to mix instruments, mandates and tracks all too carelessly. We therefore seek to strengthen nexus programming on portfolio level – not on the level of individual projects. We agree that the inclusion of conflict sensitivity is of pivotal importance in a context such as South Sudan.</p>		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
<p>In the process towards the new Cooperation Programme, a key discussion will be organised on the integration of nexus programming into the new framework, including its expected benefits and limits. Based on the evaluation of the partnership with CSRF, a continuation of the Swiss support will be decided upon, at the end of 2021.</p>	HQ Bern, SCO Juba	Drafting process of new cooperation programme

Recommendation 8
<p>Increase management attention to transversal themes, and in this regard to take a more holistic approach to the programme (“breaking down the domain silos”), and to bring in conflict sensitivities and where possible peace building initiatives into other parts of the portfolio. Support to the CSRF is an example of synergy between HSD and SDC, as well as an innovative attempt to improve donor engagement through heightened awareness of context and conflict sensitivity. Empowering women and girls, but also training men and boys on perceptions and masculinity, can have transformative effects on individual, families but also more broadly communities. The much-repeated call to involve youth would also be key in all domains.</p>

Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
Transversal themes can function as bridge builders and help breaking down silos. However, in a context like South Sudan with limited financial and human resources, it is important to prioritise. It is not possible to tackle everything with the same intensity. This is when management needs to come into play and make strategic decisions.		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
Include a thorough analysis of and discussion about transversal themes in the planned cooperation programme thematic workshops to enable SCO management to arrive at informed decision-making.	SCO HoC and Management Team	Ongoing

Recommendation 9		
Switzerland should pursue replication and scaling up (multiplier effects). Multi-bi (including contributions to UNFPA and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could be instrumental “door openers” to scale up Swiss engagement and support the ongoing active advocacy role taken by SCO Juba with backing from Swiss Embassy in Addis Ababa.		
Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
In South Sudan, Switzerland only funds OCHA, UNHCR, ICRC and WFP with multi-bi contributions and ranks among the top donors of WFP and ICRC. UNFPA is not part of Switzerland's multi-bi or core funding. In general, Switzerland is being recognized as an honest broker, as a guarantor of trust and openness, who provides flexible and timely funding. Consequently, Switzerland has a leverage effect, despite the level of funding provided as compared to other likeminded donors, which could be more exploited by joining forces of other relevant offices in Bern, Addis Ababa and Juba. Advocacy efforts in this sense should however not be overestimated and solely concentrate on multi-bi partners, but should also include other stakeholders.		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
N/A	N/A	N/A

Recommendation 10		
FDFA should take a close look at the structural issues related to recruitment for positions in difficult postings such as South Sudan, with a view to find institutional mechanisms and for example increase incentives, and in this way to attract qualified staff and retain these and avoid gaps. The FDFA has recognized the issue, but there is an urgent need to develop measures that can reduce frequent staff turnovers at management level and seek to address permanent staff to these positions.		
Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
The SDC HA Directorate is aware of the challenging staffing and recruitment situation regarding the SCO in Juba which was also addressed in the internal revision report dated 4.5.2021. We share the view that appropriate measures must be taken to ensure the necessary stability in the office management. These measures will be worked out in close cooperation with the FDFA Directorate for Resources (DR) and in the frame of the current reorganisation process SDC is undergoing.		

Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
Measures to be worked out in close cooperation with the FDFA DR.	DR	No fixed date

Recommendation 11		
<p>The next Cooperation Programme should adapt the format to fit the reality in South Sudan. The process to adapt the format could start with a mapping of “what works and what does not work, for example by conducting a lessons learned workshop”, to learn from other fragile settings and seek agreement among partners and senior management at HQ to develop the next strategy in an adapted format that works in the context. Moreover, a compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing financial and human resources should be drawn up with regard to implementation of the next strategy.</p>		
Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>We fully agree with this recommendation, which has been integrated in the process leading to the elaboration of the future cooperation programme 2022 – 2025. With a Whole-of-Government-Approach that promotes working in the nexus, we are working towards a lighter and more flexible cooperation programme with realistic expectations that can be monitored and reported on (p.ex. Annual Report process) and that responds to the fragile and highly volatile context of South Sudan.</p> <p>As for the compact on the continuity of the PHRD engagement in the country, the PHRD's commitment usually holds for the duration of a cooperation programme (if signed by the Head of PHRD). In extraordinary situations, a drawdown period of 18 months would be the strict minimum in order to responsibly leave a context.</p>		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
To be integrated in the process leading towards future cooperation programme 2022 – 2025 and to be reflected in the programme itself.	Desks Bern (SDC-HA / PHRD); SCO Juba	Drafting process of new cooperation programme

Recommendation 12		
<p>Regular in-person monitoring of the portfolio should be conducted. Monitoring on site is important in projects with several implementing partners and where the reality may not be captured if monitoring is only done remotely or through the lead organisation. Given concerns around data sharing in South Sudan, in-person monitoring also helps to facilitate more open dialogue. There is also value in considering the use of Third Party Monitors (TPM) who may be able to travel to a wider range of locations than SCO staff and also capture data which may not come out when SCO staff conduct monitoring due to the funding relationship.</p>		
Management Response		
Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>The MR to the SSD Annual Report 2020 and the response to the internal review dated 31.8.2021 already made recommendations to reduce the overall number of projects in SSD significantly, in order to lift monitoring pressure from the SCO team. It also encouraged efforts to carry out on-site monitoring, as it is key for keeping in touch with field realities, implementing partners and authorities, in particular when several</p>		

implementing partners are involved. The use of third-party monitors remains a valid option but their use should not become a general rule.

Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Juba Programme team to reduce overall number of projects;</li> <li>- Monitoring duties to be agreed in SCO Juba MbOs.</li> </ul>	Line managers Juba	Ongoing

### Recommendation 13

Introduce theories of change and test outcome harvesting in a couple of selected projects in the next Cooperation Programme in order to register outcomes in more appropriate ways that recognise the non-linearity of results.


#### Management Response

<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
Excellent proposal. As a matter of fact, it has been decided to introduce theories of change to the entire process of drafting the new cooperation programme. Outcome harvesting alongside the introduction of feasible indicators, even if only a few, will enable reporting on eventual achievements in SSD vis-à-vis the FDFA Strategy for International Cooperation 2021-24 and the Agenda 2030.		
Measures	Responsibility	Deadline
Make theories of change integral part of new cooperation programme drafting process.	Desks Bern (SDC-HA / PHRD); SCO Juba	Drafting process of new cooperation programme.

Bern, November 11, 2021



Manuel Bessler (Ambassador)  
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## II. Evaluators' Final Report

The evaluation report for the Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy South Sudan 2017 - 2020 has been elaborated in collaboration between the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division of SDC and a consultancy team constituted by Nordic Consulting Group A/S as well as one peer from SDC and one from the Human Security Division (HSD).

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
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February 2021

Figure: Map of SCO projects in South Sudan (as of November 2020).



## Executive Summary

### Bibliographical Information

<b>DONOR</b>	SDC and HSD
<b>REPORT TITLE</b>	Cooperation Strategy Evaluation South Sudan 2017 – 2020
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<b>SECTOR</b>	Cooperation strategy, multi-sector
<b>LANGUAGE</b>	English (UK)
<b>DATE</b>	February 2021
<b>AUTHORS</b>	Anne-Lise Klausen ( <a href="mailto:alk@ncg.dk">alk@ncg.dk</a> ), Alexandre Ghelew, SDC, and Barbara Züger, HSD. Ellen Rushforth, based in Juba, joined the team in the analysis and reporting phase.

### Evaluation scope

The evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy for South Sudan (2017-2020) was conducted between December 2019 and February 2021. The evaluation process followed the planned schedule until March 2020 when COVID-19 changed the possibilities to conduct fieldwork. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to pose travel and other restrictions throughout 2020 and beyond: the methodology was adapted and the analysis was conducted as a combination of “virtual field work” and a field visit to Wau by the local consultant, who joined the evaluation in this phase.

The evaluation emphasised *a mutual learning process in assessing* whether the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s (SDC) Humanitarian Aid (HA), the Human Security Division (HSD<sup>1</sup>) of the Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), and South Cooperation and its WOGA partners have reached the strategic objectives of the Swiss engagement in South Sudan. These are: *To respond in a meaningful and effective way to the needs and aspirations of the most vulnerable mainly operationalised through interventions in three domains*: “The **protection of civilians and promotion of human rights**, with special attention given to the prevention of Gender Based Violence; support to **food security and livelihoods** towards strengthening the resilience of producers and those most in need; the fostering of spaces for **dialogue and common action for peace** (including youth), as well as initiatives towards truth, justice and reconciliation, with priority on supporting church action and customary authorities’ non-violent conflict transformation and mediation roles”.<sup>[1]</sup> The evaluation focuses on **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and coherence**.

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<sup>1</sup> HSD was renamed to Peace and Human Rights Division early 2021, but its acronym (and the function of HSA) have been kept in the final version of the report for ease of reference.

## Major Findings and Conclusions

### *Cooperation strategy and context analysis*

The South Sudan strategy 2017-2020 was elaborated on the basis of a thorough and balanced context analysis (2016/2017). The analysis is relevant and includes political economy, fragility and conflict patterns, poverty and needs, but pays less attention to development perspectives. The strategy focus is at country level with limited consideration of dynamics beyond national borders.

The integration of conflict sensitive approaches into programming and decision-making requires a nuanced understanding of the situation at national and subnational levels as well as structured and maintained information flows from areas of engagement. As the Swiss Cooperation Office (SCO) does not have staff permanently present in locations outside of Juba, it is important to utilise and build on existing partnerships and networks to develop the necessary and crucial flows of information and data. This is core to the way the SCO works, and needs to remain a high priority given the volatile context.

The format guiding the strategy is not convincing as a steering and accountability instrument in a fragile and conflict-affected situation like South Sudan. It is developed for a situation, where there is engagement with Government and alignment with development plans, programmes and results. The logframe thinking and the results framework have not been particularly useful for HSD nor for SDC in the strategy period. The strategy is currently the only joint document between the Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) partners. It would be relevant for WOGA cooperation to be based on a long-term compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in South Sudan (SSD) and outlines roles and responsibilities sub-regional, regional and global levels.

### *Relevance and appropriateness of the portfolio*

Switzerland is a smaller, yet ambitious donor in the context and is well recognised for its concerted project efforts. The three domains of the strategy are relevant, but there is no convincing evidence that the portfolio overall has been particularly effective, although individual projects may suggest so if assessed in isolation. The strategy has set the bar at an unrealistic level.

Overall there is an unevenness and scattering in the portfolio between a conflict-sensitive approach and peace- and nation-building on the one hand, and the delivery of humanitarian projects on the other hand. There are many different projects, which at times seem to lack synergies both at strategic and operational level. The question therefore stands if the projects and other engagements realistically can add up to deliver on the outcomes as formulated in the strategy.

Protection needs are just overwhelming, so having a strong protection pillar (while also adopting a transversal protection approach) remains valid. Prevention of and addressing Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) is a challenge, despite it being a shared priority among donors. In order to amplify the impact of individual projects and to prevent them from being a mere drop in the ocean, the portfolio must be even more strategic. The visit to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) project highlighted that the quality of services provided, as well as project personnel and resources do not meet expected standards, and there is even doubt if interventions are in line with do no harm approaches. The protection portfolio should place greater emphasis on human rights and rule of law, both in terms of programming and advocacy. Furthermore, links to the multilateral protection and human rights agenda are absent and would need to be developed with a strong commitment from HQ.

The Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) portfolio aim to move towards resilience. The partnership in Partnership for Resilience and Recovery (PfRR) is a good example of moving

forward in this direction, but there does not seem to be a longer term plan beyond new projects and PfRR in place. The Swiss comparative advantage (and a theory of change) could have been delineated more clearly, since the needs in this domain are overwhelming. Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus engagements are “young”, and there is room for more complementarities and coherence in the portfolio.

Long-term endeavours have established Switzerland as the main international interlocutor in Peace and Nation Building. Tangible outputs and some process outcomes have been achieved, although in general the context does not lend itself to objectives being achieved in the short or possibly medium term. The interventions are relevant and effective. There is an increase in nation building /statebuilding attention in the period through support to peace monitoring (R-JMEC) and federalism through International IDEA. There is also increasing collaboration with other partners on the political economy of aid/context and conflict sensitivity (Better Aid in Conflict/Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CRSF)). The increased focus in these areas is relevant and strategically sound.

There are a number of elements in all three domains, which are steppingstones to a bolder and more coherent programme in the future. Transversal themes however have not been given sufficient attention in implementation.

#### *Implementation of the CS and its portfolio*

The WOGA partnership generally works well in the context and calls for a long-term compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing for Switzerland's financial and human resources at sub-regional, regional and global levels.

South Sudan is a difficult environment in which to run a programme and the staff is complimented for the efforts and for implementing a programme where Switzerland is recognised not so much for the size of funding but for humanitarian diplomacy, knowledge, engagement and coordination. At the same time, the programme has suffered from some shortcomings, not least the high turnover at management level. With regard to staffing, there is a need to strengthen the team in the protection domain due to the significant workload for one National Programme Officer (NPO) and the need to mainstream human rights and protection activities across all Domains.

Monitoring of the strategy has been complicated and field visits limited until Third Party Monitoring was introduced. The many projects in the portfolio also adds to the overwhelming task of implementation and monitoring. Localisation is ongoing and particularly the support through the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund shows results, at individual project level there is less evidence in the portfolio.

Effectiveness is hampered by the lack of data sharing among stakeholders, this is amongst others associated with carefulness because data can be misused, but also the relatively limited “jointness” in the donor community.

## Recommendations

### *Cooperation strategy and context analysis*

**Recommendation 1:** The context analysis and the scenarios of the future Cooperation Programme should build on more broadly founded political economy analysis, including private sector dynamics to inform the future engagements, both in programmes and in dialogue and advocacy. The Cooperation Programme should also include relevant regional dynamics.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	HA	Short-Term

**Recommendation 2:** With regard to conflict sensitivity, it is important to continue to acknowledge the extremely localised nature of the conflict in South Sudan, which in many cases are orchestrated from above and therefore has national significance. Structured feedback loops should be developed to ensure that the community in Juba capture information from the subnational level. There should also be awareness that there are different narratives in Juba and in areas of engagement.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SCO	Short to Medium-Term

**Recommendation 3:** In the formulation of the upcoming Cooperation Programme, options should be explored for deepened collaborative efforts and work with relevant stakeholders and for think tanks and facilities such as CSRF to undertake joint analysis, and on that basis develop a solid theory of change and realistic expectations.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	HA and HSD	Short-Term

### *Relevance and appropriateness of the portfolio*

**Recommendation 4:** Advocate for better integration of conflict/context analysis in protection programming. SGBV programming needs to be based on a solid protection analysis. Do no harm and quality considerations must be given greater weight and be required also from implementing partners. Interventions should ideally address also broader rule of law aspects (and obstacles). The drafting of a comprehensive intervention in this field needs to be based on the perspective of a long-term engagement and be done with a back-up from specialists. At a strategic level, thematic advisers at the regional and HQ level would be valuable for SCO to request support from, whereas at a programmatic level, ad-hoc support may be an effective resource.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SCO and HA	Short, Medium, Long -Term

**Recommendation 5:** Delineate emergency food assistance from resilience-seeking interventions in the design of the next programme in order to facilitate internal decision-making, steering of the project portfolio and deepening programmatic dialogue on resilience with partners and interested development partners (in particular those funding both humanitarian and development interventions). The food security and livelihood domain should aim to reduce general food distribution, focus on resilience and disaster risk reduction, and employment/economic opportunities and increase targeting towards women, youth and vulnerable groups.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SCO and HA and SC	Short to Medium-Term

**Recommendation 6:** The peace and nation building domain should continue to maintain a balance between convening (Tukul) and address community level peacebuilding activities in support to peace actors in civil society, and at the same time pursue entry points to support core elements of statebuilding (such as federalism, R-JMEC). This includes the continuation of building partnerships and increasing focus on women and youth and give attention to gender roles (including men and boys).

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	HSD	Short, Medium, Long -Term

**Recommendation 7: Strengthen the emphasis** on nexus programming. It could be an option to establish the linkages with multilateral, bilateral and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) partners, and capitalizing on the strong presence of peace and nation building to draw in these aspects including conflict sensitivity most notably in the FSL engagements.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SCO	Short, Medium, Long -Term

**Recommendation 8:** Increase management attention to transversal themes, and in this regard to take a more holistic approach to the programme (“breaking down the domain silos”), and to bring in conflict sensitivities and where possible peace building initiatives into other parts of the portfolio. Support to the CSRF is an example of synergy between HSD and SDC, as well as an innovative attempt to improve donor engagement through heightened awareness of context and conflict sensitivity. Empowering women and girls, but also training men and boys on perceptions and masculinity, can have transformative effects on individual, families but also more broadly communities. The much-repeated call to involve youth would be also key in all domains.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SCO	Short, Medium, Long -Term

**Recommendation 9:** Switzerland should pursue replication and scaling up (multiplier effects). Multi-bi (including contributions to UNFPA and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) could be instrumental “door openers” to scale up Swiss engagement and support the ongoing active advocacy role taken by SCO Juba with backing from Swiss Embassy in Addis Ababa.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SCO and Embassy Addis	Medium and Long -Term

**Recommendation 10:** FDFA should take a close look at the structural issues related to recruitment for positions in difficult postings such as South Sudan, with a view to find institutional mechanisms and for example increase incentives, and in this way to attract qualified staff and retain these and avoid gaps. The FDFA has recognised the issue, but there is an urgent need to develop measures that can reduce frequent staff turnovers at management level and seek to address permanent staff to these positions.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	FDFA	Short to Medium-Term

**Recommendation 11:** The next Cooperation Programme should adapt the format to fit the reality in South Sudan. The process to adapt the format could start with a mapping of “what works and what does not work, for example by conducting a lessons learned workshop”, to learn from other fragile settings and seek agreement among partners and senior management at HQ to develop the next strategy in an adapted format that works in the context. Moreover, a compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing financial and human resources should be drawn up with regard to implementation of the next strategy.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	HA	Short Term

**Recommendation 12:** Regular in-person monitoring of the portfolio should be conducted. Monitoring on site is important in projects with several implementing partners and where the reality may not be captured if monitoring is only done remotely or through the lead organisation. Given concerns around data sharing in South Sudan, in-person monitoring also helps to facilitate more open dialogue. There is also value in considering the use of Third Party Monitors (TPM) who may be able to travel to a wider range of locations than SCO staff and also capture data which may not come out when SCO staff conduct monitoring due to the funding relationship.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SCO	Short to Medium-Term

**Recommendation 13:** Introduce theories of change and test outcome harvesting in a couple of selected projects in the next Cooperation Programme in order to register outcomes in more appropriate ways that recognise the non-linearity of results.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	HA and HSD	Short to Medium-Term

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## Abbreviations

AR	Annual Report
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CS	Cooperation Strategy
CSPM	Conflict Sensitive Programme Management
CSRF	Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ET	Evaluation Team
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCD	Federal Council Dispatch
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FSL	Food security and livelihoods
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HSD	Human Security Division (the division changed name to Peace and Human Rights Division in 2021. For consistency this report uses the old name)
HQ	Headquarters
IC	International Cooperation
ICF	Interim Cooperation Framework
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation on Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
MERV	Monitoring System for Development-Relevant Changes
NCG	Nordic Consulting Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	Nonviolent Peaceforce
NPO	National Programme Officer
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PoC	Protection of Civilians
RCF	Rapid Credit Facility
PfRR	Partnership for Resilience and Recovery
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
RFW	Results Framework
R-JMEC	Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
R-TGoNU	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SCO	Swiss Cooperation Office

SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army
SPLM-IO	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SSD	South Sudan
SSCC	South Sudan Council of Churches
SSHF	South Sudan Humanitarian Fund
SSP	South Sudanese Pound
TGNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPM	Third Party Monitor
UN	United Nations
UNCF	United National Cooperation Framework
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	<b>United Nations Mission in South</b>
USD	US dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WOGA	Whole of Government Approach

## **Introduction**

### **Objectives of the Cooperation Strategy Evaluation**

Cooperation strategy evaluations analyse the Cooperation Strategies (CS) which define the Swiss international cooperation (IC) engagement in a particular country or region and assess the relevance and coherence of this engagement in regard to national development priorities and the Federal Council Dispatch (FCD). These evaluations emphasise *a mutual learning process* – whether, in the specific case of South Sudan, the HA, the HSD of the FDFA, and South Cooperation and its partners reach the strategic objectives in the country. With the emphasis on internal learning cooperation strategy evaluations are “hybrid” being conducted by a mixed team consisting of an external consultant and internal peers.

The cooperation strategy evaluation for South Sudan has been conducted between December 2019 and February 2021. The evaluation process followed the planned schedule until March 2020 when COVID-19 changed the possibilities to conduct fieldwork as planned in April 2020. It was at this point decided to postpone fieldwork until the autumn of 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic continued to pose travel and other restrictions throughout 2020. In October 2020 the Evaluation Team (ET) was enlarged with a consultant based in South Sudan in order to conduct a field visit, and support with interviews, analysis and triangulation processes.

The evaluation team include Anne-Lise Klausen, Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) (external team leader), Alexandre Ghelew, SDC, and Barbara Züger, HSD. Ellen Rushforth, based in Juba, joined the team in the analysis and reporting phase. Ayla Yurtaslan, NCG, assisted the team with the desk review in the Inception Phase.

The report structure follows the four evaluation areas of the Terms of Reference (ToR). Some of the evaluation questions have been answered in the text where it seems best placed according to the flow of the report and therefore moved to other chapters than originally placed in the evaluation matrix. The final chapter summarises forward looking topics beyond the recommendations in chapters one to four. The annexes provide additional information including the Evaluation Matrix, the flow of the evaluation process, the results frameworks and other statistical data.

### **Objectives, Methods and Process**

#### **Objectives and evaluation criteria**

The Swiss engagement in South Sudan has the following goal:

To respond in a meaningful and effective way to the needs and aspirations of the most vulnerable. This commitment has operationally been translated into the following three areas of intervention in which Switzerland can make a significant positive difference:

- “The protection of civilians [and promotion of human rights], with special attention given to the prevention of Gender Based Violence,
- support to food security and livelihoods towards strengthening the resilience of producers and those most in need,
- the fostering of spaces for dialogue and common action for peace (including youth), as well as initiatives towards truth, justice and reconciliation, with priority on

supporting church action and customary authorities' non-violent conflict transformation and mediation roles".<sup>2</sup>

In line with the CS evaluations as presented above, the South Sudan assignment focuses on **relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. Coherence**<sup>3</sup>, meaning an assessment of the compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution, was announced as an evaluation criterium in its own right by OECD/DAC in December 2019, although evaluation questions in the ToR were already at the outset relating to coherence, the criteria has been enhanced in the evaluation matrix. The methods and approach of the evaluation therefore largely follow the Toolkit guidance and adhere to OECD/DAC quality standards for evaluation.

## Methods and Process

The methods of the evaluation have a strong focus on evidence and includes the review of different document sources, interviews with staff, partners, donors and independent researchers, field visits and interviews at project sites, supplemented by follow-up interviews with relevant staff. Due to COVID-19 the planned learning points, such as an on-site workshop in Juba after field work (for example) were reduced to a series of check-in meetings in the course of the autumn of 2020, an informal presentation and discussion of preliminary findings and conclusions with Juba and HQ staff in December 2020, and a final meeting in February 2021.

Due to the delay and restrictions affecting the process, the evaluation period has been one year, rather than the planned six months. Part of the analysis was conducted prior to COVID-19 (Evaluation Area 1 on Relevance in particular), part of the data collection for Evaluation Areas 2, 3, and 4 were also carried out prior to COVID-19, while the analysis in these areas were conducted after a six-month break, when it was decided to work more remotely. From a methodological point of view, this has not been ideal, but adaptation was made to ensure consistency and high quality of the data for verification, analysis and triangulation (such as hiring of locally based consultant for fieldwork, repetition of interviews and supplementary interviews). The ET also updated the context analysis in order to understand the current situation and the contextual changes since the beginning of 2020. This was helpful because interviewees responding between October and December 2020 have taken the current situation as framing, including the new management of the SCO.

It is the team's experience in the process that, with a couple of exceptions, it is only SDC and HSD staff that have had perspectives on the strategy back to 2017 and earlier. Most donors and implementing partners' staff have been in the country or personally worked in the organisation in question for less than three years and refer to the current situation in their responses.

Annex 1 describes the evaluation methods and process in further detail.

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<sup>2</sup> Terms of Reference for the Consultant, Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy South Sudan 2017 – 2020. p.2-3.

<sup>3</sup> Coherence aspects are integrated in Evaluation area 2 and 3 of this evaluation.

## Box 1: A Snapshot of Recent Developments

**Economic Crisis:** South Sudan is currently facing an economic crisis, between September 2019 and September 2020, the exchange rate on the parallel market saw a 67% depreciation. The reduction in oil production outputs and lower oil prices in the global market limited foreign currency reserves in the country. In August 2020, the Bank of South Sudan announced the depletion of foreign exchange reserves. The difference between the parallel and the official exchange markets continued to grow; and the Bank of South Sudan rate revolving around 166 South Sudanese Pound (SSP)/US dollar (USD). In early October 2020, the Government announced plans to change to a new currency which saw further depreciation of the SSP in the parallel market to 720 SSP. Shortly after the announcement of a new currency, the Government announced they did not have plans to replace currency and the exchange rate on the parallel market went to 500 SSP.

**The Government announced a number of policy measures in early November and on the 12th November the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a USD 52.3 million loan under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).** This is the first financing approval by the IMF since South Sudan joined the Fund in 2012 and is tied up with South Sudan authorities committing to public financial management reforms, transparency, and accountability. Since October 2020, the exchange rate on the parallel market has increased and has stayed between 500 – 600 SSP. There continues to be uncertainty and the COVID-19 pandemic has also had a large impact on the country's economy with a projected growth for the 2020/21 fiscal year 10% below the pre-pandemic rate.

**Violence:** Intercommunal violence has increased in many areas of South Sudan to the highest levels seen in recent years and road insecurity continues to be a threat in many states. Violence continues to pose the greatest risk to food security, with most of the areas affected by conflict in Emergency (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 4) acute food insecurity (World Food Programme (WFP), 2020). On 30th November 2020, Amnesty International published an Advocacy Brief supporting the continued international Arms Embargo on South Sudan due to alleged extreme violence and human rights violations in 2020 in several areas.

**South Sudan continues to be a complex and insecure operating environment.** As of December 2020, South Sudan was the country with the most Violent Security Incidents Against Aid Workers since January 2020 according to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data and in October 2020, the European Union in a report indicated that there has been a rise of attacks targeting aid workers in the country. The report highlighted that at least 14 humanitarian workers have been killed in 2020 in South Sudan, making it one of the most dangerous places to work as humanitarians. In Renk, Malakal, and Bentiu, and earlier this year in Jonglei State, communities have accused humanitarian actors of unfair recruitment policies. In Renk, this escalated into the evacuation of humanitarian workers by UN peacekeepers due to threats and damage to NGO facilities in November 2020 and, as of December 2020, humanitarian activities are still suspended as access negotiations continue.

**COVID-19:** South Sudan has over 3,200 official COVID-19 cases and 62 deaths. There have been reports from several different areas of a rise in both child pregnancy and early marriage which is being attributed to the ongoing closures of schools. The Ministry of General Education and Instruction approved the reopening of two grades (P8 and S4 – final years at both levels) with all other grades of primary and secondary level will return in April 2021. The Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare and UNFPA has raised concerns over the increase in reported SGBV incident in the country related to the COVID-19 pandemic, between January 2020 and September 2020, approximately 6,000 women and girls were sexually assaulted according to a UNFPA report.

**PoC Transition to IDP Sites:** In September 2020, the UN announced the transition from Protection of Civilian (PoC)s sites to Internally Displaced people (IDP) sites. As PoC sites, the sites were under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and therefore under the protection of UN peacekeepers. The IDP camps will be under the jurisdiction of the Government of South Sudan. Three former PoCs have officially transitioned to IDP sites, Bor, Wau and Juba. Several International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO) and NGOs reported that the apparent sudden decision to transition to IDP sites would cause uncertainty and logistical and security challenges for actors working in the sites. This transition was also resisted by many internally displaced people residing in the PoCs, and former PoC residents, who demanded UNMISS wait until the official formation of the state governments. Part of the decision for the transition was to allow UNMISS flexibility to respond to conflict in other areas, and UNMISS announced in later November it would set up temporary peacekeeping bases in the Jonglei region due to the ongoing tensions in the state.

**Other developments:** In September 2018, the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in South Sudan was signed, which was followed by a seventeen-month Pre-Transitional Period. In February 2020, after a series of delays, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity was established. Despite the partial formation of the R-TGoNU in February 2020, the Transitional National Legislative Assembly has not yet been reconstituted (February 2021). The current parliament is thus operating since February 2020 without a mandate. There continues to be no agreement on the Governor for Upper Nile State, however, in early December, it was reported that the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM – IO) is ready to submit a list of State level government appointments for nine of the ten states. In late November, further delays to the graduation and deployment of unified forces were announced due to gaps in the military hierarchy. Flooding has impacted over 980,000 people in South Sudan in 2020 with the worst affected areas including Jonglei, Lakes and Unity states.

## Findings

### Evaluation area 1: Cooperation Strategy and context analysis

#### 1.1. Overview of the Cooperation Strategy of South Sudan

##### Background – Conflict, and previous Swiss engagement

**Switzerland has had a cooperation office in Juba, with staff from HA and HSD since 2006.** From around 2008 to 2014, the SCO also hosted a delegation of Switzerland's gallant armed forces, with a security sector reform team. The interests in South Sudan are further represented by the Embassy in Addis Ababa. Moreover, Switzerland also has a security presence in South Sudan and in the region (both civilian and military). Given the context of endemic poverty, widespread food insecurity, and the population's limited access to basic services, the focus of Swiss engagement has largely been humanitarian, with simultaneous peace and nation building and some few development activities.

**Swiss engagement with peacebuilding has been longstanding, dating back to the late 1990s. A milestone was the 2002 ceasefire agreement between the North and the South at Bürgenstock in Switzerland, which paved the way for Switzerland's participation in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the Naivasha Agreement, between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A), which paved the way for the referendum on independence in 2011.** South Sudan became an independent state in July 2011, the culmination of decades of civil war with the regime in Khartoum. The world's youngest country emerged war-torn and underdeveloped, but nonetheless there was a hope among the international community that the SPLM/A could transform from a militarised liberation movement to a civil government, and that oil income would support economic and human development. The renewed outbreak of conflict along ethnic lines in 2013 took most international actors by surprise, stifling hopes that South Sudan would follow the development path outlined in the New Deal Compact<sup>4</sup>. In August 2015, after months of peace negotiations led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)+<sup>5</sup>, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by the two warring parties, and in April 2016 a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was formed. The Transitional Government dissolved a few months later (July 2016), upon outbreak of conflict in Juba, once more to the surprise of international actors.

**During the CPA transition period (2005 – 2011), donors pursued a policy with emphasis on state building which continued after Independence.** However, given the Government's role in the conflict, channelling development assistance through the Government stopped after the outbreak of conflict in December 2013. Switzerland's CS 2013 – 2017 thus had to adapt to match the shift from a post-conflict setting to renewed conflict.

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<sup>4</sup> The New Deal Compact was part of South Sudan's status as pilot country for the implementation of the New Deal for Fragile States agreed by more than forty countries and organizations in Busan in December 2011. [https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer\\_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the\\_new\\_deal.pdf](https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> IGAD Member States plus the Troika (US, UK, Norway) and UN, EU and China

## Cooperation Strategy 2017 – 2020

**The overall framing and legacy of the strategy relate to The Dispatch on Switzerland's International Cooperation 2017 – 2020<sup>6</sup>**, which emphasises that Switzerland will continue to build on areas where it has a sound track record with recognised expertise.<sup>7</sup> Noted are Switzerland's historic commitment to humanitarian values and its status as a neutral country, with the latter also used to support the Swiss role as a peace-broker in South Sudan both in the CS and Annual Reports (AR). Switzerland has had a central role in the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement (2002) and in subsequent peace efforts, and South Sudan's Independence process. The strategy is also placed within Switzerland's overall positioning as a neutral and impartial actor with high standards of peace engagements and adherence to international humanitarian law. The Cooperation Strategy 2017-2020 builds on and demonstrates deep understanding of the complicated and conflictual environment. The strategy is joint between HA and the HSD. The Strategy has three broad and relevant areas/domains of interaction supported by four transversal issues (Human Rights, Protection, Gender Equality, and Good Governance) which are promoted across all domains.

**Switzerland is ranked as the 9<sup>th</sup> largest bilateral donor in South Sudan in 2018.<sup>8</sup> The country is not a priority country for Switzerland**, however, the scope of Swiss funding to South Sudan is comparable to spending in priority countries.

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<sup>6</sup> In the strategy period there has been a change in the denomination of the planning instruments at country / Federal Council's levels: 2017-20: Cooperation Strategy / Dispatch on International Cooperation and in 2021-2024 Cooperation Programme / International Cooperation Strategy.

<sup>7</sup> Dispatch on Switzerland's International Cooperation 2017 – 2020. p. 14.

<sup>8</sup> While Switzerland was among the top 10 donors to South Sudan in 2018, the Swiss contribution as well as other top donors are dwarfed by the contribution of the United States. The top ten donors and their contributions Net ODA spending to SSD in 2018 are listed below:

**1.** United States – USD 663.74 million; **2.** United Kingdom – USD 191.19 million; **3.** Germany – USD 128.44 million; **4.** Norway – USD 70.34 million; **5.** Netherlands – USD 65.76 million; **6.** Canada – USD 50.28 million; **7.** Sweden – USD 37.65 million; **8.** Japan – USD 31.91 million; **9. Switzerland – USD 22.6 million;** **10.** Denmark – USD 20.03 million

Source: OECD Stat, "Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions: ODA Total Net to South Sudan, 2018."

Figure 1: Domains of Intervention




Figure 1 illustrates the three thematic domains, which are supported by four transversal issues (Human Rights, Protection, Gender Equality, and Good Governance) promoted across all domains. The indicative amount for implementation of the strategy is Swiss Franc (CHF) 76 mio. distributed as follows: CHF 35 mio. for food security and livelihoods; CHF 25 mio. for protection/human rights; and CHF 8 mio. for peace and nation building. The budget is mainly financed by SDC (95%). HSD contributes with CHF 4 mio., i.e. half of the budget for the peace and nation building domain (the figures are without office management costs).

**The strategy document has been prepared and implemented in the format of a standard South Cooperation strategy.** In interviews it was noted that the standard strategy format assumes long term development projects as the default type of engagement. In a protracted conflict situation, interventions are mainly of shorter duration and HA financed.

**Although interventions in South Sudan have increasingly aimed for a focus on building resilience, and humanitarian-development-peace nexus programmes, the strategy format was noted to be better suited for South Cooperation portfolios.** The strategy document was noted to be more binding for SDC than for HSD, because the mandate for HSD is seen to respond to changes and opportunities in the peacebuilding context, and this implies limited predictability and difficulties to set targets and measure results over 3-4 years ahead. The logframe thinking and the results framework was therefore said not to be useful for the SCO. On the other hand, the strategy was noted as being important for WOGA coherence and a common understanding of the overall regional context.

## 1.2. Positioning: country/regional context and Swiss policies

**The cooperation strategy is quite country focused and for good reasons, given the magnitude and multifaceted needs.** Yet, SDC's guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management (CSPM) note "a decisive factor for effective prevention of violence and work for peace is an integrated view of the international, national, regional, local and

household levels”.<sup>9</sup> South Sudan’s geopolitical situation is part of regional conflict dynamics and not least its spill-overs. The ARs partly reflect on the regional aspects, most notably exemplified in the enormous population movements in the region with 1.2. million South Sudanese refugees in Uganda. There are also reflections on the regional economic dynamics around oil exports and potential infrastructure developments, and regional elements have been added to the portfolio. Since 2017, the refugee and IDP situation has been included in the food security and livelihoods domain, with a project in Yei and Maridi states and Bidibidi settlement in Uganda (credit proposal 7F-09397-02 with Caritas Belgium). This cross border project was in response to the significant displacement of South Sudanese refugees to Bidibidi rather than a planned approach of cross border responses. However, at the strategic level there appears to be a gap with regard to positioning South Sudan in the regional context and political dynamics, on which the country is highly dependent.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, it is not possible from the documentation to ascertain if and how the South Sudan programme relates to other Swiss engagements in the region. A case in point is the support to IGAD, where the South Sudan programme has an engagement. SDC in the Horn of Africa programme also has several projects and interactions through IGAD as well as an institutional capacity building programme of the organisation. *The ET finds on the basis of available documentation that there seems limited coordination in relation to the regional IGAD engagements.*

### 1.3. Quality of context analysis<sup>11</sup>

**The CS presents a solid and coherent context analysis. In particular the three scenarios have proved relevant for a country marked by great fragility, by taking into account a scenario of improvement but also the likelihood of a rapidly deteriorating situation.** The context analysis of the Strategy has, because of the areas of intervention, a lens both on needs, the political situation and on conflict patterns, but less on longer term development perspectives. Neither the Swiss nor most other donors have since the outbreak of the conflict worked directly with the Government. Alignment with government policies and plans, is a main standard question for a CS evaluation with South Cooperation engagement, but not for HA or HSD. In interviews with SDC and HSD stakeholders, the ET raised questions with regard to use of the “triggers” for changing from one scenario to another scenario. *There are indicators formulated to this effect, but the ET found that it is not clear how these indicators are used, and if SCO management and concerned units at HQ take decisions to change scenarios, and thereby adapt the portfolio based on indicator monitoring or based on real time observation of changes in the context.*

**The Annual Reports and MERV assessments show that the SCO in the strategy period takes an increasingly critical stand on the context,** specifically pointing to the drawn-out humanitarian crisis fuelled by natural disasters and violent conflict, poor governance and kleptocracy, and elite capture at the expense of progress and peace for a severely tested population. The strategy discusses the internal conflict dynamics but does not seem reflexive of international stakeholders’ roles (e.g. Humanitarian aid’s role as “fueling the conflict”, as it is analysed by Swisspeace and ODI). Based on the study findings and recognition of these issues among international stakeholders, the SCO has entered a

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<sup>9</sup> SDC. Conflict Sensitive Programme Management (CSPM) – Integrating Conflict Sensitivity and Prevention of Violence into SDC Programmes. p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Since 2016, SDC has been funding UNHCR Uganda with 1 million CHF annually (CHF 0.5 mio in 2021) for supporting the Government of UGA with implementing the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), however the cross-border links are not elaborated according to the documentation available to the ET.

<sup>11</sup> This analysis was conducted in February-March 2020, before the COVID-19 break in the evaluation process.

strategic partnership with CSRF / BAC on conflict sensitivity together with three other international donors.

**The context analysis in the CS seems hinged on the national level politics and less on options for engagement in areas of relative stability, which have come up as a discussion point in interviews.** Some interviews pointed to the need - in a forward looking development engagement perspective - to discuss potential interactions with authorities at sub-national level, and point to pathways to enhance the potential for sustainability of interventions by linking up with other donor-funded programmes. It was noted that there are geographic areas where there is potential for taking a longer term view, including building capacity of local authorities and that this should be part of a future context analysis (see Chapter 5).

**The slow implementation of the R-ARCSS and repeated postponement of the establishment of a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) up to February 2020,** contributed to uncertainty around the peace process, which has been closely monitored in the ARs and MERV reports. The contextual developments reported in the ARs appear to feed directly into the outlook and steering of the CS, with reflexivity of potential developments and how they impact upon the role that Switzerland has, e.g. “assuming that the current peace holds. Switzerland wants to support projects that would help transitioning the population toward resilience” but “if the situation deteriorates, SCO Juba will shift the portfolio back towards emergency programming”.<sup>12</sup>

**The ET has not found trace of joint analysis being conducted with others in the international community or other stakeholders at the point of writing the cooperation strategy, or any reference overall to “The New Way of Working”.**<sup>13</sup> The strategy describes the Swiss engagement in isolation from the international community both in South Sudan and the broader region. *The ET finds that in the upcoming strategy it is important to explore options for a collaborative effort, and work with relevant stakeholders and use facilities such as CSRF and think tanks to undertake joint analysis, and on that basis develop a solid theory of change and realistic targets, and explore options for collaboration on policy dialogue and programming*<sup>14</sup>.

**The context analysis has limited focus on local and multinational private sector engagement and dynamics.** The ET learned in interviews, that considerable resources went into developing a business case with Nespresso and exploring the feasibility of a role for public private partnerships in the former strategy period. Eventually this did not work out, which could be a reason for not pursuing private sector engagement in the strategy. The ET notes that the context analysis in the *future should assess opportunities for private sector engagement not only as a business proposition, but also as a consideration for if, for example, international oil, agriculture, telecommunications or other large companies could be a force driving forward the peace agenda, and if Switzerland could play a role in this regard.*

#### 1.4. Conflict sensitivity

**Conflict sensitivity is critical for all actors in South Sudan, but it is very complex.** The interviews highlighted this complexity, with actors emphasising, down to the micro levels, how conflict sensitivity will differ country to country with contexts and situations and even within counties. Conflict events and displacement of populations occur regularly at most micro levels. Without efficient channels for information flow or communication mechanisms in place, those at the macro level may miss out on these localised, yet important, sensitivities.

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<sup>12</sup> AR 2019, p. 15

<sup>13</sup> <http://agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/5358>

<sup>14</sup> After closure of the data gathering for this evaluation a Triple Nexus expert has been seconded at the UN-RCO office particularly to work on these topics.

**While there is evident need for granular and micro level information, combined with analysis on a larger scale, this information is often difficult to get due to the fear around sharing information or lack of functioning information sharing platforms or systems.** Where there is information flowing from the field levels to Juba, it is fragmented and not always objective. Interviews highlighted that, while the information sharing is often better at sub-national level, such as in the state cluster systems due to the need to coordinate responses, this is not translated into flow of information up to Juba, where information is often being used for resources mobilisation. Lack of connectivity and limited structured data sharing mechanisms further compounds this. Simultaneously, decision makers in Juba sometimes have overly pessimistic work assumptions (for example in terms of security and access) than would actually be the case in the field (i.e. the improved access situation in Wau). These issues can make it very hard for actors with physical presence only in Juba to have a true understanding of the reality of the situation on the ground, and therefore impacts their ability to integrate conflict sensitivity approaches into programming and decision-making.

**It was commented on that, while those in Juba may have more capacity to do conflict analysis and design conflict sensitive approaches, for humanitarian systems the majority of decisions on daily activities happens at field level where the capacity is lacking.** Yet, in Juba, where the higher level programmatic or policy level decision-making is often centralised, this lack of granular information flow and understanding of nuances of South Sudan can make it hard to fully ensure conflict sensitive decision-making or that conflict sensitivity is being embedded into programs. Structured information sharing mechanisms are important to help develop this understanding.

**There is an opportunity for the SCO to engage existing partners or partnerships for increased information sharing and to capture more of the micro level information.** The SCO have funded safety advisors in two, formerly three, areas in South Sudan through DRC, and they engaged all actors, including armed groups and local authorities, to gain a deeper level of understanding which could guide the humanitarian response of actors, giving more nuanced information and analysis. This, thereby, can create linkages between donors and the situation on the ground. Non-violent Peaceforce (NP) is another SCO partner with strong links to the communities and engages a range of actors in these areas. Other partnerships, which the SCO supports such as the PfRR and the NGO Forum, were also positively mentioned in the interviews as actors who are able to capture nuanced information. *The ET holds the view that these partners and partnerships could provide opportunities for the SCO to create structured information flows to the SCO office in Juba.*

**The emphasis on conflict analysis and support to the CSRF is a new addition to the Swiss CS.** Several interviewees noted that with the previous two outbreaks of armed conflict in 2013 and 2016, many international stakeholders were taken by surprise. Switzerland's support to the CSRF, was said to be borne out of a recognition that a close and updated understanding of conflict dynamics and context analyses must be done by specialised analysts. Further, there is now increasingly a recognition that humanitarian and development assistance can be a driver of conflict, and understanding the dynamics of conflict is critical when delivering aid (as discussed above).

**CSRF also has a network for national staff which focuses on the development of national staff's capacity in conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis.** The network is said to be quite dormant, also because of COVID-19, but looks at issues such as how to create space to put forward their analysis or how to appropriately ask probing questions. It was noted that, while SCO NPOs do attend, it is less regular than those from larger donors. CSRF offers annual institutional assessments on conflict sensitivity, and WFP took this further by requesting an innovative approach to the assessment, whereby national WFP staff were paired with team members from CSRF to learn about, and build their capacity on, conflict sensitivity. In relation to fear of reprisal by authorities, many actors were found to limit their information sharing to protect both their staff and those who they work with in

communities. For actors with staff physically present in different locations, this can be less of an issue if their national staff trust the internal information flow between the field offices and Juba. For the SCO, the lack of staff based outside Juba means being reliant on partners, personal networks or field trips to provide the flow of information.

## 1.5. Conclusions and Recommendations

**The South Sudan strategy 2017-2020 appears relevant in terms of assessing the needs of the target population and is in line with Swiss policies.** The strategy has been prepared based on a thorough and balanced context analysis (2016/2017), and includes political economy, fragility and conflict patterns and poverty and needs, but is less focused on development perspectives. The strategy is focused at the country level with limited consideration of regional dynamics. These are though reflected in annual reports. The context analysis alludes to the protracted nature of the conflict, and the three scenarios underpinning the strategy articulate the harsh realities. The ET reads an increasingly critical and a more politicised view of the situation in the AR and other documentation. The contextual developments reported in the ARs appear to feed directly into the outlook and steering of the CS, with reflexivity of potential developments and how they impact Switzerland's role.

**The integration of conflict sensitive approaches into programming and decision-making requires a nuanced understanding of the situation** at national and subnational levels as well as structured and maintained information flows from areas of engagement. As the SCO does not have staff permanently present in locations outside of Juba, it is important to utilise and build on existing partnerships and networks to develop the crucial flows of information.

**The ET remains unconvinced by the use of the current strategy format as a steering and accountability instrument in a fragile and conflict affected situation like South Sudan.** The format is developed for a situation, where there is engagement with Government and alignment with development plans, programmes and results. The strategy document was noted to be more important for SDC than for HSD, because the mandate for HSD is seen to respond to changes and opportunities in the peacebuilding context, and in interviews it was noted that the predictability has been very limited. The logframe thinking and the results framework are said not to be useful for HSD or for SDC, on the other hand the strategy was noted as being important for WOGA and a common understanding of the overall regional context. The ET underlines the relevance of a long-term compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing financial and human resources at sub-regional, regional and global levels.

**Recommendation 1:** The ET recommends that the context analysis and the scenarios of the future strategy should build on more broadly founded political economy analysis including private sector dynamics to inform the future engagements, both in programmes and in dialogue and advocacy. The strategy should also include relevant regional dynamics.

**Recommendation 2:** The ET recommends that, with regard to conflict sensitivity, it is important to continue to acknowledge the extremely localised nature of the conflict in South Sudan, which in many cases are orchestrated from above and therefore has national significance. This requires structured feed-back loops to ensure those in Juba capture information from the subnational level. There should also be awareness that there are different narratives in Juba and in areas of engagement.

**Recommendation 3:** The ET recommends that, in the upcoming strategy, options are explored for deepened collaborative efforts and work with relevant stakeholders, and that think tanks and facilities such as CSRF be utilised to undertake joint analysis, and on that basis develop a solid theory of change and realistic expectations.

## Evaluation area 2: Relevance and appropriateness of the portfolio

### 2.1. Portfolio overview<sup>15</sup>

All interviewees noted that the domains of the strategy are those that are most meaningful given the current context, and Switzerland was commended by other development partners for having a portfolio on peacebuilding, which was said to be unique in the international community.

Figure 2: Portfolio Analysis - Overview of budget commitment by domain in 2019 <sup>16</sup>




Figure 2 illustrates the balance in the portfolio between the domains and shows projects that span more than one domain. In the portfolio the domains are broadly defined and therefore span wide.

Engagement in pooled funds and in data analysis/coordination functions: a) supports “external coherence” of HA, b) supports global commitment towards increasing efficiency

<sup>15</sup> The analysis in section 2.1. of this analysis was prepared in February-March 2020, prior to the originally planned field work in April 2020. The overviews therefore depict the portfolio picture at the end of 2019. The analysis in the remainder of the chapter was carried out in October-November 2020.

<sup>16</sup> Figure 2 has been consolidated with figures from financial overviews provided by SDC and HSD respectively. SDC provided planning figures for 2019 – 2021, while HSD provided planning figures and disbursements for 2017 – 2019. Therefore, to establish a basis for comparison, planning figures (commitments) for 2019 were used across all projects. HSD projects were added to the Peacebuilding and Human Security domain, while the breakdown by other categories was provided by the South Sudan desk in HQ. The two South Cooperation projects have been included, but in order to establish a snapshot of 2019 commitments, the total budget (covering 2019 – 2022) has been divided by 3 to signify an annual budget commitment.

and effectiveness of HA, and c) mirrors comparable features of SDC/HA portfolio in other fragile contexts, which shows that South Sudan is not an outlier). The ET finds that these sizeable investments (1.2 + 2 Mio = 3.2 Mio/year) are not contradictory to strict adherence to focusing resources towards priority Domains.

Figure 3: Portfolio Analysis - Number of projects per domain in 2019<sup>17</sup>




Figure 3 illustrates the number of projects per domain. Number wise, the three domains have an almost equal number of projects although the volume is quite different<sup>18</sup>. The figure also illustrates an overwhelming number of engagements (42 alone within the domains). With that in mind, there are ongoing efforts at the SCO to trim the portfolio and reduce the number of projects.

Portfolio composition (as part of a desk review and with staff feedback of interviews) is dominated quantitatively (and in CHF amounts) by contributions to existing or new projects implemented by INGOs or UN agencies. In the years covered by the evaluation, project extensions appear to have been rather usual, while the ET is not in a position to determine if this phenomenon is caused by external (contextual), internal (the least risky and most efficient option) or a combination of both factors. The ET is of the view that stability in SCO Juba Management team could present a more favourable environment for strategic project acquisition (for instance by exploring the potential of the mandate modality).

In the following sections the domains will be analysed separately. It should be noted that the evaluation does not include an analysis of the small actions portfolio, but based on interviews and a document scan, *the ET recognises the value of the small actions mechanism, which is used for complementarity in relation to the domains as well as for visibility and opportunities arising in the context.*

<sup>17</sup> See footnote 9.

<sup>18</sup> In 2019, Peacebuilding and Human Security had far less than 14 projects (6, and 3-4 small actions (value 5000USD each). This has not been reflected in the figure

## 2.2. Protection and human rights

**Protection needs are just overwhelming in South Sudan, so having a strong protection pillar (while ideally also adopting a transversal protection approach) remains valid.** Prevention of and addressing SGBV in South Sudan is a challenge, despite it being a shared priority among donors. The scale of SGBV remains high, with cases of rape, abductions, and sex slavery perpetrated by armed actors, as well as deeply entrenched traditional practices such as child marriage. In spite of a reduction of fighting between armed groups, levels of SGBV (i.e. child marriage) are reported to have increased (an NPO mentioned that conflict simply exposed the needs of women and children). The 2018 AR notes that there have been some improvements in access to services for SGBV survivors, however this access is restricted in remote and conflict-affected areas. Many cases of SGBV go unreported, yet the 2019 AR notes that there is also progress on this front in areas where community engagement and sensitisation efforts were carried out by partners, namely UNFPA and NP. High levels of impunity persist, and as such perpetrators of SGBV are seldom held accountable by the government and the opposition.

**In order to amplify the impact of individual projects and to prevent them from being a mere drop in the ocean, the portfolio must be even more strategic.** *The current portfolio aims to do so to a certain extent, as, in the view of the ET, it covers three different interlinked levels.* First, by funding big protection actors such as ICRC and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who bring in vast field presence and work locally, but also at the national level. These collaborations also have the advantage of requiring less time for monitoring, while allowing for large disbursements. The second layer is the current focus on analysis, coordination and training efforts regarding protection aspects (e.g. Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) – protection cluster, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) safety advisors, REACH, etc.). And thirdly, by financing field level protection approaches addressing both communities and survivors (NV Peace Force, Ujaama, UNFPA).<sup>19</sup> This last approach is more intensive in terms of monitoring, absorbs smaller amounts of funding and produces effects mainly at the local level. However, if this last type of projects is chosen carefully and followed-up closely, it provides a great opportunity for learning and implementing new approaches, as well as very tangible results within local communities. *A good example is the NV Peace Force project, which stands out in terms of measurable impact at the community level and its intervention design based on a long-term analysis of local dynamics.*

**All of the three projects types are relevant. Before adding up on projects in the field of protection analysis and coordination, the quality and utility of the different forms need to be critically assessed.** For instance, several interlocutors informed the ET about the poor flow of protection information between Juba and the field. Furthermore, the protection cluster does not seem to be the right place to share sensitive protection information. Several NGOs and INGOs working in protection reiterated in interviews the specific potential dangers of sharing sensitive protection information during cluster meetings. It was mentioned in some of these interviews that there are cases where members of authorities are the perpetrators of SGBV cases, which puts both the survivors and the reporters at risk if shared in cluster settings. Organisations that do point to protection needs (for example rising numbers of SGBV cases) may fear reprisals, or the safety of beneficiary data cannot be guaranteed. On one occasion we were told that personally identifiable information was being shared in protection cluster meetings. Also, several protection actors confirmed that they did not trust to share information via the protection cluster, and that they continued to rely on bilateral exchanges or reporting channels within their own organisation in order to analyse protection needs (see in this regard the Professional Standards for Protection Work, Section II on Specific Standards for the

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<sup>19</sup> It should be noted that as of February 2021, additional field level protection engagements have been added and the partners working on these projects include CARE, Plan International and NPA.

management of personal data and sensitive protection data and information<sup>20</sup>. Of particular relevance is the principle that the confidentiality of personal information and sensitive data must be guaranteed at all times and that protection data collection and processing must not exceed a defined purpose (data minimization).

**As regards to SGBV, it is relevant for Switzerland to respond to this crushing reality.** Changes are likely to take a long time, due to the complexity of causes and reinforcing factors (cultural, economic, social, conflict-related). The drafting of a comprehensive intervention in this field needs to be based on the perspective of a long-term engagement and be done with a back-up from specialists. In fact, the visit to the UNFPA project highlighted that the quality of services provided, as well as project personnel and resources is not sufficient, and the ET doubts that interventions are in line with do no harm approaches. Quality must be improved, partners trained, and resources allocated where most needed. Projects working with SGBV and GBV cases have the potential to cause harm to the beneficiaries, even if inadvertently, if the intervention is not correctly implemented to best practice standards and international guidelines. The standard of quality needed to ensure that interventions are in line with do no harm approaches is therefore high. It is important for example that community outreach staff are properly trained and remunerated, otherwise the practice of “case-hunting” for individual financial gains could appear. During the field visit in Wau, the team was informed that some of the case workers in the one-stop centre had shared personal survivor information with the communities. The ET also found that more needed to be done to implement the positive obligations that arise from the preventing harmful effects principle.

For example, the avenue of court referrals must be critically questioned. Even after the field visit, a number of questions related to the different steps, risks and chances of success related to court proceedings had remained unanswered. From the perspective of a comprehensive approach to SGBV, awareness raising is key to promoting a common understanding of SGBV and the rights of survivors, but it should be questioned if it is ethical to develop awareness-raising in rural areas, if no support services, including support to reach urban centres where services are located, are then made available to survivors. The lack of structured follow-up was highlighted by project staff as a key challenge for both themselves in conducting their work and for survivors. While it is understood there are numerous challenges with follow-up in South Sudan, structured plans for different follow-up mechanisms should be included in project designs to support the project staff in this aspect. Ensuring that project staff have the required capacities and training is also essential when it comes to the requirement of informed consent before undertaking any protection action on behalf of survivors. Considering that a great majority of survivors are children or from rural communities with little access to education, being able to explain the consequences of reporting a violation and possible referral options in age- and culturally appropriate terms is essential<sup>21</sup>.

**It emerged from interviews that more emphasis should be placed on human rights and rule of law, both in terms of programming and advocacy.** Links to the multilateral protection and human rights agenda should be more explicit in the cooperation strategy. At Juba level, at the same time, *Swiss engagement in the field of humanitarian diplomacy has been highlighted positively by several interlocutors.*

**As for linkages with other domains, field personnel highlighted the need for livelihood support and/or skills training for survivors. The ET could also identify possible links of some of the protection projects with an empowerment focus on the state and nation building domain.** Where there are current successful linkages in other

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<sup>20</sup> <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0999-professional-standards-protection-work-carried-out-humanitarian-and-human-rights>

<sup>21</sup> The ET compliments the SCO for having taken action following the presentation of the preliminary findings of this evaluation (December 2020). The programme team in Juba has inter alia been in touch with the SGBV focal point at headquarters, who shared checklists and best practices.

projects in SDC's portfolio, SDC should focus on cross-learning between projects to promote these successes and support those which have had more challenges with this approach. An additional linkage, and possible area for synergy, that is important for the protection domain, especially for child protection, is the Education in Emergencies sector in South Sudan which has several large scale interventions and a number of different partners. *The ET finds that empowering women and girls, but also training men and boys on perceptions and masculinity can have transformative effects on individuals and families but also more broadly communities. The much-repeated call to involve youth would also be key for both the protection and peacebuilding pillars.*

### 2.3. Food security and Livelihoods

**The relevance of the FSL cannot be questioned, as supported in interviews and documentation.** The inclusion of one "service sector" among priority domains of intervention in the strategy makes sense in the context of South Sudan, where it directly answers to the humanitarian imperative to save human lives year on year, in a context facing internal and external shocks. The portfolio mix (composed of contributions to UN institutions, to INGOs, and where feasible through pooled funding and small actions) has contributed to the credibility of SCO Juba, by bringing field-based evidence into Juba-based coordination mechanisms and platforms with a view to influencing them, and by nurturing programmatic dialogue with operational partners. The fact that SCO Juba (Management and NPOs) has tried to keep, as far as possible, regular access to field reality, was repeatedly recognised. However, from review of macro documentation and interviews, it has not been possible for the ET to identify implicit selection criteria for composing (partner mix, geographic focus, target groups, modality) of the project portfolio. The rather short-term nature of many interventions in the FSL domain was also noted by the ET. *The ET concludes that the Swiss comparative advantage (and a theory of change) could be delineated more clearly, since the needs in this domain are overwhelming and also taking into account the limited resources available. The FSL engagement could also be more strategically articulated as complementary to the governance pillars in the preparation for the next Cooperation Programme.*

**Despite the recognition that Switzerland has generally been a flexible donor, there have also been cases where approval procedures have made interventions less timely, if not irrelevant due to missing the planting season.** *The ET therefore sees a need to better delineate emergency food assistance from resilience-seeking interventions in the design of the next Programme in order to facilitate internal decision-making,* steering of the project portfolio and deepening programmatic dialogue on resilience with partners and interested donors (in particular those funding both humanitarian and development interventions), notably through the dedicated thematic cluster during the next four-year period.

**The ET is not in a position to make recommendations on the opportunity of testing the mandate modality in SSD.** Nonetheless, it is obvious that such endeavour in the FSL domain would be so resource-intensive for staff (at SCO and at HQ), that it would notably increase programmatic and institutional risks for Switzerland, and thereby detrimental to other priority tasks (portfolio streamlining, M&E of existing projects, etc.), and that it would not necessarily contribute to pushing forward the localisation of aid agenda.

**While Switzerland has been at the forefront of international efforts towards introducing cash/voucher programmes (as a more dignified and respectful aid modality) within food assistance programming, the ET noted that it had not yet been the case in SSD,** where other DPs started with this modality during the past years. So far, it has appeared that cash/voucher programming can be implemented in the country, but that the potential to further extend it above the existing level (reported to be at 10-15% of total food assistance) was limited due to a series of severe inhibiting factors (dysfunctional

markets and trade, vulnerability to external shocks, logistics and hardware, difference between official and non-official exchange rates, as well as unfavourable domestic policies put in place by the South Sudanese government).

## **2.4. Peace and Nation Building**

**There has been engagement in the peace and nation building domain for about 20 years, and this long-term endeavour has established Switzerland as the main international interlocutor in peace and nation building.** All evidence collected by the ET in this area points to Switzerland being recognised for its role and well-developed and strategic engagements in this area. The strategic objectives are understandably broad and twofold, with one objective focusing on peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, governance and truth, justice and accountability, and the other on nation building, the constitution and legal norms. Both objectives can register tangible outputs and some process outcomes but in general, the context does not lend itself to objectives being achieved in the short or possibly medium term. Nevertheless, *it is the view of the ET that there are achievements to show, and the interventions are relevant, and effective.* This includes both the engagement with partners (peace builders), the support to analysis, and the convening role in this area (f.ex. the Tukul meetings). The ET notes an increase in nation building /statebuilding attention in the period through support to peace monitoring (R-JMEC) and federalism through International IDEA. There is also increasing collaboration with other partners on the political economy of aid/context and conflict sensitivity (Better Aid in Conflict/CRSF). This increased focus in these areas is relevant and strategically sound.

**The longer-term engagements with partners complemented by bundles of short engagements seems relevant** and also underscores that – it is both the “projects”, the contextual timely short interventions, the convening power and longer term partnerships that matters.

**There is obviously a balancing act between being considered a neutral and trusted actor, for example important in relation to the Tukul events, and engaging politically.** The ET finds that while the domain has struck this balance, in the future, an increased focus on Human Rights issues, which are currently under increasing threat according to key partners, may push the programme to take more critical stands vis a vis the Government in support of its partners, this would be important and warranted in terms of being an enabler for needed changes and reforms.

**It is found that being partaking in some of the larger peace and statebuilding processes, such as seconding a specialist to the R-JMEC and supporting International IDEA to engage in the federalism dialogue, as well as supporting the CRSF, are smart ways to increase the leverage and the effectiveness of the portfolio.** With regard to the support through the Rift Valley Institute of traditional leaders, it is difficult to see both entry points and results. However, there seems to be a broad agreement among stakeholders that they play an important role at community level in the current institutional “vacuum”. Actually, Switzerland’s reputation in South Sudan has in part been built thanks to the work done under earlier projects with traditional leaders. Nevertheless, their role must be defined, when state building reforms eventually take place on this matter. Being patient and bringing in more donors and exploring different avenues to strengthen and regularise the role of these leaders is one option. However, as stakeholder interviews pointed to, there are competing needs, not least is it important to strengthen engagements that include peacebuilding with youth as a target group, as done in the South Sudan Youth Peace and Development Organization (SSYPADO) project as well as focusing on the empowerment of women as peacebuilders. These two groups are not well represented among traditional leaders and their change agenda.

**With regard to coherence, the collaboration between HSD and HA is reportedly good, and HA has, at some point, contributed to the financing gap of the Human Security Adviser position.** Nevertheless, activities in the other domains in the portfolio can benefit more from the knowledge and experience gained in areas of peace and nation building, social cohesion activities, human rights focus, gender analysis, S/GBV and Women Peace and Security. Peace and nation building activities could also be strengthened and leveraged if more closely linked together with activities in other domains such as FSL.

**SDC funding to activities related to peacebuilding can also contribute to broadening the engagement. The SC funded project to Promote inclusive Peacebuilding and Sustainable Livelihoods through Youth Empowerment and Entrepreneurship,** is an interesting project in this regard. It brings in development cooperation perspectives, has a clear target group (youth) and a combination of peacebuilding and livelihoods. From a nexus perspective, it combines development and peacebuilding, which is new in the portfolio. The project is implemented by the Whitaker Peace and Development Initiative, and it also has private organisations as contributors. The Human Security adviser has played an instrumental role in developing the project, which shows the value of cross domain collaboration.

The ET concludes that the peace and nation building activities are highly relevant, the portfolio is strategic and well managed, and is the one area that continues to give Switzerland a particular “status” and recognition. The portfolio seems to be increasingly strategically focused on nation/statebuilding, all the while maintaining the peace dialogue and capacity building activities and support to civil society actors in this respect. There also seems to be an increasing focus on youth as a target group and gender issues (and most lately on Women Peace and Security), which also points the portfolio in a very relevant future direction.

## **2.5. Transversal themes**

**The CS lays out gender equality as a priority concern across the entire strategy,** this focus is reflected in the fact that indicators in the Results Framework (RFW) tend to be gender disaggregated, and that the peacebuilding pillar includes indicators for women’s participation. This being said, both interviews and the strategy place the most emphasis on gender responsiveness in terms of interventions that pertain to SGBV.

**Meanwhile, in interviews with protection actors, the lack of female representation in senior and decision-making positions in SSD was highlighted as a real concern.** Women in South Sudan were said to have ‘no voice’ and ‘are invisible’ which is in part due to their lack of representation in these decision-making spaces. Several actors spoken to express the need to ensure gender is mainstreamed and a strong gender lens is used for all aspects of programming, policy and decision-making. One partner suggested that Switzerland could consider incorporating a more radical policy similar to the Swedish and Canadian’s feminist policies.

Human rights and protection are also transversal themes in the portfolio. Partners interviewed noted that projects regrettably had limited focus especially on human rights advocacy including SGBV. Channels for advocacy vis-a vis authorities on human rights, protection and good governance is not apparent, but the NGO forum noted that it pays increasing importance to their members engaging in watchdog roles. *It was not quite clear to the ET, where the responsibility for the transversal themes is positioned in the SCO. The ET finds that it is important that there is management attention to the strengthening of transversal themes in the programme.*

## 2.6. Nexus programming, coherence, and adaptation

**There seems to be unexploited opportunities for all three domains to interlink project activities and strengthen coherence.** First nexus approaches between development and humanitarian programmes with interlinkages to peace and nation building activities should be further explored. This includes “borrowing” approaches from development cooperation and sharpen the targeting, especially focusing on women and youth. South Cooperation has financed two projects in the current strategy period. These projects bring in a target group focus and a nexus approach. However, since there is no planned continuation of these projects or other SC engagements foreseen, HA and HSD need to work on complementarities and synergies, as well as the programme could seek complementarity with other donors’ programmes.

**A second point concerns the lengths of engagements in the portfolio.** It can be argued that the short-term nature of projects allows for adaptations but also increases the danger of proliferation (see remarks on projects extension under 2.1). It is therefore proposed to seek to include mechanisms within programmes that can address emergency needs, such as “crisis modifier funds”, and in this way bring more coherence in the portfolio, because emergencies, to some degree, are addressed through existing projects. Meanwhile, the ET recognises the need to keep open doors and be agile and respond in a very dynamic (and volatile) environment in order for Switzerland to be seen as a credible player in emergencies. The portfolio should therefore mix longer term and short-term engagements, but with an emphasis on the longer term programming, and with emergencies being addressed within existing projects and done through the multilateral system. Working with a medium-term perspective also helps to build the capacity of partners and to engage in localisation. SGBV is a case in point where piecemeal short-term engagements do not create results and change, as was mentioned by several informants. Pursuing a balanced portfolio with emphasis on longer term programming, would also have the effect of reducing the sheer number of projects (a need which has been highlighted by most NPO staff, as well as former and current international staff).

**Third, complementarity and coherence are important not only at the SCO level, but need to be reinforced also with regional and international organisation such as the UN.**

**As to links with regional actors,** it appears from interviews and documentation available that such partnerships have not been fully exploited in the past, although the SCO should be commended for its engagement in the donor fora in Juba. Examples at hand are that the secondment of a Swiss expert to the R-JMEC has afforded valuable insights to be used for example *through enhanced exchanges with the representation in Addis*.

**With regards to UN mechanisms,** Switzerland regularly makes submissions to the UN High Commissioner for the Human Rights in South Sudan. *The ET finds that this type of engagement should be better reflected in the annual reporting. Moreover, it should be further explored how to carry Switzerland’s long term engagement in South Sudan and expertise into existing UN formats. With Switzerland likely becoming a non-elected member of the Security Council, the experience in South Sudan could be linked up with both geographic and thematic items on the Council’s agenda.* (e.g. debate on conflict and hunger, youth peace and security, women peace and security, protection of civilians).

**Finally, Switzerland supports global instruments such as the World Bank’s State and Peacebuilding Fund, the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund, and UNDPs placement of Peace and Development advisers globally.** These are examples of mechanisms that have particular focus on fragile and conflict-affected situations and there are likely to be others as well. It was also noted that there seems to be unexploited possibilities with regard to collaboration in some form with multilateral initiatives at regional/global level, as noted in one interview: “we are now on the high-level panel on the principles of IDPs, let us transfer some of this to the field”. Seeking leverage through policy dialogue has not been a priority

for the international community in the strategy period. The continued conflict and vacuum of government have been impediments, although at the end of the strategy period, there seemed to be small technical openings for policy dialogue through the Ministry of Finance. It is important for Switzerland to follow the IMF and the World Bank progression in this regard. If there are viable ways to support macro-economic reforms, which can be transformative and have considerable larger impact than the programmes that have been pursued by the international community so far, Switzerland should support such efforts (for example by posting of secondees). *With a fully staffed SCO, especially at management level, there could be opportunities to explore linking up with global instruments supported by Switzerland and benefit from these in the domains as well as in advocacy and innovation.*

## 2.7. Partnerships

**The SCO has a considerable number of implementing (contractual) partnerships, as well as the SCO is active in coordination mechanisms.** Implementing partners value Switzerland for its long-term relationships. Interviews with other donors showed that these seem to change implementing partners more often, because relations are based on mandates and a competitive process, which, according to others, is healthy for portfolio development. On the other hand, the trust that has been built between the SCO and some NGOs and other organisations (the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) is a case in point) is quite deep and besides project implementation and is therefore valuable to the sharing of sensitive information, amongst others.

**Due to its size, Switzerland, needs replicability and scale-up of its interventions in South Sudan, which can be done through partnerships and coordination.** The CSRF is a good example, where the Swiss contribution is quite small, but the conceptualisation has a major Swiss footprint, and the UK has come in as the main funder. *The ET found that the international community has, to a considerable degree, been working in small “bubbles”, and, with that in mind, a mapping of humanitarian and development activities was carried out by the community under the leadership of the UK in 2019.* The SCO played a key role in this exercise. The purpose was to establish an overview and see where there were gaps and overlaps and potentials for closer collaboration and partnerships. According to interviews, next steps have been pending amongst others due to COVID-19, which has meant absences and other work disruptions.

**Mechanisms such as the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund should be seen as a way to join forces with others to build the capacity and deliver support through international and local NGOs.** This could reduce the number of direct contributions mainly through international NGOs, in anticipation that this would also reduce administrative costs and management time, increase efficiency, and support localisation. One interview noted that SCO Juba has been instrumental in the NGO Forum which could be an example that could have a multiplier effect. *Overall, the ET finds that partnerships, although addressed in the current portfolio, could also be strengthened. In the strategy period, it is not evident to what extent partnerships have been a deliberate mean to pursue objectives.*

## 2.8. Conclusions and Recommendations

**Switzerland is a smaller, yet also an ambitious donor in the context, and well recognised for its concerted project efforts, strong engagement in coordination, and not least for its work in peace and nation building.** The three domains of the strategy are relevant, but the ET cannot find clear evidence that the overall portfolio has been particularly effective, although individual projects may, if assessed in isolation, meet their objectives. The question stands, if the projects and other engagements realistically can add up to deliver on the outcomes as formulated in the strategy. It is recognised that the strategy set the bar at an unrealistic level, and overall there is an unevenness and scattering in the

portfolio between a conflict-sensitive approach and peace and nation building on the one hand, and the delivery of humanitarian projects on the other hand. There are many different projects, which at times seem to lack synergies both at strategic and operational level.

Protection needs are just overwhelming, so having a strong protection pillar (while also adopting a transversal protection approach) remains valid. Prevention of and addressing SGBV is a challenge despite it being a shared priority among donors. In order to amplify the impact of individual projects and to prevent them from being a mere drop in the ocean, the portfolio must be even more strategic. SGBV is one area where the partner has not delivered to expected standards, and where a coordinated and strategic approach could have been expected. The visit to the UNFPA project highlighted that the quality of services provided, as well as project personnel and resources is not up to expected standard and there is even doubt if interventions are in line with do no harm approaches. There has been limited emphasis on human rights and rule of law, both in terms of programming and advocacy. Furthermore, links to the multilateral protection and human rights agenda are absent and would need to be developed with a strong commitment from HQ.

The portfolio aims to move towards resilience, and this notion is fully supported by the ET. In FSL, the partnership in PfRR is a good example of moving forward with more resilient approaches, but is there a longer term plan beyond new projects and PfRR? The current strategy, for reasons well argued in the document, does not engage with local or national government institutions, which limits capacity building and sustainability. In FSL, *the Swiss comparative advantage (and a theory of change) could have been delineated more clearly, since the needs in this domain are overwhelming, and also taking into account the limited resources available*. Switzerland is recognised as a flexible donor, but there are also cases where approval procedures had made interventions less timely if not irrelevant (for example when the Caritas project missed supporting its target group in the planting season). HDP nexus engagements are “young”, and there is room for more complementarities and coherence in the portfolio. Having said this, there are a number of elements in all three domains, which are steppingstones to a bolder and more coherent programme in the future. Transversal themes have not been given sufficient attention in implementation.

**Recommendation 4:** The ET recommends to continue advocating for a better integration of conflict analysis in protection programming (for example, the recommendations of the Swiss funded CSRF still seem to be underexploited both by Switzerland and the donor community). A strong focus on SGBV is relevant, but programming needs to be based on a solid protection and conflict analysis. Do no harm and quality considerations must be given greater weight and be required also from implementing partners. Interventions should ideally address also broader rule of law aspects (and obstacles). The drafting of a comprehensive intervention in this field needs to be based on the perspective of a long-term engagement and be done with a back-up from specialists (hired on an ad-hoc basis or also using the thematic advisers at the regional and HQ level). At a strategic level, thematic advisers at the regional and HQ level would be valuable for SCO to request support from, whereas at a programmatic level, ad-hoc support may be an effective resource.

**Recommendation 5:** The ET recommends to better delineate emergency food assistance from resilience-seeking interventions in the design of the next Programme in order to facilitate internal decision-making, steering of the project portfolio and deepening programmatic dialogue on resilience with partners and interested development partners (in particular those funding both humanitarian and development interventions), notably through the dedicated thematic cluster during the next four-year period. Moreover, FSL should aim to reduce general food distribution, when the circumstances allow it, and focus on resilience and disaster risk reduction, and employment/economic opportunities and increase targeting towards women, youth and vulnerable groups.

**Recommendation 6:** The ET recommends that the domain on peace and nation building continues to maintain a balance between convening (Tukul), the community level

peacebuilding activities in support to peace actors in civil society, and at the same time continue to find and pursue entry points to support core elements of statebuilding (such as federalism, J-RMEC). The ET supports the continuation of the partnerships and the increasing focus on women and youth, and attention to gender roles, including men and boys. Specifically, on support to traditional leaders, there is a need to pay attention to their role as peacebuilders and monitor their role as positive change agents, also for youth and women.

**Recommendation 7:** The ET recommends a stronger emphasis on nexus programming. It could be an option to establish the linkages with multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners, and capitalising on the strong presence of peace and nation building to draw in these aspects including conflict sensitivity, most notably in the FSL engagements.

**Recommendation 8:** The ET recommends increasing the management attention to transversal themes, and in this regard to take a more holistic approach to the programme (“breaking down the domain silos”), and also to bring in conflict sensitivities, and, where possible, peacebuilding initiatives into other parts of the portfolio. Support to the CSRF is an example of synergy between HSD and SDC, as well as an innovative attempt to improve donor engagement through heightened awareness of context and conflict sensitivity. *Empowering women and girls, but also training men and boys on perceptions and masculinity can have transformative effects on individual, families but also more broadly communities. The much-repeated call to involve youth would also be key in all domains.*

**Recommendation 9:** Switzerland should pursue replication and scaling up (multiplier effects). Multi-bi (including contributions to UNFPA and ICRC) could be instrumental “door openers” to scale up Swiss engagement and support the ongoing active advocacy role taken by SCO Juba with backing from Swiss Embassy in Addis Ababa.

## Evaluation area 3: Implementation of the CS and its portfolio

### 3.1. SCO set-up and performance

**The strategy is implemented by two WOGA partners: SDC and HSD.** Within SDC, HA is the lead at HQ, with some level of decision-making being decentralised to the SCO. Meanwhile HSD is managed from HQ, but with a degree of decentralised decision-making resting with the Human Security Adviser in Juba. The Head of SCO reports to the Swiss Ambassador in Addis Ababa. In addition, the Embassy in Addis comprises a political adviser and a regional protection adviser, who have regular interactions with counterparts at SCO Juba. It is noted that there is a very good collaboration with the embassy in Addis, and not least of the political side, led by regular visits by staff including the ambassador in the period assessed. However, 2020 has been different in respect because of the limitations due to COVID-19. There appears to be good collaboration between HSD and SDC staff in Juba, and these personal relations have been decisive for harvesting at least some synergies. One informant said: the key for WOGA is to understand each other’s differences not for us to be “similar” and we should also be careful about joint programming”. Having a joint strategy provides a platform for WOGA partners to think together, to formulate their work complementarities and to collaborate in a transparent and constructive manner over a mid-term timeframe, although there is disagreement on the actual value of the strategy as a steering and accountability instrument. The ET recommends that further attention be given to showcasing effective complementarities between civilian and military aspects of peacebuilding in Swiss foreign policy in the next strategic cycle. *The ET finds that the composition of partners calls for a long-term compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing financial and human resources at sub-regional, regional and global levels.*

**It is not common within SDC that management of a country programme is vested within the HA.** This feature explains differences in the level of decision-making authority on project approval in Juba and respectively in other Cooperation Offices in the region. This has resulted in the tendency by SCO Juba to opt for small actions as a preferred modality of support rather than to recourse to more cumbersome and resource-intensive entry proposal modality. Although more agile at the outset, this modality causes additional monitoring and administrative workload in the long run for NPOs and CFPA. Meanwhile HSD seems to give more leeway to the HSA than is common in other HSD programmes, which are HQ managed

**The staffing of the SCO comprises five international postings, and four NPO positions, local finance officers, a consular position, besides a number of service functions.** The short term adviser pool (SHA) has been one recruitment source to fill the gaps, and this facility has ensured that international staff at management level has come to Juba short-term. In the three years covering the evaluation there has only been shorter periods where all international staff positions have been filled with permanent staff. Interviews with SCO staff, and insights from the TPM contracted in early 2020 highlighted the significant workload on the NPO responsible for the protection domain. The FSL domain has two NPOs responsible for projects, and while the protection domain does have a slightly smaller budget, protection is also a transversal theme for SCO. Additionally, given the sensitive issues, such as SGBV, which protection projects may focus on, there is a need for quality monitoring and coordination. This level of monitoring and coordination could maybe overwhelm a single NPO if the workload is already high.

**The position as Head of Office and deputy appears to be difficult to recruit staff for, as well as maintain staff in the position.** This is obviously key for a well-functioning office, but it is widely recognised in SDC that this is a structural constraint. Interviews with former and current staff, both international and national also emphasised that the high turnover in management coupled with the challenging work environment and the regular R&R gaps, have resulted in shifting priorities, lack of follow-up, gaps in institutional memory, lack of attention to national staff's training needs and training opportunities. It was also said that sharing of resources between SDC and HSD could have been better exploited if there had been more continuity. Nevertheless, individual staff have worked hard and done their best, and with the commitment of individuals the portfolio has been implemented without major draw backs. The consequence of the leadership changes was said to have impacted on the strategic planning, and the intentions to bring the strategy into a longer term and sustainable modality mode as intended did not really happen with the core of the portfolio. Good initiatives in this direction have been taken, but not to a level where this has happened across the portfolio. Cross learning with other fragile contexts has also not been brought to the fore.

**Yet, the management turn-over points to a structural issue of recruitment and maintaining staff in these hardship postings.** The non-family duty station mostly rules out engaging mid-career staff. Conversations with other donors showed that high turn-overs are a general problem in the international community, and it was said to affect the quality of programmes, knowledge in the international community, coordination and capacity for policy dialogue negatively. It was also mentioned that high staff turnover in leadership positions open chances for government to “cheat” on the international community. The role of national programme officers is very important in a context like South Sudan, as they are the backbone of knowledge and institutional memory. *At the time of writing the ET notes that the two leadership positions are filled with permanent SDC staff. This is an opportunity to take on a long-term strategic positioning, strengthen systems, set-up knowledge sharing and provide training opportunities for local staff.*

**This high turnover of international staff in organisations (not only the SCO), who often hold senior and high-level positions, was said to create a lack of understanding and a loss of institutional learning, which can negatively impact conflict sensitivity**

**approaches and integration by actors.** This is compounded by South Sudan's complex history and dynamics which many senior staff do not have time to fully learn about and, subsequently, can limit their understanding of conflict sensitivity issues. Moreover, within the country there is a strong connection and link between the localised conflicts and national tensions and conflicts. For instance, this year has seen a rise in intercommunal violence and cattle raiding, but it was found that actors believe this to be politically motivated (cattle raiding without cattle), with several actors now working to change humanitarian actors' terminology as intercommunal violence does not accurately describe the current violence.

**National staff's knowledge and experience can be utilised in this regard and are an underused resource.** This is the case in the SCO office, all NPOs, with the exception of the HSD NPO whose position was created in 2020, have been with the SCO since at least 2015. It was found that national staff often do have a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of conflict sensitivity, but different reasons stop them from translating this into their work. These can include the lack of space to put forward their analysis or not having the ability to ask probing questions, which could be considered sensitive. Due to conflict sensitivity issues, it was pointed out that staff should have experience from different regions of South Sudan in order to widen perspectives and understanding of the very different contexts across the country. This would for example enable more monitoring in person and reduce potential security issues and language barriers.

### 3.2. Quality of the CS monitoring system

**Monitoring of projects can be resource demanding.** One of the actors interviewed spoke about how time intensive and costly it can be to do regular monitoring of the projects which they are not directly implementing, but that it is imperative to do so as activities are not always done as expected. The TPM found this to be true with the Caritas Belgium implemented project in Maridi, where a series of issues negatively impacted the implementation. Some of the project activities were dependent on the seasons, and delays in implementation resulted in activities not being implemented on time. It was concluded that some of the delays could have been mitigated against, had there been more regular monitoring in place. Actors visited in the TPM also mentioned how they had not had SCO visit their projects in a number of years.

**Several SCO NPOs spoke about them wanting to do more monitoring, but their workload made it difficult for them to effectively monitor or manage the monitoring of all the projects they are responsible for.** An additional limiting factor for field monitoring could be that NPOs are mainly from one main geographic area, hence putting a real (or perceived) barrier for visits in certain states. It was evident that the lack of monitoring by NPOs was not due to a disregard for it but high workloads and limited formal training. The TPM contracted in late 2019 was asked to produce a short document which the NPOs could use as a template to develop monitoring tools and plan visits. These actions should be highlighted as clear steps to develop more robust tools for NPOs to use for monitoring, but training and internal monitoring systems should continue to be developed and integrated into the NPOs roles.

**The field data collection trip of the ET also highlighted the importance of not only regular monitoring but monitoring that encompasses all partners involved.** While the SCO funds a UNFPA project on SGBV, there are several other partners implementing the activities. After speaking to these partners and volunteer community members, it became evident that there are several implementation issues which may hinder the projects ability to do no harm. It is unclear whether these issues would be seen in monitoring reports submitted by UNFPA. It is positively noted that SCO staff spoke about plans to increase field visits this year, which were then delayed or cancelled due to the internal COVID-19 travel restrictions in place. *The ET encourages regular field monitoring trips when possible*

*by NPOs as well an alternative, such as an external organisation, conducting Third Party Monitoring.*

While it is recommended that the monitoring is increased, there is also a need to ensure the quality of the monitoring. Quality Assurance of the monitoring, including measuring the results of the annual report or quality checking the Project Cycle Management actions against SDC rules and regulations, could be the responsibility of the NPOs to support consistency and sustainability. It is noted that the regional office in Amman has specialised staff, which would present an opportunity for collaboration and learning exchange.

**Monitoring specific projects with protection issues, such as those focusing on SGBV, can be even more difficult to do remotely.** Some protection partners interviewed stated that for certain data they would only share this verbally and other actors had very strict guidelines on limiting access. This can make the sharing of data through remote monitoring difficult and therefore reinforces the importance of field data collection trips whether by NPOs or by an external actor. The ET recognises there has been a push to improve the monitoring practices in place, including planning for more field visits to project sites in 2020 (although some had to be cancelled due to COVID-19 measures (Q14 (quarantine) was required for some months before being able to travel to the field)). There is a need for more formal training of NPOs in monitoring if they are to successfully conduct regular monitoring activities. It should also be noted that certain NPOs may not have the capacity to coordinate and manage monitoring of all the projects they are responsible for in addition to their other responsibilities, and support should be provided either from SCO senior staff or external actors. **The ET concludes that, while resource intensive, monitoring should be considered an important element of all SCO's partnerships.**

### **3.3. Coordination and aid effectiveness of the country set-up**

**The SCO is appreciated for its constructive engagement in coordination,** and has been the co-chair of the HOCs group, and been instrumental with the UK in a mapping of humanitarian and development contributions by donors. Other donors also noted that they could trust that the Swiss would be present and well prepared and knowledgeable in coordination forums.

**Evidence of donor fatigue was mentioned by several stakeholders in the interviews.** One of them cited donor fatigue as the reason behind the transition of PoC to IDP sites and expressed how 'people are tired of discussing the same issues' in South Sudan. Another interviewee spoke of donor fatigue and frustration with the slow implementation of the peace agreement, as well as donor frustrations over investments in infrastructure, such as warehouses and health centers, which are regularly looted and destroyed. Another stakeholder spoke of how those who mostly work in Juba, as most SCO staff do, are often the staff that get the most frustrated. Those directly implementing are better placed to see results and impacts, even if at small scale, rather than those who work at the policy level where positive change is often harder to see. The SCO can use its reputation and knowledge to continue to advocate for populations in need. Additionally, supporting more joined up partnerships between donors, such as the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) or the PfRR, can help to spread the risk between donors.

**The lack of data sharing was reported by several interviewees,** this was a point of some surprise to the ET. This limits any future joint analysis and data sharing as well as planning. It was also said that there are ongoing initiatives to share studies widely, but there are sensitivities around data (which was also mentioned elsewhere) that possibly hinders more joined-up analysis and approaches.

**The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic especially on large donor countries, will likely result in donors critically reviewing and downscaling budgets.** This has already been seen in the UK, where it has been announced that the Government will seek to cut the

Official Development Assistance Budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of gross national income due to a 'domestic fiscal emergency'. One of the actors interviewed warned this could create an emphasis on funding humanitarian assistance, although funding nexus approaches would prove more cost-effective in the longer term. As mentioned in other areas of this evaluation, the context in South Sudan warrants a nexus approach, one interviewee stated, 'one day you will be doing development work and then the next day there is fighting and a humanitarian context'. The SCO can use its position as a donor to promote funding to nexus approaches.

### 3.4. Innovation, knowledge sharing and learning

**In the four years covered by the strategy, the Tukul meetings is the one feature that stands out as an innovative way to bring together different stakeholders in an informal and "safe" discussion forum.** Interviews with different stakeholders reiterated and confirmed that the success is hinged on respect for Switzerland's established position as a principled and neutral donor, and in particular its work in the peacebuilding domain.

**With regard to knowledge gaps,** it came out in interviews that within the international community in Juba the analysis and understanding the situation in locations outside the capital is shallow and often not reflecting the actual reality outside the capital. This points to the need for organisations such as CSRF, the NGO platform, and monitoring of the portfolio to seek first-hand information.

**With regard to knowledge sharing and learning,** programming for more resilience is one objective, which has been pursued through partners (WFP, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)) and engagement in the PfRR, but there is not in the documentation any statements on how resilience will be strategically framed and if knowledge from elsewhere is being drawn in for example from thematic networks in SDC. In the engagement to SGBV it cannot be seen from the documentation that the activities have been informed by learnings from other contexts, expertise from HQ or elsewhere.

**The SCO should be complimented for engaging with others in developing new approaches to improving and monitoring aid in conflict by the engagement in CSRF,** not least because knowledge is seen as a real gap. CSRF also has an electronic library, which distributes studies and help organisations to become more conflict sensitive.

### 3.5. Localisation

**Localisation was highlighted in interviews as an important development agenda for South Sudan, but also as an agenda that is not straightforward to implement.** There are frustrations from National NGOs (NNGO) over INGOs reliance on them for 'deep field work' or to continue operations when INGO staff are evacuated, but then not prioritising capacity building. It was also evident in the interviews that NNGOs feel this reliance on them does not translate into funding. Lack of capacity in many areas, especially in management and monitoring, were given as challenges by INGOs for working with NNGOs. Capacity building can be in the form of training or, as was mentioned in an interview, an approach of pairing an INGO and NNGO together on a project can also support the strengthening of NNGOs' capacities. *The ET finds that SCO's funding opportunities for NNGOs should be continued as the latter are a key stakeholder in SSD in the longer term and that this investment should be tied to capacity and network building.*

**The need for a strong assessment tool was also mentioned by international actors as important when establishing partnerships with national organisations.** Interviewees spoke of instances where they received professional extensive-looking portfolios from national organisations, but discovered that these organisations consisted of one person. It was also mentioned that it is becoming more common for national

organisations to hire external consultants to write their proposals, which results in a high-quality proposal which does not necessarily reflect the capability and capacity of the national organisation. The use of assessments and, in particular, in-person assessments were therefore considered very important for actors to conduct before establishing a working or funding relationship with a national organisation. *The SCO's Partner Risk Assessment tool was stated to be a good instrument for this, the ET therefore encourages the SCO to continue using this tool and ensures its integration, including its Prevention of Sexual Exploitation Abuse and Harassment pillar.*

**Switzerland is one of 11 donors that support the SSHF, which is a country-based pooled fund managed by OCHA.** From 2015-2018, the fund put in place a number of measures to increase NGO access to funding. Allocation strategy documents emphasised that the Fund's response should be 'as local as possible, as international as necessary' and made specific references to Grand Bargain commitments on localisation. In 2015, NGOs received 11% of total SSHF funding (US\$10.2 million), rising to 39% in 2018 (US\$20.6 million). The Fund's activities were evaluated in 2019, and it was found that delivery of humanitarian response through NGOs has the expected advantage because these partners are best placed to gain access to difficult areas and to work closely with communities. They are also able to provide timely, life-saving assistance despite the logistical and security constraints that have hampered the ability of all humanitarian actors in South Sudan to respond. NGOs are often the first responders in an emergency. There is an extensive capacity building programme associated with the increased localisation for the SSHF, and the capacity for NGOs to manage larger funding is relatively low. *The ET finds that the SSHF has been a good entry point to support localisation of humanitarian response.*

**Overall, the ET has not been able to find a structured approach to localisation in the cooperation strategy, but the SSHF is one concrete example.** Another example is the capacity building of the NGO forum, and its members of which many are national organisations. There is obviously room for building synergies between the localisation of aid agenda with the long-term capacity-building efforts needed to contribute to nation-building through member-led civil society organisations, platforms and networks, with a particular focus on youth and women organisations. Interviews with INGOs also indicated that they had been "slow" to address this, mainly because of short funding cycles and focus on effectiveness and efficiency and delivery of timely outputs. *The ET finds that localisation should be a core principle in the future cooperation strategy and any extra costs for capacity building to be included.*

### 3.6. Niche for Switzerland

**Switzerland has several niches where it is known for its capacity and engagements: according to donors and implementing partners, it has carved out roles, where it punches above its (financial) weight.** The first one is the peace and nation building activities, which are quite unique among the international community, think tanks, and civil society actors. It was also reported by some that in some quarters of government, this work is well recognised. **The second** area is the principled humanitarian diplomacy, which is said to be of immense value. In this area there is general recognition of Switzerland's engagement with dialogue, safety and security projects and support to the NGO Forum, which is so important given the difficulties with access. One interviewee noted that Switzerland could do even more.

**The third** area is the coordination engagement. The ET observed that the relentless efforts of the SCO to connect parallel worlds or "bubbles" in Juba (HoMs, HoCs, humanitarian coordination mechanism, etc.) were recognised. As mentioned elsewhere, the SCO has, for example, together with the UK, prepared a donor mapping in 2019, which could show a picture of the amounts of humanitarian and development funding respectively, as well as

information about development funding, going to sectors and areas. The **fourth** area relates to timely and flexible funding: partners such as FAO noted the flexibility and the catalytic nature of Swiss funding. Another example was funding to carry out a flood assessment, paving the way for larger funders to contribute with actual investment. Others were more critical and found that Switzerland has “soft niches” but their “deliveries/investments” seem quite weak.

### **3.7. Conclusions and Recommendations**

**The ET finds that the composition of WOGA partners generally works well in the context** and calls for a long-term compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing for Switzerland’s financial and human resources at sub-regional, regional and global levels.

**The ET recognises the difficult environment in which to run a programme and the staff is complimented for the efforts** and for implementing a programme where Switzerland is recognised, not so much for the size of funding, but for knowledge, engagement, coordination and the work on peace and nation building, which is unusual and stands out in the donor community and others interviewed by the ET. At the same time the programme has suffered from some shortcomings, such as high turnover at management level. With regard to staffing, the ET found that there is a need to strengthen internal skills in the protection, because of the significant workload for one NPO and the need to mainstream human rights and protection activities across all domains.

**Strategy implementation has been guided by a cooperation strategy developed with high ambitions and in a format which (at least partly) does not fit well in the fragile and conflict-affected context with data scarcity and mainly short-term interventions.** Results according to plan cannot be verified in terms of quantity as anticipated in the strategy (see chapter 4). Monitoring has also been complicated and field visits limited, until TPM was introduced. The many projects in the portfolio also adds to the overwhelming task of implementation and monitoring. Localisation is ongoing and particularly the support through the SSHF shows results, at individual project level there is less evidence in the portfolio.

**Switzerland is recognised as a principled donor**, with flexible yet limited funding, it is also recognised for its active role in coordination and humanitarian diplomacy. Effectiveness is hampered by the lack of data sharing among stakeholders. This is, amongst others, associated with careflessness because data can be misused, but also the relatively limited “jointness” in the donor community.

**Recommendation 10:** The ET recommends that FDFA takes a close look at the structural issues related to recruitment for positions in difficult postings such as South Sudan, with a view to find institutional mechanisms and, for example, increase incentives, and in this way to attract qualified staff and retain these and avoid gaps. The ET is aware that FDFA has recognised the issue, but there is need to implement measures that can reduce frequent staff turnovers at management level and seek to address permanent staff to these positions.

**Recommendation 11:** The ET recommends for the next strategy to adapt the format to fit the reality in South Sudan. The process to adapt the format could start with a mapping of “what works and what does not work for example by conducting a lessons learned workshop”, to learn from other fragile settings, and seek agreement among partners and senior management at HQ to develop the next strategy in an adapted format that works in the context. Moreover, a compact that ensures continuity of HA and HSD commitments in SSD in the context of competing financial and human resources, should be drawn up with regard to implementation of the next strategy.

**Recommendation 12:** The ET recommends regular in-person monitoring be conducted. Monitoring on site is important in projects with several implementing partners and where the reality may not be captured if monitoring is only done remotely or through the lead organisation. Given concerns around data sharing in South Sudan, in-person monitoring

also helps to facilitate more open dialogue. There should also be more emphasis on quality and quantity (with the limited statistical data available) of monitoring being conducted. There is also value in considering the use of TPMs who may be able to travel to a wider range of locations than SCO staff and may also capture data which may not come out when SCO staff conduct monitoring due to the funding relationship.

## Evaluation area 4: Results of the CS

### 4.1. Results and effectiveness

**Due to the difficulty in collecting data on indicators in the RFW, reporting and analysis of results relies more on the narrative format of the AR.** Likewise, baseline data is sparse for certain outcomes (e.g. Domain 2, Outcomes 1 and 2 contain 11 indicators where no baseline data is available), making it difficult to measure progress. Indicators are also at times unrealistic at output level in some cases, in other cases the outputs are “nitty gritty” and in yet other cases they are not conflict sensitive nor coherent with a do no harm approach.

**The 2018 AR notes, for example that statistical indicators are difficult to find, and that there is a high variance in reporting across different organisations,** and interviewees further point out that in certain cases indicators rely on UN reports that are no longer being produced. Furthermore, the AR points out that “considering the Swiss contribution against the massive operations ongoing in SSD, it is not realistic to have indicators covering 100% of the population and what can really be attributed to the CH (Swiss) contribution”.

**For the reasons above the ET cannot on the basis of the RFW draw conclusions with regard to results and effectiveness.** At the same time the ET would like to acknowledge the SCO for the narratives provided in the AR, which give a good impression of the complicated environment and the efforts to reach results. The TPM has provided important information to build on. In lieu of data based reporting, there is a need for alternatives, and the SCO is complimented for taking initiatives both to introduce TPM and also for revising the RFW. The point however is that with the different “systems” being used, it is difficult to see how and if these add up to become a management tool for decisions regarding strategic approaches, exit of programmes, scale-up, and possible change of partners. Below the ET makes observations at the level of domains, no results are discussed for transversal themes.

### Protection of Civilians, Promotion of Human Rights

Throughout the period civilians have been and continue to face severe threats of violence, insecurity, gender-based violence (GBV) and displacement. Protection needs in SSD have been and continue to be high (different levels and types of violence are persistent and omnipresent according to literature). The analysis of results in the annual reports point to Switzerland’s role in filling the information gap in the humanitarian response through strategic contributions to DRC, NRC, REACH and the International Organisation on Migration (IOM). Provision of services and information pertaining to displacement trends, humanitarian access, risk management, and security advice supported various humanitarian clusters in planning are being produced. In terms of forced displacement, the CS is overly optimistic with the assumption that the protection environment in SSD would be able to support the return and reintegration of all IDPs.

### Food Security and Livelihoods

In the entire CS period, humanitarian needs have been immense, with many peaks and few improvements, with high levels of food insecurity (up to IPC phase 5 in some regions). Against this backdrop, Switzerland has consistently helped to provide lifesaving food to the

most vulnerable, including both IDPs and host communities, to counteract the escalation of famine. Food insecurity is chronic in SSD<sup>22</sup>, and as mentioned elsewhere, Switzerland aims for a dual focus on meeting immediate needs and building resilience. To actually say what results have been achieved is very difficult by all means for Switzerland and for all other international actors for that matter – and not least is the results framework not well suited in this domain.

## Peace – and Nation-building

Measuring the Swiss impact on the peace and nation building process against indicators put forth in the RFW has been challenging, however the narrative of ARs finds the results to be ‘satisfactory’. Switzerland has supported the SSCC in establishing spaces for dialogue, as the 2017 AR identified the SSCC as one of the only actors that is able to speak to all parties of the conflict. Likewise, Switzerland has tried to create space for discussions between traditional authorities and other stakeholders in the peace process, and while results on this front were reported to be modest in the 2017 AR, progress appears to have been made based on the narrative of the 2019 AR (no quantitative data in RFW).

The use of Tukul as a space for discussion and exchange has supported Switzerland’s visibility and credibility. In the same vein, Switzerland holds a seat as an observer in the monthly plenaries of the R-JMEC<sup>23</sup> since 2018. To support the peace process more directly, Switzerland has recruited a Senior Governance Advisor who is seconded to the R-JMEC. These activities further the perception of Switzerland as a neutral, impartial and trusted actor in the peace process.

Outside the domains, the ET finds that the SCO has contributed to process results in humanitarian diplomacy, coordination and support with others to localisation, and there is likely to be other activities that can be measured in terms of results in some form. It is however difficult using the current results formats to register “softer” achievements.

**Recommendation 13:** The ET recommends to introduce theories of change and test outcome harvesting in a couple of selected projects in the next strategy, in order to register outcomes in more appropriate ways that recognise the non-linearity of results.

## 5. Forwarding looking options

This chapter is forward looking as the formulation of the next strategy is imminent. The chapter should be seen as the ET’s views being drawn from the recommendations of the evaluation as well as additional points that have come up in the course of the evaluation. Due to the COVID-19 delays the discussions with staff have taken a more forward looking perspective than anticipated in the ToR. This section does not repeat the forward looking recommendations in the report but provides mainly additional perspectives although obviously building on the findings and recommendations in the report.

### 5.1. Overall framing

The Swiss IC Strategy (formerly dispatch) 2021-2024 makes it clear that South Sudan will not be a priority country for SDC South Cooperation. The options are therefore that funding levels are likely to remain the same, and the engagement will be with HA and HSD as the

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<sup>22</sup> <https://insight.wfp.org/wfp-launches-hungermap-live-431e59553aa5>

<sup>23</sup> The R-JMEC is constituted under Chapter VII of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). It is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement, and the mandate and tasks of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU), including adherence to the timeline and implementation schedule. RJMEC reports to the Heads of State and Government of IGAD.

main partners, and possibly with a limited support from SC which can fund engagements under the 10% of the budget that will not be allocated to bilateral cooperation countries.

## **Positioning**

The key and pertinent question is if the next South Sudan Cooperation Programme should be “business as usual” because of the protractedness of the conflict and the limited changes in the leadership and structural issues affecting governance. The ET held discussions with selected and likeminded donors on the issue and the general feeling in the international community seems to be fatigue – and one of uphill challenges in a complex environment with few entry points for a positive development trajectory. Nevertheless, there were voices that argued for Switzerland to take a step back, and then join forces with a few likeminded donors, and start to work on the positives and explore entry points, and also to take a political approach, noting that aid in South Sudan is not apolitical. This means for example to use Switzerland’s different entry points for pressure regionally and globally and seeking influence and leverage with the multilaterals on overarching themes. Meanwhile, the domains should be designed with a holistic strategic approach.

## **5.2. Specifically, for the evaluation areas**

### **Context analysis**

On the basis of an assessment of the context analysis and the current context, it is the view of the ET that in future there is a need to further emphasise at least three contextual factors:

- 1) The grave economic situation, which increasingly seems to influence all spheres of the society and the domains of engagement in a negative direction, is of importance. This includes close monitoring of the economic developments and engagement with the International Financing Institutions and other monitors of any openings arising for engagement with the Government.
- 2) Given the current context, it is of strategic importance in future to increasingly monitor and take action against the human rights violations and the shrinking space for democratic rights and civil society to operate. Currently, the space for gathering without state interference has not been curtailed, but data and information have to be carefully handled not to be misused, and the media is under surveillance. Although it may be argued that civil society actors are a mix of different opposition groups and vested interests, there is widespread intimidation. Because the main part of international attention is concentrated on needs, some of the large picture rights issues may not have been given the actionable attention needed in the past. Relatedly, the advocacy options are also complicated by the poor relationship between the international community and senior and chief policymakers. The international community, and Switzerland, have an important role to play in terms of continuously monitoring the situation and be active advocates at different levels (local to global). With regard to rights violations, it seems that the UN needs to take leadership in being the critical and principled global voice, as it should be according to its mandate. Switzerland is one country that has focus on these issues through its Peace and Nation building domain and SCO management in Juba, and this should be lifted to the multilateral institutions and platforms. Several implementing partners noted to the ET that Switzerland should further strengthen its role as it is one of the very few actors who is seen as neutral.
- 3) Humanitarian aid (through blanket distributions of food and non-food items) is reported to be, if not delivered in a conflict-sensitive way, a conflict driver and a reward-punishment instrumentalised by armed militias. The scale of this phenomenon could not be verified by the ET, but SwissPeace and ODI studies have shed light on it. The ET notes that Switzerland is engaged with other donors in close analysis of the situation, but also notes that overall, there is need to turn from a mainly humanitarian lens to one of negative peace,

state capture and deliberate use of the international community as being part of that power game.

### Portfolio appropriateness

Although the ET concludes that the current domains are those that should be the backbone of the coming strategy, there is a need for more strategic targeting and more coherence across the portfolio. One of the questions in the ToR was to assess if Swiss engagement in SSD could include partaking in “Education in Emergencies”. The ET does not find any ground to pursue this, since several larger donors are already engaged in the education sector. The ET has not come across any niche or comparative advantages that Switzerland would have in this area.

### Strategic pointers:

- **Strengthen the focus on target groups especially women and youth:** This would tie in with a continued focus on SGBV and with a focus on Women Peace and Security and seek to address women’s issues across the portfolio. The **youth** bulge is of enormous dimensions, and the long conflict has set its mark in many ways, and there seems to be an urgent need for the international community, including Switzerland to target youth and include inter-generational issues in strategic ways across the programme, be it in protection, peace building or livelihoods/employment. This work has already started, for example in the Whitaker project, and this experience can be used to think through the strategic frame. Meanwhile a gender lens as a transversal theme must also include masculinity and focus on men and boys, recognising the different roles and experiences.
- **Localisation**, as also discussed in context of the current strategy, localisation should run through all activities, and target activities, partners, and staff.
- **Nexus** approaches across programmes will contribute to coherence between the different instruments and reduce bilateral emergency interventions, for example by introducing crisis modifier in projects, and include peace building activities to enable sustainability.
- Working with national **institutions**. There are understandable difficulties to work with national and State governments, but in the next strategy there should be space for seizing opportunities at local level. At the time of writing, there was reported an openness with MoF, in this case Switzerland would not have an entry point but working with the World Bank and other likeminded donors give opportunities in this regard. Likewise, could there be opportunities to work with local authorities in areas such as disaster risk reduction, it should be done in collaboration with others to minimize risk.
- Working together with other donors and engage and **“energise” the multilateral system**. In interviews it was said that there is a certain tiredness and lack of progressive ideas in the multilateral system, with the exception of the few such as WFP.

### Domains

**Food security and livelihoods – to be sharpened with a resilience lens, while continuing to recognise emergencies.** Programmatic focus on resilience (enhancing dignity of citizens through self-reliance) and disaster risk reduction, and employment/economic opportunities for women and men. As advocated by livelihoods cluster lead in Juba (WFP), Switzerland could bring together different stakeholders and help build a resilience model and nexus approaches, that are flexible enough to address different humanitarian needs, and that can support peace building as well as start addressing gaps and building capacities of the local authorities to fill these gaps. Switzerland is well positioned to develop, test and replicate, while upscaling would be done and financed by

others. PfRR should if considered to work well be continued. Further Swiss engagement in this re-designed domain should be informed by World Bank's intervention in building social protection systems in SSD.

**Protection and human rights - with strategic focus on SGBV** – also as a transversal theme

A focus on long term solutions would be valid for a good deal of the protection approaches in particular SGBV. The existence of deep-rooted factors point to a situation where, even though the fighting related to armed groups has decreased, SGBV cases have exploded. As noted in the domain analysis, addressing SGBV needs to happen by multiple stakeholders in a coordinated approach. There could also, if resources allow, be a need to be more focused on durable solutions in the portfolio of Protection and Human Rights and development of a strategy around protection (looking to Somalia and the regional approach). An analysis of challenges and opportunities in addressing rule of law issues should be included in the upcoming strategy.

**Peace and Nation building**

Continue to work on peacebuilding but across the portfolio also link these interventions more to tangible deliveries for example in food security. Continuing the balance of local peacebuilding activities and support statebuilding at the same time. Build strong partnerships and influence stakeholders and sharing knowledge and maintain a key role in peace dialogues.

### **5.3. Management of the programme**

In the framework of the resilience discussion, Switzerland should contribute to critical thinking as to donor approaches that tend to repeat negative dynamics. If resilience will receive more attention in the new strategy, Switzerland will have to implement durable approaches also when it comes to its own programme administration. This entails to move away from in-out field trips and assessments, end-of year spending pressure, critically review allocation of overheads and check how much of the resources are indeed allocated to the field, be critical of outsourcing to the “deep field” and local partners, without providing the necessary resources and training, and also critically assess whether new ideas and opportunities are actually in line with established strategic priorities.

Other donors noted that Switzerland is relatively well staffed compared to other similar sized donors. The ET also notes that there is both capacity and capability in the SCO team, and this is obviously the backbone for a bolder and more coherent programme. Yet there seems to be a need to strengthen the protection portfolio with additional staff

## Annex 1: Evaluation flow and methods

This section is a short description of the flow and methods of the evaluation. There were a number of adaptations and the task was conducted at a difficult time because of COVID-19.

The evaluation stretched over 15 months, instead of the planned 7 months. There was a hibernation phase from April until October 2020.

Inception Phase January-February 2020	Analysis Phase March-April 2020	Reporting Phase October 2020 -February 2021
Development of evaluation matrix and interview guides	HQ interviews and selected in country interviews continued (completed)	Establishment of reference group to help the process (biweekly check in)
Building the team	Inception report comments addressed (completed)	Hire of Local consultant
Interviews HQ (in person and skype)	Detailed project and portfolio analysis (partially done)	Setting up remote interviews
Interviews key staff SCO		Virtual fieldwork (remote team and local consultant) one week of interviews and internal discussions and analysis
Document study	Field work 19th April -1st May	Field work of local consultant to Wau
In depth project analysis and Mission planning	<del>Workshops 28th and 30th April (on hold)</del>	Follow up interviews, additional desk analysis,
Drafting Inception report (20th February)	Hibernation report, Inception report with notes and “unfinished business”	Triangulation and Validation
		Presentation of preliminary findings to reference group (December 2020)
		Draft report (December 2020)
		Final Report February 202

## Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Area 1: Context analysis - at the time of the elaboration of the CS and during the implementation of the CS				
1.1. Positioning and adaptation of CS with respect to country and regional context as well as Swiss policies				
Questions/variables	Criteria/Indicators	Methods	Sources of information	Responsible
<p>111.a. How well does the CS (strategic orientation, overall goal, domains of intervention and transversal themes, global challenges) reflect the development priorities, set by the partner country/countries and the policies of the Federal Council Dispatch (FCD)?</p> <p>111. b. Are there thematic areas where Switzerland is currently not present, but which are key for the regional development and for Swiss priorities? e.g. "Education in Emergencies"?</p>	Domains and their objectives match with priorities set-out in FCD and SS national documents?	<p>Document study</p> <p>Peer exchange</p> <p>Selected interviews:</p> <p>UN,</p> <p>Government?</p>	<p>CS; FCD; Fragility evaluation;</p> <p>National Strategy Doc (we need to identify relevant transition docs, UN ICF?)</p> <p>Interviews HQ: HA, SC, HSD, other at HQ with SS history; education specialist?</p> <p>UN staff resp for SS</p>	<p>Consultant</p> <p>Peers</p>
<p>112.a Which changes in the context (national and regional) were the most important and what effects may they have caused on the CS? Which adaptations have been taken?</p> <p>113. b Have we been good and active enough in identifying the key drivers of change in South Sudan? (key question for SCO)</p>	Adaptations made on the basis of context changes in the country, in the Swiss context and ODA environment.	<p>Change matrix in template Inception report.</p> <p>(Tool 112)</p>	<p>CS, MERV, AR, of studies</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Inception report and validation during field work</p>	<p>Consultant</p> <p>Peers</p>

<p><b>1.2 Quality of context analysis</b></p> <p>121. To what extent is the context analysis realistic and relevant? To what extent is the broad political context taken into account in the CS and ARs? Does the analysis include current issues (e.g. social and economic inequality, global challenges, power relations, regional disparities) and relevant stakeholders (e.g. private sector, state apparatus and political parties, institutions and powers)?</p> <p>122. With an eye on more resilience in our future programming (provided peace process works out), what relationship do we seek (or need) with governmental authorities and at which level (local, sub-national, national)?</p>	<p>Quality of context analysis (overall and per domain)</p>	<p>Political economy analysis (in the CS); conflict analysis, scenario analysis; (quality assessment framework)</p> <p><b>(Tool 121a)</b></p>	<p>CS, AR, <i>Independent sources (we will build up recognized sources: ICG, Bertelsmann; etc)</i></p> <p>Interviews (re 122)</p> <p>HQ Desks, Embassy Addis.</p>	<p>Consultant</p>
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Evaluation Area 2: Relevance and appropriateness of the projects/programs portfolio with regard to the domains of intervention of the CS				
2.1 Relevance of the projects/program portfolios				
Questions/variables	Criteria/Indicators	Methods	Sources of information	Responsible
<p>211. a.To What extent are the projects/programs portfolios relevant, coherent and appropriate for achieving the results of the CS regarding its domains of intervention? <i>How has (S)GBV been addressed so far?</i></p>	<p>Types of support</p> <p>Financial categories</p> <p>Composition of implementing agencies (National, International)</p> <p>Evolution of project/program portfolio per domain</p>	<p>Project/program structure</p> <p><b>Tool 211a</b></p> <p>Qualitative assessment of the portfolio composition</p>	<p>Project list and project fact sheets</p> <p>CS monitoring system-level 3</p> <p>Interviews: SCO staff, national partners,</p>	<p>Consultant</p> <p>SCO/SDC operational division;</p> <p><b>Peers</b></p>

211.b How well have the resilience informed components worked so far? Should they be pursued further? If so, how could they be strengthened further in the programme?		Project visits  <b>Tool 211b:</b> Map-Comparison between Swiss intervention area and poverty distribution	Project/program managers	
212.a. To what extent are the approaches being applied appropriately in the domains?	Level of integration of the approaches in the projects and programs. Validation of the approaches.	Document study. Analysis of external evaluations and reviews	AR. Evaluation and review reports.	Consultant <b>Peers</b>
212 b. Which innovative approaches produce added value?		<b>Tool 212.</b>  Qualitative assessment with SCO staff and peers.	SCO staff, focal points/thematic networks of SDC	Consultant <b>Peers</b>
212.c. Has there been cross-learning and experience sharing with SDC offices in the region and with other fragile state programmes, in particular in the area of social protection? Is there further potential?		Selected interviews (partners, HQ)  Document analysis Interviews	SDC: Social protection evaluation SDC staff.	Consultant <b>Peers</b>

Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the CS and its portfolio				
3.1. Management Performance				
Questions/variables	Criteria/Indicators	Methods	Sources of information	Responsible
<b>3.1 Management performance</b> 311 a. How effective is the portfolio management of the SCO (regarding transversal themes, collaboration with the global programs, financial and human resources and aid diplomacy)? What are its contributions to an optimal achievement of results?	Financial management according HQ rules:  Balance between staff numbers (FTE) and workload: Gender, number of domain staff in regard to competences and specialization, professional specialisation for different domains, turnover of staff, capacity building program, needs in human resources and capacity building for new domains	Study annual audit report and annual reports  Exchange between SCO staff and peers  <b>Tool 311</b> Staff composition and competencies  Interviews	Office management reports  Annual Audit reports  OMR, AR.	Consultant  SCO/SDC operational division;
311 b. How well do the different entities of the Swiss Government work together “in and on” South Sudan?		Exchange between SCO staff and peers		Peers
<b>3.2 Quality of the CS monitoring system</b> 321. To what extent is the process management of the CS monitoring system relevant and effective, in order to provide evidence-based data/information for accounting for results (reporting) and CS steering?	Process of monitoring (per domain, transversal themes)  Indicator quality and reliability of collected data	Qualitative assessment by SCO staff and peers  <b>Tool 321</b>	Exchange between SCO staff and peers  Study of indicators in monitoring reports	Consultant  Peers
<i>NB Has the monitoring included sex disaggregated data and has this information been used by decisionmakers?</i>				

<b>3.3 Coordination, aid effectiveness and coherence in the country set up</b>	Number of donor coordination groups with active SCO participation (with details on lead)	Document study	Evaluations: SWAP, Nexus, Paris declaration: Annual reports on mgt response: AR, CS Monitoring system SCO, other donors, AR	Consultant
331. a. Which role does the SCO play within the network of different Swiss agencies in charge of international cooperation (SDC – South Cooperation, SDC – Humanitarian Aid, Human Security Division and the Swiss Members of the UNMISS), and vis-a-vis the national government and the donor community?	Representation of SCO in multilateral programmes	Exchange between peers and SCO. (Selected interviews partners, HQ)		Consultant Peers
331 b. How well do Swiss actors work together (repetition see 311 above), and where not possible between Swiss actors, how does the cooperation office harness synergies with other stakeholders such as UN agencies and NGOs?	Level of harmonization (joint platforms, joint financing)	Qualitative assessment through peer exchange		Peers
331 c. What is the added value due to Switzerland's support in the respective country?	Level and quality of cooperation among SCO and other Swiss organizations: Intensity of exchange, level of participation.	Qualitative assessment through peer exchange; Selected interviews (HQ)		Peers
331 d. What are the partnership dynamics overall in South Sudan? (Coherence question)	Value added of Swiss aid in relation to other cooperation programmes:	Exchange between peers and SCO and semi-structured interviews		Peers
331 e. Is the programme working with the right partners? Does it have the right entry points to achieve its goals? (key question for SCO)	Quality of contribution to policy dialogue and scaling up of field experiences	Project visits		Peers
311 f. Has the nexus between humanitarian aid, human security / peace building and development cooperation been addressed, and synergies harnessed and how?				



		staff and selected partner organizations		
		<b>Tool 411 c:</b> Rating of results achievements per domains		
<b>4.2 Sustainability and scaling up</b>  421a. Which innovations generated by field experience have been scaled up through policy dialogue, alliances, networking and dissemination?  421b. With regard to policy dialogue and scaling- up, what are the most important results achieved under the current strategy?  422a. Which actions have been taken at country level to enhance the sustainability of the Swiss investments?  422b. Are resources (human and financial) adequate for the set goals under the prevailing circumstances (i.e. fragile environment)?	Innovations scaled up and channels of dissemination  Success factors for scaling up/leverage  Innovations replicated by other organizations  Technical social, financial and institutional sustainability  Assessment of staffing practices and overall financial envelope.	Document study: evaluation and reviews.  Workshop (optional) Quality assessment with SCO staff  Project visits  Interviews with national and international partners.  Document study. Analysis of external evaluation and reviews  Interviews	Annual reports, external evaluations; end of phase reports       ARs, external evaluation and review reports, end of phase reports Staffing patterns	Consultant Peers       Consultant       Consultant Peers

**NOTE on Coherence:**

We recognize coherence as additional evaluation criteria (in accordance with recent OECD/DAC recommendation). At this point we include coherence as part of Evaluation area 1 – relevance. We also include coherence in Evaluation area 3: 3.1 is already formulated as a coherence question and evaluation area 3.3. Coordination and aid effectiveness; we add a sub-question on *partnership dynamics* to 3.3. in order more broadly to capture the dynamics which underpin synergies or lack of the same. We may pull out the coherence question in a separate chapter in the final report. This will be decided when we present our Inception report. (This note is based on a phone conversation with Reto on 10<sup>th</sup> December 2019)

**Legend:**

Questions marked in **turquoise** are the priority questions from the ToRs which have been added to the standard questions in the toolbox.

Based on the toolbox suggestions the peer input together with the consultant is marked in **red**, and the specific responsibilities assigned to the peers are marked in **blue**

### Annex 3: Result Framework of the CS

Domain of intervention : Food Security and Livelihoods			
(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes	Aggregated Reference Indicators of SDC	(2) Contribution of Swiss Programme	(3) Outcomes at Country level
<b>EMERGENCY</b>  <b>Outcome statement 1: <i>The most vulnerable population has safe access to life saving food.</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2020, 100% of people being classified in IPC phase 4 and 5 in 2016 have safe access to food aid (SPR WFP/ICRC reports).</li> <li>By 2020, the number of people categorised in 2016 as being above 15% GAM rate has been reduced by 50% (SPR WFP and FSLC-IPC report).</li> </ul>	<b>HA 2 - Humanitarian aid - Emergency situation</b> yy persons (M/F) reached in emergency situations	Switzerland supports multilateral and international partners in emergency food assistance to support the vulnerable population to bridge periods of food shortage.  <b>Risks:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extortion and illicit taxes</li> <li>Hostile behaviour of Government</li> <li>Insecurity and logistical constraints hindering humanitarian access</li> <li>Funding gaps (mainly regarding multilateral organizations)</li> </ul>	<b>UN ICF Outcome statement 1: More Resilient Communities</b>  <b>Indicator 1.1:</b> % of targeted communities using 11 coping strategies or below. Coping Strategy Index (CSI), disaggregated by sex of household head. <b>Baseline</b> (2014): (rCSI); 50% of targeted communities use more than 11 coping strategies. <b>Target</b> (2017): 100 % of targeted communities reduce the number of coping strategies to 11 or below (out of a score of 56)  <b>Indicator 1.2:</b> Number of targeted communities have increased assets over the baseline. <b>Baseline</b> (2014): None of targeted communities have average of 2.4 functional assets. <b>Target</b> (2017): 250 communities have community assets over the baseline average of 2.4 functional assets.
<b>RECOVERY</b>  <b>Outcome statement 2: <i>Producers have become self-sufficient and are capable of placing surpluses on local markets.</i></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2020, the number of people depending on food aid distribution has decreased to below 50% (IPC baseline 2016) due to increased resilience of the population (WFP/ICRC Reports).</li> <li>By 2020, the cereal deficit has decreased by 40 %, due to an increased production (FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment and reports).</li> <li>By 2020, the food basket cost has reached the average 2014 value due to a positive trend in the inflow of goods in the local markets (WFP/FAO market bulletins).</li> </ul>	<b>FS 4 – Basic services – Agriculture productivity</b> xxy annual yield increase for a specific crop (kg/ha) and for specific livestock (kg or l /animal) by yy small farmers supported (M/F)	Switzerland supports multilateral, international and national partners to increase the capacity of the households to feed themselves and to boost income generation.  <b>Risks:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General insecurity, erratic rains and flooding; pests and diseases disrupting agricultural production</li> <li>Non-functional markets due to micro- and macro-economic instability</li> </ul>	<b>UN ICF Outcome statement 4: Local Economy Invigorated</b>  <b>Indicator 4.1:</b> Number of value chain enabling strategies in agriculture, livestock and fisheries. <b>Baseline</b> (2015): 4 strategies. <b>Target</b> (2017): 4 additional strategies. <b>Indicator 4.2:</b> Number of Cooperatives and Micro Small and Medium sized Enterprises in place for production and marketing of produce. <b>Baseline</b> (2015): 70. <b>Target</b> (2017): 60 new cooperatives and MSMEs formed.

<p><b>(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)</b></p> <p>For Outcome 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergency Food Assistance (GFD, Food for asset/work etc., M4P).</li> </ul> <p>For Outcome 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Livelihood Recovery and Resilience Building (crop improvement, food diversification, access to markets, M4P, value chain etc.)</li> <li>• Public Private Development Partnership (input providers, Nespresso, Honey Care Africa, etc)</li> </ul>
<p><b>(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)</b></p> <p>Resources: Food Security and Livelihood, 2017-2020: CHF 35 million; 44% of total funding</p> <p>Partners: Multilateral partners (e.g. WFP, ICRC, FAO), INGOs (e.g. ACTED, Caritas Belgium, CARE, Mercy Corps), NNGOs (e.g. Caritas Juba, DMI) and others (e.g. FSL Cluster, Nespresso and Honey Care Africa).</p> <p>Strategy: Balance bilateral with multilateral contributions, the latter being understood as both burden sharing and entry points for joint venture. Direct support shall go to selected partners capable of generating good practices and approaches that may inform Switzerland's policy dialogue and influencing. Gender discrimination, the prevention/mitigation of SGBV and mainstreaming gender equality are approached as priority concerns in the frame of a strategy that aims at responding to the needs and aspirations of the most vulnerable.</p>
<p><b>(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme), see chapter 6 of CS</b></p> <p>Team: DDoC or DoC and 2 NPO</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cash: Partnerships developed and maintained that produce and demonstrate good practices with respect to promoting and strengthening livelihoods</li> <li>• Cash: Evidence and lessons learnt produced that feed in to policy/ influencing forwards delivering according to the needs of the most vulnerable</li> <li>• Multilateral contributions: evidence and good practices generated and fed in to planning and steering of the multilateral humanitarian effort. Effective humanitarian delivery supported through secondments with the potential of positive systemic/policy influence.</li> <li>• Target financial figures reached.</li> </ul> <p>Means of verification: Annual report stocktaking (partners' and donors' assessment) and self-evaluation; systematic review of documentation produced by partners (question: did the Swiss Contribution make a positive difference; if yes, how? If not: corrective measures to be identified).</p>

Domain of intervention : Protection of Civilians, Promotion of Human Rights			
(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes Baselines partly to be established.	Aggregated Reference Indicators of SDC	(2) Contribution of Swiss Programme	(3) Outcomes at Country level
<p><b>Outcome statement 1: Protection needs of displaced people – as identified by them - have been met.</b></p> <p><b>EMERGENCY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reach and Protection Cluster surveys (samples) show a positive satisfaction trend.</li> <li>Positive evolution of % of respondents (M/F) who report increased personal safety and security, disaggregated by sex.</li> <li>Services in place to report SGBV cases against women and men, boys and girls without intimidation</li> <li>Significant decline in the numbers of reported SGBV cases against women and men, boys and girls.</li> <li>Women and men, boys and girls equally participate in discussing and in decision making related to their own safety.</li> </ul> <p><b>RECOVERY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2020, all IDPs have voluntarily returned and/or settled.</li> <li>Women and men, boys and girls equally participate in discussing and in decision making related to their own safety.</li> </ul>	<p><b>HA 2 - Humanitarian aid - Emergency situation</b> yy persons (M/F) reached in emergency situations</p> <p><b>HA 4 – Humanitarian aid - Protection of vulnerable persons</b> yy persons (M/F) reached by xx organisations that contribute to the reduction of violence (including forced displacement)</p> <p><b>G1 – Gender: Sexual and Gender Based Violence</b> yy persons (M/F) - subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence - having received psycho-social, medical and/or legal support</p>	<p>Switzerland supports its partners in responding to the immediate and long-term protection needs of populations, including encouraging safe, voluntary and informed returns, as well as provision of solid and evidence based analysis and advocacy, based on civilian needs, aimed at policy influencing and promoting good practices among all actors.</p> <p>Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Government becomes highly repressive towards NGO activities</li> <li>- escalation in the security situation causing more displacements</li> <li>- lack of willingness by communities to share information</li> <li>- donor fatigue, hence shortfalls in funding affecting projects</li> </ul>	<p><b>UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened</b></p> <p><b>Indicator 3.2:</b> Percent of respondents who report increased personal safety and security disaggregated by gender. <u>Baseline</u> (2015): 28.1% (male 27.1% and female 29.5%) respondents with confidence in peace, safety and security. <u>Target</u> (2017): 50% (48% men and 52% women)</p>
<p><b>Outcome statement 2: Communities have been empowered and capacitated so as to create a safer environment for themselves.</b></p> <p><b>EMERGENCY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>From 2017 onwards, where partners intervene, steady decline in violent local conflicts (Protection Cluster and implementing partners)</li> </ul> <p><b>RECOVERY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>South Sudanese women, girls, men and boys enjoy freedom of movement.</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who report increased personal safety and security, disaggregated by sex.</li> <li>2017 onwards, increase in community driven peace initiatives, including by women.</li> <li>Women and men, boys and girls are equally involved in addressing and resolving issues related to their safety.</li> </ul>	<p><b>G1 – Gender: Sexual and Gender Based Violence</b> yy persons (M/F) - subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence - having received psycho-social, medical and/or legal support</p>	<p>Switzerland invests in community-based approaches, through support to peacebuilding activities, non-violent conflict mitigation options, capacity building of communities, with a special focus on gender equity and SGBV.</p> <p>Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-TGNU completely collapses, hence escalation of violence</li> <li>- low capacities of NGOs and high turnover of staff</li> <li>- lack of cooperation by targeted communities</li> <li>- communities lose trust and confidence in each other</li> <li>- existence of traditional norms that impede women's rights to participate in issues affecting the community</li> </ul>	<p><b>UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened</b></p> <p><b>Indicator 3.1:</b> Number of targeted governance and security reforms are implemented <u>Baseline</u> (2015): The constitution review process, legislative, military and civil service reforms agreed as part of the peace agreement <u>Target</u> (2017): 16 civil service institutions reformed, 3 rule of law institutions' Acts reviewed, permanent constitution drafted.</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.3:</b> Percent of transitional governance mechanisms with CSO/media participation. <u>Baseline</u> (2015): 0%. <u>Target</u> (2017): 80%.</p>

#### **(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)**

For Outcome 1:

- Support direct physical protection of civilians at risk of facing physical violence to ensure safety of civilians and prevent loss of lives.
- Advocacy and effective coordination of aid activities through the Protection Cluster, the South Sudan NGO Forum and OCHA to ensure effective response.
- Facilitate safe and unhindered access through support to ICRC and UNHAS, OCHA, UNMISS and other stakeholders and if need be engage with parties to the conflict to respect IHL.

For Outcome 2:

- Support information gathering, sharing, and establishing mechanisms through which all stakeholders can access information. Use produced evidence and analysis for policy influencing.
- Build local capacities and enhancing non-violent local protection mechanisms to minimize local conflicts and collectively involve all stakeholders in ensuring their own safety.
- Support sexual and gender based violence prevention and response, in particular access to support services and - where and when possible - access to justice.

#### **(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)**

Protection of Civilians and Promotion of Human Rights: 2017-2020: CHF 25 million, 31% of total funding

Partners: NP, IOM, DRC, Protection Cluster, NGO Forum, ICRC, OCHA, HCT, G6+

Strategy: Focus on helping communities prepare for and face multiple and inter-locking threats across the country. Humanitarian partners engage intensively with authorities, civil society actors including women's organisations, and the private sector so as to encourage the rapid implementation of programmes that support longer-term resilience-building and permit resumption of basic services.

#### **(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme)**

Team: DOC/DDoC and 1 NPO

Indicators:

- Programmes supported by Switzerland are acknowledged as good / best practice.
- Through providing support to key protection actors, Switzerland can influence collective donor practice and policy towards principled and rights-based protection.
- Local community-based and managed non-violent conflict transformation spreads as a basis and precondition for regional and national peacebuilding.

Means of verification: Annual report stocktaking (partners' and donors' assessment) and self-evaluation; systematic review of documentation produced by partners (question: did the Swiss Contribution make a positive difference; if yes, how? If not: corrective measures to be identified).

Domain of intervention: Peace- and Nationbuilding			
(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes Baselines partly to be established.	Aggregated Reference Indicators of SDC	(2) Contribution of Swiss Programme	(3) Outcomes at Country level
<p><b>Outcome statement 1: South Sudanese promoters of peace, such as church leaders, traditional authorities and youth, have developed and maintained spaces for dialogue and conflict transformation that respond to citizens' need (including women, youth, minorities, etc.) for peaceful coexistence and social cohesion, governance and truth, justice and accountability.</b></p> <p><b>EMERGENCY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Spaces for dialogue set up by churches and/or civil society have developed and are robust enough to sustain and advocate for peace despite a hostile environment.</li> </ul> <p><b>RECOVERY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>From 2017 onwards, HRW, Amnesty International and other surveys show positive trends with regard to peace and governance.</li> <li>By 2020, spaces for dialogue help making the voices of diverse interest groups, including women's and youth groups, heard by political decision makers at the central, state and local level.</li> <li>By 2020, conducive conditions are created to properly assess the needs and aspirations of the populations in terms of dealing with massive past violations and reconciliation, including assessing the relevance of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).</li> </ul>	<p><b>F1 – Fragile contexts Empowerment / Participation</b></p> <p>yy persons (M/F) from vulnerable groups empowered to participate in relevant peace, development and political processes</p> <p><b>F2 – Fragile contexts: Inclusion</b></p> <p>yy persons (M/F) benefit from programmes to reduce discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion</p>	<p>Switzerland supports South Sudanese stakeholders to develop and maintain spaces for dialogue and conflict transformation that respond to citizens' needs for peaceful coexistence and social cohesion, governance and truth, justice and accountability.</p> <p>Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shrinking space for dialogue due to political polarization and targeted violence or political pressure</li> <li>Efforts to deal with the past blocked by elite interests</li> <li>Lacking buy-in and capacity by South Sudanese</li> <li>Diminishing support by the international community at large to keep spaces open</li> </ul>	<p><b>UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened</b></p> <p><b>Indicator 3.2:</b> Percent of respondents who report increased personal safety and security disaggregated by gender. <u>Baseline</u> (2015): 28.1% (male 27.1% and female 29.5%) respondents with confidence in peace, safety and security. <u>Target</u> (2017): 50% (48% men and 52% women).</p> <p><b>Indicator 3.3:</b> Percent of transitional governance mechanisms with CSO/media participation. <u>Baseline</u> (2015): 0. <u>Target</u> (2017): 80%.</p>
<p><b>Outcome statement 2: Viable and equitable options towards nationbuilding have been spelt out by South Sudanese and transformed into proposed constitutional and legal norms.</b></p> <p><b>RECOVERY</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2017, a constitutional reform project has been designed, integrating an informed analysis of federal options.</li> <li>By 2018/19, a new permanent constitution based on inputs from diverse South Sudanese interest groups is in place.</li> <li>By 2018/19, free and fair elections are held with increased participation of women in the government.</li> <li>By 2018/19, the new permanent constitution and elections provide a basis for governance, human rights, justice and security reforms strengthening social cohesion, gender equality and nation-building.</li> </ul>	<p><b>HR1 - Human rights – Policies</b></p> <p>yy of initiatives, policies and political processes developed in the field of human rights</p> <p><b>F1 – Fragile contexts Empowerment / Participation</b></p> <p>yy persons (M/F) from vulnerable groups empowered to participate in relevant peace, development and political processes</p>	<p>Switzerland supports the processes to implement the peace agreement with a view to pursue a constitutional review process and enable free and fair elections at the end of the transitional period and continued nationbuilding beyond this point.</p> <p>+ the peace agreement provides a clear roadmap and structure for the reform process</p> <p>Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Possible lack of buy-in from national elites to the peace agreement blocks progress</li> <li>Elections, if held at all, legitimize status quo and hamper necessary reforms</li> <li>Social cohesion is deteriorating, hindering progress in nationbuilding</li> </ul>	<p><b>UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened</b></p> <p><b>Indicator 3.1:</b> Number of targeted governance and security reforms are implemented. <u>Baseline</u> (2015): The constitution review process, legislative, military and civil service reforms agreed as part of the peace agreement. <u>Target</u> (2017): 16 civil service institutions reformed, 3 rule of law institutions' Acts reviewed, permanent constitution drafted.</p> <p><b>UN ICF Outcome 5: Cross Cutting - Improvement of the Status of Women and Youth</b></p> <p><b>Indicator 5.1:</b> % of women in parliament; % of women in cabinet ministerial positions. <u>Baseline</u> (2015): 26.5%; 10%. <u>Target</u> (2017): 30% women and 15% youths according to the provision of the Peace agreement.</p>

<p><b>(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)</b></p> <p>For Outcome 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to church-led peace and reconciliation initiatives involving grassroots communities as well as elites.</li> <li>• Support to civil society dialogue initiatives aimed at including interests of I. A. communities, youth, women and others into public political discussions on peaceful coexistence and social cohesion, governance and truth, justice and accountability.</li> <li>• Support civil society initiatives aimed at dealing with the past and the prevention of atrocities.</li> <li>• Support to dialogue initiatives aimed at including traditional authorities into discussions on governance and conflict transformation/mitigation.</li> </ul> <p>For Outcome 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to institutions leading the implementation of the peace agreement to promote constitutional reform processes.</li> <li>• Support to South Sudanese actors, such as think tanks and civil society interest groups, to provide input into the implementation process of the peace agreement.</li> </ul>
<p><b>(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)</b></p> <p>Resources: Peace- and Nation-Building, 2017-2020: CHF 4 to 8 million, 5-10% of total funding</p> <p>Partners: Rift Valley Institute, swisspeace, South Sudan Council of Churches, SSYPADO - Youth Leaders' Roundtables, JMEC, Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF)</p> <p>Strategy: Strengthen local and national moral leaders' voice, supporting the spaces they create and the processes they lead; foster efforts towards righting the wrongs (dealing with the past), rebuild broken trust (building towards peace and reconciliation), self-organization (including customary authorities), link the high-level political dialogue with initiatives on the ground and move forward in developing a common vision and nation. Identify gender-specific topics that need to be included and monitored in reconciliation and DwP and ensure women's participation in all political dialogue processes (UN Res 1325)</p>
<p><b>(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme), see chapter 6 of CS</b></p> <p>Team: 1 Human Security Advisor, DoC/DDoC and 1 NPO</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusiveness: evidence of Switzerland significantly contributing to bringing all legitimate stakeholders on board</li> <li>• Policy influencing: documentation of Swiss supported initiatives that contribute to rooting the peace and reconciliation process in South Sudan, with and for the South Sudanese people</li> <li>• Thematic and methodological support / expertise: Switzerland provides the right expertise at the right moment</li> </ul> <p>Means of verification: Annual report stocktaking (partners' and donors' assessment) and self-evaluation; systematic review of documentation produced by partners (question: did the Swiss Contribution make a positive difference; if yes, how? If not: corrective measures to be identified).</p>

## Annex 4: Basic statistical data

Tool 121b: Basic Statistical Data		Consultant
<b>Purpose</b>	Compilation of basic information with relevant macro data at country level	
<b>Process (responsibility)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparatory phase: Document study, elaborate summary in inception report (Consultant)</li> </ul>	
<b>Data sources</b>	See below	

South Sudan					
	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GDP / capita in PPP terms (USD) -- Estimated	2,100	1,700	1,600	-	-
GDP real growth rate -- Estimated	- 0.2%	- 13.9%	- 5.2 %	-	-
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% population)	65.6 %	82.3 %	-	-	-
FDI inflows US\$ mio	-71	-	-	191	-
Net ODA received per capita (USD)	156	146	200	-	-
Swiss aid inflows (mio. CHF)					
Unemployment rate (% of labor force) – ILO modeled estimate	12.8 %	12.5 %	12.6 %	12.7 %	12.7 %
HDI	0.428	0.418	0.414	0.413	-
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	1,110	1,130	1,150	-	-
% of seats held by women in nat. parliament	26.5	-	-	-	-
Gini coefficient	-	-	-	-	-
Corruption Perception Index (TI) (0 worst, 100 best)	15	11	12	13	-
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (for Sudan, South Sudan not available)	-	2.3	-	-	-
- Status Index (1 worst, 10 best)	-	2.0	-	-	-
- Governance Index (1 worst, 10 best)	-				
Estimated adult (15 – 49) HIV prevalence (%)	2.4 %	2.4 %	2.5 %	2.5 %	-
CO <sub>2</sub> emission / capita in tons	-	-	-	-	-

## Sources:

- GDP/capita in PPP terms (USD): <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx>
- GDP growth rate: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=4>
- Poverty 1 USD (PPP) / day (consumption based): <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>
- FDI Flow and Stock: <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableView/tableView.aspx>
- Trade: SECO/OSEC
- ODA / capita: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS?page=4>
- Swiss aid inflow: [http://www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Dokumentation/Publikationen/Jahresberichte/Archiv\\_Jahresberichte](http://www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Dokumentation/Publikationen/Jahresberichte/Archiv_Jahresberichte)
- Unemployment rate (% of labour force): <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?page=4>
- HDI: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/default.html>
- Maternal mortality ratio: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>
- % of seats held by women in nat. parliament: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=557&crd=>
- Gini coefficient: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?page=4>
- Corruption Perception Index: [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi)
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/bti/laendergutachten/>
- CO<sub>2</sub> emissions / capita: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC>
- MDGs: <http://www.undp.org.bd/mdgs.php>
- UNAIDS - Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS: <http://www.unaids.org/en/>
- The world factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

## Annex 5: CS project list, budget and duration

### Project List SDC

Pillar 1: Food Security and Livelihood
Coordination / Assessment / Data Tracking
Pillar 2: Protection / promotion of HR
Multi-donor trust fund
Pillar 3: Peacebuilding / Human Security
Conflict Sensitivity
Food Security Livelihoods AND Protection
Small Actions (Other)

Project	Phase	Partial Action	Start	End	Plan 2019	Plan 2020	Plan 2021
<b>Total</b>					<b>16,476,054</b>	<b>7,579,739</b>	<b>3,663,300</b>
<b>Total</b>					<b>6,793,854</b>	<b>6,782,739</b>	<b>3,490,300</b>
7F-08861 South Sudan FSL Cluster Support	<b>Total</b>		01.08.2013	31.12.2020	<b>299,000</b>	<b>78,500</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-08861.05 SSD: WFP, FSL Cluster Support 2018-2019		16.05.2018	31.12.2019	<b>299,000</b>	<b>78,500</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-08861.05.01 - SSD: WFP, FSL Cluster Support 2018-2019		16.05.2018	31.12.2019	299,000	78,500	0
	7F-08861.06 SSD: WFP, FSL Cluster Support 2019-2020		16.05.2019	15.05.2020	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-08861.06.01 - SSD: WFP, FSL Cluster Support 2019-2020		16.05.2019	15.05.2020	0	0	0
7F-09014 South Sudan NGO Forum Support	<b>Total</b>		01.09.2017	31.08.2020	<b>380,000</b>	<b>340,000</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09014.04 SSD CONCERN Worldwide: NGO Forum Support		01.09.2017	31.08.2020	<b>380,000</b>	<b>340,000</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09014.04.01 - SSD CONCERN Worldwide: NGO Forum Support		01.09.2017	31.08.2020	380,000	340,000	0

7F-09017 South Sudan Protection Cluster Support	<b>Total</b>	15.02.2014	31.12.2020	<b>232,131</b>	<b>51,784</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09017.04 SSD, NRC: Prot Cluster Support 2017-2018	01.08.2017	30.09.2018	<b>14,106</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09017.04.01 - SSD, NRC: Prot Cluster Support 2017-2018	01.08.2017	30.09.2018	14,106	0	0
	7F-09017.05 SSD, NRC: Prot Cluster Support 2018-2019	01.12.2018	31.03.2020	<b>218,025</b>	<b>51,784</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09017.05.01 - SSD, NRC: Prot Cluster Support 2018-2019	01.12.2018	31.03.2020	218,025	51,784	0
7F-09164 SSD UNDP, CHF Support	<b>Total</b>	01.06.2019	31.12.2019	<b>2,000,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09164.06 SSD, UNDP: SSHF 2019	01.06.2019	31.12.2019	<b>2,000,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09164.06.01 - SSD, UNDP: SSHF 2019	01.06.2019	31.12.2019	2,000,000	0	0
7F-09247 SSD HA, Small-Actions	<b>Total</b>	01.01.2017	31.12.2021	<b>142,664</b>	<b>113,458</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09247.02 SSD SCO Juba, Small-Actions HA	01.01.2017	31.12.2021	<b>142,664</b>	<b>113,458</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09247.02.06 - SSD:FARMSTEW:Recipe- Health&Abundant Life	01.12.2018	30.05.2020	44,676	35,000	0
	7F-09247.02.07 - SSD:Confident Children out of Conflict	10.12.2018	31.01.2019	3,187	0	0
	7F-09247.02.08 - SSD:Francophonie, French Summer Workshop	11.01.2019	31.03.2019	2,943	0	0
	7F-09247.02.09 - SSD:JICA, National Unity Day	11.01.2019	03.02.2019	4,781	0	0
	7F-09247.02.10 - SSD:Catering for Tukul Meetings	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	10,165	0	0
	7F-09247.02.11 - SSD: Donor Group Meeting in Geneva	12.02.2019	11.03.2019	2,007	0	0
	7F-09247.02.12 - SSD:Frontline,CCHN Negotiatn Support Act	01.07.2019	30.04.2020	18,582	5,000	0
	7F-09247.02.13 - SSD:NPSS, Assessment on Flood Response	01.12.2019	31.03.2020	41,800	11,000	0
	7F-09247.02.14 - SSD:Fracophonie, Amis de la Francophonie	01.12.2019	30.04.2020	3,126	795	0

		7F-09247.02.15 - SSD:JICA, National Unity Day Sport Event	01.12.2019	30.04.2020	0	15,000	0
		7F-09247.02.16 - SSD:Third Party Project Monitoring	01.12.2019	31.05.2020	11,396	17,600	0
		7F-09247.02.99 - SSD:SCO Juba, rem. funds Small Actions	01.01.2017	31.12.2021	0	29,063	0
7F-09258 SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo		<b>Total</b>	01.01.2015	31.12.2021	<b>0</b>	<b>803,750</b>	<b>541,250</b>
		7F-09258.03 SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo	01.08.2018	31.10.2019	0	62,500	0
		7F-09258.03.01 - SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo	01.08.2018	31.10.2019	0	62,500	0
		7F-09258.04 SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo	01.12.2019	30.11.2020	0	741,250	541,250
		7F-09258.04.01 - SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo	01.12.2019	30.11.2020	0	741,250	541,250
7F-09397 SSD:Caritas B, Food Security/livelihood		<b>Total</b>	01.08.2015	31.12.2020	<b>260,225</b>	<b>41,750</b>	<b>0</b>
		7F-09397.02 SSD:Caritas B, Averting Famine 2017-2018	01.08.2017	28.02.2019	40,000	0	0
		7F-09397.02.01 - SSD:Caritas B, Averting Famine 2017-2018	01.08.2017	28.02.2019	40,000	0	0
		7F-09397.03 SSD:Caritas B, Food Security in SS/Ug	01.03.2019	28.02.2020	220,225	41,750	0
		7F-09397.03.01 - SSD:Caritas B, Food Security in SS/Ug	01.03.2019	28.02.2020	220,225	41,750	0
7F-09423 SSD: DFID, Better Aid in Conflict		<b>Total</b>	01.10.2019	31.12.2021	<b>0</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>130,000</b>
		7F-09423.01 SSD: DFID, Better Aid in Conflict (BAC)	01.10.2019	31.12.2021	0	150,000	130,000
		7F-09423.01.01 - SSD: DFID, SDC_Contribution BAC	01.10.2019	31.12.2021	0	200,000	100,000
		7F-09423.01.02 - SSD: DFID, HSD_Contribution BAC	01.10.2019	31.12.2021	0	-50,000	0
		7F-09423.01.03 - SSD: DFID, SDC_Evaluation BAC	01.10.2019	31.12.2021	0	0	30,000
7F-09430 SSD DRC, NGO Safety Advisors Unity/UNS		<b>Total</b>	01.09.2015	31.12.2020	<b>414,236</b>	<b>300,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>

	7F-09430.02 SSD DRC, Safety Advisors POCs	16.10.2016	30.11.2018	81,736	0	0
	7F-09430.02.01 - SSD DRC, Safety Advisors POCs	16.10.2016	30.11.2018	81,736	0	0
	7F-09430.03 SSD DRC, Safety Advisors POCs	01.12.2018	30.11.2020	332,500	300,000	100,000
	7F-09430.03.01 - SSD DRC, Safety Advisors POCs	01.12.2018	30.11.2020	332,500	300,000	100,000
7F-09549 SSD NP Sobat Corridor Upper Nile	<b>Total</b>	16.03.2016	31.12.2021	790,478	864,197	202,350
	7F-09549.02 SSD, NP: Sobat Corridor Upper Nile	01.05.2017	28.02.2019	190,000	0	0
	7F-09549.02.01 - SSD, NP: Sobat Corridor Upper Nile	01.05.2017	28.02.2019	190,000	0	0
	7F-09549.03 SSD, NP: Sobat Corridor Upper Nile	01.03.2019	28.02.2021	600,478	864,197	202,350
	7F-09549.03.01 - SSD, NP: Sobat Corridor Upper Nile	01.03.2019	28.02.2021	600,478	864,197	202,350
7F-09599 SSD:REACH,Assessment-Hard to Reach Areas	<b>Total</b>	01.06.2018	31.05.2019	165,000	0	0
	7F-09599.03 SSD:REACH,Assessment-Hard to Reach Areas	01.06.2018	31.05.2019	165,000	0	0
	7F-09599.03.01 - SSD:REACH,Assessment-Hard to Reach Areas	01.06.2018	31.05.2019	165,000	0	0
7F-09683 SSD NP Reducing Violence in Mundri, WES	<b>Total</b>	01.10.2016	31.12.2020	725,800	300,000	0
	7F-09683.01 SSD NP Reducing Violence in Mundri, WES	01.10.2016	31.10.2018	108,300	0	0
	7F-09683.01.01 - SSD NP Reducing Violence in Mundri, WES	01.10.2016	31.10.2018	108,300	0	0
	7F-09683.02 SSD NP Reducing Violence in Mundri, WES	01.11.2018	31.08.2020	617,500	300,000	0
	7F-09683.02.01 - SSD NP Reducing Violence in Mundri, WES	01.11.2018	31.08.2020	617,500	300,000	0
7F-09726 SSD, Mercy Corps: Food security Mundri	<b>Total</b>	24.07.2017	31.12.2022	65,281	1,000,000	1,000,000
	7F-09726.01 SSD, Mercy Corps: Food security Mundri	24.07.2017	30.09.2019	65,281	0	0

		7F-09726.01.01 - SSD, Mercy Corps: Food security Mundri	24.07.2017	30.09.2019	65,281	0	0
		7F-09726.02 SSD, Mercy Corps: Food security Mundri	01.12.2019	30.11.2022	0	1,000,000	1,000,000
		7F-09726.02.01 - SSD, Mercy Corps: Food security Mundri	01.12.2019	30.11.2022	0	1,000,000	1,000,000
		<b>7F-09746 SSD IOM: Regional Information and Co-ord Total</b>	01.11.2018	31.10.2019	<b>180,000</b>	<b>22,500</b>	<b>0</b>
		7F-09746.02 SSD IOM: Regional Information and Co-ord	01.11.2018	31.10.2019	180,000	22,500	0
		7F-09746.02.01 - SSD IOM: Regional Information and Co-ord	01.11.2018	31.10.2019	180,000	22,500	0
		<b>7F-09777 WFP, Multi-Bi H-AFR, FAC&amp;CASH (ab 2017) Total</b>	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>920,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
		7F-09777.38 WFP H-Cash AddAlloc Floods South Sudan	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	920,000	0	0
		7F-09777.38.01 - WFP H-Cash AddAlloc Floods South Sudan	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	920,000	0	0
		<b>7F-10050 SSD, UNFPA: UN Joint Program on GBV Total</b>	01.09.2019	31.08.2022	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
		7F-10050.01 SSD, UNFPA: UN Joint Program on GBV	01.09.2019	31.08.2022	0	0	0
		7F-10050.01.01 - SSD, UNFPA: UN Joint Program on GBV	01.09.2019	31.08.2022	0	0	0
		<b>7F-10280 SSD:FAO, Modernizing the Apiculture Total</b>	01.12.2019	30.11.2021	<b>0</b>	<b>816,800</b>	<b>204,200</b>
		7F-10280.01 SSD:FAO, Modernizing the Apiculture	01.12.2019	30.11.2021	0	816,800	204,200
		7F-10280.01.01 - SSD:FAO, Modernizing the Apiculture	01.12.2019	30.11.2021	0	816,800	204,200
		<b>7F-10283 Division Africa Programm blue Total</b>	01.12.2019	31.12.2024	<b>0</b>	<b>1,750,000</b>	<b>1,250,000</b>
		7F-10283.05 Programme blue South Sudan & Southern	01.12.2019	31.12.2024	0	1,750,000	1,250,000
		7F-10283.05.02 - Blue SSD:Brucell World Vision,	01.01.2020	31.12.2024	0	750,000	550,000
		7F-10283.05.03 - Blue SSD: FAO, Fodder	01.01.2020	31.12.2024	0	500,000	500,000

		7F-10283.05.04 - Blue, SSD: UNFPA, UN Joint Program on GB	01.01.2020	31.12.2024	0	300,000	200,000
7F-10291 SSD:Ujamaa Africa, GBV Empowerment	<b>Total</b>		01.09.2019	30.09.2022	<b>200,450</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>62,500</b>
	7F-10291.01 SSD:Ujamaa Africa, GBV Empowerment		01.09.2019	30.09.2022	<b>200,450</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>62,500</b>
	7F-10291.01.01 - SSD:Ujamaa Africa, GBV Empowerment		01.09.2019	30.09.2022	200,450	150,000	62,500
<b>Total</b>					<b>1,932,200</b>	<b>797,000</b>	<b>173,000</b>
7F-09258 SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo	<b>Total</b>		01.08.2018	31.10.2019	<b>294,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09258.03 SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo		01.08.2018	31.10.2019	<b>294,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09258.03.02 - SSD: ACTED FSL Akobo		01.08.2018	31.10.2019	294,500	0	0
7F-09397 SSD:Caritas B, Food Security/livelihood	<b>Total</b>		01.03.2019	28.02.2020	<b>155,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09397.03 SSD:Caritas B, Food Security in SS/Ug		01.03.2019	28.02.2020	<b>155,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09397.03.02 - SSD:Caritas B, Food Security in SS/Ug		01.03.2019	28.02.2020	155,500	0	0
7F-09988 SSD: OVCI, Improving Nutrition in Juba	<b>Total</b>		01.02.2018	31.12.2021	<b>680,200</b>	<b>437,000</b>	<b>93,000</b>
	7F-09988.01 SSD: OVCI, Improving Nutrition in Juba		01.02.2018	28.02.2019	<b>57,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09988.01.01 - SSD: OVCI, Improving Nutrition in Juba		01.02.2018	28.02.2019	57,000	0	0
	7F-09988.02 SSD: OVCI, Improving Nutrition in Juba		01.03.2019	31.01.2021	<b>623,200</b>	<b>437,000</b>	<b>93,000</b>
	7F-09988.02.01 - SSD: OVCI, Improving Nutrition in Juba		01.03.2019	31.01.2021	623,200	437,000	93,000
7F-09989 SSD: MEDAIR, Emergency Nutrition Assist.	<b>Total</b>		01.04.2018	31.12.2020	<b>802,000</b>	<b>360,000</b>	<b>80,000</b>
	7F-09989.01 SSD: MEDAIR, Improving Nutrition in Renk		01.04.2018	31.03.2019	<b>80,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09989.01.01 - SSD: MEDAIR, Improving Nutrition in Renk		01.04.2018	31.03.2019	80,000	0	0

	7F-09989.02 SSD: MEDAIR, Emergency Nutrition Assist.	01.04.2019	31.12.2020	722,000	360,000	80,000
	7F-09989.02.01 - SSD: MEDAIR, Emergency Nutrition Assist.	01.04.2019	31.12.2020	722,000	360,000	80,000
<b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>2,500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
7F-09777 WFP, Multi-Bi H-AFR, FAC&CASH (ab 2017) <b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>2,500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09777.28 WFP FAC II Central Africa Tranche 2019	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>2,500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-09777.28.01 - WFP FAC II S/Sudan 2019 iCSP S/Sudan	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	2,500,000	0	0
<b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2022	<b>1,750,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
7F-10333 UNHCR Multi- Year 2019-2022: Earmarked <b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2022	<b>1,750,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-10333.01 UNHCR Earmarked Contributions 2019-2022	01.01.2019	31.12.2022	<b>1,750,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-10333.01.10 - UNHCR 2019-22 AFR Tranche South Sudan	01.01.2019	30.12.2022	750,000	0	0
	7F-10333.01.11 - UNHCR 2019-22 AFR Tranche Uganda	01.01.2019	31.12.2022	1,000,000	0	0
<b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>3,000,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
7F-04709 IKRK Beiträge, Emergency Appeals 2016 <b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>3,000,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-04709.88 IKRK-2019/Tranche Central Africa	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>3,000,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-04709.88.01 - South Sudan - IKRK Beitrag 2019	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	3,000,000	0	0
<b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
7F-08764 OCHA Programmbeiträge HH <b>Total</b>		01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-08764.22 OCHA 2019 MULTI-BI	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	<b>500,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
	7F-08764.22.04 - OCHA 2019 H-AFR South Sudan	01.01.2019	31.12.2019	500,000	0	0

### South Cooperation Project List

Commitment Item	Project	Phase	Start	End	Amount
A231.0329	Caritas: Switzerland: Restoration of resilience in livelihoods for rural and semi-urban communities in Tori State	Single phase	01.10.2019	30.09.2022	CHF 1'800'000.--
A231.0329	Promoting Inclusive Peacebuilding and Sustainable livelihoods through Youth Empowerment and Entrepreneurship.	Single phase	01.08.2019	31.07.2022	CHF 600'000

### Project List HSD

2019

Glossar Nr.	Zuordnung	KLR neu	KLR Beschreibung	OE	PV	Geplant	Verpflichtet	Ausgegeben	Differenzen
<b>Total</b>						<b>1,276,992</b>	<b>1,266,992</b>	<b>903,376</b>	<b>363,616</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika					<b>1,012,992</b>	<b>1,002,992</b>	<b>750,209</b>	<b>252,782</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	<b>Total</b>				<b>1,012,992</b>	<b>1,002,992</b>	<b>750,209</b>	<b>252,782</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633004	swisspeace: Lessons learned IGAD mediat.	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	19,413	19,413	19,413	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633651	SSYPADO: Core Contribution	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	8,974	8,974	8,974	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633774	Improving Mediation Skills of SSCC	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	9,426	9,426	9,426	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633810	RVI: Customary Authorities Project IV	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	63,468	63,468	63,468	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634327	SSYPADO: Core Contribution 18/19	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	150,000	150,000	148,763	1,238
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634334	SSCC as a mediation actor in South Sudan	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	104,500	104,500	59,034	45,466
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634335	DFID: Better Aid in Conflict (BAC)	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	200,000	190,000	200,000	-10,000
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634336	RVI: Customary Authorities Project V	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	137,750	137,750	145,972	-8,222

10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634405	Treffen SSCC	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	31,990	31,990	18,279	13,711
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634767	IDEA: Support to R-ARCSS	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	165,600	165,600	0	165,600
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	680012	HSD: operational budget HSA Juba	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	121,871	121,871	76,882	44,989
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal					<b>264,000</b>	<b>264,000</b>	<b>153,166</b>	<b>110,834</b>
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	<b>Total</b>				<b>264,000</b>	<b>264,000</b>	<b>153,166</b>	<b>110,834</b>
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	680068	Depl. HSA Juba 1.9.16 - 31.7.20	SEF	SZC	216,000	216,000	152,311	63,689
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	680419	Depl. Governance Advisor to RJMEC	SEF	GMR	48,000	48,000	856	47,145

### Project List HSD 2018

Glossar Nr.	Zuordnung	KLR neu	KLR Beschreibung	OE	PV	Geplant	Verpflichtet	Ausgegeben	Differenzen
<b>Total</b>						<b>860,659</b>	<b>860,659</b>	<b>744,160</b>	<b>116,500</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika					<b>514,344</b>	<b>514,344</b>	<b>478,481</b>	<b>35,864</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	<b>Total</b>				<b>514,344</b>	<b>514,344</b>	<b>478,481</b>	<b>35,864</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633004	swisspeace: Lessons learned IGAD mediat.	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	40,000	40,000	40,000	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633243	RVI: Customary Authorities Project	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SALMU	57,088	57,088	57,088	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633651	SSYPADO: Core Contribution	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	79,340	79,340	79,340	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633774	Improving Mediation Skills of SSCC	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	13,954	13,954	13,954	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633810	RVI: Customary Authorities Project IV	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	100,000	100,000	100,000	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	634327	SSYPADO: Core Contribution 18/19	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	75,000	75,000	74,903	98

10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	680012	HSD: operational budget HSA Juba	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	148,827	148,827	113,060	35,767
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	680149	HSD: operational budget SA Juba	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	136	136	136	0
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal					<b>346,315</b>	<b>346,315</b>	<b>265,679</b>	<b>80,636</b>
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	<b>Total</b>				<b>346,315</b>	<b>346,315</b>	<b>265,679</b>	<b>80,636</b>
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	680068	Depl. HSA Juba 1.9.16 - 31.7.20	SEF	SZC	106,315	106,315	106,315	0
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	680120	SA South Sudan Council of Churches	SEF	SZC	240,000	240,000	159,364	80,636

### Project List HSD 2017

Glossar Nr.	Zuordnung	KLR neu	KLR Beschreibung	OE	PV	Geplant	Verpflichtet	Ausgegeben	Differenz n
<b>Total</b>						<b>1,286,046</b>	<b>1,286,046</b>	<b>1,218,974</b>	<b>67,072</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika					<b>870,641</b>	<b>870,641</b>	<b>870,185</b>	<b>455</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	<b>Total</b>				<b>870,641</b>	<b>870,641</b>	<b>870,185</b>	<b>455</b>
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	632077	Rift Valley Institute	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SALMU	20,305	20,305	20,305	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633004	swisspeace: Lessons learned IGAD mediat.	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	6,296	6,296	6,296	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633200	DFID: Mlt-Donor Conflict Sensitivity Pro	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	100,000	100,000	100,000	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633243	RVI: Custumary Authorities Project	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SALMU	209,000	209,000	209,000	0

10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633651	SSYPADO: Core Contribution	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	78,087	78,087	78,087	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633774	Improving Mediation Skills of SSCC	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	29,800	29,800	29,345	455
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	633810	RVI: Customary Authorities Project IV	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	250,000	250,000	250,000	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	680012	HSD: operational budget HSA Juba	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	114,700	114,700	114,700	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	680108	Peace building consultant in South Sudan	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SALMU	49,262	49,262	49,262	0
10.01.03.02	Schwerpunkt Gr. Horn v. Afrika	680149	HSD: operational budget SA Juba	Friedenspolitik II (FP II)	SCHCI	13,191	13,191	13,191	0
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal					<b>415,405</b>	<b>415,405</b>	<b>348,788</b>	<b>66,617</b>
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	<b>Total</b>				<b>415,405</b>	<b>415,405</b>	<b>348,788</b>	<b>66,617</b>
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	680068	Depl. HSA Juba 1.9.16 - 31.7.20	SEF	SZC	215,405	215,405	109,739	105,666
10.05.01	Entsendung SEF Personal	680120	SA South Sudan Council of Churches	SEF	SZC	200,000	200,000	239,049	<b>-39,049</b>

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