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**Evaluation 2019/1**

# **Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)**



# **Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)**

Commissioned by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division  
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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<b>Donor</b>	SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
<b>Report title</b>	Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)
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**Bern, June 2019**

## I Evaluation Process

Evaluations commissioned by the SDC's Board of Directors were introduced in the SDC in 2002 with the aim of providing a more critical and independent assessment of the SDC activities. These Evaluations are conducted according to the OECD DAC Evaluation Standards and are part of the SDC's concept for implementing Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution, which requires Swiss Federal Offices to analyse the effectiveness of their activities. The SDC's **Senior Management** (consisting of the Director General and the heads of SDC's departments) approves the Evaluation Program. The **Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division**, which reports directly to the Director General, commissions the evaluation, taking care to recruit independent evaluators and manages the evaluation process.

The Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division identified the primary intended users of the evaluation, and invited them to participate in a **Core Learning Partnership (CLP)**. The Core Learning Partnership actively accompanied the evaluation process. It commented on the evaluation design (Approach Paper); it validated the evaluation methodology (Inception Report); and it provided feedback to the evaluation team on their preliminary findings. During a presentation on the Draft Evaluation Report, the Core Learning Partnership had the opportunity to comment on the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The evaluation was carried out according to the evaluation standards specified in the Terms of Reference.

Based on the **Final Report of the Evaluators**, the **Senior Management Response (SMR)** was approved by the SDC's Board of Directors and signed by the SDC Director-General.

The SMR is published together with the **Final Report of the Evaluators**. Further details regarding the evaluation process are available in the evaluation report and its annexes.

### Timetable

Step	When
Approach Paper finalized	November 2017
Implementation of the evaluation	February – November 2018
Senior Management Response in SDC	June 2019

## **II Senior Management Response**

### **Introduction**

The SDC commissioned an independent evaluation of the linkage ('nexus') between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. The mandate was: to assess the performance of SDC strategies, programmes and partnerships in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation (operational); to analyse to what extent the working procedures, funding procedures/set-up and ways of collaboration are adequate for implementing this linkage in practice (institutional); and to compare the SDC's performance with international practices (benchmarking). The evaluation process included close involvement with the SDC's Core Learning Partnership comprising staff from all SDC departments, from both head office and the field. It was conducted with field visits to Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Mali and Myanmar as well as remote data collection in Pakistan and South Sudan, a large number of individual and group interviews as well as an e-survey. The evaluation team had access to the full range of SDC documentation.

The period under review spanned from 2013 to 2017 to assess recent developments as a basis for drawing up the new dispatch. Therefore, the evaluation was to assess to what extent the SDC's operational instruments and institutional processes ensure that humanitarian strategies and programmes adopt a systems change perspective, taking into account the corresponding development requirements and objectives. With a particular focus on protracted crisis situations, the SDC's actions are expected to facilitate the interface between relief and development. In turn, development actions include activities to respond to conflict and to reduce disaster risks.

### **Assessment of the evaluation**

At a time when international cooperation faces an increase in protracted crises, the evaluation report provides a timely and useful assessment of the SDC's nexus approach. The main objectives – assessing the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the SDC's nexus approach – have been met by the evaluators. The evaluators faced certain difficulties as the SDC's understanding of the nexus lacked guidance or appropriate RBM instruments and was left to the field offices to implement. This management response refers to the related elements in the evaluation report to enable the SDC to improve its nexus approach. This is particularly important in the context of the SDC's commitment to 'leave no one behind'. One aspect that could not be examined in depth is the comparative advantage and value added of working in the nexus. A recommendation (no. 5) is made in this regard, which the corresponding management response addresses to further strengthen the evidence base and make a case. Finally, institutional challenges were thoroughly assessed, resulting in recommendations for short, medium and long-term timeframes to implement with various degrees of priorities.

The SDC's senior management thanks the evaluation team and the SDC staff involved for their effort and the enlightening report. It especially thanks the offices contributing to the case studies and promoting the nexus in their daily work. The SDC's senior management is committed to implementing the recommendations set out in the management response.

### **Main findings**

The overall conclusion of the evaluation is that the SDC's partners recognise it as a principled donor with a strong focus on context in order to maximise the relevance and effectiveness of its activities. It concludes, however, that there is unexploited potential for the SDC to improve its evidence base and make a case with a common institutional understanding of the nexus. The SDC is advised to enhance a conducive institutional set-up at head office in order to institutionalise the nexus approach and make it less person- and opportunity-driven. The understanding of simultaneously applying instruments in the

up at head office in order to institutionalise the nexus approach and make it less person- and opportunity-driven. The understanding of simultaneously applying instruments in the same context to augment, effectively intertwine and operate synergistically to enhance outcomes for targeted populations in the short and medium and long term – most relevant in protracted crises – requires institutional attention. According to the evaluators, a number of institutional factors make the nexus approach complicated, such as different framework credits, different accountability mechanisms, different programme and project approval processes and separate reporting processes. These factors potentially lead to a heavy processing workload and reduce the time available for staff to engage more strategically. The evaluators further recommended broadening and strengthening the use of multilateral linkages and adding the notion of nexus to the global programmes and the thematic networks. The benchmarking exercise concluded that, in particular, Sida's experience and Caritas' conceptual framework and organisational structure could be a valuable source of inspiration for the SDC in pursuing its efforts to institutionalise the experiences made in various country offices.

### Key elements of the management response

Out of the nine recommendations, seven are 'fully agreed' (green), one is 'partially agreed' (orange) and one is 'disagreed' (red). This shows a high level of convergence with the evaluation findings. The key measures are summarised as follows:

1. <b>Develop and communicate a common institutional definition/understanding of the nexus.</b>	Green
2. Develop a business case for <b>one joint framework credit</b> for the medium term.	Red
3. <b>Facilitate a united organisation</b> at head office.	Orange
4. <b>Encourage decentralised reporting lines</b> for all development cooperation instruments.	Green
5. <b>Build an evidence base and specific examples of where and how the SDC has implemented a nexus.</b>	Green
6. <b>Institutionalise joint analysis; seek common outcomes and enhance partnerships that promote the nexus.</b>	Green
7. <b>Encourage partners to develop and pursue innovative approaches</b> to continuously test and enhance the relevance and effectiveness of new and existing nexus approaches.	Green
8. <b>Strengthen internal coordination:</b> SDC cooperation offices should continue to increase their support to consortia of partners	Green
9. <b>Leverage the role as a principled donor</b> in collaboration with other donors, governments, civil society and development actor coordination in specific contexts.	Green

Bern, June 2019

Signature: Manuel Sager, SDC Director General



Annex: Table Overview on recommendations, management response and measures

## Annex: Overview of recommendations, management response and measures

<b>Recommendation 1</b>		
<p><b>Develop and communicate a common institutional definition/understanding of the nexus.</b> The SDC has already worked on an institutional definition/understanding, and taking the next step to agree on, institutionalise and communicate this to staff and partners would be important for future engagement in the nexus. The nexus definition/understanding should include specific examples of where and how it is being operationalised, and how it is applicable across all SDC departments. This includes highlighting the role of the thematic networks in order to enhance continuous learning across contexts. The SDC should continuously develop the nexus as a context-specific approach including context-specific theories of change (ToC). The SDC should set up training and team building for management, staff and key partners. The definition/understanding will also be the basis for institutional changes found in the recommendations below.</p>		
<b>Priority:</b>	<b>Entity responsible:</b>	<b>Timeframe:</b>
High	SDC senior management	Short to medium term
<b>Management response</b>		
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Not agree
<p>The nexus is particularly of value in protracted crisis situations where short-term emergency relief and long-term development objectives co-exist and cannot be dealt with separately. It is currently defined at the SDC as: <i>“the integrated use of instruments (both bilateral and multilateral) of humanitarian aid and development cooperation”</i>. Integrated means <i>“the simultaneous application of instruments in the same context in order to augment, effectively intertwine and operate synergistically to enhance outcomes for the targeted population in the short, medium and long term”</i>.</p> <p>While this definition of the nexus will be shared, a common understanding still needs to emerge within the SDC on how it is being implemented. At the core of a shared objective and common understanding of the nexus is a mutual understanding of the SDC’s different instruments applied in international cooperation and how the combination of these instruments adds value over and beyond good ‘common sense’ coordination. More spaces need to be made available for staff to share their experiences and learn from each other. A mutual understanding of each other’s mandate (whether it is humanitarian aid or development cooperation), and strategic objectives and ways of working, is essential to strengthen the nexus (see also Recommendation 5).</p>		
<b>Measures</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Timing</b>
- Make sure the definition is revised to reflect the state of the art and allows for shared contextual analysis and adaptations towards collective outcomes.	Chief of staff of SC and HA together with operational divisions	01.06.2019
- Complement and substantiate the definition with specific examples and share it with staff (e.g. seminar for staff posted abroad, H-seminar, Development Days, seminars for middle management).	Heads of departments	Ongoing
- Increase knowledge and continue learning through joint field trips and exchanges with partners.	Field staff, joint desk, division and department management	Ongoing

## Recommendation 2

**One joint framework credit.** The SDC should develop a strong business case to lobby the Swiss Parliament for the merger and creation of a single shared framework credit. This will help to address the root cause of many of the current institutional and operational divides between the HA and development cooperation divisions identified by the evaluation. It will also help to facilitate joint accountability and reduce transaction costs by encouraging a more simplified, streamlined and consistent approach. The current separate framework credits mean separate accountabilities and siloed institutional processes, hindering nexus effectiveness. The different divisions will still operate with their mandates but with more holistic and flexible institutional modalities.

Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
High	SDC senior management	Medium to long term

## Management response

Fully agree	Partially agree	Disagree
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The SDC's senior management takes note of the recommendation and the argumentation in favour of a joint framework credit. In the process of developing the new dispatch, it came to the conclusion that based on the Federal Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (1976), Art. 9.1., the separate framework credits reflect the different mandates of development cooperation and humanitarian aid which are still meaningful in their own right. While the SDC agrees that a joint framework credit has the potential to also enhance joint instruments, it concludes that a) not only the separate framework credits themselves but rather organisational structures, rules and procedures are at the core of the identified 'silos'; b) the distinction according to the mandates spelled out in legislation is still relevant today; and c) the SDC will reassess the question during the preparation of the future dispatch for 2025–28.

In the past and for the immediate future at operational level, the separate credit lines are already sufficiently permeable to allow flexible funding of integrated development/humanitarian activities. Other measures could be explored in specific contexts, including joint financing, simplified administrative procedures, etc. (also refer to Recommendation 3).

## Recommendation 3

**Facilitate a united organisation.** In addition to the recommendation above, the SDC's senior management should introduce Joint Operation Committees in cooperation offices and at head office comprised of representatives from HA and SC/EC of equal seniority. This process should also include developing joint documentation for all processes (as is starting to happen in a few cases). The SDC's senior management should consider the creation of joint country/regional desks for HA and SC/EC staff at head office, particularly for countries experiencing protracted crises, and work to establish closer relations with WOGA partners, including the political desks. The change process can learn from the experience gained in cooperation offices (and the discontinued organisational attempt with a joint organisational unit between HA and SC in North Africa and MENA).

Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
High	SDC senior management	Short to medium term



Management response		
Fully agree	<b>Partially agree</b>	Disagree
<p>The SDC partially agrees with this recommendation. In the majority of cooperation offices, joint operation committees are in place and the vast majority of processes are documented in a unified way and valid for the entire SDC, e.g. cooperation strategy, annual reporting, project planning and implementation, contract management, etc. (Field Handbook). Further, the financial competencies have been harmonised between development cooperation and humanitarian aid since 1.1.2018. Colleagues from both humanitarian aid and development cooperation departments are regularly invited and effectively participate in each other's Operations Committees when projects relate to or are supposed to be implemented in the nexus. Maintaining the implementation of existing processes needs to be ensured within the institutional culture, while further improvements are explored and tested.</p> <p>Similar to the OECD recommendations<sup>1</sup> the SDC agrees that the nexus could be more strongly institutionalised at head office. Structural changes, including joining responsibilities at the level of headquarters shall be considered in view of the implementation of the Federal Dispatch 2021-2024. This will be based on an analysis and a clear definition of responsibilities, accountability lines, and adapted modalities.</p> <p>Relations among WOGA partners are generally well established and continuously strengthened within the scope of the different mandates and responsibilities.</p>		
Measures	Responsibility	Timing
- Pilot Joint Operation Committees at head office (divisions and domains) with representatives from HA and SC/EC/GC of equal seniority in cases where a clear nexus perspective is an objective. This will especially concern entry proposals and jointly financed credit proposals in protracted crises.	Deputy heads of SC, HA, GC departments	As of 01.05.19
- Change OpKom guidelines according to findings after the piloting phase above.	Deputy heads of SC, HA, GC departments	January 2020
- Ensure implementation of joint field OpKoms in all relevant contexts and joint ToR where appropriate.	Heads of divisions	Immediately
- Implement structural changes in the context of the implementation of the new Dispatch 2021-2024.	SDC Directorate	By end of 2020
- Encourage movement of staff between humanitarian aid and development cooperation departments to foster mutual understanding.	DirKo	Sept. 2019

Recommendation 4
<p><b>Encourage decentralised reporting lines.</b> SDC senior management should consider restructuring reporting lines so that all staff should report to the head of cooperation in countries where there is programmatic engagement. This step will enable joint understanding, team work and efficient and effective management. This includes delegation of responsibility to the head of cooperation by WOGA partners as relevant for holistic engagement. Joint analysis and strategy among WOGA partners should also result in complementary engagements, for example in displacement/migration and peacebuilding.</p>

<sup>1</sup> <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019>



Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
High	SDC senior management and WOGA partners	Short to medium term
<b>Management response</b>		
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>The senior management agrees with this recommendation. In cooperation offices and integrated embassies, the recommendation corresponds to current practice, with staff of Humanitarian Aid, South Cooperation, Eastern Cooperation, and Global Cooperation reporting to the head of cooperation. According to the document 'Management, Responsibilities and Competencies in the Integrated Representations' (FDFA 642-1), <i>"the head of missions are responsible for all staff at the integrated representations. They ensure that the processes to inform, consult and make decisions at the representation make it possible to have a coherent and inclusive approach in order to promote synergies"</i>. The senior management will promote the consistent implementation of this directive for SDC staff.</p> <p>Swiss cooperation strategies need to fully combine and coordinate Humanitarian Aid and Global cooperation objectives (e.g. in the migration field) and contribute to common result frameworks (also refer to Recommendation 6).</p>		
Measures	Responsibility	Timing
- Ensure adherence to joint reporting lines within cooperation offices according to the existent regulations.	Senior and middle management	Immediately
- Ensure that cooperation strategies coherently bring together humanitarian aid and development cooperation objectives within a common results framework and consequently in projects with a common logframe.	Senior and middle management	Immediately

<b>Recommendation 5</b>		
<p><b>Build an evidence base and specific examples of where and how the SDC has implemented a nexus.</b> The SDC should gather evidence on the comparative advantages of nexus approaches and how these represent stronger and more sustainable investments in building systems and reducing future vulnerabilities. In order to help counteract political pressures and build public support, the SDC should build its evidence base and demonstrate with clear, real-world examples how the nexus leads to more efficient, effective and sustainable outcomes for those living in these situations. Strategies should have results matrices for all partners, as well as a monitoring system that supports flexibility and needs to change during implementation.</p>		
Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC E+C division, Swiss cooperation offices	Medium term
<b>Management response</b>		
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>The senior management agrees with the need to establish evidence to illustrate whether, under which circumstances and to what extent the systematic implementation of nexus programmes increases effectiveness for the targeted beneficiaries. Reviews of relevant programmes and strategies should contribute to establishing evidence. Additionally, evidence generated by bilateral and multilateral partners (including Swiss NGOs) should</p>		

be taken into account in particular through the instrument of programme contributions. This instrument unifies financial resources of all three framework credits and enables NGO partners receiving these contributions to working in the nexus. In doing so, the SDC will particularly consider the difference between countries that are officially seen as the co-lead or with jointly managed programmes and countries in which one of the departments has the lead and the other is adding value or has recently joined (e.g. Nepal, Mongolia). Current cooperation strategies and their results matrices already follow a thematic logic and include the different instruments/partners. They also seek flexibility in programming and monitoring.

Measures	Responsibility	Timing
- Develop ToR for evaluations of programmes/strategies in protracted crises with key questions about connectedness between HA and SC/EC according to the definition of the nexus.	Operational divisions	Immediately
- Mandate selected thematic networks together with selected countries to develop context-specific ToC that encompass different instruments (entry points will include new cooperation strategies). They ensure documentation and dissemination of relevant learnings from planning and implementation.	Thematic networks	2019–2021
- Validate findings of evaluations with partners of the benchmarking exercises (Sida, Global Affairs Canada, WFP, Caritas)	Country desks	Ongoing

#### Recommendation 6

**Institutionalise joint analysis; seek common outcomes and enhance partnerships that promote the nexus.** The SDC should institutionalise joint analysis, partnerships and implementation during the early conceptualisation of new programmes and new phases of existing programmes in a country/regional context in order to strengthen the nexus approach. This includes providing more up-front analysis of comparative advantages, broader vulnerabilities and strategies for 'leaving no one behind'. The SDC should consider building on experiences from the HoA as a model to start institutionalising humanitarian/development linkages in both a country and a regional context.

Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC division heads, head of cooperation offices, and sector leads	Short to medium term

#### Management response

<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
<p>The SDC fully agrees. Joint analyses and seeking common outcomes is standard when drawing up cooperation strategies. They are operationalised in annual report workshops, portfolio reviews and mid-term evaluations of cooperation strategies. In new programmes, the nexus can be further strengthened through a theory of change that addresses both the immediate needs and the vulnerabilities of the target communities.</p> <p>Working in an integrated way implies that development programmes increase their flexibility and readiness to take risks through an adequate risk analysis and appropriate mitigation measures (e.g. contingency funds, conflict modifiers). At the same time, the</p>		

humanitarian aid programmes should increasingly connect short-term measures with addressing structural underlying causes.

Measures	Responsibility	Timing
- Use regional workshops (e.g. management seminars) for exchange and capacity building in effectively integrating the different instruments based on experience from the HoA (ToC, risk analysis and mitigation, connectedness of HA)	Division heads	Immediately

## Recommendation 7

### Encourage partners to develop and pursue innovative approaches.

SDC cooperation offices should continue to increase their support for consortia of partners that work in innovative ways and long term with humanitarian development linkages, which also encourages the monitoring of outcomes. This includes both programmes, multi-donor funds and coordination mechanisms. Such engagement aims to continuously test and enhance the relevance and effectiveness of new and existing nexus approaches with the overall aim of strengthening the resilience of communities living in a protracted crisis.

Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
Medium	Swiss cooperation offices	Medium term

### Management response

<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
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The SDC fully agrees and will continue the ongoing efforts mentioned in the recommendation. Progress will strongly depend on the implementation of recommendations 1, 5 and 6.

Measures	Responsibility	Timing
See measures for recommendations 1, 5 and 6.		

## Recommendation 8

### Strengthen internal coordination.

The SDC's senior management should provide encouragement and guidance to staff on how to work with the Global Cooperation Department in order to more proactively connect to multilateral and regional actors on nexus collaboration. This is especially the case in situations where either HA is engaged as the only Swiss actor or where South Cooperation or Eastern Cooperation is engaged as the only actor. This closer coordination will help accelerate sustainability and impact but also enable potential exit strategies for Switzerland in countries where, for example, there has been long-term engagement in humanitarian aid which is not directly related to emergencies.

Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC senior management	Short to medium term

Management response		
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree
The SDC fully agrees with the recommendation. Based on the context, a more systematic collaboration with Global Cooperation should be ensured with the goal to generate more resources, leverage the respective comparative advantages of the different SDC instruments, and scale up the nexus programming. To this end, the theories of change of the respective cooperation strategies will systematically include all relevant instruments.		
Measures	Responsibility	Timing
- With the communication of the definition, systematised inclusion of global programmes and global institutions in analysis, design, implementation and monitoring (including joint field visits).	Operations Committees	2019–2021

Recommendation 9								
<p><b>Leverage the role as a principled donor.</b> The SDC's cooperation offices should continue to work with partners, including donors, governments, civil society and the private sector, with the specific aim of bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actor coordination in specific contexts and in priority sectors – and thus capitalise on the principled donor position. The SDC is considered a trusted and engaged donor which upholds the principles of good donorship. Recognising that humanitarian aid and development cooperation have different objectives, the SDC should continue to emphasise and enable increased coordination and collaboration based on comparative advantages and 'do no harm' principles.</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Priority:</th><th>Entity responsible:</th><th>Timeframe:</th></tr> <tr> <td>Medium</td><td>Swiss cooperation offices</td><td>Medium term</td></tr> </table>			Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:	Medium	Swiss cooperation offices	Medium term
Priority:	Entity responsible:	Timeframe:						
Medium	Swiss cooperation offices	Medium term						
Management response								
<b>Fully agree</b>	Partially agree	Disagree						
The strong commitment and facilitating role in donor coordination is one of the SDC's repeatedly recognised comparative advantages and will remain a focus of the SDC's work. As the nexus approach must not lead to an instrumentalisation of humanitarian principles, donor coordination includes placing continuous emphasis on conflict-sensitive methods when applying a nexus approach.								
Measures	Responsibility	Timing						
- Continue donor coordination including promotion of the nexus while upholding humanitarian and development principles.	Head of cooperation	2019–2020						

# III Evaluators' Final Report

Commissioned by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division  
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

ARSEN	Appui à la Relance Socio-Economique du Nord
CLP	Core Learning Partnership
CHF	Swiss Franc
CSPM	Conflict Sensitive Program Management
CRZPC	Commission Réhabilitation des Zones Post-Conflit
CRZPC	Commission Réhabilitation des Zones Post-Conflit
DDPS	Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAO	Ethnic Armed Organization
EC	East Cooperation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
GC	Global Cooperation
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HR	Human Resources
HoA	Horn of Africa
HQ	Head quarters
HSD	Human Security Division
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LIFT	Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund
LLRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MERV	Monitoring System for Development-Relevant Changes
MENA	Middle East North Africa
NCG	Nordic Consulting Group
Nexus	In this report used as shorthand for humanitarian-development linkages
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NWOW	New Way of Working
ODFA	The Office for U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OpCom	Operational Committees
SC	South Cooperation
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SECO	State Secretary for Economic Affairs
SHA	Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit
SomRep	Somalia Resilience Program
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
WOGA	Whole of Government Approach

## Executive Summary

### Background and introduction

The increasingly protracted nature of conflicts and the high numbers and long-term nature of forced displacement in the world pose significant challenges for humanitarian and development aid efforts. These dynamics have prompted a renewed focus on the *'humanitarian-development nexus'*<sup>1</sup>. This nexus matters for all those seeking to support better outcomes for crisis-affected populations, be they a result of conflict or of natural disaster or of a mix of both types of crises. For development actors, working with humanitarian actors in crises contexts can help to protect development investments and gains. For humanitarian actors, collaborating with development actors to build the capacity of households and communities to manage shocks is key to reducing humanitarian needs and thereby the cost of humanitarian responses.

The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) has increased its level of funding to fragile and conflict-affected situations under the 2017-2020 Dispatch on International Cooperation. The aim is to allocate 50% of the bilateral budget to these contexts. Switzerland also has considerable multilateral and international engagements related to crises situations, and in global agendas and processes. This is evidenced by the role in the Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), as well as Swiss pro-active engagement in the humanitarian reform efforts (the Grand Bargain), the World Humanitarian Summit (2016), and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (2016).

### Evaluation Overview

The purpose and objective of this evaluation is to assess whether and how SDC's institutional and operational approaches to link humanitarian aid with development cooperation can be strengthened. The timeframe of the evaluation is 2013 to 2017. The overall purpose of the evaluation is divided into the following objectives:

**Table 1: The purpose of the evaluation**

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|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Institutional:</b> to analyse to what extent the working procedures, funding procedures/set-up and ways of collaboration are adequate for implementing this linkage in practice.</li><li>• <b>Operational:</b> to assess the performance of the SDC strategies, program and partnerships in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation.</li><li>• <b>Benchmarking:</b> to compare the SDC's performance in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation with international practices.</li></ul> |
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The evaluation has followed a mixed-methods, comparative case-study design, and utilized a variety of rapid-appraisal techniques including an in-depth document review; key informant and small group interviews; roundtables; Core Learning Partnership (CLP) reflection sessions; and an electronic survey. Case studies involved field visits to Haiti, Horn of Africa (HoA), Mali, and Myanmar. The evaluation also undertook remote data collection

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<sup>1</sup> The Evaluation refers to the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation, as "nexus" in the report.

in Pakistan and South Sudan. It is expected that the knowledge generated by the evaluation will serve to improve SDC's performance through learning within the organization and among its partners; the results will be used for steering and management purposes.

A quick glance overview of findings, conclusions and recommendations is found in Annex A.

## **Key findings of the Evaluation**

SDC has over the last few years started to conceptualize the nexus. A recent institutional understanding/definition reads: "the integrated usage of instruments (both bilateral and multilateral) of humanitarian aid and development cooperation". Integrated is explained as the "the simultaneous application of instruments in the same context in order to augment, effectively intertwine and operate synergistically to enhance outcomes for the targeted population in the short, medium and long term". The conceptualization further notes that the nexus concept is most relevant in protracted crises and that it can be understood as a means towards achieving the Agenda 2030 commitment to Leave No-one Behind. This institutional understanding/definition was presented at an SDC senior management-level event in February 2018, but has not been endorsed by the leadership of SDC or communicated more broadly to general staff.

Many staff, not least national staff are discouraged by the lack of communication of an institutional definition of the nexus. It was emphasised by respondents that when there is no definition, there is no guidance or training, and team building is not fully capitalized upon. There is a strong view among staff that if SDC is to fully implement a nexus approach, HQ must show more leadership and direction.

### **Institutional findings**

A review of internal SDC documents shows that issues related to strengthening the coherence and integration of the humanitarian – development linkages have been raised for more than a decade in the organization and there has been continuous reflections on how to strengthen the linkages.

SDC has four departments working under three different framework credits with their own reporting mechanisms. Humanitarian Aid (HA) has its own framework credit and so does East Cooperation (EC), while South Cooperation (SC) and Global Cooperation (GC) share a framework credit. Overall, an overwhelming number of SDC staff found that nexus programming is complicated by the following institutional factors: different framework credits; different accountability mechanisms; different approval procedures; and separate reporting. Moreover, it was reported that the parallel systems lead to a heavy processing workload and reduce time available for staff to engage more strategically, monitor programs and coordinate with partners. Earlier assessments/evaluations have also pointed to the current institutional structures as one of the main barriers for SDC departments to working collaboratively and using financing instruments in a complementary way.

The recent nexus projects/programs are designed by integrated embassies as bottom-up efforts that make use of both HA and development cooperation instruments. Staff interviewed both in headquarters (HQ) and in the field explained that the design and approval processes are based on person-driven initiatives, and especially are the heads of cooperation offices and their staff instrumental in navigating the necessary institutional

flexibility. Among the most important procedural steps in programming are the approvals of the Operations Committee (OpCom). In the cooperation offices in Horn of Africa (HoA), the OpCom is a joint between HA and SC, but at HQ the OpComs are separated according to the framework credits. Although all departments are invited to be represented and provide comments at an OpCom meeting, there is no joint decision-making.

Across all country contexts examined during the evaluation, staff underscored that leadership and staff in Swiss cooperation offices are the key to SDC's successful development of nexus programming. A critical point is therefore the changeover of international staff, and in particular of cooperation office positions. Especially national staff highlighted that achievements could be jeopardized by changes in international staff because the nexus implementation is personalized and not institutionalized.

SDC, and in particular South Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe has gone through a decentralization process. The evaluation was informed that all staff in an integrated embassy/cooperation office report to the Head of Cooperation. However, the structures seem complicated and the domain teams in an integrated embassy still have different reporting lines, including directly to HQ, which complicates integration and team building. Also, the integration that is attempted at the field office level is not mirrored at HQ, where there is some coordination, but no integration.

Interviews both in HQ and in the field have shown that the institutional set-up in HoA with joint teams and joint OpCom is considered a model in SDC. However, there were also some frustrations and critical voices which noted that the approach in HoA cannot be a model, because the flexibility, innovation and risk-taking approaches in the field are counteracted by the parallel systems in HQ, which were said to discourage the "jointness", be risk averse, and at times stripping programs of nexus approach qualities.

The human resources system in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) allows for staff to apply and fill positions SDC wide. This flexibility was reported as important and enabling for SDC staff to become well versed with all areas of SDC's mandate and for managers to be able to build teams with adequate skill sets for the nexus.

The Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) is a standby facility of approximately 700 experts, which are employable at short notice. This facility, managed by HA, was found to be key for staffing flexibility in countries in protracted crisis. The SHA is not only available for emergencies but have many different types of experts, and respondents noted that SHA is a valuable staffing instrument for enhanced nexus implementation.

## **Operational findings**

In SDC the nexus engagement is motivated by the SDGs and international paradigms towards coherent approaches delivering better outcomes particularly in protracted crisis situations. Nearly all stakeholders interviewed recognized the strong logic and potential of the nexus, also noting that siloed approaches are inadequate, particularly in protracted crisis contexts. Respondents generally provided three explanations for why nexus is a more adequate approach: (1) humanitarian planning horizons are generally too short to address underlying issues; (2) protracted crisis situations are far too complex and multifaceted to be solved simply through a humanitarian response and require a mix of instruments to be used in a coherent and complementary manner; and (3) the complex nature of protracted crises demands closer partnerships between multilateral and bilateral institutions, and indeed a

two way nexus may be insufficient. The latter highlights the need to consider focusing more attention on a three-way nexus between humanitarian-development-peacebuilding.

SDC does not yet have robust Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) data to verifiably and objectively demonstrate that nexus approaches lead to better results. It is also too early for SDC to have such documentation available, and therefore only few of the staff could provide specific examples of cases where they themselves had witnessed a positive “proof of concept,” in terms of evidence which demonstrated the utility of the nexus in practice. The team’s document review of SDC M&E data in the case study countries likewise did not find direct evidence showing that SDC’s nexus programming, so far has resulted in increased sustainability and/or resilience.

All strategies in the case countries of the evaluation allude to the importance and value of articulating how humanitarian aid and development cooperation can be complementary in addressing the needs of target populations and build resilience. The country/regional strategies include joint analysis of the protracted situations, which call for humanitarian and development linkages. However, joint analysis in all country engagements has not yet been institutionalized in SDC.

Currently there is joint programming between HA and South Cooperation (SC) in HoA and in Mali, and efforts are starting in Myanmar. Review of the programs have shown that SDC has a strong focus on context in order to establish the relevance of interventions as well as to maximise effectiveness and improve the opportunities for both impact and sustainability. Adequate contextual knowledge is ensured through multiple mechanisms, not least partnerships, continued dialogue with other actors, program visits, and use of SDC’s tools for programming in fragile contexts.

The evaluation did not find evidence that the Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) had major effect on the nexus efforts, although the WOGA partners’ mandates (migration, peacebuilding, economic development) are of importance to promote the nexus. Overall, this finding is tied to, first, the notion that in many instances few Swiss agencies were in country; and second, the realization that different Swiss agencies have different systems of working not least because other agencies are, unlike the SDC, centralized in their decision-making. The delinking of peacebuilding from nexus is considered by many staff to be a weakness in the nexus approach. Specifically, it was noted that including only humanitarian and development cooperation instruments has a potential weakening effect on the benefits for the target population.

The evaluation saw examples of SDC nexus engagement being conceptualized and developed between SDC, and NGOs/CSOs, other bilaterals, and multilaterals in the field. There was, nevertheless, also a tendency for SDC staff to see the nexus primarily as a question of internal coherence. Interviews with staff in the Global Cooperation division pointed to unexploited potential for SDC to broaden and strengthen its use of multilateral linkages. Similarly, institutional partnerships with Swiss NGOs provide SDC with opportunities to support nexus programming, because of the flexibility associated with this funding.

SDC’s partnerships with NGOs/CSOs, multilaterals, and government entities are important mechanisms that have allowed SDC to work in the nexus and yield considerable influence. SDC has been particularly successful in encouraging its NGO/CSO and multilateral partners to promote the nexus in their programming, in part due to these partners themselves already

being interested in working more in the nexus. NGO/CSO partners in the countries visited were motivated and supported by SDC to take risks and engage in innovative activities such as using “crisis modifier funds” for early mitigation of crisis situations.

Data collected in the different countries consistently support the view that Switzerland has earned a name for itself both as being well-informed regarding the conditions on the ground, in supporting, and in some cases leading, donor coordination efforts. Along the same lines, in all countries visited for this assignment (HoA, Mali, Myanmar and Haiti) partners recognized SDC as a principled donor. Multilateral partners interviewed were also generally positive about their partnerships with SDC.

### **Benchmarking findings**

The benchmarking exercise covered the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Global Affairs Canada, the World Food Program (WFP), and Caritas. Of the four organizations, Sida is perhaps furthest forward in linking its humanitarian and development assistance. Global Affairs Canada is at an early stage of working in the nexus, having made most progress in Syria and Iraq due to political will and interest in these contexts. WFP has put in place the strategies, policies and systems for working in the nexus though it appeared to be early days in terms of seeing these translated into practice at country level. Amongst non-governmental organizations, Caritas is further ahead having been combining its emergency and longer-term efforts for decades, setting up a conceptual framework, an organizational structure and decision-making procedures that support this.

### **Conclusions**

SDC has a strong proposition for an institutional definition/understanding of the nexus, which can be institutionalized. The decade of building up nexus considerations and approaches have come to maturity in the proposed definition. It is also clear that protracted crisis situations are most relevant for the application of the nexus. Protracted crises take a long time to solve and there is global consensus that in crisis both humanitarian and development actors need to be engaged from the beginning and conduct joint analysis and design joint engagement frameworks that address timely lifesaving emergency assistance and longer-term resilience activities.

### **Institutional performance**

Between 2013 and 2017, there has been a continuous and positive reflection within SDC on how to strengthen the humanitarian-development linkages particularly in protracted crises. However, the institutional change processes which have taken place within the SDC can be characterized as adjustments of existing instruments and processes based on bottom-up initiatives, where staff coordinate more and try to work around the barriers of the existing instruments and organization.

This evaluation concurs with the Fragility Evaluation (2012) that concluded: *“The barriers to genuine joint working across instruments are also considerable, with separate budgets, bureaucracies and supporting political constituencies. This is exacerbated by incompatible systems. This has meant that joint working has been more time-consuming and difficult than*

*anticipated*<sup>2</sup>. This evaluation also concludes that the current SDC instruments are not conducive to effective programming in the nexus.

The different framework credits are at the root of the lack of integration and efficiency of the current system, leading to time consuming and double work processes. The separate approval system for funding (OpCom) also works against integration, including sharing of knowledge and the development of joint operational understanding among staff. The financing mechanisms, approval and reporting systems, organization, and staffing need to be more straightforward and linked together as the number of nexus projects/programs increases. It will otherwise be difficult for SDC to scale up the number of projects/programs and for staff also to focus on context, outcomes, monitoring, coordination and partnerships.

During the period covered by the evaluation, there has been insufficient concerted leadership within SDC to set in motion structural institutional changes to increase efficiency of key processes. HQ management support for strengthening the nexus is particularly important, as individually led efforts rely on unofficial person driven workarounds. Although the current status is a handful of well-crafted nexus programs, the institutional ways of working are not sustainable, and management must take the lead in the further developing and managing of SDCs nexus approaches.

The decentralization of decision-making to cooperation offices is not consistent within SDC. This is further complicated by WOGA partners' centralised decision-making and reporting structures. This situation is not conducive towards concerted operational efforts. HQ support to country offices is also insufficiently structured.

It is potentially enabling for building professional skills in both humanitarian aid and development cooperation that staff in SDC can move between the different operational departments. This can enhance team building and strengthen nexus approaches. However, currently there is no training, knowledge sharing, coherence and team building around nexus approaches.

The evaluation also concludes that staff in SDC are motivated, engaged and generally professionals of high standard. Indeed, the key message from partners is also that SDC staff are engaged in substance matters and are reliable to work with.

### **Operational performance and partnerships**

The nexus in SDC is understood as *a means to an end*, and conceptually it covers strategy, programming, partnerships and coordination. There is coherence between those elements in SDC's nexus approach. This is underscored by a systems change thinking that is woven into the fabric of the strategic objectives across the strategies in the case study countries covered by the evaluation. The systems change approach is for example leading SDC to support innovative and flexible programming and financing modalities in partner organizations.

Resilience building is an opportunity to secure sustainability, or at least have a better chance of sustainability, and building resilience is strongly aligned with the idea that in its provision of support, Switzerland's overall objective is to "Leave No-one Behind". By focusing on resilience, SDC recognises that when development efforts are set back by emergencies, stronger resilience means that the effects of the setback are reduced. However, SDC needs

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<sup>2</sup> SDC (2012): Evaluation of the Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.



to have sufficient M&E data to verifiably and objectively demonstrate that nexus approaches lead to better results.

SDC has taken important initial steps towards joint strategies and designed a handful of well-crafted nexus programs, however joint analysis should be institutionalized across all relevant country engagements for the departments to consistently have a joined-up view of the context and set strategic objectives for engagement and bring the different instruments and partnerships to play their part.

The evaluation concludes that the experiences in HoA contain important elements of a model to develop further in future, bearing in mind the importance of taking each particular context as the starting point.

In spite of the intentions, the evaluation concludes that WOGA had limited effect on ensuring coherence and promoting the nexus. The inclusion of peacebuilding is important in contexts of fragility and conflict, and a closer collaboration between HSD and SDC will enhance careful consideration in each and every context to ensure the relevance of a “triple nexus” and what Switzerland’s role would be within the nexus.

There is room for SDC to more proactively advocate and solicit its multilateral partners to work in synergy with bilateral efforts. SDC should look for ways that Switzerland more proactively can engage with its multilateral partners to help resource and scale up nexus programming, building both on country level multilateral engagements and a more concerted use of the Global Cooperation Department as a key internal partner.

Optimizing the use of its partnerships will be critical to SDC efforts to meet the short- and long-term needs of beneficiaries, and specifically in providing more risk taking and innovation support that helps develop capacities and approaches that reduce their future vulnerabilities and increase their resilience.

The evaluation also concludes the principled donor role is important for the overall conceptual development and implementation of nexus approaches in global contexts and in specific sectors, countries and regions. SDC could do even more to influence the international community, national stakeholders and global processes through further engagement in coordination.

### **Benchmarking conclusions**

SDC’s main strength is that unlike most donors, it has a bottom-up approach to its interventions. Working in the nexus matters most at field level in order to deliver better outcomes for affected populations. The examples of nexus programming demonstrate that SDC has the potential to work successfully in the nexus. To improve the effectiveness of future nexus programming, SDC could learn from Sida about more joint analyses and flexible funding mechanisms, from WFP about putting in place relevant policies and strategies and potentially from Caritas on having decision-making procedures that allow for a flexible combination of different types of funding instruments.

## Recommendations

This section presents a prioritized list of recommendations that SDC should consider in order to mainstream an effective nexus approach, reduce institutional barriers and promote good operational practice.

1. **Develop, institutionalize and communicate a common definition/ understanding of the nexus.** SDC has already worked on an institutional definition/understanding, and taking the next step to agree on, institutionalize and communicate this to staff and partners would be important for future engagement in the nexus. The nexus definition/understanding should include specific examples of where and how it is being operationalized, and how it is applicable across all departments in SDC. This includes highlighting the role of the thematic networks in order to enhance continuous learning across contexts. SDC should, to continuously develop the nexus as a context-specific approach including context specific theories of change (ToC). SDC should set up training and team building for both management, staff and key partners. The definition/understanding will also be the basis for institutional changes found in the recommendations below.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership	Short to Medium-Term

2. **One joint Framework Credit.** SDC should develop a strong business case to lobby the Swiss Parliament for the merger and creation of a single shared Framework Credit. This will help to address the root cause of many of the current institutional and operational divides between the HA and development cooperation divisions identified by the evaluation. It will also help to facilitate joint accountability and reduce transaction costs by encouraging a more simplified, streamlined, and consistent approach. The current separate framework credits mean separate accountabilities and siloed institutional processes hindering nexus effectiveness. The different divisions will still operate with their mandates, but with more holistic and flexible institutional modalities.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership	Medium to Long-Term

3. **Facilitate a united organization.** In addition to the recommendation above, SDC leadership should introduce Joint Operation Committees in cooperation offices and in HQ comprised of representatives from HA and SC/EC of equal seniority. This process should also include developing joint documentation for all processes (as is starting to happen in a few cases). SDC leadership should consider the creation of joint country/regional desks for HA and SC/EC staff in HQ, particularly for countries experiencing protracted crises, and work to establish closer relations with WOGA partners including the political desks. The change process can learn from the experiences gained in cooperation offices (and the discontinued organizational attempt with a joint organizational unit between HA and SC in North Africa and MENA).

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership	Short to Medium-Term

4. **Encourage decentralized reporting lines.** SDC leadership should consider restructuring reporting lines so that all staff should report to the Head of Cooperation in countries where there is programmatic engagement. This step will enable joint understanding, team work and efficient and effective management. This includes delegation of responsibility to the Head of Cooperation by WOGA partners as relevant for holistic engagement. Joint analysis and strategy among WOGA partners should also result in complementary engagements for example in displacement/ migration and peacebuilding.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership and WOGA partners	Short to Medium-Term

5. **Build evidence-base and specific examples of where and how SDC has implemented nexus.** SDC should gather evidence of the comparative advantages of nexus approaches and how these represent stronger and more sustainable investments in building systems and reducing future vulnerabilities. In order to help counteract political pressures and build public support, SDC should build its evidence base and demonstrate with clear, real-world examples how the nexus lead to more efficient, effective, and sustainable outcomes for those living in these situations. Strategies should have results matrices for all partners, as well as a monitoring system that supports flexibility and needs to change during implementation.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC E+C division, Swiss Cooperation Offices	Medium-Term

6. **Institutionalize joint analysis; seek common outcomes and enhance partnerships that promote the nexus.** SDC should institutionalize joint analysis, partnerships, and implementation during the early conceptualization of new programs and new phases of existing programs in a country/regional context in order to strengthen the nexus approach. This includes providing more up-front analysis of comparative advantages, broader vulnerabilities, and strategies for “Leaving No-one Behind.” SDC should consider building on experiences from HoA as a model to start institutionalizing humanitarian-development linkages both in a country and a regional context.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC Division Heads, Head of Cooperation Offices, and Sector Leads	Short to Medium-Term

7. **Strengthen internal coordination to promote partnerships for impact and sustainability.** SDC leadership should provide encouragement and guidance to staff on how to work with the Global Cooperation division in order to more proactively connect to multilateral and regional actors on nexus collaboration. This is especially the case in situations where either HA is engaged as the only Swiss actor; or where South Cooperation or Eastern Cooperation is engaged as the only actor. This closer coordination will help accelerate sustainability and impact, but also enable potential exit strategies for Switzerland in countries where there, for example, has been long-term engagement in humanitarian aid, which is not directly related to emergencies.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC Senior Leadership	Short to Medium-Term

8. **Encourage partners to develop and pursue innovative approaches.** SDC cooperation offices should continue to increase their support to consortia of partners that work in innovative ways and long term with humanitarian development linkages which also encourages monitoring of outcomes. This includes both programs, multi-donor funds and coordination mechanisms. Such engagement aims to continuously test and enhance relevance and effectiveness of new and existing nexus approaches with the overall aim to strengthen the resilience of communities living in protracted crisis.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	Swiss Cooperation Offices	Medium-Term

9. **Leverage the role as a principled donor.** SDC cooperation offices should continue to work with partners including donors, governments, civil society, and private sector with the specific aim to bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actor coordination in specific contexts and in priority sectors – and thus capitalize on the principled donor position. SDC is considered a trusted and engaged donor, which upholds principles of good donorship. Recognizing that humanitarian action and development cooperation have different objectives, SDC should continue to emphasize and enable increased coordination and collaboration based on comparative advantages and “do not harm principles”.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	Swiss Cooperation Offices	Medium-Term

# 1. Introduction

The SDC directorate mandated this evaluation, while the SDC Evaluation and Corporate Controlling (E+C) division has commissioned and managed the assignment. This section places the evaluation in the context of the global debate and examines how SDC has sought to define the humanitarian-development nexus.

An external team from the Nordic Consulting Group A/S (NCG), Denmark, conducted the evaluation between February and November 2018. Team members included Anne-Lise Klausen as Team Leader and the following team members: Mathias Kjær; Ananda S. Millard; Tasneem Mowjee; and Maja Pedersen. Niels Harild was responsible for Quality Assurance.

The consultants would like to express their gratitude to the E+C division and the Core Learning Partnership for excellent cooperation. The consultants are also grateful to all the staff and senior leadership in SDC and its partners who have been ready for interviews and follow-up conversations. The field visits were well planned and staff were ready to engage and take time out of busy schedules to meet and assist the consultants.

## 1.1 Methodology

This section starts by outlining the purpose, objectives, and scope of the evaluation as stipulated in the SDC's Terms of Reference (ToR). Following this, the section will describe the methods and approaches applied by the evaluation. It concludes by outlining potential limitations.

## 1.2 Purpose, Objectives and Focus of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide findings, conclusions, and recommendations on past and current practices on whether and how SDC's institutional and operational approaches to linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation can be strengthened. The time period covered by the evaluation is 2013-2017. The knowledge generated by this evaluation will serve to improve SDC's performance through learning within the organization and among its partners and will be used for steering and management purposes. Furthermore, the evaluation should also serve to support SDC in achieving the objectives of the Dispatch to the Parliament 2017-2020 and contributing to the achievement of the SDGs<sup>3</sup>.

In this regard, the overall purpose of this evaluation is divided into institutional objectives, i.e. analysing to what extent the working procedures, funding procedures/set-up and ways of collaboration are adequate for implementing this linkage in practice; operational objectives, i.e. assessing the performance of the SDC strategies, programs and partnerships in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation; and benchmarking objectives i.e. comparing the SDC's performance in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation with international practices<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> SDC (2018). Independent evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation at SDC, Terms of Reference.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

### 1.3 Evaluation Methods

The evaluation followed a mixed-methods, comparative case-study design. It utilized a variety of rapid-appraisal techniques including an in-depth document review; key informant and small group interviews; roundtable discussions; Core Learning Partnership (CLP) reflection sessions; and an online questionnaire (e-survey). It involved in-country data collection in four case-study countries—Haiti, Horn of Africa, Mali, and Myanmar—and remote data collection in two countries—Pakistan and South Sudan. These countries were selected on a criterion-based sampling informed by the inception interviews and an initial document review.

In total, the evaluation team conducted 137 interviews with 219 people (120m, 99f)—of which 110 were individual interviews (64m, 46f) and 27 were group interviews (56m, 53f). The e-survey was distributed to 514 SDC staff of which 188 completed the questionnaire (95m, 93f). This led to a response rate of 37 %, which is significantly above the average response rate of surveys (20 %). The data of the e-survey was further analysed with the aim of identifying whether any differences in responses existed between headquarters and field staff; and between length of employment. The evaluation did not detect any significant differences between the above categories, and report therefore does not reflect on these issues. Additional information on the approach and methodological tools can be found in Annex B.

### 1.4 Limitations and Threats to Validity

The evaluation included several notable limitations and threats to validity which limit the applicability of its findings and conclusions outside of the direct contexts from which data was collected. Most notably, these included: (1) challenges with aggregating and distilling overarching conclusions from seven diverse contexts (Headquarters (HQ) and the six case-study countries); (2) recall bias associated with the retrospective scope of the evaluation covering activities supported between 2013-2017; and (3) boundary issues and difficulties of attribution given the number of other development partners involved over long periods of time in focus countries. Further information on these limitations and threats to validity, as well as the mitigation measures that the team used to overcome them can also be found in Annex B.

## 2. Why does the humanitarian-development nexus matter?

Many of the world's most vulnerable people are now living in fragile and conflict-affected countries with the share of global poor living in these contexts projected to reach 46% by 2030<sup>5</sup>. The humanitarian-development nexus matters for all those seeking to support and achieve better outcomes for these populations. For development actors, working with humanitarian actors in crisis contexts implementing a nexus approach can help to sustain development investments and gains. For humanitarian actors, collaborating with development actors to build the capacity of households and communities to manage shocks is key to reducing future humanitarian needs and the cost of humanitarian responses. There can be no long-term solutions for crisis-affected populations without peaceful and stable

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<sup>5</sup> World Bank (2018). *Fragility, Conflict and Violence Overview*.

societies, pointing to the important role of peacebuilding actors. Those responding to increasingly protracted and large-scale refugee and displacement crises need to provide a more predictable and comprehensive response, which requires a pooling of knowledge and financial resources, and an operational environment and national policy frameworks that allow for this to take place

Efforts to link humanitarian aid to development cooperation date back to the 1980s with the introduction of the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) paradigm. This concept had a particular focus on natural disaster contexts and implied a linear progression from emergency response to development cooperation. The realities of conflict contexts and other “complex” situations experienced in the 1990s challenged this linear approach. Aid and policy actors recognised that transitioning out of protracted conflicts was a “contiguuum” rather than a continuum, involving moving back and forth between emergency, recovery and development phases in a more dynamic and iterative fashion. This highlighted the need for different actors, including those working on peacebuilding and stabilisation, to engage simultaneously and at different levels<sup>6</sup>.

Since 2010, and perhaps earlier, there has been a renewed focus on ensuring humanitarian-development linkages. This is because development actors have accepted that they cannot achieve poverty eradication goals without concerted and increased efforts in conflict-affected and fragile states<sup>7</sup>. The increasingly protracted nature of conflicts<sup>8</sup> and the historic high level and long-term nature of forced displacement<sup>9</sup> are challenges too great for any country, government, agency, or community to address alone. The recognition of the aforementioned has fostered new alliances and approaches such as the use of resilience as an organizing analytical approach, which serve to place greater emphasis on understanding and addressing risks at different levels of both state and society in protracted and recurrent crises<sup>10</sup>. It has also ensured that the ‘Leave No-one Behind’ and ‘put the last first’ concepts are strongly embedded in the SDGs. The SDGs and the Secretary-General’s report for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), Agenda for Humanity<sup>11</sup>, have also led to a renewed focus on the humanitarian-development nexus. As a result, a large number of donors and aid agencies voiced their commitment to humanitarian reform, as part of the Grand Bargain and to the New Way of Working (NWOW)<sup>12</sup>, as outcomes of the WHS. Moreover, the Secretary-General has identified conflict as “*the biggest obstacle to human*

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<sup>6</sup> Levine, S. and Mosel, I. (2014). *Supporting Resilience in Difficult Places: A critical look at applying the ‘resilience’ concept in countries where crises are the norm*. HPG Commissioned Report. Overseas Development Institute.

<sup>7</sup> World Bank (2011). *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, security and development*. Washington DC: World Bank, and OECD (2015). *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting post-2015 ambitions*.

<sup>8</sup> There has been a shift from inter-state and one-off civil wars to ongoing and repeated conflict within states (World Bank 2011). The bulk of humanitarian aid is provided to conflict situations and crises that have lasted over 8 years (Development Initiatives 2017).

<sup>9</sup> Forced displacement is at a record high, with 65.6 million people displaced at the end of 2016. Of these, 22.5 million (34%) were refugees, while the rest were internally displaced persons or asylum seekers (UNHCR 2016).

<sup>10</sup> Mowjee, T., D. Garrasi and L. Poole (2015) *Coherence in Conflict: Bringing humanitarian and development aid streams together*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

<sup>11</sup> Agendaforhumanity.org

<sup>12</sup> For more about the Grand Bargain see: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-hosted-iasc> and the New Way of Working is explained at [https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/NWOW%20Booklet%20low%20res.002\\_0.pdf](https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/NWOW%20Booklet%20low%20res.002_0.pdf)



*development resulting in massive forced displacement and migration*<sup>13</sup>.” This has led to the expansion of humanitarian-development nexus thinking to also include peacebuilding in some contexts<sup>14</sup>.

## 2.1 SDC’s working definitions and understanding of the nexus

In SDC the “Comprehensive Aid Approach” found in the Middle East Strategic framework 2010-2014 was an early formulation of the nexus, which also included the establishment and later the dismantling of a joint MENA-North Africa department. In 2012, SDC commissioned an evaluation of the performance of its instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This evaluation recommended more joint programming in protracted contexts and, since then, SDC has worked to strengthen the linkage between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. By 2015, SDC had expanded the aim to include fostering optimal complementarity in the use of humanitarian aid and development cooperation funds, intervention modalities, instruments, approaches and knowledge to achieve the best possible result. Most recently, SDC undertook a participatory internal reflection on the organization’s strategic direction, “Vision 2030”. In this process the nexus concept was presented at the directorate retreat as *“the integrated usage of instruments (both bilateral and multilateral) of humanitarian aid and development cooperation*<sup>15</sup>”. The presentation explained *integrated* as the *“the simultaneous application of instruments in the same context in order to augment, effectively intertwine and operate synergistically to enhance outcomes for the targeted population in the short, medium and long term*<sup>16</sup>. This conceptual understanding emphasises SDC’s aid instruments as well as it highlights that the implementation of the nexus should be context specific and based on the type and level of Swiss engagement within the particular context. It also highlights that the nexus concept is most relevant in protracted crises and that SDC does not require new instruments to operationalise the nexus because it can do this through joint strategic frameworks in program countries. The other main change between the 2015 and 2018 conceptualisations is a shift towards emphasising the role, and focus, on beneficiaries.

SDC has increased its level of funding to fragile and conflict-affected countries under the 2017-2020 Dispatch on International Cooperation by allocating 50% of the bilateral assistance budget to these contexts<sup>17</sup>. This, combined with the SDG commitment to Leave No-one Behind, has led SDC to work on improving the effectiveness of its engagement in fragile and protracted contexts and acknowledging that *“the complexity of tackling Leave No-one Behind calls for an integrated approach to addressing the dynamics of multidimensional poverty and the mechanism of exclusion”* (SDC, 2018)<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> UN General Assembly (2016) *One Humanity: Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary General for the World Humanitarian Summit*. A 70/709, pg. 8.

<sup>14</sup> World Bank (2018). *Fragility, Conflict and Violence Overview*

<sup>15</sup> SDC (2018). *“Reflexions 2030: Nexus HH/EZA – Erkenntnisse der Arbeitsgruppe”* (2018). (Evaluation team translation from German)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid

<sup>17</sup> OECD (2018). *Development Co-operation to Leave No One Behind. A snapshot of the DAC member approaches*.

<sup>18</sup> SDC (2018). *Leave No-One Behind*. SDC Guidance, page 14.

### 3. Institutional Findings

This chapter gives a brief account of the organization of SDC, followed by findings related to the institutional environment, programming and financing procedures, decision-making processes and human resource issues of relevance for the nexus.

#### 3.1 SDC organization

SDC is an agency within the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) with four operational departments, which work under three different Framework Credits with their own reporting structures within SDC and to some extent the Parliament.

Eastern Cooperation (EC) is regulated by its own legal framework (until 2024) and Framework Credit. Humanitarian Aid (HA) has its own Framework Credit, and South Cooperation (SC) and Global Cooperation (GC) have a joint Framework Credit, but share legal framework with Humanitarian Aid (HA). At Headquarters in Bern, Humanitarian Aid is housed in one location, while the South Cooperation, Global Cooperation and East Cooperation are co-housed in a separate location. While the above suggests separation, the different departments are all part of FDFA and have shared resources, such as a common IT platform and shareweb, and joint human resources and career management, which counter the separate structures and seek to enable integration and communication interactions.

#### Evaluation Questions and OECD/DAC Criteria addressed in chapter 3:

##### Relevance/Effectiveness

- Are the SDC's institutional approaches relevant to ensuring the linkage between humanitarian aid, development cooperation, and peacebuilding?
- To what extent does the SDC Directorate support a greater emphasis on humanitarian-development linkages?
- How is the concept of linkages understood within the SDC and are there differences in interpreting the concept?

##### Effectiveness/Efficiency

- Are the SDC's organizational policies and procedures and internal ways of collaboration conducive to implementing the linkage between humanitarian aid and development cooperation?
- What factors contribute to, or hinder, the complementarity of humanitarian aid and development cooperation, particularly in protracted crises?

#### 3.2 Priority of the nexus

A review of internal SDC documents shows that issues related to strengthening the coherence and integration of the humanitarian – development linkages have been raised for more than a decade in the organization<sup>19</sup>. Between 2013 and 2017, there has been a continuous and positive reflection in SDC on how to strengthen this linkage, particularly in protracted crises situations. A recent document, the Directorate's *"Fit4Fragility Note" (2017)* for example, stated that SDC's program management in fragile contexts must apply the Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM) principles; be prepared for long-term engagement ("stay engaged"); and effectively collaborate between *"development cooperation and humanitarian aid (Nexus) especially in protracted crisis"*<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> SDC (2012). Evaluation of the Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts; ODI (2016). SDC engagement in Protracted Crisis.


<sup>20</sup> SDC (2017). *Fit for Fragility (F4F)* Working in Fragile Contexts – Measures to Make SDC Fit for Purpose.

The SDC nexus approach was explained to the evaluation team as “learning by doing”- and as an approach that, in principle, empowers staff, including local staff. Staff interviewed in the field, especially in the Horn of Africa (HoA) (since 2013), Mali (starting in 2012 and developed over time) and recently in Myanmar, consistently said that they are now trying to bring in the comparative advantages of development cooperation and humanitarian aid respectively in their engagements. In HoA one staff member noted that in the field “*we live the nexus*”, with the additional statement that staff continuously run into institutional obstacles when taking steps to implement a nexus approach. Another staff noted that “*the world has changed but SDC’s instruments still date back to the way we worked in the last century*”. Overall, an overwhelming number of SDC staff found that working in the nexus is complicated by the following institutional factors:

- different framework credits;
- different accountabilities;
- different approval procedures;
- separate reporting.

The workload caused by the different and parallel systems of the current institutional structures reduces the time available for SDC staff to engage in strategic thinking, coordinate with implementing partners, and monitor the programs. The need to release more staff resources for substance engagement was also formulated as an argument for a reorganization to become “*fit for current and future reality*”.

To probe questions related to priority and intent to work in the nexus, the evaluation asked SDC staff through the e-survey, if pursuing more integrated programming along the nexus was a priority at SDC. The responses were overwhelmingly positive as 63 percent of the respondents agreed, and an additional 15 percent strongly agreed. It was, however, also noted in interviews that the organizational



prioritization is found to be much more theoretical and conceptual, since there has been little concrete action taken to restructure SDC’s instruments to make better use of synergies and integrated programming. Several staff members identified the dismantling of the integrated MENA-North Africa unit at the HQ in 2015, and the physical separation of the HA department from the rest of SDC, as a signal that the nexus is not really being prioritized<sup>21</sup>.

Respondents also noted that there has to be due consideration to the time it actually takes to change institutional processes. This is, for example, illustrated by the HoA strategy (2018-2021): “*The shift towards more resilience building/development programming has proven*

<sup>21</sup> The MENA-North Africa unit was an example of a joint organizational unit, which according to many staff showed a direction of how SDC could start to streamline the organization to work more efficiently in the nexus. The unit was however dismantled in 2015, apparently because the unit was a hybrid within the overall organization.

*to be more demanding than expected. This is, on the one hand, due to the fact that large-scale emergency responses are still required, and on the other hand, caused by the fact that most implementing agencies continue to be primarily humanitarian actors. As a result, steering the portfolio towards more developmental approaches has been slower than planned<sup>22</sup>.* As a broader reflection, staff noted that the consensus-driven nature of the Swiss political system means that institutional change is not done fast: *“Switzerland changes slowly and gradually”*.

### **3.3 Programming and Finance**

#### **3.3.1 Institutional aspects of programming**

A number of nexus enhancing developments have taken place from 2013 to 2017. This section presents the findings of the institutional aspects of nexus programming.

Joint programming between HA and SC have taken place in HoA and in Mali. In both contexts the country/regional strategies include analysis of protracted situations, which call for humanitarian and development linkages. Respondents noted that the joint programming had not been straightforward, since institutional procedures facilitate joint programming. As expressed in the first joint strategy in HoA (2013-2016): A Whole of SDC Approach *“is expected to be exemplary with such a strategy but will require internal administrative/programmatic adjustments and joint processes”<sup>23</sup>*. The Swiss Cooperation Office staff in both contexts have found themselves working on two processes for the same project, which has been time-consuming and inconvenient: *“Processes are very slow, our decision-making processes are simply too cumbersome. Sometimes it is also about personalities.”*

Staff interviewed, both in HQ and in the field, explained that the joint projects have been designed and operationalized based on person-driven initiatives, and have worked where there was a clear willingness to find the necessary operational flexibility and support within the organization. Staff, both in HoA and Mali, also reported having at times to “fight” with HQ to keep the essence of the contents and secure the value of a nexus approach of the programs they developed. In Haiti, on the other hand, the planning, conceptualizing, and reporting mechanism used by the humanitarian and development sections continue to be administratively separate. This means that teams only come together at the conceptual stage and, if at all relevant, at the implementation stage. For projects which are understood locally as nexus type interventions under the current strategy (2018-2021), and where the nexus is expressly mentioned, some activities have been initiated by the humanitarian aid team without assurances that development cooperation will co-finance.

The program cycle in protracted crises follows the Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM) and the Monitoring System for Development-Relevant Changes (MERV) modalities (see Table 2). These tools do not currently include processes for nexus programming, although CSPM has guidance for mapping of stakeholders, planning, managing and monitoring programs in protracted contexts. Meanwhile, joint programming has been facilitated by a concrete procedural step through the issue of permission for Joint Credit

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<sup>22</sup> SDC (2018). *Swiss Cooperation Strategy, Horn of Africa, 2018-2021*.

<sup>23</sup> SDC (2013). *Cooperation Strategy Horn of Africa 2013-2016*.

Proposals since 2017<sup>24</sup>. This step allows for one Credit Proposal to be passed through the parallel systems in HA and SC. The parallel systems are maintained, but the project narrative is the same.

**Table 2: CSPM and MERV**

The CSPM evolved from SDC's experiences collecting Peace and Conflict Data, and specifically from a previous tool which was piloted in 7 countries. One of the driving elements for the use of the CSPM is the level of intensity of a conflict. Irrespective of its use, the CSPM, as all other SDC efforts, has its foundation in the "do no harm" principles. The CSPM tools are developed and used in an effort to support planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SDC engagement. CSPM tools are both basic and comprehensive. The determination of which tool to use depends on the complexity of the context.

MERV is not the only tool used to ensure accurate contextual analysis, but it is one of the standard tools available to the SDC today. MERV pursues a number of specific objectives:

- To reflect on trends and changes that have a long-term effect,
- To assess at an early stage how these trends and changes potentially could affect the projects and program of SDC,
- To highlight trends and changes which need to be considered in orienting SDC's program in the medium- and long-term,
- To detect potential crisis situations as soon as possible.

MERV enables the use of a standardized tool to support the regular monitoring of contextual changes that in turn may affect the implementation of the program. In the cases assessed, MERV was used on an annual basis<sup>25</sup>.

### 3.3.2 Financing mechanisms

Both earlier assessments/evaluations and staff interviews have pointed to the current structure with different framework credits and the associated separate reporting structures as one of the main barriers for SDC departments to working collaboratively and using financing instruments in a complementary way. While SDC's financing mechanisms are criticized, findings from the e-survey show that 45 per cent (n=176) of staff believe that the funding instruments do permit programming along the humanitarian-development nexus although with difficulties. The following adjectives were widely used by staff to describe the current financing system: *"rigid"*, *"poorly aligned"*, *"complex"*, *"inflexible"*, *"not conducive"*, *"additional burden"*, *"programming along the nexus is possible with creativity"*, *"a lot of administrative magic"*, *"is possible if the willingness for good collaboration is there."*

Respondents also noted that the current framework credit structure incentivises senior management to protect the separate budget amounts and supports a culture of separation, instead of promoting flexibility. This point was also made by an earlier external assessment, which found that: *"what counts is the money and who controls it"*<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Die Komplementarität zwischen H- und IZA-Interventionen wird im Rahmen neuer Länderstrategien systematisch angesprochen. (17-7-2017) (Fit4Fragility).

<sup>25</sup> SDC (2013). Guidelines for the Monitoring System for Development-Related Changes (MERV).

<sup>26</sup> ODI (2016). SDC's Engagement in Protracted Crisis, page 10.

The evaluation was also informed that there have been discussions in SDC on reform of the framework credits to make financing more flexible between the departments. Attempts to establish a so-called *nexus fund*, which would be a joint fund, were halted a couple of years ago, because it was considered to be introducing an additional process layer, instead of adding flexibility. The proposal reappeared in 2018 and has recently been described as a way to overcome what was underscored as the “*the silo created by the separate financing and allocation streams*”<sup>27</sup>. The proposal noted that the fund, as a way to streamline nexus programming in spite of the separate framework credits. It has been argued that the fund, although proposed as an intermediate measure, would serve to drive integration of separate work processes and build teamwork in the medium term. The evaluation did not find support for this proposal among staff.

The overall sentiment is that the financing mechanisms in a nexus approach need to be more straightforward and joined up as the number of joint programs increases. Staff argued that only if financing and procedures follow an efficient process of program preparation, will there be time and resources for staff to focus on context and outcomes, be creative and flexible in the joint programming. This is also in line with the international commitment from the World Humanitarian Summit, which called for financing modalities that promote strategic outcomes (See Table 3 and Table 11).

The evaluation did find that staff in one case (and there may be others) have been able to use the joint financing creatively. In Mali, humanitarian funds have been used to initiate project activities, at a time when the development cooperation funding for the joint program was delayed, because the Government to Government agreement for the development cooperation funding was delayed. Table 10 outlines different ways to link humanitarian and development programming, showing examples of how flexible funding instruments enable nexus programming.

**Table 3: From funding of projects towards financing of outcomes**

“Without a fundamental shift from funding individual projects to financing outcomes, it will be difficult to transcend the humanitarian-development divide and achieve the vision that I have outlined on working towards collective outcomes. The current humanitarian approach is frequently geared around funding individual, often short-term, projects. This approach incentivizes competition among agencies, non-governmental organizations and other assistance and protection providers, rather than coherence. It encourages the funding of projects based on the priorities of a donor, rather than the priorities that have been identified by the affected people and data and analysis. It promotes funding for international assistance and protection providers based on mandate or pre-existing relationships rather than who is best placed to deliver in that given context. It sets up funding gaps in appeals that are measured in terms of how many projects have not been funded, rather than in terms of the overall impact that the gap in financing will have on the achievement of an outcome. It locks funding to the delivery of a particular project, rather than allowing the flexibility for programs to adjust to new needs, risks or shocks that may arise over the course of the program. It leads to results and success being based on the delivery of that particular project, rather than on how it contributes to a more strategic outcome that reduces need and vulnerability.”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Director Retreat in February 2018.

<sup>28</sup> SG's report for the WHS, Paragraphs 156-157

### **3.4 Decision-making and human resources**

#### **3.4.1 Approvals**

The most important procedural steps in programming are the approvals of the Operations Committee (OpCom). This mechanism endorses the technical quality of a project/program after preparation and serves to release funds. The structure exists in all departments of SDC. It has three tiers and the first tier is at cooperation office level. In the cooperation offices in HoA, the OpComs are joint, but at HQ all departments are invited to be represented and provide comments at an OpComs meeting called by a department for the approval of their credit proposal: the decision-making, however, is not joint.

Interviews both in HQ and in the field showed that the institutional set-up in HoA with joint teams and joint OpCom is considered a model in SDC. However, there were also some frustrations and critical voices which noted that the approach in HoA cannot be a model, because the flexibility, innovation and risk-taking approaches in HoA are counteracted by the parallel systems in Bern, which were said to discourage the “jointness”, be risk averse, and stripping programs of nexus approach qualities. Working out a joint OpComs structure with joint decision-making was mentioned as a “low hanging fruit” that would start to enable nexus programming. The introduction of a joint OpComs system was also expressed as “*a way to create collaborative working relationships without a reorganization*”.

#### **3.4.2 Decentralization**

SDC, and in particular South Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe, has gone through a decentralization process. This means that embassies and cooperation offices have considerable independence in determining thematic areas of work and programmatic engagement. The actual configuration to adapt institutional processes to strengthen the nexus in the case study countries differs, but the purpose has been to arrive at an organization that is more agile and better able to deliver. In HoA staff also have one specific Terms of Reference per thematic domain, so there is no distinction between humanitarian and development affiliation.

The evaluation was informed that all staff in an integrated embassy/cooperation office report to either the Head of Cooperation or the Head of Humanitarian Assistance, who then, in the case of integrated embassies, reports to the Ambassador. However, the structures seem complicated. In Mali for example at the level of *domain management*, a team leader for governance and education has a mixed team of six staff members, from south cooperation, humanitarian aid and Human Security Division. They respectively report to the team leader (south cooperation staff) who then reports to the head of the cooperation office, while the humanitarian aid staff report directly to the head of cooperation office, but not to the domain team leader. HSD staff report to Bern although with some information obligation to the head of cooperation. This way of organizing teams cannot be said to be efficient or consistent.

However, the integration that is attempted at the field office level is not mirrored at HQ where there is some coordination, but no integration. This translates into the view, with evidence to support this, that the nexus works better at the field level than it does at the HQ level. Inspired by the organization of the HoA regional program, the evaluation was told that the HoA desk officers in Bern had deputized for each other.

Across all countries visited, SDC’s development of nexus programming was attributed to the role played by cooperation offices. The Mali office is originally a South Cooperation



office, which had staff from HA added after the crisis hit the country in 2012. It was said that the integration has started to work, because the leadership in the Cooperation Office want to work in the nexus. In Myanmar, staff interviews, and background documents present a clear consensus that the Embassy is getting better in terms of discussing and planning for activities along the nexus, but that actual implementation of nexus activities has been limited thus far. A majority of staff felt that, although the 2013-2018 Cooperation Strategy made references to the nexus, many of the activities were traditional HA and SC, some of which were later “retrofitted” to include more of a nexus approach. Similarly, nexus thinking in Haiti appears to have a number of origins. Initial efforts to join humanitarian and development cooperation initiated at the programmatic level, this was anchored on a strong embassy driven philosophy of placing the actors at the centre and actively exploring how humanitarian assistance and development cooperation could be coordinated. Lastly, for some, particularly at the embassy, the challenges faced and realisations recognised at the cooperation office following hurricane Mathew played an important role in underscoring the importance of nexus for many staff.

The general consensus amongst staff is that to fully implement nexus, HQ must show more leadership, but respondents also noted that support from HQ has increased in the past few years. Thirty-three percent of the respondents to the e-survey found that they receive some support from SDC HQ to implement the nexus, however, the majority of the qualitative responses to this question stress that HQ support to country offices is insufficiently structured. Table 4 illustrates the decentralization taken by DFID, which includes both programming and financing.

**Table 4: The DFID business case of decentralized planning**

<p>DFID takes a business case approach the nexus. If this approach were to be pursued by SDC, the country office or relevant geographical or issue-centred team would undertake a thorough context analysis and outline the activities required to respond to this, based on Switzerland’s comparative advantage. This would be similar to the current integrated strategy approach. However, it would go a step further, with the teams making a joint application for funding that would be allocated in a coordinated way from the different instruments, depending on the nature of the activities and which instrument is best suited to it. This has the advantage of promoting the shared development of programs without requiring joint programming or funding, unless this is appropriate. It also has the advantage of not requiring SDC to completely change the framework credit structure, but rather to change how it incentivizes behaviour. It would also strengthen opportunities to ensure that the programs developed would draw on sectoral and technical expertise across SDC (which is already happening in some cases)<sup>29</sup>.</p>
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### 3.4.3 Human Resources

The HR system in FDFA allows for staff to apply and fill positions SDC-wide, so humanitarian staff for example can take positions in Eastern Cooperation, and SC staff can take positions in HA. This flexibility is important and is enabling for SDC staff to become well versed with all areas of SDC’s mandate and, for managers, to build teams with adequate skill sets for the nexus. SDC staff are, however, concerned that the FDFA has centralized the human resources (HR) function. Earlier SDC had its own HR function, which was noted by respondents as a way for SDC to be flexible and agile, because staff could

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<sup>29</sup> ODI (2016). SDC’s Engagement in Protracted Crisis; evaluation interview with DFID in Nairobi.

be added more easily to particular country teams. One critical point related to HR is the changeover of staff, and in particular of cooperation office positions. Especially national staff highlighted that achievements could be jeopardized by changes in international staff. Similarly, it was pointed out that changes at HA and SC in Bern may also jeopardize both the interactions at HQ and the relationship in country offices. A concern reported was also that work in fragile environments and shifting between humanitarian and development assignments is not incorporated systematically into career paths, and staff members are not, in general, rewarded for accepting assignments in challenging contexts.

The Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) is a standby facility of approximately 700 experts, which are employable at short notice. This facility, managed by HA, was found to be enabling for staffing flexibility in countries in protracted crisis. SHA has many different types of experts. Respondents noted that SHA is a valuable staffing instrument in nexus engagement implementation. The SHA roster of experts is also considered by respondents as a very useful mechanism not only for emergencies, but also for strengthening the technical expertise in cooperation offices. It was also noted by respondents that sometimes SHA experts might not be focused on long-term systems change because they are on short-term contracts.

The placing of secondments is one strategic and flexible use of human resources to support the nexus. In HoA, examples include two experts supporting durable solutions in the Humanitarian Coordinator's office in Somalia, and a seconded staff to WFP in Somalia. In Haiti, SDC has seconded staff to the Inter-American Development Bank. In Mali, SDC considered strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus working group (coordination mechanism) with a secondment (or long-term consultant), as a way to influence coordination and "punch above its weight."

#### **3.4.4 Organizational identities**

A cultural gap between humanitarian and development staff was noted by multiple respondents; but several respondents also explained that this gap could be generational, noting that younger staff are less tied to a particular "identity."

The e-survey found that some staff working in HA felt that development cooperation colleagues understood the implementation of a nexus approach to be associated with behaviour change among humanitarian staff. Other staff working with humanitarian aid found that they are more interested in the nexus than their colleagues from development cooperation, because staff working in HA are those that see the need to move away from continuing humanitarian aid in protracted crisis situations. The points on different perceptions were also emphasized by an earlier study: *"Pre-conceived ideas about the 'other side', ingrained ways of working and differences in terminology are a significant barrier to collaboration, as identified in interviews and the Coherence in Conflict study"*<sup>30</sup>. The joint programming as is currently happening was said to help overcome the humanitarian-development "cultural gap" among staff.

#### **3.4.5 Guidance and training**

Multiple SDC respondents stressed their frustration at the lack of an institutional definition or guiding framework for the nexus (section 2.1.). Many staff, not least national staff,

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<sup>30</sup> Mowjee, T., D. Garrasi and L. Poole (2015) *Coherence in Conflict: Bringing humanitarian and development aid streams together*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

explained that they are asked to participate in coordination meetings in the humanitarian cluster coordination system, in donor sector working groups, or with Government representatives, and that they find it challenging that there is no definition or institutional understanding in SDC. It was also found that the lack of communication of an institutional understanding hinders guidance, training, joint understanding and team building and therefore both institutional and operational changes. Both staff and senior management emphasized that guidance is indeed important but also needs to be sufficiently flexible and adapted to each context. Both development cooperation staff and humanitarian aid staff also emphasised in interviews that acquiring more knowledge about each other's mandates and work processes would enhance team work and improve collective outcomes. The lack of understanding of the "other half of the house" was reported as a demotivating factor for staff.

Some key partners also found that SDC should have a definition and provide guidance. In particular, they noted that a definition and guidance will help SDC and partners to have a joint understanding, and this again supports shared analysis, joint monitoring and shared outcomes. In Mali, humanitarian partners were concerned that there was a trend towards the nexus "becoming a traffic jam" because the nexus means something different to the many actors. It was noted that SDC, as a principled donor, should have a clear grasp of its own understanding of the nexus linkages, as this will help to avoid confusion and waste of resources.

SDC has thematic networks that harbour institutional knowledge and learning. These networks are an important resource for the whole organization. The evaluation's interviews showed that some networks are quite strong and work well, while others are less active. It was also found that the networks are quite divided between HA and the rest of SDC. From the interviews it appeared that the nexus was not included as a transversal theme in sector networks, or in the network on aid effectiveness. It was also pointed out that including the nexus as a transversal topic would strengthen the institutional knowledge in the different sectors.

**Table 5: Staff knowledge and the nexus**

<p>Although SDC does not have an institutional definition of the nexus (see section 1.2.), the majority of staff interviewed felt that they, individually understand what a nexus approach to programming means. The e-survey completed by SDC staff found that 60 percent (n=188) of respondents felt confident in their own understanding of nexus. In fact, an even greater number of respondents, 66 percent, noted that in the period under review (2013-2017) they themselves had been engaged in activities which they would consider nexus interventions. The notion that humanitarian and development activities do not take place along a timeline, but rather take place in a more organic and iterative manner, responding to needs on the ground, is a common element consistently found in staff understanding of the nexus. Furthermore, among staff, the nexus is not understood as joint programming only, but a broader contextual engagement in line with international understanding of the nexus.</p>
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### 3.5 Conclusions

Between 2013 and 2017, there has been a continuous and positive reflection within SDC on how to strengthen the humanitarian-development linkages particularly in protracted crises. However, the institutional change processes which have taken place within the SDC can be characterized as adjustments of existing instruments and processes based on

bottom-up initiatives, where staff coordinate more and try to work around the barriers of the existing instruments and organization.

This evaluation concurs with the Fragility Evaluation (2012) that concluded: *“The barriers to genuine joint working across instruments are also considerable, with separate budgets, bureaucracies and supporting political constituencies. This is exacerbated by incompatible systems. This has meant that joint working has been more time-consuming and difficult than anticipated”*<sup>31</sup>. This evaluation also concludes that the current SDC instruments are not conducive to effective programming in the nexus.

The different framework credits are at the root of the lack of integration and efficiency of the current system, leading to time consuming and double work processes. The separate approval system for funding (OpCom) also works against integration, including sharing of knowledge and the development of joint operational understanding among staff. The financing mechanisms, approval and reporting systems, organization, and staffing need to be more straightforward and linked together as the number of nexus projects/programs increases. It will otherwise be difficult for SDC to scale up the number of projects/programs and for staff also to focus on context, outcomes, monitoring, coordination and partnerships.

During the period covered by the evaluation, there has been insufficient concerted leadership within SDC to set in motion structural institutional changes to increase efficiency of key processes. HQ management support for strengthening the nexus is particularly important, as individually led efforts rely on unofficial person driven workarounds. Although the current status is a handful of well-crafted nexus programs, the institutional ways of working are not sustainable, and management must take the lead in the further developing and managing of SDCs nexus approaches.

The decentralization of decision-making to cooperation offices is not consistent within SDC. This is further complicated by WOGA partners' centralised decision-making and reporting structures. This situation is not conducive towards concerted operational efforts. HQ support to country offices is also insufficiently structured.

It is potentially enabling for building professional skills in both humanitarian aid and development cooperation that staff in SDC can move between the different operational departments. This can team building and strengthen nexus approaches. However, currently there is no training, knowledge sharing, coherence and team building around nexus approaches.

The evaluation also concludes that staff in SDC are motivated, engaged and generally professionals of high standard. Indeed, the key message from partners is also that SDC staff are engaged in substance matters and are reliable to work with.

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<sup>31</sup> SDC (2012): Evaluation of the Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

## 4. Operational Findings

In SDC the nexus engagement is motivated by the SDGs and international paradigms towards coherent approaches delivering better outcomes particularly in protracted crisis situations (see also Chapter 5). This chapter takes its starting point in the findings related to resilience and sustainability (section 4.1.) followed by the findings of how the nexus is included in strategies (section 4.2.); programming including WOGA cooperation (section 4.3); and in partnerships (section 4.4.).

### 4.1 Building resilience and enhancing sustainability

What evidence is available to support the argument that working in the nexus helps lead to more efficient and sustainable results? This has been a key question for the evaluation. Respondents and background documents consistently argued that planned and intentional blending of instruments will lead to better outcomes and provide more multifaceted solutions to the complex humanitarian and development challenges faced. However, few of these staff or documents were able to provide specific

examples where they themselves had witnessed a “proof of concept”, or tangible experiences, which demonstrated the utility of the nexus in practice. The team’s document review of SDC M&E data in the case study countries also found no direct evidence showing that SDC’s nexus programming resulted in increased sustainability and/or resilience.

Staff highlighted that resilience building aims to ensure that communities become, over time, better able to respond to the threats and crises they are faced with. Moreover, resilience building is understood across all countries examined as an opportunity to secure sustainability, or at least have a better chance of sustainability. Therefore, building resilience is strongly aligned with the idea that, in its provision of support, Switzerland’s overall objective should be to “Leave No-one Behind”.

By focusing on resilience, SDC recognises that when development efforts are set back by emergencies, if resilience is stronger, the setback effects are reduced. In the same vein, humanitarian actors see resilience as an opportunity to ensure that their efforts have a longer impact than may otherwise be the case (i.e. if focused exclusively on short-term service and good delivery). In South Sudan resilience building is also a component of Humanitarian Aid, mainly seen as an opportunity to have longer-lasting impact, and also as a way to link up to development cooperation if and when the context changes. In Mali, Myanmar, and HoA (to some degree), the starting point has been development cooperation and therefore resilience has been a concept built into development objectives. This also means that humanitarian activities have been more targeted in responding to specific urgent needs within a broader development context.

#### Evaluation Questions and OCED/DAC Criteria:

##### Effectiveness:

- To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?
- To what extent are SDC’s humanitarian and development (or mixed) program and implementation modalities relevant for meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?

While only a few respondents interviewed were able to provide tangible examples of nexus programming leading to better or more sustainable results, nearly all stakeholders interviewed recognized the strong logic and potential of the nexus, also noting that siloed approaches are inadequate, particularly in the case of protracted crisis context. Respondents generally provided three explanations as to why nexus is a more adequate approach: (1) humanitarian planning horizons are generally too short to address underlying issues; (2) protracted crisis situations are far too complex and multifaceted to be solved simply through a humanitarian response and require a mix of instruments to be used in a coherent and complementary manner; and (3) the complex nature of protracted crises demands closer partnerships between multilateral and bilateral institutions, indeed a two way nexus may be insufficient. The latter highlights the need to consider focusing more attention on a three-way nexus between humanitarian-development-peacebuilding.

Ultimately, the most compelling and overarching reason for why the nexus approach has merit is, simply put, because fragile environments are not siloed. Populations living in crisis do not have humanitarian or development problems, they have a myriad of challenges which donors have the luxury of dividing into specific categories, if they so wish, but ultimately, in dividing into categories there is a considerable danger that the support provided is driven by donor country objectives, rather than by beneficiary needs and capacity to build resilience. Given the focus that SDC places on context analysis, SDC is well placed to use beneficiary needs and realities as drivers for support, rather than determining the engagement based on the type of aid they can deliver. See theory of change in Table 6 and the financing mix in 2018 in the case countries of the evaluation in Table 7.

Specific examples from the case studies include:

- In South Sudan, SDC has utilized its multilateral partnerships to promote more sustainable food production beyond merely daily subsistence. Both the South Sudan 2015 Annual Report and Cooperation Strategy 2017-2020 claim that SDC's advocacy efforts helped alter the way that FAO and ICRC approach food security and WASH in the country. With SDC support, the FAO and its partners were able to provide "enhanced agro-pastoral advisory services delivery through "Agro Pastoralists Farmers Field Schools," established sustainable community-based seed systems, improved livestock productivity through improved access to animal health services, and increased production and access to nutritionally balanced food through a voucher system."<sup>32</sup>
- A sector nexus example can be found in SDC's activities in Pakistan. According to the 2015-2016 Cooperation Strategy for Pakistan, SDC identified water as a "vector for governance" to help address both short- and long-term needs. According to the strategy: "SDC supports reform processes at the provincial level and works with stakeholders at the local level, ensuring ownership and sustainability. Understanding the political economy of water resources allows to address issues of exclusion and to improve equitable access, thereby reducing core issues of fragility in the region."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> South Sudan 2015 Annual Report.

<sup>33</sup> SDC (2015). 2015-2016 Cooperation Strategy for Pakistan

- In HoA, programs address immediate needs (through crisis modifier funds) at the same time as building resilience both with rights holders and duty bearers. SDC's durable solutions engagement is well developed and focuses on building self-reliance of both refugees and host communities. An interesting pilot is the testing of the private sector health providers in Somalia, the rationale being that the health system in the medium term will need to rely on private providers. Including the private sector in a nexus approach adds another angle to humanitarian-development linkages and to ensuring the development of sustainable health services.
- In Mali, programs also focus on humanitarian-development linkages, such as return to education; early warning and prevention of drought. With regard to sustainability, SDC supports, for example, the National Food Security Commission to develop an early warning system. Support to the Ministry of Education in Mali to develop and implement an Accelerated Learning Policy that enables out-of-school children (displaced, and nomadic in particular, and more girls than boys) points to a very important systemic change that has aimed to make education more relevant for vulnerable (nomadic) children and their families.
- In Haiti, interventions in the infrastructure sector and the agriculture sector were underpinned by a governance component in order to combine emergency support with development, which ultimately aims to improve resilience. The efforts in the agriculture sector have included not only improvement of agricultural opportunities by the population, but also working with government and civil society in the development and strengthening of mechanisms to ensure safe water resources and develop response mechanisms to crises that threaten water and agriculture. This means that efforts are both cross thematic as well as bridging humanitarian and development activities.
- Finally, in Myanmar, two partners identified SDC's long-term engagement to improve health service delivery in government and Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) controlled areas as the "perfect mixture of humanitarian response, development, and peacebuilding programming". From a humanitarian perspective, the program works to provide basic health services and immunization to vulnerable and under-served communities, including through the use of "backpack health workers" in some of the most remote border areas. From a development perspective, the program is working on health system development to strengthening both the infrastructure of government and the EAO health centres, while also providing training to health workers on both sides. From a peacebuilding perspective, the program aims at the eventual convergence of both systems by building up trust between both sides through repeated engagement of, for example, technical Training-of-Trainers on issues such as cold-chain vaccine storage and the accompaniment of government health workers on EAO-led vaccination campaigns.

**Table 6: Towards a Theory of Change**

A review of the Theory of Change (ToC) suggested during the inception phase, and of the material reviewed since, both literature, interviews and field visits have led to the (draft) formulation of a revised theory of change. It is important to underscore that the ToC developed here reflects the findings of this assignment and identifies not only what currently takes place, but rather includes suggestions as to what would generate the best possible results. The ToC also recognizes that the environments within which the SDC works are dynamic, often exhibit protracted crisis, and may experience sudden onset crisis in addition.

Development cooperation and humanitarian aid pursue the achievement of the SDG's and specifically the objective to *Leave No-one Behind*.

1. *If* SDC has a joint strategy with joint objectives in a protracted context, decentralized presence and decision-making, and joint desks both in the field in HQ; including that HA in situations of emergencies operates as currently but with an explicit exit strategy for each emergency.
2. *And if* HQ facilitates the nexus by establishing operational effectiveness in programs/projects and efficient institutional processes most notably in planning, and financing in a unified system with joint reporting lines,
3. *Leading to*
  - a. Nexus programming being relevant and efficient within SDC,
  - b. *And* time being freed for staff and management to continuously keep a holistic understanding of dynamics in order to enhance resilience and pursue that systems change can be at the centre of engagement (relevance and effectiveness),
  - c. Coordination and partnerships with other stakeholders (implementers, beneficiaries, other donors) becoming effective in pursuit of enhancing sustainability and impact (coherence and sustainability).

## 4.2 Nexus in strategies

The most recent Dispatch on Switzerland's International Cooperation (2017-2020) aligns with the 'Leave No-one Behind' objective, and it highlights flexibility in funding as a cornerstone to work in protracted crises. The Dispatch states that Switzerland's international cooperation includes a range of instruments that complement, combine and reinforce each other. By acting jointly and contributing their respective comparative advantages, Switzerland's international cooperation actors aim to achieve greater impact than if they were acting individually. The Dispatch underscores that in regions with long-running conflicts, the points of contact between humanitarian aid and development aid activities need to be strengthened. This perspective essentially highlights that the Swiss government sees, at a high level, the importance of ensuring a coherent use of all Swiss tools to improve relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of Swiss support to developing countries, and countries in crisis.

### Evaluation Questions and OECD/DAC Criteria:

#### Effectiveness/Efficiency

- To what extent are the SDC's strategies coherent and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages?
- Do the humanitarian strategies adopt a systems-change perspective?

**Table 7: Humanitarian and development funding in Country cases of the evaluation (numbers from 2018)**

SDC has a long tradition for humanitarian aid and development cooperation being present in the same countries, for example from the Balkans in the 1990s. In the country cases of the evaluation, the sequencing has been the following:

- Myanmar started as humanitarian aid and then development cooperation has followed. The budget for Myanmar is CHF 22 million for development cooperation and CHF 11.2 for Humanitarian Aid, HSD engages with CHF 1 million and CHF 1.3 million from SECO in 2018.
- Haiti started as humanitarian aid and then development cooperation. The budget for Haiti was CHF 10.35 million in development cooperation and CHF 7.73 million in humanitarian aid in 2018.
- HoA started as humanitarian aid (1990s in Somalia) and then development cooperation followed in 2013, the emphasis being on Somalia. The budget for development cooperation is CHF 24 million and CHF 15.3 for humanitarian aid in 2018.



- Mali has had development cooperation for more than 30 years; humanitarian aid came in after the crisis in 2012. The distribution is CHF 20.00 million for development cooperation and CHF 7.47 million for humanitarian aid in 2018.
- South Sudan started as humanitarian and then moved to development cooperation recognising its independence and need for statebuilding. With the crisis there has been a change to humanitarian aid with a budget of CHF 15.12 million in 2018. The remaining budget for development cooperation is CHF 0.29 million in 2018.
- In Pakistan the budget is CHF 32.2 million of which CHF 12 million are destined for humanitarian aid according to the Strategy from 2017-2019.

The assessment of strategies showed that there have been considerable developments since 2013. Making the link from the Dispatch to the level of strategies, the evaluation found that all strategies in the case study countries allude to the importance and value of the nexus. In some cases, the nexus is specifically mentioned, while in others it is implied. In the South Sudan Strategy, a country where development cooperation is not present, nexus thinking is reflected in the strategy's forward-looking focus and emphasis on resilience building. Some staff highlighted that there has been a push from HQ to develop strategies that are nexus oriented, while other staff noted that it has been the on-the-ground experiences that have driven the shift in strategic thinking. The observed shift was also attributed to the Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) and not least the SDGs, which have led to the recognition that the Swiss government must combine all efforts towards meeting these goals. Gender issues are of strategic importance in the nexus, the issue is given particular attention in Table 8.

Examples of nexus in strategies include:

- The overall goals of Switzerland's engagement in the *Horn of Africa (HoA)* since 2013 have been poverty reduction, improvement of human security and stability and addressing migration challenges. The focus is on vulnerable populations and includes both a generational and a gender perspective. The nexus approach is built into the regional focus on North-eastern Kenya (drought, poverty, conflict and refugees and displacement affected communities), Somalia (drought, poverty, conflict and IDPs), and South-eastern Ethiopia (drought, poverty, conflict and IDPs). The utility of the nexus approach is evident for "... *the zones where Switzerland can bring in its regional humanitarian/development and human security expertise, but also which are of direct concern with respect to international migration*"<sup>34</sup>
- In *Mali*, the strategy 2012-2015/2016 focused exclusively on development cooperation. This changed after the crisis in 2012, and since then the Mali program has included humanitarian interventions and the *Strategie de Cooperation Suisse au Mali 2017-2020* is holistic, taking the ongoing crisis as its starting point and integrating humanitarian perspectives. There is a focus on long-term development goals while addressing the immediate needs of vulnerable target groups and humanitarian-development linkages are explicitly included in the strategy. SDC has maintained a focus on the three domains of intervention that are particularly relevant to the Malian context, these are education, rural development and food security; governance and peace; and gender (transversal theme).

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<sup>34</sup> SDC (2013). Cooperation Strategy Horn of Africa 2013-2016.

- Both the current *Myanmar* Cooperation Strategy (2013-2018) and the strategy currently under development (2019-2023) make explicit references to both the Swiss foreign assistance priorities, as well as efforts to increase engagement along the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding (HDP) nexus. While the Strategy currently under development intends to build on the results from the previous strategy, the switch in geographic focus, as well as the more flexible use of HA funding for “protracted crises” and development-like activities in marginalized communities, limits the coherence between the two strategies. However, within the new strategy, the activities appear more coherent and the strategy makes repeated references to working across the nexus and with a whole-of-government approach to collective development and humanitarian challenges.
- In the case of *Haiti*, the 2013-2016 strategy highlights the aftermaths of the earthquake and the general fragility of the country. In the aftermaths of the earthquake (2010) the support provided to Haiti expanded to include humanitarian support and focus attention on reconstruction and resilience building. Since 2013 there has been a clear shift towards an ever-increasing effort to articulate humanitarian and development assistance, reflected in the cooperation note and subsequent strategies (2014-2017 and 2018-2022). Respondents in Haiti consistently felt the importance of linking humanitarian and development interventions was further underscored by the efforts to mitigate impact of hurricane Mathew in 2016.
- In *Pakistan* there is clear strategic and policy level coherence that has promoted humanitarian and development linkages. The 2012-2014 concept note already stressed the value of the integration of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. In 2016 a decision was made to develop a joint Humanitarian-Development strategy (2017-2019). This strategy was jointly drafted by south cooperation and humanitarian aid departments, but does not make explicit mention of nexus, yet the concept is implicit. The strategy does make clear that the combined use of the different instruments as a way to support the most vulnerable and build resilience will be a core element of Switzerland’s intervention modality. The document was, and is, regarded as a considerable step forward towards integrated thinking and implementation.
- In *South Sudan* engagement has been primarily focused on humanitarian aid complemented by human security, and development cooperation, prior to the onset of the current violent conflict. The current strategy stresses its alignment with the SDGs, and specifically goals 2, 5 and 10, which focus on food security, gender equality and reduction of inequality within (and amongst) counties respectively. In line with these overarching objectives, the strategic focus has been tied to food security, protection and promotion of human rights, as well as peace and nation building. Although the strategy does not include the active engagement of development cooperation, it does have a specific focus on resilience-building as a step towards reinitiating development engagement when this becomes possible.

The strategic *coherence* with nexus thinking, which has become increasingly visible in SDC strategic level documentation, is underscored by a systems-change approach that is woven into the fabric of the strategic objectives across the strategies in all case study countries including in South Sudan, which only receives humanitarian aid from SDC. Resilience building, particularly at community and local authority levels, are noted in HoA, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Haiti, as a central element to support systems change. In

Pakistan the focus has been on supporting the development of government mechanisms and systems to better address development challenges, while ensuring that the needs of vulnerable populations are considered and addressed.

**Table 8: Gender and the nexus**

For SDC gender is a cross-cutting issue which is relevant to both humanitarian and development cooperation activities. Within SDC there is a clear recognition that gender issues are context specific and although engagements are different in humanitarian situations than can be in longer-term development trajectories, the underlying gender objective of promoting a transformative change is common across the organization. However, despite efforts to achieve transformative change, a recent evaluation of the SDC contribution to gender found that SDC's efforts are largely gender positive rather than gender transformative.

As pertains to nexus specifically, what can be achieved obviously depends on the intervention modality. Gender focused activities require both the protection focused intervention; as well as the longer-term activities in order to achieve a transformative effect. For example, Gender Based Violence (GBV) requires that victims be supported, and perpetrators dealt with, but these immediate activities do not make any headway towards changing gender constructions and reducing the probability of future violence. Therefore, protection activities must be complemented with economic livelihood opportunities, psycho-social counselling, as well as legal measures to address impunity.

Data collected from the field made limited links between nexus and gender. However there are numerous examples of gender mainstreaming and focus on women and girls in targeting. In Pakistan, SDC has, as part of the governance -local state building efforts, seconded staff to both UNHCR and UN Women in an effort to ensure that both women and refugees/IDP are better protected. This is a good example of a shorter-term effort that while commendable requires a myriad of other activities to ensure that local state agencies are able to ensure that female refugees and IDPs are better protected as a matter of course. In Haiti, efforts to ensure that women masons were included in trainings have not been as successful as would be hoped, underlining the need for a shift in gender perspectives. A female mason interviewed during field data collection underscored how difficult it was to remain in the sector as a woman. SDCs response to the challenge to including women has led to the development of training guides that include women alongside men doing the same tasks, as well as the introduction of a training module which focuses specifically on the importance of having different gender perspectives when designing and building infrastructure. Examples of how gender has been effectively introduced into nexus are limited, although clearly the recognition that gender must be mainstreamed goes hand-in-hand with the efforts to move towards a more nexus approach. *The Council of Europe, General Secretariat concluded in its communication: Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus - Council conclusions (19 May 2017)* "the importance of systematically mainstreaming a gender perspective throughout the humanitarian-development nexus. In particular, the role of women as actors of change, including in humanitarian action, development assistance, peace building and security, mediation, reconciliation and reconstruction, conflict and crisis prevention as well as their heightened vulnerability in crises should be fully recognized. The diverse needs of persons in vulnerable situations, including persons with disabilities, gender-based violence victims, displaced people, older persons and children, should further be considered throughout the response cycle". SDC is fully aligned with this approach judging by the overall focus on gender and addressing vulnerability, although in order to ensure the operational alignment with the above view would need to be articulated, for example in training and guidance on nexus approaches if and when such would be introduced<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf>

### 4.3 Nexus in programs/projects

Currently, there are joint projects in HoA (3) and in Mali (2). In Myanmar, the Embassy is carefully assessing the possibility of utilizing flexibilities in HA funding to support joint activities and help facilitate a shift in geographical focus from South East Myanmar to more central and north eastern areas. In Haiti, following Hurricane Mathew in 2016 the SC was allowed to reallocate a small funding line to support humanitarian interventions. This was regarded as a flexible and responsive approach, and as a practical example of a nexus approach.

A number of humanitarian-financed projects in Haiti, mainly in infrastructure development and agriculture, pursue nexus thinking. These projects have a built-in local governance component in an effort to strengthen local capacity to respond to future crises (in line with Disaster Risk Reduction good practice). These examples show that nexus programming is not only derived from strategic level concepts, but also by existing project portfolio assessments that closely focus on relevance and effectiveness in a given context. Specifically, the project known as PURPOSE worked in this way by aiming to contribute in the short-term to the revival of family farming, the restoration of drinking water quality control mechanisms and the restoration of the capacity of town halls, while employing a structure and approach geared towards longer-term projects.

In South Sudan, for example, humanitarian aid is provided as part of a longer-term aid delivery effort, with considerable emphasis placed on having a solid contextual knowledge that can assist in the identification of opportunities to develop resilience. However, there is a danger that emergency response teams don't make full use of the contextual knowledge on the ground. Indeed, there are different views regarding how well local knowledge is used in cases where emergency response teams are deployed from HQ.

The focus on local context is also reflected in the thematic areas of engagement, as well as the regions selected for support. In Pakistan, for example, the recently merged areas of former FATA<sup>36</sup> were identified specifically because they are considered the most vulnerable. In Myanmar, HoA, Haiti, South Sudan and, to some degree, in Mali, where local and regional governments have been chosen as partners, there is less direct engagements with central governments.

#### Evaluation Questions and OECD/DAC Criteria:

##### Effectiveness/Efficiency

- To what extent are the SDC's programs coherent in cooperation countries (incl. mixed programs?)

##### Relevance

- To what extent does programs take local context into account?
- To what extent does SDC link its humanitarian and development cooperation in response to local contexts and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages?
- Do the humanitarian strategies adopt a systems-change perspective?

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<sup>36</sup> FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas; although FATA were merged into the KP province with the 25th Constitutional amendment in May 2018, for a better understanding, we still use the differentiation between KP and FATA in this document.

The assessment of this evaluation shows that SDC's focus on context is an effort to ensure the relevance of interventions as well as to maximise effectiveness and improve the opportunities for both impact and sustainability. Adequate contextual knowledge is ensured through multiple mechanisms, not least continued dialogue with other actors, including visits to the field, but also through the use of CSPM and MERV, as well as the conduct of periodic risk assessments. The aforementioned efforts enable the SDC to have a solid and accurate understanding of the conditions on the ground.

In support of relevance to local contexts in programs, SDC supports new and agile program and financing modalities in partner organizations in HoA. The "crisis modifier funds" or budget lines for fast disbursements in the Somalia Resilience Program (SomRep), and the Borana Project in Ethiopia are innovative examples of funds that are factored into development programs to support sudden onset emergencies, which are a recurrent feature in the local context. These programs can respond quickly, continue to build the resilience of communities over time and support a system change approach. SDCs support to such modalities is in line with good international practice (see Table 9)<sup>37</sup>.

**Table 9: Crisis Modifier Funds**

A number of donors have incorporated crisis modifiers into programs (often those building resilience) in contexts where there are recurrent crises so that the programs can adapt and respond to small-scale shocks. In USAID, crisis modifiers have usually involved an agreement between OFDA and the mission in country that enables OFDA to fund humanitarian activities through a USAID development program when a crisis occurs (in Ethiopia, USAID has used the mechanism in drought-prone pastoral areas). This can be a useful mechanism for injecting emergency funding quickly, although it is limited in funding and scope and therefore unlikely to be sufficient for a large-scale emergency.

The Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund has established a set of indicators to identify when to trigger a crisis modifier for the projects that it is funding. This takes the form of a risk-financing mechanism to enable projects to adapt and respond to climate-induced shocks.<sup>1</sup> In Somalia, both the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) program and the Somalia Resilience Program (SomRep) have incorporated community-based early warning systems and the use of crisis modifiers.<sup>1</sup> BRCiS has contingency funding embedded in members' multi-year budgets and it maintains close relationships with the donors, facilitating quick funding decisions.<sup>1</sup>

In the Sahel, in 2015, DFID linked a humanitarian fund, Providing Humanitarian Assistance for Sahel Emergencies (PHASE), to the existing multi-year Building Resilience to Climate Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) program as a crisis modifier. The aim was to enable development organizations that were part of BRACED to respond to new humanitarian needs arising in project areas, thereby protecting the project's development gains. While the mechanism proved useful, an evaluation highlighted the need for building a contingency plan into the program with specific triggers for early action. The evaluation concluded that, "Crisis modifiers are not a simple bolt-on to projects. The reality is that working to address crises in development projects requires a fundamental shift in the way development actors design, think and act."

<sup>37</sup> USAID (2017) *Shock Responsive Programming and Adaptive Mechanisms: Approaches and tools*; UNDP (2017) *ZRBF Indicators Reference Guide*; SomRep and FEWSNET (2014) *Building Resilience by Linking Community Based Early Warning Systems to Informal Safety Nets in Somalia*. Presentation to 2nd Arab Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, 14-16 September 2014; BRCiS (2016) *Crisis Modifier and No Regret Responses for Resilience Building*. PowerPoint presentation; Peters, K. and F. Pichon (2017) *Crisis Modifiers: A Solution for a more flexible development-humanitarian system? Evaluative learning for resilience: Lessons from the BRACED experience in the Sahel*.

In Mali, the retrofitting of programs and new and complementary humanitarian interventions has made the overall program relevant to the protracted crisis context. These efforts started with the Appui à la Relance Socio-Economique du Mali (ARSEN) program after the crisis in 2012 being changed to address the collapse of services in the North. The recent examples are the PRESA program with objectives of food security and building of resilience systems; and the Strengthening of education and securing legal protection for vulnerable target groups project in Mopti region. Both these programs have been approved medio 2018. The focus in the Mopti project is on the most vulnerable groups i.e. internally displaced and out-of-school children, and both short-term return to school and long-term quality of education for children from vulnerable populations. The Mopti project and the PRESA programs are examples of SDC's understanding of the dynamics of vulnerability in the conflict-affected areas being central to programming. In Myanmar specifically, real time contextual knowledge is understood by the embassy staff as a key element in ensuring that contextual shifts can be quickly addressed in responses in order to safeguard progress made.

Programmatic coherence between development cooperation and humanitarian aid varies from country to country and within the countries studied. All the cases selected for this evaluation, except for South Sudan, were identified because they are examples of nexus type interventions. Some of the variance can be attributed to the contexts, but also to SDC leadership and staff initiatives in country offices (section 3.4). For example, in Myanmar some regions of the country have received development cooperation support while others have only received humanitarian aid. The same is true of Haiti, HoA and Mali. Therefore, the need and opportunity for coherence may not be present. However, some staff noted that while in some cases, phasing out of one type of aid is understood and contextually sound, in other cases reasons for supporting one area and not another are less clear. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, given as an example by a number of respondents based at HQ, it was noted that the humanitarian and development support has historically been based in different regions of the country and this has limited the opportunities for joint support.

Another example given is South Caucasus, where SDC's Eastern Cooperation has worked with HA colleagues to gradually take over engagement with government partners to deal with issues related to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Disaster Risk reduction (DRR). Generally, the nexus in Eastern Cooperation is centred on strengthening local resilience systems as part of DRR, but there could be other areas of resilience building that would be relevant to explore, as noted in interviews.

The institutional partnerships that SDC has with various Swiss NGO partners is another interesting example. These organizations receive program contributions, partly from all three credits (South, East, and Humanitarian Aid). The organizations can use these funds at their own discretion both for development and humanitarian purposes (see also section 4.4.1).

**Table 10: Different ways to link humanitarian and development programming**

The alignment or coordination of humanitarian and development interventions towards effectively reaching collective outcomes can take different forms, with the ideas of sequencing, layering, complementarity, pivoting and differentiation - all of which are important in framing their operational intersections.<sup>38</sup>

- For example, it might involve *sequencing* of funding instruments and programming, with humanitarian interventions meeting short-term needs while development actors put in place longer-term arrangements.
- It could also involve *layering*, with humanitarian and development actors providing different forms of assistance, or assistance that overlap to the same groups in the same geographical area (e.g. humanitarian assistance to meet immediate needs such as food and non-food items combined with development-funded basic services such as health and education).
- Humanitarian and development interventions might involve *complementarity*, with humanitarian actors meeting lifesaving needs in more insecure parts of a country, while development actors operate in more stable areas. Interventions could also be complementary in terms of populations, with humanitarian actors assisting displaced populations and development actors assisting host communities to ensure adequate coverage of services in the same geographic locations.
- Humanitarian and development interventions can also be co-financed for interventions in the areas of resilience building or durable solutions, where the boundaries between humanitarian aid and development are blurred.
- Designing flexible longer-term development program that can *pivot* or adapt to changing circumstances, including emergencies or other shocks, is also a way to work in the nexus. One technical way of putting this into practice is through a *crisis modifier*.

#### **4.3.1 WOGA in programming**

WOGA is highlighted as a mechanism to ensure the coherent and effective collaboration of all government entities in pursuit of a common goal. At the FDFA this means collaboration between the SDC, the political division which includes the Human Security Division; and other departments including the State Office of Migration; the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS), and the State Secretary for Economic Affairs (SECO) and potentially others. Overall the WOGA concept is aligned with the integration of all Swiss embassies, a shift that was formalized across all embassies in 2017.

Plans to work in a WOGA approach are noted in joint strategies, as is the case in HoA, Myanmar, South Sudan and Pakistan. In Haiti the principal presence is SDC, with an ambassador as head of mission responsible for diplomatic activities. The FDFA is engaged more specifically on the restitution of the Duvalier funds. The views collected through interviews regarding how WOGA is understood and implemented varied. Some argue that WOGA plays a role but in most cases the number of Swiss agencies involved in any one country is limited. SECO is an important WOGA partner, but with limited presence in the country cases covered by the evaluation (only in Myanmar). Others propose that WOGA, irrespective of the number of agencies present in a country, remains relevant because it calls attention to the important role of ensuring a coherent and common Swiss voice. With

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<sup>38</sup> Scott, L., A. Garloch and A. Shepherd (2016) *Resilience and Sustainable Poverty Escapes: Implications for programming*. USAID, Leveraging Economic Opportunities and Chronic Poverty Advisory Network.



regard to actual outcomes, it was noted that the WOGA partners have different reporting mechanisms making it difficult to establish a joint results framework.

HSD is considered a key WOGA partner in protracted crisis, but because of its different organizational structure, there seems to be an unexploited opportunity for complementarity and for capitalising on the humanitarian-development - peace nexus. In Mali, HSD is present and works on peacebuilding including support to training of partners in CSPM, which is beneficial to both the international community, NGOs and to government. However, despite considerable efforts, it has not been possible to find opportunities for complementary programming in the Mopti region. In Somalia, HSD activities are detached from SDC interventions. In Myanmar, both HSD and SECO are present and interviews with Embassy staff overwhelmingly highlighted the utility of having a diversity of opinions and perspectives involved during both formal and informal meetings. However, there was also evidence from both interviews and background documents that the Embassy may not be as “integrated” as the name might imply.

Both in Mali and in the HoA, displacement and mixed migration flows are of key policy interest to Switzerland. Programming towards durable solutions is done by SDC in collaboration with other donor partners, and SDC is active in coordination and policy dialogue, while the migration aspects and the high-level political dialogue rests with the State Office of Migration. Both in HoA and in Mali, respondents noted that it would be useful for the common cause of tackling the issue of migration and displacement politically, if the State Department of Migration had a stronger presence at country level, but this engagement is a lengthy process owing to the different structures of each agency.

#### **Evaluation Questions and OECD/DAC Criteria:**

##### **Effectiveness/Efficiency**

- To what extent does the SDC encourage its bilateral and multilateral partners to ensure linkages?

##### **Effectiveness/Efficiency/Sustainability:**

- To what extent do SDC’s partnerships contribute to addressing both immediate humanitarian needs and developing and implementing long-term solutions in protracted crises?
- What factors are facilitating or hindering the ability of partners to implement the nexus?

##### **Relevance:**

- To what extent do SDC partners have humanitarian-development linkages in place?

## **4.4 Partnerships**

The evaluation was also interested in exploring the extent to which SDC was able to “punch above its weight” and influence the actions of others to strengthen the implementation of nexus. An examination of a range of partnerships—with NGO/CSO partners, host government institutions, and other donors—and the extent to which these partnerships facilitated or hindered a more effective, efficient, relevant, and/or sustainable response, is explored here. The partnerships with other donors were limited, and therefore discussed as part of coordination mechanisms (section 4.5.).

### **4.4.1 NGO/CSO Partnerships**

The evaluation found strong evidence that SDC has, to a large extent, encouraged its NGO/CSO partners to strengthen their work in the nexus during the period reviewed. A



majority of NGO/CSO respondents interviewed across all four case-study countries visited (Haiti, HoA, Myanmar, and Mali) described SDC as an “engaged” partner in both the design and monitoring of activities. SDC was reported to regularly ask for updates on how activities can better reach those in need, and how implementers have considered and/or addressed various nexus issues, particularly those related to CSPM. Examples included:

- Encouraging partners to reframe the forced displacement agenda from a humanitarian issue towards a humanitarian-development linkage topic. Partners also provided examples from Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, where SDC’s “Skills4Life” project helped build skills of young refugees to enter the job market. The dialogue supported by SDC (and others) with the Kenyan government on the longer-term implications and opportunities for refugees to develop a sustainable livelihood and self-sufficiency model in the Kalobeyei Settlement.
- In Mali (Mopti), SDC asked partners to work harder at identifying complementarities and gaps in their humanitarian and peacebuilding work by working closer with OCHA to get a better sense of the vulnerabilities and needs from a humanitarian angle, and to be part of a larger coordination mechanism spanning both humanitarian needs and development issues. The SDC partners implementing in the region of Mopti were also asked by SDC to coordinate regularly among themselves to work with synergies and complementarity.
- In Haiti, partners credited SDC for its flexibility in defining and understanding challenges on the ground. While local partners were not able to articulate the programming as nexus, they were able to describe the importance of being able to respond, on the one hand, quickly, and on the other, with longer-term resilience-building measures.
- In Myanmar, partners lauded SDC for prioritizing working in conflict-affected areas and its ability to carry out programming along 10-year programming timeframes to address both short-term humanitarian needs, but also to help strengthen surrounding systems—such as ethnic health service providers—to provide a longer term and more sustainable response.

This last point, the ability to program along longer time horizons, was raised as a critical factor facilitating working in the nexus by partners in HoA, Mali, Haiti and Myanmar. Interviewees explained that these longer time horizons allowed them to better understand the context, develop more meaningful relationships with key interlocutors, and implement a “systems change” perspective that strengthens supporting institutions instead of only providing direct service delivery, and to facilitate earlier ending of external life-saving support.

Another important element facilitating working in the nexus highlighted by partners was SDC’s willingness to provide so-called program support through the instrument of institutional partnerships that SDC has with approximately 35 Swiss NGOs. Interviews with SDC HQ staff highlighted SDC’s provision of core funding through institutional partnerships to these organizations funded through development instruments and partly through both development and humanitarian instruments. Within this program, which is negotiated for four years (2017 – 2020), these institutional partners can flexibly work in the nexus. Interviewees from one of those NGOs, Caritas, explained how their development department used some of the humanitarian funding to trigger small-scale emergency responses while the humanitarian department uses some of the development funding for

its longer-term work. However, these respondents also clarified that while SDC's institutional support allows for this flexibility, the idea for doing so came from Caritas's own initiative and the willingness of its departments to work together.

SDC's provision of institutional support was also evident at country/regional level. In HoA, SDC has provided core funding to support the Somalia NGO platform which consists of 85 organizations; their agreement with SDC is to work on localization, including opening four local offices in Somalia, as well as specifically mentioned in the agreement - working more on the nexus.

Findings from the e-survey corroborate the experiences recounted during the qualitative interviews. According to the e-survey, 54 percent of SDC staff respondents (64 of 118) reported that they had encouraged NGO partners to work along the nexus, as compared to only 15 percent who reported that they had not (31 percent of respondents marked "not applicable" based on their position). However, while NGO/CSO respondents were generally complementary of their partnerships with SDC, a minority did offer suggestions for how SDC could improve its support to partners in relation to the nexus. These suggestions could be categorized into two general themes: (1) operational and (2) conceptual. Operationally, HQ staff from one large international NGO and frequent partner to SDC explained that SDC's decentralized approach made it difficult for their organization to develop common approaches across the different countries where it partners with SDC. They expressed frustration that an idea or approach to working in the nexus that had been tested and proven successful in one country would then be rejected when proposed in another SDC priority country. They also explained that different funding requirements between SDC's instruments also had significant implications on their programming. One obvious example was that SDC's HA instrument allowed the partner to include overhead costs in the contract, where SC budget requirements did not allow for overheads. This was said to create an incentive for the partner to prioritize working with Humanitarian Aid - from a purely financial perspective. Conceptually, a few partners explained that the concept of the nexus still appeared to be interpreted differently not just across different SDC country offices, but even among staff. They explained that some SDC staff (as well as their own staff at times), still appeared to be stuck in the traditional "humanitarian" and "development" continuum paradigms. One common sticking point they mentioned was that SDC at times underestimates how long it takes to transition from a highly unstable situation focused purely on humanitarian response, to a more integrated nexus response.

#### **4.4.2 Multilateral Partnerships**

Similar to findings from interviews with NGO/CSO partners, multilateral partners interviewed were also generally positive on their partnerships with SDC. SDC was once again described as an engaged, transparent, and "*principled partner*", in reference to Switzerland's focus on the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian responses.

While individual examples varied by context, three key strengths emerged from the discussions: (1) SDC's ability to program along longer timeframes (covered above); (2) SDC's ability to convene others to work in the nexus (covered below in section 4.4.); and (3) SDC ability to provide assistance on short notice through the SHA, which could be used to fill strategic gaps quickly.

While overall multilateral partners were generally positive in their references to SDC, a few interviewees also offered suggestions to improve on the way SDC partners with multilaterals

to work in the nexus. In Myanmar, one senior UN official recommended that SDC be more assertive with its multilateral partners and take a stronger hand in shaping their work in the nexus. The respondent mentioned that SDC was a major donor to this UN agency institutionally, and thus held a significant level of influence with key actors in HQ; thereby SDC could better leverage to support its agenda in the nexus. This view was echoed by other respondents. In Mali, for example, partners of the Commission Réhabilitation des Zones Post-Conflict (CRZPC) - which assists government and UN agencies with high-level political dialogue towards more joined up humanitarian-development approaches to health, education, food security, WASH and protection issues - strongly encouraged SDC to leverage its neutrality and positive reputation to step up to an instrumental role to help coordination of the multilateral partners. Interestingly, this view was also shared by staff within SDC's own Global Cooperation division, who urged "use us to facilitate that we can use our multilateral partners more strategically in the nexus" as a way also to expand the nexus implementation to go beyond a purely Swiss instrument question.

Interestingly, apart from coordination mechanisms, which are covered in section 4.5., SDC strategies and other agency documents clearly identify SDC's contribution to multi-donor funds, as well as secondments and provision of technical expertise, as an important modality for how SDC can engage in the nexus. The strategies for Myanmar, HoA, and Mali all specifically mention that fragile contexts require mixed aid modalities and that SDC's financial and technical contributions to multilateral mechanisms provide an important contribution to that mix<sup>39</sup>. Interviewees in both the field and HQ argued that SDC could do more to prepare and encourage its multilateral partners to support its activities and provide a more sustainable, nexus-focused approach. Specifically, interviews with staff in the Global Cooperation division at SDC felt there was an unexploited potential for SDC to broaden its use of all instruments and bring in more multilateral nexus engagement from HQ level, and not only as currently bring in the multilateral engagement from a field perspective.

The evaluation did find interesting examples of SDC reaching out to multilateral partners in the field to promote the nexus, such as in the Skills4Life project in Kakuma and the multilateral link being developed both to the UNHCR and to the IFC in the Kalobeyei Settlement in Kenya (as also mentioned in section 4.3.1.). The partnership with IGAD, which aims to strengthen the role of a regional organization as an intermediary in regional policy dialogue on durable solutions, is also supporting nexus work.

#### **4.4.3 Host Country Government Partnerships**

While evidence from the evaluation suggests that SDC generally has sought to encourage its NGO/CSO and multilateral partners to work more in the nexus, evidence from the e-survey and case studies also suggests that SDC has been less active in engaging its host-country government partners to do so. Only 39 percent (n=188) of SDC staff responded that they had encouraged host-country partners to work in the nexus over the last five years (compared to 44 percent for multilateral partners and 54 percent for NGO/CSO partners).

Qualitative responses during fieldwork echoed the finding that SDC staff had been less active in encouraging host government partners to work in the nexus. Reasons varied from one context to another: in Haiti and Myanmar, a key barrier reported was the low levels of government capacity. However, while working with central government is largely impossible

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<sup>39</sup> ODI (2016). SDC's engagement in protracted crisis.

in Haiti, and capacity is limited at many levels, efforts to work with local governments have been sustained. Indeed, some respondents noted that working with local government representatives requires a more complete knowledge of the individual as well as of his or her position to warrant investment. Who one is engaged with, respondents noted in Haiti, can be a key element in ensuring that engagement leads to expected results. SDC documents and staff reported that they simply did not feel confident that their government counterparts had the capacity to effectively engage in efforts to plan along the nexus. In Myanmar, the challenge was the lack of a clear government focal point to engage in discussions on the nexus. For example, one partner working on nexus issues related to land tenure in Myanmar reported having to engage with 26 different government agencies to complete a basic mapping of land tenure around the country. In Haiti, Pakistan, and South Sudan, SDC staff explained that they actively avoided discussing nexus issues with government partners. In Haiti, staff explained that this was due to a lack of a government strategy related to the nexus, in particular, and development in general, while in Pakistan and South Sudan it was more related to alignment with SDC exit priorities and a lack of confidence in the government as a reliable partner. Interestingly, HoA and Mali were outliers to this trend with staff reporting positive experiences of engaging government on nexus issues, particularly when working with local government and, in Mali, also with central Government. For example, in Mali, SDC has been working with both central and local governments on nexus activities related to education and food security. Similarly, in Mopti region, SDC is the only international partner currently providing budget support to the local council. Likewise, in HoA, SDC is working to build up local government capacity in areas of preparedness and response mechanisms in northern Kenya with other partners in the K-Rapid program, in Somalia through the SomRep program, and in Ethiopia through the Borana project.

#### 4.5 Coordination Mechanisms

As mentioned above, as well as in several SDC country strategies reviewed by the evaluation, SDC has utilized various approaches at country level to encourage others to work more in the nexus. The evaluation noted several instances where Switzerland is a convener to facilitate/encourage nexus work, including:

- Supporting IGAD to convene the UNHCR and regional Governments to work on Durable Solutions specifically in relation to the closing of the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya;
- Playing a key convening role in a “task force” on the humanitarian-development nexus in Mali;
- Chairing the “SE Working Group” in Myanmar and facilitating discussions on a variety of nexus issues related to school and health centre construction and operation, as well as successfully advocating the Fund Board of the “Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund” (LIFT) to work more along the nexus.

##### **Evaluation Questions and OECD/DAC Criteria:**

##### **Effectiveness/Efficiency**

- To what extent does the SDC encourage its bilateral and multilateral partners to ensure linkages?

##### **Effectiveness/Sustainability:**

- How can SDC’s partnerships be improved in order to achieve humanitarian-development linkages?

- Reorganizing and serving as Co-Chair of the donor group in Haiti and facilitating discussions on how each donor defined the nexus and their individual programming experiences.

Data collected in the different countries consistently supports the view that Switzerland has earned a name for itself, both in being well informed regarding the conditions on the ground, as well as supporting, and in some cases leading, donor coordination efforts. As mentioned above and along the same lines, in all countries visited for this assignment, partners recognized the SDC as a principled donor.

In addition to the above, both in HoA, Haiti, Mali and Myanmar, SDC is recognized by the partners for its agile and flexible approach, being seen as a trusted and knowledgeable partner, that always attends meetings, comes prepared with representatives at the right level and is willing to go the extra mile – it is considered a constructive engagement, which shows respect and enables partners to build a real partnership.

#### **4.5.1 Relevance to local contexts**

There was a common theme across both the interviews and documents reviewed for this evaluation that nexus interventions needed to be relevant to local contexts and focused on meeting the short- and long-term needs of intended beneficiaries. SDC's working understanding of the nexus recognizes this and clearly puts the end beneficiaries at the centre of interventions. This echoes findings from the team's document review which found emphasis on the need to develop vision around the target population to make sure people get access to health, education, while moving towards collective outcomes, without necessarily worrying about whether these activities fall under humanitarian or development labels.

However, while the majority of interviewees felt that SDC did an adequate job of keeping a focus on end beneficiaries' needs, a few respondents in HQ and HoA, reported that they felt SDC, at times, shifted its attention towards its partners' needs and their ability to meet contractual obligations, rather than the degree to which partners responded to beneficiary needs specifically.

Notably, some respondents questioned the utility of talking about "needs of beneficiaries" as they felt this implicitly conveyed a sense of humanitarian assistance and that SDC should instead move towards a vision of improving society by supporting the development of stable and cohesive communities. In Mali, a few interviewees asked what should happen when a crisis occurs outside of the areas where SDC is currently working. They noted that it was unclear if and how the SDC's humanitarian team would be able to focus on those most affected in an emergency area or if they should follow a more rigid "nexus response" and continue to support SDC's larger development interests and work in areas that may not be not most affected.

#### **4.6 Risks of humanitarian development linkages**

There was strong consensus, both from respondents during fieldwork and from the background documents reviewed, that **context should drive any consideration of pursuing the nexus** and that SDC should avoid the risk of trying to implement the nexus uniformly across all contexts. When asked if they could identify any other potential risks in

trying to more consistently link humanitarian and development approaches, the following views were most prominent:

**Diversion of funding and expertise:** Staff explained that the management and response to humanitarian crises required different expertise and funding flexibility than responses to longer-term development challenges. They expressed concern that by requiring staff to have too broad skills sets and expertise might in turn limit the depth of that expertise. Additionally, they provided various examples of how using HA funding for development projects might limit SDC's ability to respond to acute and sudden onset emergencies, or vice versa, or how the use of South Cooperation (SC) funds for response to recurrent humanitarian crises might limit a SC budget already under threat at the Swiss Parliament.

**Delayed response:** A concern raised primarily by HA staff focused on the risk that taking a more "development approach" to emergencies - particularly in terms of baselines, procurement restrictions, and in-depth conflict sensitivity analysis - would undermine HA's ability to respond rapidly, which is considered a key strength of Swiss emergency engagement.

**Conflict sensitivity:** The risk of being conflict insensitive and "doing harm" was a counterpoint by development staff to the risk of a delayed response highlighted above. Respondents feared that a push to work more along the nexus might be misinterpreted as an encouragement to take "short cuts" or undertake less rigorous assessments in order to facilitate a quicker response. Staff explained that while tedious at times, there were valid reasons as to why development projects can take up to 18-24 months to start.

**Creating dependency:** In Mali, it was said that delivering food aid as an interim measure in a development program can maintain target groups as recipients. This can jeopardize the interest of target groups to actively participate in programs where they contribute themselves towards self-reliance. It was also noted that humanitarian aid provides services of better quality (for example in health) than is feasible for Government and development programs to provide. Similarly, in South Sudan SDC recognizes that there is a need to counter the culture of dependency that exists given the long-term conflict and experience of direct aid that the population has become accustomed too.

**Compliance:** Staff also highlighted potential audit and fiduciary risks associated with working in the nexus. Examples most often centred on instances where HA or SC funding had been used in ways to overly stretch the definition of the type of activity such funding was intended to support. Staff explained that part of the careful and divergent approval process at HQ was derived from the fact that these staff had to carefully account and report back on how this funding was used.

**Impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian aid:** Some humanitarian partners in Mali asked that SDC continue to be a "principled donor" and help uphold the humanitarian principles which they felt are threatened by linkages with development approaches.

**SDCs internal structure:** Within SDC the principal risks to linking humanitarian and development activities are not tied to the response and support provided to beneficiaries; rather, these are about political and financial implications for the different departments within SDC itself. One fear is that funding will be redistributed from either development or humanitarian budget lines in pursuit of activities that do not traditionally fall under that domain and that this could lead to budget cuts. Staff are also worried that pursuing nexus

interventions might inadvertently increase internal tensions and perceptions of “stepping on people’s toes”.

## 4.7 Conclusions

The nexus in SDC is understood as *a means to an end*, and conceptually it covers strategy, programming, partnerships and coordination. There is coherence between those elements in SDC’s nexus thinking. This is underscored by a systems change thinking that is woven into the fabric of the strategic objectives across the strategies in the case study countries covered by the evaluation. The systems change approach is for example leading SDC to support innovative and flexible programming and financing modalities in partner organizations.

Resilience building is an opportunity to secure sustainability, or at least have a better chance of sustainability, and building resilience is strongly aligned with the idea that in its provision of support, Switzerland’s overall objective is to “Leave No-one Behind”. By focusing on resilience, SDC recognises that when development efforts are set back by emergencies, stronger resilience means that the effects of the setback are reduced. However, SDC needs to have sufficient M&E data to verifiably and objectively demonstrate that nexus approaches lead to better results.

SDC has taken important initial steps towards joint strategies and designed a handful of well-crafted nexus programs, however joint analysis should be institutionalized across all relevant country engagements for the departments to consistently have a joined-up view of the context and set strategic objectives for engagement and bring the different instruments and partnerships to play their part.

The evaluation concludes that the experiences in HoA contain important elements of a model to develop further in future, bearing in mind the importance of taking each particular context as the starting point.

In spite of the intentions, the evaluation concludes that WOGA had limited effect on ensuring coherence and promoting the nexus. The inclusion of peacebuilding is important in contexts of fragility and conflict, and a closer collaboration between HSD and SDC will enhance careful consideration in each and every context to ensure what a “triple nexus” entails and what Switzerland’s role would be within the nexus.

There is room for SDC to more proactively advocate and solicit its multilateral partners to work in synergy with bilateral efforts. SDC should look for ways that Switzerland more proactively can engage with its multilateral partners to help resource and scale up nexus programming building both on country level multilateral engagements and a more concerted use of the Global Cooperation Department as a key internal partner.

Optimizing the use of its partnerships will be critical to SDC efforts to meet the short- and long-term needs of beneficiaries, and specifically in providing more risk taking and innovation support that helps develop capacities and approaches that reduce their future vulnerabilities and increase their resilience.

The evaluation also concludes the principled donor role is important for the overall conceptual development and implementation of nexus approaches in global contexts and in specific sectors, countries and regions. SDC could do even more to influence the

international community, national stakeholders and global processes through further engagement in coordination.

## 5. Global Alignment and Benchmarking

### 5.1 Alignment with international commitments

Switzerland is actively engaged in shaping the international commitments related to the achievement of the SDG's and implementation of reforms processes that will enable the achievement of the SDGs by 2030. SDC has also recently published a *Guidance note on Leaving No-one Behind*, which increasingly will frame Swiss international engagement in the next Dispatch. Traditionally Switzerland has had a strong relationship with the multilateral system, and its traditional focus on humanitarian action has been important for the most recent engagement in protracted crises and the conceptual development and closer linkage between humanitarian and development action. These processes are for donors, including Switzerland, a longer-term engagement internationally towards increased coherence of delivering aid in protracted crises (see Table 11). Switzerland has most recently engaged in humanitarian reform process (the Grand Bargain), the World Humanitarian Summit and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Interviews confirmed that SDC actively engages at the global level but wants to engage in efforts to ground international commitments into new practices. The evaluation finds, based on interviews with staff and partners, that Switzerland is a serious and committed actor and seeks to align its own systems with international commitments. Hence there is a conducive policy environment for the nexus within SDC with the institutional challenges that have been discussed in Chapter 3 of this report.

#### Evaluation Questions and OECD/DAC Criteria:

##### Effectiveness/Efficiency/Sustainability:

- What are the risks of linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation for implementing the SDC's commitments to both humanitarian principles and the principles of development cooperation?

##### Relevance:

- Are the SDC's objective and approaches in line with its international commitments with regards to the development/humanitarian linkage (Agenda 2030, World Humanitarian Summit commitments?)
- To what extent do the SDC's operational and institutional approaches align with global good practice on humanitarian-development linkages?

**Table 11: Donor Frameworks and Commitments related to coherence**

2003	Good Humanitarian Donorship: Principles and Good Practice	Principle 9: Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities
2005	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	Point 7: Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations... In such situations, worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonized within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of partner countries.



2005	Addis Ababa Action Agenda	Point 6: We recognize the need for the coherence of developmental and humanitarian finance to ensure timelier, comprehensive, appropriate and cost-effective approaches to the management and mitigation of natural disasters and complex emergencies.
2007	Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations	FSP 1: Take context as the starting point: Understand the specific context in each country and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. FSP 4: Prioritize prevention – International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest
2008	Accra Agenda for Action	Point 21: Adaptation of aid policies for countries in fragile situations. Including commitments to undertake joint assessments (a), to jointly define realistic objectives to tackle root causes and ensure protection (c), and flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities.
2015	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs)	Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all Goal 17.14: Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development Paragraph 74 (e): They will be people-centred, gender-sensitive, respect human rights and have a focus on the poorest, most vulnerable and those furthest behind.
2015	Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030	Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to 'Build Back Better' in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction
2016	World Humanitarian Summit, Grand Bargain	Commitment 10: Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors
2016	New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants	Commitment 38: We will take measures to ... enable host countries and communities to respond both to the immediate humanitarian needs and to [refugees' and migrants'] longer-term development needs.

Adapted from<sup>40</sup>:

## 5.2 Benchmarking

One of the three purposes of this evaluation is “*to compare the SDC’s performance in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation with international practices*”. SDC and the evaluation team agreed to use the New Way of Working (NWOW) as a framework for the benchmarking exercise, since this is driving current thinking and action around the humanitarian-development nexus.

In discussion with SDC, the evaluation identified four actors for the exercise. These are two donors – the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and Global Affairs Canada – and two SDC partners, WFP and Caritas Switzerland. The team

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<sup>40</sup> OECD (2017) *Humanitarian Development Coherence*. World Humanitarian Summit: Putting Policy into Practice. The Commitments into Action Series. OECD Publishing. Available online: <http://www.oecd.org/development/humanitarian-donors/docs/COHERENCE-OECD-Guideline.pdf>

conducted interviews with each agency and reviewed relevant documents. It was a challenge to secure an interview with WFP and the agency did not supply documents in addition to those provided by SDC, so the benchmarking exercise has limited evidence regarding how it is putting strategic commitments into practice. Annex D summarises the findings from the benchmarking exercise, providing examples of how SDC and the other actors are implementing the four elements of the NWOW. This section presents the main findings from the four organizations that participated in the exercise organized according to the four elements of the NWOW. It does not present findings related to SDC since these are covered in other sections of this report and in the summary in Annex D. However, it concludes by highlighting relevant lessons for SDC.

### **5.2.1 Strategies and collective outcomes**

The benchmarking exercise found that all four organizations had strategic frameworks for working in the humanitarian-development nexus to varying degrees. Sida, WFP and Caritas have these at both the global and country levels. WFP's Strategic Plan 2017-2022 outlines how the agency can leverage its strengths and humanitarian response capacities to contribute to delivering the SDGs. This focus on delivering the SDGs is reflected in WFP's new Country Strategic Plans, new Corporate Results Framework and its revised financial framework.<sup>41</sup> Sida's Vision 2019-2023 provides global strategic direction and a growing number of its country strategies include a focus on humanitarian-development linkages. Caritas's 2020 strategy presents a model demonstrating how the organization seeks to meet basic needs, strengthen resilience and enhance equity to contribute to human development and to end poverty. This demonstrates Caritas's "understanding that development cooperation and humanitarian aid are integral elements of one single undertaking".<sup>42</sup> Country or regional strategies adapt this model to the specific context. Canada has been more specific in its approach to the nexus. It has a three-year Middle-East strategy for Syria and Iraq with a WOGA approach and was in the process of developing a strategic document to define how different types of assistance for the Rohingya crisis fit together.

Political will and strategic leadership have been important drivers of working in the nexus for Sida, Canada and WFP. Although the NWOW framework does not take this into account, they can be critical in enabling organizations to put in place the measures needed to link humanitarian and development assistance. Canadian political will to ensure a comprehensive response to the Syria and Iraq crises led to agreements on collective outcomes, structures for coordination and collaborative working. For the next three-year strategy, Global Affairs Canada will seek joint humanitarian and development funding, for example for the education sector in Jordan.

For Sida and WFP, Agenda 2030 and the commitment to 'Leave No-one Behind' are the collective outcomes towards which they are working. Several Sida country strategies focus on strengthening the resilience of vulnerable people and communities as a way of bringing together humanitarian and development assistance.<sup>43</sup> Sida has also been incorporating risk,

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<sup>41</sup> WFP (2016) *Integrated Road Map: Positioning WFP for a changing world. Informal consultation document*. Rome, Italy.

<sup>42</sup> Caritas Switzerland (2016) *End Poverty: The International Cooperation Strategy 2020*. Lucerne, Switzerland. Pg. 14.

<sup>43</sup> Sida (2018) *Sida's experience of operationalizing HUM-DEV nexus*. Stockholm, Sweden.

vulnerability and resilience into its multidimensional poverty analyses. Including a specific objective in its development strategies has enabled Sida to respond flexibly to emergencies. For example, a nexus objective in its Uganda strategy meant that it could adapt its support quickly to respond to a new influx of refugees. Sida is also able to use its development cooperating funding flexibly. For example, during the threat of famine in Somalia in 2017, it wrote to its development partners stating that it would allow them to change their existing programs to respond to the threat. Some partners responded so that, for example, an organization supporting a local radio station used this to broadcast humanitarian information.

### **5.2.2 Common context analyses**

Sida was the most advanced of the four organizations at undertaking common context analyses and needs assessments. Its annual humanitarian crisis analysis (done country-by-country to help Sida prioritise the allocation of humanitarian funds) provides an opportunity to involve development colleagues. It develops development country strategies, usually every five years, so there are fewer regular opportunities for humanitarian staff members to engage in these processes, but they are increasingly involved. There are also other opportunities during the year for humanitarian and development staff to share information and discuss opportunities for collaboration, such as Sida's annual retreat for humanitarian staff from the field and headquarters. Sida does not have a formal structure to promote engagement and collaboration between its humanitarian and development staff currently (in the past, at headquarters level, it had country teams in the conflict and post-conflict department that included a humanitarian staff member). Therefore, these mechanisms have developed because staff recognise their interdependence and find the interactions beneficial.

### **5.2.3 Working on the basis of comparative advantage**

None of the four organizations had clear guidelines or mechanisms for identifying the comparative advantage of their humanitarian and development work in a given context. This was not an issue for Caritas since its staff work in a cohesive way (for example, a staff member might work on humanitarian and development issues within a country or on the same sector, such as education, across countries). WFP tended to work to its comparative advantage on the basis of external requests, such as a government requesting its expertise in developing a common cash platform. Sida acknowledged that, whilst it is aiming to increase the flexibility of its financing and operations so that it can use different instruments on the basis of comparative advantage, this is still personality-dependent. Sida and Canada both seek to select partners on the basis of their comparative advantage in a specific context.

Sida has made two changes that help it to work on the basis of comparative advantage. One is that its staff can move from working on humanitarian assistance to development cooperation, and vice versa. This helps to break down barriers internally and enables staff to better identify the comparative advantage of Sida's humanitarian and development assistance. The other is that, in 2017, it changed its contribution system to make it easier to transfer development funds to the humanitarian team for disbursement since the latter has faster procedures. For example, Sida was providing both humanitarian and development funding to WFP and UNHAS in Sudan so the Africa Department forwarded its contribution to the humanitarian team for disbursement. The humanitarian team managed the funds, but both sections monitored its use. There are a number of cases where Sida

has provided both humanitarian and development funding to the same partner, particularly UNICEF. In the case of MSB, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Sida's Africa Department has provided development funding for its resilience work so that the humanitarian team could focus its funding to MSB on more lifesaving activities.

#### **5.2.4 Multi-year humanitarian financing**

Both Sida and Global Affairs Canada have made a concerted effort to provide multi-year humanitarian financing. Canada co-chairs the Grand Bargain workstream on Multi-Year Humanitarian Planning and Funding with UNICEF. In 2017, it hosted a workshop that aimed to consolidate learning on good practice and challenges, and commissioned a synthesis paper for this. This synthesis paper and a joint OCHA, FAO and NRC report on multi-year humanitarian financing capture important lessons relating to this issue.<sup>44</sup> This includes identifying the key challenge that implementing organizations, and the humanitarian system as a whole, are not yet set up for multi-year working and to deliver the associated benefits. Despite this, both Canada and Sida have allocated multi-year funding to partners. However, both continue to disburse this funding in annual tranches.

For recipient organizations, the main challenge is the lack of availability of genuine multi-year funding that would enable them to take longer-term approaches and adapt to changing needs. This reduces the incentive to change planning and other systems to work in a multi-year way.

#### **5.2.5 Additional key lessons**

The NWOW framework is not comprehensive and other lessons emerged from the benchmarking exercise that could be useful for SDC. One is around Sida's experience with resilience programming. Although the agency has spent considerable time and effort at headquarters to develop guidance on resilience, at field level, the concept of 'resilience programming' has not proved helpful because program officers tend to see this as something separate to their work. Mainstreaming resilience and vulnerability into existing programs are more helpful, for example, asking a health program officer to consider how to make their program more relevant to vulnerable groups that Sida is supporting with humanitarian aid.

For Caritas, its organizational structure has been the key to enabling it to incorporate both humanitarian and development activities in the same program. Although it does have geographical teams and a humanitarian team, it has a clear division of responsibility for responding to emergencies of different sizes and also a process for allocating funding internally, based on the type of activity rather than the source of funding. Therefore, when Caritas receives institutional partnership funding from SDC that comes from different credits, the organization uses the funding not according to the source credit but according to how it works internally. This enables the humanitarian section to receive development funding for its longer-term work, while the development sections receive humanitarian funding for small-scale emergency responses.

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<sup>44</sup> See Global Affairs Canada (2017) *Synthesis Paper - Multi-year planning and funding for humanitarian action: towards good practice lessons, standards or benchmarks. Background documentation -- Grand Bargain consultation on Multi-Year Humanitarian Planning and Funding* and FAO, OCHA and NRC (2017) *Living up to the Promise of Multi-Year Humanitarian Financing*.

An internal evaluation of humanitarian-development linkages in Sida identified separate coordination systems for humanitarian aid and development cooperation as a barrier to joint analyses at country level. Sida has sought to contribute to improving coordination mechanisms and, in Uganda, it supported the secondment of two humanitarian-development coordinators to UNDP. In Myanmar, Sida has advocated for the donor coordination committee to identify common interests across humanitarian and development assistance.<sup>45</sup>

### **5.3 Lessons from the benchmarking exercise for SDC**

Of the four organizations covered by the benchmarking exercise, Sida is perhaps furthest forward in linking its humanitarian and development assistance, although Caritas has long had an enabling organizational structure, so the issue has been less challenging. WFP has put in place the strategies, policies and systems for working in the nexus though it appeared to be early days in terms of seeing these translated into practice at country level. Global Affairs Canada is at an early stage of working in the nexus, having made most progress in Syria and Iraq due to political will and interest in these contexts.

As demonstrated by the matrix in Annex D, SDC is also working on the elements of the NWOW framework. Its main strength is that unlike most donors (including Sida), SDC has a bottom-up approach to its work. Working in the nexus matters most at field level, in order to deliver better outcomes for affected populations. The examples of nexus program presented in this report demonstrate that SDC has the potential to work successfully in the nexus. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of future nexus programming, SDC could learn from Sida about more joint analyses and flexible funding mechanisms, from WFP about putting in place relevant policies and strategies, and potentially from Caritas on organization structure although this will be more challenging for SDC as a donor agency.

### **5.4 Conclusions**

SDC's main strength is that, unlike most donors, it has a bottom-up approach to its work. Working in the nexus matters most at field level in order to deliver better outcomes for affected populations. The examples of nexus programming demonstrate that SDC has the potential to work successfully in the nexus. To improve the effectiveness of future nexus programming, SDC could learn from Sida about more joint analyses and flexible funding mechanisms, from WFP about putting in place relevant policies and strategies, and potentially from Caritas on having decision-making procedures that allow for a flexible combination of different types of funding instruments.

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<sup>45</sup> Sida (2018) *Interaction between humanitarian and development cooperation - from operating plan prioritisation to practice*.

## 6. Recommendations

This section presents a prioritized list of recommendations that SDC should consider in order to mainstream an effective nexus approach, reduce institutional barriers and promote good operational practice.

1. **Develop and communicate a common institutional definition/understanding of the nexus.** SDC has already worked on a common institutional definition/understanding, and taking the next step to agree on, institutionalize and communicate this to staff and partners would be important for future engagement in the nexus. The nexus definition/understanding should include specific examples of where and how it is being operationalized, and how it is applicable across all departments in SDC. This also includes the role of the thematic networks in order to enhance continuous learning across contexts. SDC should, to continuously develop the nexus as a context-specific approach including context specific theories of change (ToC). SDC should also set up training and team building for both management, staff and key partners. The definition/understanding will also be the basis for institutional changes found in the recommendations below.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership	Short to Medium-Term

2. **One Joint Framework Credit.** SDC should develop a strong business case to lobby the Swiss Parliament for the merger and creation of a single shared Framework Credit. This will help to address a root cause of many of the current institutional and operational divides between the HA and development cooperation divisions identified by the evaluation. It will also help to facilitate joint accountability and reduce transaction costs by encouraging a more simplified, streamlined, and consistent approach. The current separate framework credits mean separate accountabilities and siloed institutional processes hindering nexus effectiveness. The different divisions will still operate with their mandates, but with more holistic and flexible institutional modalities.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership	Medium to Long-Term

3. **Facilitate a united organization.** In addition to the recommendation above, SDC leadership should consider the creation of joint country/regional desks for HA and SC/EC staff in HQ, particularly for countries experiencing protracted crises, and work to establish closer relations with the political desks. This change process can learn from the experiences gained in cooperation offices and the organizational attempt with a joint organizational unit between HA and SC in North Africa and MENA. Likewise, SDC leadership should consider introducing joint operation committees in cooperation offices and HQ comprised of representatives from HA and SC/EC of equal seniority. This process should also include developing joint documentation for all processes (as is starting to happen in a few cases).

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership	Short to Medium-Term

4. **Encourage decentralized reporting lines.** SDC leadership should consider restructuring reporting lines so that all staff should report to the Head of Cooperation in countries where there is programmatic engagement. This step will enable joint understanding, team work and efficient and effective management. This includes delegation of responsibility to the Head of Cooperation by WOGA partners as relevant for holistic engagement. Joint analysis and strategy among WOGA partners should also result in complementary engagements for example in displacement/ migration and peacebuilding.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
High	SDC Senior Leadership and WOGA partners	Short to Medium-Term

5. **Build evidence-base and specific examples of where and how SDC has implemented nexus.** SDC should gather evidence of the comparative advantages of nexus approaches and how these represent stronger and more sustainable investments in building systems and reducing future vulnerabilities. In order to help counteract political pressures and build public support, SDC should build its evidence base and demonstrate with clear, real-world examples how the nexus lead to more efficient, effective, and sustainable outcomes for those living in these situations. Strategies should have results matrices for all partners, as well as a monitoring system that supports flexibility and needs to change during implementation.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC E+C division, Swiss Cooperation Offices	Medium-Term

6. **Institutionalize joint analysis; seek common outcomes and enhance partnerships that promote the nexus.** SDC should institutionalize joint analysis, partnerships, and implementation during the early conceptualization of new programs and new phases of existing programs in a country/regional context in order to strengthen the nexus approach. This includes providing more up-front analysis of comparative advantages, broader vulnerabilities, and strategies for “Leaving No-one Behind.” SDC should consider building on experiences from HoA as a model to start institutionalizing humanitarian-development linkages in a regional context.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC Division Heads, Head of Cooperation Offices, and Sector Leads	Short to Medium-Term

7. **Encourage partners to develop and pursue innovative approaches.** SDC cooperation offices should continue to increase their support to consortia of partners that work in innovative ways and long term with humanitarian development linkages

which also encourages monitoring of outcomes. This includes both programs, multi-donor funds and coordination mechanisms. Such engagement aims to continuously test and enhance relevance and effectiveness of new and existing nexus approaches. The overall aim is to strengthen the resilience of communities living in protracted crisis.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	Swiss Cooperation Offices	Medium-Term

8. **Strengthen internal coordination.** SDC leadership should provide encouragement and guidance to staff on how to work with the Global Cooperation division in order to more proactively connect to multilateral and regional actors on nexus collaboration. This is especially the case in situations where either HA is engaged as the only Swiss actor; or where South Cooperation or Eastern Cooperation is engaged as the only actor. This closer coordination will help accelerate sustainability and impact, but also enable potential exit strategies for Switzerland in countries where there has been long-term engagement in humanitarian aid, which is not directly related to emergencies.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	SDC Senior Leadership	Short to Medium-Term

9. **Leverage the role as a principled donor.** SDC cooperation offices should continue to work with partners including donors, governments, civil society, and private sector with the specific aim to bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actor coordination in specific contexts and in priority sectors – and thus capitalize on the principled donor position. SDC is considered a trusted and engaged donor, which upholds principles of good donorship. Recognizing that humanitarian action and development cooperation have different objectives, SDC should continue to emphasize and enable increased coordination and collaboration based on comparative advantages and “do not harm principles”.

Priority:	Responsible Entity:	Timeframe:
Medium	Swiss Cooperation Offices	Medium-Term



## Annex A: Quick Glance of findings, conclusions, and recommendations

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
Overall			
I.			
<p>SDC has over the last few years started to conceptualize the nexus. A recent institutional understanding/definition reads: <i>“the integrated usage of instruments (both bilateral and multilateral) of humanitarian aid and development cooperation”</i>. Integrated is explained as the <i>“the simultaneous application of instruments in the same context in order to augment, effectively intertwine and operate synergistically to enhance outcomes for the targeted population in the short, medium and long term”</i>. The conceptualization further notes that the nexus concept is most relevant in protracted crises and that it can be understood as a means towards achieving the Agenda 2030 commitment to <i>Leave No-one Behind</i>. This institutional understanding/definition was presented at a senior management level event in February 2018 but has not been endorsed by the leadership of SDC or communicated more broadly to general staff.</p> <p>Many staff, not least national staff are discouraged by the lack of communication of an institutional definition of the nexus. It was</p>	<p>SDC has a strong proposition for an institutional definition/understanding of the nexus, which can be institutionalized. The decade of building up nexus considerations and approaches have come to maturity in the proposed definition. It is also clear that protracted crisis situations are most relevant for the application of the nexus. Protracted crisis situations take a long time to solve and there is global consensus that in crisis both humanitarian and development actors need to be engaged from the beginning and conduct joint analysis and design joint engagement frameworks that addresses timely lifesaving emergency assistance and longer-term resilience activities.</p>	<p><b>1.Develop, institutionalize and communicate a common definition/understanding of the nexus.</b> SDC has already worked on an institutional definition/understanding, and taking the next step to agree on, institutionalize and communicate this to staff and partners would be important for future engagement in the nexus. The nexus definition/understanding should include specific examples of where and how it is being operationalized, and how it is applicable across all departments in SDC. This includes highlighting the role of the thematic networks in order to enhance continuous learning across contexts. SDC should, to continuously develop the nexus as a context-specific approach including context specific theories of change (ToC). SDC should set up training and team building for both management, staff and key partners. The definition/understanding will also be the basis for institutional changes found in the recommendations below.</p>	High

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
emphasised by respondents that when there is no definition, there is no guidance or training, and team building is not fully capitalized upon. There is a strong view among staff that if SDC is to fully implement a nexus approach, HQ must show more leadership and direction.			
<b>Institutional</b>			
<b>II.</b>			
<p>A review of internal SDC documents shows that issues related to strengthening the coherence and integration of the humanitarian – development linkages have been raised for more than a decade in the organization and there has been continuous reflections on how to strengthen the linkages.</p> <p>SDC has four departments working under three different framework credits with their own reporting mechanisms. Humanitarian Aid (HA) has its own framework credit and so does East Cooperation (EC), while South Cooperation (SC) and Global Cooperation (GC) share a framework credit. Overall, an overwhelming number of SDC staff found that nexus programming is complicated by the following institutional factors: different framework credits; different accountability mechanisms; different approval procedures; and separate reporting. Moreover, was it reported that the parallel systems lead to a</p>	<p>Between 2013 and 2017, there has been a continuous and positive reflection within SDC on how to strengthen the humanitarian-development linkages particularly in protracted crises. However, the institutional change processes which have taken place within the SDC can be characterized as adjustments of existing instruments and processes based on bottom-up initiatives, where staff coordinate more and try to work around the barriers of the existing instruments and organization.</p> <p>This evaluation concurs with the Fragility Evaluation (2012) that concluded: <i>“The barriers to genuine joint working across instruments are also considerable, with separate budgets, bureaucracies and supporting political constituencies. This is exacerbated by incompatible systems. This has meant that joint working has been more time-consuming and</i></p>	<p><b>2. One joint Framework Credit.</b> SDC leadership should develop a strong business case to lobby the Swiss Parliament for the merger and creation of a single shared Framework Credit. This will help to address a root cause of many of the current institutional and operational divides between the HA and development cooperation divisions identified by the evaluation. It will also help to facilitate joint accountability and reduce transaction costs by encouraging a more simplified, streamlined, and consistent approach. The current separate framework credits mean separate accountabilities and siloed institutional processes hindering nexus effectiveness. The different divisions will still operate with their mandates, but with more holistic and flexible institutional modalities.</p> <p><b>3. Facilitate a united organization.</b> In addition to the recommendation above, SDC leadership should introduce Joint Operation Committees in cooperation offices and HQ comprised of representatives from HA and SC/EC nad Global</p>	<b>High</b>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
<p>heavy processing workload and reduces time available for staff to engage more strategically, monitor programs and coordinate with partners. Earlier assessments/evaluations have also pointed to the current institutional structures as one of the main barriers for SDC departments to working collaboratively and using financing instruments in a complementary way.</p> <p>The recent nexus projects/programs are designed by integrated embassies as bottom-up efforts that make use of both HA and development cooperation instruments. Staff interviewed both in headquarters (HQ) and in the field explained that the design and approval processes are based on person-driven initiatives, and especially are the heads of cooperation offices and their staff instrumental in navigating the necessary institutional flexibility. Among the most important procedural steps in programming are the approvals of the Operations Committee (OpCom). In the cooperation offices in Horn of Africa (HoA), the OpCom is a joint between HA and SC, but at HQ the OpComs are separated according to the framework credits. Although all departments are invited to be represented and provide</p>	<p><i>difficult than anticipated</i><sup>46</sup>. This evaluation also concludes that the current SDC instruments are not conducive to effective programming in the nexus.</p> <p>The different framework credits are at the root of the lack of integration and efficiency of the current system, leading to time consuming and double work processes. The separate approval system for funding (OpCom) also works against integration, including sharing of knowledge and the development of joint operational understanding among staff. The financing mechanisms, approval and reporting systems, organization, and staffing need to be more straightforward and linked together as the number of nexus projects/programs increases. It will otherwise be difficult for SDC to scale up the number of projects/programs and for staff also to focus on context, outcomes, monitoring, coordination and partnerships.</p>	<p>Cooperation of equal seniority. This process should also include developing joint documentation (as is starting to happen in a few cases). SDC leadership should consider the creation of joint country/regional desks for HA and SC/EC staff in HQ, particularly for countries experiencing protracted crises, and work to establish closer relations with WOGA partners including the political desks. The change process can learn from the experiences gained in cooperation offices (and the discontinued organizational attempt with a joint organizational unit between HA and SC in North Africa and MENA).</p>	

<sup>46</sup> SDC (2012): Evaluation of the Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
comments at an OpCom meeting, there is no joint decision-making.			
<b>III.</b>			
Across all country contexts examined during the evaluation, staff underscored that leadership and staff in Swiss cooperation offices are the key to SDC's successful development of nexus programming. A critical point is therefore the changeover of international staff, and in particular of cooperation office positions. Especially national staff highlighted that achievements could be jeopardized by changes in international staff because the nexus implementation is personalized and not institutionalized.	During the period covered by the evaluation, there has been insufficient concerted leadership within SDC to set in motion structural institutional changes to increase efficiency of key processes. HQ management support for strengthening the nexus is particularly important, as individually led efforts rely on unofficial person driven workarounds. Although the current status is a handful of well-crafted nexus programs, the institutional ways of working are not sustainable, and management must take the lead in the further developing and managing of SDCs nexus approaches.	<b>Addressed by recommendations 1, 2, 3 (above)</b>	
<b>IV.</b>			
SDC, and in particular South Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe has gone through a decentralization process. The evaluation was informed that all staff in an integrated embassy/cooperation office report to the Head of Cooperation. However, the structures seem complicated and the domain teams in an integrated embassy still have different reporting lines, including directly to HQ, which complicates integration and team building. Also, the integration that is attempted at the field office level is not	<p>The decentralization of decision-making to cooperation offices is not consistent within SDC. This is further complicated by WOGA partners' centralised decision-making and reporting structures. This situation is not conducive towards concerted operational efforts. HQ support to country offices is also insufficiently structured.</p> <p>HQ support to country offices is also insufficiently structured. Besides the institutional structural shortcomings, the lack of institutional definition or guiding framework for operationalizing the nexus also affects the</p>	<b>4. Encourage decentralized reporting lines.</b> SDC leadership should consider restructuring reporting lines so that all staff should report to the Head of Cooperation in countries where there is programmatic engagement. This step will enable joint understanding, team work and efficient and effective management. This includes delegation of responsibility to the Head of Cooperation by WOGA partners as relevant for holistic engagement. Joint analysis and strategy among WOGA partners should also result in complementary engagements for example in displacement/ migration and peacebuilding.	<b>High and medium</b>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
<p>mirrored at HQ, where there is some coordination, but no integration.</p> <p>Interviews both in HQ and in the field have shown that the institutional set-up in HoA with joint teams and joint OpCom is considered a model in SDC. However, there was also some frustrations and critical voices which noted that the approach in HoA cannot be a model, because the flexibility, innovation and risk-taking approaches in the field are counteracted by the parallel systems in HQ, which were said to discourage the “jointness”, be risk averse, and at times stripping programs of nexus approach qualities.</p>	<p>nexus engagement negatively, because there is lack of guidance and training which are important for consistent knowledge, coherence and team building. SDC simply needs an institutional definition or guiding framework and training that allow SDC to be “fit for nexus implementation.”</p>	<p>On institutional structural shortcomings related to lack of an institutional definition of the nexus, please refer to recommendation 1.</p>	
<b>V.</b>			
<p>The human resources system in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) allows for staff to apply and fill positions SDC wide. This flexibility was reported as important and enabling for SDC staff to become well versed with all areas of SDC’s mandate and for managers to be able to build teams with adequate skill sets for the nexus.</p> <p>The Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) is a standby facility of approximately 700 experts, which are employable at short notice. This facility, managed by HA, was found to be key for staffing flexibility in countries in protracted crisis. The SHA is not only available for</p>	<p>It is enabling for building professional skills in both humanitarian aid and development cooperation that staff in SDC can move between the different operational departments. This enhances team building and can strengthen nexus approaches.</p> <p>The evaluation also concludes that staff in SDC are motivated, engaged and generally professionals of high standard.</p> <p>Indeed, the key message from partners is also that SDC staff are engaged in substance matters and are reliable to work with.</p>		

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
emergencies but have many different types of experts, and respondents noted that SHA is a valuable staffing instrument for enhanced nexus implementation.			
<b>Operational</b>			
<b>VI.</b>			
In SDC the nexus engagement is motivated by the SDGs and international paradigms towards coherent approaches delivering better outcomes particularly in protracted crisis situations. Nearly all stakeholders interviewed recognized the strong logic and potential of the nexus, also noting that siloed approaches are inadequate, particularly in protracted crisis contexts. Respondents generally provided three explanations for why nexus is a more adequate approach: (1) humanitarian planning horizons are generally too short to address underlying issues; (2) protracted crisis situations are far too complex and multifaceted to be solved simply through a humanitarian response and require a mix of instruments to be used in a coherent and complementary manner; and (3) the complex nature of protracted crises demands closer partnerships between multilateral and bilateral institutions, and indeed a two way nexus may be insufficient. The latter highlights the need to consider focusing more attention on a three-way nexus between humanitarian-development-peacebuilding.	<p>The nexus in SDC is understood as <i>a means to an end</i>, and conceptually it covers strategy, programming, partnerships and coordination. There is coherence between those elements in SDC's nexus thinking. This is underscored by a systems change thinking that is woven into the fabric of the strategic objectives across the strategies in the case study countries covered by the evaluation. The systems change approach is for example leading SDC to support innovative and flexible programming and financing modalities in partner organizations.</p> <p>Resilience building is an opportunity to secure sustainability, or at least have a better chance of sustainability, and building resilience is strongly aligned with the idea that in its provision of support, Switzerland's overall objective is to "Leave No-one Behind". By focusing on resilience, SDC recognises that when development efforts are set back by emergencies, stronger resilience means that the effects of the setback are reduced. However, SDC needs to have sufficient M&amp;E data to</p>	<b>5.Build evidence-base and specific examples of where and how SDC has implemented nexus.</b> SDC should gather evidence of the comparative advantages of nexus approaches and how these represent stronger and more sustainable investments in building systems and reducing future vulnerabilities. In order to help counteract these political pressures and build public support, SDC should build its evidence base and demonstrate with clear, real-world examples how the nexus led to more efficient, effective, and sustainable outcomes for those living in these situations. Strategies should have results matrices for all partners, as well as a monitoring system that supports flexibility and needs to change during implementation.	<b>Medium</b>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
SDC does not yet have robust Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) data to verifiably and objectively demonstrate that nexus approaches lead to better results. It is also too early for SDC to have such documentation available, and therefore only few of the staff could provide specific examples of cases where they themselves had witnessed a positive “proof of concept,” in terms of evidence which demonstrated the utility of the nexus in practice. The team’s document review of SDC M&E data in the case study countries likewise did not find direct evidence showing that SDC’s nexus programming, so far has resulted in increased sustainability and/or resilience.	verifiably and objectively demonstrate that nexus approaches lead to better results.		
<b>VII.</b>			
<p>All strategies in the case countries of the evaluation allude to the importance and value of articulating how humanitarian aid and development cooperation can be complementary in addressing the needs of target populations and build resilience. In a few cases country/regional strategies include joint analysis.</p> <p>Currently there is joint programming between HA and South Cooperation (SC) in HoA and in Mali, and efforts are starting in Myanmar. A number of the strategic elements of importance for strengthening a nexus approach in protracted crisis come together</p>	<p>SDC has taken important initial steps towards joint strategies and designed a handful of well-crafted nexus programs, however joint analysis should be institutionalized across all relevant country engagements for the departments to consistently have a joined-up view of the context and set strategic objectives for engagement and bring the different instruments and partnerships to play their part.</p> <p>The evaluation concludes that the experiences in HoA contain important elements of a model to develop further in future, bearing in mind the</p>	<b>6.Institutionalize joint analysis; seek common outcomes and enhance partnerships that promote the nexus.</b> SDC should institutionalize joint analysis, partnerships, and implementation during the early conceptualization of new programs and new phases of existing programmes in a country/regional context in order to strengthen the nexus approach. This includes providing more up-front analysis of comparative advantages, broader vulnerabilities, and strategies for “Leaving No-one Behind.” SDC should consider building on experiences from HoA as a model to start institutionalizing humanitarian-development linkages both in a country and a regional context.	<b>Medium</b>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
in Mali and in particular in HoA, this includes the regional focus, comprehensive and joint strategy, nexus programs, relevant and innovative partnerships - despite the institutional barriers and limitations. Review of the programs in these countries also showed that SDC has a strong focus on context in order to establish the relevance of interventions as well as to maximise effectiveness and improve the opportunities for both impact and sustainability. Adequate contextual knowledge is ensured through multiple mechanisms, not least partnerships, continued dialogue with other actors, program visits, and use of SDC's tools for programming in fragile contexts.	importance of taking each particular context as the starting point (See also finding 4).		
<b>VIII.</b>			
The evaluation did not find evidence that Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) had major effect on the nexus efforts, although the WOGA partners' mandates (migration, peacebuilding, economic development) are of importance to promote the nexus. Overall, this finding is tied to, first, the notion that in many instances few Swiss agencies were in country; and second, the realization that different Swiss agencies have different systems of working not least because other agencies are, unlike the SDC, centralized in their decision-making. The delinking of peacebuilding from nexus is	In spite of the intentions, the evaluation concludes that WOGA had limited effect on ensuring coherence and promoting the nexus. The inclusion of peacebuilding is important in contexts of fragility and conflict, and a closer collaboration between HSD and SDC will enhance a more holistic consideration in each and every context if a "triple nexus" is relevant. The role that Switzerland could play should be carefully considered and risk should be assessed in relation to expected outcomes.	<b>No recommendation as the triple nexus was not included in the terms of reference for the evaluation.</b>	



Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
<p>considered by many staff to be a weakness in the nexus approach. Specifically, it was noted that including only humanitarian and development cooperation instruments has a potential weakening effect on the benefits for the target population.</p> <p>The delinking of peacebuilding from nexus is considered by many staff to be a weakness in the approach described here. Specifically, it was noted that including only humanitarian and development cooperation instruments has a potential weakening effect on the target population.</p>			
<b>IX.</b>			
<p>The evaluation saw examples of SDC nexus engagement being conceptualized and developed between SDC, and NGOs/CSOs, other bilaterals, and multilaterals in the field. There was though also a tendency for SDC staff to see the nexus primarily as a question of internal coherence. Interviews with staff in the Global Cooperation division pointed to unexploited potential for SDC to broaden and strengthen its use of multilateral linkages. Similarly, institutional partnerships with Swiss NGOs provide SDC with opportunities to support nexus programming, because of the flexibility associated with this funding.</p>	<p>There is room for SDC to more proactively advocate and solicit its multilateral partners to work in synergy with bilateral efforts. SDC should look for ways that Switzerland more proactively can engage with its multilateral partners to help resource and scale up nexus programming building both on country level multilateral engagements and a more concerted use of the Global Cooperation Department as a key internal partner.</p>	<p><b>7.Strengthen internal coordination to promote partnerships for impact and sustainability.</b> SDC leadership should provide encouragement and guidance to staff on how to work with the Global Cooperation division in order to more proactively connect to multilateral and regional actors on nexus collaboration. This is especially the case in situations where either HA is engaged as the only Swiss actor; or where South Cooperation or Eastern Cooperation is engaged as the only actor. This closer coordination will help accelerate sustainability and impact, but also enable potential exit strategies for Switzerland in countries where there has been long-term engagement in humanitarian aid, which is not directly related to emergencies.</p>	<p><b>Medium</b></p>

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
<b>X.</b>			
SDC's partnerships with NGOs/CSOs, multilaterals, and government entities are important mechanisms that have allowed SDC to work in the nexus, promote innovation and yield considerable influence. SDC has been particularly successful in encouraging its NGO/CSO and multilateral partners to promote the nexus in their programming, in part due to these partners themselves already being interested in working more in the nexus. NGO/CSO partners in the countries visited were motivated and supported by SDC to take risks and engage in innovative activities such as using "crisis modifier funds" for early mitigation of crisis situations.	Optimizing the use of its partnerships will be critical to SDC efforts to meet the short- and long-term needs of beneficiaries, and specifically in providing more risk taking and innovation support that helps develop capacities and approaches that reduce their future vulnerabilities and increase their resilience.	<b>8.Encourage partners to develop and pursue innovative approaches.</b> SDC cooperation offices should continue to increase their support to consortia of partners that work in innovative ways and long term with humanitarian development linkages which also encourages monitoring of outcomes. This includes both programs, multi-donor funds and coordination mechanisms. Such engagement aims to continuously test and enhance relevance and effectiveness of new and existing nexus approaches. This aims to strengthen the resilience of communities living in protracted crisis.	
<b>XI.</b>			
Data collected in the different countries consistently support the view that Switzerland has earned a name for itself both as being well-informed regarding the conditions on the ground, in supporting, and in some cases leading, donor coordination efforts. Along the same lines, in all countries visited for this assignment (HoA, Mali, Myanmar and Haiti) partners recognized the SDC as a principled donor. Multilateral partners interviewed were also generally positive about their partnerships with SDC.	The evaluation concludes the principled donor role is important for the overall conceptual development and implementation of nexus approaches in global contexts and in specific sectors, countries and regions. SDC could do even more to influence the international community, national stakeholders and global processes through further engagement in coordination.	<b>9.Leverage the role as a principled donor.</b> Swiss cooperation offices should continue to work with partners including donors, governments, civil society, and private sector with the specific aim to bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actor coordination in specific contexts and in priority sectors – and thus capitalize on the principled donor position. SDC is considered a trusted and engaged donor, which upholds principles of good donorship. Recognizing that humanitarian action and development cooperation have different objectives, SDC should continue to emphasize and enable increased coordination and	

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations	Priority
		collaboration based on comparative advantages and “do not harm principles”.	
<b>Benchmarking</b>			
<b>XII.</b>			
<p>The benchmarking exercise covered the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Global Affairs Canada, the World Food Program (WFP), and Caritas. Of the four organizations, Sida is perhaps furthest forward in linking its humanitarian and development assistance. Global Affairs Canada is at an early stage of working in the nexus, having made most progress in Syria and Iraq due to political will and interest in these contexts. WFP has put in place the strategies, policies and systems for working in the nexus though it appeared to be early days in terms of seeing these translated into practice at country level. Amongst non-governmental organizations, Caritas is further ahead having been combining its emergency and longer-term efforts for decades, setting up a conceptual framework, an organizational structure and decision-making procedures that support this.</p>	<p>SDC's main strength is that unlike most donors, it has a bottom-up approach to its interventions. Working in the nexus matters most at field level in order to deliver better outcomes for affected populations. The examples of nexus programming demonstrate that SDC has the potential to work successfully in the nexus. To improve the effectiveness of future nexus programming, SDC could learn from Sida about more joint analyses and flexible funding mechanisms, from WFP about putting in place relevant policies and strategies and potentially from Caritas on having decision-making procedures that allow for a flexible combination of different types of funding instruments.</p>		

## Annex B: Methodology

This Annex presents *selected* information. The full methodology can be found in the inception report.

### Purpose, Objectives, and Scope

The **purpose** of the evaluation was to provide an independent, evidence-based assessment of the extent to which SDC's has been able to link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation, as well as provide recommendations for how this linkage could be strengthened going forward. This would be achieved through three **objectives**, including:

1. Providing an operational assessment of the performance of the SDC strategies, program, and partnerships in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation;
2. Analyzing to what extent institutional factors such as working procedures, funding procedures/set-up, and ways of collaboration are adequate for implementing this linkage in practice; and
3. Conducting a benchmarking exercise to compare the SDC's performance in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation with international practices.

The **scope** of the evaluation covered all relevant nexus activities supported between 2013-2017.

### Intended Use and Users

The **intended use** of the evaluation is to support SDC's institutional learning and to help support SDC to achieve the objectives of the Dispatch to the Parliament 2017-2020 and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The **primary intended users** of the evaluation include SDC leadership, SDC's Evaluation and Corporate Controlling division, and SDC field missions implementing the nexus.

### Design and Methodology

The evaluation followed a **mixed-methods, comparative case-study design**. It utilized a variety of rapid-appraisal techniques including in-depth document review; key informant and small group interviews; roundtables; CLP reflection sessions; and an electronic survey. It involved in-country data collection in four case-study countries—**Haiti, Horn of Africa, Mali, and Myanmar**—and remote data collection in two countries—**Pakistan and S. Sudan**. These countries were selected based on a criterion-based sampling informed by the team's inception interviews and initial document review.

### Evaluation Design Matrix

The evaluation has been guided by an "Evaluation Design Matrix" (EDM) which has provided the analytical framework for how the team has systematically collected and analyzed their data throughout the evaluation. It provided an overview of the main and sub evaluation questions, the OECD criteria around which they are categorized, the main data sources used to gather data to answer these questions, the methods for data collection and analysis, and finally, emphasizing the utilization-focused nature of the evaluation, the purpose for answering each question and how SDC can use the information to guide their decision-making. As part of the EDM development process, the team also looked for ways to reduce, focus, and reorganize the list of 24 questions originally provided in the ToR. The

EDM has been further reduced from the matrix presented in the Inception report to the final matrix, as a few overlaps were identified during data collection and analysis (see the EDM at the end of this Annex).

## Benchmarking

One of the three purposes of the evaluation was “*to compare the SDC’s performance in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation with international practices*”. This task was not was not elaborated in the ToR and is therefore presented below. The approach to benchmarking has been to benchmark against some of the t latest developments in ensuring humanitarian-development linkages. For this reason, The New Way of Working (NWOW), a key outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), was selected as the overarching framework. The benchmarking has been a qualitative exercise to identify examples of good practice as well as opportunities for change from SDC and relevant actors against each of the four components of the NWOW.

New Way of Working	SDC	Donor 1	Donor 2	SDC Partner1	SDC Partner 2
Collective outcomes					
Common context and risk analyses					
Working on the basis of comparative advantage (including funding)					
A multi-year timeframe					

The evaluation team has used a combination of documents and interviews with one or two key informants from each organization to identify examples of good practice and relevant lessons for SDC.

To ensure that the benchmarking captured good practice across actors while keeping the exercise manageable, the team has assessed the SDC against two donors (SIDA, Sweden and Global Affairs Canada) and two implementing partners (WFP and Caritas). The team initially proposed including just one partner, but the CLP recommended broadening out the selection of partners in order to capture good practice across a wider range of actors.

## Limitations and Mitigation Measures

Distilling lessons learned and best practices across five diverse contexts covering activities implemented by a variety of actors and guided by a number of shifting policies and strategies has not been an easy task. Some potential biases and threats to validity and our mitigation measures to minimize their effect have therefore been identified.

***Recall bias and retrospective nature.*** The retrospective nature of the assignment has presented both difficulties in tracking down key stakeholders involved in SDC activities throughout the period reviewed, as well as introduced potential recall bias as interviewees have been asked to rely on memory of events and actions that may have taken place years ago.

Mitigation Measure: The team has therefore compared interview responses with evidence from the desk review to triangulate information. When questions in the data collection tools

asked about events in the past or changes over time, the team has asked respondents to anchor responses to key events or examples. Please find the Evaluation Design Matrix on the following page:

***Boundary issues and difficulties of attribution*** given the number of other development partners involved over long periods of time in focus countries have been a particular difficulty. Attribution of results and the assessment of impact to SDC has been difficult given the relatively limited funding from SDC in some cases of multi-donor presence, limited monitoring data, shifting strategies and priorities, and the large number of intervening variables influencing results.

Mitigation Measure: Recognize that attribution is neither feasible nor desirable for this assignment and instead focus on establishing potential contribution. This includes being careful not to draw sweeping conclusions in the final report and recognize the unique context of each of the case study countries. There has through triangulation with different stakeholders been very clear responses with examples of the particular Swiss contribution, however the attribution aspect has more complicated to conclude on. This is also related to the lack of definition and to the many different versions of the humanitarian development nexus.

***Keeping intended users and other key stakeholders engaged throughout assignment.*** Based on previous experience implementing similar evaluation designs, an important challenge has been to keep all key stakeholders engaged to ensure progress in discussions and avoid similar issues being raised repeatedly in meetings.

Mitigation Measure: Stakeholders have been provided with regular updates on progress and opportunity to provide feedback and reflection. This has been done through the CLP meetings and presentations and documents presented for discussions at these meetings.

Please find the Evaluation Design Matrix on the following page:

Evaluation Questions/Sub-questions	OECD Criteria	Data collection		Analytical methods	Purpose
		Data Source(s)	Method(s) of collection		
OUTCOME					
EQ1: To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?					
1.1 To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages enhance the sustainability of the SDC's approaches in these contexts?	Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Primary and secondary documents</li><li>• SDC staff, Embassy staff and partners</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Document review</li><li>• Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)</li><li>• Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Content analysis of documents</li><li>• Thematic patterns analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To assess the extent to which SDC's current approaches support sustainable results, particularly in areas of protracted crises</li></ul>
1.2 To what extent do the SDC's humanitarian strategies and programme adopt a systems' change perspective, taking into account corresponding development requirements and objectives?	Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Primary and secondary documents</li><li>• SDC staff, Embassy staff, partners, and community stakeholders</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Document review</li><li>• KIIs</li><li>• FGDs</li><li>• E-survey</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Content analysis of documents</li><li>• Thematic patterns analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To identify the contribution of humanitarian-development linkages in achieving sustainable results</li></ul>
EQ2: To what extent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments relevant to meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?					
2.1 To what extent are SDC's strategies, program, partnerships contributing to addressing both immediate humanitarian needs and developing and implementing long-term solutions in protracted crises?	Effectiveness Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Primary and secondary documents</li><li>• SDC staff, Embassy staff, partners, country experts, and community stakeholders.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Document review;</li><li>• KIIs</li><li>• FGDs</li><li>• E-Survey</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li><li>• Content analysis of documents;</li><li>• Simple descriptive statistics of survey data</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To provide evidence of the extent to which SDC is succeeding in implementing an integrated approach that contributes to achieving results.</li></ul>

OPERATIONS					
EQ3: How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments in contexts where it is implementing both types of instruments?					
3.1 To what extent does the SDC encourage its NGO, bilateral and multilateral partners to ensure linkages?	Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary documents</li> <li>• SDC staff and partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thematic patterns analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To assess the extent to which SDC has guided its implementing partners on pursuing an integrated approach to programming; and to identify areas where SDC could work with partners to make improvements.</li> </ul>
3.2 How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development (or mixed) strategies, program and implementation modalities in contexts where it is providing both types of instruments	Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary and secondary documents</li> <li>• SDC staff, Embassy staff, partners, and community stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thematic patterns analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide evidence of the extent to which SDC's programme and implementation modalities are coherent and contribute to meeting both humanitarian and development needs (both in contexts where the SDC is providing humanitarian and development assistance and where it is only providing one type of assistance).</li> </ul>



INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT					
EQ4: To what extent is the SDC's institutional environment conducive to ensuring humanitarian-development linkages?					
4.1 To what extent does the SDC Directorate support a greater emphasis on humanitarian-development linkages?	Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with Board members</li> <li>• Documents expressing commitment</li> <li>• Survey of SDC staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• E-survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Simple descriptive statistics of survey data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To identify the level of political will for creating a conducive environment for humanitarian-development linkages</li> </ul>
4.2 Are the SDC's institutional approaches relevant to ensuring the linkage between humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peacebuilding?	Relevance, Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary documents</li> <li>• SDC staff at HQ and field levels</li> <li>• Survey on staff perceptions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> <li>• Roundtable Discussions with select country staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To identify whether the institutional environment in which the SDC operates facilitates or hinders humanitarian-development-peace linkages.</li> </ul>
4.3 How is the concept of linkages understood within the SDC and are there differences in interpreting the concept? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What support and guidance does SDC provide to field staff on implementing nexus?</li> </ul>	Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentation on procedures</li> <li>• SDC staff at HQ and field levels</li> <li>• Survey on staff perceptions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> <li>• Roundtable Discussions with select country staff</li> <li>• Possible census survey of relevant SDC staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Simple descriptive statistics of survey data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To assess the extent to which SDC HQ has provided guidance to field staff on strengthening nexus programming, and the extent to which field staff have absorbed that guidance.</li> </ul>
4.4 Are the SDC's organizational policies and procedures (staffing and financial) and internal ways of collaboration conducive to	Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentation on procedures</li> <li>• SDC staff at HQ and field levels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> <li>• E-survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To assess the extent to which current SDC procedures support humanitarian-</li> </ul>

implementing the linkage between humanitarian aid and development cooperation?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey on staff perceptions</li> </ul>		KIIs/FGDs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Simple descriptive statistics of survey data</li> </ul>	development linkages and whether they contribute to greater efficiency.
4.5 What factors contribute to, or hinder, the complementarity of humanitarian aid and development cooperation, particularly in protracted crises?	Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary and secondary documents</li> <li>• SDC staff, Embassy staff, country experts, partners, and community stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> <li>• E-survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> <li>• Simple descriptive statistics of survey data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To identify good practice and barriers to ensuring linkages, and suggest areas of improvement, if needed.</li> </ul>
<b>GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXT</b>					
<b>EQ5: To what extent are the SDC's approaches to humanitarian-development linkages aligned with its major international commitments and to global good practice?</b>					
5.1 Are the SDC's objectives and approaches in line with its international commitments with regards to the development/humanitarian linkage (Agenda 2030, World Humanitarian Summit commitments)?	Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary and secondary documents</li> <li>• SDC Board and staff members, partners, other donors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> <li>• FGDs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs/FGDs</li> <li>• Benchmarking exercise</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To assess the extent to which the SDC is meeting its international commitments and how it is performing relative to other donors and partners.</li> </ul>
5.2 To what extent do the SDC's operational and institutional approaches align with global good practice on humanitarian-development linkages?	Relevance				
5.3 What are the risks of linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation for implementing the SDC's commitments to both humanitarian principles and the	Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy and strategy documents</li> <li>• SDC and Embassy staff members, partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs</li> </ul>	

principles of development cooperation?					
<b>EQ6: To what extent does the SDC link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation in response to country/regional contexts?</b>					
6.1 Are the SDC's strategies and programme taking context and partner country strategies into account systematically and sufficiently?	Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategy and program documents</li> <li>• SDC and Embassy staff members, partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Document review</li> <li>• KIIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Content analysis of documents</li> <li>• Thematic pattern analysis of KIIs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide evidence of the extent to which the SDC's strategies respond to specific contexts and support relevant humanitarian-development linkages</li> </ul>

Please find the Matrix for the sampling of country case studies on the following page:

	Priority		Sequencing		Amount of Funding			Type of Crisis		Organization Modality				Type of engagement/partners						
	Dev	Hum	Hum-Dev	Dev-Hum	Equal	Dev	Human	Man made	Natural	WOGA	Integrated embassy/office	Regional Program	National office	Direct action	Multi Lateral	Host government	International CSO NGO	National/local NGO/CSO	Private sector	Universities
Afghanistan (Hindu-kush)	✓		✓			✓		✓			✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		
Bangladesh	✓			✓		✓		✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Bolivia				✓		✓			✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		
Burkina Faso	✓					✓							✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Central America (Nicaragua, Honduras)	✓			✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		
Central Asia (Tajikistan)			✓			✓		✓	✓						✓	✓	✓	✓		
Chad	✓	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Cuba	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓				
Greater Horn of Africa (Somalia, Kenya/Ethiopia, Eritrea)	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓		
Haiti	✓	✓	✓		✓				✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Mali	✓	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		

Myanmar	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Nepal	✓		✓			✓			✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		
Niger	✓			✓		✓		✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓			
North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt*)	✓		✓			✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓ *
OPT		✓	**			✓		✓		***			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Ukraine	✓			✓		✓		✓	**	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
countries excluded- where there was no hum and development																				
countries where hum and dev operated completely separately (South Sudan, DRC, Southern Africa)																				
countries that could not be visited were also excluded																				
*marked country only; **unclear/unsure; ***whole of department																				

## Annex C: People Consulted

	Name	Title and division
15 March 2018	Maurice D. Voyame	Africa division, Deputy Head
16 March 2018	Rahel Bösch	Institutional Partnerships division, Head
16 March 2018	Andreas Huber	Abteilung Africa, Chef Africa + Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid
19 March 2018	Sebastian Eugster	Deputy Head of Division Europe, Asia and Americas
19 March 2018	Gerhard Siegfried	SONAP, Head
20 March 2018	Simone Droz	South Asia and Conflict & Human Rights Division
20 March 2018	Nathalie Semoroz	Deputy Head of Division South Asia
21 March 2018	Philippe Puyo	Global Institutions division, Desk UNICEF
21 March 2018	Manuel Flury	GZ/ Global Program Food Security, Head of Division
21 March 2018	Richard Chenevard	Eurad, Desk Tajikistan
21 March 2018	Dorothee Lötscher	Program Manager Horn of Africa, SONAP
26 March 2018	Pia Hänni	Africa division, Desk Horn of Africa)
26 March 2018	Mr. Jean-François Cuénod	Deputy Head of South Cooperation
26 March	Franziska Freiburghaus	Head EAD
27 March 2018	Derek Müller	Head SAsia
27 March 2018	Marcel Stoessel	GZ/Global institutions, Focal point fragility
28 March 2018	Chantal Nicod	Head DAO
28 March 2018	Markus Reisle	GZ/Global Program Migration, Head of Division
28 March 2018	Philippe Besson	Abteilung Multilaterales, DEZA-HH, Chef
12 June 2018	Giancarlo De Picciotto	Kooperationsbüro Bamako, Chef IZA
12 June 2018	Barbara Schuler	Program Officer, Embassy in Mali
12 June 2018	Emilie Aubert	Program Officer, Embassy in Mali
12 June 2018 + 23 August 2018	Séverine Weber	Deputy Head of Regional Cooperation Horn of Africa, Embassy in Kenya
12 June 2018	Luca Willig	Human Security Advisor, Swiss Cooperation Office in Mali
25 June 2018	Interview with Claudia Moser	FDFA HSD, Humanitarian Policy Division, Scientific collaborator
25 June 2018	Interview with Regina Gujan and Jaqueline Schmid (new in job)	Department of Multilateral, Stv. Chefin / DEZA Focal Point Disaster Risk Reduction HH/ Network DRR, Focal Point
25 June 2018	Larissa Meier and Henri Stalder	Durable Solutions Analyst at United Nations in Somalia, Nairobi
26 June 2018	Muriel Gschwend	Department of Africa, Program Officer (West Africa)
27 June 2018	Jean-François Cuénod	South Cooperation, Stv. Chef/in
29 June 2018	Marc De Santis	Counsellor and Co-Head of International Cooperation at SDC Embassy in Addis Ababa.
29 June 2018	Stephanie Guha	Deputy head of mission in Mali
4 July 2018	Katharina Jenny	Department of Multilateral, Program Officer for WFP
4 July 2018	Davide Vignati,	Protection Adviser, Humanitarian Aid Department
11 July 2018	Andreas Huber	Chef Africa + Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid
12 July 2018	Interview with Barbara Profeta	Regional consultant, Embassy in Nairobi
12 July 2018	Martin Saladin	SECO
16 July 2018	Selina Haeny	Embassy Nairobi (now in Bern)
18 July 2018	Kunow Abdi	Embassy Nairobi
15 August 2018	Lillian Kilwake	Program Officer, Migration and Protection-Kenya and Somalia SDC- Horn of Africa
15 March 2018	Andrea Inglin	Program Officer

5 March 2018	Rahel Fisher	Program Officer for Central America / Encargada para América Central
1 March 2018	Peter Sulzer	Programmbeauftragter Grosse Seen
5 March 2018	Sergio Perez	Program Manager Cuba
2 March 2018	Thomas Piras	Chargé de program Desk Haïti
1 March 2018	Geneviève Swedor	Program Officer
13 March 2018	Jean-Mathieu Bloch	Chargé de program Desk Mali Programmes régionaux d'éducation
March 7th	Aita Pult	Program Manager, North Africa
	Verena Noser	Program Officer MENA- Northern Africa Region. Humanitarian Aid Department
19 March 2018	Geneviève Contesse	Program Officer
5 March 2018	Thomas Frey	Program Manager South Sudan and Southern Africa
1 March 2018	Carmen Thönnissen	Program Manager, Regional Program Southern Africa
9 March 2018	Esther Keimer	Program Manager Afghanistan
14 March 2018	Jean-Gabriel Duss	Water Advisor Eastern Europe and Central Asia
5 March 2018	Richard Chenevard	Program Manager Central Asia
2 March 2018	Lukas Lüscher	Program Manager Bangladesh
1 March 2018	Katharina Stocker	Program Manager Myanmar
2 March 2018	Björn Schranz	Program Officer South-East Asia & Pacific
7 March 2018	Ms Sonia Carlotti	Program Officer Nepal - South Asia Division
14 March 2018	Boris Maver	Deputy Director of Cooperation in Niger (ai)
7 June 2018	Maria Hauer	Humanitarian Unit, Sida
7 June 2018	Jessica Eliasson	Africa Department, Sida
	Anna Sahlen Ramazzotti	Sida
8 June 2018	Mandy Zeckra	Head of Department, Humanitarian Aid, Caritas
23-30 August '18	Alex Brans	Head of Programs; Save the Children, Switzerland
23-30 August '18	Andrew Shaver	Durable Solutions Unit, IOM
23-30 August '18	Daniel O'Malley	Deputy head of delegation, ICRC
23-30 August '18	Joanna De Berry	Senior operations officer, WB
23-30 August '18	Lucas Ruttiman	Ex regional head of cooperation
23-30 August '18	Martina Durrer	HoA desk officer
24 August 2018	Paul Opio	FAO, regional program coordinator for livestock and pastoralism
23-30 August '18	Rauof Mazou	UNHCR Representative
23-30 August '18	Stephen Ayella	Save the Children, Somalia (HoP)
23-30 August '18	Dr Abdi Dalmar,	Medical Doctor, Eye specialist, mobiliser of affordable private health services for
23-30 August '18	Anne Hölscher, Kevin Mackey,	SomRep (Chief of Party, Monitoring spec
23-30 August '18	Abdurahman Sharif	Director, Somalia NGO Consortium,
23-30 August '18	Mathias Mayr, Puteri Watson,	WB Somalia team
23-30 August '18	Mamadou Kante,	Acting National Director of Basic Education
23-30 August '18	Luc Verna	Head of Echo
23-30 August '18	Maria Jose Benitez Velaso	Embassy of Spain
23-30 August '18	Francisco Bellafont	Embassy of Spain
23-30 August '18	Jean-Nicolas Marti	Chef de Mission, ICRC
10-15 Sept. 2018	Florian Delauney, Minusma and Philippe LaFosse, France	Minusma and France (hum dev task force
10-15 Sept. 2018	Domitilie Galli	NRC head Mali
10-15 Sept. 2018	Hamet Cisse	SDC staff Mali
10-15 Sept. 2018	Mariam Sylla	HSD staff Mali

31 July, 2018	Frank Wiederkehr	Program Manager, Desk Pakistan South Asia, Conflict and human rights division
16 October 2018	Franziska Vogtli	
	Sabine Rosenthal	Program Officer South Asia
16 October 2018	Stephanie Burri	Head of Development Cooperation
5 October 2018	Jan Luc Bernasconi	Deputy Head of Swiss Humanitarian Aid, and division Hum Aid (Asia, Americas, and Europe)
September 2018	Sebastian Eugster	Deputy Head of Division Europe, Asia and Americas
September 2018	Stefano Berti	Director of Cooperation Haiti
September 2018	Alain Delley	Chef Finances, Personel et Administration
September 2018	Alexius Butler	Deputy Mission Director USAID
September 2018	Audrey Vacheron	Coordination officer., UN/CTP
September 2018	Entela Sula	Country Director, Helvetas
September 2018	Evelyn Awittor	Senior Country Officer, World Bank
September 2018	Guiseppe Scollo	ECHO, Head of office
September 2018	Ivan Bartlini	Responsible for CCR program (long term consultant)
September 2018	Jean-Francoise Golay	Head of HA, SDC
September 2018	Luis Sanches Zimmerman	CARE, Deputy director
September 2018	Jacques-Philippe Mondésir	Resp. National Program RRC, SDC
September 2018	Jean-Luc Virchaux	Former Ambassador Haiti
14 Sept. 2018	Larsan Traore	SDC staff, Mali
7 August 2018	Christopher Demerse	Deputy Director, Strategic Analysis and Planning Unit, International Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, Global Affairs Canada
8 August 2018	Rebecca Richards	Chief, Emergencies and Transitions Unit, WFP
19 Sept. 2018	Mathias Kruger	Regional Resilience Advisor, Horn of Africa Sida
11 Sept. 2018	Peter Schmidt	Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, Country Director, Myanmar
4 Sept. 2018	Jos van der Zanden	Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, Chief Technical Advisor
14 Sept. 2018	Tom Kramer	Transnational Institute – TNI, Country Director
11 Sept. 2018	U Shwe Thein	Land Core Group, Director
10 Sept. 2018	Joan Bastide	Centre for Development and Environment – CDE, University of Bern, Country Representative
10 Sept. 2018	Markus Buerli	Swiss Embassy, Deputy Head of Cooperation, Myanmar
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12 Sept. 2018	Teresa McGhie	USAID, Mission Director
September 2018	Peter Batchelor	UNDP, Country Director
September 2018	Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing	CDNH
7 Sept. 2018	Dr. Si Thura	CPI, Executive Director
	Markus Bühler	Save the Children, Director Program Implementation
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12 Sept. 2018	Oren Ginzburg	3MDG/UNOPS, Fund Director
12 Sept. 2018	Anki Dellnas	UNDP, TDLG Senior Technical Advisor
14 Sept. 2018	Aung Thant	Paung Ku, Executive Director
13 Sept. 2018	Mark Häussermann	SDC, Head of Mawlamyine office
10 Sept. 2018	Thierry Umbeh	Swiss Embassy, Head of Humanitarian Affairs, Myanmar
10 Sept. 2018	Dr. Renate Lefroy	Swiss Embassy/SDC, Head of Skills Development Domain
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11 Sept. 2018	Ms. Rea Bonzi	SDC, Head of Health and Governance (and JPF focal)
14 Sept. 2018	Lilian Buergi	Swiss Embassy, Head of Finance, Personnel and Administration
11 Sept. 2018	Jeanne Briggs	USAID, Mission Director, Director of Democracy, Governance, and Humanitarian Affairs Office
12 Sept. 2018	Kyaw Soe Lwin	Swiss Embassy, Human Security Division
14 Sept. 2018	Giacomo Solari	Swiss Embassy, Dpty Head of Mission/Head of Cooperation
3 October 2018	Marcel Stöessel	Global Division, SDC, Bern
3 October 2018	Thomas Gass	Assistant Director-General, Head South Cooperation
4 October 2018	Manuel Bessler	Deputy Director-General, Head of Humanitarian Aid Department and Head of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit
3 October 2018	Andrea Ries	Senior Policy Advisor, Focal Point Development Effectiveness
4 October 2018	Jean-Marc Clavel	Head of Staff of the Directorate
5 October 2018	Reto Nigg	Deputy Chief of Staff Humanitarian Aid and SHA Program Officer Quality Assurance
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4 October 2018	Ruth Huber	Assistant Director-General, Head Cooperation with Eastern Europe
4 October 2018	Pradeep Itty and Justine Boillat	Head of Quality Assurance and Poverty Reduction division
October 2018	Pio Wennubst	Head of Global Cooperation Department
2 October 2018	Nicolas Randin	Head of Dispatch Team
11 Sept. 2018	Vincent Panzani	SCI, Head of program, Livelihoods
15 March 2018	Andrea Inglin	Bolivia Desk
5 March 2018	Rahel Fisher	Program Officer for Central America / Encargada para América Central
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September 2018	Jean-Luc Virchaux	Former Ambassador, Haiti
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## Annex D: Benchmarking

Please find below a Summary of key lessons and good practice from the benchmarking exercise, based on the New Way of Working framework.

	Sida	Global Affairs Canada	WFP	Caritas	SDC
<b>Collective Outcomes</b>	<p>At the global level, reducing risks and vulnerabilities, resilience building and reducing dependence on humanitarian aid are the collective outcomes towards which different parts of Sida are working. This is supported by Sida's new 'vision 2019-2022', which focuses on extreme poverty, vulnerability and 'Leave No-one Behind'.</p> <p>Country strategies increasingly focus on strengthening resilience and some include a 'nexus' objective that provides flexibility for the development program to respond to new humanitarian needs.</p>	<p>Overarching objectives in Middle-East strategy for Syria and Iraq is main example. This is a three-year, integrated strategy for a whole of government approach in the two countries and refugee-hosting countries in the region. Canada is developing a similar approach for the Rohingya crisis.</p> <p>The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework has provided an opportunity for the humanitarian section to reach out to bilateral development programs in pilot countries.</p>	<p>At global level, the SDGs and Agenda 2030 frame the collective outcomes towards which WFP is working.</p> <p>At country level, WFP is developing Country Strategic Plans through consultation processes and this can help to identify collective outcomes. However, it has found it challenging to work with partners towards collective outcomes because it is often far ahead of others.</p>	<p>Caritas's international cooperation strategy 2020 presents the 'Caritas pyramid' of ways to end poverty. This shows that covering basic needs, enhancing equity and strengthening resilience contribute to a move from ending poverty at the base to human development at the top of the pyramid. This helps Caritas to focus on addressing longer-term needs even in humanitarian situations because it does not conceptualise its responses as 'humanitarian' or 'development'.</p>	<p>The 2017-2020 Dispatch is aligned with the SDG commitment to Leave No-one Behind and highlights flexibility in humanitarian and development funding as a cornerstone of SDC's support to protracted crises.</p> <p>A growing number of country strategies include collective outcomes and promote humanitarian-development linkages.</p>
<b>Common context</b>	<p>Increasingly, development staff are involved in the annual humanitarian crisis analyses while</p>	<p>The humanitarian section had a Middle-East analyst position funded under the Middle-East strategy.</p>	<p>WFP has worked with UNHCR on joint needs assessments in refugee contexts and is working</p>	<p>Caritas is still exploring ways of conducting common risk and/or context analyses. It's</p>	<p>SDC undertakes joint context analyses in some</p>

	Sida	Global Affairs Canada	WFP	Caritas	SDC
<b>analyses/needs assessments</b>	<p>humanitarian staff are involved in the development of country strategies. This is because staff recognise the benefits, rather than due to a formal structure or mechanism or instructions to work in this way.</p> <p>There are also other opportunities for humanitarian and development staff to discuss ways of working together, e.g., in 2017, the annual event for all Sida humanitarian staff in Stockholm included a day of discussing nexus issues with development staff.</p>	<p>Also, humanitarian bureau was represented in development of South Sudan country strategy since development programming has been a challenge due to the conflict.</p> <p>Canada encourages partners (e.g., WFP and UNHCR) to undertake common analyses and joint needs assessments.</p>	<p>on a partnership with IOM for IDP contexts.</p> <p>WFP is also working on sharing its food security data as a public good, which can contribute to programming decisions. It has signed a data sharing agreement with UNHCR and is working on one with IOM.</p>	<p>Syria strategy, for example, focuses on an analysis of organizational risks at program level with risks for beneficiaries analysed at project level.</p>	<p>countries/regions but this is not systematic.</p>
<b>Working on the basis of comparative advantage</b>	<p>Sida is working towards greater flexibility in operations and financing in a number of contexts, but the degree of adaptation and interaction is highly personality-dependent. In a few contexts, recognising that the humanitarian team can</p>	<p>Canada focuses on identifying the comparative advantages of partners in specific contexts.</p>	<p>WFP's working on the basis of comparative advantage tends to emerge through requests from governments (e.g., for its expertise in developing common cash platforms) or other agencies (e.g., UNHCR requesting food</p>	<p>For Caritas, the idea of working on the basis of comparative advantage is predicated on the idea of bringing together different mandates or funding instruments. However, it works in a cohesive way that makes this irrelevant. There are close linkages</p>	<p>Internally, SDC's work on the basis of comparative advantage is reflected in its jointly funded programs.</p> <p>SDC selects its partners well on the basis of their</p>

	Sida	Global Affairs Canada	WFP	Caritas	SDC
	disburse funding far more quickly, geographical teams have transferred funding to the humanitarian team to disburse, with joint oversight.		assistance in certain contexts).	between staff. Also, staff might work across humanitarian and development activities or work in a sector like education across countries.	comparative advantage.
<b>Multi-year humanitarian funding</b>	In its 2018 allocation process, Sida opened a specific window for multi-year humanitarian support for humanitarian projects to adopt a transformative approach and avoid humanitarian dependency. It has also provided 3-year funding to the Whole of Syria Livelihoods Consortium. While Sida can allocate multi-year humanitarian funding, this still tends to be disbursed annually.	<p>Canada has been co-chairing the multi-year funding Grand Bargain workstream with UNICEF.</p> <p>While Canada can allocate humanitarian funding on a multi-year basis, it disburses the funds annually. Its largest multi-year funding has been to Syria, Iraq and neighbouring countries.</p> <p>The multi-year funding has enabled some NGO partners to be adaptive in volatile contexts. UN agencies have not changed their systems to pass on the benefits of multi-year funding to NGO partners, which is a challenge.</p>	WFP has established a new financing architecture to enable it to combine humanitarian and development funding. One challenge is that few donors provide multi-year, flexible funding.	While Caritas is able to secure 18-month funding, obtaining two-three year funding for protracted crises remains a major challenge.	SDC is able to provide humanitarian funding for a maximum of 12-18 months.

	Sida	Global Affairs Canada	WFP	Caritas	SDC
<b>Other issues</b>	<p>About a year ago, Sida changed its funding system to enable the development program to transfer funds to the humanitarian team to disburse and manage. There are also examples of the humanitarian and development teams providing complementary funding to the same partner.</p> <p>Leadership, and the development of the 2019-2022 vision, have been key to pushing forward change in Sida.</p> <p>Ability of Sida staff to cross from humanitarian to development programming and vice versa has helped to break down barriers.</p>	<p>Political prioritisation has been very helpful for humanitarian-development linkages, particularly in Syria and Iraq. "People do what they're told to do" and, without this, there is often pushback from development staff when humanitarian staff reach out to initiate working together.</p>		<p>For Caritas, having an enabling institutional set up has been key to working that allows it to integrate different types of work in the same program is critical. This includes having a clear division of responsibility for responding to emergencies of different sizes. Caritas allocates SDC funding internally not on the basis of whether it's humanitarian or development funding but based types of activities so the humanitarian section receives development funding for its longer-term work while the development sections receive humanitarian funding for small-scale emergency responses.</p>	<p>Institutional commitment to humanitarian-development linkages that has been delivered so far through increased coordination and a bottom-up approach without structural changes. Staff felt confident that they understood working in the nexus.</p> <p>Leadership in cooperation offices has been important for ensuring linkages.</p>

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**Annex F: Country Reports**

This annex entails the country reports of the evaluation 6 case studies. The fields studies were in Horn of Africa (focus on the Nairobi based operations with Somalia at the centre as the main area; Mali; Haiti and Myanmar. The desk studies were Pakistan and South Sudan.

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## **Horn of Africa (HoA) Case study**

This case study is one of six country case studies - four field-based and two desk-based - designed to explore the extent to which SDC's operational instruments (strategies, programs, and partnerships) and institutional processes (working procedures, funding credits, and organizational set-up) facilitate or hinder SDC's work along the humanitarian-development nexus.

### **Context**

Somalia is a country in deep long-term crisis; the impacts are chronic and are signified by cyclical food insecurity, deep poverty, inadequate service delivery and in 2013 when SDC developed its first Horn of Africa Strategy there was about 1.3 million IDPs and more than 1 mill refugees. Most refugees are in Kenya (about ½ million) are located in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps and the more recent Kalobeyi refugee settlement near Kakuma. Altogether humanitarian data show that about 4 million Somalis in Somalia are in critical need of humanitarian assistance at all times that is about 1/3 of the population. The Horn of Africa region is ridden by fragility, conflict as well as generally well-functioning government systems. The region is however very uneven both with regard to incomes, services, governance and resources. In Somalia there has been considerable progress in the last 5-6 years and statebuilding takes place although with set-backs. Currently the federal system of Government is being debated and developed, but a fairly competent central government is in place and attempting to extend its influence outside Mogadishu. The efforts of peace and statebuilding are jeopardized by tensions between the Federal Government and the member states and by Al Shabaab which continues to control quite large parts of South Central Somalia. Cyclical drought both in Somalia but also in parts of Ethiopia and North eastern Kenya add to the fragility of the region. Nomadic life styles are under threat and low level conflicts on access to grazing and water are intertwined with other conflict patterns and means that there are low level conflicts that if remaining unattended may spark unrests that fuels the cycles of poverty, displacement with the associated effects of lack of health, education and livelihoods.

### **Results**

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's policies and strategies coherent and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages? (focus on targeted population)**

**EQ: How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments in contexts where it is implementing both types of instruments**

In Horn of Africa (HoA) the Swiss policy interest is to enhance the regional stability, and to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and conflicts and improve governance and address the migration pressure. The overall goals of Switzerland's engagement in HoA are poverty reduction, improvement of human security and stability and addressing migration challenges.

Switzerland is a latecomer compared to other international players. Switzerland has had two strategic frameworks in HoA. First the "*Cooperation Strategy, Horn of Africa 2013-2016*, "A "*Whole-of-Government*" Approach" (HoA strategy 2013-2016), followed by the *Swiss Cooperation Strategy, Horn of Africa 2018-2021* (HoA Strategy 2018-2021). Strictly speaking the latter strategy falls outside the time period of the evaluation but provides

analysis of results and lessons of the performance of Swiss strategic approach 2013-2016 and how the learning is brought into new strategic thinking and practices.

The HoA Strategy 2013-2016 falls under the Dispatch on International Cooperation 2013-2016 and is from the start developed on the basis of a Whole of Government Approach. SDC partnered with the political directorate of FDFA, the Federal office for Migration (Federal Department of Justice and Police) and the federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport. The strategy was developed in close collaboration with the Swiss embassies and SDC programme offices in the region. As noted in the strategy “The Horn of Africa is one of Switzerland’s regions of concentration for development and humanitarian aid, a status required under the federal Dispatch on International Cooperation to the Swiss Federal Parliament. Humanitarian Aid (HA) initiated engagement in the region in the 1990s and reestablished a regional humanitarian programme office in Nairobi in 2009 (PROOF), and South Cooperation and the State Department for Migration started engagement in 2013. An antenna of that office opened in Addis Ababa in 2010. The severe drought in 2011 made Switzerland further accelerate its presence and humanitarian contribution. The implementation of the strategy has consisted of regional and multi-country interventions, research activities, multilateral and regional organisations, core/earmarked contributions, bilateral instruments to a number of different types of implementing partners, locally managed development funds, and the HA direct implementation modality. The programme management is decentralized to SDC offices in Nairobi and Addis Ababa (Source: HoA strategies, SDC staff interviews HQ and Field).

The HoA strategy 2013-2016 added “significant” long-term development cooperation funding to the existing humanitarian portfolio. The total budget of the first HoA strategy was CHF 140.05 mill of which roughly 94% was contributed by SDC, which as noted in staff interview in reality means that the engagement is a “whole of SDC” engagement as different to a WOGA engagement. It was decided to limit the engagement to the “small” Horn of Africa, i.e. Somalia, Ethiopia and North Eastern Kenya. Regional support was identified to IGAD as the overarching regional organization. This umbrella added conceptually to the coherence of the strategy as a regional strategy. The jointness in the strategy runs through shared analysis and shared objectives which then translates into “the joint action”. The joint action is operationalized by decentralization of parts of the programme cycle processes, and devolved management decisions. Staff also holds both Humanitarian Aid (HA) and South Cooperation (SC) responsibility. Two programmes have so far been prepared and co-financed jointly between HA and SC: these are SomRep, and the support for Skills for Life in Kakuma (see below). A joint programme is being prepared for the Durable Solutions initiative. (Source: Staff interviews, credit proposals).

The engagement in HoA falls in four domains/sectors: Food security and rural development; health; good governance and peacebuilding and conflict transformation sector; and the migration sector. These sectors were and continue to be aligned with national priorities. Somalia received and continues to receive the lion’s share of Swiss funding i.e. more than CHF 60 mill, while the remaining funding was distributed in three parts to cover North Eastern Kenya about CHF 19 mill.; Ethiopia 25mill; and regional project received about CHF 19 mill (these figures based on rough calculation) (Source: project overviews, HoA).

The WOGA partners have conducted a thorough analysis of the context, and the logic of the strategy is reflected from strategy level through to programmes. The process of developing joint context analysis and strategy has also been a way for SDC to understand

its role as a humanitarian and development “linkage” actor in the larger picture of national stakeholders and international engagement - and strategically assess its engagement considering the funding levels and strengths and limitations of its instruments and size. The Cooperation offices in HoA have developed an understanding of the nexus not as a question of the organization’s instruments working together, but as a nexus to potentially becoming the main modus operandi of engaged in the protracted crisis areas in the region<sup>47</sup> (Source: Strategies, staff interviews, partner interview).

With regard to modalities the strategy noted that a Whole of SDC approach “is expected to be exemplary with such a strategy but will require internal administrative/programmatic adjustments and joint processes”. It is the decentralized integrated effort that appears to have been driving forward the humanitarian-development linkages from strategy towards programming, and at times in spite of more traditional approaches wanted by senior management in Bern (Source: Strategy, Staff interviews HQ and HoA.)

The HoA team has taken a bottom-up and strategic engagement as a starting point and designing interventions to best meet objectives, rather than allowing the rules relating to funding instruments to dictate their design. In HoA there is a joint operations committee that has been established and create collaborative working relationships without a reorganization. However, among staff, not only in HoA there is frustration that the work processes and instruments are not adapted to a protracted crisis reality, and the internal workload to work with parallel systems and their specific requirements reduces time to engage on substance.

SDC has been able to form its engagement in HoA within an evolving international context of support to implementing nexus modalities – and SDC has been able to start the strategic engagement without the “baggage” of existing development programmes, this may also have been enabling for SDC to develop coherence from strategy to programming (Source: Staff interviews HoA, former staff HoA).

**EQ: To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?**

In the context of Somalia, resilience is broadly understood as strategies and implementation modalities that both include short term solutions and emphasize long-term capacity strengthening of communities to resist environmental/societal challenges and shocks. The humanitarian -development nexus approach is therefore in accordance with aims and processes of building resilience. In HoA there is a major change in the discourse towards strengthening of humanitarian development linkages in programming. However, constraints include the continued security challenges and restricted access to intervention areas, and difficulties to build up longer term capacity of communities reaching communities with development interventions.

SDC is very dependent on its partners and it was noted in interviews that there are some partners, who are dynamic and continue to develop approaches that to be most relevant in any given situations. Other partners were said to have developed the humanitarian-

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<sup>47</sup> Independent expert interview, HoA

development narrative on paper but in practice continue humanitarian approaches. One reason for this was said that development funding is still very short term in many cases, and the pressure to deliver short term results does not allow for “new ways of working”. SDC has been extending its humanitarian funding to up to three year cycles and development funding has a time frame of 12 years. SDC also has continuous attention on the resilience aspect and sustainable development, according to implementing partners working with SDC in all sectors (source: partner interviews; partner programme documentation).

One example is SDC’s support to and engagement with the Somalia Resilience Consortium (SomRep), consisting of a number of international NGOs and local partners. SomRep has existed since 2006 and has increasingly moved towards quite a sophisticated targeting of both short term needs and long term capacity and systems building. The programme works at community, sub-national and national level as it moves towards resilience building government and financial systems become more and more important.

The programme (1) addresses needs post shock and planning for future mitigation through asset rehabilitation, income generation and planning. The programme has a “crisis modifier pool fund” built in for immediate assistance to communities that experience sudden shocks, which has been strongly supported by SDC. The second result area is to ensure protection of existing and new productive assets and laying the foundations for economic engagement and growth and in this way build capacity to deal with future shocks. Third is to develop economic pathways and entry to market systems and forth is to work with government its policies and institutions to ensure an enabling environment. The programme has a strong analysis and monitoring component that enables ongoing assessments of what works and what does not work. SDC has been a strong supporter of the “crisis modifier” fund that enables SomRep to without delays of asking donors to address communities facing a humanitarian situation and to help them re-bounce (Source: SomRep, Staff interviews, interviews other donors to SomRep).

**The Crisis Modifier Pool Fund (as designed for SomRep phase 2018-2021)**

Interventions take place under the auspices of emergency aid provision and leverage the income generating opportunities to, simultaneously, generate income and repair damaged infrastructure in support of current and future livelihood activities. The fund can be tapped for Cash for Work to undertake activities such as rehabilitation of water supply; land clearance; canal rehabilitation feeder road habilitation and provide households with basic needs and lay the foundations for recovery. The fund can also support unconditional cash transfer for consumption (Source: SomRep Strategy 2018-2021)

SDC has also prompted SomRep to do more on economic development. This has marked an important development of the programme, which initially concentrated on the push factors (for examples skills and training). With economic development becoming more central the programme has included focus on the pull factors (the market, relevant value chains etc).

Other examples of building resilience and supporting sustainable development include the Borana project in Ethiopia which also has a “crisis modifier mechanism”; WFP and FAO receive support for their resilience programmes and at the regional level IGAD is supported. These programmes strengthen the resilience of communities and build up the capacity of local authorities; early warning systems, and for WFP the SDC emphasis through technical assistance to establish a biometric registration system of vulnerable groups to enable quick

transfer of cash when necessary. The support to FAO also focuses on agricultural systems adapted to the harsh environment. The Kenya Rapid (K-Rapid), i.e. the Resilience Arid Lands Partnership for Integrated Development started as a humanitarian water and sanitation programme, but now it incorporates water management/governance component at country level and a private sector component. The biggest donor is USAID, and SDC is the second biggest donor (Source: partner interviews, partner documentation, Staff interviews).

Especially the support to IGAD, which is considered a relatively weak organization but with a high degree of legitimacy in the region is by partners seen as a signal of the seriousness of SDC to strengthen resilience and work long term (Source: interviews with two multilateral organisations).

It was underlined by different stakeholders that devolved functions to local authorities in Kenya is an enabling factor for the implementation of humanitarian-development linkages, while the absence of local authorities and the lack of clarity of state levels and functions limit setting objectives for longer term capacity building and system change. (Source: Partner interviews, SDC staff)

SDCs portfolio of Migration and Protection aims towards durable solutions for forcibly displaced populations. SDC is engaged from global to local level, Global compact for refugees; Nairobi and Kampala declarations, at policy level SDC works on the asylum space. SDC works both through multilateral partners and others. The Skills4Life in Kakuma Refugee Camp is implemented by Swiss contact. It is an interesting example of a humanitarian project, which was turned into a first generation skills development project (cofinanced by HA and SC) with the aim of strengthening income generating possibilities. However, there is a continuous development and a recognized need to continue to assess the market needs. Skills4life is currently not really a long-term project; but it aims for more integration into the market and into the education system. One other example of a constructive SDC role is around the Durable Solutions Initiative, where SDC according to partners takes the role as a convener, although they have limited funding. "SDC could be the lynchpin and be seen to be the main coordinator among the donors. The Swiss humanitarian tradition injects useful principles in these processes, they remind others of the principles of impartiality and neutrality when needed". A multilateral partner notes the role SDC in helping IGAD to organize a regional summit on the refugee situation in Somalia SDC interest in support to the piloting of experimental approaches in the Kolebeyi Refugee settlement in Turkana was also found to show a forward looking engagement to improve projects such as Skills4Life to be more sustainable. (Source: field trip interviews with partner; staff interviews, multilateral, IFI)

SDC is also involved in the Somalia coordination mechanisms. These work in parallel with very limited coordination between development actors and humanitarian actors. In the case of Somalia, SDC advocates for the New Way of Working promoting the nexus. However, it is difficult for a smaller bilateral donor to influence behavior. SDC therefore selects its engagements carefully, in order to play an influential role as a convener and as an advocate when it for example co-chairs a coordination mechanism. Partners noted without exception that SDC plays a very constructive and consistent role in the coordination mechanisms that is of priority to them. SDC has been co-lead in the coordination mechanism for the National Development Plan (migration high on the agenda). (Source: Donor, multilateral and NGO partners)

Staff reported that they feel more influential when they work with NGOs than with multilaterals. It was though noted that the strategic placement of SDC secondees in multilateral organizations (WFP and two durable solutions advisers in the Regional Coordinator, Somalia office), seems to be highly valued by the receiving organisations and potentially more valuable than a policy dialogue. Other multilaterals, i.e. UNHCR and IOM praise SDCs openness and their willingness to help them bring in new approaches to durable solution initiatives, but also felt that SDC could even step up their role as a convener of others, given Switzerland's somewhat principle and independent status (outside the EU) (Source: interviews with secondees; multilaterals; staff).

SDC is recognized by the partners for its agile and flexible approach and is seen as a trusted and knowledgeable partner, which always attend meetings, come prepared with representatives at the right level and is willing to go the extra mile – it is constructive engagement, which shows respect and enables partners to build real partnership.

SDC is also praised by the partners for standing up and assist the implementing partner if there are problems within a programme that needs a constructive solution (examples by FAO and UNHCR): SDC is pragmatic and forward looking while other donors were mentioned to be obstructive at times and be less interested in finding quick and locally decided solutions, but will want to go back and forth with their headquarters and thereby incur long delays. (Source: partner interviews)

The flip side of SDCs reliance on partners are explained by SDC staff which witness cases where their reliance on partner and limited access in Somalia is weakening their engagement and monitoring ability with the result that what has been intended to support hum-dev linkages and the potential sustainability, as SDC's intentions are not necessarily delivered on the ground. There is no training of partners and partners are mainly humanitarian and have been so for decades. Partners are often bigger than SDC, and because the nexus is often implemented in hard to reach areas in Somalia or North-eastern Kenya, the implementers are humanitarian (Source: interviews staff).

**EQ: To what extent does the SDC link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation in response to local contexts? (context and partner strategies)**

SDC invests considerably (international and national staff) in understanding the context, understanding the field. This approach is important because it permits more responsive (informed responses) to target populations. SDC is known among other stakeholders to want to engage locally and understanding local dynamics and build the resilience of communities and capacity of local authorities. It was also found that there is a good understanding of the nexus always taking the specific context as the starting point. The SDC approach is to have a good number of staff at the country level, this allows for a lot of engagement.

In the case of the health sector in Somalia, SDC analysis of the local situation has led to an innovative exploration of options to build health services through local efforts. The private sector's role as a service provider is an interesting perspective of the humanitarian development linkages and reduce dependence on international assistance. SDC supports an initiative led by a group of medical practitioners from the returned diaspora spearheaded by eye surgeon (Caafinet). They deliver affordable and standard services to the population in non-serviced areas and with special emphasis on IDP populations, where they are



present and has introduced a quality assurance system of services. The doctors have also set up an emergency service including ambulances in Mogadishu. SDC has supported the initiative with technical assistance to develop the business models, as well as having a dialogue with the World Bank in order to support scale up of the initiative. A second initiative in the health sector in Somalia also aims to move towards building local capacity. SDC supports the Somali Red Crescent, who delivers half of the current health services in Somalia, to develop a strategic plan for their engagement including the strengthening of government health services. Both initiatives aim to build systems in a long term context, and with entry points that are rooted in thinking outside the box and not assuming that the state as a traditional duty bearer in service delivery will be able to take on such a responsibility in the near or medium term future. (Source: partner interviews; staff interviews; project documentation).

A point raised by staff and partners is around the continued need for monitoring of changes in the local context, as situations change quickly.

An interesting example of localization is the SDC support to the Somalia NGO consortium (based in Nairobi). They have been in dialogue with SDC since the end of 2015. They are supported with a one year grant for 2017 and now the consortium has got three year funding for their three year strategy. The grant specifies the consortium to work with humanitarian and development linkages and localisation. SDC's conditionality was that the consortium would establish an office in Mogadishu and that the consortium would start building a relationship with the government. (Source: project documentation; partner interview; staff interview).

**EQ: To what extent is the SDC's institutional environment conducive to ensuring humanitarian-development linkages?**

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments relevant to meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?** *Instruments = strategies, credits, programs, partnerships, implementation modalities, and thematic networks*

There is quite some openness in SDC's institutional environment, which follows from the international trend, i.e. commitments at WHS, SDGs etc. There is however some concern that there are so many different versions of what the nexus is. In HoA it is felt that there is relatively common understanding of the nexus given the length of the protracted crisis in Somalia. ("WHS is so overall that everyone can put in their nexus definition. SDC came into a system of nexus when they started working in HoA in 2012"). Staff interviewed in HoA noted that they "live" nexus, but miss an institutional definition guidance on the nexus, because they run into programming obstacles with HQ; and in the coordination mechanism they engage in they are uncertain about the institutional emphasis and limitations of the undefined nexus; moreover, was it noted that rotation of staff and new staff would need to have guidance and training.

It reported that the co-funding in HoA, which has become possible although it has been a challenging process. Within SDC the communication flows were reported to be complicated when nexus programming is done. There is no clear structure and modalities to guide staff. Transactions costs are too high.

The lack of both definition, guidelines and training is a constraint for “nexus” implementation. Local staff, for example are quite dependent on guidelines and training, because they have not experience with the systems in Bern, and for their ability to move between the systems in a creative and flexible way a definition, guidelines and training is required.

With regard to bureaucratic processes it was also noted that while humanitarian-development programming should be taken to scale, SDC “works around our bureaucratic processes” – and limits sizes of programmes to avoid comprehensive approval processes. Programmes below three years and below CHF three million were said to be preferred by staff, although it is inefficient from a programming point of view because it takes 5-6 months to prepare a project which then needs to happen every three years instead of every four years<sup>48</sup>.

Humanitarian aid has more flexible resources, and staff that can “move around and do things”. Development is more rigid and dependent on third parties. It came out in interviews with staff that these features should be kept but in a defined institutional framework. It was repeated in staff interviews that the nexus implementation currently depends on individuals and teams, who want to work differently and be more relevant in the context they are engaged in. This is not sustainable in the long run (Source: staff interviews HoA, former staff HoA).

Switzerland is considered a small but a serious development partner and a strong advocate for complementarity between development and humanitarian action (by other bilaterals, by implementing partners covering international, regional and national NGOs and multilaterals). Switzerland has also developed a distinct profile. It was however also noted by partners that Switzerland could be more visible at the level of political dialogue with Government, particularly in Somalia. Switzerland is considered a strong partner at the technical level, but high-level dialogue would further increase Switzerland’s profile and promote linkages between humanitarian-development actions.

From SDC staff’s viewpoint are there difficulties in assessing to what extent humanitarian partners relay work differently although their narratives have changed and are now emphasizing humanitarian development linkages. In protracted crisis most partners are traditionally humanitarians, because of the contexts of insecurity and conflict. Some partner organisations do not have development experience; and it is difficult to develop different expertise and locally institutions are very weak and building systems is a long term endeavor, which does not lend itself to showing results and effective delivery. The real incentives for implementers are often to show quick results and obviously to save lives, so changes require reassurance from donors and longer funding frames, which SDC staff noted is still in the making. (Source: staff interviews; partner interviews).

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<sup>48</sup> ibid

## Summary Ratings By Evaluation Criteria

Assessment Criteria	Rating (High, Medium, Low)	Rationale
Relevance	<b>High</b>	SDC has focus on four sectors that are particularly relevant for HoA. The strategy has been developed based on a thorough context analysis and partners have been selected carefully with emphasis on those working in the nexus. The target groups include vulnerable populations including a generational and a gender perspective, and there is particular focus on displaced, marginalized and unserved populations.
Effectiveness	<b>Medium</b>	There is a clear link from the Dispatches to strategy level and to programmes. Joint programmes (co-financed between HA and SC) have been developed although with bureaucratic hurdles. WOGA does not seem to play a role in reality in Kenya (this is apparently different in Ethiopia). From the partner' view part SDC is an effective and trusted donor that helps them deliver and work with humanitarian development linkages.
Efficiency	<b>Medium/Low</b>	Staff finds that joint programming has not institutional anchoring but is based on staff initiatives to make things work, which increases the work load. There are concerted efforts at embassy level and dual processing in HQ although a project is only presented at one OpCom and the decision is accepted by the other operational department.
Sustainability	<b>Medium</b>	Difficult to assess sustainability in the Somalia context, however the structural approaches that programmes like SomRep and K-Rapid implement are designed to address short term need but with a strong focus on building resilience of communities and local authorities. The durable solutions perspectives for displaced populations are hinged on political will and Switzerland has limited influence in this regard, but SDCs focus is on findings entry points towards durable solutions.

## Areas for improvement

- The nexus within the institutional environment to be worked out and streamlined
- SDC instruments (financing and HR) to be more aligned and integrated,
- Guidelines and training needed

## Mali Case study

This case study is one of six country case studies - four field-based and two desk-based - designed to explore the extent to which SDC's operational instruments (strategies, programs, and partnerships) and institutional processes (working procedures, funding credits, and organizational set-up) facilitate or hinder SDC's work along the humanitarian-development nexus.

### Context

Switzerland is a long-term development partner in Mali, and SDC continued to support the country during and following the political crisis which erupted in 2012. The conflict necessitated major changes in international engagement and a number of donors reduced their programmes or pulled out. Switzerland was one of few bilateral development actors, which continued its support at the same level and stayed engaged in the conflict affected areas. SDC has operated through two strategies in the period of evaluation: Strategy 2012-2015 (ending 2016) with a budget of roughly 30 Mill CHF per year and most recently the ongoing strategy 2017-2020<sup>49</sup> (total SDC budget CHF 90.800.000 (CHF 78.000.000 South Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid CHF 12.800.000)); and including other federal agencies the budget for the same strategy amounts to CHF 95.600.000. The strategy 2012-2015 (2016) focuses on long term development, as Mali before the crisis emphasized long term development assistance and had no humanitarian assistance. Since the crisis the Mali programme has included humanitarian interventions and in the recent strategy has integrated humanitarian assistance in development programmes, as well as there are free standing humanitarian projects. The recent strategy is holistic, taking the ongoing crisis as its starting point. The strategy also includes peace interventions (HSD). The Programme concentrates on three regions, i.e. Sikasso in the South, and the conflict affected regions of Mopti and Timbuktu in Central and Northern Mali. The overall objective is to support the Government's strategic plan "le CREDD", i.e. to *"promouvoir un développement inclusif et durable en faveur de la réduction de la pauvreté et des inégalités dans un Mali uni et apaisé"*.<sup>50</sup> The priority domains are rural development and food security; education; and governance and peace with two transversal themes of gender and governance. Protection is a key theme for those target groups directly affected by the crisis.

Mali is a vast country with a population of almost 18 million (2016). Although sparsely populated, with only 10% of its people living in the north, high population growth rates and drought have fueled food insecurity, poverty, and instability. The economy is highly undiversified and vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations and the consequences of climate change. The provision of public services in the country is challenging and access is highly uneven, affecting social cohesion and creating geographical disparities.

Presidential elections were held in the summer of 2013 and again in 2018. Peace negotiations between the Government and two rebel coalitions, the "Platform" and the "Coordination," was concluded with the signing of agreements in May and June 2015. The agreement gives stronger impetus to decentralization, creating a role for these regions, as well as a development zone and program of accelerated development (*Programme de*

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<sup>49</sup> Stratégie de Coopération Suisse au Mali 2017-2020 (Departement Federal des Affaires Etrangères 2017).

<sup>50</sup> Op cit.

*développement accéléré du Nord*). However, its implementation is challenging. Security, critical to economic recovery and poverty reduction, is fragile, in the face of continued attacks by armed groups on UN peacekeepers, the Malian army and civilians, mainly in the north and central regions, which necessitates continued humanitarian assistance. Mali ranks 175<sup>th</sup> out of 188 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index for 2016. Since 2012 populations have been forcibly displaced and schools and health services, which were already scarce, have hardly been operating in conflict affected areas. Although many IDPs were able to return home between 2013-2016 and the same counts for refugees Malian refugees in other countries there continues to be major problems with protection and out of school children. The school enrolment was already low before the crisis (75% in 2011) and 70% in 2015. The proportion of girls dropped to 64% in the same period. Youth unemployment remains a huge problem coupled with the limited level of education for many young people. Switzerland head two coordination mechanisms in the period of evaluation: education (2015-2016) and the livestock and fisheries group (2016-2017).

## Results

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's policies and strategies coherent and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages? (focus on targeted population)**

**EQ: How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments in contexts where it is implementing both types of instruments?**

The *Strategie de Cooperation Suisse au Mali 2017-2020* signals engagement that the country will be in crisis mode for some time. Programming is set to be continue with development goals but also addressing immediate needs of vulnerable target groups. The humanitarian-development linkages are explicitly included in the strategy. Humanitarian aid was not included in the strategic framework (2012-2015, 2016) However, at the time of crisis in 2012, SDC quickly brought in humanitarian staff and developed humanitarian responses into its country engagement as well as SDC continued its long-term development engagement in spite of security challenges. As a more holistic response to the crisis, activities of the Human Security Division included support for transitional justice by strengthening the capacities of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) and the process of national reconciliation (peace policy: community consultations, circles of peace, watch committees).

Unlike many other development donors Switzerland continued its development engagement in the conflict affected areas after 2012. Switzerland is considered among both donors, NGO partners and Government of Mali to have a special status, because of its ability to adapt to the crisis and stay engaged and active during time of high insecurity (Sources of information: Strategy, programme documents, staff interviews, implementing partner interviews, non-partner interviews, programme examples and statistics).

SDC is increasingly planning humanitarian-development linkages in strategies; planning of programmes, implementation and coordination in protracted crisis situations globally.

Overall, SDC has so far not developed a definition or guidance on its engagement, the closest to an institutional framing reference is the SDC guidance for fragile and conflict affected situations (CSPM). Staff interviewed (globally) note that they have a broad understanding of what programming in a "nexus" means, but seek institutional framing, guidance and reforms of instruments. As confirmed in Mali, SDC seems only to have made minute adjustment to bridging the silos between humanitarian aid and development

cooperation. In the field there is an ongoing testing of “smart and workable solutions” being tried to overcome the difficulties presented by the separate structures and instruments on which SDC engagement continues to be built (Source: staff interviews HQ, and field, E-survey).

In Mali staff and implementing partners find that SDC must develop an institutional framing (as opposed to a strict definition) of its humanitarian-development linkages approach and modalities, aimed both at staff, implementing partners. This will besides programming help to position Switzerland in the interactions with Government, civil society, bilateral and multilateral partners. The institutional framing is proposed to give sufficient space and flexibility for contextual differences (Source: staff interviews and implementing partners focus group).

In Mopti, humanitarian and development programmes are complemented by HSD and there has been considerable attempts of coordination, but these have so far not materialized.

**EQ: To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?**

SDC works in two conflict affected regions i.e. Mopti and Timbuctoo – and in Sikasso. In Sikasso there is no conflict, but programming is done using a fragility lens bearing in mind that conflicts continue to evolve in Mali. Adjustments were made after the crisis in 2012 (such as in the ARSEN project in the North) and humanitarian aid was quickly designed to supplement the development efforts and focus on immediate needs of displaced populations (education, health, Wash and livelihoods). The key planning step after the crisis was also to assess the potential to include immediate needs through “retrofitting” of existing development programmes.

Under the current strategy, programming is increasingly planned jointly and there are good examples of joint analysis leading to joint planning including both systems change and immediate needs in a volatile and changing contexts. One such programme is PRESA with objectives of food security and building of resilience systems and the NRC implemented project: Renforcement l’Education and securing legal protection for vulnerable target groups. Both projects have been approved medio 2018.

Overall domains and the programmes are very relevant to the situation. Major focus is on vulnerable populations i.e. in particular children (out of school) and youth, nomadic populations, women, and internally displaced households and their livestock. It is the assumption in the programmes that the humanitarian-development linkages focus under the auspices of CSPM planning is enabling for strengthening resilience of target groups as well as reaching more vulnerable groups. Judging from the programme documentation there seems to be no hard data available to support this assumption at this point.

The development elements in current programming are strong on capacity building and systems change. Examples are the support to the Commission of Food Security to strengthen early warning, social protection, and coordination among actors; accelerated schooling policy and Tool Kits of the Ministry of Education, and block grant support to local authorities. (Sources: Programmes are PRESA; PADE; PACEM; Renforcement l’education et documentation civile); PACY/P-SEL Delta, PAFP) (examples of process of programming (NRC); interviews SDC staff, implementing partners, relevant Government).

**EQ: To what extent does the SDC link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation in response to local contexts? (context and partner strategies)**

SDC makes major efforts to make their implementing partners work in complementarity in the regions of Swiss engagement. This approach works well in Mopti. Partners have had to set up coordination amongst them aiming at delivering higher quality assistance to target groups, avoiding overlaps and identify gaps in response and to continue their implementation of development programmes (which was made difficult by the crisis) and also address immediate needs. With a highly insecure, dynamic and fluid context, the Swiss partners have built a strong collaboration. Some coordination has been established with OCHA, in order to obtain solid information and overviews of humanitarian needs, this has, according to the focus groups, been very beneficial and created better targeting and support. (Sources: examples of process of programming (NRC); interviews SDC staff, implementing partners, relevant Government). It was pointed out during interviews with partners that the coordination among Swiss partners should be extended to include other main partners (bigger ones), but this is a start and the broader coordination mechanisms are very separate between humanitarian and development actors, noting that “the Swiss nexus” in Mopti works.

This evaluation also concurs with the findings and conclusions of Diarra & Marchai’s (2017) qualitative and participatory assessment report of the Swiss engagement since 2012, which highlights: “The importance of the quality of human resources and networks of national and local partners, as well as the quality of the dialogue and discussions among these actors to work in crisis contexts. The efforts invested by the Swiss Cooperation Office in Mali, which is considered as an “outreach cooperation”, have been crucial in allowing continuation of activities in northern and central regions of Mali and to ensure continuity of the Swiss support to local authorities and populations which is a key element in a context of profound instability” (Conclusions chapter).

A humanitarian-development linkages approach in Mali has many meanings and forms. The Stabilization & Recovery Section of MINUSMA co-chairs with France and UNDP forms a sub-group of humanitarian-development donors under the auspices of the Commission Réhabilitation des Zones Post-Conflict (CRZPC). The group assists in high-level political dialogue with the Government of Mali and coordinates particularly with UN agencies a joint humanitarian development approach to health, education, food security, Wash and with protection as a transversal topic. The progress of these efforts is considered slow by the co-chairs and partners interviewed. Switzerland participates in this coordination forum, and their role as an active and engaged and practical partner is recognized. Swiss implementing partners question this forum, because of its “securitization” and political nature, which they see as potentially backfiring in terms of credibility of their work in the conflict zones. It was noted that if the nexus approach currently goes beyond humanitarian and development including elements of social cohesion and peacebuilding. It could become a “traffic jam”, and not as intended be “a new way of working”. Switzerland is seen by partners as a principled country which should use its standing among the international community to take a cautious and diligent approach in the coordination fora.

SDC is recognized by the partners for its agile and flexible approach and is seen as a trusted and knowledgeable partner, which always attends meetings, come prepared with representatives at the right level and is willing to the extra mile – it is constructive engagement, which shows respect and enables partners to build real partnership. SDC



provides Technical Assistance at short notice which seems to be appreciated by the partners, these placements fill strategic “gaps”.

The efficient leading role of SDC in the coordination of the education coordination (2015-2016) and the livestock sub-group (livestock “nexus”) in 2016-2017, was praised by partners. Yet partners find that SDC should capitalize on this experience and play a bigger role in the leadership of the overall humanitarian-development linkages approach coordination. This point was made both by bilateral and multilateral actors, who find that Switzerland’s long engagement and principled standing among partners should be capitalized on.

**EQ: To what extent is the SDC’s institutional environment conducive to ensuring humanitarian-development linkages?**

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC’s humanitarian and development instruments relevant to meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?** *Instruments = strategies, credits, programs, partnerships, implementation modalities, and thematic networks*

The current Dispatch is considered an adequate overall strategic guidance that opens up opportunities and room for building resilience and working in the nexus.

Staff (according to the e-survey and interviews) find that planning processes and monitoring, financing instruments and HR will need to be aligned to be conducive for SDC to be effective and efficient. There is currently double bureaucracy because of the siloes between humanitarian aid and development, this has for example be formulated as a need for reorganization to become “fit for current and future reality”. Proposals include flexible financing approved up front in development programmes (“crisis modifier”); joint operation committees in HQ; more decentralization of decisions to the field; strategies should have a results matrix and a monitoring system to support flexibility and needs to change during implementation; institutional framing of the nexus, common HR carrier opportunities.

Guidelines and training are also requested, so staff know how to engage in external dialogues and coordination mechanisms and internally in programming and monitoring. This was also pointed out as necessary to ensure higher quality of internal team work.

*It was noted as a risk that when humanitarian aid is reduced in particular communities, neither government nor development actors can provide services to the same level. This both creates a dependency syndrome, but it also opens up for dissatisfaction by affected populations.*



## Summary Ratings By Evaluation Criteria

Assessment Criteria	Rating (High, Medium, Low)	Rationale
Relevance	<b>High</b>	SDC has maintained focus on the three domains of intervention of the that are particularly relevant for the contextual challenges in Mali. The long-term assistance programme has been retrofitted because of the crisis and need for interventions of humanitarian character, which have been developed in complementarity. Continued focus on conflict affected areas with development programmes, although there were problems of implementation because of security. Focus on the most vulnerable groups, including displaced and out of school children and both their short-term return to school and long-term quality of education for children from vulnerable populations. High degree of understanding “the nexus”.
Effectiveness	<b>Medium</b>	There is a clear link from the Dispatches to the strategies (2012-2015(16) and 2017-2020. Adjustments made to include humanitarian action after the crisis. Programmes following strategies. The cooperation office in Bamako added humanitarian expertise after the crisis in 2012, existing project (ARSEN) was retrofitted to the situation, new hum projects were developed separately, but complementary to the development programmes. Effectiveness hampered by the different instruments that require separate processes, however, the HA programme was carried out with in depth understanding of both hum and dev. The most recent programmes have been joint developed as hum-dev programmes (PRESA, education). Implementation has become more effective by close partner coordination on hum dev (addressing complementarities and gaps in Mopti). Effectiveness has also been hampered by the security situation especially in the North where it has been difficult to maintain implementation of development activities. Effectiveness is sought by coordination, SDC been lead in education and livestock and fisheries and have in both cases played constructive roles to enhance effectiveness. High degree of understanding of the nexus among all stakeholders, but the confusion on what is part and not part of the nexus.
Efficiency	<b>Medium/Low</b>	The office in Bamako is not an integrated cooperation office, but leadership and dedicated staff is enabling for efficiency of processes. HSD is partly delinked. Strong partnerships with implementers, which seem to be efficient within the contextual constraints. SDC availability of short term assistance enhances efficiency and effectiveness of coordination. It has been difficult to plan projects jointly because of the silos, but this has been overcome due to strong leadership and ability to find the flexibilities in the system – but this is very time consuming.

Sustainability	<b>Medium</b>	The support to the food security commission to enhance their focus not only on food distribution but also on early warning and building social protection systems is an important engagement in terms of potential sustainability. The support to the Ministry of Education to develop and implement an Accelerated Learning Policy enables out of school children (displaced, and nomadic in particular, and more girls than boys). One key element of sustainability has been SDC commitment to support capacity building of local authorities including providing budget support. Second, the local authorities have been included in coordination mechanisms in Mopti.
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### Areas for improvement

- The nexus within the context needs to be “defined” and risks identified.
- SDC instruments (financing and HR) to be more aligned and integrated,
- Guidelines and training needed

### Mali mission programme

Specifically, for Mali the evaluation mission has conducted:

11 in depth staff interviews; 3 focus group with staff per domain on strategy and programming; Focus group with non- implementing Swiss NGOs (5 organisations); Two in depth interviews with implementing partners; 1 focus group with director level staff of implementing partners; 1 focus group with implementing partners in Mopti; in depth interview with two national government partners (commissioner level); one in depth interview with Mayor in Mopti; In depth interview with 5 donors; focus group with multilaterals (6 UN organizations). In total the mission has interviewed 48 people.

## Myanmar Case study

This case study is one of six country case studies - four field-based and two desk-based - designed to explore the extent to which SDC's operational instruments (strategies, programs, and partnerships) and institutional processes (working procedures, funding credits, and organizational set-up) facilitate or hinder SDC's work along the humanitarian-development nexus. Specifically, it is intended to analyze the extent to which SDC's:

1. Humanitarian strategies and programs adopt a systems' change perspective and corresponding development requirements and objectives;
2. Actions taken facilitate the interface of relief and development, especially in protracted crises; and
3. Development actions include activities to respond to conflict and disaster risks.

The case study follows the same structure as the main report and will present two main sections:

- (1) **Operational Performance** by assessing the relevance, coherence, and performance of SDC's strategies, programs, and partnerships in linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation.
- (2) **Institutional Performance** by analyzing the extent SDC's working procedures, funding procedures/set-up, and organizational structure are adequate in practice.

Aligned to the scope of the main report, the case study covers activities supported under the current Myanmar Country Strategy (2013-2018) but also draws upon information from the forthcoming strategy (2019-2023) where relevant. As with the Mali case study, analyzes the nexus as a three-way, development- humanitarian-peacebuilding (HDP) construct.

### Context

One of Southeast Asia's poorest countries, Myanmar provides an ideal case study for understanding both the need and potential benefit of pursuing a more integrated humanitarian-development nexus (hereafter referred to simply as the "nexus"). The country of 52.5 million, including over 135 ethnic groups and 121 languages according to the 2010 census, faces a myriad of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding issues and has been designated as a "priority" country for both Swiss humanitarian (2001) and development (2013) support. Myanmar consistently ranks in the top three countries "most vulnerable to extreme weather;"<sup>51</sup> faces ongoing violent conflict in the west (Rakhine), north (N. Shan/Kachin), and in the south (S. Shan, SE), with an estimated 118 of 330 townships, home to one quarter of the country's population, affected by conflict; and the country consistently ranks as one of the lowest countries in SE Asia on both performance and investment on key development indicators such as health, education, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). In addition, it faces more systemic challenges such as "weak state capacities, persisting conflicts, systematic discrimination, social exclusion, unequal access to basic services and natural resources and widespread poverty making it a fragile state."<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> "Vulnerability in Myanmar: A Secondary Data Review of Needs, Coverage and Gaps." HARP. June 2018.

<sup>52</sup> Opening Note Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Myanmar 2019-23, 06 February 2018

Swiss support to Myanmar began in the mid-1990s in the form of humanitarian assistance to refugees in camps along the Thailand-Myanmar borders. This support was expanded during the late 1990s and Myanmar officially became a “priority country for humanitarian assistance” in 2001. This humanitarian assistance was greatly expanded in 2008 in response to the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis, which resulted in over 100,000 deaths and \$4 billion worth of damage according to UN estimates.<sup>53</sup>

Beginning in 2011, Swiss humanitarian assistance shifted its geographic focus from the Nargis-affect “delta region” to the South East (SE) of Myanmar where it began implementing direct assistance projects. According to the “2013-17/18 Swiss Cooperation Strategy,” Swiss assistance was very much focused on supporting a three-way humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus. Specifically, it focused on supporting “the peace process and assistance to populations affected by conflict and crises, promotes a democratic society, the reduction of poverty and the growth of a sustainable national economy, applying the whole range of tools of development cooperation, humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and human rights promotion instruments as well as the diplomatic toolbox.”

The Embassy of Switzerland in Myanmar is currently developing its next country strategy, the “Swiss Cooperation Strategy for Myanmar 2019-23.” The strategy will involve an expansion of SDC’s geographic focus area to include South Shan, while Humanitarian Aid activities will continue to focus on Rakhine and Kachin/Shan.

## Summary Findings on Operational Performance

### Strategies

Both the current 2013-2018 and forthcoming 2019-2023 country strategies repeatedly reference both the appropriateness and assumed value of working along the DHP nexus to address Myanmar’s myriad of short-medium-, and long-term needs. The nexus is mentioned as early as the preface of the current strategy and is repeated throughout the subsequent sections highlighting the achievements of past Swiss assistance, current context for Swiss cooperation, Swiss foreign policy objectives, and the strategic objectives and orientation sections (see **textbox** for examples). The forthcoming strategy, currently under development, continues to emphasize the nexus, however, with more of a focus on the

#### References to the Nexus in 2013-2018 Country Strategy

“In line with the variegated country context, the strategy addresses a range of human development situations: from prevention of and recovery from acute conflict and displacement, to humanitarian crisis and rehabilitation, to sustained pro poor development.” ~ Preface

“Switzerland’s established role in Myanmar as a neutral transparent party engaged in addressing humanitarian concerns will be capitalized on through a longer-term development cooperation approach and support to the peace building process, for which the situation has now become more conducive.” ~ Pg. 13.

“Switzerland’s domain interventions build on the SDC HA engagement that continues in the southeast and will apply a synergetic approach, combining humanitarian, development and peace-building instruments in a practical and delivery-oriented manner.” ~ Pg. 19

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<sup>53</sup> “Cyclone Nargis costs Burma, \$4B, Says UN.”

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/21/cyclonenargis.burma>. Accessed, September 23, 2018.

assumed peacebuilding (compared to development) gains that such an approach would support.

The emphasis on working in the nexus was further reinforced by several reviews and papers commissioned by the Embassy. A July 2017 Embassy Discussion Paper places the three-way “nexus” as central to the success of Switzerland’s engagement in Myanmar. “...Switzerland needs to work increasingly within the peace-humanitarian-development nexus due to Myanmar’s ongoing fragility. Our policy has to be multifaceted by addressing the drivers of conflicts, supporting peace, delivering humanitarian assistance, developing institutions, resilience, capacities and socio-economic progress in a complementary way”.<sup>54</sup>

Finally, in terms of implementation strategies, both country strategies also highlight the use of a “Whole of Government Approach” (WOGA) and the geographic focusing of activities as facilitating Switzerland’s work in the nexus. The extent to which the WOGA and “integrated Embassy” concepts have materialized in practice are covered in depth in the **Institutional Performance** section below. The strategy to limit activities to specific geographical areas is not only a central feature of both country strategies but was also identified by a vast majority of respondents interviewed during field—across both SDC staff and partners—as a factor facilitating the implementation of the nexus. These respondents explained that the geographic focus and proximity of activities meant that humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding staff were encouraged, if not directly “forced” by the leadership, to collaborate to address common issues such as restrictions in access, the building of trust, and the strengthening of governance and supporting systems for service-delivery. This also explained that the geographic focus has resulted in the emergence of joint coordination mechanisms, such as the “SE Working Group,” wherein the nexus was often discussed (see **Partnerships** for additional detail).

## Programs

Between 2013-2018, Switzerland supported 46 activities across four domains,<sup>55</sup> accounting for nearly CHF 157 million in programming and making Switzerland the 10<sup>th</sup> largest donor

### References to Geographic Focus Facilitating the Nexus

“The focus on the geographic area of southeast Myanmar provides the opportunity to build on two decades of SDC Humanitarian Aid experience...and complement them with initiatives in development cooperation and peace promotion and democratisation.”

~2013-2018 Country Strategy

“To address the overall transition towards peace and to be able to continue working on the DHP nexus it is suggested to expand the Swiss focus to the North-East - notably to Kayah and Shan states...Building on the positive experience in the South-East, an expansion towards the North-East could involve direct implementation of humanitarian aid, linked to the overall embassy engagement in the region.”

~ Outcome Document: 2019-2023 Strategy Review

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<sup>54</sup> Protracted Crises. Pg. 1.

<sup>55</sup> These included two activities in “Employment and Vocational Skills Development,” six activities in “Agriculture and Food security,” 14 activities in “Health, Social Services and Local Governance,” and 24 activities in “Promotion of Peace, Democratization, and Protection,” although many of these

to Myanmar.<sup>56</sup> While working in the “nexus” was presented as a common theme unifying most activities under the 2013-2018 Cooperation Strategy, interviews with SDC staff (HQ and field) and partners, as well as a review of background documents identified the following projects as the most relevant examples where the “nexus” was present:

- **“Primary Health Care” program in SE.** While an argument can be made that the program helps provide life-saving humanitarian support to women and their newborns, the program provides a particularly good example of the development-peacebuilding nexus and SDC’s commitment to maintain a **“system change perspective”** to its programming. Working through two consortia working on a 10-year programming timeframe—one led by Save The Children (SCI) and the other led by Community Partners International (CPI)—the program works to improve both the coverage, coordination, and trust between government and Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) health service providers. Switzerland was quite risk-taking in this regard, working in Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) as early as 2014, prior to these EAOs signing the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which could be regarded as a violation of the 2010 military backed constitution. Going forward, “Switzerland will further strengthen synergies between the development programmes and the basic services (including health infrastructure) provided as part of Switzerland’s humanitarian aid. It will continue to focus on conflict-affected areas using an inclusive approach - i.e., including ethnic armed organisations and their health organisations.”<sup>57</sup>
- **“Gulf of Mottoma” project.** Implemented by Helvetas, this project focuses on providing basic livelihood security to vulnerable communities along targeted coastal areas of the Gulf of Mottama in Mon state and Bago region in SE Myanmar. While the project was envisioned to be primarily a development focused intervention, it was highlighted as a good example of where SDC has included **specific activities in development projects to respond to natural disaster risks**. The project includes a small but built-in component and contingency-fund to address emergent humanitarian needs, mostly through community based disaster-risk management. This contingency fund was activated during the recent August 2018 floods in SE, wherein Helvetas was able to quickly utilize program funds to support the provision of emergency humanitarian supplies. The project also worked in two KNU controlled townships and is working to promote trust building between KNU and government authorities working on coastal resource management and livelihoods.
- **“Strengthening Land Governance” project.** Implemented by Land Core Group, Transnational Institution, and the University of Bern’s Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), the project works to address land tenure issues and support legal reform to secure equal access to land for small-scale food producers. While the immediate nexus relevance was initially difficult to identify in background documents, respondents explained that the project worked to address humanitarian issues related to acute and seasonal food insecurity, development issues of promoting civil society participation in legal land reform and securing land rights for more sustained livelihoods, and peacebuilding issues by working with the Mon State Government, Border Guard Forces, and KNU and NMSP representatives to participate in joint meetings and trainings to inform their respective populations on their land rights. The project is also working on the potential convergence of different existing land use

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included secondments and financial contributions to various United Nations (UN) agencies in Myanmar.

<sup>56</sup> Concept Note for the Swiss Cooperation Strategy Myanmar 2019 – 2023. Pg. 2.

<sup>57</sup> Outcome Document: 2019-2023 Strategy Review.

policies between EAOs and the Government of Myanmar for the benefit of small-scale food producers across the country.

- **Support to Multi-Donor Funds: “Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund” (LIFT), “Joint Peace Fund” (JPF) and “Three Millennium Development Goal Fund” (3MDG).** Both background documents and interviews with SDC staff and partners also point to Switzerland’s contribution to multi-donor funds in Myanmar as supporting a nexus approach. The clearest example was Switzerland contribution to LIFT and its active advocacy on the Funding Board for the fund to focus more on areas “emerging from conflict.” As a result, the fund, which originated as a humanitarian-focused fund, is shifting its focus during its next round of implementation to do more to **facilitate the interface of relief and development** by supporting the development of livelihoods in conflict affected and EAO-controlled areas. Under JPF, interviewees highlighted the work being done with Norwegian Refugee Council to support the issuance of government registration document in both government and EAO-controlled areas. With 3MDG, SDC advocacy has helped shift the focus of the fund to working exclusively in conflict-affected areas and with Ethnic Health Organizations.


Overall, while the case study identified clear evidence of where SDC is working along the nexus in terms of: (1) adopting a “systems change perspective” in humanitarian programming; (2) taking actions to facilitate the interface of relief and development, particularly in protracted crises; and (3) ensuring that development activities identify and respond to conflict and disaster risks, the overarching finding is that the nexus is still mostly confined to strategic commitments and future planning than it is manifested in actual programming across Switzerland’s broad portfolio to date. As one senior staff member summarized, “in terms of planning, I’d give us a 4 [out of 5] in planning for the nexus but only a 2 or 3 in terms of implementation.” However, encouraging, every staff member interviewed reported that the Swiss Embassy had improved in terms of considering the nexus between the current and forthcoming country strategy and recent turnover in staff.

## **Partnerships**


In addition to reviewing the extent to which the Swiss Embassy has worked along the nexus, the case study also explored the extent to which Switzerland “punches above its weight” by influencing others to work along the nexus. **Figures 1-3** below summarize the responses provided by SDC staff themselves when asked to rank the extent to which SDC encourages host government, implementing partners, and other donors to work along the nexus. Interestingly, while a majority responded that SDC encourages its different partners to work

along the nexus at least to a “medium extent,” responses also indicate that SDC encourages Myanmar government partners less than its implementing or other donor partners.


**Figure 3: To what extent does SDC encourage host**



**Figure 3: To what extent does SDC encourage implementing**



**Figure 3: To what extent does SDC encourage other donors to**



This perspective was triangulated and validated by both evidence from the desk review and interviews with SDC partners. While all three sources (SDC staff interviews, partner interviews, and background documents) indicate a willingness by SDC to encourage Myanmar government partners to pursue the nexus, all three sources also explained that the apparent lack of willingness of the government to engage substantively with international partners and the lack of coordination among the government’s different ministries and departments present considerable challenges for succeeding in doing so.

Interviews with SDC implementing partners and other international donors corroborated SDC staff’s own perspectives on their encouragement of others to work along the nexus and helped to provide some specific examples. Implementing partners explained that while SDC staff consistently encouraged them to consider the multiple needs of target beneficiaries and actively checked on their adherence to “Conflict Sensitive Program Management” (CSPM) principles, many of these partners themselves had made working along the nexus an organizational priority and were committed to doing more going forward. Other donor partners interviewed (both UN and bilateral) provided various examples of Switzerland actively participating in, and in some cases leading, coordination working groups—such as the SE working group, Development-Humanitarian-Peace Nexus workstream of the Cooperation Partners Group, or the LIFT and JPF Fund Boards. They mentioned that Switzerland was particularly notable in its emphasis among development partners on CSPM and the need for international actors to focus their activities to supporting vulnerable groups in conflict-affected areas, including non-ceasefire areas, which can be contentious in the Myanmar context.

## Summary Findings on Institutional Performance

### “Integrated Embassy,” WOGA, and Funding Modalities

The opening of an integrated Embassy in 2012 was in large part motivated by an interest in pursuing the “nexus” by breaking down “silos” between its Humanitarian Assistance (HA), South Cooperation (SC) and Human Security Division (HSD) domains and providing a more unified, holistic approach to programming. Specifically, Switzerland aimed for staff to work together “at the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in addressing the drivers of violent



conflict, delivering humanitarian assistance and developing institutions, resilience and capacities simultaneously in a complementary and synergetic way in order to end humanitarian needs, ensure sustainable development and a viable and peaceful functioning of a State.”<sup>58</sup> This would in turn be done by coordinating the use of different instruments available to each office/division, such as “FDFA’s political and economic relations tools, SDC’s development cooperation and humanitarian aid approaches as well as Human Security Division’s (HSD) peace-building and human rights promotion instruments. In addition, SECO in the area of economic development cooperation supports a few regional and global projects which are carried out by multilateral organisations and an INGO. The whole-of-government approach will be applied pragmatically through all levels of interventions: at project level, for support to policy dialogue and promotion of donor coordination.” (pg. 16).”<sup>59</sup>

However, interviews with Swiss Embassy staff and background documents also indicate that, in practice, the Embassy might not be as “integrated” as intended and that important institutional obstacles remain. This can be seen both in the physical set-up of the Embassy, with the HA and SC/HSD housed in two separate buildings,<sup>60</sup> as well as in the contractual, financial, and reporting differences between the various divisions. Nearly all Swiss Embassy staff interviewed, both national and international, reported that institutional factors were not facilitative of working in the “nexus.” Listed by frequency of reference, these included:

- 1. Differences in timing and flexibility of funding instruments.** The vast majority of staff interviewed identified differences in the flexibility and time needed for approval as the biggest institutional obstacle to working more in the “nexus.” Staff explained that while HA funding was extraordinarily flexible and quick, with one staff member explaining that approval can sometimes be as quick as 24 hours in exceptional circumstances, SC funding usually requires an 18-24 month timeframe to allow sufficient time for assessment, planning, procurement, and then start-up. To help address this issue, staff suggested that HQ provide more guidance and examples of the possibilities for co-funding, or at least, provide more flexibility for the intentional (and planned) sequencing of funding.
- 2. Mindsets of staff.** The second most commonly cited factor hindering the “nexus” cited by Embassy staff was a difficulty of staff to think outside of their traditional humanitarian or development paradigms. Staff explained that there is still a tendency for HA staff to focus on addressing immediate needs and for SC staff to prioritize a more measured, careful approach having considered important conflict sensitivity risks. However, staff also acknowledged that while common to most Embassies in Yangon and around the world, the less was probably less pronounced with the Swiss

“I think it’s a great opportunity to work in an integrated Embassy because people bring different perspectives. We have people working along Track I, II, and III. However, that also means that when we meet in the office we don’t really talk to each other, we have different audiences and levels of communication. Some are more interested in feeding back info at Ministry level, others at grassroots level.”

~ Swiss Embassy Staff Member

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<sup>58</sup> Swiss Embassy’s Discussion Paper focusing on the SE.

<sup>59</sup> 2013-2017 Myanmar Country Strategy, pg. 14.

<sup>60</sup> This has been recognized as an issue previously and the Embassy has applied for and received permission to move to a joint building in early 2019.

Embassy given its rotational policies, integrated embassies, and encouragement to switch between different sectors, countries, and programs.

3. **Human Resources (HR) policies and contracts.** Related to the above, several staff also focused on specific contractual differences between staff working in the various domains. Specifically, the cited the differences between permanent staff and “*direct action*” contracts and the practice of hiring HA staff from the Humanitarian Core Roster.
4. **Different engagement and reporting lines.** Finally, a few staff emphasized the importance of understanding how the day-to-day engagement with actors at different levels in-country (see textbox) and reporting lines back to Bern reinforced divisions between staff.

The issues identified during fieldwork align with many of the main issues identified by SDC itself during a recent mission to review the 2019-2023 Cooperation Strategy. “Despite the integrated representation in Yangon, which per se is a great advantage, this is not without challenges such as parallel planning and monitoring missions, different project timelines, the extent of delegation of authority, and being located in two different buildings for the time being. Working in the same geographical areas helps; also having a common focus on specific issues or working with the same partners.”<sup>61</sup>

### **Working Procedures**

However, while interviews with staff and evidence from background documents indicate that the formal institutional structure, funding mechanisms, and administrative processes serve more as a hinderance than a facilitating factor for working in the nexus, staff also explained that the more informal processes and working procedurals were ultimately more important. Here staff, both in HQ and in Myanmar, explained the importance of informal interaction between colleagues from different divisions, even something as simple of lunchtime conversations in a shared cafeteria, could greatly facilitate working in the nexus. In terms of a more formal and regular procedure, staff widely identified the current joint “Operational Committee” meetings as a “good practice” example for working in the nexus. They explained that staff from all departments were required to attend this bi-weekly meeting (now a weekly meeting since October 2018) and that each proposal reviewed by the “Ops Committee” needed to explicitly state how the intended activity would support the nexus. If it did not, staff explained that it would be requested to do so and resubmit for a future meeting. While there remain different approval criteria between SDC HA, SC, and HSD, the practice of inviting SDC colleagues from each department to the credit proposal discussions could be a “good practice” that SDC HQ could follow.

Overall, the take-away message from staff interviews and discussions during the mission outbrief was that while there are several institutional factors that currently hinder the Embassy’s ability to work in the “nexus,” these can and are often overcome by staff willing and creative enough to find ways of working around them. Staff emphasized the importance of informal communication and ability to capitalize on flexibility and “grey areas” provided within these institutional structures and processes.

### **Potential Risks and Unanticipated Consequences**

There was strong consensus, both from people interviewed during fieldwork and from the background documents reviewed, that **context should drive any consideration of**

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<sup>61</sup> Outcome Document: 2019-2023 Strategy Review

**pursuing the nexus** and that SDC should avoid trying to implement the nexus uniformly across all contexts. Additional risks included:

**Diversion of funding and expertise.** Staff cautioned that the management and response to humanitarian crises required different expertise and funding flexibility than responses to longer-term development challenges. They expressed concern that by requiring staff to have too broad a set of skills and expertise might in turn limit the depth of that expertise. Additionally, they provided various examples of how using HA funding for development projects might limit SDC's ability to respond to acute and sudden onset emergencies or vice versa how the use of South Cooperation (SC) funds for response to recurrent humanitarian crises might limit a SC budget already under threat in the Swiss Parliament.

**Delayed response.** One concern raised primarily by HA staff focus on the risk that taking a more "development approach" to emergencies—particularly in terms of baselines, procurement restrictions, and in-depth conflict sensitivity analysis—would undermine what many considered to be HA's strength of rapid response.

**Conflict sensitivity.** The risk of being conflict insensitive and "doing harm" was a counterpoint by development staff to the risk of a delayed response highlighted above. Respondents feared that a push to work more along the nexus might be misinterpreted as an encouragement to take "short-cuts" or undertake less rigorous assessments in order to facilitate a quicker response. Staff explained that while tedious at times, there were valid reasons for why development projects can take up to 18-24 months to start on the ground.

**Compliance.** Staff also highlighted potential audit and fiduciary risks associated with working in the nexus. Examples most often centered on instances where HA or SC funding had been used in ways to overly stretch the definition of the type of activity such funding was intended to support. Staff explained that part of the careful and divergent approval process at HQ was derived from the fact that these staff had to carefully account and report back how this funding was actually used.

### Summary Ratings By Evaluation Criteria

Assessment Criteria	Rating (High, Medium, Low)	Rationale
<b>Relevance</b>	High	Both internal and external country context analyses documents highlight the need for partners to pursue a nexus approach.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Medium /Low	While the intent to pursue the nexus is clearly stated in strategies, only a limited number of projects across the portfolio is implementing the nexus in practice.
<b>Efficiency</b>	Medium/Low	Several important institutional factors were identified as hindering the nexus and WOGA.
<b>Sustainability</b>	Medium	Still too early to fully assess, however, there is evidence of potential sustainability given SDC's long term engagement in SE and longer programming timeframes that consider "systems change" perspectives.

## Conclusions

Myanmar's myriad of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding needs strongly justify the relevance of Switzerland pursuing a nexus approach to its programming. While the Embassy has made strong and consistent commitments to implementing the nexus, its current (2013-2018) and forthcoming (2019-2023) country strategies, and its geographic focused approach to programming combined with the commitment of its staff to facilitate working effectively along the nexus, key institutional challenges remain for doing so on a more consistent and broader basis.

Switzerland's own documents, as well as interviews with staff, that the "synergistic and complementary" benefits of combining Switzerland's "diplomatic and political tools, peace-building and human rights promotion instruments, development cooperation and humanitarian aid" have not yet fully materialized.<sup>62</sup>

Fortunately, however, there was also a wide reaching consensus that the Embassy has and continues to improve over recent years. SDC has already undertaken a number internal reflections and assessments and this case-study found evidence that the main conclusions and recommendations from these efforts remain valid. Most simply summarized, these recommendations would be that (1) "Working in a fragile context requires a smart mix of aid modalities;"<sup>63</sup> and that "Flexibility is obviously required. Working on the nexus with the ambition of reconciling HA, Development and Peace activities has to fit into the very complex, fragile, diversified and moving context of Myanmar. It is only possible to proceed by focusing, selecting and adjusting Switzerland's engagement to its means (HR and financial), tools and added values, matching with Myanmar's needs/demand according to its National Policy Framework currently under revision. Flexibility has to be ensured, and is challenged by short- medium- and long objectives."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Opening Note, pgs. 1-2.

<sup>63</sup> Outcome Document: 2019-2023 Strategy Review

<sup>64</sup> Swiss Embassy's Discussion Paper focusing on the SE.

## Haiti Case study

This case study is one of six country case studies - four field-based and two desk-based - designed to explore the extent to which SDC's operational instruments (strategies, programs, and partnerships) and institutional processes (working procedures, funding credits, and organizational set-up) facilitate or hinder SDC's work along the humanitarian-development nexus.

### Context

Switzerland governmental engagement in Haiti is relatively recent. While Swiss civil society and non-governmental organizations have had a presence in the country since the 1950s and 1960, the Swiss government led engagement dates back to the 1990s. In 2013, following the devastation caused by the 2010 Earthquake, Haiti became a priority country for Switzerland. Currently Swiss governmental presence in Haiti constitutes the second largest permanent ambassadorial contingent.

In Haiti, Switzerland is not regarded as a principal donor in terms of fund allocations or prominence, but it is regarded as a key player in donor coordination. SDC has operated through two strategies while in Haiti: a first strategy that covered the 2014-2017<sup>65</sup> period with a budget of 79 million CHF; and a second and most recent strategy covering the 2018-2021.<sup>66</sup> While the evaluation period excludes the second strategy, elements of the analysis included here have included the review of this document because it is particularly relevant to an SDC discussion on nexus. Prior to 2014, the work conducted in Haiti by the Swiss government was led by Mid-Term Cooperation Programme (2011-2013).<sup>67</sup>

The Mid-Term Cooperation Programme (2011-2013) was specifically focused on post-earthquake reconstruction and counted with a budget of 36 million CHF. The majority of these funds were to be used for humanitarian aid. During the 2014-2017 strategic period the SDCs total budget for south cooperation and humanitarian aid in Haiti totalled CHF 79 million, with 34 and CHF 45 million allocated to South Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid respective. The geographical focus was on the western part of the country, Nippes, the South and South-East. These areas were identified as the most in need. Specifically, a focus on rural areas within the general geographical areas covered were noted as being of particular relevance. The areas of focus were not only identified because they appear to be the most disadvantaged in terms of access to goods, services and opportunities, but also because they have suffered particularly extreme environmental degradation. In the case of the West, Nippes and the South East, the Quake of 2010 was also a key factor in securing Swiss attention on the area.

Haiti is regarded as a very fragile environment. This is owed to weak governance, extreme poverty and the continued threat of natural hazards catastrophe. According to the World Bank, 90% of the population are at risk from natural catastrophe. The Bank further notes that the 2016 Hurricane (Mathew) caused damage that was equivalent to 32% of GDP (GDP calculated at 8.0% Billion). This needs to be understood also within the regional context,

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<sup>65</sup> Stratégie de coopération suisse en Haïti 2014– 2017

<sup>66</sup> Stratégie de coopération suisse en Haïti 2018 – 2021

[https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/fr/documents/laender/cooperation-strategy-haiti\\_FR.pdf](https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/deza/fr/documents/laender/cooperation-strategy-haiti_FR.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> DDC Programme de coopération à moyen terme Haïti 2011–2013

where Haiti figures as the poorest country in the Americas, and where the most recent household survey (ECVMAS 2012) found that 59% of Haitians (x=6 million) lived below the national poverty line. Indeed, the same survey found that 24% of the population lived below the extreme poverty line.<sup>68</sup> Adding to these challenges, Haiti is among the most unequal countries in the world. According to the Gini index, Haiti currently has a GINI coefficient of .59.<sup>69</sup> The current United Nation estimates place the population numbers at a little above 11 million, with a 1.2% growth rate. The population are largely urban dwellers (61.4%).<sup>70</sup>

The political situation has been characterized by considerable political upheaval, insecurity and numerous periods without a working government. In 2004 following the collapse of the Aristide government the MINUSTAH, a UN mission to help restore and maintain order, was established. It was closed-down completely in 2017 following a UN Security Council resolution to do so. The closing of the mission was understood as a key milestone in the process of stabilization which was expected to follow the February 2017 return to constitutional order.<sup>71</sup> The swearing in of the Moise government in February 2017 was preceded by the 2015 indefinite deferment of elections due to allegations of fraud. This led to the instating of an appointed president in February 2016 and to new elections at the end of 2016 which ultimately led to the swearing in of President Moise in January 2017.<sup>72</sup> Although the election of Moise was ruled not corrupt, his government is under considerable scrutiny. He himself is accused of corruption and money laundering and his prime minister resigned in July 2018, as a result of an impending no-confidence vote. Haiti is ranked one of the top most corrupt countries in the world.<sup>73</sup>

Against this political backdrop, Haitians enjoy few government administered services, and are often confronted with local governments which are inept and uncommitted; and they also face continued threat of environmental crisis.

## Results

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's policies and strategies coherent and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages? (focus on targeted population)**

**EQ: How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments in contexts where it is implementing both types of instruments?**

The current strategy (2018-2021) did away with the separation between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, and integrated both instruments into the three focus areas. The Haitian experience demonstrates a clear evolution in how the SDC sees its engagement and the importance of the nexus approach. During its presence in Haiti, the Swiss government has been guided by two strategies (2014-2017 and 2018-2021) and by a cooperation note (2011-2013).

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<sup>68</sup> See <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>

<sup>69</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>  
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient>

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/haiti-population/>

<sup>71</sup> <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45034.pdf>

<sup>72</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/haiti>

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/haiti>; <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/haitis-troubled-path-development>

The cooperation note (2011-2013) did specifically link the Swiss support to the 2010 Haitian National Plan of Action, which identified trustworthy infrastructure; food security, specifically of the rural poor; and natural resource management and disaster risk reduction (DRR) as national priorities.<sup>74</sup> To this end it is important to underline that the cooperation note was coherent with Haitian priorities, although the veracity of the priorities and degree to which the Haitian government actually pursued these in a broader sense is strongly disputed. Discussions with numerous respondents provided a varied view of the Haitian government approach to national priorities and the utility of said plans. Some respondents noted that there are clear priorities which are arduously pursued, while others pointed out that the current Haitian national development plan (2016-2019) has still to be produced. This they argued is a clear demonstration of a lack of strategic thinking at the top levels. Multiple respondents noted that at the local level plans are developed. However, here too there are different perspectives regarding the degree to which the government plans influence delivery of aid. Some respondents noted that local plans are extremely broad and that donors and international civil society actors, who bring funds, have a great degree of latitude which ultimately means that it is very easy for actors generally, not only the Swiss, to align to 'existing priorities,' and that the local governments intervene very little.

It was also noted by multiple respondents, including donors, multilateral and international organizations, that although there is a coordination mechanism to bring together donors' support, these do not address programmatic aspects of development cooperation or humanitarian aid. Currently the donor coordination group, which has been spearheaded by the Swiss embassy, is the main donor coordinating mechanism. The group brings together donors, UN, EU and civil society actors. However, members of the group highlighted that the group, although a very useful venue to discuss current issues, had not been able to lead to the coordination of efforts or to the development of a broad coherent and comprehensive donor strategy for Haiti.

As pertains to the nexus more specifically, neither the cooperation note that guided the 2011-2013<sup>75</sup> support nor the strategy that guided the 2014-2017 development cooperation and humanitarian aid provided to Haiti make express mention of the need to link humanitarian and development interventions through a nexus approach. However, a clear progression in thinking and approach is visible from a review of past and current strategies. The cooperation note does make specific mention of the need to focus on the target populations (Haitians) rather than on broader Swiss driven strategic objectives. During data collection in Haiti, a number of respondents highlighted that the Swiss support stood apart from other donors, because Switzerland did not have a political agenda to pursue in the country. Some respondents highlighted that other donors are driven by agendas that are far more HQ determined and more aligned with donor government priorities and policies, than with the needs on the ground.

In addition to a clear focus on the needs of the population, rather than the furthering of an externally inspired agenda, the experience secured during the 2011-2013 time-period led to a number of conclusions. Chief among them the need to shift interventions which had initiated as a humanitarian intervention, into medium- and longer-term development efforts.

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<sup>74</sup> Billan de cooperation 2011-2013/ DDC Programme de cooperation à moyen terme Haïti 2011–2013, see Stratégie de coopération suisse en Haïti 2014– 2017

<sup>75</sup> DDC Programme de Co-operation à moyen terme Haïti 2011–2013; see: Stratégie de Coopération Suisse en Haïti 2014– 2017.

The need for this shift was understood as a way to strengthen the focus towards risk reduction-fragility. As a result of these developments and following from a broad concept of the need to comply with the Paris accords, the 2014-2017 strategy for Haiti makes specific mention of the need to ensure complementarity and harmonization between intervention humanitarian and south cooperation efforts. This strategy pursued a change theory that was based on the idea that medium- and long-term development, and the reduction of fragility, could be achieved with a focus on efforts to improve living conditions (direct); support for the development of legitimate government agencies and the support for the development of a 'healthy' relationship between the agents of the state and the population. Achieving these objectives would serve as a foundation on a stronger social contract. To this end the strategy focused on three key areas of support: a) Good Governance; b) Agriculture and food security; and c) Reconstruction and Disaster Risk Reduction; and was rooted in a medium- and long-term post-earthquake reconstruction effort concept. In addition, the strategy highlighted the role that cross cutting issues, mainly gender, and governance, can serve as a linking force between interventions.

The implementation of the 2014-2017 strategy includes a varied set of modalities and which has served to test the opportunities, and the needs, for a nexus approach, and also to challenge views regarding the applicability of the approach. Hurricane Mathew (2016) served to further highlight the opportunities for nexus and the value of a coordinated approach. In Haiti, at the operational level, most staff would agree that the nexus approach, or elements of it, have been implemented in the field in the post Mathew period. However, a few key issues from the post-Mathew experience need to be highlighted. First, the humanitarian intervention post-Mathew was implemented in two modalities. One was the post emergency response contingent sent to Haiti directly from Bern. This contingent, according to some respondents, basically bypassed the embassy completely. The contingent did not report to the embassy, or to the Ambassador, but rather directly to Bern. They did not have as part of their mandate to ensure a coordinated approach with the embassy, and hence were not set up in a way that would serve to ensure that they gained from the contextual knowledge held at the embassy, or that their efforts would be ones that could be later sustained or further supported by Swiss development cooperation efforts. A second effort started at the embassy and joined efforts by both humanitarian and south cooperation efforts working jointly. This effort was funded 50/50 from South Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (i.e. Relèvement immédiat Post-Matthew (soutien aux familles), the continuation of this project is known as PURPOS). Although, this can be regarded as a considerable step forward, some interview respondents noted that still within the joint funded project there was a fair amount of independent engagement by on the one side the humanitarian effort and by south cooperation on the other. Essentially, that even when the project was funded as a joint effort, there were still many challenges in ensuring collaboration. These were resulting from a series of issues including different understandings on how to respond to beneficiary needs; different approaches on how to work with beneficiaries; as well as the different reporting and financial requirements demanded of humanitarian and development cooperation.

Within the embassy the post-Mathew experience served as foundation for the current strategy (2018-2021) where the nexus is expressly mentioned. The *Stratégie de Coopération Suisse en Haiti 2018-2021* signals a clear shift towards a more coherent approach to support that identifies a thematic, rather than development or humanitarian, oriented approach. This is noted as a clear strategic objective resulting from lessons learned



during the implementation of previous strategy and plan of action. Specifically, how the Earthquake of 2010 and hurricane Mathew of 2016 challenged the previous intervention modality which focused more strongly on a separation of efforts. It is also worth noting that, according to some interview respondents, leading to the development of the most recent strategy (2018-2021) nexus had become a more noted priority at headquarters and was highlighted as a focus that embassies should consider when developing new strategies.

**EQ: To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?**

Interviews with SDC staff in Bern and Haiti, as well as with other donors, and representatives from implementing partners, all agree that in Haiti strengthening the resilience of the population is a key element to ensuring long term development. How resilience building can be achieved, and how to articulate humanitarian and development efforts is a more complex question, however.

The 2013-2017 experience, where the need to further coordinate and align interventions has provided for interesting results. First, it is important to underscore that 'nexus' thinking was not integrated into the strategy until 2018, and that previous efforts were largely described in the strategy as distinct thematic areas, and therefore there was a great degree of latitude regarding whether or not interventions consistently explored opportunities for collaboration or not. Interviews conducted with SDC staff highlight that while there are some very good examples of nexus type projects, the vast majority of projects funded did not include a nexus approach or thinking of any kind. This is further highlighted by the document review where identifying nexus interventions is virtually impossible, since all projects are assigned to either development cooperation or humanitarian aid and as such they often have different titles, budget lines, explanations and fulfil different narrative reporting requirements.

However, despite the aforementioned shortcomings, there is a general consensus amongst interviewees at the embassy and in Bern, that the experience in efforts to try to articulate activities (nexus) prior to 2018, has been a valuable platform from where further discussions can be had. One of the chief and longer-term interventions, which is underlined as a good example of the nexus is the CCR project. CCR was driven by the Humanitarian Aid section and aimed to increase resilience through the promotion and support for improved infrastructure. The effort came to encompass a variety of projects and interventions, and over time engaged multiple partner options (Universities, CSOs, training schools, local government etc), and was picked up and rolled out by other actors, including UN Habitat and UNDP. However, its success as a 'nexus' project is challenged by some respondents not because of what it has achieved, but because of how it has been understood internally.

On the one hand it appears that CCR has been able to secure considerable legitimacy, relevance, responded to local needs and ultimately has led to increased resilience amongst target populations. Its establishment was not without its challenges, not least exploring how it could be made sustainable, which was seen as needing to address two key elements. First, ensuring that at the institutional level the knowledge transferred could remain and second, ensuring that those trained could market the skill set secured. This example is illustrative of a challenge that was consistently noted by SDC respondents, while having an integrated office is important and valuable, until now the humanitarian and development

departments largely operate with different modalities, priorities, and approaches to achieve results.

Not least financial and administrative systems. This means that while the CCR programme can, for an outsider, be seen as nexus as it came to encompass a wide range of activities which are not traditionally associated with HA, but would be rather considered development, within the embassy it was, at least for some, a humanitarian activity.

This experience points to challenges with the nexus concept, chiefly, how it is understood. Is nexus when activities engage beneficiary groups in a manner that extends beyond immediate emergency care/support into more longer-term development responses aimed to support resilience. Or does nexus mean that both south cooperation and humanitarian aid must be engaged in a comprehensive joint effort with a collective vision and strategy forward. If the latter, then Haiti has not yet experienced this. If the former, then Haiti has some interesting and positive experiences. Ultimately there are challenges which include how efforts such as the CCR transfer its operationalisation from direct action to working with partners, is just one example; as well as how to transform immediate response direct action into more long term institution building, that require addressing. All that said, clearly the new strategy is working towards a more integrated approach that understands SDC staff as a collective resource that should be utilized towards a common goal. This however, this has not yet materialized. Moreover, any joint effort at the embassy could be easily countered in the event of a future catastrophe that led to the sending of an emergency contingent from Bern that bypasses the local embassy as was done following Mathew.

Despite the challenges noted, there is an agreement amongst those interviewed that nexus is an important tool to better deliver support to the Haitian population. Indeed, respondents within and outside SDC in Haiti continually highlighted that irrespective of strategies, policies, and other such documents, the reality in Haiti forced all actors to think in a nexus way. By this they meant that all development activities are sooner or later affected by an emergency. Indeed, recovery efforts from one emergency may very well be affected by a subsequent catastrophic event. This, in an environment which is perennially vulnerable means that regardless of how aid is administered, all effort, development and humanitarian, need to adapt/ articulate to ensure that gains made are not lost at the onset of the next emergency or disaster. However, respondents have also noted that nexus thinking was not only driven by local realities, conditions and experiences, but also a discourse pushed forward by HQ.

Interviewees had different views regarding which thematic areas were the easiest or most complex for introducing nexus thinking, but governance and agriculture were two where most tended to agree that there were clear nexus opportunities that could be activated. A review of documents shows that risk reduction and infrastructure development is the sector that has most often brought together south cooperation and humanitarian aid (see final section). The modality of the integration has varied and has included elements of local governance. What is clear from the review of documents and from discussions with SDC staff is that the link between the two sectors is most often found in efforts to build resilience.

**EQ: To what extent does the SDC link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation in response to local contexts? (context and partner strategies)**

SDC takes considerable steps to ensure that the support they provide is contextually relevant and that coordination is prioritized. In Haiti in particular the Swiss embassy has played a key role in establishing, funding and promoting the donor coordination group. Their role was consistently commended by other donor bodies and humanitarian and development agencies working in Haiti, with some arguing that the existence of donor coordination itself is due to Swiss engagement. It is also important to note that theoretically there is another coordination mechanism, one that is supposed to be led by the government, but this forum does not really function as a coordination body. All types of respondents, including Swiss and other donor agencies, multilateral organizations, and implementing partners, consistently noted that the current government is investing considerable effort to try to secure a funding modality that would allow them to distribute and allocate all donor aid. This is a position that is clearly not tenable to most, if not all donors.

The coordination efforts made by Switzerland in Haiti should not obscure the fact that most actors work in a largely individualistic manner and that amongst those interviewed there was limited knowledge about what others were doing. While, according to some respondents' members of the donor group, efforts to make the donor group more operational have been made, none agree that these efforts have led to clear and concerted understanding of what each are doing and on how to improve collaboration, coordination and synergies.

Donor group members interviewed noted that the donor coordination group largely functions as a high-level strategic information exchange platform, which has come to include the engagement of key actors, such as OCHA. OCHA's role is to provide information and updates on current contextual conditions. The issue of nexus has been addressed at the donor coordination meeting as a presentation given some time ago. Switzerland has made efforts to use the donor coordination platform as an opportunity to present and discuss nexus experiences. This is reflected in interviews with SDC staff, as well as with participants of the group and a review of minutes and presentations given. However, these efforts have not led to further nexus type engagement or more operational discussions between donors and implementors. Indeed, consistently those interviewed (donor agencies, multilateral, and implementing partners) highlighted that they had limited, if any knowledge, of how other actors, the Swiss among them, tackled nexus questions or operationalised nexus.

Government officials at the central level were unavailable for interview, but government and local counterparts at the regional level whom were interviewed were not aware of the nexus concept at any level. They did not distinguish the support they received from either Switzerland or other donors as being humanitarian or development and were not concerned with issues of articulation. Indeed, their understanding of what constitutes emergency and what constituted development, both in terms of funding opportunities, and as pertains objectives was limited at best. Their principal concern was with the availability for funding and their ability to access resources to support an activity.

However, the fact that the "nexus" terminology is not used by actors in the field, or that other donors have limited knowledge of what or how Switzerland goes about their work, should not be seen as an inability to respond to local contexts. On the contrary, interviews with partners universities, civil society, local government, and international NGOs all noted that Switzerland was well equipped to respond to contextual needs. They also highlighted, as

did some SDC staff, that their ability to make long term commitments was of central importance to responding to needs within the Haitian environment.

The fragility experienced in Haiti is underscored by both documentation (Strategy, projects documents) and interviews alike. To this there appears to be a strong sense amongst respondents, within and outside SDC, that articulating the humanitarian and development work is central to reducing fragility. However, some respondents also note that articulating the two modalities should not be understood as a fundamentally different way of providing either form of aid. Therefore, some respondents highlighted, the challenges that have been faced in ensuring durable development in Haiti will not be 'magically' done away with by a nexus approach.

Still ensuring that there is a clear articulation is contextually very relevant for a number of reasons: First such an approach is more organically tied to the reality faced by the country as a whole. By this it is understood that Haiti is a very fragile environment that is under constant threat. In turn this means that ensuring that the fragility is addressed on a continuous basis, is a key element for all development cooperation. Addressing fragility is seen as a foundational element. Second, disarticulating development activities from humanitarian efforts means that when a crisis does strike, development efforts suffer considerably. Some respondents stated that nexus was a way to ensure that development efforts were not derailed at the onset of the crisis, but rather had a built-in emergency response element. Thirdly, disarticulating humanitarian aid from development interventions can seriously threaten the sustainability of humanitarian activities.

**EQ: To what extent is the SDC's institutional environment conducive to ensuring humanitarian-development linkages?**

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments relevant to meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?**

The current Dispatch is seen as providing adequate general guidance and facilitating room for working with different approaches and modalities and more specifically to focus on nexus and resilience building. However, all respondents stressed a fundamental challenge with the implementation of the nexus approach. Mainly rooted in administrative and financial mechanisms. Specifically, until now two central factors a) institutional culture and b) financial and administrative mechanism have been a barrier to nexus activities (meaning collaborative and well-articulated Development cooperation and humanitarian aid activities). As the embassy moves forward to implement the current strategy, respondents from SDC stressed, for example, that when nexus activities are planned (under the current strategy) the timelines required by South Cooperation is such that HA needs to start with activities without a clear confirmation that in fact it will be possible to hand over their efforts to SC. In short, the mechanism to ensure an efficient articulation are currently absent.

Indeed, amongst SDC respondents there is a consistent view that funding mechanisms are not nexus friendly. There is no way to do financial planning that is nexus. It was highlighted that in Haiti, projects which are to be implemented under the new strategy, and which at the operational level are considered nexus, are fully independent of one another at the financial level. They have different budgets and reporting lines are completely different.

In terms of planning, conceptualizing, and reporting, the mechanisms are also fundamentally different. This means that the nexus takes place operationally when a project is conceptualized, but that each team needs to develop a proposal, and secure funding independently. For projects which are under the current strategy (2018-2021), where nexus is expressly mentioned, some activities have been initiated by the humanitarian aid wing without the security that the projects will be approved on the development side. This demonstrates a clear gap in how the system works.

Indeed, a review of annual reports and project documents also reveals that even in projects where the “nexus opportunity” is highlighted, the project itself, the titles, descriptions, justification, etc. are fully separate. Indeed, a review of the documentation of activities would not allow for an easy identification of what is or is not a nexus project.

There is a clear understanding within the office in Haiti that if nexus is to be fully implemented the facilitating factors must be made available by HQ, otherwise there are consistent and pervasive disincentives and then the emphasis falls back on the willingness and ability of individuals to work together towards pursuing a common approach. Specifically, the mechanism to report (financial and narrative) were stressed. It was also noted that at HQ the set-up is not nexus oriented. How to resolve this is an open-ended question with multiple views varying from a full overhaul to a third approach that would facilitate joint efforts. Moreover, there is also a noted need to change the culture within the SDC itself in order to be able to effectively implement such a joint approach. This would require mechanism to support a consistent approach or to value the nexus experience as an asset in hiring processes. A chief risk noted was that it appeared as if the requirements for Humanitarian Aid (reporting) were becoming more cumbersome and increasingly emulating the demands made of development projects.

At the implementation level, a key example of nexus type programming has been the previously mentioned CCR project. Aside from this, other examples that mention engagement at some level or opportunities for linking include: Infrastructure development (annual report 2013) where an effort by south cooperation included water and sanitation and building of schools. The Infrastructure development and risk reduction component of the 2014 annual report highlights the same elements. As pertained to risk reduction both annual reports highlight the need to identify opportunity to engage with humanitarian aid in the future to identify ways to ensure support to masons as part of the reconstruction effort. The annual report goes on to highlight the need to identify opportunities for humanitarian and development cooperation in the future and specifically highlight the need to identify ways to continue and support the progress made by the risk reduction activities conducted within the humanitarian aid domain.

The 2014 annual report also shows that projects in governance and food security included both development cooperation and humanitarian aid interventions. However, how these activities were articulated with each other is hard to establish from the narrative. Similarly, while risk reduction and reconstruction were understood as a humanitarian aid effort, there was one project as part of that domain that was funded and run by development cooperation. Although the level of integration is hard to establish. The 2015-2016 report follows suit, with one notable exception: in the 2016 annual report the need to make risk reduction a cross cutting issue rather than a single domain is highlighted.

It is also important to note that Helvetas, a principal partner for Swiss cooperation in Haiti, mentioned as the implementing partner for multiple projects throughout the period under

review, is new to the nexus concept themselves. Helvetas is traditionally a development cooperation agency, however more recently they have realized that they need to be able to respond to the threat of catastrophe. Helvetas understands that in the Haitian environment being able to articulate their development cooperation efforts with humanitarian aid, and building resilience locally, are important elements to safeguarding the efforts they have undertaken.

What the review of documents underscores is that projects which are noted as pursuing a “nexus” approach can also be understood as projects that are underpinned by resilience building. This means that in the documents it is hard to determine if any engagement between humanitarian and development took place, and interviews show that engagement between humanitarian and development efforts has varied considerably and been very dependent on individual efforts. However, projects are increasingly ensuring that a resilience building element, irrespective of where the funding is coming from, is embedded into interventions of all kinds.

Others:

Partners on SDC performance in the nexus: All partners noted that projects, which Switzerland showcases as Nexus, which took place during the time under evaluation have been highly successful. All respondents except 2 noted that they had insufficient knowledge to compare, with most highlighting that they did not know if SDC did nexus, how they understood nexus or if SDC supported nexus.

### Summary Rating By Evaluation Criteria

Assessment Criteria	Rating (High, Medium, Low)	Rationale
Relevance	<b>High</b>	SDC has maintained a clear line of support since 2011. The principal focus has been on reconstruction and resilience building; food security/agriculture and good governance. These elements are highly relevant to the Haitian context. While some respondents feel that the governance structures are so weak that any efforts are futile, the approaches, as documented by SDC, show that there are some opportunities, however limited, for engagement. Most recently, the resilience building effort has been removed and a focus on a more transversal approach (nexus) which is better focused on fragility and constant vulnerability has been adopted (2018-2021) strategy. This is understood as resulting from clear lessons learned and as a solid step forward to increase relevance.
Effectiveness	<b>Medium</b>	There is a clear link between the 2013-2016 dispatch, where the aftermaths of the quake and the general fragility of the country are highlighted, and the support that has been given to Haiti. The support to Haiti was shifted, we are told via interview, in the aftermaths of the earthquake. The Swiss government committed supplementary funds to respond to the catastrophe and in the aftermaths the strategy was shifted towards more reconstruction and resilience building. This focus was again reignited in the aftermaths of hurricane Mathew. Since 2013 there has been a clear shift towards an ever increased effort to articulate humanitarian and development aid, but efforts to do so in practice have been few. It appears that

		programmes that have been able to bridge the divide have been highly effective in doing so, but this has not always been backed by a solid internal articulation and hence it is possible that opportunities have not been maximised.
Efficiency	<b>Medium/low</b>	<p>The office in Haiti is integrated, with all regional offices following suit. There is new leadership which is focused on developing an internal institutional culture that focuses more strongly on working collectively towards the reduction of fragility.</p> <p>However, despite Switzerland's best efforts to support coordination with other donors little practical results are visible. Most donors work independently of each other. Moreover, working with the government agencies is an extremely slow process owing primarily to factors that are out of Swiss control (extremely weak structures). This all results in a medium to low level of efficiency. However, this should be understood in context: there are no indications that a different approach would yield improved results.</p>
Sustainability	<b>Medium</b>	<p>The support provided as part of CCR and PURPOSE, which focused on safe construction and on a comprehensive approach to post hurricane recovery are two examples of how support can be provided in a manner that is able to ensure a strengthening of a fragile environment so that it is better able to respond to the next crisis. In Haiti it is clear that not providing support in a manner that aims to reduce fragility will lead to a never ending cycle of humanitarian interventions. In this way the shift is towards providing support that is able to address fragility as a way to address development; and secure progress made. However, this integrative approach is not yet applied across all projects and programmes.</p> <p>There are different views regarding which thematic areas are more or less adept to nexus, but all agree that government partners are essential, but require a considerable investment.</p>

## Haiti mission programme

Specifically, in Haiti:

13 in depth interviews (3 of which had two participants) with SDC staff, NGOs, other donors and international organizations and government officials; 2 focus group with SDC staff focusing from development cooperation and humanitarian aid focusing on programmatic experience; 2 Focus group with implementing partners, one in Jacmel; and one focus group with members of the Majors office in Jacmel. In total 39 people were met with and included in discussions or interviews. Additional interviews were conducted to support the data collection in Haiti. These interviews included staff based in Bern (desk officers), as well as former staff from the embassy in Haiti.

## Areas for improvement

- SDC instruments (financing and HR) to be more aligned and integrated
- Guidelines and training needed




## Pakistan Case study

This case study is one of six country case studies - four field-based and two desk-based - designed to explore the extent to which SDC's operational instruments (strategies, programs, and partnerships) and institutional processes (working procedures, funding credits, and organizational set-up) facilitate or hinder SDC's work along the humanitarian-development nexus.

### Context

Switzerland governmental engagement in Pakistan dates back to 1966. Recognizing that Pakistan is no longer amongst the poorest nations in the world, a decision was made in 2008 to remove Pakistan from the SDC south cooperation priority country list and start a slow process of disengagement. This decision was followed by a subsequent decision to develop a Hindu-Kush Programme, which would focus on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and have a 2015-2018 lifespan. The 2012-2016 Swiss Cooperation for Pakistan Strategic document reflects the decision to develop a Hindu-Kush programme. However, this decision was rescinded in 2014 following an amendment to the 2015-2016 strategic plan which called for the separation of efforts conducted in Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the time it was argued that the two countries pursued unique goals and had different developmental, security related, and political realities and objectives. The decision to separate the programmes and reassign them back to a country effort gave way for the development of a Pakistan Strategy for the 2017-2019 time period. In May 2017 a decision to more rapidly phase out the programme in Pakistan was confirmed. This decision called for an end of operational activities by the end of 2019.

The above decisions were taken against the backdrop of a 2013-2016 Dispatch that acknowledges that Pakistan is very vulnerable to conflict, is a country where women's rights are threatened, and access to education and health care are not enjoyed by all. Interviews with numerous staff at SDC in Bern and Pakistan recounted different perspectives regarding the reasons for the close down of the Hindu-Kush Programme and phase out from Pakistan. While reason given vary somewhat, all agree that the decision was political and tied to the reduction of priority countries pushed within Switzerland. How the eminent exit would affect efforts to focus on resilience building, through the nexus, in the regions of focus were not considered.





The current programme in Pakistan focuses on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which are amongst the most underdeveloped and account for about 30% of Overseas Development Cooperation to Pakistan. The 2012-2014 concept note identified Rural Livelihood, Good Governance and Human Rights as the focus thematic areas. During the 2015-2016 time period, the programme was refocused on water as a vector for governance issues. The current strategy continues this later focus with activities in two domains:

**Domain 1: To contribute to improve the livelihoods and resilience of population in KP and FATA living below the international poverty line, especially in crises affected districts.**

**Outcome 1:** Target population improves its management of resources and increases agricultural production through citizen's participation and non-violent dispute settlement.

**Outcome 2:** Sub-national and local governments in selected cluster areas utilize their enhanced capacity to establish policies that ensure inclusive and accountable resource management with a focus on water.

**Domain 2: To promote local governance and conflict resolution at local level and protect human rights of vulnerable groups.**

**Outcome 1:** The government protects vulnerable people, especially refugees and IDPs, with a functioning justice system and a durable solution strategy.

The total budget for Pakistan for the Strategic period is of 37 200 000 CHF, of which 12 million CHF correspond to humanitarian assistance.

## **Results**

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's policies and strategies coherent and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages? (focus on targeted population)**

**EQ: How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments in contexts where it is implementing both types of instruments?**

In Pakistan there is a clear strategic and policy level coherence that promoted humanitarian and development linkages. The 2012-2014 concept note already noted the value of the integration of humanitarian and development domains. However, interviews reveal that a main challenge in the development of the strategy was the lack of a common understanding of how to approach support to beneficiaries shared by both the humanitarian and development staff.

In 2016 a decision was made to develop a joint Humanitarian-Development strategy (2017-2019). The strategy was developed by both south cooperation and humanitarian aid, but does not make explicit mention of nexus but rather the concept is implicit. The strategy does make clear that the combined use of the different instruments as a way to support the most vulnerable and build resilience will be a core element of Switzerland's intervention modality. The document was, and is, regarded as a considerable step forward towards integrated thinking and implementation.

Despite the strategic level progress, however, a review of the annual report for 2017 illustrates the challenges that SDC faces when integrating humanitarian and development efforts. Indeed, the report shows that efforts are delinked at the financial and reporting level. This is visible in the project list which separates south cooperation from humanitarian

projects, as well as in the example success stories annexed to the report. The latter do not showcase any example of joint humanitarian and development work. To the contrary they list each effort as independent of each other.

This suggests, and interviews confirm, that the implementation of the strategy has not been as united as the document might lead us to expect. This is due to a number of reasons: First, Pakistan has not experienced a natural catastrophe during the strategic time period, therefore the opportunities to truly test SDCs ability to operationalise nexus have been limited. Work with refugees, which is also a humanitarian aid priority, has traditionally been separate and as the exit of the country nears, humanitarian aid and development cooperation have not fundamentally shifted their previous approaches to work. Second, the efforts to work along a nexus approach have been very limited since humanitarian funding is less than development funding, and given the imminent departure from the country, SDC has focused on developing capacity, and on supporting linkages between Pakistani bodies and international, including Swiss, knowledge centres. Essentially relationships that already existed between south cooperation on the one hand and humanitarian assistance on the other have continued and even developed in preparation for the exit. Rather than identifying and fostering the development of more joint humanitarian aid and development cooperation relationships. Third, some have posed that the limited time left in the country has hampered the ability to more effectively identify opportunities for joint and longer-term planning.

Specifically, the SDC has focused on a series of partnerships both historically and as they prepare to exit the country. The 2017 annual report specifically highlights the following:

As part of the water management domain, SDC has engaged and partnered with multiple government offices including funding posts and supporting capacity development. Specifically, SDC has supported the Disaster Management Support Authority of FATA (FDMA), the Pakistan Red Cross Society, the National Institute for Disaster Management, as well as with the University of Peshawar. SDC has also partnered with multilateral organizations, specifically with the World Food Programme (WFP). SDC's in kind and core contribution are, according to the 2017 SDC annual report, credited with integrating DRR into the WFP's Pakistan Strategic plan 2018-2022.

As part of the governance -local state building efforts, SDC has seconded staff to both UNHCR and UN Women in an effort to ensure that both women and refugees/IDP are better protected. SDC has also conducted a series of events aiming to support local government entities or Community Based Organizations. The SDC annual report highlights that the Swiss support for the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum, an entity that provides support to International NGOs, will likely be filled by other donors, such as DFID, BMZ or the EU. Another collaboration worth noting is for a collaboration with UNESCO, which aims to support the cultural heritage of the Kalash group, an ethnic minority.

In addition, SDC plans to join Australia, Norway and Belgium in supporting the establishment of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Natural Disaster Risk Management Fund. The establishment of the fund was expected for 2017, but was delayed to 2018. While the fund has been established, it is unclear from the documents available for 2018 if Switzerland has been involved. Interviews conducted suggest not. Switzerland has also been the co-chair of the World Bank Coordinated Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), through this engagement Switzerland has been able to support the use of a result based monitoring system. The annual report (2017) suggests that Switzerland intend to be an active member of the coordination meetings until 2019, but not thereafter.

In sum at a very fundamental level the current strategy was expected to promote sustainability through a common understanding of beneficiary needs, or better put a cohesive view of how needs should be addressed. In reality this has meant that efforts from the humanitarian side have focused on bringing attention to marginalised groups, such as refugees, as important beneficiaries of the efforts that SDC is generally focused on and in developing opportunities for resilience building.

Overall the principal Swiss focus has been, and is expected to continue, supporting the government to promote legislation, transferring knowledge to local counterparts, enabling upscaling through multilateral partners (shorter term engagement) and in so doing ensuring that vulnerable groups which would normally be the focus of humanitarian intervention are adequately integrated into wider efforts, as well as pursuing the consolidation of knowledge, and skills. The objective as the close down continues is to enable multilateral agencies supported by SDC to upscale their on engagement, and strengthen internal capacity through secondments. This includes, for example the work of WFP and UNHCR for whom the engagement is secured through 2018. These efforts pursue an overarching resilience building and/or the development of longer lasting structures and mechanism underlining objective. These objectives are clearly exemplified by the most recent annual report off activities (2017) and confirmed through interviews.

**EQ: To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?**

Discussions with SDC staff in both Pakistan and Bern suggest that strengthening resilience of beneficiaries, and supporting development, requires a nexus based approach. All those interviewed agree that for the SDC the core focus have always been and will continue to be on beneficiaries. Some highlighted that thinking long term -what comes after- is a relatively new (less than 10 years) way of thinking for SDC.

However, they also highlight that the Pakistan experience has showed that how beneficiaries are seen and their needs understood vary greatly depending on which lens is used (development or humanitarian). Specifically, respondents noted that south cooperation and the humanitarian aid section staff have different views regarding multiple issues. For example: the degrees of engagement with beneficiaries which is necessary to successfully deliver support; the relative efficiency of investing more/less time in the development of programmes; the relative value of providing support through local partners vs directly; the relative value of investing in planning and development of efforts vs providing support more quickly; the degree of threat that staff can be subjected to when engaged in interventions. Ultimately, all these issues lean to a core difference of perspective: what type of support is most useful to beneficiaries and when?

Discussions with SDC staff suggest that while there is an understanding that nexus is a good way forward, what nexus means for each department, and how it should materialise vis-à-vis beneficiary groups is not yet defined in the same way by all. Still, the variance of views has not affected implementation of the current strategy since efforts to consolidate efforts, and enable partners to upscale engagement ahead of Swiss departure from Pakistan has promoted parallel HA and South Cooperation engagement. Specifically, the support provided by SDC has helped to integrate Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) into the way WFP operates generally in Pakistan. In this way, Switzerland deserves credit for

support which is well aligned with its own strategy and which addresses resilience issues, which many respondents in this assignment generally, consider a key element of the nexus discussion.

Some interviews highlighted that an example of the historical failure of coordination in Pakistan is illustrated by the support provided to refugees/IDP in earlier efforts prior to the Hindu-Kush programme. Some respondents noted that one of the goals of the Hindu-Kush programme was to be able to better address the needs of refugees in a more holistic way, but none of these efforts materialised as the programme was cancelled before it got started. Refugees have consistently been supported through humanitarian activities and treated as a humanitarian concern, which according to some interview respondents exemplifies a lack of vision which has transformed an acute crisis into a protracted one. A more holistic view that had aimed to respond to refugee needs in a way that was not only short, but also longer term (south cooperation) would have been able to address, or at least attempt to address, the enduring challenges that refugees face, including general marginalization, lack of development opportunities, etc. The support provided to UNHCR is reported by SDC (annual report 2017) as a considerable contribution to the protection of refugees and IDP and the safeguarding of their rights. The documents reviewed suggest that the support does not focus on resilience building specifically.

This example makes a salient argument for the importance of nexus type activities which not only addressed the immediate needs of beneficiary groups, such as refugees, but which also look into the more complex and long term needs, which can only be effectively addressed through development efforts. Currently, the needs of refugees are highlighted as an important beneficiary group for the broader governance strengthening effort that SDC is engaged in. This translates into ensuring that refugees are taken into account as a minority group in SDC engagement. Supporting their rights and access to justice has been the focus of the UNHCR activities supported by SDC.

Some interview respondents highlighted that although the current strategy for Pakistan clearly promoted a coherent approach to link humanitarian and development linkages, this should not be understood as meaning that SDC staff now have a common understanding of beneficiary needs, or of how to address these cohesively. Ensuring that the humanitarian aid and south cooperation approaches are aligned as the programme moves closer to closing down requires continues dialogue between both branches (humanitarian and development). Currently the water governance effort is led by a staff member with a humanitarian background, although most of the funding and activities under the thematic area are categorized as development cooperation. Mixing staff in this way is important, most interviewees agreed, and a step forward towards an improved understanding of both humanitarian and south cooperation by all staff, regardless of background, but having both views represented also means more discussions are required during planning and implementation of every activity because, as exemplified earlier, the views are so divergent. However, according to others the inclusion of humanitarian staff in development efforts or vice versa is one step, which while important, cannot be seen as a solution to ensuring that nexus can happen, or that staff from either south cooperation or humanitarian assistance gain a solid understanding of, and respect for, how the other department carries out their work. Ultimately, a key factor, given the lack of a truly conducive environment, falls back on the willingness of the staff themselves.

All current interventions focus on strengthening local governance, and local capacity development, this is true of both the local governance and water governance efforts. The link to humanitarian interventions is materialised in how the needs of refugees are highlighted as part of water governance efforts. This means that while on the one hand SDC works at the overarching policy level, supporting government efforts to develop policies and strategies, they also aim to ensure that refugees are not left behind. Essentially that policies and plans developed take into account the presence and needs of the most vulnerable, which in this particular case are primarily the refugees. This is how the nexus has materialised in the programme most recently. A review of the recent annual reports demonstrates the imminent exit as most projects and programmes, both humanitarian and development, have been for a couple of years focused on closure, documentation and the transfer of knowledge based on the experiences had. Both South Cooperation and Humanitarian assistance are engaged as part of each domain, but as individual efforts within each domain.

**EQ: To what extent does the SDC link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation in response to local contexts? (context and partner strategies)**

In Pakistan today there are few natural catastrophe borne humanitarian needs, this is reflected in the budget contributions, that SDC is focused on. Pakistan has not had a crisis in recent years and as a middle income country they are less interested in direct support, rather their focus is on the acquisition of knowledge.

According to SDC staff, in Pakistan the main focus for SDC has been promoting SDG 16 rather than nexus specifically. This is clearly highlighted in the Strategic document (2017-2019) Indeed, some argue that given the focus of the programme and the local context nexus is less relevant. This does not mean that the concept should not be reflected at the strategic level, but rather that operational opportunities for nexus are few.

There have been some attempts to support nexus oriented efforts, such as an initiative by the Asian Development Bank which according to one respondent was going to develop a nexus oriented programme, but the effort did not materialise and the respondent did not have many details beyond knowing that the intention had been there.

**EQ: To what extent is the SDC's institutional environment conducive to ensuring humanitarian-development linkages?**

The current SDC institutional environment broadly speaking, not specifically in Pakistan, is not systematically supportive of the nexus approach. However, some staff interviewed noted that the Agenda 2030, as well as WOGA have played a very important role in promoting nexus thinking within the SDC generally and that by extension this has impacted the way nexus has been understood in Pakistan. These two efforts have respectively put forth a longer term and holistic approach to working, which was a very important step forward for SDC generally and specifically in relation to developing their own nexus thinking. In short, these two efforts, WOGA and the SDGs, have allowed SDC staff to think beyond what they do as part of their respective departments, but rather expand into exploring what it is that their efforts should achieve long term and also what other instruments may be available to them when pursuing longer term goals and objectives. The above mentioned,

is an interesting assessment of the role played by WOGA and the Agenda 2030, but remains the views of a limited group of individuals.

Despite progress made towards more nexus oriented thinking, there is still a need for more communication and engagement between both humanitarian and South Cooperation staff in Bern, and locally at the embassies and between Bern and the embassies. The understandings of how to get from “a” to “b” is not the same for humanitarian and development cooperation staff. Moreover, the financial and reporting mechanism used by SDC do not promote nexus in any way.

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC’s humanitarian and development instruments relevant to meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?** *Instruments = strategies, credits, programs, partnerships, implementation modalities, and thematic networks*

In Pakistan the strategy for the most recent time period (2017-2019) is nexus conducive in so far as it calls for a nexus approach. However, the programmes under implementation are very focused on the imminent closure of the development cooperation engagement and hence focus primarily on transferring capacity to the government, as well as on documenting and closing activities, not on how humanitarian and development SDC activities can be linked to each other and what such a link may mean in the future. The humanitarian effort is also chiefly focused on a roll back of SDC activities, supporting upscaling of work by partners in the short term, documentation and closure of efforts. To the degree that there is a nexus thinking is in ensuring that the most vulnerable, primarily refugees, are not overlooked by development cooperation initiatives.

Specifically, in water governance, where the majority of the humanitarian engagement is expected, has focused on supporting coordination, M&E and knowledge transfer; these efforts are quite similar to those of south cooperation under the same domain. Although in a more limited scale, the same can be said of the local governance domain.

It is also worth highlighting that according to SDC staff, at this time SDC in Pakistan is not promoting nexus thinking with either the government, their partners, multilateral or bilateral agencies. Simply put, nexus thinking is not the priority concept for Pakistan at the moment for SDC. Interviewees note that perhaps this would have been different if a considerable natural catastrophe had affected the country. Although the Swiss focus has been on FATA and KP, two zones where there is a protracted crisis in relation to the refugees and IDPs, the focus of the intervention as Switzerland prepares to exit has not been directly on these crises specifically and on how to effectively respond to the long-term impacts related to the crisis. Indirectly by focusing on SDG 16, and ensuring that refugees and IDP concerns are included in government efforts to provide goods and services to the population, it can be argued that Switzerland is forward looking and supporting nexus thinking in the provisions of aid. Similarly, Swiss efforts to support multilateral work can also be thought of as nexus inspired in so far as interventions are focused more on resilience building (WFP). Therefore, while in its own activities nexus has not been highlighted, and SDC notes that nexus is not something they are deliberately focused on particularly because given the phase out Switzerland has other priorities, some of SDC funding has gone to interventions that are more nexus oriented.

## Summary rating By Evaluation Criteria

Assessment Criteria	Rating (High, Medium, Low)	Rationale
Relevance	<b>Low/high</b>	<p>SDC decided to exit Pakistan rapidly in May 2017. The exit plan shifted the course of work almost exclusively towards capacity development. This has meant that the opportunities to engage both humanitarian and development opportunities have been limited.</p> <p>However, an argument can be made for the value of nexus in relation to vulnerable groups such as refugees and IDPs in KP and FATA. To these populations specifically nexus thinking can be an issue of keen importance. Therefore the relevance of nexus may not be high for Swiss cooperation in its phase out, but is to some of its beneficiary groups.</p>
Effectiveness	<b>Medium</b>	<p>The 2013-2016 dispatch make clear mention of areas of concern in Pakistan, the most recent strategic documents highlight that the geographical area of focus for SDC, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), are more fragile and vulnerable than the rest of Pakistan. Therefore, an argument can be made for the need to continue working on resilience building as a foundation for development cooperation. However, in view of the imminent departure of SDC from Pakistan the focus has been on handover rather than on examining how to strengthen local resilience or on how to move from resilience into more long-term development efforts.</p>
Efficiency	<b>Medium/low</b>	<p>The Swiss engagement in Pakistan has been strained by the flip-flopping decisions made in relation to the programme. First the decision to depart, following the development and prompt dissolution of the Hindu-Kush Programme and subsequent decision to exit Pakistan. These decisions have made long term planning difficult as plans to exit were replaced by plans to stay, which were in turn quickly shifted to new exit plans. Indeed, given the decision to exit, and the fact that the exit plan places its emphasis on transferring capacity to the government, with no clear nexus focus, it is unclear why the strategy was focused so consistently on nexus.</p> <p>Although the nexus concept has been alluded to in earlier documents, only the most recent strategy makes a more clear argument for integration, while still not calling it nexus. During the most recent strategic period the decision to focus on capacity development has limited the number of areas where humanitarian intervention could play a role. Therefore, the opportunities to explore the use of nexus thinking have been few.</p>
Sustainability	<b>Medium</b>	<p>The efforts conducted in water governance, including efforts to ensure that the needs of refugees are also included in policy, legislation and highlighted to government partners, appear to have a solid potential for becoming sustainable in the long term.</p>

**Areas for improvement**

- Investment in securing a common understanding of what each party does
- Financial and reporting structures are not conducive




## South Sudan Case study

This case study is one of six country case studies - four field-based and two desk-based - designed to explore the extent to which SDC's operational instruments (strategies, programs, and partnerships) and institutional processes (working procedures, funding credits, and organizational set-up) facilitate or hinder SDC's work along the humanitarian-development nexus.

### Context

SDC support to South Sudan dates back to 1994. When it became apparent that South Sudan would become an independent country, Switzerland became a strong supporter of the South Sudan government and had the full intention to support the development of the nation at its time of independence. Upon South Sudan's independence the country was a post conflict fragile environment and a new country that required considerable international support. With this in mind Switzerland focused its attention on expanding its efforts in South Sudan by expanding the operations office that was established in 2006 into a Development Cooperation office which was tasked to take on a wide range of activities in an effort to support the new nation both at the governance level as well as other aspects of supporting state building and post-conflict reconstruction, but this effort was short-lived. The office was shut down two years later, in 2013, when working with the South Sudanese government became no longer tenable given their position and role of the government in relation to the renewed armed conflict, which continues to date.



Switzerland's closure of the Development Cooperation office was a recognition that engaging with the country's government as a development partner was not possible. However, the efforts to support the South Sudanese people did not halt. SDC then shifted its focus back to humanitarian aid at the exclusion of Development Cooperation.

The 2013-2016 Strategy for South Sudan highlights a Whole of Government Approach (WOGA) with an aim to support the needs of the South Sudanese population, particularly the most vulnerable. The strategy recognizes the absence of development cooperation but highlights the roles that SDC Humanitarian Aid and other Swiss agencies can play as efforts are made to support the South Sudanese to achieve peace and gain resilience. The strategy stresses the role that humanitarian interventions will play in *"strengthening the resilience [of the South Sudanese population] to conflict and displacement."* The 2017-2020 Strategy for South Sudan highlights that the main Swiss effort in South Sudan remains humanitarian, but that these efforts are complemented by human security and development interventions. Specifically it notes that while the channeling of development funds through the government was halted in 2013, the support for development initiatives and supply of technical support have not been stopped. Current engagement in South Sudan is well aligned with the 2013-2017 Federal dispatch which highlights the vulnerability of South Sudan and highlights the importance of the linkages between humanitarian aid and peace support.

## Results

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's policies and strategies coherent and do they promote humanitarian-development linkages? (focus on targeted population)**

**EQ: How coherent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments in contexts where it is implementing both types of instruments?**

In South Sudan, Switzerland is only implementing humanitarian interventions at this time. Still there are some relevant nuances worth exploring here.

The South Sudan case is somewhat particular as pertains to nexus. While, for Switzerland, humanitarian aid is a humanitarian imperative and largely delinked from contextual issues such as local politics in pursuit of lifesaving measures, South Cooperation requires a trust worthy partner on the ground that will serve as an anchor for development efforts and can serve as a way by which the sustainability of the engagement can be secured. This pre-requisite aiming to facilitate long term development was tied to Switzerland ability to trust and collaborate with the South Sudanese government. Given this, the opportunity for the implementation of a humanitarian and development nexus in South Sudan does not exist because engagement with the South Sudanese government, at this time, is considered impossible for Switzerland given the role played by the current government in the current armed conflict.

However, a review of the strategies for South Sudan, while not making specific reference to nexus, does have a clear "nexus type" approach. On the one hand, discussions with field staff reveal that if nexus is defined as linkages between humanitarian and development activities, then there is no nexus in South Sudan. On the other hand, if nexus is understood far more broadly as identifying opportunities to build resilience which might later facilitate and serve to strengthen efforts to support development, then current humanitarian efforts in South Sudan are better aligned with nexus. Indeed, they could even be seen to be nexus.

Moreover, peace support work is ongoing in South Sudan, this type of work is supported with the view that it will over time enable a transition to peace, which in turn will open opportunities for the re-start of development efforts. This is another form of nexus, although not one covered by this assignment. Still it serves to highlight that nexus can have different modalities and that each modality needs to be catered to the specific context. The link between peace support and humanitarian aid was highlighted in the 2013-2016 Federal Dispatch.

Given the aforementioned, the short answer to the overall question is that SDC is not implementing hum-dev nexus in South Sudan, while the longer answer is that the SDC specifically, and Switzerland more broadly, are taking steps to safeguard their interventions in that hope that these leave a longer lasting impact, specifically that they are not only life-saving, but also build resilience. In this way current engagement in South Sudan can be understood as nexus oriented.

**EQ: To what extent do humanitarian-development linkages help SDC to support sustainable development and strengthen the resilience of communities in countries affected by protracted crises?**

The current SDC strategy for South Sudan focuses considerable attention on resilience building. Specifically, the strategy recognizes that from an SDC perspective the volatility of

the environment does not allow development cooperation type interventions. Within this context the SDC effort in South Sudan focuses on, aside from direct aid to mitigate immediate challenges, the development of projects which intend to, with time, allow beneficiaries to better respond to their own challenges. In practical terms this means, for example, not only enabling the provision of safe water, but working with beneficiaries to ensure an improved understanding of water and sanitation (public health issues). Another example is support to food security, which has not ended with the provision of food aid, but has come to include the development of irrigation systems that could in turn enable improved crop yields. Key partners in these efforts have included the ICRC, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, MEDAIR. The strategy also makes mention of the engagement of local actors, such as churches, as entities that can support efforts to build resilience.

Specifically, the current engagement in South Sudan focuses on:

- 1) the protection of civilians, with special attention given to the prevention of Gender Based Violence,
- 2) support to food security and livelihoods towards strengthening the resilience of producers and those most in need,
- 3) the fostering of spaces for dialogue and common action for peace, as well as initiatives towards truth, justice and reconciliation, with priority on supporting church action and customary authorities' non-violent conflict transformation and mediation roles.

Specifically, in relation to the work on peace support, the engagement is a joint effort between SDC and the Human Security Division (HSD).

A longer term area of support of Swiss engagement has been WASH activities, as these have been perceived as ones where longer lasting results can be expected/secured. Through its support of ICRC and WFP, Switzerland has also engaged in efforts to promote food security/food resilience. Indeed, ICRC and WFP, as well as other actors, have implemented multiple projects in South Sudan. Essentially, according to both documents and interviews, while in South Sudan the SDC does not implement nexus they do focus attention on building resilience through their own work and support other actors who are also focused on resilience building.

In sum, even though in South Sudan there is no humanitarian-development nexus because there are no development cooperation activities undertaken at this time, strengthening resilience where possible has been a core element of intervention efforts.

**EQ: To what extent does the SDC link its humanitarian aid and development cooperation in response to local contexts? (context and partner strategies)**

In South Sudan, the strategy documents and discussions with relevant staff shows that SDC has invested considerable energy on ensuring that their support to the country is context specific. In fact, the halting of development cooperation in 2013 was a context driven decision, as has been SDC's focus on resilience building as a key pillar of intervention in South Sudan. Indeed, the focus on resilience building in South Sudan is a direct response to the recognition that working with the government is not a viable option at this time.

The SDC recognizes that an additional important challenge in South Sudan is countering the culture of dependency that exists given the long-term conflict and experience of direct aid that the population have become accustomed too. This means that finding opportunities

to build resilience is both important and at times not so straight forward. Specifically interviewees spoke of the challenges that can be encountered when support for communities is politicized by the warring factions; or where communities lack the cultural or personal support required to further engage in an activity -i.e., make it sustainable.

Overall in South Sudan the current engagement is focusing on building a platform for development. Working with local actors to support peace (churches, youth groups) and with local communities to identify opportunities to build resilience. Doing the latter can be difficult and contentious and there are clear dangers that SDC efforts are seen as partisan or are used (or abused) by factions involved in the conflict. SDCs work with governors and bishops has had to be dialled back because it became politicised and embroiled in the conflict, this is a continued threat to any intervention in a context as is the one in South Sudan.

SDC invests considerably on understanding and adapting to local contexts. SDC has a comparatively large office and does a lot of direct-action work. In South Sudan the office counts with 6 international staff and 16-17 national staff, which allows them to go into the field and collect data themselves. This provides Switzerland an advantage over other countries that may have more funds but have limited staff and therefore are reliant on the efforts of the implementers they support. It is fair to say that for Switzerland understanding the context is a central component for the way support is provided.

**EQ: To what extent is the SDC's institutional environment conducive to ensuring humanitarian-development linkages?**

**EQ: To what extent are the SDC's humanitarian and development instruments relevant to meeting the humanitarian and development needs of the targeted population?** *Instruments = strategies, credits, programs, partnerships, implementation modalities, and thematic networks*

There are two elements to understanding nexus. One is the documentation, such as strategies and policies, another is programming. In South Sudan at a strategic level there is nexus thinking, and this has translated into programming and even partnerships in some limited ways, specifically in strengthening resilience, however it would be incorrect to think of these efforts as full nexus.

According to those interviewed the consensus was that SDC has made progress towards the development of documentation. The need for further theoretical guidance is not so important at this stage, however what it all means in practice requires more attention. Interview respondents felt that this may not only apply to SDC staff, but also to parliamentarians and other non-field staff. The fact that financial and administrative mechanism are not nexus conducive can be rooted in a lack of understanding of what the realities are like on the ground.

Other findings (to be completed when three local staff interviews are completed.):

## Summary rating By Evaluation Criteria

Assessment Criteria	Rating (High, Medium, Low)	Rationale
Relevance	<b>Not determined</b>	SDC does not implement a hum-dev nexus in Sudan because development cooperation is not present. However, their approach is nexus inspired and the focus is on resilience building as a platform from which development cooperation can work in the future.
Effectiveness	<b>Not-determined</b>	Since Development-humanitarian nexus is not applied, this cannot be responded to. On building resilience, a number of challenges were highlighted by respondents: a) Much of the South Sudanese population is aid dependent owing to their previous experience, so resilience building efforts may be unexpected by the beneficiary group  b) Support can get easily entangled in the politics of the conflict.
Efficiency	<b>Not-determined</b>	
Sustainability	<b>Medium</b>	It is very hard to say how effective efforts to build resilience will be. Time will determine this. How much these efforts will serve as a solid platform for development will depend on multiple factors, not least the length of the war.

## Areas for improvement

- There needs to be a clear understanding that not all environments are able to handle long term development efforts. In South Sudan today, development is not an option.

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